The Thaler Decision in India and the Crisis of Anthropocentric Patent Theory: AI, Inventorship and the Future of Innovation Governance

Abstract

The Indian refusal of Stephen Thaler’s DABUS patent application represents more than a routine rejection of artificial intelligence inventorship; it exposes a foundational crisis within anthropocentric patent theory. This commentary examines the Indian Patent Office's decision against the broader transnational DABUS jurisprudence and argues that, while the refusal is doctrinally defensible under the Patents Act, 1970, it is theoretically insufficient for an era in which innovation increasingly emerges from human–machine collaboration. The Controller's reasoning rests on the statutory interdependence of inventorship, legal personality, entitlement, assignment and proof of right. Since DABUS lacks the capacity to own property, execute legal instruments or transfer rights, it cannot qualify as a "true and first inventor" under Indian law. In this respect, the decision aligns with the prevailing approach in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, where courts have similarly confined inventorship to natural persons.

However, this convergence should not be mistaken for conceptual resolution. Across jurisdictions, courts have largely avoided the normative question of whether patent law should recognise AI-generated invention, instead resolving the issue through narrow statutory interpretation. The Indian decision therefore reveals the limits of judicial minimalism in responding to technological disruption. It preserves the coherence of the existing patent framework, but only by reaffirming assumptions that invention is necessarily human, creativity is inseparable from legal personhood, and rights must flow from a human inventor.

The commentary further situates the decision within India’s broader AI policy landscape. India’s developmental strategy actively promotes AI-driven innovation through initiatives. Yet its patent law remains anchored in a human-centred model of inventive activity. This creates a regulatory contradiction between India’s technological ambitions and its intellectual property architecture. The DABUS refusal thus marks a transitional moment in innovation governance: it confirms the current legal impossibility of AI inventorship while simultaneously demonstrating the inadequacy of existing patent categories. The future challenge is not simply whether AI should be named as an inventor, but how patent law should govern invention in such systems.