Virtual Worlds as a New Game Theoretic Model for International Law: The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Authors

  • Peter S Jenkins PhD candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Member of the State Bar of California

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2966/scrip.060109.4

Abstract

Game theoretic analysis of international law has traditionally revolved around the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a model developed during the Cold War that reflects the general unenforceability of international agreements. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are, however, enforceable and require a different approach. The current global economic crisis will exacerbate the controversies concerning the broad powers exercised by the arbitrators appointed under BITs. It is thus imperative to explore a viable new game theoretic model, which can be provided by virtual worlds such as Second Life and World of Warcraft.

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Published

01-Apr-2009

Issue

Section

Research Article