



LEVIATHAN


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EDITOR IN CHIEF

Welcome,

On behalf of the *Leviathan* journal, I am pleased to present to you our second instalment of the academic year. In this issue we discuss border conflicts, rules of international law, attitudes towards identity, the changing nature of sovereignty, and the limitations of diplomacy. In short, we explore the building and breaking of boundaries and conventions.

This is the first-ever issue of *Leviathan* to use a photograph rather than a painting on the front cover. We wanted this decision to emphasise our view of borders not just as abstract concepts or markers of sovereign territory but as starkly real and deeply personal stories of separation, struggle, and resilience. For example, the partition of India, analysed by Nishad Sanzagiri for this issue, must be understood not just in the context of colonial geopolitics, but also as a process that left millions of families displaced, mistreated, and torn apart. Likewise, as Will O'Sullivan points out, in order to meet the challenges of Kenya's broken education system – an invisible border – we must understand the conditions and needs of the pupils as well as the political culture within the country. Throughout our discourse, we must never lose sight of the real people affected by international politics.

Several of the articles herein deal with the issue of building a Europe whole and free. Can this continent truly be united in transcending the borders of sovereignty, nationalism, and culture when so many divisions exist even within nations? In 'Die Mauer im Kopf' contributor David Kelly describes the ghosts that still haunt Germany a quarter of a century after its reunification. The photograph on the front cover of this issue recalls the days leading up to reunification, featuring the Berlin Wall and the Brandenburg Gate in 1989. While the former was for many decades a physical mark of division, the latter has since become a symbol not just of German but of European openness, integration, and peace. In a reflection of the time period, one of the most prominent graffiti on the wall reads, in Russian letters, 'glasnost'.

Contrary to popular belief, however, the fall of the Berlin Wall was not an inevitability, according to Mary Elise Sarotte's recent book *The Collapse*. With much uncertainty and a still-powerful East German state, the fall of the wall was "accidental and contingent" in the way it came about. The Brandenburg Gate, located in no-man's-land between east and west Berlin for much of the Cold War, was opened again. The fact that such formidable borders can simultaneously be so fragile strikes at the heart of the ambitions and insecurities of our shared humanity.

Continuing the practice we started in *Leviathan's* 'Power' issue, we decided to highlight seven stories as special profile pieces in each region. These analytical items reflect some of the most important global trends of today. Territorial disputes in the East China Sea are heating up, allowing China to flex its military and political muscle and potentially provoking the wrath of the United States. The spread of Ebola in West Africa should alert the international community to the importance of present and future cooperation against natural enemies that do not respect state borders. The war in Ukraine reignites an old debate concerning small states' right to self-determination in the face of geopolitical bullying. Increased ISIS activity in Syria, Iraq, and several other countries demonstrates how unsuitable modern Middle Eastern borders fail to prevent terrorism and sectarian conflict. In the United States, the recent crisis involving unaccompanied Central American children on the border calls attention to the country's broken homeland security system and the failing of the political class to recognise the human implications of bureaucratic rules. Finally, we investigate the tension between national sovereignty and financial markets in a globalising world. We hope that these profiles convey our understanding of borders through a compelling and captivating narrative.

I would like to extend some words of thanks. First, to our readers, whose interest and enthusiasm keep the staff motivated and make me believe in the future of this journal. It is the readers who take the published word and through their feedback turn it into a dialogue, making this endeavour worthy of the scholarly character to which it aspires. Further, we must recognise the work of our contributors as particularly commendable: it takes a special kind of resolve to voluntarily take on extracurricular academic writing. By projecting their views into the wider community, *Leviathan* hopes to ensure that its contributors' toil is not in vain. Finally, the commitment of staff members who edit, produce, and fundraise for the journal cannot go unnoticed. These brilliant individuals have maintained their dynamism throughout the academic year, and working alongside them is a pleasure and a privilege.

Leviathan continues to benefit from the academic, financial, and administrative infrastructure provided to us by the Department of Politics and International Relations and the PIR Society. To them, too, we owe a debt of gratitude. Our bonds grow stronger with the passing of time, creating a community of colleagues and friends that I am confident will last for years to come.

I hope that you enjoy the talent and vision reflected in these pages.

Sincerely,

Marko John Supronyuk

Marko John Supronyuk
Editor in Chief



MEET THE STAFF



Marko John Supronyuk

Editor in Chief

Marko is a fourth year student of International Relations & Law and scholarship holder at the University of Edinburgh. An American of Ukrainian descent, he has interned at the Truman National Security Project in Washington, D.C., as well as with Governor Patrick Quinn and Congressman Brad Schneider in Chicago, Illinois. During his time at university, he has served as convenor of the School of Social and Political Science, constitutional law editor at the Edinburgh Student Law Review, president at the European Union Society, vice president at the Politics and International Relations Society, and student ambassador for the University of Edinburgh admissions office.



Lene Kirstine Korseberg

Deputy Editor in Chief

Lene is a fourth year student of Law & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Norway, she also has a Bcs. in Pedagogy from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Prior to becoming Deputy Editor in Chief of Leviathan, Lene was the Editor-in-Chief of The Student, the University of Edinburgh student newspaper. She is now the Deputy Editor for the Scottish Centre for International Law's Working Paper Series, a collection of articles produced by academic researchers associated with the Centre.



Vilde Sofie Rodin

Treasurer

Vilde is a fourth year student of International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Particularly interested in humanitarian organisations, she has previously worked for Médecins Sans Frontières in Norway and several other organisations seeking equal rights and opportunities for disadvantaged youth. In addition to her work with Leviathan, she has been on the committees of the Politics and International Relations Society and the Middle Eastern Society.



Jessica Killeen

Chief of Production

Jessica is a second year Politics & Sociology student. Having lived in London, Paris, Los Angeles, and Nashville, she was the youngest-ever Editor-in-Chief of her high school newspaper. She currently works for Edinburgh University Students' Association as a Societies and Volunteering Developmental Assistant. Jessica is highly interested in traveling, volunteering, and debating politics over coffee.



Juliana Fentress

Fundraising Director and Copy Editor

Juliana is a third year student of Politics & Economic & Social History at the University of Edinburgh. In addition to her work on Leviathan, Juliana is the Secretary of the Scottish Chapter of Democrats Abroad, an elected Academic Campaigns Organiser for the Edinburgh University Students' Association, Sourcing Officer for the Meadows Marathon, and an active member of the Politics and International Relations Society. She previously worked as a campaign fellow for U.S. Senator Cory Booker and for the Super PAC Ready for Hillary.



Lynn Marissa Davies

Chief Copy Editor

Lynn is a fourth year student of English Literature & History. Although Scottish by birth and Eurasian by descent, she spent her formative years as an expatriate in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, and Cairo, Egypt. Having lived within the margins of distinct and unfamiliar cultures, she takes particular interest in hegemonic value systems, the unique social problems they generate, and the role of mass media within their formation. In addition to her work with Leviathan, she is involved in various forms of social intervention as a trained mentor, peer-educator, and support worker for LINKnet, Fast Forward, and Waverley Care.



Hallam Tuck

Editor for Asia-Pacific

Hallam is a fourth year History student at the University of Edinburgh, and a proud native of New York City. He has interned with the New York Immigration Coalition and HarperCollins Publishers. He co-founded and hosts The Back Bench, the weekly radio show of the Politics and International Relations Society. Hallam is a proud graduate of the National Outdoor Leadership School, and when he's not working, he can be found hiking, biking, and fishing.



Nicholas Pugh

Editor for Africa

Nick is a second year student of International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He has grown up on both coasts of the United States, but calls North Carolina, Hawaii, and Germany home. In addition to his work at Leviathan, Nick is involved in the Politics and International Relations Society and the Cross Country and Cycling clubs. He is currently working to start the 'Brothers in Arms Initiative,' an intercultural communications program that aims to bring together the children of the men and women who have served together in combat and reconnect veterans to their 'brothers' in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Conor Penn

Editor for Europe and Russia

Conor is a third year English Literature student at the University of Edinburgh. He was born in Hertfordshire and raised in County Down. Prior to joining Leviathan, Conor served as Editor-in-Chief of The Student, the University of Edinburgh newspaper, and regularly blogs for The Huffington Post. He is interested in UK and Irish politics, with a particular focus on Northern Ireland. Having been fortunate enough to travel extensively over Europe, North Africa, and Asia Minor, he is also interested in European and global politics more broadly.





Leonie von Hammerstein

Leonie is a fourth year International Relations student at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Berlin, she has studied and lived abroad in the U.S., Malawi, and Spain and currently plans to explore Latin America after her graduation. Alongside her work within Leviathan, she also co-hosts the weekly music show Fresh Connection with Edinburgh's student radio FreshAir.

Editor for Latin America



Rina Moss

Rina is a first year postgraduate student of International Relations of the Middle East with Arabic at the University of Edinburgh. She completed her undergraduate degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. She was born in Japan and raised in Orlando, Florida.

Editor for the Middle East



Andrew Womer

Andrew is a first year Politics and Economics student at the University of Edinburgh. He was born and raised in Washington D.C. and has interned at The Jack Kemp foundation, a D.C.-based political think tank where he specialised in U.S. foreign policy. As well as being an editor for Leviathan, Andrew is a member of the University of Edinburgh Tennis Club, the Politics and International Relations Society, and History Society.

Editor for North America



Yuechen Wang

Yuechen is a third year visiting student from Beijing Foreign Studies University, representing the China Scholarship Council and Chinese Ministry of Education for studies in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Coming from the School of English and International Studies at BFSU, Yuechen is on the National Honoured Project of International Politics and Economics. He was the co-convenor of the 2014 BFSU International Debate Championship, an intern for Ipsos Group in China, and is a Chinese-English interpreter certified by China Accreditation Test for Translators and Interpreters and National Accreditation Examinations for Translators and Interpreters.

International Editor



Joakim Bjørnstad

Joakim is a fourth year student in the Middle Eastern Department of the University of Edinburgh. From Norway, he has also lived in Australia and has a background working with the Norwegian Labour Party. In addition, he has rowed with the Edinburgh University Boat Club and has held several positions on the Middle Eastern Society committee.

Production Team Member



Vanessa Ellmann

Vanessa is a second year Politics & German student at the University of Edinburgh. Originally born in Düsseldorf, Germany, she has moved around in both England and Germany before coming to Edinburgh. Apart from working on Leviathan, she is a member of the Politics and International Relations Society and the Kickboxing Club. She has also interned at the global software company Brady. In her spare time you will find her travelling, going for runs with her dog, or drinking coffee.

Production Team Member



Nathalia Rus

Nathalia is a first year student of Politics. Born in France, she founded the first Amnesty International High School group in Paris and has taken a gap year in Russia at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Spain at the University of Salamanca to learn new languages and to experience different cultures. She is also involved in EUTIC and the Economics Society.

Production Team Member



Agnes Steil

Agnes is a first year International Relations student. Born in Berlin, she also lived in France, Italy, and Belgium and is now excited to call Edinburgh her new home. Next to politics, she loves travelling and thus took a gap year to intern at a European Union liaison office in Brussels and the German Centre for Venetian studies in Venice.

Production Team Member



Kanzanira Thorington

Kanzanira is a second year Law & International Relations student at the University of Edinburgh. An American of Ugandan, Barbadian, and Panamanian descent, Kanzanira has always had an interest in foreign language and culture. Over the years she has studied Spanish, French, and Chinese. In high school, she served as Co-Chair of the Model United Nations team and News Editor of her school newspaper. Here at University, she is also taking additional Chinese language courses at the Confucius Institute of Scotland.

Production Team Member



Darya Gnidash

Darya is a second year International Relations student at the University of Edinburgh. Apart from working for Leviathan, she has previously interned at the Institute of World Policy and assisted PEN International. Coming from Ukraine, she has a passion for the politics of Eastern Europe, Sundance movies, and languages. At the moment, she is learning her seventh foreign language and hopes to increase this number in future.

Digital Director



Jonathan Riddick

Jonathan is a second year History & Politics student. Aside from editing Leviathan, he has worked as a copy editor for Groupon, and interned for the British Labour Party and DeHavilland political consultancy. He has a strong interest in Middle Eastern history and political Islam, as well as the history of the Soviet Union. He is a volunteer for the charity 'Health in Mind'.

Copy Editor



Asia-Pacific



In the recent history of the Asia-Pacific region, there has been no shortage of power struggles. As China's economic power has grown, its political leaders have been increasingly willing to assert regional diplomatic influence and develop a sphere of influence outside of Western control. In Hong Kong, Joshua Wong and the Occupy Central Movement presented the strongest popular challenge to Beijing's authority in decades. In Indonesia, Joko Widodo won a heavily contested presidential election against establishment candidate Prabowo Subianto, and now faces an even tougher challenge in consolidating authority over splintered political factions in Indonesia's House of Representatives. In Japan,

Shinzo Abe doubled down on an aggressive monetary easing programme, hoping to bolster a stagnant Japanese economy and fend off any political competition in the upcoming election cycle. In each of these contests, it is not wholly clear who will emerge as the victor. Yet, the intensity of these battles for power reflects the growing importance of Asia as a center of global economic growth and military power.

Although it is impossible to know the future, it is possible to formulate the questions that will define it. The struggle for dominance in Asia between the U.S. and China will be defined by both nations' ability to project economic and military influence, thereby gaining access to many of the globe's most dynamic economies. Similarly, as sustained economic growth brings greater affluence, the longevity of many of Asia's political leaders will be determined by their ability to incorporate the interests of newly empowered social groups into fragile political structures. Whatever the answers to these questions may be, they will not come quietly.

Hallam Tuck

Tension in the East China Sea: Why Japan, China, and the US Are Fighting Over Rocks

BRYDNE SLATTERY

In recent years, ties between Japan and China have been strained by a territorial dispute over a clutch of five uninhabited islands in the East China Sea called the Senkaku Islands, known in China as the Diaoyu Islands.¹ The value of the islands is attributed to their proximity to important shipping lanes, their rich fishing grounds, and potential surrounding oil and gas reserves.² In addition, they are situated in a strategically significant position, particularly in the current climate of rising competition between the US and China for military primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the dispute has progressed past the quantitative value of the islands into a more difficult discussion of nationalism and historical right.

Historically, the islands were formally recognised internationally as being under Japanese sovereignty. In 1884, Japan claimed to have discovered the islands, which they surveyed for ten years before deeming them uninhabited.³ Following the Chinese defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, Japan annexed the Senkaku Islands and seized Taiwan, which lies just to their south, as war spoils. The islands were then licensed to Tatsushiro Koga, a Japanese businessman who set up a bonito-processing station with 200 employees, the last of whom abandoned the island during the Second World War.⁴ Following the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan relinquished several territories under its dominion, and control of the Senkaku Islands was handed over to the Americans, who used them for bombing practice. In 1972, following the end of American occupation, the Japanese government resumed responsibility of the Senkakus.⁵

By this time, a report had been released presenting evidence that suggested the presence of large oil and gas reserves in the seabed surrounding the islands.⁶ This led to China stating its historical and cultural claims to the islands, which resulted in a lasting dispute over the sovereignty of the islands and the surrounding natural resources. The claimants do not dispute the fact that the Japanese controlled the Islands from 1895 until the Second World War, but debate whether or not the islets were in fact free to be claimed in the first place.⁷ Chinese groups claim to have discovered the Diaoyu Islands in 1372 and to have subsequently used them as navigational aids.⁸ China argues that the islets were transferred to Japan along with Taiwan following the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war, and should therefore have been returned to Chinese control along with Taiwan after the Second World War.⁹ Many who favour Japanese control point to the fact that China was silent on their claim to the islands, both following 1895 when Japanese nationals lived on the island and after the Second World War when America controlled the islands, as grounds to dismiss the Chinese claims.¹⁰

Although international law supports Japan's claims, China has made several advances towards taking control of the islands. Since 2008, Chinese fishing trawlers have plied the waters around the islands, in a few instances colliding with Japanese coast guard vessels.¹¹ Tensions then further increased in 2012, when the radical nationalist governor of Tokyo announced his intentions to purchase the islands because he felt his government was not doing enough to defend the claims. In response, the Japanese government purchased them from their private owner in what their officials say was an attempt to prevent them from falling into radical hands.¹² This decision was seen in China as a Japanese attempt to

strengthen control over the islands, setting off a week of violent anti-Japanese protests and leading China to send military vessels to enforce their claim.¹³ More recently, last November, China declared that foreign aircrafts would be required to notify the Chinese government when flying through the airspace above the islands. The Japanese government, stating their rights as legal sovereigns and their claim that the area above the Senkaku is within their airspace, has declared that they will not do so.¹⁴

Currently, disputes over the rights of the islands are heavily influenced by a mutual desire to avoid military confrontation as well as a strong economic co-dependence. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed 52 years ago by the United States and Japan, guarantees that should a conflict occur, America will enter in defence of Japan.¹⁵ Several recent incidents have too closely approached military confrontation.

In September 2013, a Chinese military drone was spotted flying over the Senkaku islands.¹⁶ China was unapologetic, leading Japan to release a series of guidelines that stipulated the proviso that it would shoot down any unauthorised unmanned aircraft that entered Japanese airspace and ignored warnings to leave. A spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defence announced in response that if Japan were to shoot down a Chinese drone, it would be considered an 'act of war' demanding severe retaliation.¹⁷ The possibility of such an incident ultimately leading to a full-blown world war, however, seems to have subdued the debate over the islands into a prolonged standoff. The Japanese coastguard, for example, stops not only Chinese patriots but also Japanese right-wing activists from reaching the islands, maintaining a forced terra nullius.¹⁸ Tensions only worsened in August 2014, when Shinzo Abe and other government ministers visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours millions of war dead including several wartime leaders convicted as war criminals.¹⁹ To China, such visits and a refusal to discuss the Senkaku territorial disputes only serve to emphasise the historical regional rivalry and the bitter legacy of Japan's occupation of China.²⁰

Optimists could point to a recent meeting in Beijing between Abe and Jinping that at the very least marks a thawing in the tense relations and absence of communication over the last few years.²¹ Japanese media outlets claim that Abe agreed to acknowledge that China has a case in their claim for the islands in an unofficial capacity, in order to secure a heads-of-state meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Beijing.²² Although this will not be included in a joint statement or any other officially released documents after the summit meeting, an open dialogue preparing a crisis-management system to prevent accidents at sea is a promising step towards avoiding conflict and war.²³ As historical rivals, Japan and China vie for economic leadership in the region. A resumption of dialogue on this issue could go a long way towards preventing a small incident from escalating to boiling point on an international scale.

Brydne is a fourth year student of Psychology.

A Tale of Two Nations

NISHAD SANZAGIRI examines how power politics and religious nationalism defined the partition of India.

The territorial partition of British India, which led to the creation of the dominions of India and Pakistan, resulted in the strained relocation of 20 million people and approximately 1.5 million deaths.¹ The Indo-Pakistani border is, even today, one of the most contentious and complex demarcations in the world. The chief tenet of partition, as articulated by the Muslim League leaders, was the 'two nation' theory; it stated that Hindus and Muslims were separate civilisations fated to evolve into distinct nations and, thus, could not live together peacefully in a united India.² This article will attempt to define the importance of religious nationalism in the partition of India. It will be argued that partition was much more a result of a calculated power struggle between key players in the provincial and central political arena and not so much a direct cause of religious nationalism. Particular focus will be given to religious representation, and the methods by which the epic personalities of the time mobilised religious identity in pursuit of political power.

During the colonial period, in an effort to divide and rule, the British made special political provisions for minorities.³ A key turning point in the history of the independence struggle was the 1909 British commitment to institute separate electorates

for Muslims at the provincial rank. Largely seen as an early catalyst for the 'Pakistan demand', this drove the colonial notion that those communities who belonged to a common religion shared collective interests distinct from others.⁴ The Congress' decision after the 1937 provincial elections to defiantly reject Muhammad Ali Jinnah's proposition for a coalition ministry in the United and Central Provinces (UP and CP, respectively) proved to be a critical political blunder as it paved the way for the League's consolidation of differing Muslim factions. This could have been avoided considering that, in the pre-Khilafat and Non-Cooperation days, there were not so many splits between Hindus and Muslims in North India as compared to those between Sunnis and Shias.⁵

It should be stressed that not all of the religious factionalism was based on purely religious dissent; if lines of cleavage were apparent between Hindus and Muslims, they were equally visible between the Congress establishment and non-Congress Hindus.⁶ An alternative explanation is that most of the communal dissensions were artificially cultivated by self-serving elites. For example, the UP Tenancy Bill, which aimed to bring about agrarian land reforms, was denounced by Muslim zamindars in eastern and western UP and taluqdars in Awadh, who labelled it a religious attack on Muslims, despite it not being explicitly directed





against them; they were not the victims of the scheme in their capacity as Muslims, but in their capacity as political adversaries of Congress and its land reform policies.⁷ Crucially, Robinson has shown that the self-interest of the top echelon of political players was the driving force of religious nationalism, citing the fact that despite UP being a Muslim-minority province, it became the 'birthplace of Muslim separatism' due to intra-elite infighting and dissension.⁸ Importantly, feelings of separatism were cultivated by Muslim elites vying for economic and political power by intentionally feigning 'selected symbols of Muslim identity.'⁹

At the start of the Second World War Muslim sentiments were characterised by rancorous bitterness, which served to strengthen the position of the League and cement its role as the chief representative body of the Muslim populace.¹⁰ At the same time, the ability of Congress to negotiate a settlement with the British worsened, as it could not legitimise its claim of being the sole mouthpiece of India.¹¹ The wartime Churchill-led British leadership leaned towards favouritism for the League over Congress since the latter was overtly against Indian involvement in WWII unless the British promised expeditious independence.¹² The former, however, supported the British in lieu for a promise for inclusion in any further cross-party deliberations. This move of boosting the League's position in the pre-independence dialogue eventually threatened Britain's resolve towards a United India.¹³ For these reasons, much of the academic discourse on the partition has branded Jinnah and the League as the components that wrecked plans for a united India.¹⁴ Wolpert, for example, quips that Jinnah 'virtually conjured' Pakistan by the strength of his invincible determination.¹⁵

It is important to note that Muslim-majority provinces desired a weak centre and strong provinces, based on the belief they were unlikely to get a large share of power.¹⁶ The League's mandate in 1940, as stressed in the Lahore Resolution, was that all forthcoming constitutional provisions be reassessed afresh since Indian Muslims were a collective nationality.¹⁷ For the same reason, it also insisted on autonomous sovereign Muslim states in the north-west and north-east of India.¹⁸ The ambiguous wording of the Resolution, however, completely ignored the notion of a unitary centre. The core centre of support for separatism on religious lines lay in the Hindu-majority provinces of UP and CP. Therefore, the problem Jinnah faced was that, in order to have any input in constructing the constitutional future of the country, the League had to substantiate its backing in the Muslim-majority provinces. As such, the consciously vague phraseology used in the Resolution did not alienate either side, letting each believe what they wanted to believe.¹⁹ Jinnah's resort to religious ideology was clearly a realistic ploy to realise his dream; rallying a society ruptured by politics but restrained by religion.

During the later years of the independence struggle, most Congressmen — and in turn, the British — accepted the notion of partition. At the end of WWII,

Britain had little interest in ruling over an unruly nation such as India.²⁰ Jinnah's stalling manoeuvres, which had aided him (and the British) during wartime, now became a nuisance.²¹ This was coupled with the British belief that the best guarantor of future strategic and economic interests in South Asia would be an authoritative centralised government.²² Thus, giving Jinnah a small chunk of the subcontinent likely seemed a better option than leaving behind a weak alliance.

Nehru's commitment to a united India has been questioned from various corners of academia in recent times. The League had already accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, which documented a federal scheme, and Nehru's denunciation put Jinnah in an awkward position; by 'accepting something less than Pakistan, he had lost the bargaining counter which the demand for the fully sovereign Pakistan gave him.'²³ Similarly, Jaswant Singh, a veteran Indian politician and former Cabinet Minister, blamed the Nehru-Patel leadership in Congress for 'conced[ing] Pakistan to Jinnah.'²⁴ Azad, in the unabridged version of his autobiographical narrative, says that Patel was of the view that Pakistan would fail so miserably that, in the end, the Provinces would 'be forced to return to India'. He thus wanted Congress to accept partition in order to teach Jinnah 'a bitter lesson.'²⁵ Tellingly, the nature of relationships, personal ambitions, and characteristics did play a central role in the division of India.²⁶ In fact, Jinnah and Nehru shared a rather hostile rapport. Nehru wrote in 1943:

*'Instinctively I think that it is better to have Pakistan or almost anything if only to keep Jinnah away and not allow his muddled and arrogant head from interfering continually in India's progress.'*²⁷

Without the independence struggle, Hindus and Muslims would have continued to concentrate on their respective status as subjects under British rule.²⁸ That said, it can safely be concluded that Partition was not so much the result of religious nationalism as much as it was a dynamic tussle between the Congress and League leadership which played on the underlying religious sentiments of the masses for political gains. It was Nehru's lust for power, Jinnah's lack of articulate political judgments, and the British preference of leaving behind an authoritative government free from religious infighting (coupled with their own priorities back home) that eventually led to a divided subcontinent. The fact that the plea for separatism originally came from those colonial pockets that today remain in India, and that there are many Muslims living in rather peaceful harmony with their Hindu brethren, refutes the primordial notion of India historically comprising of two separate Hindu and Muslim nations unable to fuse together.

Nishad is a second year student of International Relations.

China's Tragic Power Politics

YUECHEN WANG applies *The Unholy Trinity* to the issue of Borders between the Party State, the Locality, and the People.


The People's Republic of China is 'formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CCP)', as is written in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.¹ In his *Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx theorised a utopian communist world without conflict, and asserted that this could be achieved under the constant leadership of a party that is benevolent, selfless, and advanced.² Yet, Communist political parties cannot allow their true Marxist ideology to be sabotaged by 'popular' competitors who do not represent the proletariat.³ Based on this theory, communist parties tolerate no competitive elections. This helps to explain why China finds it difficult to allow democratic elections, and why it has defined a clear border between the party state and the people. Indeed, this has provoked a major clash between the CCP elite and mass public opinion. Western commentators see Beijing as the public's arch-rival, yet there is strong evidence that Beijing has become more tolerant.⁴ Some scholars have seen this as an unintentional consequence of decentralisation.⁵ China has also traditionally been defined by fierce conflicts between central and regional authorities.

Building on the notion of an 'Unholy Trinity' or trilemma developed by Obstfeld and Taylor in their work on international economics, this paper will expand this model to show that relations between the central government, regional officials, and popular mass movements respectively have dominated Chinese politics.⁶ Indeed, Beijing has utilised these competing relations with regional authorities and the public to maintain overall stability. In this sense Beijing has acted as an 'offshore balancer' in domestic politics, like it has in world politics.⁷ Crucially, the concerns of centralisation and authoritarianism are intertwined, defining the tragic nature of Centralised Authoritarianism.

The Unholy Trinity of Communist Authoritarianism

Ideally, Beijing would prefer that both the mass public and the regional authorities were perfectly submissive. However, the current status quo shows that none of the three actors are capable of containing the other two at the same time. By building on and expanding the model of the 'Unholy Trinity', it is possible to detect why this is so; in order to survive, certain benefits from the third party have to be sacrificed in order to ensure support from the second party. As is shown in Graph I below, the interactions of the three groups (CCP, regional authorities, and the mass public) can produce three interactions: (1) a contentious centralised party-state; (2) a de facto authoritarian federation; and (3) an anarchical overthrow of Beijing's authority.

Party-State Centralised Authoritarianism of CPP



Graph 1

(1) Contentious Centralised Party-State

In this interaction, Beijing and the mass public gain at the expense of regional authorities. In these cases, conflicts and unrest in the form of mass protest grab the attention of Beijing. The major features of such movements are that they are tolerable, amenable to central government policies, that they accuse regional governments of abuses, and that they target material welfare. In contrast, the governor or party leader of the region is hostile to the protestors' central policy. In this scenario, the party-state concedes a degree of authority to mass movements to solve a more urgent issue, principally the containment of an independent regional government. Instead of publicly condemning the mass movement, the state takes advantage of public indignation to promote the interests of the CCP elite. Usually, the consequence of this is the resignation of major corrupted officials and a reshuffle of local cabinet with new members publicly allegiant to the central government. The result of this interaction is a contentious centralised Party-State. Crucially, Beijing regains control of the region by using mass protest to knock local authorities into line while projecting an image of the CCP as a responsive advocate for mass civil rights.

In these cases Beijing is willing to shed a degree of authority because the requests of the protestors are fundamentally civil. Their major conflict is not with an authoritarian China, but a corrupted local government. Beijing can therefore meet the needs of the people by simply giving them material benefits. Indeed, using certain suitable mass movements to clean-up crony regions does not threaten CCP rule in Beijing at all. This interaction is defined by (1), where assertive discretionary localities conflict with material-pursuing civil protestors. From this perspective, China can be still centralised, while certain contentions are tolerated.

The Maoming PX incident is a good example of this interaction. After three decades of preferable policies and discretionary autonomy, Guangdong's potential for independence became too much for Beijing to ignore.⁸ Indeed, corruption in the province was severe until 2014.⁹ In April 2014, in Maoming, the local government's plan for a PX plant provoked mass protests by citizens demanding better environmental regulation and transparency in Guangdong's government.¹⁰ Responding to the protests, Beijing required the Guangdong government to move the plant to another city.¹¹ This not only made CCP leadership look agile and responsive, but also provided an opportunity to reshuffle the regional leadership to ensure loyalty. The result of this benign public mass movement was a more centralised central-region relationship that was slightly more permissive to public opinion. The example of Guangdong thus testifies to the possibility of centralised power co-existing with mass movements.

(2) Authoritarian de facto Federation

The second possible scenario within this model is also concerned with the relation between mass movements and the Beijing leadership. In this scenario, which can be called an Authoritarian de facto Federation, the aims of the protests, namely democracy and greater transparency among the Beijing leadership, are intolerable to the CCP. If the protests do not pose a legitimate threat to centralised authority, Beijing may condemn them as Western-led, manipulated, and illegitimate. In other cases, in order to protect the authority of the CCP doctrine, Beijing might give orders to shut down the protests by the use of force. In this case, the loyalty of regional political leaders is rewarded with a greater degree of autonomy for local authorities. Such interests may only occur under the following two criteria. First, the protests must target CCP leadership in Beijing rather than corrupt local officials. Second, local leaders must clearly support Beijing's leadership. The central feature of this interaction is a process whereby Beijing maintains



stability by yielding some autonomy to regional political leaders, turning a blind eye to their abuses and corruptions, and enforcing their military strength.

From September to November 2014, the CCP's authority was seriously challenged by the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and the unrest of Xinjiang's Uighurs Muslim population.¹² In both cases, Beijing had the confirmed allegiance of local leaders. In Hong Kong, the party's designated leader, Leung Chun-ying, went to Beijing multiple times to show his support of the government.¹³ In similar ways, the presence of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in the Xinjiang area since the 1950s has served as a constant assurance for Beijing.¹⁴ In Hong Kong, Beijing publicly supported the local government to pacify the incident using the 'least violence' possible, while in Xinjiang, Beijing designated Uighur insurgents as 'terrorism' and gave the order to curb 'threats'.¹⁵ In these situations CCP leaders are willing to give regions greater autonomy in order to ensure that mass movements are properly contained. The unfortunate result of this is that Hong Kong's leadership continues to have the ability to abuse its power, much as Xinjiang's military officials have the authority to keep extracting resources and repressing the people.

(3) Anarchic Confederation

The third possible interaction, which would result in the CCP elite being overthrown, is extremely unlikely in contemporary China. If both regional leaders and the mass public were determined to achieve transparency in the national government, it would be hard for Beijing to use either punishment or appeasement as leverage. Although unlikely, such a situation might arise if powerful regions and a mass movement were bound together either by a leadership coup, a serious economic downturn, or obvious incompetence. In this situation, the party-state would no longer be in the position to force regional leaders or the public to make sacrifices. In the complete absence of CCP rule the state would likely separate into multiple powerful local regions ruled by crony bureaucrats or warlords, closer to anarchy

than democracy. The actors with the most power and resources, that is, the powerful regions, would likely be free to abuse their power and ignore the need to reconstruct an ordered, unified, and advanced political system. This is aptly described by Samuel P. Huntington as 'political decay', or Praetorianism.¹⁶ Crucially, in the absence of a central state, regional leaders are unlikely to build a modern democratised union, but would instead try to conquer one another, creating a condition of anarchical confederation.

Centrism, Authoritarianism or Anarchy: The Unholy Trinity

The political stability of contemporary China is threatened both by powerful regional leaders and pro-democratic mass movements, suggesting an embedded inadequacy common to any large communist state. The system of power relations between the central government, regional powers, and popular political movements has established an unholy trinity in China. In disputes between Beijing and local powers, the centralised state tends to diminish regional authority in favour of purely material civil rights. The less frequent, yet much more vocal, case occurs when mass movements directly challenge CCP leadership. With the support of regional leaders, Beijing would assist in the repression to the protestors, enhancing the power of the regional leaders to crack down any such protest. In a third and extremely unlikely scenario, the central power may become weak enough to marry regionalism with mass movements. However, as regionalised powers have no overarching central government, instead of a democratic order, anarchy would be the probable outcome. This unholy trinity appears to be the doom of Chinese politics. The absoluteness of communist doctrine, combined with China's vast landmass, makes it impossible to simultaneously maintain order, democracy, centralised unity, and regional autonomy. The fact that power is based on sacrifice suggests the tragic limits of China's power politics.

Yuechen is Leviathan's International Editor.

In Need of a Moral Compass?

ROSS ROBERTSON explores the controversy of Australia's 'boat people problem' and its recent deal with Cambodia.

Since Tony Abbott led the Liberal party to victory in September 2013, Australia has been the subject of much criticism from the international community. Stubborn stances at the latest international summit on climate change, successful repeals of mining and carbon taxes domestically, as well as the old chestnut of increasing marginalisation of indigenous communities, have been some key contributing factors.¹ In contrast, one issue that has not received as much attention as it perhaps deserves is the plight of asylum seekers, intercepted by Australian authorities, now detained in camps across the Pacific. The most notable of these are the detention centres located on the Pacific island state of Nauru, which currently hold almost 1,000 prospective refugees,² mostly from South Asia, effectively trapped in a diplomatic no-man's land.

Once in power, Prime Minister Abbott was widely lauded by his countrymen for immediately enacting Operation Sovereign Borders, famously announcing that he would 'stop the boats'.³ In December 2014, this was accompanied by several controversial amendments to the Migration Act; the act now grants temporary asylum to those seeking it, yet prevents them from obtaining permanent residency in Australia.⁴ But what of those who do not make it to Australian shores? In fact, a minority of people who board boats to cross the Pacific actually make it there, due either to accidents or interception by Australian coastguards.⁵

The most recent development in Australia's border control strategy has been to seek cooperation from regional neighbours, in particular the Southeast Asian nation of Cambodia. In September 2014, Cambodia's deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng and Australian immigration minister Scott Morrison met in Phnom Penh to sign a 'Memorandum of Understanding' between the two countries reputed to be worth US\$35 million.⁶ The basic idea is to pilot a scheme that proposes to relocate those asylum seekers currently held in camps on Nauru to Cambodia, instead of their intended destination: Australia.

Morrison has proposed a program of linguistic and cultural introduction as part of a wider scheme to prepare the asylum seekers for life in a new country. In addition, over a subsequent four-year period, Australia is offering to sponsor the living costs of the asylum seekers, as well as a bulk cash investment that Morrison claimed would go toward 'rice-milling projects, land-mine-clearance projects, [and] electoral-reform issues'.⁷ While these are clearly salient issues for the Cambodian government to address, they are not necessarily the ones that an Australian powerhouse would prioritise when interacting with one of the poorest nations in the region.

In addition, the exact terms of the agreement remain contested by both sides, particularly the issue of numbers. Morrison has been quoted as saying that after the pilot phase is completed there is 'no cap'⁸ on the number of people who could be relocated to Cambodia from Nauru. The Cambodian government, however, remains decidedly cautious in comparison and has appeared intent on stressing that this project would involve a very small number of refugees at first, and that these people's progress would be monitored in order to determine further action.⁹

Yet it is not only the numbers that do not seem to add up. Cambodia has stated that it views this project as a 'humanitarian activity',¹⁰ but with \$35 million of Australia's money being offered to Cambodia in return, some have questioned the real motives behind the deal. Many would suggest that this is a win-win for Abbott and Sen; Australia finds a willing recipient of people it will not welcome and cannot send home, while Cambodia receives a significant economic investment as well as gaining valuable political currency.¹¹

Morrison has been quick to reject the controversy surrounding the deal, underlining that this is an initiative that offers Cambodia a chance to progress and one that challenges preconceptions based on a perhaps outdated reputation. In addition, both parties have repeatedly stressed that it is a voluntary initiative and not a policy of enforcement.¹² However, some question the feasibility of these statements, particularly given the current climate in Nauru; the country is fiercely cutting public funding as it struggles with a debt of \$49 million owed to Firebird, a US investment fund.¹³ Moreover, the detention centre in Nauru and the funding from Australia that it provides has in fact become institutionalised to the point that it is relied upon by many locals as the most stable guarantee for employment. The temporary closure of the camps in 2007 under former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's Labor government was viewed as a significant blow to both the economy of Nauru and its employment prospects.¹⁴

Conditions within the camps themselves appear to be even more dire than Nauru's economic state, however. An Amnesty International team that visited the main detention centre in 2013 described it as

'a human rights catastrophe (...) a toxic mix of uncertainty, unlawful detention and inhumane conditions'.¹⁵ The resettlement deal was announced to the camp residents via a video message from Morrison, explaining that not voluntarily relocating to Cambodia would result in a further five years detention in Nauru and no prospect of ever reaching Australia. Since this announcement there have been reports of at least seven suicide attempts within the camps.¹⁶

When the deal was first announced, it was accompanied by some hope due to the proposed re-introduction of Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs), which would grant refugees at least temporary asylum in Australia.¹⁷ This hope has been short-lived, however, as only 200 of the 1,000 asylum seekers on Nauru have been recognised as refugees.¹⁸ In addition, the recent amendments made to Australia's Migration Act have seen many references to the international Refugee Convention removed, a development which has been deplored internationally.¹⁹

Quite apart from the moral question of Australia effectively passing responsibility for the detainees in Nauru onto Cambodia, there remains the issue of whether Cambodia is at all suited to receive them. David Manne, a lawyer for the Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre, argues that Cambodia, 'one of the poorest countries in our region with one of the worst human rights records', is a highly unsuitable destination for those being held in Nauru.²⁰ In addition, many hold little hope of the funds invested by Australia actually reaching any meaningful projects as Transparency International currently ranks the country among the twenty most corrupt countries in the world.²¹ In addition, Cambodia's treatment of existing refugees does not bode well for any volunteer arrivals from Nauru. Not one of the current 63 refugees in Cambodia has been granted citizenship, as is the stated practice; instead they are given a 'proclamation', which according to a refugee interviewed by Human Rights Watch 'is absolutely useless'.²² Only with a passport can one buy property, open a bank account, or even own a motorbike.²³ If Cambodia cannot follow its own basic procedure regarding integration of refugees, what guarantees does Australia have that it will be any different for those arriving from Nauru?

Denise Coughlan, spokesperson for the Jesuit Refugee Service, was quoted by Al Jazeera as saying that a relocation to Cambodia would 'probably' be an improvement in conditions for those detained in Nauru.²⁴ This however seems a very faint silver lining to a particularly ominous cloud, as the only certainty afforded to the detainees seems to be that they will not be going home, nor be sent to Australia, anytime soon. The hope becomes fainter still when one considers that any volunteers relocated to Cambodia will be a minute minority when considering how many will be left stranded in Nauru.

The irony of the problem of asylum seekers being such an important issue in Australian politics cannot be ignored, considering that the modern nation itself was established by immigrants deemed undesirable by British society, and built up by people from all across the world. In addition, the aboriginal population was systematically disenfranchised and decimated by those who came and settled.²⁵ Nevertheless, immigrants and in particular asylum seekers, or 'boat people' as they have been termed by the press, consistently rank highly as a decisive issue in Australian politics. Inevitably, the politicians must respond. A national poll conducted by UMR in January 2014 revealed that 59 per cent of Australians believe that most boat people are not genuine refugees, while only 30 per cent believe the opposite to be true.²⁶ In addition, 60 per cent want the Abbott government to increase the severity of treatment toward 'boat people'.²⁷ It seems that the majority of Australian's preconceptions are wrong, however, as 97 per cent of asylum seekers from Afghanistan were adjudged to be genuine refugees, while 96-98 per cent of those from Iran, Iraq, and Myanmar were granted protection visas.²⁸

Even if you were among the minority of Australians willing to give the 'boat people' the benefit of the doubt, the fact that the 2014 federal budget for handling asylum seekers was AUD\$ 2.9 billion, and in fact overran to AUD\$ 3.2 billion, has to ruffle some feathers.²⁹ It is unclear whether tactics such as the immigration ministry's alleged purchase of sixteen hard-hulled life boats,³⁰ with which to transport asylum seekers back to countries of origin such as Indonesia and Papua New Guinea if the original vessels are deemed unfit, have contributed to such extortionate spending rates. It is clear however that if the general consensus of the Australian electorate is a tougher stance, the agreement with Cambodia is perhaps not such an illogical, if nonetheless immoral, conclusion.

Ross is a third year student of Politics & Philosophy.





Africa



REGIONAL EDITOR



From the lines drawn on European maps during the 19th century, to independence movements and the political boundaries of today, physical borders have always played an important role in shaping life on the African continent. Such borders often have a tangible impact on everything, from resource allocation to igniting political strife. Yet responses to threat and other issues in the 21st Century often involve crossing more than physical borders. The international community often achieves its ends by ignoring lines, through intervention, humanitarian aid, and even forays into the private lives of citizen. As such, security concerns in Africa (and indeed the world) are no longer constrained by traditional boundaries.

As writers in this issue observe, disease, terror, and ideas know nothing of lines on a map or words on a page. The divide between private and public governance is shrinking, more developed countries continue to exploit African nations, and transnational conflicts threaten to push traditional borders into obsolescence.

Borders do not however, merely precipitate conflict; they often alter the way conflict is perceived. The ocean that separates North America from Africa has become much more than just a physical boundary, and along with thousands of miles of open water, a massive gulf in public attention has formed. While events in Europe have received their due time in the spotlight, many more events have been largely overlooked by the mainstream media. Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb continues to pose a significant threat, refugees and terrorists alike are forcing the Africa/Europe border onto the agenda, and disease continues to plague the West African coast. Yet for all this, there is reason to believe that Africans are more empowered than ever before and there is much to look forward to in 2015.

Nicholas Pugh

Disease Without Borders: Why the Closing Of Borders Will Not Stop the Spread Of Ebola

JULIANA FENTRESS

The progression and spread of the 2014 outbreak of the Ebola virus from its origins in Guinea into the neighbouring West African states of Sierra Leone and Liberia — and in a very few, highly publicised, cases to the US and UK—follows the fairly standard movement of a highly infectious disease across national borders. Ebola is particularly difficult to contain because, while it is not especially contagious, it is extremely infectious.¹ Another factor that makes the virus difficult to contain is the unusually long period during which a person can develop symptoms following exposure, namely, up to 21 days.² These characteristics of the Ebola virus, and the environment in which it arose, pose a serious problem for world leaders. How should countries unaffected by the virus protect their own citizens and prevent the spread of the disease across borders?

After the first confirmed case of Ebola in the United States, political leaders were quick to propose and enforce measures to prevent any other potentially infectious persons from entering the country. The controversial strategy favoured by New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and his Maine counterpart Paul LePage was to perform health screenings at many major international airports and to detain those who may have been exposed.³ The health screenings, which sound like a moderately good idea in theory, proved to be extraordinarily difficult in practise. The first US Ebola patient had not come on a flight from his home in Liberia, but was travelling to the US from Brussels. Because of this, leaders quickly realised it would be impossible to isolate suspected carriers by port of last departure, as this would require all airport passengers to be, at the very minimum, questioned about prior travels before selected persons could be screened. Other criticisms of this method include the possibility of it diverting airport personnel from other necessary tasks, the potential for widespread travel delays, and the fact that it may not even detect infected persons due to the extended incubation period.⁴

Also, the screening method may falsely detect illness in people, as it did in the case of famed 'Ebola nurse' Kaci Hickox, who was detained against her will in an airport quarantine before being sent home under police watch and strict instructions not to leave her home for a number of weeks.⁵ It is noteworthy that Ms. Hickox did not, and does not, have Ebola, nor did she ever show any symptoms; the short term curtailing of her interactions with the public was a precaution that proved to be unnecessary and perhaps even overzealous. Ms. Hickox raised important questions about the role of government in managing public health crises, and the civil liberties of those who may have been exposed to the virus.⁶ TIME Magazine may have lavished high praise on the healthcare workers who are fighting Ebola by naming them Person of the Year for 2014, but their treatment upon returning home has proven to be far less welcoming.⁷

Another option, touted by failed American presidential candidate and real estate mogul, Donald Trump, was to simply close American borders to those who had come from affected regions. In Trump's own words, he wanted to 'stop the flights coming in from West Africa'.⁸ This sort of isolationist reaction shows a stunning lack of awareness of the globalised nature of our world. To start closing borders to many nations of people because of the possibility for infection would set a worrying precedent. This idea is made even more ludicrous when considering the extraordinarily few people who have been affected beyond those living in the hardest hit areas of West Africa. Given the closely monitored and successfully controlled spread of Ebola to the

United States, the fear of Ebola is no reason to close borders to international travellers. Medical professionals in the United States are well trained, their hospitals are well equipped, and access to essential personal protective equipment is unfettered; if an Ebola outbreak were to occur, the United States is perhaps one of the best equipped countries to handle the situation.

The emergence of a confirmed case of Ebola in a new country is worrisome threat, though not necessarily the unmitigated disaster that many popular news outlets like to portray it as. Take for example the case of Nigeria, whose first confirmed Ebola case was that of Patrick Sawyer, a man who had arrived by airplane from Liberia on July 20th and who died shortly thereafter. The following outbreak saw nineteen confirmed cases and eight fatalities. However, the rapid mobilisation of Nigerian healthcare professionals and the establishment of a specialised command centre orchestrated a swift and efficient response to the mounting threat. As a result, Nigeria was declared Ebola free on October 20th.⁹ Unfortunately, the lessons learned from the success in Nigeria are not applicable to the nations of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, all of whom lack the resources employed by Nigeria and must cope with a contagion spread far beyond what is easily containable. In these countries alone there were roughly 20,000 cases diagnosed as of December 28th 2014.¹⁰ However, for countries where the virus is new or not yet widespread, the Nigerian case proves that, with effective resources, a country can successfully contain and control the spread of the virus. With the recent confirmation of the first Ebola case in the UK, the success of Nigeria is comforting news indeed.

Ebola, although highly infectious, is not highly contagious. This distinction is very important. Ebola is only transmittable through direct contact with bodily fluids of an infected person, and once exposed, it is very likely that an individual will be similarly infected. However, Ebola is not transmittable through airborne means, meaning it is only moderately contagious.¹¹ Successful containment efforts in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, and Nigeria have all proved that small-scale outbreaks are controllable. Viral outbreaks know no national borders, and it is certainly possible that there will be new Ebola outbreaks in new countries in the coming months. However, closing borders and restricting movement is hardly the answer.

The most affected areas need humanitarian aid and trained medical professionals to attempt to control widespread disease, while the rest of the world simply needs to remain vigilant so that new outbreaks are contained. By providing financial assistance the international community could provide desperately needed medical supplies to those regions that have exhausted their resources in the fight against rampant sickness. A large number of medical professionals have already volunteered to tend to patients in some of the hardest hit areas, but the continuing spread of the virus and the alleged 'inadequate response' by nations with the capability to assist caused Médecins Sans Frontières to proclaim that 'the outbreak is far from over'.¹² There are promising new trials of Ebola vaccines in progress, but until then, an effective international humanitarian response coupled with informed vigilance is the best way public health officials know how to halt the spread of the virus.¹³

Juliana is Leviathan's Fundraising Director and Copy Editor.



Barriers to Development in Kenya

WILL O'SULLIVAN details the effect of language, land, and colonial politics on the modern education system.

In northwest Nairobi, 15 minutes drive from downtown, a single road is crowded by hundreds of houses, restaurants, kinyozi barbers, electronics shops and hotels. Corrugated iron roofs top most of the small buildings. Despite being called a 'semi-slum,' this town is beginning to show signs of Kenya's development as each year more five-storey hotels are constructed. Off the main road, a primary school aims to provide an alternative to the crime and drugs in which many children otherwise become involved.¹ Three teachers and 100 pupils between the ages of six and seventeen constitute the school, with many more on the waiting list. The school was founded on the initiative of two teachers, with no government funding or involvement, and its registration with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has yet to be confirmed.

This school in northwest Nairobi is run in the informal manner common to the region. Harambee, or 'all for one', schools date back to the 1920s, when Kenya was still under colonial rule.² Such schools were initially created as a response to the missions that constituted the main source of Kenyan education. In mission schools, the theory behind teaching underwent an extended tug-of-war between 'religious instruction, literacy and humanistic education on the one hand, and technical training on the other.'³ Justification for the latter theory was rooted in demands made by European settlers. Living in Kenya's 'white highlands,' these settlers relied on the manual labour of the African portion of Kenya's population to perform the otherwise impossible task of farming. Committed to bringing about European dominance, the settlers encouraged vocational or technical training, as opposed to literacy training, in order to perpetuate the agricultural and pastoral practices of African Kenyans.⁴ By establishing a settled farming group in a predictable location, the administration could much more easily regulate the behaviour of rural Kenyans through 'loans, supervision and marketing facilities.'⁵ In response to a system committed to their subjugation, Black Kenyan communities funded harambee schools to advance their education independently.

These informal schools remain common in modern Kenya. In fact, schools like the aforementioned example are responsible for the education of about 17 per cent of all primary school students in greater Nairobi.⁶ The continued prevalence of harambee schools is still necessitated by the Kenyan government. For a child to enter the formal, government-regulated system of education, students must fulfill government-mandated requirements at several crucial stages. Graduation from primary to secondary school in Kenya is contingent on passing the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE).⁷ While this may not seem to differ from education systems in more-developed nations, difficulties arise regarding costs and fees for such examinations. Data suggests that barriers around primary school graduation have clear consequences. According to household surveys, roughly three quarters of all primary school-aged children in Kenya attend school; however, the corresponding figure in secondary schools drops to less than 50 percent.⁸

Colonial influence cemented English as the official language in government ministries, therefore, the KCPE is administered in English. Despite the great diversity of language in the country, there exist very few instances of indigenous language instruction. The few instances that do exist occur only in rural primary schools, and last only a maximum of three years.⁹ Moreover, Swahili-speaking Kenyans living in rural areas have much less exposure to Western culture and the English-teaching facilities required to succeed.¹⁰ As a result, in order to graduate past elementary school and pursue any specialised career not involving manual labour, rural students must learn a language alien to day-to-day life.

A remnant of British imperialism, the education system operates exclusively English language; a vestige of the 19th century, the European settler's agenda of maintaining an uneducated, rural peasantry is has manifested widespread regional inequality.

Historically, physical borders have proved as equally important as the invisible, socio-economic boundaries between Africans and Europeans. Disputes over land rights and allocation have been a hugely contentious topic throughout Kenya's history.¹¹ The great proportion of the population with an agrarian lifestyle gives land a 'high social, cultural and economic value,' as well as making it 'a source of livelihood and political power,' both historical and current.¹² As a consequence, colonial policies of land administration involving taxation, displacement of Kenyan farmers and elite monopoly caused widespread suffering.¹³ Independence did nothing to improve the situation. The power of the elite was consolidated, prompting the criticism that independence 'tended to Africanise the colonial class structure,'¹⁴ rather than reform it. Supporting this claim, modern politics of land rights still affect the Kenyan education system. Many informal harambee schools are located on land owned by missions and churches.¹⁵ Similarly, the high price of land disincentives landlords to sign lengthy leases, they often evict tenants upon finding a better offer.¹⁶ These are just two of the many reasons preventing a school from owning a lease. Yet proof of ownership of the school's land is one of the many Ministry of Education criteria for registration. Consequently, these schools are often precluded from registering with the Ministry of Education, thus eliminating the possibility that funding be provided for facilities. A lengthy UNESCO report includes this effect, stating that the conditions of harambee school buildings as often being 'very poor, compared to public/government schools'.¹⁷

This work aims to show the clear causal relationships that can be drawn between colonial administration and modern failures in Kenyan education. These connections are not vague, but clear and identifiable. Colonial politics are still manifested in disadvantaged rural and impoverished individuals. A product of British imperialism, the Kenyan education system neglects the value of indigenous culture and language. and negatively impacts modern procedures of land administration. These, in turn, prevent the physical establishment of modern informal primary schools.¹⁸ Charting the historical development of education in Kenya, links can be traced up to clear, present-day realities, in which many Kenyans are forced to fund their own education in non-regulated and unsubsidised schools. Although harambee schools have had a positive impact, the benefits of government subsidy are undeniable and government regulations still obstruct the education of average Kenyan citizens.

Although the issues raised in this article are clear examples of inequality and injustice, engagement with them should be accompanied by self-critical questions. First, Kenya is a place with a politically active population,¹⁹ a very new constitution,²⁰ and an idiosyncratic culture and all the associated difficulties of governance. It is neglectful to overlook this nuance and characterise Kenya simply as a state struggling under the yoke of its circumstance. While good intentions and willingness to speak out about these issues are common, they can often lead one into an unintentional 'saviour' mind-set. Such paternalism is reminiscent of the very thinking that created these injustices in the first place. We must remember how easily we can unwittingly cross the border from actors resisting injustice, to instruments in perpetuating it.

Will is a second year student of Social Anthropology & Politics.

Europe & Russia

The theme of 'borders' presents a distinctly interesting topic of discussion, not least in the context of Europe and Russia. The geopolitical, cultural, and anthropological ramifications of geographical borders give rise to a

multiplicity of views and perspectives. This is particularly so in Europe, where the unification of certain states is often understood to be in tension with the individual cultures and national identities of others.


The burgeoning electoral successes of far-right nationalist movements and political entities across Europe, some of which are discussed in the articles that follow, is a source of interest to even the most amateur psephologist. In the United Kingdom, the

Conservative party have pledged an 'in-out' referendum on Europe by the end of 2017, which is indicative of scepticism even towards the mainstream centre of the political spectrum.

Borders are also, of course, the subject of international conflict and strife. We might perceive that economic and diplomatic expediency are often insufficient bulwarks against the emotive ideological, nationalist rhetoric. Furthermore, we frequently encounter border conflicts that transcend these arguments, giving rise to bloodshed and international political outcry, such as the events witnessed in the ongoing Crimean Crisis which reached its most troubling zenith in 2014.

As we enter a new year, we are reminded of all that it will hold, especially in the UK where a General Election quickly approaches. The conceptualisation of borders is loaded with inter-relating concepts and ideologies, such as nationalism, culture, identity, and political self-determination. With this in mind, we might stop for a moment to consider the dazzling array of concepts that a geographical border can represent.

Conor Penn





Ukraine's War of Independence: The Agency of the Weak

MARKO JOHN SUPRONYUK

Broadly speaking, there are two competing hypotheses on the motives behind Russia's ongoing intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. One holds that Russia is in essence an imperial force that has long sought to stage an aggressive return to great power politics. The other sees Russia as a defensive rational actor, responding above all to NATO expansion. John Mearsheimer, the key promoter of the latter view, argues that 'Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts and their Ukrainian allies have been adhering to liberal ideas.'¹ Yet this neorealist explanation is far from comprehensive.

Neorealism sees states as 'rational actors whose interests and calculations give form and content to the world order and national security.'² Alexander Motyl challenges Mearsheimer's explanation on the basis that it betrays the tenets of neorealism, 'which assumes that 'objective' threats would be recognised as such by any rational observer.'³ The 'defensive Russia' theory fails to recognise that NATO is much weaker than Russian rhetoric would suggest. An overwhelming majority of its members do not meet their defence spending obligations,⁵ and questions continue to persist around the members' political will to uphold the alliance's Article 5, which considers an attack on one member to be an attack on all. Furthermore, NATO expansion beyond its present borders has not actually been considered likely since Russian objections led to Ukraine and Georgia being denied membership in 2008.⁶ Motyl argues that 'a strict application of realist logic should lead rational Russian leaders' to understand that NATO is a 'paper tiger.'⁷ If NATO was founded to deter, it has failed in that mission, thereby invalidating Russia's concerns.⁸ Vladimir Putin's actions are indeed calculated, but far from being a response to NATO's strength, they are an exploitation of the alliance's weakness.

A consistent shortcoming of the current discourse on the war is that both liberals and realists in the West fail to recognise the agency of Ukraine in the conflict that bears its name. The realist tendency to overestimate great power politics and to overlook the agency of others is understandable and even intellectually honest. But the same problem occurs with liberals, for whom 'the weak are of interest but primarily as bearers of rights and objects of emancipation' rather than as actors with agency over themselves and, to a degree, over the strong.⁹ No wonder then that so much of Western commentary on the crisis overlooks entirely the role of Ukraine itself in the events of the past year. The realists see Ukraine either as a battleground or as part of Russia's sphere of influence; the liberals see it as a 'prize' to be emancipated.

However, Ukraine ought to be seen as more than a pawn in this narrative. This country, independent since 1991, has until recently prioritised Russian interests

ahead of its own.¹⁰ Now, it is a state finally growing into itself. In February 2014, Ukrainians overthrew a regressive, authoritarian president following his attempts to violently repress pro-democracy protests.¹¹ In May and October they voted for progressive, Western-looking leadership in wartime elections that were nevertheless praised by international observers.¹² Today, Ukraine is determined to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity despite a Russia that betrayed its international obligations, having previously signed binding treaties that promised the preservation of Ukraine's borders.¹³ Responding to these events has demanded shattering sacrifices – and that is no mere accident. Ukraine has made rational and self-interested choices. The revolution, elections, and war have not been a futile manifestation of lofty and naive liberal ideals, as Mearsheimer would see it, but rather of a people choosing their future through the negation of and resistance to despotism.

Blind to the role and resolve of Ukraine itself, Mearsheimer describes how 'U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold.'¹⁴ But when was this attempt made? No Western policymaker 'actually provided any material assistance to the Maidan.'¹⁵ Beyond verbal and symbolic show of support, the West's feeble ventures to aid the pro-democracy protesters who ousted president Viktor Yanukovich last year were barely conscious, hardly meaningful, and anything but monolithic. Instead, the more likely explanation is that some European leaders like Catherine Ashton, who visited the Maidan, tried to ride the wave of grassroots goodwill towards the West. It was a rare opportunity to express solidarity with those in the developing world who still believe in democratic values championed, in theory, by the EU.

To fail to recognise the agency of Ukraine as an independent actor is to miss the point. It is possible to understand the country's role in crafting its destiny yet still to disagree with the wisdom of Ukrainian policies. It is also possible to simultaneously recognise that it is not nearly as strong as the great powers to its east and west and could suffer tremendously for its choices. Mearsheimer explicitly addresses the question of whether Ukraine should have a say in what happens next. He theorises that Ukrainians should not be able to decide the strategic direction of their country in the high-stakes game that is geopolitics.¹⁶ What Mearsheimer is missing is the fact that this discussion is no longer hypothetical and his question no longer relevant. Ukraine is already deciding its own future: its agency should not be discarded as a liberal dream, but should be reckoned with as a concrete reality.

Marko is the Editor in Chief of Leviathan.

Behind the Gold Curtain

INGEBJØRG BIRKELAND examines the European perception of 'borders' post-Schengen.

It has been asserted that 'nations are in fact made and unmade at their borders,'¹ and 'a nation's claims of political legitimacy are only as strong as their territorial boundaries.'² Following the implementation of the Schengen Agreement, does the term 'borders' hold the same significance in a European context, or has the perception of its substance been altered?

Broadly speaking, the Schengen Agreement constitutes an agreement amid a number of EU member states, excluding the UK and Ireland, and including non-Member States Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. The agreement is meant to ensure the removal of checks of persons travelling between those nations, and the common coordination of visa and entry regulation. Additionally, it requires shared regulation of the European Union's external borders, as well as judicial cooperation regarding extradition of criminals.³ Essentially, it eliminates the practical existence of borders between signatories of the agreement, creating a formal, common border of externality to the EU. Consequentially, some have cited it as a 'startling reversal' of state sovereignty,⁴ undoubtedly largely transforming intra-EU mobility.

In an exclusively European Union context, the relevance of the construction of a European Union citizenship is also a significant consideration: this constituting a collective, supranational affiliation for all citizens of the EU.⁵ In combination with the Schengen Agreement, this construction has led to the prominence of terms likening the EU's external borders with the Berlin Wall, such as a 'gold curtain' and, perhaps most prominently, a recycling of the term 'Fortress Europe.'⁶ Claims have been forwarded of an oncoming 'human tsunami'⁷ from outside the Schengen area, supposedly looking to take advantage of rights and privileges provided by the EU. The rhetoric used in describing issues related to the Schengen Agreement has, however, been dubbed by many as 'exaggerated.'⁸ In any case, some concern has indeed been assigned to Greece's border to Turkey, cited as 'porous' in academic literature,⁹ but perhaps even more to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, located along the Moroccan coastline.¹⁰ These Spanish areas have been labelled as the 'Southern Frontier of Fortress Europe,'¹¹ not just because of their location but also because of the vast security associated with their physical attachment to the African continent. These enclaves constitute the only places African immigrants can enter the EU on land, and as a result they have been fenced off using double-wired fences, funded

partly by the EU.¹²

The European Union only explicitly endeavoured to 'eliminate the barriers which divide Europe.'¹³ Nevertheless, some have claimed the EU is behaving hypocritically, as this increased focus on external border control and securitisation is contrary to the EU's underpinning aspiration to 'build bridges across borders.'¹⁴ The consequences of this, they find, is a furthering of boundaries based on ethnicity, religion and race.¹⁵ Some have, however, dismissed this argument, finding that the notion of the impenetrable 'Fortress Europe' is merely symbolic as opposed to being connected to genuine control of cross-border movement. The reason for this is the vast numbers of third country nationals who still manage to enter European territory.¹⁶

Others have argued that 'Maze Europe' would constitute a more precise branding of the EU, because of its ability to 'keep some out, some in, and most confused as to their precise whereabouts.'¹⁷ This allegory perhaps holds some truth, as the EU is hardly consistent in its dealings with immigration both from external locations as well as intra-EU migration. Indeed, citizenship cases related to intra-union migrants as well as immigrants from everywhere from Jamaica, to Colombia, to China have had entirely different outcomes.¹⁸

Ultimately, the EU's desire to ensure resilient control of its external borders following the elimination of its internal borders is hardly incomprehensible: the function of borders and citizenship of those hailing from within those borders is arguably to give grounds for protection of the citizens of the relevant area.¹⁹ So, perhaps the overstated rhetoric used when discussing matters related to external border control of the EU is the most defining of post-Schengen EU border-relations. Consequently, the European understanding of 'borders' arguably remains intact; but rather than influence the perception of the significance or constitution of borders, the Schengen Agreement has influenced the European perception of the location of relevant borders. The perception of the significance of these borders may even be strengthened, if merely symbolically.

Ingebjørg is a fourth year student of Law & Social Policy.



‘Die Mauer im Kopf’: Imagined Borders in Modern Germany

DAVID KELLY argues that, although the Berlin Wall is long gone, Germany is still divided.

Those who built it claimed it was an ‘Anti-Fascist Protection Rampart.’¹ The world on the other side knew it as the Berlin Wall. To everyone it was a potent symbol of the division of Europe between communism and capitalism and the partition of Germany between East and West. However, on November 9th 1989, the wall began to crumble. The cold night air was filled with the chanting of jubilant Berliners: ‘Die Mauer ist tot!’ – the wall is dead.² Soon the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was dead too. The movement towards the reunification of East and West Germany, completed in October 1990, was inexorable. Willy Brandt, a former West German Chancellor and Mayor of West Berlin, encapsulated the hopeful mood of the time: ‘Now what belongs together will grow together.’³

The physical wall was easy enough to destroy. However, the feeling of division has never quite dissipated. Over 25 years after its fall, many Germans still speak of ‘die Mauer im Kopf’ – the wall in the mind. This psychological divide reflects persistent economic, socio-cultural, and political differences between East and West, which are generally underestimated both within and beyond Germany.

Economics

Since reunification there has been large-scale government investment in the former GDR, amounting to over €1.6 trillion.⁴ Nearly €34 billion has been driven into infrastructure alone, transforming previously decrepit roads into world-class autobahn, diverting so much funds that roads in the West are now said to be in worse condition than in the East.⁵

Nevertheless, the East’s per-capita GDP remains below even that of stagnant Italy and crisis-hit Spain. Meanwhile, the West’s per-capita GDP far outstrips this and makes Germany as a whole Europe’s leading economy.⁶ Eastern GDP is only 67 per cent of Western GDP, exactly the same as ten years ago.⁷ Eastern wages are, on average, just 70–80 per cent of those for comparable work in the West.⁸ As recently as 2005, unemployment was over 18 per cent and, despite falling to around 10 per cent, still compares unfavourably with the West where joblessness is just 6 per cent. Moreover, 90 per cent of Germany’s largest and most successful companies are based in the West.⁹ Economic integration has stalled, and the elderly and particularly those whose careers collapsed along with the GDR, have borne much economic and personal pain.¹⁰

Culture and Society

Exploiting this kind of nostalgia for the GDR – Ostalgie – is big business in modern Germany, from the leading GDR brands which continue to sell well in the East¹¹ to the 2003 film and box office hit *Goodbye Lenin*.¹² Many East Germans feel reunification robbed them not only of their stability and security, but of their identity and history too. Ostalgie is the natural result of this sense of loss, disorientation and alienation. As one East German woman puts it: ‘You know, there is no real unity in this country... I don’t feel I belong here at all.’¹³

According to the Centre for Eastern Studies, a Warsaw-based independent think tank, two German societies are ‘still functioning in parallel.’¹⁴ Even the holiday destinations and diets of East and West Germans tend to differ.¹⁵ Many East Germans are angered by the way their homeland has been demonised since 1990. As East German actress Corina Hartfouch says: ‘I cannot recognise my country from the way it is depicted. We didn’t just have autumn and winter. We had spring and summer too. Life wasn’t just about the Stasi.’¹⁶ Despite the Stasi’s record of spying upon, imprisoning, torturing, and murdering its own citizens, there is still nostalgia for the repressive state it defended. The GDR provided free childcare, free education, free public transport, and heavily subsidised cheap rent and food.¹⁷ To many, that world is preferable to the atomised, Darwinian world of reunified, capitalist Germany. It is predictable, perhaps, that they might long for a time when unemployment, homelessness, prostitution, and crime were low, non-existent or, at least, invisible.¹⁸

The West German understanding of history, however, is profoundly different.¹⁹ To Westerners, the GDR was, like Hitler’s Third Reich, an Unrechtsstaat or a dictatorship. There was no real democratic or religious freedom in a one-party police state like the GDR. It was, and remains, the most powerful and pervasive surveillance state ever built. In Stalin’s USSR, there was one NKVD agent for every 5,830 people; in Hitler’s Third Reich, one Gestapo agent per 2,000 civilians; in the GDR, one Stasi agent or informant for every 63 people (or 6.5 people if part-time informants are included).²⁰ Moreover, after decades of aggressively atheistic rule, East German society is highly irreligious, especially compared to the West. While nearly three-quarters of West Germans today belong to a Protestant or Catholic Church, only 26 per cent of East Germans do.²¹

Furthermore, East German society is sitting on a demographic time bomb. Since 1990, the East’s population has declined by 10 per cent and is aging fast, due to a low birth rate, high emigration levels (especially among the young and well-educated), and low immigration levels.²² The East is, consequently, much less racially diverse. Only 36 per cent of East Germans interact with foreigners on a daily basis, compared to 75 per cent of West Germans.²³ Without increased immigration, the GDR may soon be littered with ghost towns.²⁴

Politics

Although both Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Joachim Gauck are Easterners – Ossies – who grew up behind the Iron Curtain, they are among the only Easterners to have risen to power since reunification. Although 1 in 5 Germans live

in the East, fewer than 5 per cent of Germany’s political, business, science, and media elite are Ossies, according to researchers at Bielefeld University. None of Germany’s top 30 companies has an East German boss; 95 per cent of social science professors are West German, including at East German universities like Leipzig and Dresden; and every editor of Germany’s best-selling newspapers is West German, even at Eastern titles like *Berliner Zeitung* and *SuperIllu*.²⁵

The average Ossie and Wessie (Westerner) also tends to have different political values and a different worldview. Although residents of both firmly believe in democracy as an idea, satisfaction with the German political system is much lower in the East. Hence, support for more radical political parties on both the far-left and the far-right is also greater in the East.²⁶

Die Linke (the Left), the heir of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) which ruled the GDR, and the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) have achieved significantly higher levels of electoral support in the East than in the West.²⁷ For example, two-thirds of Die Linke’s membership is East German.²⁸ In the 2013 national parliamentary elections, Die Linke won 8.6 per cent of the vote nationwide but upwards of 20 per cent in the East, giving them 64 seats in the Bundestag and making them the third largest-party in the lower house of parliament.²⁹ The party has never been in government in the West, but has been a coalition partner in the Eastern states of Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony, and now Thuringia. In December 2014, Thuringia elected Germany’s first-ever Die Linke state premier. Having won 28 per cent of the vote the party now leads a coalition alongside the Social Democrats and Greens.³⁰ Although they insist that they do not wish to resurrect the GDR, many of their members and some of their leaders have links to the Stasi and the SED.³¹

In 2010, Matthias Platzeck, the Premier of Brandenburg, attracted widespread praise in the East and courted great controversy in the West when he declared that reunification was not a merger of equals but an annexation, or ‘Anschluss’, of East Germany by West Germany.³² A slim majority of East Germans concur and go even further, agreeing that ‘West Germans colonised the former GDR.’³³ Practically speaking, Platzeck is correct. Reunification simply meant that the Federal Republic of Germany’s borders and the jurisdiction of its existing institutions were extended to cover the former GDR. Nothing was kept over from the GDR.

Ergo, as Platzeck explains, even today many East Germans still ‘don’t feel like they’re part of united Germany – in their minds and their hearts. Everyone in the west is baffled by that. They ask: “Why don’t you feel like you’re part of one country after all the money we spent for you?” My answer to them is always: “Just imagine you’re from a society that completely disappears and there’s nothing left”. You would also feel to a certain extent homeless.’³⁴ In 2010, 67 per cent of East Germans said they did not feel like part of a united country.³⁵ In 2001, 37 per cent even described their nationality as ‘East German’ rather than ‘German.’³⁶

Perceptions of difference and stereotypes of Ossies as lazy, old-fashioned, and uncouth and Wessies as snobbish, greedy, and arrogant persist in the popular imagination. 63 per cent of East Germans and 42 per cent of West Germans believe they are still more different than alike. Clear majorities in the East and West believe that the ‘Other’ has a different way of speaking, thinking, and even of raising children.³⁷ A shared, post-reunification German national identity is, clearly, still a work in progress.

The Future

German reunification itself, therefore, is also incomplete. An imagined border between East and West, the wall in the German national mind still stands where a very real border once did. And it is not hard to see why. The East still suffers from greater poverty and unemployment than the West. Its people consume different products, work for different companies in different industries, and interpret their history and view the GDR very differently. They are less religious, less youthful, and less diverse than their Western compatriots. They also vote for different political parties at different rates, support more left-wing values, and feel less German.

This imagined border has not and will not disappear overnight. But, as ever, it is young people which provide the greatest hope for long-term change. Germans born after the fall of the wall care less for the prejudices and geopolitics of the past. They are much more likely than their parents or grandparents to feel like they belong to a united Germany. The silent passage of time appears to be slowly – albeit much more slowly and painfully than anyone ever anticipated back in 1990 – eroding the East-West divide.

As the Germans celebrated on that historic night in 1989 there were relatively few pessimists. Once reunification had been negotiated, it was largely assumed that, as Brandt had envisioned, what belonged together would grow, naturally and seamlessly, together. However, in 1983, long before the wall fell, the writer Peter Schneider sounded a prescient note of caution to those who underestimated the task ahead: ‘It will take us longer to tear down the Wall in our heads than any wrecking company will need for the Wall we can see.’³⁸ The decades since have proven Schneider right. Those seeking the reunification of Ireland, Korea, or Ukraine would be wise to take heed. Old walls are much easier to destroy than new identities are to build.

David is a third year student of Politics.



Borderless European Identity

MARTYNAS JANKAUSKAS explores the possibility and repercussions of a cohesive European identity.

Ever since the creation of the European Union there has been a gradual move towards the elimination of physical borders to facilitate free movement. Together with this breakdown of physical boundaries is an attempt to cultivate a collective, borderless European identity. The free movement of people, goods, and ideas mean that countries within the EU are more open to outside influence and may feel threatened by a loss of their own unique culture. We might ask whether European countries should close down their borders to preserve their identity or should they rather try to form a collective European identity? Is it possible at all to create such a unified understanding of being European, and if so, how can it be achieved?

According to Held and McNally, the European Union is a Kantian project created to ensure peace in a continent that has been fighting wars for centuries.¹ This task has been successful largely because an armed conflict between European Union countries is simply not going to happen – France will not suddenly send in tanks to Germany nor will Poland decide to strike Lithuania. Indeed, as result of the Single market and the Schengen Agreement, EU states are cooperating to the point where fighting each other is an idea buried long ago. Would the next step be a collective European identity? A common European culture? In a sense, this is already happening as a result of increased migration, the free movement of ideas, and a gradually increasing tendency for people to identify themselves as European.² Yet at the same time it is obvious that at the moment, a collective identity of the sort would be an incoherent mix of various cultures of different states. Applying Wendt's theories of constructivism, it can be argued that European identity is indeed being socially constructed.³ It may perhaps seem artificial in the way it is coming about, but many if not most European nations, whether Scottish or German, constructed their national identities using literature, songs, or historical figures.⁴ In the future we may see more attempts at forming a European identity on the basis of common culture or shared history, although that will pose many problems due to the fact that European history is, in a sense, one of constant war and irreconcilable differences.

It is possible to speak of a borderless European culture in theory, but in practice many EU citizens reject the idea – to them it as an encroachment on their unique heritage and traditions.⁵ These very same people are already complaining of a loss of national identity happening right before their eyes. This seems inevitable because of free trade, foreign investment, migration, and globalisation. However, is it not possible to simultaneously retain one's sense of nationality and consider oneself European? The two are not mutually exclusive and can indeed coexist. However, it would be a mistake for this European identity to be formed from a top-down elite approach.⁶ It would be artificial and would surely increase the already prevalent euroscepticism. Instead, it is the citizens of Europe across the continent that must forge this identity through their everyday discourse and exchange of ideas.⁷ For this to happen there must be openness and a civil and political will, which is somewhat lacking at the moment due to a loss of confidence in the European project.⁸

Do we currently have anything close to a European identity? The EU has a flag and an anthem – they are quite well identifiable. Obviously these aren't enough, as people need to see themselves first as Europeans and then as citizens of their

own countries, and not the other way around. What makes matters difficult is the multiplicity of different languages, religions and, cultural traditions within the EU – synthesising all of these cultural artefacts into one common identity is virtually impossible.⁹ It seems undesirable to completely tear down cultural borders between nations as this would slowly but surely denigrate individual and unique cultures. Europe has an incredibly rich history and to eventually lose unique cultural heritage to an artificial, common European identity would be deeply grievous. As societies and nations are constantly mixing, it is too late to stop the process and go back to closed-border policy, yet that is exactly what many in Europe are calling for.¹⁰

Anti-European sentiment is voiced all over Europe, especially in the West. Britain is becoming more sceptical of immigrants; similar ideas are expressed in Germany and France.¹¹ If we moved towards a stricter policy on immigration and free movement, then it would seem that the idea of a common European identity without borders would have to be scrapped for some time. Closing down borders would be a dangerous prospect for Europe, as it could lead to even more pessimism about the future and could serve only to fracture European unity.¹² It seems that the best option is a compromise – liberalisation and cross-cultural movement through elimination of borders, yet continued effort to preserve unique national heritage and identity.¹³ Perhaps the idea of a common European identity is one meant to exist solely in theory. It seems more plausible to see the future of the European Union as a fluid and constantly adapting process rather than one that is set out on paper in an official plan. Perhaps what Europe needs is not necessarily a strict identity, but an understanding of common values: freedom, democracy, legal procedure, tolerance and, of course, peace. It is these values that have brought together the countries of Europe to form the EU, they can be successful in future integration and identity formation.

At the same time, it is clear that EU citizens care most about practical issues, and not theoretical and abstract ideas on what it means to be European.¹⁴ In many senses, today the EU is failing its citizens' expectations – the financial crisis is still ongoing, and unemployment is on the rise. With such a slump in confidence, it is no wonder why many countries are beginning to doubt the European project, let alone an abstract European identity.¹⁵ In order to push through with a more unified Europe, the most important practical social and economic issues need to be dealt with. However, oftentimes EU citizens throw undue criticism at the Union because of unrealistic expectations.

The EU might benefit from strengthening its political system and addressing the problem of legitimacy – no tangible European identity is possible if its citizens think that they're being ruled by 'Eurocrats' in Brussels who care only for corporate and elite interests.¹⁶ Europeans must be confident with the EU and its direction, otherwise the union is headed for a serious crisis of identity. Economic liberalisation and elimination of physical borders has definitely helped European unity up until now, but it seems that we may have to wait for generations to see the rise of a new European identity.

Martynas is a second year student of Politics & Sociology.

The Ice Age of War

DARYA GNIDASH explores the nature of frozen conflicts and their significance to the Post-Soviet space.

Transnistria. Nagorno-Karabakh. Kashmir. South Ossetia. For the past decades these names have topped the media headlines with various analysts suggesting ways to end these conflicts. In fact, conflict resolution was not on top of the agenda of the disputing parties. What they might have in mind was redrawing state borders by virtue of starting the 'frozen conflicts'.

"A frozen conflict is a situation in which active armed conflict has been brought to an end, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants"ⁱ It should be noted that the word 'frozen' is used to describe the complexity of the conflict and not the absence of political activity.ⁱⁱ It usually involves an asymmetrical military power, reliance on long-standing cultural bickering, and a strategic interest in sustaining the conflict.ⁱⁱⁱ

Namely, in the case of Kashmir, the access to the rich water system could be seen as a reason for both India and Pakistan to claim their rights in this region. Likewise, in Transnistria, the Soviet legacy remains the apple of discord between Moldova and Russia. As a result, it becomes apparent that geography represents a driving force of the frozen conflicts.

What is more, frozen conflicts use nationalism to mobilise support for the dispute. Huntington, among other scholars, notes that new conflicts would be fought between civilisations, with cultural differences nourishing the hatred to any other civilisation.^{iv} An actual war proves to be costly and leads to numerous human losses in both camps. In comparison, informational warfare, sparked by the rise of patriotism, is cheaper and can relate to greater audiences. In so doing, Kaldor notes that nationalism is 'reconstructed' to achieve greater political control over the citizens.^v Subsequently, areas where frozen conflicts take place come under the influence of a bigger state, which aims to rebuild what was lost in the past. For instance the Crimean peninsula was taken from Ukraine under the motto 'Crimea is ours',^{vi} aiming to revive pro-Russian attitudes within the population. Similarly, the Donbass rebels are seeking Russian nationality on the grounds of a large population of ethnic Russians. Yet, from the point of view of rebels, it is more about rejecting the Ukrainian nation-building project and their treatment of the people of Donbass.^{vii} Ergo, nationalism appears to be a nametag

that is useful to cover the potential strategic interest that the bigger state has in sustaining the conflict.

Despite the fact that frozen conflicts have often been associated with Russian aggression, it is the fragmentation of the post-Soviet society and a lack of cultural identity that provokes conflict. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR have led to the establishment of the new states such as Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – states with on-going frozen conflicts. Driven by a new wave of democratisation, these governments have sought to become liberal democracies after an enduring tradition of communism. However, one may argue that the borders of the new states were symbolic and had little practical meaning. None of the governments introduced any particular immigration checks, and the Russian language still remained the most commonly spoken. As a result, the territories were still influenced by the Kremlin's policies, and no particular social change was achieved. As former Soviet allies started to join international organizations such as NATO, denoting a change in their political focus, borders have become more visible than ever before. Had the Soviet Union not pursued a path of constructing one single Communist identity, the borders of the new states would have had a much stronger meaning. By virtue of having close cultural ties to its neighbours, the government of Russia remains a strong geopolitical player; capable of punishing those it sees as disloyal. Thus, the lack of cultural identity and a merged historical past have decreased the essence of the post-Soviet borders and have left scope for their evolution.

Frozen conflicts pose a challenge because of the unwillingness of societies to let go of their past. When parties to such conflicts conclude a peace treaty, the chances of one of them breaching it are high, making continued hostilities sometimes inevitable.^{viii} In order to prevent and resolve post-Soviet-style frozen conflicts, it is vital for smaller nations to develop a sense of distinct identity that could not be easily attacked.

Darya is a second year student of International Relations.



Migration Powers and Politicised Welfare

MAXWELL GREENBERG explains the relationship between the EU, its member states, and migration policy.

With the ascent of anti-migration parties across Europe, it is easy to wonder to what degree European states are in control of their migration regimes. Are borders too porous or too rigid? With continued Europeanisation of migration standards, what agency do individual governments have in affecting the number of migrants who choose to settle in a particular country? These questions are exceedingly important in the run-up to the May 2015 UK General Election, as both UKIP and the Conservative Party have made pledges to repatriate powers over net migration numbers from the European Union. The Conservatives have even pledged to hold a referendum on continued EU membership if David Cameron's negotiation skills do not prove up to muster on the issue. In order to address the question of to what degree do European states control immigration, we must first define what 'control' of immigration means and establish reasoning for the need to control migration flows.

Bigo and Guild note that it is often undisputed that a fundamental right of the state is to control its frontiers and differentiate citizen from foreigner, as opposed to the right of individuals to move freely.ⁱ The State has traditionally been defined by control over territory, population, and administration.ⁱⁱ When we question if European states have lost control of immigration, it must be asked if states are still defined by their monopolisation of the mobility of peoples.ⁱⁱⁱ Guiraudon argues that migration control policy 'constitutes a privileged domain to study the evolution of the notion of national sovereignty and its translation in policy-making processes... and into the changing role of the state.'^{iv} Migration is a policy issue that overlaps enormously with economics, foreign relations, and labour markets. Controlling policies that affect the status of migrants and the nature of the migration process is a broad regime of policy choices. Furthermore, there is a hierarchy of control in immigration. In a liberal bureaucratic Western state, many individual decisions about who may and may not cross a frontier are made on a daily basis by agents of the state.^v Control is clearly not merely about taking decisions about which people can enter or exit a territory: for a country to be in control of immigration policies, it must have the sovereign agency to manipulate migration flows.

It is also helpful to briefly establish the scope of immigration. International migration occurs in a number of forms, including 'economic migration, family migration, ethnic migration, asylum seeking, and illegal immigration.'^{vi} It is worth noting that migration is an appropriate policy issue for Foucauldian discourse analysis, as control of immigration is a form of power relation between state and citizen, as well as between states.^{vii} The parameters of this essay will not permit that, however. The structural factors affecting migration flows are not necessarily about specific policies pursued by states and more about the changing nature of migration. The vast increase in the availability of travel has empowered many millions of people who have a desire to migrate.^{viii} Bigo, however, argues that territorialism is an outdated model for conceiving the state: 'States are conceived as networks of power and no longer as bordered power containers.'^{ix}

Halfmann, agreeing in this instance, takes a postmodernist approach to the nature of the state as fixed to citizens and territory. He argues that European states have lost control of immigration; the nature of the liberal democratic state's relationship with its citizens is undermined by migration. Migration challenges the logic of linking citizens to a state. In the liberal tradition, legal residents share civil and political rights with citizens – all legal residents of a territory are, by the nature of their legal status, treated equally before the law.^x Halfmann notes that, 'over time court decisions have led to the enforcement of equal treatment of foreigners and citizens in many legal and social issues – despite the interests of the state in privileging citizens.'^{xi} European states may be effective at limiting the number of non-EU nationals who enter their territory, but for those third-country nationals who are already inside European states, or who migrate from within the EU, the legal systems of all liberal European states, which guarantee equal access to civil and political rights (social rights to a lesser extent) mandate integration as a primary goal of social policy.^{xii} Geddes (2003) argues that supranationalists like Halfmann believe that the EU represents 'the erosion of the core national state functions with regards to border control and the mediation of membership and belonging... much as states have... had to relinquish some forms of border control and have had to accept court rulings which support the human rights of immigrants and the civil rights of their citizens to sue their own government.'^{xiii}

There is no doubt that European states have ceded substantial policymaking ability to supranational decision making bodies within the European Union. I will endeavour to show that the 'pooling sovereignty' within the policymaking apparatus of the European Union does not qualify 'losing control' of immigration policies for member states. Collaboration at the European policy-level on migration policy, argues Geddes, was prompted in its infancy by shared security concerns in the mid-1970s.^{xiv} Supranational strategies for dealing with terrorist activity began being developed in earnest in 1975 with the formation of the Trevi Group, a collection of senior

justice and home affairs ministers which met biannually.^{xv} Integration on the 'area of freedom, security, and justice' (AFS) was taken on in earnest in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which named it as a core European objective despite its overlap with policy issues intimately linked to national policymaking systems.^{xvi} Lavenex evaluates the implementation of an AFS agenda as "(like other areas of EU policy) integration has been incremental, riddled with delicate compromises and reservations by member governments." The process of Europeanisation in AFS has been particularly characterised by the 'relative weakness of legal harmonisation and a focus on more operational aspects of coordination between national authorities. This has generated a peculiar pattern of shared competences between sub-national, national, and European levels of governance...' A feature commonly identified of policies made at the European level is 'functional spill-over,' critical to a neo-functionalist accounting of European integration, whereby a policy that is adopted causes a new set of policy challenges which require further supranational policy coordination.^{xvii} The elimination of internal borders is often cited as an example of a policy that caused spill-over by requiring the further cooperation on policing external borders and the creation of common immigration regulations.

Guiraudon argues that the traditional horizontality of immigration policymaking, where decisions about the acceptance or denial of foreigners are made at the national level, is outdated.^{xviii} Beginning in the 1980s, he contends that a vertical dimension must be added to the migration process, given that the EU has assumed competencies on the issue. The lack of legally binding policymaking at a European level has encouraged national actors seeking to influence migration and asylum policy to engage in 'venue shopping' for 'policy venues,' or institutions where decisions are made on a certain issue. The venue is chosen by the actor seeking to influence policy for its ability to mobilise certain constituencies – 'the rules that guide each political arena favour different kinds of actors as they require different resources and call for different strategies.' As a result of a number of landmark legal decisions between the 1970s-1990s, Guiraudon notes that there has 'been a reduction of the arbitrary and discretionary powers of bureaucracies. In particular, certain categories of foreigners are protected against expulsion (family members, long-term residents)'^{xix} She continues, that once security groups like the Trevi group had been established, expansion of authority into other policy areas of transnational co-operation could be easily established.

The proliferation of these networks of contact between Justice, Home Affairs, Migration and Social Affairs ministers at a supranational-level resulted in a situation where migration control agencies developed migration policies at a European level as a means of achieving policy outcomes that were politically difficult to achieve in the domestic political arena or difficult to achieve when subject to domestic legal restrictions.^{xx} Unlike migration regulations in, say, Germany, where interest groups or domestic courts may be able to form coalitions that prevent ministers from implementing the sort of policies that they would like to achieve, European migration regulations may be negotiated freely as the ECJ had 'no role to play in the Maastricht 'third pillar framework.'^{xxi} Moreover, the ECJ had no jurisdiction over national measures adopted to 'maintain law and order and safeguard internal security,' even if they were developed through co-operation at a transnational level.^{xxii} The implication of venue-shopping for evaluating the level of control that European states have over immigration policy is critical – even within the constraints of the EU, states, vertical links are privileged, and certain domestic actors bypass national limits on domestic interest articulation to enact policy change at the transnational level. Givens and Luedtke, discussing Guiraudon's argument, show that the harmonisation of policy that has occurred in transnational forums has tended to be restrictive, unlike policy made in national courts or the ECJ, and the venues were chosen by states specifically to pursue national policy goals and 'enhance national sovereignty and control of immigration by allowing state actors to circumvent national-level institutional constraints.'^{xxiii} While significant policymaking ability has been supranationalised, states, by ceding policymaking authority to the EU, and by ceding sovereignty, have managed to take greater control over immigration policy.

Crowley points out that borders are 'institutional as much as territorial' – controlling immigration is not as simple as permitting or denying entrance to a given territory.^{xxvii} Bommes and Geddes argue that sovereign states are partially characterised by loyalty to the state from citizens in exchange for 'the political provision of welfare' from the state.^{xxviii} They hold that national welfare states 'have evolved as international thresholds of inequality,' where international migration is an attempt to breach these thresholds, with migrants often seeking better access to social mobility.^{xxix} The exchange of loyalty for welfare, they continue, defines the structure of relations between migrants and states, with migrants viewed positively or negatively by their perceived loyalty (or lack thereof), and by their potential claims to welfare.^{xxx} Control over participation in national welfare states is a critically important policy area which European states exercise regularly in their regulation of migration. In evaluating if European states have



lost control over immigration, the extent that individual states may permit or deny access to national welfare states is a vital criterion for evaluating the degree of control that they have over immigration as a policy area.

The state's welfare obligations are 'the structural implications of the concept of citizenship.'^{xxxii} Citizenship since the mid-twentieth century can be conceptualised as an institution guaranteeing civil, political, and social rights, developed in that order, and prioritised today in that order.^{xxxiii} Esping-Andersen, in his seminal work on typologies of welfare states, argues that social citizenship lies at the heart of welfare capitalism; social integration brought the new working and middle classes into a national community which valued equality in civil, political, and some social rights.^{xxxiii} Halfmann notes that 'the welfare state gave the idea of the nation substance by granting entitlements only to citizens.'^{xxxiv} With the emergence of Europe as a destination for mass migration, Banting argues that the structure of national welfare states has been undermined – minority communities often feel that social rights are determined by majority communities, and majority communities often feel that the cultural homogeneity that was previously characteristic of their national community is compromised.^{xxxv}

Migration often results in a shift in the political order of European states. Banting posits that there are typically three broad political reactions to mass migration in welfare states. First, migrants might be incorporated into the existing community without a fundamental change to the social consensus. Second, 'vulnerable sections of the dominant culture – such as young, less educated, blue-collar workers – might be driven by a 'welfare chauvinism' that supports the welfare state but rejects open immigration policies and the ready access of foreigners to social benefits.'^{xxxvii} Finally, political resistance to multicultural policies may result in a swelling of support for neoliberal policies that undermine the nature of the welfare state, and, potentially, the emergence of far right parties.^{xxxviii} Some European states, like the social democratic Scandinavian states, have opted for the first reaction. Some, like corporatist Germany and Austria, have opted for policies of welfare chauvinism. Other states, like France and particularly the United Kingdom, have seen a full-blown rejection of social incorporation and multiculturalism and the political ascendance of far right neoliberal parties like the United Kingdom

Independence Party and the Front National.

There are compelling reasons for this observable policy variance. Of course, elements of all three reactions are not mutually exclusive and may exist simultaneously in a state – the Sweden Democrats, a far right anti-immigration party have, in the past decade, become a significant actor in Swedish politics. These political phenomena may be explained by the differing nature of European welfare states as well. For instance, in social democratic welfare capitalist states, the 'ethos of equality' may contribute to the relatively swift normalisation and social inclusion of migrants.^{xxxix} In liberal welfare states, like the United Kingdom, welfare chauvinism takes the form of restrictive benefits policy designed to deny foreign residents access to social rights, and in restrictive immigration policies designed to reduce the number of immigrants to a country.^{xl}

There is a strong case to be made for establishing a causal link between the political character of a European welfare state and its likely response to increased migration. Welfare policies towards recent migrants vary tremendously between European states. The nature of welfare state political cultures forged during the last century has a profound impact on the sort of variance that can be observed in welfare policies. Integration into the welfare state is intimately tied to social citizenship. Control over participation in the welfare state is, as Esping-Andersen argued, control over the nature of the relationship between citizens, the state, and social community. The varying policies towards recent migrants demonstrate the substantial control over the nature of immigration that European states retain, even within the constraints of the EU.

European states have ceded significant migration policymaking powers to the EU, but, whilst doing so, established processes by which national policy agendas may still be exerted. Furthermore, European states remain firmly in control over the welfare benefits that migrants in their territory have a right to enjoy, and thus regulate the ways in which migrants might socially integrate. European states have a complex and overlapping governance structure for migration policies, but they remain in control of immigration.

Maxwell is the President of the Politics and International Relations Society and former Editor in Chief of Leviathan.

An Open Door for Nationalism

THOMAS WARREN wonders whether increasing immigration is paving the way for far-right politics across Europe.

Despite currently wielding more power over a greater number of people than ever before, the European Union is facing its fair share of problems – a fact demonstrated rather emphatically during the recent European Parliament elections. Consider voter turnout, for example. In the UK it was a predictably low 35.6 per cent; dwarfed by both the General Election of 2010 (65.1 per cent) and the referendum on Scottish independence (84.6 per cent). This issue was present throughout Europe where an average of 42.54 per cent, a record low, remained consistent with the trend of waning interest in Brussels that has seen a decrease in turnout every election since its inception.ⁱ Something even more concerning for the EU post-May, however, was the phenomenal success of anti-EU parties.

The ascent of Euro-sceptic far-right parties to the forefront of European politics, although not entirely unforeseen, was remarkable. In the UK, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) captured 26.8 per cent of the vote along with 24 seats.ⁱⁱ It was a similar story in France where the National Front secured 26.6 per cent of the vote and 23 seats to perform more than four times better than in 2009.ⁱⁱⁱ With Denmark, The Netherlands, Hungary and Austria also seeing large swings towards parties based on nationalistic principles rather than European cooperation, discussions surrounding the factors responsible are rife.

Immigration has been seen as the primary cause. With the respective parties' stances on immigration proving their flagship policies, it follows that much of their support can be derived from this. UKIP demands that the UK 'get back control over its borders; with the National Front wanting a reduction in the volume of immigration to 5 per cent of its current level.^{iv} The EU's official policy on immigration, which applies to all its member states, facilitates the 'free movement of persons' within the union.^v The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the most notable in granting this right to move and reside freely in member states, with only small amendments being made to the legislation since. It is therefore the number of residents the legislation covers, rather than changes in the legislation itself, that has shaped feeling towards immigration over the last 12 years.

Since 1992, the EU has more than doubled its membership to 28 nations. The introduction of Scandinavian powers Sweden and Finland in 1995 was followed by an encompassing of the East that included Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria followed in 2007. The trends as a result of this are interesting. In 1992, migration of UK citizens to the EU exceeded migration of EU citizens to the UK.^{vi} This was again the case between 2002 and 2003. However, with the 2004 inductees, EU migrants

rose from 61,000 in the year 2003 to 178,000 throughout 2008.^{vii} Furthermore, the volume of migration to the UK also increased every year during this period, whilst migration out of the UK stayed fairly constant. Post 2008, the Eurozone crisis stemmed the flow slightly, with less migrants coming to the UK from the EU, however net migration still rose in both 2009 and 2010. France tells a similar tale with European migrants increasing at an average of 12 per cent per year between 2009 and 2012.^{ix}

If this was enough to garner interest in UKIP and the National Front, a fitting solution to the recent explosion of support for the far-right would be the opening of EU borders to Romania and Bulgaria in early 2014, mere months before the European elections. However, statistics show that the number of Romanians and Bulgarians working in the UK actually fell once the restrictions were lifted on January 1st, 2014.^x Although anti-immigration propaganda may well have already convinced many subsequent voters by the time these statistics were revealed, it does allow for the possibility of other factors contributing to the far-right's success besides immigration.

Firstly, it can be argued that their popularity may stem from growing dissent towards the increasing location of powers within Brussels. As mentioned earlier, the EU now has greater control over more countries than at any time in its history – if nothing else, this invites democratic concerns over the legitimacy of such power with declining voter turnout. The will of voters to claw legislative power back to national Governments could well explain the rise in the popularity of anti-EU parties. Alternatively, spillover from the financial crisis and the effects still being felt on that front could also offer some explanation beyond immigration. It is possible that a lack of faith in mainstream parties both in the UK and across Europe has caused voters to look for alternatives. With the argument present that major parties are converging towards the political centre, these alternatives may well have taken the form of the far-right.

There can be little doubt that immigration has had, and continues to have, a growing effect on the popularity of the far-right. Voters are becoming increasingly concerned with job and living prospects, and choosing to exercise this concern at the polls. But the issues with immigration appear to be an indication of more general tensions felt towards the EU; the mounting popularity of anti-EU parties signals a growing disillusionment with what the European Union is becoming. If nationalism is to be prevented from spiralling out of control, it's not just immigration that needs reviewing, it's the European Union itself.

Thomas is a third year student of Economics.



Breaking the Borders of Convention

BENJAMIN WISEMAN argues the need for multi-partisan cooperation across conventional party-bloc lines in the face of mounting support for the populist far-right.

With a general election in the UK looming on the horizon, the question of whether any conceivable governing majority can possibly be formed has hardly ever seemed more pertinent. With recent polling showing the Conservative and Labour Parties to be neck and neck, with each receiving 33 per cent of the electoral support, and expected potential coalition partners (such as the Green party and the Liberal Democrats) hovering at around seven per cent,¹ the prospective parliamentary stalemate could prove to be quite the drawn-out affair.² The only major alternative to these established parties, then, can be seen in the burgeoning far-right United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), currently bashfully polling at a likely understated fifteen per cent of the vote. In one way or the other, UKIP is highly likely to assume the role of key player in the near future.³

Whether UKIP will be pushing for their agenda from within a coalition or as part of an opposition remains to be seen.⁴ What is clear, however, is that both main UK parties have resorted to appropriating UKIP's most central matters of concern, to greater or lesser degrees, to try and stem the flow of lost support. Such matters are most notably those concerning immigration,⁵ and to some extent putting forward a proposed referendum on continued EU membership.⁶ Thus, rather than jointly declare some form of rudimentary cooperation to allow the largest party to rule on its own terms, they have instead both compromised fundamental standpoints to match those of UKIP's. By implicitly allowing UKIP to influence the future of the British political make-up so potently, the UK in effect runs a real risk of stumbling into an imminent political impasse with no clear majority to be found.

Hung parliaments with political systems in subsequent gridlock are nothing new. In fact, it is a scenario that tends to occur from time to time throughout the party-political world, for various erratic reasons with equally inconsistent and varying volatile outcomes. Following the 2010 UK general election, no party managed to successfully secure an outright parliamentary majority on their own. This led to an effectively hung parliament and an apprehensive six days of 'coalition seeking' before the governing partnership between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats was finally announced. While these six days were indeed a noteworthy lull in the continuity and stability of contemporary British political governance, they were dwarfed by the aftermath of the Belgian general election held only one month later. Staggeringly, the Belgian outcome brought about a 535-day long 'transitional' period, eclipsing all other modern-day records of failure to form a government thus far.⁷

In both cases, the governmental standstills led to a similar rise in uncertainty regarding the general direction of the overall state of affairs, as well as considerable drops in confidence around financial matters in particular.⁸ This was perhaps most notably portrayed by the downgrading of Belgium's credit rating by Standard & Poor, attributed specifically to the astonishingly long period spent in what was essentially a political vacuum.⁹ Dissimilarly, however, the state of domestic politics in Belgium had already been in turmoil since 2007, largely due to the ascent of secessionist Flemish parties, including the extreme far-right populist party Vlaams Belang and the centre-right New Flemish Alliance (N-VA).¹⁰ In the UK, conversely, the serious ascension of UKIP had not yet taken place, allowing the generally perceived more amenable Liberal Democrats to effectively assume the role of kingmaker through deciding whether to ally with the Conservative or the Labour party respectively.¹¹

Yet, in the present day, the scenario has reversed. While UKIP now seems poised to claim at least fifteen per cent of the votes in the UK 2015 general election, their Flemish counterparts Vlaams Belang have been declared 'burnt toast' in Belgium following their disastrous election results of May 2014 in which they saw their support essentially cut in half.¹² This reversal in Belgium has largely been accredited to many Vlaams Belang voters simply having grown tired of the inability of the party to work within the system, due mainly to their radical, demagogical reputation. Instead, the party was arguably seen as contributing only to the continued disruption of the political process in the country.¹³ In the UK, UKIP has already declared that they 'won't do a deal'¹⁴ in any shape or form before the election, and that they aim to 'fundamentally change British politics'¹⁵ on their own. As a result, genuine parallels can be drawn between UKIP and their Flemish equivalent's position just over seven years ago. Moreover, if the outcomes in Belgium are anything to go by, their indications do not bode well for the future stability of British politics, and arguably society as a whole, if retained on the current trajectory.

In Sweden, the established parties have recently been forced to cope with a very similar situation to that in the UK, though by implementing a markedly different solution. In the 2014 Swedish general election, the ruling minority centre-right

coalition was ousted from power by a second minority coalition comprised of the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Green Party.¹⁶ With a meagre combined total of 38 per cent of electoral support, however, the newly elected centre-left minority coalition saw its budget proposition voted down one month later, and proceeded to announce a snap re-election shortly thereafter.¹⁷ The root of the inability of both the centre-left and centre-right to gain sufficient parliamentary sway to rule on their own can be found – just as previously in Belgium and potentially in the UK – in the rise of a far right anti-immigrant/EU party.¹⁸ The Sweden Democrats (SD) garnered an impressive thirteen per cent of the vote in 2014, picking off heaps of purportedly disenfranchised voters primarily from the two largest parties in Sweden on either side of the party-bloc border.¹⁹ Following a rapid succession of probes after the announcement to hold a new election, however, the decision was withdrawn as it was seen as detrimental to all major traditionally established parties, and more importantly society at large, to hold it.²⁰ A deal across the traditional borders of party bloc politics was instead struck between all major parties, lasting until 2022, and effectively ensuring that the largest minority coalition will be tacitly allowed to rule throughout their mandate.²¹

Yet, such cooperation across conventional party borders is perhaps not as groundbreaking as it might seem at first glance. In 1931, when questions championed by the hard-line communists were the hot topic in Sweden, a series of violent events and political turmoil unfolded between various groupings in society. The result was several deaths and a complete breakdown of trust between the varying political factions and societal groupings.²² Despite the dire situation, consolidation was eventually reached when a middle ground, establishing most importantly a set of basic areas too vital to be allowed to decline, was agreed upon by all major parties (excluding the communists).²³ These agreements then proceeded to 'prompt broad political cooperation across party boundaries'²⁴ regarding the most vitally perceived areas, on the grounds that 'without trusting cooperation between the parties (...) the social trap would snap shut, not only around the Swedish (...) market, but around all of Swedish society' as well.²⁵ The 2014 agreements across the borders of the established political parties in Sweden – devised to avoid the influence of disruptive, populist, political dissidents – arguably owe greatly to the consolidation of the legacy of 1931.

This lesson of cooperation across traditional party borders is, arguably, one that bears repeating in order to avoid a great deal of hardship for a great deal of states in the coming years. Across Europe, and especially in the UK with the parliament closer than ever to finding itself hung at the clutches of a dissenting UKIP, the need to bypass conventional party borders to reach agreement across the political spectrum is obvious. Populist, nationalist, and racist parties like the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Germany, Golden Dawn in Greece, and Front National in France are all serious contenders for either attaining serious amounts of power or, at the very least, gridlocking attempts by others to rule in their respective countries without their support. If the hard-earned agreement set out by Sweden to circumvent the influence of nascent far-right parties to maintain stability is not enough, what happened in Belgium provides perhaps the prime example of what can happen should the lesson go unheeded. With an approach to cross-border party cooperation more based on the Swedish model, Belgium could have avoided setting the world record for longest hung parliament and having their credit rating demoted, among other detrimental consequences, largely due to uncertainty about the future alone.²⁶ Instead, it took them seven debilitating years to reach a lasting consensus of government, from 2007-2014, with countless periods of power vacuum varying in length between the numerous provisional caretaker governments.²⁷ If that is not reason enough to bury the traditional hatchet between the major established parties – if only temporarily, and at a most basic level – nothing ever will be. In that event, we can likely only resign ourselves to at least a handful of years of political degradation in more than a handful of European countries.

Confronted with the very real threat of exceptionally lengthy periods of hung parliaments at best and far-right domination at worst, therefore, the major established parties in Europe are faced with – and must make – a decisive choice. Either they assume responsibility for finding compromises that are favourable for the development of society amongst each other, or they will have to prepare to break a whole new set of records for failure by succumbing to the petty politics of conventional party borders.

Benjamin is a fourth year student of International Relations.

Latin America

REGIONAL EDITOR



Latin America has experienced the brutality of physical, ideological, and political borders, not only as consequence of the continent's colonial past, subsequent political movements, and wars for independence, but also its continuously controversial relationship with the US. This

experience has highlighted the importance of building independent political entities in order to ensure stability in the region. However, with the increasing interconnectedness of the international economic system and the steep rise of communication in a globalised world, issues such as deforestation in the Amazon region or the production of cocaine in Colombia suddenly transcend national borders, contributing to global phenomena such as climate change

and transnational crime. As a result, solutions are often sought through international action, thereby denying local agency.

The articles in this issue of the Leviathan highlight these contradicting power relations by deconstructing the meaning of borders in a region that still sees mounting international involvement, not only by states, but also by non-state actors. One prominent example includes the US-led 'War on Drugs', which ultimately proved to be ineffective in tackling the root causes of increased drug production. In addition, Greenpeace's inability to take into account local concerns, whilst campaigning for greater environmental regulations during the Lima Climate Summit, demonstrates ever more how boundaries are disrespected in the region.

It remains thrilling to see where Latin America is headed in 2015 and how much it will be able to distance itself from the varied agendas of different stakeholders. It will be up to the region to decide whether its regional integration efforts prove resilient enough to deal with these far-reaching problems.

Leonie von Hammerstein



Trouble in El Dorado: How Stateless Crime Undermines Society in Latin America

MUHAMMAD IQBAL

Mercenary expeditions in Latin America began in 1532, when Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro arrived in Peru. This was the first attempt in what would subsequently be a period characterised by conquests and colonisation in the region.¹ Many of these efforts were spurred in part by the fables of El Dorado, a legendary city of such immense wealth and abundance of gold that its people would routinely hurl spiritual offerings of golden objects into lakes.²

Today a different kind of mercenary activity exists in the region, along with a different kind of material wealth being sought after. The trafficking of drugs across borders in Latin America currently exists as a multi-billion dollar industry, which finances organised crime syndicates and contributes to the pervasive influence of corruption and violence on day-to-day life.³ Focusing on stateless crime in Latin America, we will here take a brief look at the prevalence of transnational organised crime in the region, and the effective steps currently being taken in order to combat the continuation and growth of this issue. Due to its immensity and complexity, the countermeasures discussed here are not comprehensive anti-crime solutions, but rather, best practice examples identified by particular cases in the region.

Drawing on numbers to highlight the extent of cross-border crime in Latin America, it must first be noted that up to 90 per cent of global cocaine seizures are reported to occur on the continent, with Peru recently being ranked as the top source of coca leaves and cocaine hydrochloride, the raw materials needed for cocaine, followed by Bolivia and Colombia.⁴ In a research service report for the US Congress, the most prominent drug trafficking cartels were identified as being those from Mexico and Colombia, with total drug proceeds from the two countries estimated to generate between \$18 billion and \$39 billion annually.⁵ The impact of trans-border organised crime in the region in turn has been significant. It was estimated by the InterAmerican Development Bank that the issue has contributed to the diminishment of Latin America's per capita gross domestic product by as much as 25 per cent, due to its discouraging effect on investments from foreign firms, curtailment of worker productivity, and inflation of operating costs for businesses.⁶

'Yes, but...?' This appears to be the only expected way to respond to such analyses. Yes, two Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, have both shown a steady rise in crime rates and violence, where such factors remain major forces undermining growth, welfare, and development.⁷ But, experts still predict the same two countries to emerge among the top ten nations dominating the global economy within the next fifty years.⁸ Yes, rising demands in European and South American drug consumption threaten to expand the global market for drug trade and thus contribute to organised cross-border crime in the region.⁹ But, the decreased consumption of illicit drugs in the US, still the largest consumer in the Latin American drug trade, has significantly contributed to the decreased flow of drugs through the Caribbean, a route traditionally thought to be the preferred corridor for drug trafficking by Colombian organised crime groups.¹⁰ Yes, crime per capita has been on a steady, albeit slight increase in Latin America since 1995, with the continent being deemed the most violent region in the world.¹¹ But, impact evaluations carried out in three of the five most violent countries in the world – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – recently managed to identify several productive community-based efforts at combatting crime, some producing up to 51 per cent reductions in perceived incidences.¹²

Looking back briefly into the annals of history, it was in the 19th century that a number of aggressive Latin American revolutions took place, leading to the creation of sovereign states independent from the Spanish rule that had dominated them for centuries past.¹³ It is then similarly tempting to believe that belligerent approaches to crime prevention such as those adopted by numerous Latin American policymakers, promising an iron fist stance against crime,¹⁴ or the US-backed 'war on drugs'¹⁵ are the most appropriate means for tackling organised cross-border crime. Yet, as demonstrated by the numbers, such measures have only failed to quell long-term cocaine production in the region. In the early 1990s, while Peru had been responsible for producing 65 per cent of the world's cocaine, efforts involving the shooting down of airplanes carrying cocaine products to Colombia resulted in drug traffickers shifting their operations up north, leading to Colombia becoming the estimated source of 90 per cent of the world's cocaine in 2000.¹⁶ However, Peru's return to its position today as the world's top cocaine producer has been due to measures focused solely on eradication efforts and less on long term sustainable projects involving alternative development for former coca farmers, as well as prevention and treatment programmes.¹⁷

Thus, with the livelihood of members of the drug trade, especially farmers, being dependent on the production of drug crops, it becomes something of a paradox that although it is proving to be the scourge of the Latin American economy, the industry also fuels its growth, albeit indirectly. As such, the more effective solutions to counteracting the region's problem have arguably been identified as those that tackle local-level symptoms of organised crime, including gun-buyback programmes and community policing ventures.¹⁸ Further examples of this local-based approach include curricular changes in public schools, regular visits to at-risk homes by healthcare providers, and alternative dispute resolution measures aimed at decongesting court dockets.¹⁹ Better still are best practice proposals adopted from residents of different neighbourhoods in Buenos Aires, organising concerted strategies for better lighting and police patrolling based on shared information on criminal gangs and observed crime patterns.²⁰ Some of these efforts have managed to produce an astounding 67 per cent reduction in homicides, which is significant particularly for statistically violent countries such as El Salvador.²¹

Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact solution to the problem, with policemen, soldiers, judges, mayors, and political candidates being openly killed by cartel gunmen and members of transnational crime organisations on a regular basis, it would appear that the local level efforts mentioned earlier are not only the best, but also the only plausible method to tackling this lawlessness.²² Though suggestions have been made in favour of interstate cooperation for dealing with transnational offences, these have typically included cross-border extradition agreements between Latin American countries and cooperation between the parliamentary and defensive institutions within those countries.²³ Such measures seem counterintuitive given the prevalence of corruption in the region and the seeming impotence of its institutions at present.²⁴ In this manner, it is then unconvincing that the added stresses of such bureaucratic hullabaloo would assist in dispelling the myth of El Dorado for the mercenaries of the 21st century.

Muhammad is a fourth year student of Law & International Relations. He is the Director of Communications at the Politics and International Relations Society and former Editor for Asia at Leviathan.

Time for Change, Greenpeace?

HALLAM TUCK examines the exclusionary politics of the corporate environmental movement.

In December of last year, activists from Greenpeace caused uproar when they placed a series of banners promoting climate change regulations beside Nazca's iconic hummingbird figure.¹ The intention of the protest was to pressure nations at the UN Climate Change Conference in Lima to adopt greater environmental regulations in an effort to combat climate change.² Yet, by damaging the archaeological sites in Nazca, Greenpeace undermined their own goals in spectacular fashion. By trespassing on the fragile world heritage site, to which access is closely regulated, Greenpeace activists carved new lines into the soil, irreparably damaging the geoglyphs.³ For many Peruvians, the protest exemplified a dishonourable insensitivity common among western organisations towards their cultural heritage.⁴ In a broader sense, the protest highlighted the series of faults at the heart of Greenpeace's strategy of 'direct action'. Casting regional environmental concerns in the universalising language of human survival promotes fundraising and movement building at the risk of excluding the communities that do not ascribe to Greenpeace's symbolic discourse. Climate change clearly concerns all nations, especially

developing countries like Peru, which studies suggest will bear the brunt of climate change's negative effects.⁵ Yet, Greenpeace's current strategy promotes a strain of climate activism that bears little sensitivity to non-Western traditions, agency, or interest. Although the organisation's past successes clearly accord them respect, the errors of the Nazca protest highlight important fractures that must be overcome if the environmental movement is to meaningfully integrate global interests.

Since its inception in the late 1960s, Greenpeace has relied on a strategy of 'direct action' to galvanise public opinion and promote reform.⁶ Where all social movements have an asymmetrical reliance on mass media, Greenpeace has been remarkably successful in using provocative media coverage to promote changes in business and government.⁷ This is, of course, the deliberate result of a successful media strategy that has reduced the asymmetrical relationship between Greenpeace and various media outlets. In interviews with sociologists studying social movements, Greenpeace activists emphasised that their primary focus was to



attract funding through media saturation, which would then be reinvested in outreach drives to increase membership and garner more coverage.⁸ One activist remarked that 'one's performance in a campaign is evaluated on how successfully you're able to project a message through the media, because the politicians are totally responsive, capitalism is responsive to the media.'⁹ Rather than reduce their dependence on media outlets, Greenpeace engages in provocative, media-friendly protests that pressure targeted governments and businesses while also building recognition.

The scale of Greenpeace's success has been distinct and remarkable. In a recent campaign against Asia Paper and Pulp (APP), a company contributing heavily to deforestation in Indonesia, Greenpeace pressured toy manufacturer Mattel to remove APP products from their supply chain.¹⁰ In a series of videos distributed widely across the internet, activists attacked Mattel's reputation by linking the iconic Barbie toys with deforestation.¹¹ The image of 'chainsaw Barbie' was a particularly brilliant example of this provocative media strategy, linking Barbie's symbolic cultural excesses with the threat to ecological stability posed by deforestation. In response to the campaign, Mattel removed rainforest-sourced paper from their supply chain.¹² Images from Greenpeace's campaign to protect the Arctic have achieved a similarly powerful symbolic impact. Videos of activists being held at gunpoint by the Russian coast guard outside Gazprom's Prirazlomnaya oil rig in the arctic brought widespread condemnation from media outlets in the west and boosted donations to the organisation.¹³

Crucially, Greenpeace executives have kept the political ideology driving their organisational strategy deliberately loose, allowing them to advocate for a broad variety of issues under the banner of 'defending the natural world.'¹⁴ Indeed, Greenpeace activists have mobilised the discourse of 'environmental justice' as a universalist political language that views all of the threats to human survival as intertwined and interrelated.¹⁵ This universalist language overcomes general public apathy by situating the campaigns not as parochial environmental concerns, but as larger efforts to save 'mother nature.' Therefore, when Greenpeace implements a direct action it functions on two levels: on a basic level the action disrupts the planned operation of the business or state organisation it is targeting.¹⁶ Simultaneously, the protest functions as a signification of 'what is wrong with the world', thus influencing the members of the public who consume the images through television and the internet.¹⁷

Even before the Nazca protest, the NGO had been heavily criticised for its opposition to genetically modified (GM) foods, which promise to alleviate malnutrition and hunger in the developing world.¹⁸ Canadian ecologist Patrick Moore, once a prominent member of the organisation, has repeatedly publicly criticised Greenpeace's campaign against 'golden rice', a GM rice crop fortified with vitamin A, that he argues would save two million children a year from premature death.¹⁹ This suspicion towards genetically modified crops reflects a crucial disjunction between the developed and developing

world. In the capital-intensive agricultural industries of the developed world it is far easier to be suspicious of GM crops that would improve yield without spraying pesticide or using heavy fertiliser.²⁰ Robert Paarlberg, a professor of political science at Wellesley College in the United States, has argued that poor African farmers have been unduly denied access to productive biotechnology like GM crops and synthetic fertilisers by wealthier nations who do not face the same challenges.²¹ Although it is still unclear whether GM foods bear risks that outweigh their benefits, the simple fact is that the future of biotechnology continues to be shaped by politicians and scientists in wealthy countries who are unlikely to fully understand the needs of the developing world.

The importance of the Nazca protests was to suggest, in overwhelmingly symbolic terms, that the NGO's spectacle-hungry media strategy had little understanding or respect for Peruvian cultural heritage. Responses to the protest from Peruvian officials and media outlets suggested that, by damaging the site, Greenpeace activists had offended a sense of national identity that relies heavily on the symbolic imagery of pre-colonial cultures.²² That all of the activists accused by the Peruvian government of 'attacking archaeological monuments' are foreigners only reinforces perceptions of the protest as a desecration of national heritage by extrajero interlopers.²³ Yet on a broader level, the failure of Greenpeace's meticulously crafted public image in Peru stems from the fact that a social movement that thrives on support from western public audiences will not always be sensitive to non-western interests.

If Greenpeace's goal in Peru was to pressure negotiators at the UN Climate Conference to adopt more aggressive climate regulations, critical reactions to the agreed climate deal would suggest that they had little success.²⁴ Perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that the controversy surrounding the protests will provoke any major lasting change. Yet, policymakers and activists should draw a series of important lessons from the incident going forward. Most obviously, social movements like Greenpeace that rely specifically on media coverage are limited in the scope of their 'transformative politics' by their asymmetrical dependency on spectacular media coverage. In the words of one Greenpeace activist: 'When we finally got lots of media coverage is when we were out saving cute little whales. That wasn't threatening the US government... The media is just another big business and we'll never accomplish what we want by depending on the media.'²⁵ Simultaneously, the Nazca protests suggest a deeper separation between the developed and developing world over the shape of climate change regulations and development policy. The continuing debate over the implementation of biotechnology in developing countries is a strong example of this. These debates show that a truly inclusive, global approach to climate policy will need to be far more accessible and accountable to non-western interests.

Hallam is Leviathan's Editor for Asia and host of political radio programme The Back Bench.



Middle East

The Middle East's rather artificial borders, notably comprised of straight lines, were demarcated by the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 and have for decades caused cross-border problems. This is mostly due to the amalgamation of a variety of ethnic groups and religions within these states. Over the years, these conflicts have ebbed and flowed, yet recently a substantial crisis has emerged prompting politicians, scholars, and the public at large to seriously question the future of the Middle Eastern landscape.

In contemplating the issues of the Middle East, it is critical to note how the region is grappling with a multitude of diverse border-related issues. As it deals with traditional cross-border problems such as immigration (for example, the on-going war

in Syria continues to send thousands of refugees pouring out of the country), the region is also facing more radical changes stemming from the work of the Islamic militant group ISIS seeking the dissolution of all borders. The internal struggles also beg us to consider how this state of affairs has gotten international forces involved to secure the peace and stability of the region.

In this issue, we will be aiming our focus towards those political and religious matters that have transcended borders. Our articles will examine both how the rising tension between Sunni and Shia are fragmenting nations, and how the political and religious ideologies of ISIS are challenging typical state boundaries. As evidenced in these articles, there is broad uncertainty over the future of the region, as the geo-political order of the Middle East hangs in the balance.

Rina Moss



The Islamic State: The Dissolution of Modern Borders

ANNA SEARS

As ISIS militants move through the deserts of the Iraqi-Syrian border, their vivid and brutal military strategy has gained international attention for its efficiency. Behind this shock-and-awe display of force, however, is a much more nuanced mission to completely restructure the balance of power in the Middle East. Capitalising on the regional instability generated by the civil war in Syria and on-going strife in Iraq, ISIS has succeeded in gaining control not only of 31,080-km² of territory,¹ but also in a 'hearts and minds' sense. Among Sunni tribes and in many rural areas in Anbar province, the declaration of the Islamic State in summer 2014 was welcomed heartily in villages that had not seen a stable government since the fall of Saddam Hussein.²

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or 'DAESH', the Arabic acronym for the same name)³ would be a neo-caliphate, erasing all borders established in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. The group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, envisions a unified state of Sunnis in the style of the original Islamic state as established by the Prophet Mohammed in the year 622. This idea is not an original one – Arab nationalism became popular in the 1950s and culminated in the brief creation of the United Arab Republic, bringing together Egypt

and Syria; pan-Islamism manifests itself throughout the modern history of the Middle East in a variety of forms, from political (the Ba'ath party in Iraq) to social (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). What sets ISIS apart is the ruthless nature of its conquest, a characteristic that is a direct product of continuing radicalisation of Levantine society since the 1990s due to civil war and occupation.⁴

The origins of the current incarnation of ISIS can be traced back to the Islamist group Jamaat al-Tawhid, founded in 2000 by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.⁵ His mission did not gain popularity until he brought it to Iraq after the U.S. invasion, where eventually it became one of the factions fighting in the Sunni insurgency of 2003.⁶ As that militia changed leadership and composition over the next few years, the element of Zarqawi's vision that remains a core tenet of the ISIS doctrine and differentiates ISIS from previous Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda, is the importance of targeting internal enemies, i.e. the Shia, as a means of purifying the Caliphate, before going after the American occupiers.⁷ This is why today, ISIS does not shy away from incurring large numbers of civilian casualties in order to gain control of territory. Each conquered city represents more than simple military strength; it validates the idea that the success of an Islamic state is unstoppable divine providence.

When the U.S. intervened to put down the tribal uprising in Iraq in 2009 with



the now infamous 'troop surge,' the mission of the Islamic State lost traction among the Sunni tribes who were offered more participation in the Iraqi government if they aided the repression of Islamist groups.⁸ However, when American troops finally left Iraq in 2009 and the nascent Iraqi government proved to not only be disorganised but impotent, Sunni tribal leaders were turned into looking for new alliances. As ISIS regrouped and established training camps for guerrilla fighters between 2011 and 2012,⁹ they quickly won over the loyalty of disparate groups looking to back the next 'strong horse' in the region.¹⁰

The idea of the Islamic State not only tactically reaffirms Sunni authority; it also rejects the entire ideological legacy of the western conquest of the Middle East. In real time, this makes Islamism politically advantageous to rebel leaders and tribes searching for stability, but underlying this is a much more far-reaching appeal to any and all Muslims who feel that the potential of Islamic society has been stifled in the modern era by the West, cruelly reducing a rich and sophisticated tradition to bloodshed and international subservience. So even though many understand that a fully formed Islamic state is only a remote possibility, they support ISIS for their brazen pursuit of a long-dormant ideal.¹¹ Similarly, to a generation of Sunni youth facing a collapsed job market and limited social mobility, the decision to join ISIS doesn't even require a particularly devout faith;¹² militants receive housing, food, money, not to mention the more intangible rewards of honour and camaraderie - which is a difficult offer to turn down.

The appeal of ISIS paired with its quick success has brought them worldwide popularity among militant Islamic groups, inspiring copycat attacks as well as enticing young men from all over the world to join. Taking advantage of the globalised internet-community, ISIS posts recruitment videos on their official twitter and publishes a flashy online magazine, *Dabiq*,¹³ replete with edgy graphics and religious symbolism (*Dabiq* is a north Syrian town mentioned in the Hadith as the location where Islamic and Christian armies will meet on Armageddon).¹⁴ Their videos in particular are gruesome, most infamously a clip posted in August depicting the beheading of an American journalist in response to airstrikes in Iraq. As the call to join the Islamic state is global, the boundaries of its membership are blurred by this phenomenon of viral web-notoriety. Turkish teens are idolising individual militant commanders,¹⁵ while jihadi groups in the Sinai Peninsula jointly pledged allegiance to the Islamic state last November.¹⁶ More troubling are various rogue acts of terrorism carried out in the name of ISIS by unaffiliated actors -- most notably the hostage crisis in Sydney in December, where captives were made to hold up the flag of the Islamic State to the windows of the café in which they were being held.¹⁷ The central ISIS command manipulates this feeling of confusion over where exactly the group ends and begins as a way to promote a sense of their universal presence and the inevitability of their success.¹⁸

The governing apparatus of the Islamic State is surprisingly elaborate, able to administrate large swaths of land and implement local government as they continue military operations in rough conditions.¹⁹ Al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, maintains a high level of secrecy, fuelling rumours of his superhuman character. In meetings with provincial leadership, he appears with such a large entourage that sometimes a local

governor will not know exactly which man is the would-be Caliph until a surprise reveal late in negotiations.²⁰ There is some speculation over whether or not Al-Baghdadi obtained a doctorate degree from the University of Baghdad in Islamic studies,²¹ and either way, this doesn't prove him to be any kind of lifelong extremist; rather his radical ideology was nurtured during his internment as a civilian detainee in the U.S. military-run Camp Bucca near Umm Qasr, Iraq after the start of the Sunni uprising in the mid-2000s.²² It was there he began collaborating with Sunni insurgents and crystallised his vision of a tactical Jihad that would be intellectually as well as strategically successful. Now, his inner circle is made up mostly of former members of Saddam's military command,²³ who oversee a large network of rebel commanders and use their expertise to establish regimented tax structures in conquered territories to fund their operations. They use their violent grip on rural communities to round up petty criminals and establish sharia courts; small services that keep them entrenched in the lands they conquer even as the front is kilometres away.

ISIS' impact on regional dynamics in the Middle East has been profound, and some of the effects might not be fully realised for decades. Within Syria and Iraq, ISIS has been implicated in upwards of 17,000 civilian deaths in 2014,²⁴ primarily of Shia, Christians, and Yazidis. These last have suffered particularly at the hands of the Islamic State; their women have been kidnapped and enslaved by the thousands in order to be given away to Sunni youth as enticements to enlist.²⁵ Based primarily in Nineveh province in northwest Iraq, the Yazidis have been almost completely displaced; the UN reports that around 50,000 of them have taken refuge in the ridges of the Sinjar mountain range without food or supplies.²⁶ Their closest allies, and sole protectors in many cases, have been the Peshmerga Kurds.²⁷ This relationship causes difficulties for international coalitions against ISIS, as the Kurds have previously been a problematic actor in the process of stabilising the Iraqi government, since they claim land and oil resources that are vital to Iraqi sovereignty.²⁸ However, in this case, the international community might not be able to risk leaving the Kurds out of the effort to curtail ISIS - they have extensive knowledge of the territory, are more agile than the Iraqi military, and most importantly, Kurdish leadership knows that their cooperation will gain them much-needed legitimacy in the fight for statehood.²⁹

On a larger scale, Iran has entered the fray by launching air attacks against ISIS strongholds near their border with Iraq,³⁰ and the Turkish and Russian governments are reported to have entered into an alliance against ISIS cells within their borders that have pledged to 'liberate' Sunni populations in Chechnya and the Caucasus.³¹ Whether or not these, along with the efforts of the West, have had a real impact on ISIS' progress is still unclear. What is certain is that very strange bedfellows have been made of previous enemies in the international community. However, the fight against extremism will require much more than military power to combat the intellectual hold that ISIS has over the heart of the Levant.

Anna is a postgraduate student of International Relations of the Middle East with Arabic.

The Shia-Sunni Divide

BARBARA WOJAZER characterises the conflict that may redefine the Middle East.

The schism that occurred at the origins of Islam is at the root of many ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. In a time of instability, this divide is exacerbated by the rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. This conflict may result in the modification of borders in today's Middle East.

Since the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D., Islam has been divided between two doctrines. Originally, Shias believed that the descendants of Mohammed's son-in-law, Ali, were his legitimate heirs, while Sunnis refused to follow Ali's descendants. The dispute over authority later evolved into a complex conflict. It is now as much a division on the soul of Islam as it is an ethnic, identity conflict. It reflects a power struggle between rival communities of different religious identities.¹ Although Sunnis make up about 87 per cent of the total Muslim population,² there are parts of the Middle East where Shias are a clear majority. When shaping the borders of the countries in the region, France and Great Britain did not consider these religious divisions. For a century now, this oversight has contributed to aggravated tensions in the Middle East.

Although danger has always existed, Shias and Sunnis have lived peacefully for most of their history, partly because the two are not radically different: they share faith in the Prophet and the Quran, and their prayers are the same.³ After 1918, coexistence, cooperation, and even intermarriages became routine in large cities in Iraq and other countries.⁴ Later, sincere attempts at reconciliation were made by large parts of both communities. In 2005, a meeting in Jordan gathered 170 scholars representing nine different persuasions of Islamic thought. By recognising each other's sovereignty, they addressed a major clashing point in this religious divide.⁵

However, in every time of instability, sectarian tensions resume. The balance of power between Shias and Sunnis has been disrupted by several events, of which the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is seen as the most important. According to Ofra Bengio and Mehr Livak, it 'provided a significant boost to the Shi'a all over the Muslim world.'⁶ The American-backed regime of the Shah was replaced by the Islamic rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shia religious leader. The revolution gave him 'the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government,'⁷ a Shia concept that stands in contrast to the Sunni view that the political and religious leaderships can be separated. Shias accentuated their prominence in the Middle East, and consequently, Sunnis felt threatened and feared the emergence of another Shia power resembling that of the Safavid dynasty.⁸ Saudi Arabia, the most powerful, overtly Sunni country, reacted by accelerating the propagation of Wahhabism, a puritan revival.⁹ The Shia awakening backfired, antagonising opinions on both sides.

Launched in 2003, the intervention in Iraq again triggered a cycle of violence. This time, a Shia-led regime replaced the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. This first-ever Shia government in Baghdad frightened foreign Sunni leaders.¹⁰ As

chaos spread in Iraq, one's identity and affiliation with one of the communities became extremely important, as they became the only forms of authority in much of the country during the time of the intervention.¹¹

The events of the Arab Spring further destabilised the region, creating a high level of insecurity. Already concerned by the rise of Shias after the intervention in Iraq, Sunni-governed regimes became increasingly worried about their grip on power. Seeing, for example, that Iran boosted its support to Shia fighters in Yemen, Saudi Arabia responded by extending its level of supports for Yemen's Sunnis.¹²

Naturally, the consequences of the Arab Spring differed between countries: Tunisia is undergoing a democratic transition; while the situation is less clear in Libya and Egypt.¹³ But, the area where the conflict between Shias and Sunnis is perhaps most blatant is in Syria. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Assad regime controls the Mediterranean Coast, Damascus, and Homs, possibly threatening Lebanon's sovereignty. The rump-state of Damascus, whose interests are generally Shia-aligned,¹⁴ is likely to stay with Assad,¹⁵ but even this is subject to speculation. On the other side, one can wonder what will happen to the opposition strongholds. The Syrian war has been seen by some Sunni leaders as their last chance to reverse the spread of Shia domination, and for Saudi Arabia, to counter Iran's growing influence.¹⁶ The stakes are high, and both powers have deployed extensive means to influence the war. According to Reuters, 'Assad is now benefiting from the deployment by Tehran of hundreds more military specialists... and security experts.'¹⁷ Hezbollah is helping the Shia regime, while Sunnis are being aided by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.¹⁸

It is too soon to evaluate the consequences of the Arab Awakening and the Syrian war. Still, one may say it has triggered a chain-reaction of violence between Sunnis and Shias in the Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese area. These countries are now seen as fractured, and the conflicts could redraw the map of the Middle East.¹⁹ According to Pierre Rousselin, there is an urgent need to find national unity to counter these fractures, and that might very well happen through the redefinition of frontiers put into place by the Sykes-Picot Treaty.²⁰ Ultimately, the divide between Sunnis and Shias is widening as violence grows and retaliation spreads throughout the Middle East. The region is undergoing some major structural changes. For now, it is hard to predict how conflicts will settle, but the character of the region will be decided by this settlement.

Barbara is a first year student of Politics & Russian.



North America



It seems as though the borders of North America have never been, or at least have never felt, static. They arose from constant rivalries between colonists, indigenous

peoples, and revolutionaries. Although cartographers in the region haven't had much business since the Polk administration, borders continue to have the utmost significance, representing not only lines on the map but also identity, influence, unity, and division.



The articles in this issue of the Leviathan highlight some of the most beckoning questions about the past, present, and future of North America. The southwestern border of the United States in particular has been troubled by a humanitarian emergency. Carter Cikovic endeavours to assess this bizarre and sudden immigration crisis, in which the border has become a hotspot for burdened Central American minors.

While the Mexican-American border exacerbates a divide between societies, it is important to remember that some separations are lifting. Our contributors discuss the execution of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the changing relationship between the U.S. and Cuba, as well as the challenges and successes of migrant assimilation in Québec.

Andrew Womer

The Southern Border in Crisis: America's Immigration Debacle

CARTER CIKOVIC

Last year saw many crises throughout the world, but the one that battered the headlines of the domestic American media most prominently was the immigration crisis. 'A wave of humanity' hit the United States, as a massive amount of undocumented immigrants swept across the Southwest border of the United States through Mexico.¹ While the surge of undocumented immigrants coming into the U.S. illegally was far above average—over a 100% increase from the previous year—the heavy flow was the least disconcerting aspect. What caught the eyes and ears of the American public and those in Washington most was the fact that a shocking number—the federal government estimates over 62,000—of these immigrants were unaccompanied minors, largely coming from Central America, accounting for an 'unprecedented' 40 per cent of all illegal immigrants to the U.S. in 2014.^{2,3} The response of the U.S. government to this immense humanitarian, legal, and logistical challenge has exposed how broken the American immigration system really is. This article will explore the origins of the crisis and the problems and deficiencies of the U.S. immigration system.

To begin to understand the mass emigration of unaccompanied minors, one first needs to recognise the circumstances south of the Mexican-American border. As is widely known and covered in the American media, its immediate neighbour Mexico has been plagued for the past decade by drug violence. The immense shadow of the drug cartels on Mexican society has been a heavy burden to the Mexican people for some time now and is useful in explaining why Mexican immigration has been so high since the early 2000s.⁴ And while Mexican emigration still currently delivers the majority of undocumented immigrants to the U.S., the patterns of immigration are changing. An increasing portion of overall immigrants—and an even more extreme portion of unaccompanied minors—are coming from Central America, often for the very same reasons as the immigrants from Mexico. Although harbouring relatively smaller populations in comparison with Mexico, the effect on drug violence has been disproportionately large on Central American countries, in particular Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which have among the highest homicide rates in the world.⁵ Like Mexico, as a result of the dominance of the cartels, these countries are plagued by police and governmental corruption, as well as high rates of human trafficking and kidnappings.⁶ Quite reasonably, these conditions have made emigration from these countries an appealing option. However, while the growth of the drug cartels and political instability within the past four years in Central America serve as adequate explanations as to why overall emigration has risen so dramatically in recent years, they are insufficient in explaining the sudden and disproportionate immigration of unaccompanied minors to the U.S.

We have to understand this phenomenon through immigration law in the United States. From a legal standpoint, the U.S. government does have a prescribed method for the dealing with unaccompanied minors that have traversed the border into the country. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)—first put into law in 2000 by President Clinton and then later reauthorised by President Obama in 2013—requires that the Federal government seek to place undocumented persons that may be victims of human trafficking, largely children, with relatives or 'appropriate sponsors.'⁷ According to Mark Greenberg, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Department of Health and Human Services, if the minors do not have 'appropriate sponsors' to take them in once they arrive in the U.S., the legal default is they are placed in '[Department of Health and Human Services] shelters' until they are given their day in court and processed through the legal system.⁸ According to Statute 71 of the TVPA, potential victims are also to receive 'comprehensive services including legal, housing, health care, and economic assistance' by the government.⁹ Whatever the realities may be of the way in which TVPA is actually upheld, the law in itself provides insight and perhaps clarity into why the mass influx

of unaccompanied minors may be taking place as of late.

The TVPA affords special treatment to unaccompanied minors, giving them the possibility of reconnecting with family members in the U.S., shelter and protection from the dangers that they have likely faced in their home countries and theoretically 'services including legal, housing, health care, and economic assistance'. Further, it is reasonable to expect that if this information was to any extent bestowed on a family living in gang dominated areas of Honduras, Guatemala, or El Salvador, it would prompt them to send their child to the U.S. Evidence to support this claim can be seen in the fact that in 2014, a year after the TVPA legislation was reintroduced into law, the flow of unaccompanied minors from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras was five times larger than it had been in 2012, a year before the reintroduction of the legislation.¹⁰ While correlation does not necessarily indicate causation between the existence of the law and the flow of unaccompanied minors, the data presented, aided by logically found conclusions about the incentives provided by the TVPA, give very good reason to believe there is such a relationship.

The manner in which the TVPA was carried out must be examined as well, along with how the history of failure to enforce it exacerbated the crisis in 2014. When the crisis occurred, thousands of unaccompanied minors had to be taken to hotels and other nongovernmental facilities for lack of available space. To this day, many of the minors remain in these places, as well as Department of Housing and Human Services (HHS) shelters awaiting trial without access to proper medical care or legal advice.¹¹ These actions baffled and angered many observers of the crisis and demonstrated to many that the United States government had no prepared method of dealing with unaccompanied minors in any regard. According to a report by the Center for Public Policy Priorities, there is 'no uniform process for what happens to an unaccompanied child once apprehended.'¹² While initially authorised into law in 2000, the TVPA has had very little influence on the de facto protocol of U.S. law enforcement. Historically, the fate of a given child has relied most heavily on its nationality. If arriving from a neighbouring country (i.e. Mexico), the child would be immediately discharged to its side of the border.¹³ This stands in contrast with not only the TVPA, which promises legal services and shelter, but also the 6th Amendment of the Constitution, the right to counsel with an attorney.¹⁴ This procedure, while destructive, was taken not because of malice, but because of lack of resources and funding in possession of U.S. Border Patrol and the HHS to handle such challenges in accordance with the law. Why was this not addressed sooner? The amount of government facilities dedicated to the housing of child immigrants has always been far too small to handle the real flow of minors. However, in previous years the problem was smothered by the Border Patrol's ability to immediately discharge minors that came from Mexico since, until late 2013, they have made up the vast majority of unaccompanied children.¹⁵ Hence, when the Border Patrol was tested in 2014, when most of the unaccompanied minors were coming from Central America, it was unable to pursue the same tactics of immediate discharge that had worked in the past. This systemic weakness, more than anything else, is what led to the very public collapse of the immigration system on the southern border.

On the 20th of November 2014, President Barack Obama announced executive action to, among other things, grant deferral from deportation for unaccompanied minors and allow them to be integrated into American society, though without providing a path to citizenship.¹⁶ While these actions will certainly help to alleviate some of the symptoms of the crisis, much more needs to be done in enforcing the laws already in place and addressing the fundamental holes of the immigration system, especially in regard to how America treats the most vulnerable of its visitors.

Carter is a first year student of Politics.



Sub-state Regions, Nationalism, and Migrant Integration: The Case of Québec

JOSEPH GAYESKI examines how Québec managed the borders of its nationalism to integrate migrants.

National borders are no longer the only significant boundaries of migrant immigration policy. With the increasing regionalisation of governance and newfound fervour for sub-state nationalism, regions around the world have been able to craft and implement their own integration policy, often diverging from the greater state. In 2014, Scotland held a referendum for independence from the United Kingdom, while Catalonia voted symbolically to break from Spain shortly after. Both cited immigration as a key policy area relating to their regional autonomy.¹

However, many critics fear that sub-state nations are inherently less welcoming to migrants than the rest of the state as a whole. As immigration and, in particular, integration policy is devolved to the regional political sphere, it may compete with the greater state policy goal of protecting cultural and linguistic traditions. Critics place sub-state nationalism diametrically opposite the civic nationalism of the larger state. They argue that the former is based on an exclusive ethno-cultural identity, while the latter is formed from 'post ethnic' civic values.² In liberal states where pluralist civic nationalism has been successful in accommodating diversity, critics see no basis for sub-state nationalism other than 'tribal' claims of superiority.³ The flow of greater ethnic diversity within a region may therefore present a challenge to the 'self-conceptions and political aspirations' of sub-state nations.⁴ This challenge can spark nationalist regional sentiments and create right-wing political parties, such as the Northern League of Northern Italy or the Christian Socialist Union of Bavaria,⁵ which can lead to xenophobia (as demonstrated by the Vlaams Blok party of Flanders).⁶

Sub-state nationalism, however, is not exclusive by nature. Regions with unique national identities are certainly capable of welcoming migrants, even when migrants are faced with distinct linguistic barriers. The province of Québec in Canada is a good example of this. Québec has formulated its own approach to migrant integration known as 'interculturalism', which seeks to foster migrant assimilation while maintaining its linguistic identity. The accommodating case of Québec is vital in counterbalancing the supposition that xenophobia necessarily follows sub-state nationalism.

Québec is the only region within Canada in which French is the most commonly spoken language. The 82.5 per cent of Quebecers that speak French at home are a minority in Canada, making up just under a quarter of the Canadian population.⁷ The region also claims distinct ethnic origins from the rest of Canada, historically identifying 'true Québécois' as descendants of the original French settlers.⁸ These distinct characteristics appeared at first to be threatened by the influx of migrants to Québec after World War Two.⁹ The fear that high levels of immigration would dilute the linguistic and cultural identity of the province resulted in a defensive position towards migrants in the post-war period.¹⁰ With over 200 mother-tongue languages being spoken by migrants in Canada it would not be unreasonable to think that Quebecers would regard immigration as a substantial threat to their linguistic heritage, especially as migrants choose to settle in Québec more than any other province.¹¹ However, despite these trends, Québec's policymakers have managed to strike a balance between linguistic protection and a pro-immigration policy.

Québec's regional parties have pursued protective government policies without resorting to an ethnically exclusive nationalism. After the 'Quiet Revolution' of the 1960s, Québec began to implement its own migrant integration policy that diverged from the Canadian policy in two ways.¹² First, with the introduction of Bill 101 in 1997 by the nationalist Parti Québécois, all children in Québec, both native and migrant, were required to attend French-speaking schools if they wished to receive public education.¹³ Further legislation created government language services to adult immigrants, entitling new Quebecers to free French

classes.¹⁴ These policies have been successful in integrating migrants into Québec's francophone society: by 2006, a record-high 51 per cent of allophone migrants spoke French at home.¹⁵

Second, Québec successfully negotiated migration control from the federal government. A series of bills from 1971 onwards culminated in the 1991 Canada-Québec Accord, which granted the sub-state nation responsibility for the 'selection, reception, and integration of immigrants to Québec.'¹⁶ Québec used its new authority to develop a points-based immigration policy that favours migrants with some knowledge of French.¹⁷ Though selective, Québec's selection criteria are no less welcoming than the rest of Canada. Rather, the 'linguistically dichotomized' immigration scheme in Canada allows Québec to promote immigration alongside its francophone identity.¹⁸ The criteria have not diminished ethnic diversity, as the policy accounts for the large numbers of Haitian, Moroccan, and Algerian migrants welcomed in the region as "neo-Québécois."¹⁹

In contrast to the divergence towards multiculturalism of other sub-state nations, for example Scotland, Québec's interculturalism was designed to counter aspects of multicultural policies that Québec criticised as dismissive to its distinct culture.²⁰ Interculturalism deliberately diverges from the 'linguistic dualism' of Canada by exclusively promoting French.²¹ Although the model departs from multiculturalism in that it emphasises a central language, interculturalism shares the same goal of accommodating diversity within a common civic national identity.²² The model does not exclude migrants from the nation, but rather facilitates 'inter-ethnic exchanges' within its francophone tradition.²³ Interculturalism allows the national project of Québec to balance 'the creative tension between diversity and continuity of the French-speaking core.'²⁴

By refuting Canada's multiculturalism, promoting French at the expense of English, and privileging francophone migrants, Québec's immigration policy opens itself to criticism as illiberal. Professor and multiculturalist academic Will Kymlicka acknowledges that some of Québec's linguistic policies may be illiberal, but argues that such policies of greater state intervention may be required for sub-state nations to develop modern and 'post-ethnic' nationalisms.²⁵ The 'moral contract' implemented in 2008 exemplifies Québec's construction of such a nationalism. Since 2009, migrants have signed 'a declaration of common values of Québec society', a symbolic pledge to civic values including 'liberal democracy, gender equality, and the separation of church and state.'²⁶ Though more interventionist than other regional policies, the emphasis on civic values, rights, and freedoms is evidence of a modern 'post-ethnic' Québécois nationalism.²⁷ Québec's ability to promote ethnic diversity while protecting its linguistic and cultural identity refutes claims that sub-state nations are inherently unwelcoming to migrants.

As states increasingly devolve authority to regional governments, immigration will continue to affect the identities of sub-state regions. Though immigration does not inevitably challenge sub-state nationalism, many theorists have argued the incompatibility of minority nationalism with a welcoming immigration policy. The case of Québec refutes this claim. The sub-state region actively constructed their conception of the 'nation' as an inclusive civic community. With the language policy and selection criteria of the intercultural approach, Québec proves that regions are able to pursue the protection of distinct identities alongside welcoming immigration policies. Though regionalisation may result in exclusionary sub-state nationalisms, Québec shows it is not an inevitable consequence.

Joseph is a fourth year student of International Relations.

Havana and Washington: A Newfound Love?

NGHIA MAI analyses the recent improvements in diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba.

Although 2015 is now well on its way, the happenings of 2014 have yet to become a distant memory. One of the major shocks came in the last few weeks of 2014 when Washington and Havana decided to restore diplomatic relations after more than 50 years of confrontation, isolation, and one-sided population movements.¹ In the near future, we may very well see the lifting of the economic embargo imposed upon Cuba by the United States after the Missile Crisis of 1962, which after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s became increasingly unpopular and irrelevant within a changing global political landscape to the point that its only advocate outside the United States was Israel.²

This lifting, which seems inevitable at the current pace, would largely lay the old Cold War ghost to rest and usher in a new era of co-operation between the two countries similar to those we have seen between the US and former Cold War enemies like China and Vietnam. However, with opportunities come potential challenges, which will be explored in depth below.

The decision to restore ties with the former Cold War adversary was not a rash executive action by President Obama but rather the result of eighteen months of secret talks between the Obama and Raul Castro, who has acted as President of Cuba since the stepping down of his brother Fidel in 2008.³ The immediate outcome was an agreement on the release of the American contractor in Cuban prison, Alan Gross, in exchange for the release of three Cuban intelligence officers being held in American Federal Custody, as well as the opening of diplomatic offices in the two countries and loosening of certain travel and trade restrictions.⁴ This served as a huge first step in the normalisation process.

While this has received much media attention, the path towards reconciliation was already being paved early into President Obama's first term in office. In March 2009, Congress approved the lifting of restrictions on Americans traveling to Cuba, not excluding



members of the Cuban diaspora with relatives on the communist island.⁵ As a result, the numbers of Americans traveling to Cuba rose by 20 per cent in the following month.⁶ This ensured the future possibility of a thaw in relations; now, it was not a question of if, but when. The easing into improved relations was furthered when Cuba was lauded internationally, and even to some extent within the US itself, for its efforts in assisting the fight against the Ebola epidemic in West Africa despite the harsh economic sanctions against it.⁷ This brought the moral justification for the embargo into review for many observers.

The restoration of diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba opens doors for opportunities in all fields, which could prove to be a mutually beneficial win-win situation for both parties. On an individual level, it allows both Obama and Raul Castro to create a positive legacy for themselves, a feat that both presidents are struggling to achieve in their respective homelands. In regards to economics, the opening of the borders would certainly accelerate the limited free market reforms implemented by Raul Castro, which includes, but is not limited to, the authorising of sale of mobile phones and the opening of small businesses in order to address the situation of Cuba's stagnant centrally planned economy.⁸ By normalising relations, Cuba would be granted access to the large and conveniently located US economy. With the influx of US tourism and trade, one would expect an increase in capital flow to the country, which would contribute positively in the effort to raise the living standards of the average Cuban citizen.⁹ This approach has proven successful in the past with both China and Vietnam, both of whom benefitted tremendously from limited free market reforms and economic ties to the US.¹⁰

Politically, this would allow the US to take steps to entertain a new, more prominent role in the Americas, which has been hindered in recent years due to the rising economic influence of China and emergence of left wing governments, such as in Venezuela.¹¹ As such, on both sides of the spectrum there are several potential benefits to be made, not to mention the fact that Cuban baseball players will now no longer have to defect in order to play in the MLB.¹²

However, the new deal brings with it potential challenges, and internal opposition emerged right after the agreement was made. These challenges primarily come from the Republicans seated in the American Congress; the deal was heavily criticised by both House Speaker John Boehner and Cuban American Senator Marco Rubio, who denounced Obama's actions as catering to tyranny and '[skirting] the law'.¹³ In light of this, it may be quite difficult for Obama to work with Congress in eliminating the embargo, especially seeing as it was written into law through the Helms-Burton act of 1996.¹⁴ Further, many critics feel that the agreement is too one-sided, advantaging Cuba more than the US, despite the fact that Washington has a stronger negotiating hand than Havana. Finally, it could perhaps be said that the agreement did not attain appropriate concession from Cuba in regards to democratic reforms. This can be demonstrated by Raul Castro's speech, in which he stated that he would accept Obama's gesture of goodwill '...without renouncing a single one of our [communist] principles'.¹⁵ This alludes to the possibility that the political reforms so desired by Washington for Cuba, particularly with regard to its poor human rights record, could fail to materialise.

Despite the challenges and criticism, the recent agreement between the two countries' respective heads of state represents a historical milestone and is the first step in a long-term process of normalisation of relations and the complete lifting of the outdated embargo. This could prove to be an important step towards the improvement of Cuban lives; however, we cannot simply expect swift social changes to happen in Cuba overnight. Whether such changes are brought to life depends on the choices made by Raul Castro and, hopefully, in part, by the Cuban people. On the whole, this is a moment to celebrate; the psychological border between Cuba and America has been lifted and meaningful conversation is to be conducted.

Nghia is a first year student of History.

NAFTA+20

JACK GRAY explores the lessons of North America's borderless trade experiment.

Just over 21 years ago, on January 1st 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement came into force. The agreement was established to strengthen economic ties between Mexico, the United States, and Canada, the three North American countries. The passing of the agreement was a source of contention up until its signing; supporters argued that the agreement presented a chance for North America to remain economically ascendant in the face of rising Asian and European Co-operation, whereas critics feared that its passage would induce heavy job losses. Some even viewed it as imperialist.¹ Today, most analysts agree that, '[i]n reality, NAFTA did not cause the huge job losses feared (...) or the large economic gains' that was hoped for.² Now, more than two decades on, with the benefit of hindsight, what lessons can be drawn from the famous trade agreement?

In 1990, when the trade agreement was first proposed by the three countries' respective heads of state, the future members were all in relatively disparate situations. For Mexico, NAFTA represented an opportunity to open itself up to the growing low-skilled labour market, which the Mexican government saw as a crucial step to clawing their way out of economic downturn.³ The United States, whose geographical position was most favourable to the passage of the treaty, hoped to create an economic area under its dominance that could extend liberalised trade into new markets, as well as forge stronger partnerships with its neighbours.⁴ Canada stood to gain the least from NAFTA. While increasing commercial trade with the US was generally beneficial, Canada already had a strong trade agreement with the US and adding a further one opened up the possibility for new tensions. Additionally, opening Mexican markets to those of Canada, though promising, was a logistical challenge due to the country's respective geographical locations.⁵ Ultimately though, the reliance of these nations upon each other for trade was the factor that drove them all into the agreement. In fact, to this day, over 60 per cent of merchandise trade by Canada and Mexico is with the US, who itself trades most with the Canadians, and the third most with Mexico. In effect, only China can be said to truly compete with the North American nations on their own turf.⁶

With the introduction of the treaty, the biggest compromises were made by Mexico and Canada. Mexico was first made to reform its restrictions on the Mexican Automobile Industry. Mexican law required a certain percentage of parts, known as the parts content, in Mexican vehicles to be manufactured in Mexico; now, this was dropped in favour of potentially cheaper car parts in either the US or Canada.⁷ Likewise the Canadians compromised by allowing the North American parts content to be raised, disadvantaging the production of Canadian manufactured parts similarly in favour of North American manufacturing as a whole.⁸ The willingness of Mexico and Canada to accept changes to long-held internal law early on in the negotiations was indicative of the dominance of the US in lobbying their interests in the agreement.

Another potential problem for the agreement was the status of the nationalised Mexican petrochemical industry. The US-Canada FTA, signed just six years earlier in 1988, had massively reduced

Canada's ability to control its energy sector by prohibiting both export-price requirements and a reduction in exports without a corresponding domestic decrease in consumption.⁹ Naturally, the US was keen to extend this agreement with Mexico, however Mexico rejected both of the clauses and Canada did not hasten to defend the US's position as the very same clauses imposed on them in 1988 caused popular uproar. While the US felt that the opening of Mexican petrol was an invaluable aspect of the treaty, in the end it settled on a compromise; Mexico was excluded from the provisions in the US-Canada FTA and allowed to keep its exclusive laws, which included the banning of US or Canadian drilling or exploration projects on Mexican soil.¹⁰ This was a blow, but undoubtedly a very pragmatic move by the US negotiators who understood that had the issue been pressed, the entire agreement could have been derailed.

During NAFTA's negotiation phase in the early 1990s, a sense of hope began to pervade Mexican society. To a nation recovering from a decade of recession and financial mismanagement, the ideas of progressive President Salinas seemed to herald a new age for the nation. Salinas' actions came as Mexicans were beginning to heighten the expectations to their own country, hoping to reach the quality of life enjoyed by their northern neighbours.¹¹ However hopes were shattered as Mexico then underwent a series of financial crises, beginning with a severe devaluation of the peso as Salinas left office in 1996, followed by huge increases in interest rates.¹² Domestically produced corn was rapidly undercut by heavily subsidised US imports, bringing about a large decline in Mexican agriculture.¹³ This was a disastrous time for the Mexican economy, but could any of Mexico's financial suffering be attributed to its involvement in NAFTA? The World Bank Report on NAFTA's economic consequences suggests that this might be the case:

'[T]he evidence shows that in the post-NAFTA years aggregate fluctuations in Mexico have become increasingly synchronized with those of its partners in the treaty (...). This suggests that the nature of macroeconomic volatility in Mexico is changing, with developments in the U.S. accounting for an increasingly large fraction of the variation in Mexico's GDP growth.'¹⁴

Hence, tied to the economic heavyweight of the US, and without the economic clout necessary to extricate itself from difficulty, Mexico suffered gravely in the 2004 and 2008 recessions. While by all logical measures NAFTA holds a certain amount of responsibility for many of Mexico's financial woes after 1994, it is important to recognise that trade between the member countries was already growing by the early 1990s notwithstanding the introduction of NAFTA.¹⁵ The impact of NAFTA, however large, on Mexico's economy reveals the desire of politicians to chase attractive ideas like GDP growth and trade expansion that may sound good but do not attempt to directly tackle more tangible concerns such as the quality of life for the average citizen. As such, while North America's experiment in liberalised trade may not have been fully successful, it has become a crucial player in the global movement to end traditional border systems.

Jack is a first year student of History & Politics.





International



REGIONAL EDITOR



From a bird's eye perspective, there are fewer real borders than we imagine or see on a world map. It's possible that the concept of borders evolved from our biological instincts for protection and shelter-seeking, from the need to defend ourselves from harm. Borders establish an awareness of practical boundaries that distinguish 'us' from 'them'.

These abstract divisions also exist between the institutions that dominate our world. In her profile,

Nathalia Rus explains how one such border, between the market and the nation-state, has defined the way we think about global governance. The intertwining, yet essentially conflicting interests of nations and markets create a tension that both

encourages and confounds reform at all levels.

When the demand for mobility, openness, and free communication clashes with security concerns and sovereignty, borders can become controversial and harder to make sense of. In his article, Calum Bolland accounts for the evolving understanding of nationalism in a globalising world. Whether one prefers the market or the nation-state, globalisation or sovereignty, borders are far more than just drawing lines – they are rules that govern the world.

Yuechen Wang

National Politics and Financial Markets: A Wall of Mistrust

NATHALIA RUS

Taken together, national politics and the financial market may be printed in our minds as two ubiquitous and necessary forces that oppress each other and constantly seek to be in charge of decision-making, forging a picture of apparent dichotomy. The welfare state versus the liberal order, IMF supervision versus local idealised localism – these are some popular examples of their respective struggles. Indeed, after the supposed fall of Keynesian economics, the 'Washington consensus' led financial institutions and most traditional political ideas to engage in a battle of both ideology and de facto policies.

However, the frontier between the two is blurring and the growth of mutual cooperation has led social science academics to consider the weakening of the nation state as a myth, an excuse for cutting government budgets.¹

Yet, the mutual distrust between national politics and the market is actually felt most acutely from the citizens' side, which often perceives the market and its watchdogs as a threat to democracy. Joseph Stiglitz has highlighted this concern during his career as chief economist at the World Bank.² But the extreme suspicions expressed in populist parties' speeches are precisely where the demagoguery resides. The borders between national politics and the market should not be built as a New Berlin Wall, but rather should be removed and seen as co-leaders in ensuring that their respective interventions do not harm one or the other, but sustain them both.

Concerns over whether the mistrust is well founded, and in what way it actually harms governments, their citizens, and the economy, should be the starting point of any discussion. Is strong sovereignty really in the interest of states? Where, de facto, are the frontiers of authority between governments and markets?

We first need to understand what prevents many of us from demolishing the Wall erected between national politics and the global market for trust and cooperation. The market, where sellers and buyers of all scale and in all places interact within its mechanisms, is acknowledged to be part of everyone's lives. But it is indeed feared and mistrusted when taken as a whole, or where immense transactions occur. The fear is sound, for many reasons. One of the reasons is because of the nature of the market mechanism itself. Market stability betrays an underlying instability in the system: when the environment seems safe, risk-taking in the financial system becomes more common.³ Another reason is that while the micro borders of the Market are nominally distinct, their actions and impacts are tangled and are constantly developing a more sophisticated web, diminishing our grip on our environment and our control of the system.⁴ To understand the magnitude of this concern, an example of implications on a smaller scale will do. Sweden had four of its banks active in countries in the Baltic region. This presented a relatively simple scheme for collaboration between home and host authorities. But when the 2008 crisis struck those banks, no less than fourteen governments and aid organisations needed to be involved to restore the states' economies, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to rescue Latvia with a US\$2.35 billion stand-by arrangement. It took a very long time for the European Commission to be involved in the financial relationships between home and host countries because of the web that goes far beyond the Europe's borders. This is still an issue in need of undergoing further reforms.⁵

Now, with the example of the four Swedish banks in mind, we can begin to understand the consequences of a sudden bankruptcy of giants such as Goldman Sachs or J.P. Morgan Chase – indeed categorised, among others, as


a 'SIFI', Systemically Important Financial Institution, or alternatively referred to as 'Too Big To Fail'.⁶ Its implications would lead to a systemic crisis, even a systemic collapse.

Welfare state advocates often criticize governments' cooperation with the financial market. But a welfare state needs a high rate of employment: the higher the employment rate, the easier it is to plan and extend welfare programs. It is known that when the economy collapses, unemployment rises and welfare policies become unsustainable.⁷ In the case of SIFI bankruptcies and their consequences, the traditional fight for strong state welfare programs is likely to seem demoted, and even alternative private bodies for healthcare services would not be efficient. Indeed, in the private welfare market, low-risks groups are likely to be under-covered: since assurances are not a fair trade, people will tend to pay less than they should. In the event of sudden large expenses, those people will only be partially covered. Thus, the thought of systemic crisis is indeed frightening. And as the British American economist Simon Johnson points out, 'scariness becomes power'.⁸

A systemic-key actor evidently holds an immense degree of authority. It is in the interests of all to prevent its bankruptcy; hence, a government will have to pledge support with the promise of providing policies and regulations that are compatible with the SIFI's sustainability. Nowadays, absolute sovereignty is neither feasible nor desirable. The clear borders between global market and national politics – their sovereignty – do not exist. It follows that demagoguery and populism are not only a threat to democracies; they are also a threat to our whole system's sustainability. Garry Schinasi, former policy advisor at the European Commission and IMF, urged local policy makers in developing countries to resist external and internal pressures that are playing against the long-term interests of all; indeed, the IMF policies needed in a state – following the incompetency of a government – are often so unpopular, that it can lead to a political crisis, which undermines the necessary decision-making process.⁹ The strategy most often adopted consists of handing over the scapegoat function to the international financial institutions. In Brazil in 2008, President Cardoso was able to overcome domestic opposition by constantly tying its policies to the IMF program. A similar phenomenon occurs in European countries, in which the European Union directives are designated as the reason of all ills.

In the end, however, one must not underestimate the fact that sovereignty is desirable, and encouraged, as long as it does not risk to endanger other countries' well being. National sovereignty is, through the lenses of financial executives, welcomed in terms of effective supervision, with the key role of ensuring a 'macro-prudential regulation', as suggested by Claudio Borio. He saw the pre-crisis Basel III's countercyclical capital buffer as a development that reconciles sovereignty with effective supervision, by proposing to implement new regulatory standards, notably on bank capital adequacy. Yet, it is never so simple, since imposing high capital requirements is likely to generate local exposures, though they are precisely smaller when put at larger scale: the size-asymmetry problem is not easily warded off. But the extension of our current micro-prudential perspective to a macro one in order to lessen global risks is underway: the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into US federal law by Barack Obama in 2011 is, although criticised for its deceptive actual efficiency, a breakthrough in terms of the state's sovereignty exercise vis-à-vis the financial regulations in the beginning of the 21st century.¹⁰

Nathalia is a member of Leviathan's production team.



Imagined Borders in the Modern World

CALUM BOLLAND assesses the relevance and persistence of nationalism.

In our increasingly globalised and, interconnected world, borders are crumbling with the rise of international, transnational, and global networks.¹ Economic, political and cultural trends are hallmarks of this 'intensification' of social relations across the globe as distinct localities find themselves affected and affecting others far more.² However, a growing school of thought suggests that borders, far from becoming obsolete, are reasserting themselves in new and diverse forms. Whilst the nation-state (especially the component after the hyphen) experiences the most dramatic transformation in this light, the imagined borders of nation and national identity experience a renaissance.³ Acknowledging the durability of this idea and understanding it better are essential for state actors on the global stage, and in doing so it may then be reconstituted into a more liberal and progressive form.

The contemporary global political order is one that is made up of what has been termed 'post-traditional nation-states'.⁴ Since the treaty of Westphalia, sovereignty has been the central tenet of international relations: this being perhaps the clearest affirmation of state borders, though it is increasingly challenged by forces both from above (e.g. international organisations such as the EU, UN, or WTO) and below (e.g. secessionist movements in multinational states).⁵ Sovereignty, and therefore the prominence of state borders, is marginalised in an environment in which international bodies supersede state autonomy whilst the free movement of people, capital, and ideas are facilitated by technological developments.⁶ Whilst these aforementioned borders are gradually undermined, the imagined borders of nation seemingly endure. Nationalism, a concept branded as dead or dying in the late 20th century by many,^{9,10} has defied its last rites. Movements across the globe are testament to this, and though this nationalism can take various forms, this work shall discuss these within the broad and simplified categories of 'progressive' and 'regressive'.

The nation can be understood as an 'imagined political community', which is crucially 'limited' (in terms of the number of citizens) and 'sovereign' (with regard to the objective of self-rule).¹¹ Though debate surrounds the historical roots of nations and national identity, it has been argued most persuasively that these are born out of modernity, with their origins placed around the time of the industrial revolution¹² or the proliferation of capitalism.¹³ Nationalist divisions defined the 20th century in a most brutal fashion. Its excesses led to murderous ethnic cleansing and warfare on a scale never before seen in human history. It was in the closing decades of this century, then, that the less-than-sympathetic eulogies were made, though in retrospect these seem wholly premature. Scholars increasingly argue not only for nationalism's continued existence, but also for it being essential in the construction of human identity.^{14,15} Nationalist scholars have described the nation as an indispensable 'micro-hub of solidarity'¹⁶ and this idea is perhaps never more pertinent than in our increasingly globalised and atomised world. This drive for the national *gemeinschaft*, or community, is articulated in forms which (a) either seek to revert to a pre-modern and pre-globalised world, stratified in ethnic terms and inherently regressive; or (b) in terms which are far more forward-thinking.

The regressive nationalist discourse exhibited by those who would seek the establishment of a 'classic nation-state' fail to realise that their goals are incompatible with the contemporary political world.¹⁷ Narrow-minded rejection of immigration and multiculturalism, as well as appeals to re-establish sovereign

rule without international interference, are hollow statements which though they find support in times of hardship, are divisive and reminiscent of the worst of nationalist chauvinism: the so-called 'dark gods' theories of nationalism rejected by Ernest Gellner seem ever more salient.¹⁸ This resurgence is rightly condemned by nationalist theorists,¹⁹ though there are examples given of nationalist discourse of a liberal and progressive nature which would address these criticisms.²⁰ This 'liberal nationalism' seeks to unite national identity, understood as fundamental to human nature, with basic cosmopolitan values that would be afforded beyond the borders of the imagined community. National identity is also defined as adopted and chosen, rather than as ascriptive in the ethnic understanding, and there is an emphasis on the state's role in the equal treatment of minorities within these. This civic and inclusive understanding of the nation is crucial to the liberal nationalist agenda and the discourse of politicians who claim to articulate it.²¹ Elsewhere referred to as 'rooted cosmopolitanism', it has been mooted as a critique of the cosmopolitan agenda and a solution to the crisis of identity in the modern, globalised world.²²

Liberal nationalism, if simplified to the essence, rejects the idea of a single homogenised global culture. Whilst national identity is deemed fundamental to individual identity, it is far from the only affiliation that we make. There is room to understand freedoms and social justice as important both within and between nations. Though national identity is chosen, this commitment should not be seen as more superficial. Rather it moves beyond the traditional ascriptive nature of national identity. In short, a commitment to equal rights for individuals and nations is what this approach advocates.²³ Important for achieving this end, however, is that states take on the burden of responsibility in instilling this nationalism.²⁴ Whilst it is true that violent nationalist excesses are thankfully restricted in an era with far more widespread access to communicative technology,²⁵ the cultural shift required for liberal nationalism is one which must be facilitated by states themselves, and by international institutions such as the European Union.²⁶ Culturally, this nationalism represents an alternative to the threat of homogenisation often conflated with a cosmopolitan ideal: a chance for nations to flourish and proliferate removed from the insularity of ethnocentrism and tribal thinking.²⁷ Imagined borders contain an ever growing and evolving culture which, far from seeking some pre-modern myth, should look forward and decide how it wishes to define itself under changing cosmopolitan circumstances. These communities, reconciled with liberal values and shorn of chauvinist tendencies, should be cultivated in the modern world.

Borders in the current era of globalisation, though perhaps less relevant in economic, political, or physical forms, persist in the imagination of the individual and national communities. By understanding this, states must seek to instil a positive and progressive liberal nationalism understood along civic lines. Regressive, ethnocentric nationalisms hark back to an era pre-dating modern globalisation. It is important to discard this, to acknowledge the excess and devastation of the 20th century, for which a large portion of blame must be laid with nationalism, and to learn to live in a world in which borders, imaginary or otherwise, do not inhibit basic cosmopolitan values.

Calum is a fourth year student of Sociology & Politics.

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Tensions in the East China Sea: Why Japan, China, and the US are fighting over rocks

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A Tale of Two Nations

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
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