




LEVIATHAN

THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

POWER

VOLUME 5 ISSUE 1 DECEMBER 2014
5TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION



CONTENTS

ASIA-PACIFIC

Zhang Xin: Bravely Building a New World in the World's Second Largest Economy
Hanako Shimada, page 5

People Power In Communist China
Viktoria-Luise Koch, page 5

Speak Softly and Carry a Large Bankroll
Carolina Toczycka, page 6

AFRICA

Aliko Dangote: What is Africa's Greatest Personal Fortune Actually Worth?
Jack Evans, page 7

Fathers and Friends
Will O'Sullivan, page 8

EUROPE & RUSSIA

Dmitry Kiselyov: Agitator, Demagogue, and Vladimir Putin's Mouthpiece
Maxwell Greenberg, page 9

Another Country: Power In Northern Ireland
David Kelly, page 9

Power and the European Citizen
Ingebjørg Birkeland, page 10

Decisions of the Powerful
Freddie Wild, page 11

Citizens of the Union
Anthony Salamone, page 12

LATIN AMERICA

Mario Vargas Llosa: Questioning Power Structures in Latin America
Leonie Meier, page 13

The Amazon is Ours
Pauline Op De Beeck, page 14

The Power of Magical Realism
Rebecca Rosser, page 14

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

Tawakkol Karman: Feminism, Islamism, and a Nobel Prize
Anna Breedlove, page 15

Iran's Shadow Wars in the Middle East
Joakim Bjørnstad and Vilde Sofie Rodin, page 16

NORTH AMERICA

Rand Paul: America's Libertarian Darling Polarises Everyone
Jack Gray, page 17

Black Political Power: Beyond Ferguson
Kanzanira Thorington, page 18

The GOP, Voter Suppression, and American Democracy
Juliana Fentress, page 18

A Revolving Door or Vicious Circle?
Andrew Bailie, page 19

INTERNATIONAL

Christine Lagarde: Holding Her Breath Under Water
Dionisis Pelekis, page 20

Softly Powerful: China's Pursuit of International Influence
Professor Xie, page 21

Understanding Power and How To Use It
Briana Pegado, page 22

Reconceptualising Power
Iqan Fadaei, page 23

Power, Plutocrats, and Poor Decisions in the Era of Global Capitalism
Anu Pauliina Hiekkaranta, page 24

FOLLOW US ON

 [FACEBOOK.COM/LEVIATHANJOURNAL](https://www.facebook.com/LEVIATHANJOURNAL)

 [@LEVIATHANEDUNI](https://twitter.com/LEVIATHANEDUNI)

to stay up to date with Leviathan and Politics and IR Society events

LEVIATHAN is generously supported by the University of Edinburgh Department of Politics and International Relations and the Edinburgh University Politics and IR Society. The opinions and views expressed in Leviathan are those of their authors alone.

 **Politics & IR**
— society —
University of Edinburgh





EDITOR IN CHIEF

Welcome to the fifth year of *Leviathan*!

It is with tremendous gratitude and pride that I present to you the first instalment of this volume. Five years amounts to an anniversary, and I knew that the theme of this issue had to reflect that.

Whether in the offices of Edinburgh academics, in the halls of Westminster, or in Wall Street boardrooms, leaders in all fields are fascinated, sometimes obsessed, with power. But that fascination is not only limited to those at the top. It permeates popular culture, and we can see it in ourselves as we root for our favourite power-hungry characters in *Game of Thrones* and *House of Cards*.

The latter series is delightfully and disturbingly sinister, depicting a person who, like the rulers in Orwell's *1984*, seeks power not for 'wealth or luxury or long life or happiness' but for its own sake. Frank Underwood assures us that 'power is the old stone building that stands for centuries.' But does the murderous anti-hero delude himself, like the mighty king of kings in Shelley's *Ozymandias*? Perhaps power is just a house of cards.

And though it's true that even the greatest empires crumble and fall, some power structures remain unbending. The world over, the fight against the tyranny of oppressive ideology has seen varying degrees of success. The crimes perpetrated by ISIS and Boko Haram, the introduction of harsh anti-gay legislation in Russia and parts of Africa, and the continuing failure to liberate and empower women demonstrate that the battle between liberalism and bigotry is not over, and progress not inevitable.

For this issue, we asked *Leviathan* contributors to research the lives and careers of people representing each of the regions we cover, plus, on popular demand, the international Christine Lagarde. The seven powerful individuals profiled herein are leaders and innovators in the fields of politics, business, finance, literature, and information wars. Some are heroes, some are villains, and some have yet to show their true colours, but all have shaped the fate of their region and the world.

We are happy to welcome for the first time Prof. Tao Xie of Beijing Foreign Studies University. His account of China's pursuit of soft power provides us with a captivating insight into the subject. Meanwhile, University of Edinburgh graduate and EUSA President Briana Pegado reflects on power dynamics and the stories we tell in 'Understanding Power'. Some of the best, and at times poignant, student writing we have hosted can be found in 'Reconceptualising Power' by Iqan Fadaei and 'Another Country: Power in Northern Ireland' by David Kelly.

Leviathan has come a long way in five years, and honourable mentions are in order for the journal's trailblazing alumni. In particular, I would like to recognise my predecessors Maxwell Greenberg, Natasha Turak, and former creative director Adrie Smith as individuals who continue to inspire our work today.

The painting chosen for the front cover of this issue is *The Victory of Lord Duncan* by John Singleton Copley. It is on display in the Scottish National Gallery and depicts a moment in the aftermath of the Battle of Camperdown, one of the most significant naval victories in history. The leader of the Dutch forces offers his sword in a display of defeat, but Admiral Adam Duncan refuses, saying only 'I would much rather take a brave man's hand than his sword.' Gentlemanly, merciful, and indeed most British. The gallantry, however, is made less charming by the striking presence of a burning ship, a reminder that however courteous the facade, this handover of power was brought about through brute force and imperial might.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the subject matter, *Leviathan* received a record number of submissions, making this the largest issue yet. Regrettably, we could not accommodate all articles in the printed version. We would like to thank all our contributors and encourage them to submit again for the February 2015 issue Borders.

Leviathan's Power issue was brought into existence by a dedicated staff of twenty, who, between them, are gaining expertise in ten fields of study, speak fifteen languages, and have lived in twenty-five different countries. I would like to thank the *Leviathan* team, the PIR Society leadership, and the PIR Department at Edinburgh University for their wonderful work and support.

It is my first issue as Editor in Chief, and I can genuinely say that this product is a work of love. It sometimes feels impossible to be creative or to pay attention to detail when one is bogged down with the many managerial concerns that come with running an organisation. This is why, in addition to everyone else on the team, I would like to extend special gratitude to Deputy Editor in Chief Lene Kirstine Korseberg, Chief of Production Jessica Killeen, and Fundraising Director Juliana Fentress. The journal could not have met the standards of quality, integrity, and professionalism expected of it without their work and ideas.

We hope that you find the finished product worthwhile and thought-provoking.

Sincerely,

Marko John Supronyuk

Marko John Supronyuk
Editor in Chief



MEET THE STAFF



Marko John Supronyuk

Editor in Chief

Marko is a fourth year student of International Relations & Law and scholarship holder at the University of Edinburgh. An American of Ukrainian descent, he has interned at the Truman National Security Project in Washington, D.C., as well as with Governor Patrick Quinn and Congressman Brad Schneider in Chicago, Illinois. During his time at university, he has served as convenor of the School of Social and Political Science, constitutional law editor at the Edinburgh Student Law Review, president at the European Union Society, vice president at the Politics and International Relations Society, and student ambassador for the University of Edinburgh admissions office.



Lene Kirstine Korseberg

Deputy Editor in Chief

Lene is a fourth year student of Law & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Norway, she also has a Bcs. in Pedagogy from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Prior to becoming Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Leviathan, Lene was the Editor-in-Chief of The Student, the University of Edinburgh student newspaper. She is now the Deputy Editor for the Scottish Centre for International Law's Working Paper Series, a collection of articles produced by academic researchers associated with the Centre.



Vilde Sofie Rodin

Treasurer

Vilde is a fourth year student of International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Particularly interested in humanitarian organisations, she has previously worked for Médecins Sans Frontières in Norway and several other organisations seeking equal rights and opportunities for disadvantaged youth. In addition to her work with Leviathan, she has been on the committees of the Politics and International Relations Society and the Middle Eastern Society.



Jessica Killeen

Chief of Production

Jessica is a second year Politics & Sociology student. Having lived in London, Paris, Los Angeles, and Nashville, she was the youngest-ever Editor-in-Chief of her high school newspaper. She currently works for Edinburgh University Students' Association as a Societies and Volunteering Developmental Assistant. Jessica is highly interested in traveling, volunteering, and debating politics over coffee.



Juliana Fentress

Fundraising Director and Copy Editor

Juliana is a third year student of Politics & Economic & Social History at the University of Edinburgh. In addition to her work on Leviathan, Juliana is the Secretary of the Scottish Chapter of Democrats Abroad, an elected Academic Campaigns Organiser for the Edinburgh University Students' Association, Sourcing Officer for the Meadows Marathon, and an active member of the Politics and International Relations Society. She previously worked as a campaign fellow for U.S. Senator Cory Booker and for the Super PAC Ready for Hillary.



Lynn Marissa Davies

Chief Copy Editor

Lynn is a fourth year student of English Literature & History. Although Scottish by birth and Eurasian by descent, she spent her formative years as an expatriate in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, and Cairo, Egypt. Having lived within the margins of distinct and unfamiliar cultures, she takes particular interest in hegemonic value systems, the unique social problems they generate, and the role of mass media within their formation. In addition to her work with Leviathan, she is involved in various forms of social intervention as a trained mentor, peer-educator, and support worker for LINKnet, Fast Forward, and Waverley Care.



Hallam Tuck

Editor for Asia-Pacific

Hallam is a fourth year History student at the University of Edinburgh, and a proud native of New York City. He has interned with the New York Immigration Coalition and HarperCollins Publishers. He co-founded and hosts The Back Bench, the weekly radio show of the Politics and International Relations Society. Hallam is a proud graduate of the National Outdoor Leadership School, and when he's not working, he can be found hiking, biking, and fishing.



Nicholas Pugh

Editor for Africa

Nick is a second year student of International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He has grown up on both coasts of the United States, but calls North Carolina, Hawaii, and Germany home. In addition to his work at Leviathan, Nick is involved in the Politics and International Relations Society and the Cross Country and Cycling clubs. He is currently working to start the 'Brothers in Arms Initiative,' an intercultural communications program that aims to bring together the children of the men and women who have served together in combat and reconnect veterans to their 'brothers' in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Conor Penn

Editor for Europe and Russia

Conor is a third year English Literature student at the University of Edinburgh. He was born in Hertfordshire and raised in County Down. Prior to joining Leviathan, Conor served as Editor-in-Chief of The Student, the University of Edinburgh newspaper, and regularly blogs for The Huffington Post. He is interested in UK and Irish politics, with a particular focus on Northern Ireland. Having been fortunate enough to travel extensively over Europe, North Africa, and Asia Minor, he is also interested in European and global politics more broadly.



Leonie von Hammerstein

Editor for Latin America

Leonie is a fourth year International Relations student at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Berlin, she has studied and lived abroad in the U.S., Malawi, and Spain and currently plans to explore Latin America after her graduation. Alongside her work within Leviathan, she also co-hosts the weekly music show Fresh Connection with Edinburgh's student radio FreshAir.



MEET THE STAFF

**Rina Moss****Editor for Middle East and North Africa**

Rina is a first year postgraduate student of International Relations of the Middle East with Arabic at the University of Edinburgh. She completed her undergraduate degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. She was born in Japan and raised in Orlando, Florida.

**Andrew Womer****Editor for North America**

Andrew is a first year Politics and Economics student at the University of Edinburgh. He was born and raised in Washington D.C. and has interned at The Jack Kemp foundation, a D.C.-based political think tank where he specialised in U.S. foreign policy. As well as being an editor for Leviathan, Andrew is a member of the University of Edinburgh Tennis Club, the Politics and International Relations Society, and History Society.

**Yuechen Wang****International Editor**

Yuechen is a third year visiting student from Beijing Foreign Studies University, representing the China Scholarship Council and Chinese Ministry of Education for studies in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Coming from the School of English and International Studies at BFSU, Yuechen is on the National Honoured Project of International Politics and Economics. He was the co-convenor of the 2014 BFSU International Debate Championship, an intern for Ipsos Group in China, and is a Chinese-English interpreter certified by China Accreditation Test for Translators and Interpreters and National Accreditation Examinations for Translators and Interpreters.

**Joakim Bjørnstad****Production Team Member**

Joakim is a fourth year student in the Middle Eastern Department of the University of Edinburgh. From Norway, he has also lived in Australia and has a background working with the Norwegian Labour Party. In addition, he has also rowed with the Edinburgh University Rowing Club and has held several positions on the Middle Eastern Society committee.

**Vanessa Ellmann****Production Team Member**

Vanessa is a second year Politics & German student at the University of Edinburgh. Originally born in Düsseldorf, Germany, she has moved around in both England and Germany before coming to Edinburgh. Apart from working on Leviathan, she is a member of the Politics and International Relations Society and the Kickboxing Club. She has also interned at the global Software company Brady. In her spare time you will find her travelling, going for runs with her dog, or drinking coffee.

**Nathalia Rus****Production Team Member**

Nathalia is a first year student of Politics. Born in France, she founded the first Amnesty International High School group in Paris and has taken a gap year in Russia at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Spain at the University of Salamanca to learn new languages and to experience different cultures. She is also involved in EUTIC and the Economics Society.

**Agnes Steil****Production Team Member**

Agnes is a first year International Relations student. Born in Berlin, she also lived in France, Italy, and Belgium and is now excited to call Edinburgh her new home. Next to politics, she loves travelling and thus took a gap year to intern at a European Union liaison office in Brussels and the German Centre for Venetian studies in Venice. Agnes is also an active member of the Politics and International Relations, Model United Nations, and the European Union Society.

**Kanzanira Thorington****Production Team Member**

Kanzanira is a second year Law & International Relations student at the University of Edinburgh. An American of Ugandan, Barbadian, and Panamanian descent, Kanzanira has always had an interest in foreign language and culture. Over the years she has studied Spanish, French, and Chinese. In high school, she served as Co-Chair of the Model United Nations team and News Editor of her school newspaper. Here at University, she is also taking additional Chinese language courses at the Confucius Institute of Scotland.

**Darya Gnidash****Digital Director**

Darya is a second year International Relations student at the University of Edinburgh. Apart from working for Leviathan, she has previously interned at the Institute of World Policy and assisted PEN International. Coming from Ukraine, she has a passion for the politics of Eastern Europe, Sundance movies, and languages. At the moment, she is learning her seventh foreign language and hopes to increase this number in future.

**Jonathan Riddick****Copy Editor**

Jonathan is a second year History & Politics student. Aside from editing Leviathan, he has worked as a copy editor for Groupon, and interned for the British Labour Party and DeHavilland political consultancy. He has a strong interest in Middle Eastern history and political Islam, as well as the history of the Soviet Union. He is a volunteer for the charity 'Health in Mind'.



ASIA-PACIFIC



In the recent history of the Asia-Pacific region, there has been no shortage of power struggles. As China's economic power has grown, its political leaders have been increasingly willing to assert regional diplomatic influence and develop a sphere of influence outside of Western control. In Hong Kong, Joshua Wong and the Occupy Central Movement presented the strongest popular challenge to Beijing's authority in decades. In Indonesia, Joko Widodo won a heavily contested presidential election against establishment candidate Prabowo Subianto, and now faces an even tougher challenge in consolidating authority over splintered political factions in Indonesia's House of Representatives. In Japan, Shinzo

Abe doubled down on an aggressive monetary easing programme, hoping to bolster a stagnant Japanese economy and fend off any political competition in the upcoming election cycle. In each of these contests, it is not wholly clear who will emerge as the victor. Yet, the intensity of these battles for power reflects the growing importance of Asia as a center of global economic growth and military power.

Although it is impossible to know the future, it is possible to formulate the questions that will define it. The struggle for dominance in Asia between the U.S. and China will be defined by both nations' ability to project economic and military influence, thereby gaining access to many of the globe's most dynamic economies. Similarly, as sustained economic growth brings greater affluence, the longevity of many of Asia's political leaders will be determined by their ability to incorporate the interests of newly empowered social groups into fragile political structures. Whatever the answers to these questions may be, they will not be simple, and they will not come quietly.

Hallam Tuck

ZHANG XIN: BRAVELY BUILDING A NEW WORLD IN THE WORLD'S SECOND LARGEST ECONOMY

HANAKO SHIMADA



Zhang Xin is a self-made Chinese real estate mogul whose career has risen as fast as the Beijing skyline she so heavily influenced. Her success has not gone without recognition. Aside from receiving a number of awards for her contribution to Chinese architecture, she has been named by Forbes magazine as one of the 'World's Most Powerful Women' year after year¹ and, in 2009, the All-China Women's Federation named her one of 'China's Top 10 Career Women Role Models'.² Today, thanks to her real estate company, SOHO China, her net worth is approximately £2.3 billion.³ Yet, her high net worth is far from being the true mark of her success. Rather, as someone whose extraordinary achievements have been built on skill, focus, and

sheer determination, she is a symbol of China's meteoric rise to global economic dominance.

Zhang Xin was born into the Cultural Revolution to parents who had emigrated from Burma in the 1950s.⁴ Unfortunately, being intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution meant that they were enemies to Mao Zedong and, like many others, were forced to live on the outskirts of Beijing during his leadership.⁵ For Zhang Xin, this meant having to grow up in the harsh re-education camps, and when this hardship proved too much for her family and her parents separated, she and her mother moved back to Beijing where her mother worked as a translator.⁶ Still, life was very difficult. Essentially homeless, Zhang Xin recalls sleeping on her mother's desk at her office, using her dictionaries as pillows.⁷ If her sleep was far from comfortable, it was surely during those nights that she first dreamt of building herself a future at the centre of China's physical transformation.

Her formidable willpower and determination led to the decision to move to Hong Kong at the ripe age of 14.⁸ There, Zhang Xin worked in factories until the age of 20 when she finally saved up enough money to earn a passport and buy a one-way plane ticket to London.⁹ The breakthrough to Zhang Xin's success came when she received scholarships and grants which allowed her to receive an undergraduate degree from the University of Sussex, and complete her postgraduate degree at the University of Cambridge.¹⁰ Her professional career started soon after graduating, when Goldman Sachs in New York offered her a position.¹¹ Zhang Xin however, did not enjoy the world of investment banking, and was so disgusted by the attitudes of the rich towards the poor that she returned to China.¹² Once back in Beijing, she met Pan Shiyi, a young idealist with a similar background, who was committed to liberalising China.¹³ Their combined vision resulted in the inception of the real estate development firm called SOHO China. The couple has been described by the Times of London as 'China's most visible and flamboyant property tycoons'.¹⁴

A decade later, SOHO China had become one of the largest and most powerful real estate companies in the country, responsible for dozens of the largest properties in the heart of Shanghai and Beijing's business districts.¹⁵ The couple worked extremely well together and managed to guide the company through the Asian financial crisis in 1997.¹⁶ When SOHO China went public, the company grew by more than 80 per cent annually and in 2012, its profits were £360 million.¹⁷ In an interview with Forbes, Zhang Xin said her resilience and continuous drive stemmed from being born with passion and loving what she does.¹⁸ Now, she is driven by the excitement she feels when she turns her visions into a reality through creating buildings out of nothing.¹⁹ Furthermore, it is estimated that SOHO China has contributed to a fifth of Beijing's Central Business District.²⁰ Today, SOHO China's buildings amount to a total of 20 million square feet of office, commercial, and residential space.²¹

The power couple understands the crucial role education plays in transforming one's life thanks to their time at university, and the opportunities that presented themselves upon graduation. As highly influential business magnates, Zhang Xin and her husband started the SOHO China Foundation in 2005, hoping to inspire students with the attitude that a good education is the foundation for success.²² The SOHO China Foundation aims to support education in China by giving financial aid scholarships to China's brightest youths so that they too can be empowered by receiving the world's best education.²³ Zhang Xin's belief in the powerful force of education is also apparent in her involvement with Teach for China, a non-profit organisation focused on eliminating the country's educational inequality.²⁴ Zhang's story serves as an example to the millions of Chinese women who have the drive and tenacity to start their own enterprises in one of the world's most significant markets.

It is clear that Zhang Xin is not afraid to dream big. She is an ambitious visionary who has been one step ahead of the market during the last 25 years of China's economic expansion.²⁵ Having faced hardships and immensely laborious working conditions before she could fulfil her ambitions, it is no wonder that her story and success make her a popular public figure in China - especially to those from similar backgrounds. According to Forbes' 'The World's Richest Self-Made Women' list, fewer than half of the women listed came from formally Maoist China, suggesting that the easing of state control of the economy created the right macro-environment for a generation of entrepreneurs to emerge.²⁶ Being the daughter of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution meant that she had to swim against a very strong current, but her determination and resilience has turned her into a big fish in a big pond. Her buildings are physical manifestations of her success and of her unique rags-to-riches story. Her dramatic achievements serve as a testament to China's status as the new land of opportunity.

Hanako is a fourth year student of International Relations.

PEOPLE POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA

VIKTORIA-LUISE KOCH examines the continuities and differences between forms of Chinese popular protest.

The roots of protest in China lie deep within its history, ever since Mao's Great Proletariat Protest that occurred from 1966 until Mao's death in 1976.¹ This fundamentally social movement sowed the seeds of the ideal of autonomy, that is, further involvement in the political process and future of their country, within the minds of the Chinese people.² Autonomy was also the defining ideal behind the Student Protest of 1989.³ This movement was the first in the People's Republic of China (PRC) to be driven by a request for reform within the government, which would allow the population to gain an identity beyond the state and the right to self-determination for civil society.⁴ Whereas need-based protest was not a novel idea in China, the 1989 protests featured

structures unique to democratic forms of demonstration. The right to self-organisation, a legal framework, non-violent activities as well as a broad public appeal were features that social movements had not adopted before.⁵

Although these demonstrations represented a failure of the democratic movement within the country, since no forum for its proliferation was created, they did manage to shake the Communist regime by shifting primacy to the right of self-determination. This introduced one of the key aspects of democracy, namely, free speech into the heavily censored Communist arena.⁶ While the Student Protest of 1989 was a defining and dark chapter in Chinese history, the idea of protest was not new; China has a long history of public outcry, albeit within the boundaries of an authoritarian regime. Indeed, although some of these movements



have been influenced by the power wielding political elite, most of them represent genuine popular attempts to reshape the country's political landscape.⁷

Protest is widely considered to be a sign of discontent and frustration among civil society towards the political elite of a country. However there are models⁸ recognising cases where protest might be tolerated by authoritarian governments in order to facilitate communication between the social strata and the political elite, therefore stabilising the authoritarian regime instead of damaging it. In one model, a case study of China and the various protests that have occurred over the last two decades was made.⁹ This model suggests that the communities are faced with three basic choices. They can either accept the status quo and live under the regime, try to overthrow it by protest (or more violent methods), or lastly, engage in protest of a loyalist kind.¹⁰

As opposed to the ideals brought forward by the Student Protests of 1989, inspired by democratic governments, the authoritarian state does not have the system of feedback that the democratic states gain mainly through open elections and a free press. Political protests certainly do not have the power to change a country's political axis. They are nonetheless a potent method for civil society to make its dissatisfaction public, and force the government to act accordingly, though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would likely only tolerate protests that do not challenge the system.

Loyalist protest has three features; first the demonstrations are rather restricted, involving only small groups of people rather than masses.¹¹ Second, they do not seek to blow the protest out of proportion, so support is not sought outside of the immediate group.¹² Finally 'they are explicitly loyal in rhetoric', meaning that they do not challenge the CCPs policies or their right to govern.¹³ Although it may seem illogical to stage a protest that does not have a broad platform or mass popular support, there are still good reasons to do so. Considering that the regime is in charge of setting the boundaries and 'terms of engagements' that society has to abide by, it is dangerous for protesters to stray from these terms. Additionally, the regime needs sources on the ground in order to maintain control of the public's daily lives, which enhances the control mechanism of the Communist state. While China remains a prominent

example when it comes to balancing the need for economic development against the continuing stability of the authoritarian regime, there are many instances of loyalist protest within less economically successful regimes. In Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, for example, labour protests prior to the 2011 revolution adopted a model of loyalist protest for some time, only addressing 'narrow economic issues' instead of asking for more coordination between the different plants.¹⁴ Crucially, Mubarak reacted very similarly to the CCP.¹⁵

Essentially, loyalist protest enables the government to recognise the troubled areas of society and concede to some of the protestors' demands, without loosening the regime's grip on political authority. It also helps to filter out corruption and maintain surveillance of party officials. It does, however, depend on the distinction between protest and revolt. Loyalist protest is a very low-impact variant that is of little consequence for the regime, whereas the 1989 protests were the first of their kind. They directly challenged the CCP's right to govern, leading to a violent confrontation that left a scar in the cultural consciousness of the country and fear in the hearts and minds of its people.¹⁶

Bearing that in mind, imagine how different Tiananmen would have been in today's circumstances. With today's technology, social movements are born with the touch of a button. Be it the Occupy Central movement, the Ferguson outrage, or the peaceful protests for a democratic Hong Kong, contemporary mass movements are born out of the ability that technology and democracy gives us to have a voice, an ability that does not exist within the Chinese system. An open press and censor-free Internet give the public the opportunity to engage in democracy, pressuring politicians and organisations into acting transparently. This gives all citizens the power to initiate a discussion and instigate change. Yet, the CCP retains its legitimacy since it has managed to produce a flourishing economy, however unbalanced it may be. Whether the Chinese people like it or not, the system is unlikely to experience fundamental reform any time soon, no matter the amount of protest.

Viktoria-Luise is a first year student of International Relations.

SPEAK SOFTLY AND CARRY A LARGE BANKROLL

CAROLINA TOCZYCKA examines the challenges and successes in the growth of China's global soft power.

Traditionally, power was tested in the context of military actions. Recently, however, Joseph S. Nye has famously argued that proof of power lies in the ability to influence people into changing their behaviour.¹ The fundamental principle of what can be described as 'soft power' resides in exercising influence through persuasion rather than coercion. Effectiveness of persuasion derives from a contemporary understanding of a country's attractiveness: diplomacy, government, business appeal, cultural output, education, and ideology are all crucial factors.

According to the IMF, with an adjusted GDP of \$17.6 trillion, China recently emerged as the world's single largest economy, overtaking a title the US has been proudly crowned with for the last 142 years.² This figure represents GDP corrected for purchasing power parity, acknowledging lower costs of living in China and exchange rates to US dollars. The nominal Chinese GDP is a mere \$10.4 trillion, however, and has not yet overtaken the US.³ Nevertheless, China's growth rates justify its re-emergence as the world biggest economy, as it was in the late 1870s.⁴ Current breath-taking economic results would suggest that the PRC should strive with unparalleled fervour to gain hegemonic power. The question in the pursuit of this soft power is to what extent China is successful at managing its global reputation.

Since 2013, 'Community of Common Destiny' has become a term Beijing is particularly keen on using when describing its relationship with neighbouring countries.⁵ During diplomatic visits to ASEAN member countries, Xi Jinping inspires neighbours with a vision of stable and unique cooperation, and it might seem that this program counterbalances the 'return to Asia' strategy implemented by Washington.⁶ After 2001, the region saw a major displacement of US economic and military influence from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, Chinese financial strength makes it a powerful creditor to the developing countries. During the 2008 financial crisis, China provided a stimulus package of \$586 billion⁷ to East and Southeast Asian countries, which helped to ameliorate the impact of the recession.

In 2014, the official rise of Chinese defence spending is announced to rise 12.5 per cent from last year, which amounts to only a third of the US military budget.⁸ However, whereas Pentagon reports project flat or declining military spending over the next five years, China is undergoing a rapid naval modernisation, which is especially noticeable in the context of China's actions in the South China Sea.⁹ However, Xi Jinping's policies reflect a deep understanding of changing patterns in world politics, from coercion to persuasion. A heightened interest in natural resources and territorial expansion on the Spratly islands might serve as basis to perceiving China as a potential military aggressor. However, its subtle policies focus on projecting a softer image – China refers to historical legacy, which

suggests a national unity of the mainland with the islands.¹⁰ To some, it inspires warm attitudes towards the Middle Kingdom and equips it with a larger leeway to achieve its regional goals. Smaller powers like Taiwan may show resistance to accepting the tacit establishment of China's supremacy over the region but their economic interdependence with China keeps revolt highly improbable.¹¹

One might argue that before achieving the status of a global hegemonic supremacy, China ought to cure the sick man that is its mainland. The problem resides in the fact that, in a country of its size and with such population heterogeneity, every sign of progress is diluted while every problem magnifies a thousand times over. Recent protests in Hong Kong destabilised China's authority on the island, but it is unlikely that they will have long-term effects on Beijing's political control, as Hong Kong remains a business city dependent on its financial dealings with China.¹²

The economic stability that is ensured through close bilateral trade with the mainland, amounting to 45.6 per cent of Hong Kong domestic exports,¹³ still outweighs autonomy claims by a minority of Hong Kong citizens. As perceived through the Western perspective, protests exposed human rights infringements.¹⁴ Yet, the authority of the Chinese government remains unquestionable, and its partnership with Russia remains strong. Both countries have become more assertive in national claims and further strengthened their United Nations coalition by signing a US \$400 billion gas pipeline deal.¹⁵

A soft power 'charm offensive' is a term often used about China's financial activities on the African continent – the overall figure amounts to \$40 billion in Foreign Direct Investments.¹⁶ It is possible that China is losing the comparative advantage of its cheap labour force: creating infrastructure in Africa and exploring human resources increases the efficiency and returns on capital employed. Sceptics see Chinese assertiveness as being fuelled by Beijing's thirst for Africa's natural resources and go as far as calling it Neo-Colonialism.¹⁷ However, locals admit that China is perceived as 'a saviour, a partner, a model', despite a certain discomfort felt in relation to the fact that China is filling managerial positions with Chinese officials rather than transmitting skills to locals.¹⁸ Moreover, China is once again seen as an alternative creditor, instead of the IMF or the World Bank.¹⁹ In this sense, soft power is exercised but hardly on a win-win basis. Last but not least, despite the common perception of China relying heavily on exports, developed nations are also very much influenced by China's soft power. Over one third of Australian exports go to China, which caused former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to suggest that Australia's sovereignty is at risk if it does not diversify to leverage its dependence on China's demand for coal.²⁰

At the same time, China wants to be perceived as a partner, not a sponsor or dictator. The emergence of Confucius institutes in over 100 countries aims at engaging young people with Chinese history and raising



awareness about the culture centred on peace, balance and respect.²¹ While similar initiatives from the French, German, and Spanish governments seemed to work, China's considerable spending on its cultural centres (\$278 million in 2013), seems to have provided poor returns.²² Cruel communist history under Mao, government-led media censorship, and a communist ideology that does not align with neoliberal capitalism drowns out positive soft-power vibes that the CCP tries to send through CCTV or English versions of China Daily.²³

In 2012, while Britain was rejoicing over topping the Monocle+ IFG annual 'Global Soft Power' ranking, China did not even make into the top 20.²⁴ Monocle+ IFG observers seem not to rate China's diplomatic and cultural efforts very highly.²⁵ Perhaps, however, developing countries

see China in a more positive light due to the fact that China has overcome many of the challenges facing still-developing nations. With a population of over one billion, China has a major opportunity to make gains through soft power on the African continent.²⁶ Based on this evidence it could be argued that the future landscape of politics will be shaped by countries that now challenge the Western view. As western economies become less influential, emerging economies such as those on the African continent, India, and most importantly China will see enormous growth in their spheres of influence.

Carolina is a second year student of Business & Finance.

AFRICA

REGIONAL EDITOR



Perhaps nowhere else in the world has the changing nature of power been so diversely realised as in Africa. As the year draws to a close, the continent is racked by a dizzying array of conflicts, some decades old, others recent developments. The growing power of non-state actors, from terrorist organisations to influential individuals, has created enormous challenges while also providing the means to rectify new issues.

This year, Africa has experienced both great successes and great failures; from the well-orchestrated containment of the Ebola virus in major Nigerian cities, to the success of the African Union in driving back Al-Shabbab in Somalia, the people and governments of Africa are rapidly making progress.

Yet the continent is still experiencing growing pains. While Nigeria is handling the Ebola crisis better than anywhere else, the threats posed by Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations in the northern part of the country have gone largely unaddressed. The richest man on the continent, who now is perceived as more powerful than any African Head of State, has begun to look beyond his own country, and has made it his sole responsibility to enhance the development of West Africa. On the Eastern Coast, despite recent successes, the international community at large—and especially the UN—continues to treat the African Union with a paternalist attitude, closely regulating its power and intervening on its behalf while foreign trawlers still exploit the Somali coastline, exacerbating an already growing piracy problem.

The struggle to acquire, maintain, and legitimise power in Africa has been an issue for centuries, and as people on the continent become ever more connected to the world, the challenges that accompany the struggle for power will only grow larger.

Nick Pugh

ALIKO DANGOTE: WHAT IS AFRICA'S GREATEST PERSONAL FORTUNE ACTUALLY WORTH?

JACK EVANS



In markets riddled with corruption, states reliant on informality, and industries built on lawlessness, the ancient adage that 'money is power' can be personally exemplified by the systems' most successful elites. In Nigeria, the man who possesses the country's greatest individual fortune may well hold a comparable wealth of influence across all facets of society—a society in which goods, services, loyalty, and permissions all have a price tag.

The largely self-made manufacturing tycoon, Aliko Dangote, has a net worth estimated at \$22.8 billion USD by Forbes and near-monopolies on several of the products vital to a hugely populated, developing nation.¹ Cement, sugar, and flour all contributed to the growth of his 33-year-old company, Dangote Group, in its early years, and formed a financial foundation for recent expansions into other industries and other countries.² Today, Aliko Dangote is not only the wealthiest man in the elite-controlled Nigeria; he is the wealthiest man in Africa.

The story of his success is seen by many within Nigeria as a heroic endeavour—entrepreneurship and ambition took a young Dangote from his hometown in the impoverished, northern Kano state to the grand office building in Lagos within the space of a few decades.³ Although his rags-to-riches story may be somewhat of a misconception—his family was one of the wealthiest in Northern Nigeria during his childhood—Dangote's business acumen is undeniable, and necessarily matched by an impressive understanding of politics. How else might an up-and-coming commodities trader have navigated the chaos of successive military juntas throughout the 1980s and 90s? Although he often denies accusations of an inappropriate closeness to current and past ruling governments, undisguised campaign donations are supposedly often supplemented by informal dealings and reciprocated by national policy influence and certain industry protections.⁴ It is likely not a coincidence that numerous products, from bottled water to spaghetti, are placed on Nigeria's import ban list while Dangote Group and its subsidiaries make a lucrative trade from such necessities.⁵ The prohibition on importing 'bagged cement,' for example, did not keep the company from making some of its greatest gains in the 1990s from the bagging and distribution of imported loose cement.⁶

While it is easy to deduce the possibility of backdoor dealing from Dangote's success, few verifiable conclusions can be drawn. The difficulty of proving corruption is inherent to the act, and there is almost no evidence of any breaches of law by the Dangote Group available to the public (an American diplomatic briefing from 2005, recently made available on Wikileaks, seems to express frustration with this lack of any certifiably illegal actions).⁷ Indeed, Nigeria's import bans have long been promoted by the current government under President Goodluck Jonathan as part of a general trend of increased economic protectionism, and as such may have influenced Dangote Group's production focuses, rather than vice-versa.⁸

While business on the continental scale requires varying degrees of political clout everywhere, it is somewhat surprising that Dangote's personal interests seem limited to financial expansion, rarely pursuing influences on Nigeria's government that do not serve to increase his fortune. As a native of the northern half of the country, ravaged by violence, disease, and poverty intensely disproportionate to the booming, urbanised South, a desire to equalise living standards and national power-sharing might be expected from the former region's favourite son.⁹ In an interview with Al Jazeera earlier this year, he reiterated his long-time belief in investment as Nigeria's—and Africa's—best hope for development with an almost philanthropic attitude towards his commercial actions, claiming: 'I think the country is much, much larger than my interests.'¹⁰

It is in this same vein that Dangote explains his focus on commodity markets and production over the oil and gas sector. The business that has produced roughly 35 per cent of Nigeria's GDP in recent years (and many of its millionaires and billionaires) was left completely untouched by the Dangote Group until plans to invest in a refinery were announced in April.¹¹ However, as noble as he makes the fair sale of food, clothing, and shelter out to be, critics claim that, at times, Dangote's companies held monopolies on such products and have closely restricted market diversification and competition. In the 2005 American embassy report on his effect on Nigeria's business environment, the author writes that, 'we know the company at one time or another held the exclusive import rights in sugar, cement, and rice, using such advantages to do volume business and undercut competitors.'¹²

Nevertheless, Dangote has brought a greater degree self-sustainability into Nigeria through domestic production. The monopoly on sugar imports mentioned above did sustain his sugar refinery (the first in the country) and accordingly lowered the product's real cost to Nigerians.¹³ Dangote's latest project has a similar goal—to 'eradicate' reliance on oil and gas imports—for the sake of his country and his fortune.¹⁴

Today, Dangote Group is far and away the largest business conglomerate on the African continent, looking to increase its geographic reach abroad. Cement plants are currently under construction from Senegal to Zambia, and previously announced intentions to build in Iraq and Myanmar are also developing.¹⁵ If this worldwide spread is realised, Aliko Dangote will become more than a just a commercial force within West Africa—he will be a singular, globalising link between his home region and the rest of the developing world. To what or to whom he will direct the accompanying influence can only be left to speculation.

With every expansion, however, new enemies are made and new competition is aroused. The increasing prevalence of Chinese financing, manufacturing, and work-related immigration to Africa puts Dangote at odds with some of the most potent economic forces on the continent. Speaking to Al Jazeera, he acknowledged the volume of Chinese investment but also reiterated the popular complaint amongst Africans about the apparently short-sighted commercial strategies of Chinese companies, worrying that they are little concerned with creating sustainable, domestic development.¹⁶



While few can claim this of the future-conscious approaches to growth that Dangote takes in his business ventures, criticisms of his wealth and power wielding remain. Most are based on suggestions of purchased government influence and ruthless, competition-crushing business ethics.¹⁷ As incongruous as such criticisms may be to his professed confidence in domestic improvement, there exist few visible cracks in Dangote's self-created, positive public image. It is only on occasion that the wealthiest man in Africa even acknowledges the cutthroat, money and power-driven business environment in his country.

Speaking to *The Economist* two years ago, Dangote admitted: 'If you want to do business you have to foster a good relationship with the government of the day. If you don't, how do you expect the government to listen to your complaints?'

With a trillion-Naira fortune in his pocket and influence across the developing world, it is likely that the Nigerian government, among others, listens to Aliko Dangote's complaints.

Jack is a second year student of International Relations.

FATHERS AND FRIENDS

WILL O'SULLIVAN examines the United Nations-African Union relationship and its effect on the AU's ability to combat al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The international community has closely watched Somalia's first faltering steps out of the bracket of the failed state. The early and mid-1960s saw such developments as independence and constitutional ratification by popular referendum. However, power struggles followed, characterising a long period of presidential assassination, military coup d'états, and inter-clan warfare.¹ The UN-approved African Union (AU) response to this long-term instability is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), made up of roughly 22,000 troops alongside humanitarian and police components.²

One of the primary tasks of this AMISOM force is combatting Somalia's al-Shabaab organisation.³ Al-Shabaab is rigorously organised, and is broken down into two branches, one focused on advancing military aims and the other on law and order. A supreme Emir and his Shura council of ten members lead al-Shabaab. Within the organisation, the country is divided into distinct geographical units, each with an individual military commander. This design is meant to provide relative autonomy to each individual commander while ensuring that the organisation remains within the power of the Emir and his council.⁴

Inter-clan violence proliferated in Somalia in the period leading up to Siad Barre's regime, and from the collapse of this regime in 1991 until 2006 there was a period of complete instability and violence. Trapped between clan disputes that lacked clear motivations and the regular violation of human rights by U.S.-backed Ethiopian raids, the civilians of Somalia increasingly supported al-Shabaab, who provided them with a clear doctrine, social hierarchy and governing structure.⁵

Al-Shabaab and AMISOM are by no means the only two groups exerting influence in Somalian affairs. The UN and some of its most powerful members also have interests, or a lack thereof, that impact the efficacy of AMISOM in combatting al-Shabaab. This reflects a legacy of paternalism in UN decision-making regarding the AU that has chronically marginalized the interests of African States. Upon its inception, only four African countries were part of the UN.⁶ The impact of such lack of initial membership is evident in the power structures of the P5 and the General Assembly, as both exhibit glaring historical exclusion of African interest and representation. The current UN structure is consequently less calibrated to African inclusion, and may therefore potentially marginalize AU interests in peacekeeping operations.⁷

The short history of the AU makes determining the success of the UN-AU relationship harder. The mandate of the AU in Darfur between 2004 and 2007 was quite weak, effectively limited to monitoring ceasefire agreements. The Security Council further limited the range of responses available to the AU, exemplified in constraints such as restricting the mandate on the use of force to protecting civilians only 'under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity'.⁸

As a result, the principle of human rights and, more importantly, the autonomy of the AU's mission seemingly lost out to UN limitation. This is also to some extent reflected in the case of Burundi. To date, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is the only operation both initiated and coordinated solely by AU member states. The mission in Burundi involved protecting the politicians returning to participate in the transitional government, facilitating the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs),

and demobilising former militias. AMIB is to a large extent considered an important precedent for the AU in terms of autonomy and self-reliance⁹. However, in spite of the success of the AU, the UN ultimately decided to replace the mission in Burundi.¹⁰ As such, and in light of past relations, it can be argued the UN acts mostly as an organisational and financial crutch to the AU, rather than assuming its usual role as a normative entity, largely capable of soft power. The question, then, is whether Burundi was a precursor to future AU legitimacy, or just another instance of the AU acting as a handmaid to the UN.

The same question can be asked of AMISOM and its fight against al-Shabaab. Soon after al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for attacks in Kampala in 2010, the Ugandan president, along with other members of the AU, appealed to the UN for an expansion of the AMISOM mandate. Their call was for changing the character of the force from one of peacekeeping to one of peace-enforcement, in the hopes of addressing al-Shabaab more directly.¹¹ However, the UN rejected this proposed change in the constitution of AMISOM, yet compromised by allowing the limited use of pre-emptive force.¹²

It is currently unclear whether this relationship is beneficial or harmful to the common goals of the two institutions, and whether or not Al-Shabaab is benefitting from the dysfunctional red tape and influence of major powers. Similarly, the duration of the AMISOM presence in Somalia is entirely determined by the UN, which is a major issue. Although systems of regular renewal is in place, the legitimacy of AMISOM is entirely contingent on the willingness of UN powers to fund and further consider the operation.¹³

Recent developments to the conflict have only perpetuated this relationship. Earlier this month, AMISOM forces entered, and reportedly gained full control, of Barawe, a port town southwest of Mogadishu. Strategically, this town was vital for al-Shabaab in transport of weapons and food. In order to strengthen the growing power of the Somali government, major media outlets described the capture of Barawe as a joint Somali and AMISOM effort.¹⁴ This raid marks a noteworthy development, as the town has been under al-Shabaab control for six years.

However, despite such progress, sporadic attacks continue from al-Shabaab militants, involving improvised explosive devices on targeted government locations.¹⁵ Nevertheless, recent developments may herald a stronger, more independent AMISOM force. An increasingly plausible proposition is that AMISOM should become a defender of the international norms of human rights, similar to those set out in the United Nations Charter. With greater organisation and funding, one can only hope the AU will continue its current operations, though on a larger and more efficient scale.

Although it requires an improvement of the diplomatic relations between the member states and better administrative running of the organisation in general, the AU has the opportunity to escape from underneath the imperious gaze of the self-interested powers in the UN. If so, it is possible that, in the next decade, the AU will not only replace the UN missions, but also see them through more efficiently and more effectively than the UN itself.

Will is a second year student of Social Anthropology & Politics.

EUROPE & RUSSIA



The question of what it means to have power in both Europe and Russia has rarely been more pertinent than it is now. Perhaps power is best conceptualised through a punitive framework, exemplified by the sanctions levied against Russia following the Crimean crisis earlier this year. Or perhaps power is located in nationalist rhetoric, such as that expounded by Eurosceptic political movements, and exemplified by the burgeoning electoral successes of the UK Independence Party (UKIP),

Mouvement pour la France, and Alternative für Deutschland.

Undeniably, it has been a tumultuous year for both Europe and Russia. The Crimean crisis has circumscribed relations between the EU and Russia as largely antagonistic, and amidst condemnation of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and a subsequent flurry of sanctions emanating from the EU, relations have continued to become strained. Russia's expulsion from the G8 in March 2014 symbolises what is rapidly being understood as a stand-off between East and West, reminiscent of Cold War era hostilities.¹

Meanwhile, the nexus of relationships represented by the EU is finding itself increasingly susceptible to interrogation by political movements on the right of the ideological spectrum, serving to channel domestic focus onto the efficacy of European membership. The ostensibly pan-European trend of scepticism perhaps points towards an uncertain future for both supranational and intergovernmental co-operation within the EU.

Ultimately, the question of how we might conceptualise power in an increasingly uncertain political climate remains an open one, and is situated at the fore of contemporary European thought.

Conor Penn



DMITRY KISELYOV: AGITATOR, DEMAGOGUE, AND VLADIMIR PUTIN'S MOUTHPIECE

MAXWELL GREENBERG



Described as Russia's 'Chief Propagandist' by *The Economist*,¹ the first video result that a Google search returns for Dmitry Kiselyov is a fierce tirade against homosexuality. Kiselyov, in a severe tone, argues that '...to fine gays for "gay propaganda" is not enough. We must ban them from donations of blood and semen, and see their hearts after car accidents buried in the ground or incinerated,'² all of which was received with widespread applause. The regression of Russian media to an era of state propaganda reminiscent of the Soviet Union is personified most flamboyantly by Kiselyov.

Dmitry Kiselyov, 59, was born in Moscow during the heady days of the Cold War. In 1978, he graduated from the Norwegian branch of the Philological Faculty of Leningrad State University.³ From 1978 until 1989, he worked for *Radio Moscow*, the Soviet Union's international news service, widely regarded as a propaganda mouthpiece, broadcasting in Polish and Norwegian.⁴ Since the fall of the Soviet Union, he has held a series of news commentator roles across Russian television media. In 2013, he was appointed by President Vladimir Putin as the inaugural head of the official Russian government international news agency, *Rossiia Segodnya* (RS).⁵ RS was formed by presidential decree from a merger of *RIA Novosti*, the former Russian state media agency well respected for its journalistic integrity, and the *Voice of Russia*, an international radio service. RS, according to the presidential decree founding it, is purposed with providing 'information on Russian state policy and Russian life and society for audiences abroad.'⁶ The creation of RS was regarded by experts on Russia as a brazen attempt to consolidate the Kremlin's political control over state owned media sources.⁷ By scuppering *RIA Novosti*, the previous last bastion of moderate liberalism in Russian media, Putin has made it virtually impossible for dissenters to benefit from a national media platform. The network *Russia Today*, a news-media organisation fairly well known in the West, was rebranded simply as its acronym, RT, in 2009, and is a separate organisation. While RT is nominally independent of the Russian state, RS and its head, purport no such independent-mindedness.

Kiselyov attained national prominence presenting RS's flagship weekly news programme. From this platform, he has vocally denounced the West, smeared Putin's political opponents, actively promoted homophobia, and made comments denounced by Jewish groups as anti-Semitic. He is particularly outspoken about the West, and frequently alleges conspiracy against Russian interests. This should all be considered, Kiselyov argues, with the knowledge that 'Russia is the only country on earth which can reduce the United States into radioactive dust.'⁸

Kiselyov first made a name for himself during Ukraine's Orange Revolution, then working for a pro-government Ukrainian television channel. At that time

too, he argued for Viktor Yanukovich's right to govern after protests broke out against Yanukovich's fraudulent election.⁹ He continued his pro-Yanukovich coverage at RS during the Maidan revolution. In his coverage of the protests, he placed the blame for the crisis squarely on the United States, specifically targeting Victoria Nuland, an Assistant Secretary of State, for encouraging violence and inciting revolution.¹⁰ He also described the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU, the issue that sparked the protests, as a nefarious plot by Sweden and Poland to seek revenge on the Ukrainians for their victory at the Battle of Poltava in 1709.¹¹

In response, the Ukrainian government has banned broadcasts of *Rossiia 1*, the channel that broadcasts RS and its head, Kiselyov. In Crimea, during the Russian invasion, *Rossiia 1* and several other Russian-language state dominated channels were the most widely viewed television channels. For his comments, Kiselyov has the dubious honour of being the only journalist, after Russia's annexation of Crimea, to be singled out for sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russian citizens. The sanctions include travelling, banking, or otherwise doing business in the EU. Responding to the sanctions, Kiselyov commented, 'I don't have any accounts or business in the EU. I am a professional journalist; that is all I've ever been.' His coverage of the Maidan protests also brought criticism from Igor Yakovenko, the former head of the Russian Union of Journalists, commenting after Kiselyov's appointment to lead RS that Russian state media would be transformed into a 'Goebbels-type' information service.¹²

None of this has been able to diminish Kiselyov domestically. The Public Opinion Foundation, a Russian polling firm, released a poll on the 27th of March naming him the second most trusted journalist in Russia.¹³ In an April comment piece in *The Guardian*, Kiselyov argues that, while *The Economist* regards him as a propagandist, he regards himself as a journalist 'free to tackle difficult issues without fear of state sanction.'¹⁴ When asked directly about the propagandist nature of RS, Kiselyov replied that 'state-owned media is bound to have a constructive rather than a destructive goal.' Kiselyov argues that the sanctions levied against him violate the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights which enshrines freedom of movement, and that he is being persecuted for exercising his right to free speech, which, he alleges, is under assault in the EU, and protected in Russia.¹⁵

The controversy surrounding Dmitry Kiselyov is symptomatic of the political climate fostered by the Putin regime, and by Kiselyov himself – that of an intolerant and suspicious worldview. Vladimir Lenin said, perhaps apocryphally, 'trust is good, control is better.' Dmitry Kiselyov, and the return to state control of the Russian news media that his public personality represents, demonstrates the illiberal and mistrustful attitude of the Putin regime towards its own citizens.

Maxwell is a fourth year student of Politics. He is the president of the Politics and International Relations Society and former editor in chief of Leviathan.

ANOTHER COUNTRY: POWER IN NORTHERN IRELAND

DAVID KELLY discusses the future of the UK's forgotten outpost and Europe's forgotten conflict.

An unpredictable general election just months away; discontent and inequality on the rise; Scotland's flirting with the idea of independence; Wales' demand for more powers; chaos in the Middle East; and a possible messy exit from the European Union on the horizon – the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland appears to be standing on the edge of a historical precipice.

Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, power is slipping gradually and quietly from Whitehall's grasp. Preoccupied with other challenges, the province is receding from British view. When Northern Ireland is thought of, when it is thought of at all, by those in London's corridors of power, it is usually as that peculiar enclave once scarred by sectarian violence, but now merely a drain on Britain's time and money.¹ 'The Troubles', and even the peace process ended by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement,² are now a distant memory.

The remarkable ease with which the Republic of Ireland, one of the signatories and guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, was persuaded to relinquish its long-standing territorial claim to the six northern counties, was telling. Dublin merely confirmed what many had long suspected – it was no longer interested in the hassle of unification. An overwhelming 94 per cent of voters in the Republic voted to accept that position in a subsequent referendum.³ The idea of permanent separation between north and south seemed to leave the Republic distinctly nonplussed.

For London, Northern Ireland has always been a bit of an afterthought.

The province has an even less prominent place in the social or political consciousness of the

ordinary citizen on 'mainland Britain'. Such is the social, cultural and political disconnect that the *New Statesman* finds itself able, not only to ask openly 'Would anyone care if Northern Ireland left the Union?', but to answer with a rather emphatic and uncontested 'No.'⁴ It is certainly difficult to imagine Prime Minister David Cameron affirming his 'love'⁵ of Northern Ireland and pledging to fight 'with every fibre that I have'⁶ to keep it within the Union, as the Conservative leader did during Scotland's independence referendum.

Those tourists who make the now popular journey to visit Belfast's Titanic exhibition or the republican murals along the city's Falls Road are encountering a very different Britain from the one on the other side of the Irish Sea. To the eyes and ears of Cardiffians, Glaswegians and Liverpoolians, Northern Ireland – in a similar way to the global metropolis of London – can seem like a world apart.

The first thing which strikes any visitor to Northern Ireland is the ubiquity of the flags – the Union Jack, the red hand of Ulster, the Irish tricolour, the Scottish Saltire, paramilitary symbols – which seem to dominate the streets and skylines of all of the province's cities, towns and villages. Gabriella Elgenius, an expert on symbols and identity at the University of Oxford, argues that flags, as potent and emotive national symbols, are a 'significant element of the nation-building process' and in the authentication of boundaries.⁷ Symbols like flags 'illuminate boundaries and raise awareness of membership.'⁸ Flags, through their 'signalling of territorial claims and commonality', are 'highly divisive agents.'⁹ In Northern Ireland, flags are powerful and contested symbols of group identity, distinguishing loyalist and republican spaces from each other in an overt and adversarial manner. The Union Jack of loyalism and the Irish tricolour of republicanism are powerful, enduring symbols of difference. The flag's power lies in its ability to ensure that 'the past' – its histories and its mythologies – are



always present in the present.¹⁰ The loyalists and republicans of Northern Ireland are constantly reminded of who they are and where they come from, just as any national flag atop any public building anywhere in the world is a reminder to those who pass below it that, for example, they are Scottish and this is Scotland. Flags can therefore come to possess immense power in terms of cultural and, in Northern Ireland, political identity.

The suspicion and paranoia surrounding flags in Northern Ireland can descend into Pythonesque absurdity. In September this year, during the Ryder Cup at Gleneagles, police were called to a house in County Down by a local resident claiming that an 'offensive' 'Arabic flag' had been erected by his neighbours. It turned out that the flag was neither Arabic nor offensive and was, in fact, that of the European Union, being flown to celebrate Europe's golfing victory over the United States.¹¹ More seriously, in late 2012 and early 2013, protests and riots enveloped parts of Belfast after local councillors voted to limit the number of days on which the Union Jack would fly above the famous City Hall.¹²

Disagreement between the major political parties – Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) on the republican and nationalist side, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) on the loyalist side, and the cross-community Alliance Party in neither camp – on how to proceed vis-à-vis the flag impasse is one of the reasons that further progress has stalled.¹³ Sinn Féin and the DUP have been increasingly unable to work together in Stormont's mandatory all-party coalition.¹⁴ The peace process and the devolved administration are in a rut, thus demonstrating, in a country characterised historically by conflict, the extent to which power can be located in cultural symbolism. Meanwhile, Britain stands on the side-lines as an impotent spectator. The future of Northern Ireland lies at and relies upon Stormont, not Westminster. Only Stormont has the power to sustain or derail the peace process.

The assumption in both Dublin and London is that, eventually, the parties will carve out some kind of imperfect compromise. A return to the bad old days is seen as, if not impossible, then certainly unforeseeable. The degree of normality which has been painstakingly achieved has bred complacency in Stormont. While none of the major parties wish to see a return to conflict, other groups are not so squeamish – dissident republicans are still armed and active. In 2011, a police officer was killed by a car bomb in Omagh¹⁵ and in 2013, bomb disposal officers were called to an average of more than one security alert every day.¹⁶

Moreover, Northern Ireland's young people are growing up in a place troubled by poverty and disillusionment. Unemployment and economic inactivity in Northern Ireland are significantly higher than the UK average.¹⁷ Over 21 per cent of young people aged 18 to 24 are not in employment, education or training.¹⁸ Nearly half of young people believe that the economy will either get worse or fail to improve.¹⁹ The story of poverty breeding frustration and boredom, and of frustration and boredom breeding violence is a familiar and dangerous one.

A stagnant economy is not the only challenge facing the province which could threaten long-term stability. The 2011 census revealed that the Protestant population (48 per cent) continues to decline, while the Catholic population continues to rise (45 per cent), leading some to predict that the question of a united Ireland will inevitably be resuscitated in the near future.²⁰ However, interestingly, only 25 per cent categorise their national identity as 'Irish only', compared to 40 per cent who identify as 'British only' and a growing number who identify as 'Northern Irish only' (21 per cent).²¹ Support for Irish unity currently stands, according to opinion polls, at just under 30 per cent – although

an overwhelming majority of those saying 'Yes' to Irish unity would only be prepared to vote for it in 20 years' time.²² Given the fierce opposition of many loyalists, and the reluctance of many republicans to re-open old wounds, the possibility of Irish unity, and therefore the possibility of locating Northern Irish power within the Houses of the Oireachtas, does not appear imminent.

According to Andy Pollak of the Centre for Cross Border Studies, it is 'difficult to overstate the lack of interest there is among people in the Republic these days in Northern Ireland.'²³ Pollak suggests that many people south of the border 'say that after over 90 years of going their very different ways, the two are separate places, and that is the way to keep them.'²⁴ The Republic has its own identity which is no longer dependent on all 32 counties or the entirety of the island of Ireland, along with its own economic problems, which would only increase by taking on the financial burden of the six northern counties. The attitude of most in the Republic is encapsulated by the comments of one University College Dublin student taking part in a survey of attitudes to north-south relations: 'it's really far more trouble than it's worth. I mean, to integrate Northern Ireland into this state – why would you be bothered?'²⁵ Even those living in the Republic, perhaps with family and friends living there, perceive Northern Ireland as though it were a foreign country. Pollak is right, then, to question whether people 'in the South really want the North as part of an eventual united Ireland?'²⁶

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that British power in Northern Ireland is secure. Northern Ireland has always been different from the rest of the UK, and these differences only continue to deepen. Bizarrely, the most ostentatiously 'British' and 'Unionist' part of the UK is perhaps its most abnormal constituent. Northern Ireland is much more religious, conservative and patriarchal than the rest of the UK.^{27 28 29} Its political culture remains utterly distinct. Loyalism's fervent devotion to the cultural, political, and historical symbolism represented by the Queen and the Union Jack is not mirrored anywhere else in the UK. Whether or not this disconnect is sustainable within a single state is an open question.

Unwanted by Dublin and London; ignored by the rest of the UK; forgotten by the rest of Ireland – Northern Ireland is becoming ever more disconnected and different from its neighbours. Who, then, in the long-term, will have the power to rule over the province?

There was, once upon a time, talk on the discontented loyalist fringes of 'independence from Britain.'^{30 31} Nations smaller than Northern Ireland survive and thrive independently. In 1968, the then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland Terence O'Neill dismissed the advocates of such an idea as 'extremists' and 'lunatics.'³² For most, such an idea remains fanciful and unpalatable. But, however unlikely it may seem, the idea possesses a certain logic. As we have seen, neither Dublin nor London particularly wants the power to rule Northern Ireland, loyalists remain as staunchly opposed to Irish unity as ever and republicans appear unable to make much headway on the issue. Meanwhile, Northern Ireland's distinctive social, cultural, and political consciousness – born at partition, developed during 'the Troubles' and entrenched in the new millennium – continues to grow.

At times, Northern Ireland already seems like another country. Perhaps, one day, it actually will be.

David is a third year student of Politics.

POWER AND THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN

INGEBJØRG BIRKELAND discusses whether EU citizenship is empowering or 'just a product for a customer'.

European Council President Herman van Rompuy stated in 2013 that, 'Europe is much more than a product for a customer.'¹ This has repeatedly been cited as the political aim of what came to be the European Union.² Legally, this commenced with the opening declaration of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, stating that the signatories were '[d]etermined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe', and culminated in the formal creation of a citizenship of the European Union by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The supposed goal was to solidify the ever-expanding range of rights enacted by the EEC during its then 35-year tenure. But have these ambitious aims actually culminated in the empowerment of the citizens of the EU in any significant way?

There are many ways to define what 'citizenship' entails, and it may be viewed differently in different social and historical contexts. It has been described both as having 'elemental looseness' as well as a 'fundamental essence.'³ Nevertheless, the notion of citizenship arguably invokes general thoughts of certain rights and duties held by the individual citizen against the state, and vice versa.

EU citizenship is unique in the sense that it traditionally has required a cross-border element in order for it to be 'activated.'⁴ This rule, often referred to as the 'wholly internal rule'⁵ means that an EU citizen must move from his or her home member state to a host member state for their citizenship rights to take real effect. This requirement of movement within the Union unequivocally links someone's legal status as an EU citizen to the market through the economic

activity necessitated by a cross-border move. Previous and recent European Court of Justice case law demonstrates the manifestation of this 'elemental looseness' in the EU's perception of citizenship.

The 2004 Zhu and Chen⁶ case demonstrated the ease with which EU citizenship rights can be manipulated: here a Chinese couple residing in Wales purposely moved to Northern Ireland for the birth of their child. At the time, Ireland allowed any person born on the entire island of Ireland to acquire Irish nationality,⁷ thus enabling the couple's new-born daughter to obtain Irish citizenship. This allowed the parents to utilise EU rights derived from their daughter upon their return to Wales, as she was now an Irish citizen residing in the UK. In this case, circumventing rules and directives meant to establish a sense of order and entitlement regarding EU citizen-rights ultimately entailed nothing more difficult than a half-hour Ryanair flight.

The 2011 case of *McCarthy*⁸ concerned a woman of dual British and Irish citizenship, whose Jamaican husband was facing deportation. McCarthy attempted utilising rights granted by EU Directive 2004/38⁹ to stop this, which established '... the right of permanent residence in the territory of the Member States for Union citizens and their family members.'¹⁰ In spite of this, her case was ultimately unsuccessful, deemed so as she was on benefits while simultaneously not having



'activated' her EU citizenship rights by ever actually residing in another EU state apart from the UK. Essentially, she was denied the use of this right, as she did not qualify as an economic actor in the Union.

Immediately preceding the *McCarthy* case, however, was the similar case of *Ruiz Zambrano*,¹¹ which surprisingly resulted in an opposing judgment. In this case two Colombian citizens were in the process of being deported from the state of Belgium. This was successfully halted by the existence of their two Belgian-born children (of Belgian citizenship): although these children had never left the Union they would, in effect, be forced to leave the Union if their parents were deported, leaving them unable to exercise their citizenship rights altogether. Here we can observe a strong sense of empowerment in relation to citizenship of the Union. However, when reviewing these cases comparatively they demonstrate the flimsy and unpredictable nature of EU citizenship, and its lack of substantive content. In light of the outcome of the *Ruiz Zambrano* case, Advocate General Sharpston of the Court of Justice concluded that, in his opinion 'Lottery rather than logic would seem to be governing the exercise of EU citizenship rights.'¹²

Foreshadowing the verdicts of the *Ruiz Zambrano* and *Zhu and Chen* cases, the Court of Justice stated in 2001 that '[t]he status of 'citizen' of the European Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of all the Member

States.'¹³ Some have even claimed that EU citizenship is 'aggressively encroaching into the realm of the nation state.'¹⁴ On the other hand, while these cases can be seen to serve as a demonstration of the expansion of the scope of EU citizenship, they can just as well serve to display the overly bureaucratic, disorganised, and hit-or-miss nature of the 'activation' of powers and rights of the citizens, characterised by the outcome of the *McCarthy* case. Its instability, as well as the ease with which it can be manipulated, ultimately renders EU citizenship as a policy tool falling short of truly empowering its citizens in a meaningful and reliable fashion.

The scope of EU citizenship may currently reach beyond the free market, but it is still indisputably linked to it. Therefore, van Rompuy's assertion that 'Europe is much more than a product for a customer' can ultimately only be regarded as partly true. Its continued expansion is reassuring, but further clarification of its scope, and regulation of its loopholes, is needed in order to fulfil the goals set out by the Treaties. Only then will the citizens of the EU be empowered in a social and constitutional sense, and not just as actors in an economic market.

Ingebjørg is a fourth year student of Law & Social Policy.

DECISIONS OF THE POWERFUL

FREDDIE WILD uses game theory analysis to examine decision-making during the Ukraine Crisis of Summer 2014.

Decision theory in international relations has long occupied philosophers, political theorists, and newspaper columnists alike. During the Cold War, game theory was used as a prismatic device to understand the incentive-based choices facing international actors. Using conflicts with clear payoff-metrics allows us to examine how powerful individuals approach decisions by analysing the goals and objectives of each outcome, possible actions, and consequences of those actions, before using these factors to determine the credibility of threats and promises. The factors can be seen as power determinants between actors, enabling the more powerful side to achieve their goals, even at the expense of the other side. The principles of game theory and analysis of conflict strategy will be applied to the Ukraine Crisis of Summer 2014 in order to explore these concepts.

Through the application of game theory, it is possible to examine the consequences of various actions using an objective-based payoff matrix, in which payoffs are determined by two players moving sequentially, with the value of each combination of actions to a given player determined by the objectives pursued:

Fig. 1¹

| {Player A, Player B} | I | II |
|----------------------|-------|-------|
| i | {1,2} | {2,1} |
| ii | {0,0} | {0,0} |

Player A, who moves first, achieves a payoff of 1 in the event of I followed by i, and a payoff of 2 in the event of II followed by i. Other combinations yield a payoff of 0. Player B, who moves second, achieves a payoff of 2 in the event of I followed by i, and a payoff of 1 in the event of II followed by i. In this way, the first choice preference of both Player A and Player B are conflicting.

Fig. 2

| {Russia, West} | Withdraw | Intervene |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Resolution | {Medium, High} | {High, Medium} |
| No resolution | {Low, Low} | {Low, Low} |

The constructed payoff matrix has Russia as the first mover, and the West as the conditional mover. Here, the values of the various payoffs are given the identity Low < Medium < High, which is absolute and transferable, so that Low < High.

The payoff structure of the Ukraine Crisis has been weighted according to the perceived reward for any given combination of action. Russian payoffs are determined by the benefits accrued through achievement of goals, minus the costs of any negative outcome. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has said that it suspects Russia's end goal to be a prevention of rebel defeat and a frozen conflict that leaves Russia in effective control.² As such, this has been included in the payoff matrix under the heading 'Intervene,' with the opposite state being 'Withdraw'. Sanctions have had a negative economic impact to date, and this threat continues into the future with a possible credit crunch in 2016.³ I therefore assume that a 'Resolution' of sanctions by the West is preferred to 'No resolution' of sanctions and the possibility of future conflict. This leads to a best-case scenario of 'Intervene' with 'Resolution,' yielding a payoff of 'High.' The next best case is 'Withdraw' with 'Resolution,' yielding a payoff of 'Medium.' Any action that brings about further sanctions and the possibility of conflict with 'No resolution' is deemed to have a 'Low' pay-out.

The West's goal is the prevention of further Russian interventionism; Angela Merkel has stated that Russia cannot alter European borders with impunity.⁴ This means that the goals of Russia and the West are directly opposed, and cannot achieve payoff maximisation simultaneously. Because sanctions have had a detrimental effect on Western economies, particularly in Europe — several companies, including BP and Renault, have warned NATO of the potential negative impacts — the best-case scenario is 'Withdraw' with 'Resolution,' yielding a payoff of 'High.'⁵ According to this logic, the next best case is 'Intervene' with 'Resolution,' yielding a payoff of 'Medium.' Any action that brings about further sanctions and the possibility of conflict with 'No resolution' is deemed to have a 'Low' pay-out.

The Nash Equilibrium is a tool for understanding decision choices under certain conditions. It is defined as the choices made by an agent in a game that maximise expected payoff, given what another agent is doing.⁶ Using this definition of Nash Equilibrium, where actions taken are dependent on other agents, implies that the consequences of a given action are a central determinant of the decisions eventually taken. In order for the consequences of an action to be understood, the current position — comprised of the goals and costs of the participating agents — must first be examined. This concept was illustrated through the payoff matrix above.

Now that the tools and knowledge for decision analysis have been explored, it is possible to determine which decisions will be taken under any given framework. For example, in the first payoff matrix, without any prior commitments, Player A, as the first mover, has the initiative and will therefore choose action II, forcing Player B to select between a payoff of 1 or 0,⁷ creating a Nash Equilibrium of {II,i} with payoff {2,1}. Player B, as second mover, has tools available to attempt to force Player A to take action I.⁸ If Player B can make a prior commitment to alternative actions, it will force Player A into taking action I, becoming the first mover and gaining initiative.⁹ This is achieved through the use of threat or promise, whereby Player B commits to taking action ii if Player A takes action II. This ensures that there is a payoff of {0,0} in the event of action II, and so Player A will take action I to receive a payoff of 1, rather than 0.¹⁰ Whether or not this is successful depends on how credible the threat or promise is.¹¹ An incredible threat or promise will ensure that Player A will take no notice of the threat and so take its maximising action, II.¹² Therefore, the success of a threat of a particular action hangs on the credibility of that threat.

To apply this to the situation in Ukraine, without use of a threat, Russia, as first mover, will choose its maximising action of 'Intervene,' and thereby force a Nash Equilibrium of {Intervene, Resolution} while the West also tries to maximise its payoff. In this scenario, the possibility of further damaging sanctions and conflict were a deterrent threat — a threat used to stop a particular set of actions.¹³ By examining the possibility of further sanctions, the West was attempting to convince Russia that the set of actions, {Intervene, Resolution}, would be impossible, as a first action of 'Intervene' would result in a second action of 'No resolution,' leading to a payoff of {Low, Low}. If this threat is deemed credible, the new Nash Equilibrium will be {Withdraw, Resolution} with payoff {Medium, High}.

The credibility of the threat of further sanctions is thus of paramount importance in governing the decision of Russia over whether to 'Intervene' or 'Withdraw'. Such credibility is achieved through commitment to pursuing a threat after the first action has been taken, even though the second player would achieve a higher payoff by pursuing another action.¹⁴ Credibility is communicated



through the interaction of information between individuals, as acquisition, concealment, and revelation of knowledge are central to determining the true intent of an individual.¹⁵ The combination of commitment and communication demonstrates that credibility is not determined by intent of the threatening player, but rather the threatened player's interpretation of the threat.

As such, if sanctions are perceived to constitute a credible commitment to future detrimental actions in response to interventionist policies, then Russia's actions will be entirely determined by the relative payoffs between the states, {Withdraw, Resolution} and {Intervene, No resolution}. However, if sanctions are not seen as a credible commitment to future detrimental actions, were Russia to pursue interventionist policies then the Nash Equilibrium will be {Intervene, Resolution}. Changing payoffs will also yield different action incentives. For example, if the geopolitical cost of 'Withdraw' for Russia were greater than the

cost of definite future sanctions and conflict, it is likely that no threat would offer a large enough incentive to take action 'Withdraw'.

The decisions of powerful international actors are complex, dynamic equilibria requiring awareness of the goals of the participants, the actions that can be taken to achieve those goals, the benefits and costs resulting from different actions, the potential promises and threats that can be made, and the credibility of those promises and threats. The power conferred by conditional equilibria and strength of credibility on one side or another leads to a superior outcome for the more powerful side, as well as repercussions to affected organisations and individuals.

Freddie is a third year student of Economics.

CITIZENS OF THE UNION

ANTHONY SALAMONE analyses how much influence the ordinary citizen has in the EU.

Recent months have seen a burgeoning of public discussion on the European Union (EU), what its priorities should be and how it ought to go about realising them. In Britain, the Scottish independence debate and the prospect of a renegotiation and referendum on EU membership have intensified the existing focus on Europe, brought about by the economic and financial crisis and the salience of the far-right on the political scene. Engagement with European issues is welcome, even in instances where some of the facts seem to go missing. One can only hope the tone of the debate on 'Europe' will begin to match the significance the EU has on everyday life in the UK.

When we think about the EU in practice, the effects on the individual often come to mind – the freedom to work, study, or retire in any EU country or the opportunity to buy goods without obvious barriers from across most of the European continent. It is clear that the Union confers extensive rights on individuals. While relatively rare for a supranational organisation, that fact was confirmed early on in the van Gend en Loos judgment from what is now the Court of Justice of the European Union.¹ In this context, we might ask ourselves how much influence ordinary citizens have on how the EU functions and on the decisions it collectively takes.

If we apply these questions to EU legislative decision-making, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the EU Council become the principal institutions of focus. By taking each of them in turn, we can begin to informally gauge how readily citizens can have a direct impact on their choices. In the first instance, we can consider the Commission, the institution meant to act in the collective interests of the EU. The Commission proposes nearly all European legislation, and as such it serves as a locus for actors wanting to shape the direction of draft laws from the very beginning. While it will accept interest from almost all groups, in part because the attention reinforces its own legitimacy, the Commission listens to actors in proportion to their perceived power in the system.² In such a dynamic, where less influential Member States might themselves be marginalised, citizens do not rank very highly.

Attempts to empower citizens at EU level have principally taken the form of engagement on social media and the European Citizens' Initiative, an EU petitions system brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon. However, most initiatives to date have floundered on the signature requirements and deadlines and, even in the few successful cases, the Commission has only been required to review the proposal (and likely do no more than that).³ In short, individuals hoping to make a mark on EU decisions would probably need to go elsewhere.

What about the European Parliament? Surely the single EU institution directly elected by voters must be interested in the views of citizens. Undoubtedly it is interested, but the Parliament's own orientation and its inability to act contradict any such concern. Since the European Parliament cannot introduce its own bills, its core focus rests on the proposals it receives from the Commission and the Council. In this respect, its legislative emphasis falls on adapting what invariably begins somewhere else. Despite continual efforts to boost its own powers, the Parliament's capability to determine policy is tempered by the inter-institutional reality. As a result, although MEPs represent constituents, the either broad nature or technical content of legislation means that they do so in a more indirect manner than in national parliaments. All of its scrutiny powers aside, the Parliament does not 'hold government to account' and members do not necessarily spend significant time chasing up constituents' complaints or appeals. Taking into perspective the delineation of its competences and the wide nature of its representation, the Parliament too is not an ideal venue for citizens to guide EU decision-making.

We arrive then at the EU Council (for purposes of discussion here we can include the European Council as well). As the collector of national officials for EU affairs, the Council is more of a gathering than an organisation. Nevertheless, it is the facility through which citizens can have the greatest impact on EU decisions. In general, Member States are much more responsive to initiatives from individuals for, in contrast to the other EU institutions, they

are dependent on citizens for their power (the Parliament is elected as well of course, but the combination of low turnout, minimal interest, and second-order ranking makes its selection a product of domestic politics rather than of an unequivocal mandate from voters). The combination of their elective imperative and their capacity to act means that national governments can offer key points of entry to shaping the EU. Of course, each Member State has a different degree of say, depending on factors such as its size, the issue at hand, and how well it works with other states. With all of this in mind, national governments may still not listen to the demands of citizens. It is commonplace for them to hide behind EU institutions or simply place blame elsewhere. However, of the three institutions engaged in making EU policy, the Council – or, more to the point, elements within it – is most likely to be swayed by citizen engagement.

Since we have established that citizens have relatively limited opportunities to influence EU policy, we can explore why this is the case. At the heart of the matter, we find the question of whether the European Union is an international organisation or something more (such as an emerging super-polity).⁴ The extent to which the EU meets or exceeds the expectations of an international organisation can explain the practical level of citizen impact on its functioning.

Although the European Union may be singular in the breadth and depth of integration of its Member States, it fundamentally remains an international organisation. Four points in particular illustrate this fact. Firstly, the EU's structures are predominantly intergovernmental – they feature sovereign Member States, interstate cooperation, and defined areas of competence. Although it includes supranational elements as well, the EU is grounded in the mutual and voluntary participation of independent states in a profit-sharing enterprise. Secondly, the Member States have the final say, through setting the agenda in the European Council to amending the EU treaties. Thirdly, citizens on the whole do not treat EU politics as equal to national politics. This perception is evidenced by the perpetually declining participation in European Parliament elections. In most Member States, EU affairs are considered external issues viewed through the frame of domestic politics. Fourthly, the Member States retain their own political identities. Countries themselves are responsible for implementing the vast majority of EU law, and in many cases they decide how they want to achieve European objectives. While it is true the EU has transnational features, its individual and discrete Member States are the foundation of the Union.

In practice, the ordinary citizen can have only limited impact on how the EU functions and what it decides. The cynic might remark that the EU institutions are 'too preoccupied' to make time to address peoples' concerns. Considering how the European Union works, it is unrealistic, if regrettable, to expect that individual citizens might have a say in an organisation which, while it confers rights on them, in practice functions in many respects like any other international organisation. As a result, the EU institutions on the whole are substantially insulated from the political predisposition of the public. Concentrating on Member State governments is likely the most strategically prudent avenue for influencing what the EU does, as national leaders directly require the continuing support of their citizens for their existence.

The European Union often finds itself entangled in the paradox of possessing some democratic features, yet without constituting a clearly defined polity. This confusion naturally raises questions of its accountability and legitimacy.⁵ The implications for an increasingly integrated and empowered organisation with such limited venues for direct citizen participation are unclear, but they are likely not promising. The current debates on the UK's constitutional future and EU membership would do well to be accompanied by discussion on a vision for how citizens can engage with the (other) Union.

Anthony is PhD candidate in Politics. His research focuses on UK-EU relations and the politics of Britain's EU membership.



LATIN AMERICA

REGIONAL EDITOR



Today, Latin America finds itself at a crossroads. On the one hand it is going down a road of rapid economic development and becoming increasingly aware of the new role it could play in global power structures. On the other hand, it still struggles to cope with security issues, accountability, and increasing social disparities.

Climate change is one area where Latin American countries have gained a louder voice in the international sphere; it is no coincidence Lima is hosting the UN Climate Change Conference this December. Furthermore, the emergence of economic and political alternatives in the form of a variety of left-wing parties and their programmes clearly mark a break with former

power structures. On the other hand, the region risks its new global position by failing to cope with drug trafficking and violence, authoritarian leadership, and its continuing dependency on the extraction of natural resources for regional economic development.

The articles in this issue of the *Leviathan* shed light on the many dimensions of power in a region that is still coping with its rapid development: the power of ideas that question existing deficiencies and imagine a different, better reality; the power of certain political groups to shape policymaking at a national and international level; and the struggles for power by socially marginalised groups trying to make their voices heard. It remains thrilling to see where Latin America is headed as it seems to be a guiding role model to other developing regions in the world – not only when it comes to climate change issues but also the building of fairer, socially more coherent societies.

Leonie von Hammerstein

MARIO VARGAS LLOSA: QUESTIONING POWER STRUCTURES IN LATIN AMERICA

LEONIE MEIER



Mario Vargas Llosa (1936) is undeniably one of the most influential writers in Latin America. His novels, books, and plays have received international recognition, culminating in the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2010, which was awarded 'for his cartography of structures of power and his trenchant images of the individual's resistance, revolt, and defeat.'¹ Personal and political forces have shaped his work, characterized by deeply insightful explorations of power and resistance in Latin American culture. The power of his ideas and imagination manifests itself in Vargas Llosa's ability to question and

criticise what he considers to be morally wrong, and at the same time conveys his liberal ideas of freedom and democracy. Drawing on his biography and discovering the ongoing themes in his literature, this portrait will try to shed light on Vargas Llosa's depiction of power both as an author and politician.

The starting points for Vargas Llosa's novels are always personal experiences. What stands out in his ideological development and has direct bearing on much of his work is his hatred of the brutal, disciplinarian excesses of his father.² The lessons of power from his father did not only shape Vargas Llosa's early years, but also contributed to his aversion of any kind of authoritarianism, machismo, and the seemingly endemic corruption so inherent in Latin American political culture. In short, it fostered his love for freedom. At the age of 13, Vargas Llosa was sent to the Leoncio Prado military academy in Lima where, or so his father hoped, he would forget about literature and pursue a career in the military. However, rather than conforming to his father's wishes, Mario used the insights he gained into the brutality and prejudice of Peruvian society under General Odría's 1948-1956 military dictatorship for many of his future works.

As a journalist in his late teen years, young Vargas Llosa got to know the 'darker face'³ of Lima, visiting slums and red light districts, which contributed to his understanding of the complexity of Peruvian society. He became a rebel, rejecting his parents' choice of a catholic university, choosing instead to go to a secular, left-wing college. However, it was during the following years he spent in Europe that he began to see himself as a Marxist intellectual, becoming increasingly anti-establishment. In Europe, he gained a more universal perspective. This enabled him to position Peru amongst other nations, and subsequently criticise its authoritarian power structures; in his own words: 'I discovered Latin America in Europe.'⁴

In his most overtly political novel, *Conversation in the Cathedral* (1969), he brings all his aversion and mistrust to paper, depicting the deeply entrenched political corruption and abuses of power in Peru during the 1950s. The novel looks at the coerciveness of socio-economic hierarchy and the exploitation of the weak in Peruvian society, portraying a two-folded concern; one with how the quest for power transforms a person's life, and the other with how this quest affects the lives of others not immediately caught up in the struggle. The social tensions within Peruvian society become very evident in *Conversation in the Cathedral*, confronting the reader with Vargas Llosa's experiences of military academy, which he considered to be 'like a scaled-down model of Peru.'⁵

An attentive observer, Vargas Llosa did not just question power structures in Peru. In the early 1960s he was a high-profile supporter of Castro's Cuba,

but soon became disillusioned with socialism and distanced himself from the leftist revolution. He saw his growing disenchantment finally confirmed in 1971, when Castro forced the rebellious Cuban poet and writer Herberto Padilla into a shameful 'show trial' before imprisoning him. Vargas Llosa loudly voiced his concern in the 'Padilla Affair,' leading a group of writers to publish a powerful open letter of protest, which resulted in Castro further hardening Cuba's cultural policy, demanding a public apology. Vargas Llosa has always stood by his stance in terms of Cuba, which ultimately ended his close friendship with García Márquez, whom he considered 'Castro's courtesan' and who, until his death in April 2014, continued to be a close friend of Fidel Castro.⁶

Returning to Lima in 1974, after sixteen years of adventure in Europe, Vargas Llosa soon became concerned with the dangerous political extremism that spread across Latin America from both the political Left and Right. In response to this extremism, he ran as presidential candidate for the centre-right party in 1990. Some argue that he wanted to establish a kind of British Thatcherism in Peru,⁷ but he himself claims that he was never hungry for power and that he got involved in politics for moral, rather than political, reasons. He eventually lost the election to Alberto Fujimori, and has since retreated from the world of politics, realising he was a writer, not a politician.⁸ However, the influence of politics on his literary work is undeniably strong, if not one of the 'persistent "demons" that provoke his creativity.'⁹

Many of his novels embody liberal values and his non-fiction writing consistently advocates liberal democracy.¹⁰ In *The Feast of the Goat* (2000), he explores the conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism on the basis of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo's dictatorship in the Dominican Republic (1930-1961), which he researched in meticulous historical detail. Drawing on this brutal dictatorship, he considers the tensions between the eternally antagonistic human aspirations of power and freedom, more particularly 'between the will to power of the tyrant and the free will of the people, in terms both of democratic practice and of individual liberty.'¹¹ In this way, he confirms once more his aversion to anti-individual tyranny of both right-wing nationalism and left-wing collectivism, whilst educating the reader about his aspirations for a liberal democratic awakening.

Evidently, Vargas Llosa's work and his life as a politician and author have invited his audience to explore Latin American political and cultural identities by questioning existing power structures on a state as well as a personal level. He may have been criticized by left-wing observers of being 'conservative' and 'neoliberal',¹² but his novels speak of important issues outside the coloured political arena: freedom, will and power. 'Literature helps a lot to overcome the limited perspective of life that we hold,' he says, 'influenced by our nationalistic vision that is both limited and provincial.'¹³ Vargas Llosa considers himself a citizen of the world and a declared enemy of all forms of nationalism, calling on culture as a great instrument to overcome geographical limitations and widen the space to understand life's problems. Reading his novels and listening to his interviews, one is easily inclined to think of Vargas Llosa as a defender of freedom in the tight strings of Left and Right authoritarianism that keeps recurring, not only in Latin America, but elsewhere in the world as well. And it is precisely the power of his ideas and his ability to dissect power structures within complex societies that make Mario Vargas Llosa such an important contemporary figure.

Leonie is a fourth year student of International Relations.



THE AMAZON IS OURS

PAULINE OP DE BEECK argues that the power of Brazil's domestic agricultural lobby poses a threat to the success of international deforestation treaties.

Brazil recently declined signing the latest international attempt to curb deforestation—despite experiencing a continuing increase of such measures in the Amazon forest. Suspensions have arisen that this may have to do with Brazil's revision of its domestic Forest Code in 2012. The revision was pushed through after decades of lobbying efforts by the Agricultural Lobby, more commonly known as the *ruralistas*.¹ Given that agriculture is one of Brazil's largest sectors, it is not surprising they have a vested interest in the maintenance of Brazil's forests. However, for the *ruralistas*, maintenance does not only mean reforestation—it also implies deforestation. The watering down of the Forest Code demonstrates the increasing power of the *ruralistas* and explains Brazil's changing attitudes in global deforestation talks.

The Forest Code of 2012 was highly contentious, especially in the eyes of the international community. The code eased rather than strengthened the force of the requirement of forest preservation that farmers must conduct. Since its introduction in 1965, the Forest Code has been an internationally admired piece of domestic Brazilian legislation that prioritized Amazonian protection over agricultural production. It required farmers to keep 80 per cent of their land covered by forest.²

However, the power of the agricultural lobby has increased significantly since the advent of the initial Forest Code. *Ruralistas* argued that the old Code was holding back growth, and that a revised version would allow expansion of Brazil's market share in exports of beef, soya, sugar and poultry, necessary for economic growth in the country as a whole. Without revisions, they argued, agribusiness could not continue to export competitively and, more importantly, feed its own people.³ By reducing mandatory forest coverage to 50 per cent and by providing immunity for those businesses that conducted illegal deforestation prior to 2008, agricultural growth could be increased.⁴

This was a bill for farmers, not for the environment. *Ruralistas* wanted a code that would boost investment, and especially protect small landowners. Greenpeace aptly recognized the irony of the legislation, deeming it 'unbelievable that the forest code [was] being eroded weeks before Brazil [held] the Rio Summit [on sustainable development].'⁵ The document is weak, ambiguous, and goes against many scientific underpinnings of the original, stronger Forest Code.

The successful weakening of the Forest Code demonstrates the intense power of the *ruralistas* in Brasilia. Not only is their group extremely influential in Congress, their discourse rings true to many of the rural poor. Kátia Abreu, president of the National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock at the time, abhorred the environmentalist plight against the code revision. She stated that, 'there are NGOs out there that are compromised with their countries of origin, particularly from Europe,' describing their actions as an 'attempt to paralyze the growth of Brazilian agribusiness.'⁶ This rhetoric to a large extent reflects public sentiments and helps explain why the *ruralistas* in Congress superseded the environmental camp. Despite urban discontent expressed in pop culture and by São Paulo businesses, the *ruralistas* have a 100-man-strong voting bloc and no environmental sentiment, making them an extremely powerful actor on the political arena.

The successful weakening of the Forest Code will have grave implications for Brazil's meeting of emission targets. Brazil often hides behind the fact that it has one of the cleanest energy matrices. However, it is not energy usage that accounts for Brazil's emissions—it is deforestation.⁷ As such, the code does not only affect the condition of the Amazon—it also has an effect on global emission levels. This represents an inherent dilemma faced by many developing countries: protecting the environment while supporting economic development. In light of this code revision, a lot of speculation surrounds the involvement of the agricultural lobby in Brazil's rejection of the declaration to end deforestation by 2030.⁸ Given the sheer size of Brazil's forests it is clear that, without Brazil as a signatory, this international commitment will hold little credence, and consequently have marginal effects on global deforestation.

Much of Brazil's economy depends on legal deforestation. That is why the treaty with an aim of ending deforestation by 2030 poses a strong paradox for Brazil; a country that depends heavily on agriculture is essentially given an end date for its domestic territorial expansion. Given that agriculture essentially depends on land availability, the 2030 date imposes a stop to Brazilian agriculture growth, something the agricultural lobby does not desire.

The rejection of the first publication of the international deforestation treaty comes at an extremely pertinent time, in light of the fact that Marina Silva did not make it to the second round of the Brazilian presidential elections. Silva, the former Minister for the Environment, was pegged as the environmental favourite and sported unexplainable surges in polling, followed by a similarly perplexing loss in the first round of elections. However, even here we see environmental concerns losing ground to the *ruralistas*. Despite portraying her as potentially being the first ever green president, she too was 'in bed' with the agricultural lobby; her running mate was a hardliner in the Brazilian agricultural sector.⁹

Since the military government in the 1960s pioneered the phrase, 'A Amazonia e Nossa' ('the Amazon is ours'), a politicization of the nation's forests has developed and continues to do so post-democratization.¹⁰ It represents a serious issue of sovereignty for the Brazilians and it is likely that Brazil will try to avoid any firm commitment to this treaty, less it be watered down to what Brazil deems appropriate. Brazilians feel at loss with their bountiful forest. On the one hand it is dubbed 'the lungs of the world'; on the other, it provides income for the majority of the population.¹¹

The extent to which the agricultural lobby can improve its commitments to sustainable farming and reductions in deforestation combined with increases in reforestation will determine how Brazil continues its role in the next round of deforestation negotiations. It is clear that without the *ruralistas* on board it will be very difficult for Brazil to make any credible international commitments. And without Brazil as a signatory, the international commitment to end deforestation by 2030 will hold little force and only produce marginal results.

Pauline is a fourth year student of International Relations.

THE POWER OF MAGICAL REALISM

REBECCA ROSSER explores the influence of Latin American authors on politics.

Latin America has been diagnosed by experts and non-experts alike as having a 'crime disease'.¹ Indeed, the sequence of civil wars, dictatorships, violations of human rights, and poverty is nothing short of outstanding. 20th and 21st-century Latin America is marked by an almost innumerable amount of conflicts and military dictatorships, such as the rule of General Somoza in Nicaragua, General Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, and Batista in Cuba. Despite the fact that these tyrannies emerged as a salvation and response to previous civilian dictatorships, most of them share many characteristics: 'innumerable revolutions, political charters stamped with a too ingenuous idealism, sundry tyrannies, and leaders who posed as regenerators and reformers.'²

Thus, the use of reason was left to people like Mario Vargas Llosa, Gabriel García Márquez, Neruda, Graham Greene, Octavio Paz, and Isabel Allende. These authors initiated a symbiotic relationship between politics and literature. Politics are the reason for the existence of novels such as *A Hundred Years of Solitude*, *The President*, *The Power and The Glory*, or *The House of Spirits*. Such literature has become 'combat literature; it moulds the national consciousness, giving it form and contours and flinging it open before new and boundless horizons.' It is a literature of combat because it assumes responsibility, and because it expresses a will to liberty independent of time and space.³ In light of such reflections, it will here be argued that the power of literature is indispensable to achieving change and progress in Latin America.

During times of peace, society remains static, almost immobile. There are no differences between *The House of Spirits* and *The Painter of Battles*. They are both pieces of fiction, telling a story that jumps from past to present and foresees the future that is to come. However, in times of conflict, these two novels become much more than joyous entertainment. They are written by people who have

experienced or witnessed dictatorships, civil wars, and poverty first hand, and thus become novels hosting tales of passion, the spilling of blood, content, and discontent.

Isabel Allende and Arturo Pérez-Reverte, as well as many others, sought change and revolution for their societies. This meant that they would accept exile and persecution if that allowed them to write about the reality in their home countries in a critical and thought-provoking way. As such, these novelists converted storytelling into chess techniques that people apprehended and used in politics and when dealing with forces of power.⁴

Isabelle Allende is a good example of an author who had the power to influence political reality and to enhance the thought process within society. She was forced to live in exile because she eagerly wanted to expose the political reality of her time, characterised by peaceful and bellicose sceneries, war and peace, and joy and sadness. Furthermore, being Salvador Allende's niece, the first Marxist president to be democratically elected in Latin America, she has had a direct relation to Chilean politics since birth.⁵ Both her professional and personal life was marked by the events explored in her novels; civil war; her family's horrific memoirs; nationalisation, collectivization and socialization; a coup d'état, and a dictatorship.⁶ Amongst her production, *City of Beasts* is a compilation of all of this, a novel describing the power of human beings. The political reality of the time inspired Allende's novels and her magical realism was made into reality when Mario Vargas Llosa ran for the presidency in Peru in 1990.⁷ It would almost appear as if reality and literature had become the same thing.

According to Pérez-Reverte, most of the issues arising in Latin America in the 20th and 21st century have a common cause: the



predominance of one idea, one ideology, one belief, and one book.⁸ An example of this is the conflict in Mexico between the government and the Catholic Mexicans between 1926 and 1929. In order to understand what caused this series of assassinations in the name of Jesus Christ ('Cristo Rey') one will have to go back to the Mexican Revolution in 1910. The rebels saw their objectives of abolishing private property and eliminating Catholic schools threatened by the Church.⁹ In response to this, President Calles enforced laws that limited the influence of the Church over the Mexican people, which consequently led to Catholics being persecuted for more than ten years. The 'Cristeros', as they were known, took the matter into their own hands, resulting in the death of thousands of people¹⁰. The group was driven by an extreme faith, which blurred the line between faith and ideology. Calles described this reality in a letter to Mexico's ambassador in France as 'a political movement [that] must be eliminated in order to proceed with a Socialist government free of religious hypnotism which fools the people... within one year without the sacraments, the people will forget the faith...'¹¹. Therefore, the plurality that Latin American novels advocate is crucial for political change. Authors such as Pérez-Reverte, who openly loathe and dread the singularity of ideas and beliefs, become indispensable to achieving progress.¹²

Octavio Paz (1914) from Mexico City is another example of a political and literary personality, who studied, thought, created, and pushed for innovation in his society. He lived and observed life as a poet and a diplomat. As a poet, he achieved 'solidity, elegance and a lasting quality' by analysing and resolving a range of situations within a text.¹³ As a diplomat, he travelled to India, China, the USA and Europe, where he learnt about different idiosyncrasies, lived within various cultures, and met with several important political leaders.¹⁴

However, he resigned as ambassador of Mexico after the massacre of student demonstrators in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Tlateloco (1968), the day when government forces eliminated the protest (and the protestors) that consisted of peaceful speeches aiming change. Straight after this event, he initiated his fight for freedom and democracy. He confronted the Mexican government, openly opposed Castro's regime, and worked to expose the violations of human rights that were carried out in Cuba. He delivered a string of accusations against all fascist regimes, Joseph Stalin's in particular, and claimed his support for the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War¹⁵. His lectures at Cambridge University and Harvard University and speeches in international conventions were imbued with ideas of freedom, rights, and democracy. He manifested the differences between literature and politics and between fiction and reality. In fact, he said: 'There can be no society without poetry, but society can never be realized as poetry, it is never poetic. Sometimes the two terms seek to break apart. They cannot.'¹⁶ However, he was able to discuss politics through literature, an ability he is credited for to this day.

In conclusion, Latin American authors such as Mario Vargas Llosa, Octavio Paz, and Isabel Allende have created a precious legacy, consisting of knowledge and experience that should help Latin America in the 21st century to 'make the world not better, but good'.¹⁷ They have woken up people's consciousness, shaped people's thoughts and behaviours, and brought up revolutions, demonstrations, and dissidence through the expression of reality in a magical literary world. They are powerful people.

Rebecca is a first year student of Politics & Economic & Social History.

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

Once again, events in the Middle East have managed to seize the attention of the global media, this time with the spotlight shining on the Islamic State. As it has swiftly expanded its way through parts of Iraq and the Levant,¹ the Islamic State has demonstrated that its influence is by no means limited to its regional boundaries. With the highly publicised kidnappings and executions of British and American journalists,² the world has been compelled to view the Islamic State as a viable force that is contesting the prevailing power structure and altering the political geography of the region. The impact of the Islamic State on the Middle East reminds us of just how delicate the balance of power truly is. This frailty lends itself to uncertainty,

which makes predictions, even about the near future, problematic.

However, we can use these events as a platform to assess how the concept of power shapes Middle Eastern politics. The articles in this edition call our primary focus away from the Islamic State to gain a broader perspective of regional events. In doing so, they challenge us to carefully assess how we understand power within the Middle East. Anna Breedlove's narrative of Tawakkol Karman's life illustrates the influence and voice of women in politics. Meanwhile, the piece on Qassem Suleimani opens our eyes to the power of individuals that lurk in the shadows, and more pointedly, reveals one of the complicated webs of power that exists within the region. As evidenced by these articles, there are a number of ways to understand power, and while we are merely scratching the surface of this theme, we, nevertheless, hope that these articles deliver insight and arouse thought.

Rina Moss

REGIONAL EDITOR



TAWAKKOL KARMAN: FEMINISM, ISLAMISM, AND A NOBEL PRIZE

ANNA BREEDLOVE



The Arab Spring, during which more than 2,000 protestors were killed,¹ was not the beginning of human rights violations for the people of Yemen. The entirety of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh's thirty-three year rule was fraught with accusations of torture, murder, and corruption, from the execution of thirty people accused of trying to overthrow him in 1978, to the war he waged to unite the north and south of Yemen resulting in more than 10,000 casualties.² One year into his reign in Yemen, Tawakkol Karman was born as the daughter of Saleh's former Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

After receiving an undergraduate degree in Commerce from the University of Science and Technology in Sana'a and a graduate degree in Political Science, Karman followed her father's footsteps into politics, joining not the General People's Congress that he had been a member of, but the Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah). Islah was the major political opponent to Saleh's corrupt regime, and a growing force for the Islamisation of Yemen. Karman became one of a group of activist women who emerged from the Islah party, challenging both the party's more hard-line members and the world's conceptions of an Islamist women's rights advocate.³

Karman, a mother of three, founded the non-governmental organisation, Women Journalists Without Chains (WJWC), in 2005. WJWC produces annual reports on press freedom and human rights issues in Yemen, and advocates for the rights of journalists.⁴ In 2007, Karman took on a greater public advocacy role when she began leading peaceful

protests every Tuesday in front of the Cabinet in Sana'a (Yemen's capital city) demanding an end to corruption, and calling for democracy and greater freedom of expression.⁵ These protests lasted until the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011. Inspired by the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, Karman and her supporters began clamouring for President Saleh's resignation, and for justice for the human rights violations that the Yemeni people had endured.

It was shortly thereafter that Tawakkol Karman was arrested for the first of what was to be many times. Her detention, however, was short lived. The Yemeni media outlets widely publicised her imprisonment, and protests erupted across the country. Only 36 hours after her arrest, she was released. In an article in *The Guardian* a few months later, Karman upheld her efforts for peaceful change by saying, 'The country is united in its aim to rid itself of the regime through public vigils and rallies, civil disobedience and slogans instead of tear gas and bullets.'⁶

In October 2011, Tawakkol Karman, unaware of her nomination, was in her tent in Change Square when the announcement came on television; she noticed that the students around her were dancing and chanting 'Ya Salaam, ya salaam, Tawakkol - she is the symbol of peace.'⁷ Along with two Liberian peace activists, Leymah Gbowee and Liberia's president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Karman was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel Committee stated that all three women were given the Prize 'for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women's rights to full participation in peace-building work.'⁸ Before Malala Yousafzai in 2014, Karman was the only Arab woman, the second Muslim woman, and the youngest person ever to win the Nobel Peace Prize.⁹

Just one month later, the Gulf Cooperation Council, members of the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union convinced President Saleh to sign the Gulf Initiative. The Initiative provided the framework for Saleh to



step down from power, but also gave complete amnesty from legal and judicial prosecution to Saleh and most of his government officials.¹⁰ Stability, sadly, came at the expense of justice for the human rights violations of the people of Yemen. Thus, Saleh's removal from power was a bittersweet victory for Tawakkol Karman and Yemen.

While there has been much positive acclaim for Tawakkol Karman, there has also been scepticism, particularly in light of her membership in the Islah party. Centrist leaning members of the Muslim Brotherhood lead the Islah party in Yemen,¹¹ however, the Muslim Brotherhood of Yemen is not the same Muslim Brotherhood as that of Egypt, and the roots of Islah are anti-communist.¹² On the other hand, Karman has also received criticism from her own party for being too liberal. The most extremist members criticised her after she published a paper condemning them for blocking a bill that would outlaw marriage to girls under the age of 17. Nevertheless, she continues to back Islah as the best political party with support for its female members.¹³

Drawing inspirations from Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King Jr., Tawakkol Karman is clearly someone in favour of peaceful protest.¹⁴ She campaigns for freedom of the press in a country with illiteracy rates at around 60 per cent, making her mission for a free broadcast media that much more important.¹⁵ And, through her advocacy for the end of all tyranny, she combats the continuing and troubling influence of al-Qa'ida in Yemen. Her life's work exudes her words: 'With the fall of tyranny we will dry up the springs of terrorism, as tyranny and terrorism are two sides of the same coin; every terrorist is a tyrant and every tyrant is a terrorist. We know this very well and we seek to overthrow them both through our great peaceful fight.'¹⁶

Anna is a postgraduate student of International Relations.

IRAN'S SHADOW WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

JOAKIM BJØRNESTAD and VILDE SOFIE RODIN discuss how

Qassem Suleimani and the Iranian Quds force is covertly controlling the Middle East.

Iran has built a capacity for covert asymmetrical warfare ever since the crushing loss of life in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88).¹ Their sharpest tool for implementing hard foreign policy goals is the Quds Force, a special operations branch of The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC or Revolutionary Guards). The IRGC is the wing of the Iranian military concerned with the integrity of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, protecting Iran from foreign interference and what are deemed to be deviant movements. The head of the Quds Force is 'shadow commander' Qassem Suleimani, who is considered to be one of the most powerful men in the region. Through proxies and militia forces, he is conducting clandestine operations to undermine the West in the region, especially in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.²

General Qassem Suleimani is part of the Tehrani power elite and is close to the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. The Ayatollah has on several occasions referred to Suleimani as the 'living martyr of the revolution,' and an irreproachable war hero of the Iran-Iraq War.³ Suleimani took over the reigns of the Quds Force in 1998.⁴ Since then he has had his hand in every Middle Eastern policy-jar, enjoying a 'relationship with everyone' in order to exert control over Iran's neighbouring polities.⁵

Amusingly, Suleimani is commanding his operations from the former U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran, vacated by the Americans in 1980. From the compound, the Quds Force protects Iranian interests by assassinating rivals, arming allies, and directing a network of militant groups.⁶ These militant groups include but are not limited to pro-Assad forces in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shia militias in Iraq. The Quds force is also giving large sums of money to an archipelago of groups opposing the U.S. and its regional allies. Israel, in particular, faces almost daily threats from Quds-supported groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.⁷ These military, political, and economic support missions are all part of Iran's 'shadow war' for regional dominance.

In Lebanon, Suleimani has close control over his 'terrorist proxy' Hezbollah, which the Quds Force founded in the 1980s.⁸ Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah received about 100 million dollars from Iran.⁹ This kind of support ensures the loyalty of Hezbollah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah.¹⁰

In addition to being a key player in Lebanon, Suleimani has considerable power in Iraq. Suleimani is infamous within his own ranks for sending a text message to David Petraeus, then U.S. Commander in Iraq, stating: 'General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan.'¹¹ After the American invasion in 2003, Iran entrenched itself in the Iraqi Civil War. Militarily, the Quds Force trained and funded both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades.¹² These are the Shia militias vying for power in the Shia south of Iraq, infamous for their part in the sectarian violence of the Iraq war. Today, these militias backed by Suleimani's men are the only groups stopping the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham from taking the north of Baghdad.¹³

Iran also played an active role in Iraqi politics. When the US searched for a new prime minister in the wake of the invasion, Iran helped secure Nuri al-Maliki's place in 2006. Al-Maliki, Iran's man in the Green Zone, lived and trained with the IRGC while in exile during the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁴ The positioning of al-Maliki is emblematic of Iranian influence in Iraq. Al-Maliki's successor, Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, recently made his first official state visit to Iran, indicating continued Iranian influence.¹⁵

While Iraq became a new ally only after the 2003 invasion, Iran has backed the al-Assad regime in Syria since 1979.¹⁶ Iran has made itself the guarantor

of the Alawite regime's survival following the 2011 Syrian Revolution because it has an interest in opposing Sunni and Western influences in the Middle East.¹⁷ Suleimani will do whatever it takes to keep Syria stable, believing that if Damascus falls, Tehran will be lost.¹⁸ Thus, Iran's strategy is to provide funding, intelligence, and military training for pro-Assad forces in Syria;¹⁹ one example of which is a recent seven billion dollar loan to the Syrian government,²⁰ which has created a new paramilitary force in Syria called the People's Army consisting of approximately 50,000 fighters commanded by Suleimani.²¹ The Quds Force also controls its own elite combat troops on the ground in Syria.²² Therefore, Iran is arguably the single force that has kept the Syrian regime going, with some even saying that Suleimani 'is running the war himself.'²³

Considering these proxy politics of the Quds Force, the official foreign policy goals of Iran seem entirely contradictory. Throughout his presidency, Rouhani has been working toward a nuclear deal with the West. However, the Quds Force has been increasing its presence from Beirut to Basra, undermining both the authority of Rouhani and the good faith of the negotiations. Despite diplomatic negotiations on the nuclear question, one cannot expect the IRGC and Quds to follow Rouhani's lead.

The reason for this inconsistency is that Rouhani has no control in the matters of the Quds Force or in the workings of the IRGC.²⁴ The difference between the IRGC (and the Quds Force) and Rouhani is important; the Quds Force operates above and independently of the government. However, they both ultimately answer to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Thus, the contradiction between stated and unstated foreign policy goals could be seen as a product of the Iranian system, in which the President has the mandate of the people, but little real power. It is Ayatollah Khamenei who ultimately controls the fate of Iran, and by having a loose leash on Suleimani, he can dissociate himself from the dirty work of sectarian insurgencies orchestrated from the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran. This allows Khamenei to be a public ideologue, Rohani to be a well-meaning presidential negotiator, and Suleimani to be the pragmatic hit-man. This division of power and responsibility proves to be a major point of frustration for the West.

The military and financial capacity that the Quds Force has in the Middle East is problematic because it is unpredictable. Interpreting the opaque power structures of Iran is a throwback to the Kremlinology of the Cold War, and makes reliable intelligence difficult to obtain. The power held by the Quds lies in their independence from the politics of Tehran, in their pragmatism, and in their surreptitiousness. One former CIA operative claimed that 'Suleimani is the single most powerful operative in the Middle East today – and no one's ever heard of him.'²⁵

The readers are kindly advised to keep General Suleimani and his puppets in mind the next time they read about sectarian violence in Iraq, about al-Assad in Syria, and the movements of Hezbollah. Iran's 'shadow wars' are shaping the politics of the Middle East the strings of which are being pulled from the US Embassy compound in Tehran. At the apogee of Iran's Middle East, is Qassem Suleimani, the most powerful military man in the region; for although he may not be famous, 'nothing strengthens authority as much as silence.'²⁶

Joakim is a fourth year student of Arabic. Vilde is a fourth year student of International Relations. Both are members of the Leviathan staff.



NORTH AMERICA

REGIONAL EDITOR



The United States is generally regarded as the most powerful country in the world, but today more than ever since the demise of the Soviet Union that status is threatened. The U.S. has been embroiled in conflict in the Middle East for more than a decade and has suffered immensely from the global economic meltdown. Its debt is approaching \$18 trillion, and its people are losing faith in their leaders. And while the America continues to struggle against these omens, its peers are boasting high growth economies and rapidly increasing political influence in their respective regions and beyond.

The U.S. has responded by exercising its not very understated soft power, through arm sales, foreign aid, and handshakes. Often these interventions come uninvited; however, as other global powers stretch their influence

past their borders, some are more than willing to make a friend in the American government. While this old tale is playing out, there is an internal and perhaps subtler threat to the power of the United States.

Politics has become an ugly game. The Republicans and Democrats are simultaneously divided by an ocean yet and at each other's throats. Leadership in both parties is lacking, political stalemate continues to plague Washington six years into the Obama presidency, and as a result politicians are taking more and more questionable measures in pursuit of an edge. These measures, seen most prominently in the electoral process of today, have come so far as to compromise the power of the individual to have a voice in the government.

We can hope that these power struggles will allow the U.S. to learn and to grow. However, some soul-searching is in order. The American government must look candidly at itself to decide what it stands for both at home and abroad, knowing that this decision will determine its future.

Andrew Womer

RAND PAUL: AMERICA'S LIBERTARIAN DARLING POLARISES EVERYONE

JACK GRAY



If you've been paying attention to American politics lately, chances are you will have come across the Kentucky Senator deemed the 'most dangerous'¹ as well as the 'most interesting'² man in politics, Rand Paul. The ophthalmologist-turned-politician continues to polarise the media, the American public, political analysts, and even those within his own party. So who is Rand Paul?

In 2009 Rand Paul, aged 46 at the time, was a successful and active physician in Bowling Green, a small town in western Kentucky. But ultimately Rand's destiny lay not in the doctor's office, but in the Capitol Building on Washington's National Mall. Running for the first time in 2010, Paul

won comfortably by over 10 percentage points against Democrat Jack Conway; surprising to some at the time, but certainly not shocking. Rand Paul had been active in politics since his college days at Baylor University, heading the local branch of the Young Conservatives of Texas whilst studying.³ But the most important of his political activities related to the relationship with his father Ron Paul. The elder Paul himself had a distinguished career, representing two of Texas' congressional districts, being a candidate for President on three occasions, and becoming perhaps the most famous libertarian politician to date. The relationship provided Rand with first hand experience, being given the opportunity to work on and manage campaigns as he did in his father's 1988 presidential and 1996 congressional campaigns, as well as speaking for his father Ron during his unsuccessful 2008 Presidential campaign.⁴ This campaign was particularly important for Rand, since although Ron Paul's 5.54 per cent share of the vote in the 2008 Republican Primary was not enough to send him to the general election, it was enough to promote the profile of Rand to a position where he could make his run for the US Senate.⁵

The campaign began as a movement within the Kentucky branch of the Republican Party to replace beleaguered incumbent Sen. Jim Bunning, who had struggled to obtain funding after a series of fumbles.⁶ Bunning's withdrawal left only Paul and Kentucky Secretary of State Trey Grayson, whom Paul defeated by more than 20 per cent,⁷ with the help of the innovative 'moneybomb' technique of campaigning,⁸ which encouraged grassroots donations during frenzied periods of campaigning. Most interestingly, Rand Paul refused to accept donations from senators who supported the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,⁹ and attacked Grayson as a D.C. insider. Paul continued to eschew these libertarian ideals during the general election.¹⁰ The campaign against Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway would prove to be a bitter one, as Conway accused Paul of far-right extremism and opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Paul ventured onto the left-leaning Rachel Maddow show to rebut the allegations and confirm his distaste for racism, but stated that he was still against Title II of the act because it, as he put it, prevented private establishments from exercising the right to free speech.¹¹ Despite these setbacks, Paul defeated Conway with 59 per cent of the vote, and joined the 112th Congress as Kentucky's junior Senator to Mitch McConnell.¹²

Since 2010, Paul has been viewed as a shining star for both the Tea Party and libertarian movements within the United States, and is one of the few members of either group who could conjure mainstream recognition. As the Republican Party searches for its 2016 presidential candidate, Rand Paul holds unique appeal as a candidate who retains fiscal conservatism whilst holding some moderate views on social policy. Senator Paul's appeal to the far-right base is clear: he is the son of a Tea Party founder, creator of the anti-federal Kentucky Taxpayers United, and a staunch opponent of government expansion¹³, notably

in the January 2011 spending bill proposal.¹⁴ However, the reason for the excitement behind Paul is his ability to bring far-right proposals to the table as viable ideas and to engage those who traditionally view the Republican Party as opponents. Recently, Paul has pushed for lower penalties for possession of crack cocaine, which could help to ingratiate the powerful African-American vote at the 2016 election - a development that could prove fatal to Democratic efforts.¹⁵ Indeed, Paul believes that the GOP could receive a third of the African-American vote, because '...a third of them are conservative on a preponderance of the issues'.¹⁶ However, despite some moderate tendencies with regards to social policy, Paul remains firmly on the right on most issues. His opposition to gay marriage could prove troublesome in 2016 because, despite the Republicans' widespread disdain for the LGBT community, the majority of Americans now support the end of the traditional definition of marriage.¹⁷

On foreign policy, Paul has attempted to merge traditional libertarian non-interventionism with the post 9-11 policy of US world-policing. In 2011, Paul campaigned for a 10 per cent reduction of defense spending and an end to foreign aid payments, but this year backed airstrikes on ISIS and the restoration of some of the defense spending lost through cuts.¹⁸ However, while these moves fall into the mainstream, they leave Paul open to criticism from both sides of the aisle - a problem he has faced on many issues as his term has progressed. Paul has been branded as a non-interventionist or an isolationist, contrary to the positions of the GOP and the American public.¹⁹ It is easy for a change of opinion to become evidence of a 'flip-flopper', as Mitt Romney learned the hard way during his ill-fated 2012 campaign. Potential opponent Marco Rubio has done just that, accusing Paul of waiting for poll numbers instead of shaping them,²⁰ in what may prove a foreshadowing of what is promising to be one of the most hotly contested Republican primary in many years.

Whether or not Senator Paul is capable of winning said primary, or even if he will run, remains to be seen, but polls indicate that the Republican base is extremely divided, with Jeb Bush as the frontrunner, and Paul, Rick Perry, Ted Cruz, and Mike Huckabee grouped behind him. All trail behind Mitt Romney, who has indicated he will not be running. Even to gain election in a traditionally red state, Paul had to battle accusations of extremism. It is hard to see a way for Senator Paul to escape these criticisms at either the primaries or the general election, where they will undoubtedly be amplified, and it seems likely that Paul's tendency to alienate large donors will put him on the back foot in an election system that increasingly values money over policy. If Paul does win the nomination, he will most likely face Hilary Clinton, who is the clear favourite on the Democratic side. Clinton would work to expose Paul's conservative views on same-sex marriage and foreign policy, while his critics on the right would most likely attack him as a moderate and a flip-flopper. The challenges that Paul's campaign may face share a galling resemblance to those of Mitt Romney in 2012, who of course was defeated by President Obama.

However, for Senator Rand Paul all hope is not lost in a presidential run. If he can market his views for tight fiscal conservatism to a middle class who are still feeling the effects of the 2008 crash,²¹ his largely non-interventionist approach to an America tired by two Middle Eastern wars, and the wider ideas of libertarianism to a youth vote increasingly disillusioned by the democratic party and the system as a whole,^{22*} Paul may just be able to establish one of the most powerful and comprehensive campaigns ever seen. Whether he can do this is another question entirely, and may well prove beyond him, but what is clear is that Senator Rand Paul is a key face to watch over the next few years, and quite possibly beyond.

Jack is a first year student of History & Politics.



BLACK POLITICAL POWER: BEYOND FERGUSON

KANZANIRA THORINGTON examines how Black voter apathy has led to white governments in African-American communities.

In his book *Who Governs?*, influential political scientist Robert Dahl examines who holds political power in American society. Dahl divides the American public into two segments: the political stratum, made up of politically involved citizens, and the apolitical stratum, citizens who do not have an active role in government.¹ Although these two groups have distinctive functions in society, the political and apolitical strata are linked through their common goals and interests.² Therefore, Dahl insists, the members of the apolitical stratum are still able to 'govern' by sharing the common values with the members of the political stratum.³ But what happens when the lack of political participation creates a government that is almost completely unrepresentative of the constituents?

In August 2014, unarmed black teen Michael Brown was shot and killed by white officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri. Following the shooting, protests broke out in Ferguson and aggressive police response only escalated tensions.⁴ As Ferguson fell into further unrest the media coverage focused on the nearly all-white police force in a predominantly black city. However, the police force's lack of diversity was only a part of a much larger problem— Ferguson, like many black communities across America, has a predominately white local governments.⁵

Despite having a Black population of 67 per cent, the Mayor of Ferguson, along with five of six city council members, are white⁶. Since the shooting of Michael Brown, Mayor James Knowles and the city's government have been widely criticized for defending the police's actions against protesters, which have included the use of tear gas and rubber bullets.⁷ The events in Ferguson demonstrate a clear disconnect between the government and its constituents, which is the result of years of political disengagement. Historically, voter turnout in Ferguson elections have been low and in the city's most recent elections only 12.3 per cent of eligible voters participated.⁸ While local election officials do not record voter turnout based on race,⁹ the electorate in low turnout elections tend to be white and politically conservative.¹⁰ As a vast majority of Ferguson's population do not take an active role in politics, the city is left with an unrepresentative government that does not appear to share the same values and interests of its community.

Unfortunately, the current political situation in Ferguson is not unique. Low Black voter turnout has led to white political control in many Black cities throughout America.¹¹ While voter numbers in the US generally have declined in recent years, there has been an even greater drop with African-American

voters.¹² Partly due to their troubled and complex history, African-American voters have developed a different political behaviour than that of their white counterparts.¹³ Many African-Americans have a general distrust of the American political system,¹⁴ and this mentality has ultimately proved detrimental to Blacks in America. African-American cynicism towards American politics is rooted in the widespread belief that Blacks have little impact on American democracy.¹⁵ This attitude has created a general sense of political apathy in the Black community, particularly in local elections. With low voter turnout and an absence of viable Black political candidates in local elections,¹⁶ many African-Americans are unable to exert political power in their own communities and are thus left to be governed by the white minority.

Although white governments in black communities have become a political norm, events in Ferguson show how a system of unrepresentative government can lead to disaster. Throughout months of protests, Ferguson's citizens have expressed great dissatisfaction with their local government and with their lack of power within the American political system. In response, many national and Black political leaders have argued that Ferguson, and other black communities, must exercise their vote to advance and protect their interests. While historically areas characterized by conflict lead to a more politically motivated public,¹⁷ this has not yet happened in Ferguson. Despite their desire for change, Ferguson only has 128 newly registered voters since the shooting of Michael Brown.¹⁸ While the events in Ferguson could have led to a new phase in Black political power, it is likely that African-Americans will stay home in the elections to come.

In his study of political power in America, Robert Dahl concludes that even politically uninvolved citizens, who make up the apolitical strata can still exert power. However, Dahl notes that this power is contingent on the use of elections and competitive parties as this ensures that the views of the larger society are reflected in the political stratum.¹⁹ In Ferguson and many other black communities in the US, the lack of political participation has created a largely homogenous government that does not share the interests and values of its constituents. In order to bring positive change to their cities, African-Americans must work within the American political system through local elections to form more representative governments and gain political power and control over their communities.

Kanzanira is a member of Leviathan's Production Team.

THE GOP, VOTER SUPPRESSION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

JULIANA FENTRESS analyses voter suppression techniques and power dynamics in American democracy.

In recent years, American politics has been marked by a troubling trend towards the systematic suppression of certain minority groups in democratic processes. Common voter suppression techniques include shortened early voting, shortened voter registration periods, and laws requiring photo identification at polling stations. While proponents argue that these laws are necessary to curb the threat of voter fraud, a simple analysis of cases of alleged misconduct reveal that such fraud is, in fact, extremely uncommon. The prolonged media campaign by the far right to convince the American public of rampant voter fraud only serves to justify efforts to curb the rights of minorities to exercise their legal rights in a participatory democracy. Voter suppression techniques are a tactic being successfully employed by those in office to entrench unequal power dynamics.

Texas' Governor-elect Republican Greg Abbott issued a statement that claimed that 50 cases of voter fraud had been tried in Texas between 2002 and 2012.¹ Of those 50 cases, only 2 were of a nature that would have been prevented by mandating photographic identification.² To put that number into perspective, there were 37,415,328 votes cast in Presidential and Gubernatorial elections alone in Texas between 2002 and 2012.³ In fact, Research Director for Project Vote, Dr. Lorraine Minitte, notes that in the 2005 fiscal year, there were many more Americans convicted of violating migratory bird protection laws than there were substantiated cases of voter fraud.⁴ The problem of voter fraud in America has very little to do with any actual wrongdoing, and much to do with perception. A Marquette University poll found that of those persons who believed that voter fraud accounted for a dozen votes or less in an election, a mere 29 per cent support voter ID laws. This is a significant contrast to the 60 per cent of all respondents who indicated their support.⁵

The recent push for mandated photographic voter identification at polling stations is one of the more common voter suppression techniques, and is law in a rapidly growing number of states. The controversial new Texas voter-ID law SB14 is the strictest of this legislation to date and requires one of six

forms of photo identification to vote: a passport, a military ID card, a driver's license, a license to carry a concealed firearm, a citizenship certificate, or one of the newly introduced election identification certificates (EICs).⁶ The elderly, the disabled, and low-income persons are all disproportionately affected by these requirements, as they are less likely than the general population to drive or travel internationally, and as such, many do not obtain or maintain licenses or passports. In fact, almost one in five Americans over the age of 65 do not have a valid, current, government-issued photo ID.⁷ Americans must pay for many of these documents, and the EIC, the only free option available to non-veterans, is proving to be extremely difficult to obtain. To force these people to pay for these documents simply to vote is reminiscent of the now illegal poll tax that once institutionalised racism and minority suppression in the American South. It is estimated that up to 600,000 Texans who have registered will be unable to vote because of the new legislation, disproportionately many of whom are African-American, Latino, or low-income.⁸ Reducing early voting hours is another way in which certain elected officials including Ohio's Republican Secretary of State Jon Husted are preventing certain Americans from accessing democratic processes.

Low income persons, single parents, and students are particularly affected by these regulations as they are less likely to be able to take time off from work, school, or family obligations to wait in long lines on election day. There is also a racial component to these changes, as a 2008 study determined that African-Americans were 26 times more likely to vote during early voting than Caucasian voters.⁹ Federal Judge Peter Economus struck down the Ohio changes citing both the 14th Amendment and the Voting Rights Act; the Supreme Court later overturned the ruling.¹⁰ There are also political implications for these demographics, as the groups who are unduly oppressed by these voter suppression techniques are groups who would be reasonably expected to be Democratic voters.

The array of voter suppression techniques currently being employed by conservative American politicians marks a worrisome turn of the political system from democracy to institutionalised, discriminatory



oppression. The disproportionate effect that these laws would have on minority groups is well documented, and still many states are in the process of moving towards this restrictive behaviour. Republican leadership has proven to be a growing threat to the rights of minorities. By simply limiting the voting rights of those who are likely to oppose them, these politicians are manipulating the electoral system to better the chances that they will remain in power. Voter suppression entrenches policies that are exclusionary and discriminatory in law. The inequity in power dynamics between elected politicians and low-income persons and racial minorities is significant enough already. If these voter

suppression tactics become law, they could take away one of the only means of true participation in government that many people have. These laws stand to erode the basic principles of democracy and are a disturbing example of how those in power can abuse their influence to remain so.

Juliana is Leviathan's Fundraising Director and Copy Editor.

A REVOLVING DOOR OR VICIOUS CIRCLE?

ANDREW BAILIE explores the power of the insiders in American politics.

To provide effective representation, governments must be receptive to the will of its people. By allowing interest groups to influence the legislature on behalf of citizens, lobbying, in theory, creates a link between citizens and the state beyond the polls. However, politicians are being over-reliant on funding by interest groups and by participating in what is sometimes called 'revolving door' phenomena, referring to the movement of people between legislative roles and influence groups.¹ Today, thousands of special interest groups exist, advocating everything from dehydrated onion and garlic to reptile keepers.² The Founding Fathers hoped competing interests would further enhance a system of checks and balances, allowing for true representation. In reality, a minority of groups have managed to infiltrate the corridors of power, whilst the vast majority of citizens and their views are being effectively quieted.

Lobbying has formed part of the United States' political landscape since the formation of the Republic. Traces of these groups can be seen in the Federalists Papers; in No. 10 of the series, author and soon-to-be President, James Madison, warned against 'organised groups of citizens (...) united by some common impulse of passion, or of interest' and their threat to democracy.³ Madison's trepidations turned out to be justified, as problems arose with these groups as early as 1875, when Sam Ward was convicted for bribery. Ward, today known as 'The King of the Lobby', a flamboyant businessman, held extravagant dinner parties at which his clients could mingle with specially requested Congressmen, allowing for money to infiltrate the political system over a bottle of champagne, eerily similar to the political fundraisers that are seen today.⁴

Money has undoubtedly become the pivot of political success in the USA. Due to the Citizens United Case of 2010, in which campaign donations from individuals and corporations became unlimited under the law, fundraising has become an indispensable part of the election process.⁵ Lobbying groups have stepped into this funding 'arms race', either with direct donations to campaigns or via political action committees, which can actually launch ads and hold rallies and so forth for candidates as long as they are not formally affiliated with the campaign.⁶

Such money is a huge bargaining chip for interests groups, corporations, and wealthy individuals. This can be seen quite clearly with oil subsidies. Last year, oil and gas interests groups spent \$363 million on political donations, thereby acquiring \$5.2 billion of governmental subsidies. In contrast, groups representing renewable energy, which is very popular among the American public, spent \$28 million, yielding only \$2.2 billion of subsidies.⁷ Coincidence? Probably not, as this has been a trend, at times much more extreme than now, since 1979.⁸ As journalist Jim Rutenberg put it, Citizens United has allowed these interest groups to 'start what are in essence their own political parties, built around pet causes or industries and backing politicians uniquely answerable to them.'⁹ These interests groups are given a place and voice in government, and often interests groups directly link themselves to the inside the government via the revolving door. Many former government employees are recruited after the end of their political careers to join interest groups, often tempted by high salaries.¹⁰ This financial capacity to lure ex-Congressmen into lobbying positions is a key weapon for corporations seeking legislative power. To further illustrate the lobbies' stranglehold on US politics I will examine two powerful groups, with different aims but similarly alarming degrees of power.

Dow Chemicals is the second largest chemical company in the world,

employing 53,000 people in 2013¹¹ and producing raw materials for various industries. As one of the top five highest spending lobbyists in the US in 2014, Dow is campaigning on 114 bills, covering topics such as nuclear power, taxes, and, most worryingly, conservation. Dow has one of the worst environmental records of any corporation in the US; in 2010 alone, they produced 600 million pounds of toxic waste, which makes them the second largest producer of improperly treated toxic waste in the world.¹² For example, in 2007 it was forced to remove several ton of sediment from the Tittabawassee River, which it had polluted with a pollutant called dioxin.¹³

Despite this shaky history, Dow has been able to use its 17 former government employee lobbyists to influence the funding for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (intended to hold polluters to account),¹⁴ as well as to secure millions of dollars a year in subsidies from the government.¹⁵ Promoting a company such as Dow Chemical and furthering their power in the market is certainly a hazard to the environment, and is not consistent with the views of the American people; a Gallup poll found that 62 per cent of the American public believes that the government is doing 'too little [...] in terms of protecting the environment.'¹⁶ Supporting Dow therefore is a clear example of a lack of representation within the government, and based on the evidence given prior, it can be said that lobbying had much to contribute to this injustice.

The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been a huge player in Washington since the 1970s. Officially established 'to strengthen, protect and promote the U.S.-Israel relationship',¹⁷ AIPAC funds 'approved' politicians whilst mobilising against those who do not hold compatible views. With a \$60 million budget and annual conferences attended by two-thirds of Congress, AIPAC puts pressure on the US government to militarily confront Iran, to give unconditional support for the Israeli government, and promote Israeli policies that are in direct conflict with International Law on an immediate and forceful level.¹⁸ However, its anti-Iran, anti-Palestine stance no longer represents the people it claims to stand for. According to a recent Pew Centre poll, only 38 per cent of American Jews believe that the Israeli government is sincerely pursuing peace.¹⁹ Whilst hundreds of Student Government presidents attended this year's conference, a Gallup poll released in July shows that only a quarter of young Americans believe Israel's actions in Gaza to be justified.²⁰ The influence that AIPAC holds in the government is not representative, not only of the American public, but even the American Israelis who they claim to represent.

However, is this culture of money in politics possible to eradicate? It would certainly be a long process to make this happen, but other countries have taken steps in the right direction. Canada's implementation of the Lobbying Act in 2008 established a commissioner of lobbying, a comprehensive register, and a lobbyist's code of conduct that has gained significant success in limiting the access of lobbying groups to government.²¹ A growing movement, led by Represent.US, is campaigning for similar reforms in America. An effective anti-corruption act should prohibit the revolving door phenomena and make the flow of money into politics more transparent. Only by regulating the power of the lobby industry will the U.S. move towards a government truly by the people, for the people.

Andrew is a first year student of Philosophy & Politics.

INTERNATIONAL

'Power' is among the first buzz words taught to politics and international relations students. As a concept, its understanding has been crucial to innovation and classification, not only in politics but in almost every other academic discipline.



Too many people have dreamt of being powerful. On their way there, whether as the hunters or the hunted, they find an identity - one they don't necessarily understand, and call it politics. For too long, very few women survived this pursuit. For the international section of this issue, we have chosen to take a look at one such person - a woman of many firsts. 'Holding Her

Breath Under Water' was an effort to show the power of a typically striving, yet unique, individual.

But is the pursuit of power a part of our shared identity? Our mutual view of power has led to a misunderstanding of it, argues Iqan Fadaei in 'Reconceptualising Power'. His article looks deeply into the meaning of this concept to showcase the theoretical fallacies from which we continue to suffer.

Be it the power of one over another, malign, benign, western, or the power of the stories we tell as highlighted by Briana Pegado in 'Understanding Power', power has been, is and will always be the buzz word that deserves our continuous interrogation and study.

Yuechen Wang



CHRISTINE LAGARDE: HOLDING HER BREATH UNDER WATER

DIONISIS PELEKIS



Christine Lagarde, throughout her career, has become familiar with the 'first woman to...' tag. Born in 1956 to a family of academics, she soon proved to be dedicated and hardworking. As a teenager, she was a member of the National French Synchronised Swimming team, and succeeded, after passing her baccalaureate in 1973, in gaining an American Field Service scholarship to the Holton-Arms School for girls in Bethesda. She worked as an intern at the United States Capitol, as Representative William Cohen's congressional assistant. During the year in the U.S., she perfected her English and gained her first experiences in a field she would dominate in

the future, politics.

Upon returning to France, she studied at Paris West University Nanterre La Défense, where she earned Master's degrees in English, labour law, and social law, before attending the Institute of political sciences of Aix-en-Provence, where she obtained another Master's degree. In 1981 she went back to the U.S., to work for the international Chicago-based law firm Baker & McKenzie as an associate. She handled mainly labour, anti-trust, and mergers and acquisitions cases, making partner within six years. Eighteen years after joining the firm, and after having served as the head of the firm in Western Europe, she became Baker & McKenzie's first ever female Chairman. From that position, she pioneered a 'client first' approach, which significantly increased the firm's profits.

From Law to Politics: First Taste of Power

Following her extraordinary legal career, Ms Lagarde was, in 2005, appointed as France's Trade Minister. After spending more than twenty years working outside France, her transition was difficult. Though not a stranger to the French public realm, having been honoured in March 2004 by receiving an appointment to France's highest order, the Legion of Honour, she was not accustomed to French politics, and the deeply rooted sense of social welfare and statism inherent in the French populace were thoroughly different from what she became accustomed to during her legal career. This can be demonstrated by one of her first comments, which was a criticism of the rigidity of France's labour market. Naturally, the comment was not well-received. Notwithstanding the less than perfect beginning of her ministerial career, she proved to be one of France's most successful Trade Ministers, and during her tenure French exports reached record levels.

After a brief spell as France's Agriculture Minister she was appointed by Nicola Sarkozy and Francois Fillon as France's first female Minister of Economic Affairs, Finance, and Employment. It is worth noting that she was the first woman to be in charge of a G8 economy. She did not hesitate during her tenure as finance minister to blame the 2008 financial crisis on the male-dominated, 'testosterone-fuelled' culture of international finance. As a finance minister she seemed torn between her own market-friendly instincts and the French statist status quo. Her reforms during that time are equally mixed: on the one hand she tried to regulate hedge funds, and on the other she attempted to make the French economy more competitive. She became extremely popular in France, coming second in a 2009 poll carried out newspaper *Le Parisien* on the country's favourite personalities. In the same year, the *Financial Times* declared her the best finance minister in Europe.

However, her popularity was not shared outwith her native France, especially among other European States. As France's finance minister, she played a key role in the early stages of the Eurozone debt crisis. Her eagerness to crack down on tax evasion is demonstrated by the so called 'Lagarde List', a spreadsheet containing the names and account details of roughly 2,000 potential Greek tax evaders, who maintained undeclared accounts at Swiss HSBC's Geneva branch. The List was part of a much larger dataset of names retrieved by the French authorities in January 2009, and the names in that dataset were shared with a number of European governments. Lagarde's enthusiasm was not shared by them, with the Greeks locking the List in a drawer for years and the British declaring that they would not prosecute the individuals named in the List – or reveal their identity to the public.

A French Star in New York

Even while everything seemed to be going well for Ms Lagarde, an extraordinary opportunity came about. A position she was born for was, very suddenly, vacated. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, was forced to stand down following allegations of sexual assault and attempted rape made by a hotel maid on May 14, 2011. Lagarde rose to the challenge, announcing her candidacy for the job on May 25. She was shortlisted, her main opponent being governor of Mexico's central bank Agustín Carstens. Both had extraordinary résumés, with Carstens boasting previous IMF experience as deputy managing director from 2003 to 2006. His candidacy was supported by most Latin American governments, Spain, Canada, and Australia. Lagarde received the support of most of the big players: the U.S., the UK, China, Russia, India, and Germany. On June 28, the IMF's board announced that Lagarde had been selected to be the Fund's new managing director. She was the first woman to be appointed to that position.

Lagarde had some rather big shoes to fill, as Dominique Strauss-Kahn was considered to be one of the IMF's best directors. The *Washington Post* wrote 'Without Strauss-Kahn at the helm, Europe is at risk of losing a key source of

financial support in its efforts to contain the debt crisis buffeting the continent'¹. Economist Joseph Stiglitz commented that Strauss-Kahn was an impressive leader who re-established the credibility of the institution. The Economist believed he spearheaded the Fund's change of approach, which 'led it to become kinder and gentler', especially towards the poorer countries.² This would be the biggest challenge in Lagarde's extraordinary career. But she could not fully dedicate herself to upholding her predecessor's legacy while implementing her own policies. Mere days after she was appointed, a ghost from her days as finance minister came to haunt her. That ghost was none other than the Tapie affair. In 2007, as finance minister, Lagarde authorised a panel of judges to arbitrate a 14-year-old legal dispute between Bernard Tapie and Credit Lyonnais (which had, in that period, become state-owned). In 2008, the judges awarded Tapie, a vocal supporter of Nicola Sarkozy, £248 million in damages. The out-of-court settlement scandalised opposition politicians. Lagarde was accused of abusing her power, and the public prosecutor recommended a full judicial inquiry into Lagarde's role, saying there was evidence of 'several reasons to be suspicious of the regularity and even the legality' of the settlement. The investigation is still ongoing, and in August 2014 Lagarde was further accused of 'negligence'.

Notwithstanding all those problems, Lagarde assumed her position as the IMF's managing director amid a serious crisis. She tried to follow DSK's policies and approved large bailouts for the struggling Eurozone economies, alongside the European Commission and the European Central Bank (thereby creating the 'Troika'). However, during her tenure the IMF pushed for further austerity as a condition to approve loans. This is backed by a report from the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad)³ saying that the IMF has not learned from previous mistakes and has increased the conditions attached to loans from 14 in 2007 to 20 in 2014, thus remaining heavily engaged in highly sensitive and polarising policy areas. The research also suggests that twenty out of the twenty-two countries that were in IMF programs at the time of the report's publication were repeat lenders and had been in IMF programs in the last decade. To make things worse, it is shown that most of those countries had previous arrangements with the Fund in the last three years.

The way the Troika handled the Eurozone debt crisis has been controversial to say the least. The Fund had a history of underestimating the negative effects of large-scale spending cuts on economic growth, and history repeated itself. In June 2013, the Fund officially admitted that austerity was hurting the Greek economy, and began a blame game with the Commission. The IMF's role in the bailout programmes has been heavily criticised and questioned, even from the inside. Paulo Nogueira Batista, one of the Fund's executive directors, who holds voting powers for Brazil, Ecuador, and a number of other Latin American countries, voiced his concerns in 2013 saying that 'the Fund's lending policies were changed in a casuistic way to accommodate European interests'.⁴ These controversial decisions, with less-than-enviable results, seem to have hurt the Fund's cohesion. In March 2011, a few months before Lagarde took over, the Ministers of Economy and Finance of the African Union discussed and agreed upon the creation of an African Monetary Fund, as an alternative to the IMF. Another big blow to the Fund came in July 2014, when at the 6th BRICS summit Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa announced the creation of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)⁵ with an initial size of \$100 billion, again as an alternative to the IMF. The significance of this move is highlighted by the fact that the BRICS economies represent 20% of the world's GDP.

Lagarde's tenure in the IMF has, thus far, not been free of controversial decisions and embarrassing results. However, it must be recognised that she succeeded in the hardest and arguably most important mission she undertook, the Eurozone debt crisis. Notwithstanding all the problems that she, as the head of the IMF, had to face, she managed to stabilise the Eurozone economies. Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have left the Troika support mechanisms, and Greece's future looks much brighter than it did three years ago. She successfully led one of the largest international organisations through a challenging international crisis. She fostered international cooperation, working closely with the European Union and other international organisations, and followed in DSK's footsteps, making the IMF a credible player in international affairs. She affirmed the power of international institutions on the world stage, by risking the Fund's reputation – and perhaps even its future – in her quest to save the Euro and the EU. Some may say that her tenure was Eurocentric, but that's where the biggest challenge was, and she took it on.

Her hard-working professionalism, appetite for technical detail, impressive negotiating skills and the odd mix of 'Frenchness' and internationalism have made Ms Lagarde into one of the most powerful individuals in the world. She is one of the most important people in the world of international politics, setting the agenda on international finance. She could be the face of international success; she could be the poster-person for the empowerment of international institutions.

Her journey to the top has not always been easy. She had to fight hard, and at every turn there was another problem facing her. She managed to succeed in the face of adversity, dominating the boys' club that is finance. She perseveres even after having been accused of abuse of power in her native France. One thing is sure about Lagarde: her experience as a synchronised swimmer is obvious – she can hold her breath under water.

Dionisis is a fourth year student of Law and the Treasurer of the Politics and International Relations Society.



SOFTLY POWERFUL: CHINA'S PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE¹

Prof. TAO XIE

What is power?

This is a question that animated heated intellectual debates in political science and sociology in the United States in the 1960s. Thanks to these debates, we now know that power has at least three faces.² The first face is the Dahlian view, that is, the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do.³ In international relations, this face of power usually involves coercion (e.g., military threats) and/or cooption (e.g., economic payments), and it can be viewed as a different label for hard power.

While the first face of power is often overt, the second face of power tends to be much more covert. It is agenda setting, that is, the ability to decide which issues will be considered and which will not.⁴ In international relations, agenda power should be on its full display at international institutions. There are so many issues competing for attention at such institutions, and those who decide which issues will be considered wield enormous power over those whose issues are excluded.

The third face of power is even more covert than the second face. It is the ability to shape the preferences of others, so that they will want what you want and do what you want them to do, even against their own interests.⁵ From a Marxist perspective, this is the power to manufacture 'false consciousness,' or 'the opium for the people.'

In 1990 this third face of power was resurrected in a different label by the Harvard professor Joseph Nye, who called it soft power, that is, 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.'⁶ Such attraction, according to Nye, derives from a country's cultural heritage, political values, economic prosperity, technological innovation, smart diplomacy, etc. Attraction could be temporary, but it also could be internalized and become one's sincere preferences. In the real world, this could mean that if a foreigner has internalized democracy and freedom championed by the United States, he/she will probably support U.S. policies to spread—or even impose—these values on other countries, even if such policies may be detrimental to this person's interests (e.g., domestic instability in his or her own country).

If so, who does not like soft power? Instead of resorting to intimidation, military force, economic sanctions, or diplomatic pressure, a country can achieve its foreign policy goals through willing support and cooperation from others. Such a soft approach to foreign policy adds to one's legitimacy and saves precious resources. To be able to achieve foreign policy goals in such a fashion is to be softly powerful. Or to borrow the famous ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tze, 'The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without a war.'

No wonder so many countries—big and small—quickly jumped on the bandwagon and launched soft power campaigns of various sizes and with different effects.⁷ It turns out that the Chinese—leaders, scholars, journalists, and policy analysts—have been the most attentive students of Nye.⁸ Since 2007 Chinese leaders have repeatedly called for enhancing China's soft power, and the Chinese government has invested billions of dollars in bolstering its soft power abroad. To some observers, China's soft power initiatives have amounted to nothing less than a 'charm offensive.'⁹

Why are Chinese leaders so keen to build up China's soft power? How does China promote its soft power? What are the effects of China's soft power campaign?

Why

When talking about China's pursuit of soft power, one needs to first understand Chinese leaders' views of soft power. At a group study session of the CPC politburo in January 2014, the Chinese president Xi Jinping made it clear what kind of soft power China is seeking. He vowed to 'promote China's cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world.' For Xi, modern Chinese values are 'socialist values with Chinese characteristics.'¹⁰ What are these values, then? Since the 18th Party Congress in 2012 these values have been defined as 'prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendship.'¹¹

If China's soft power campaign is to disseminate these values, then few would raise objections. Many of these values—such as democracy and freedom—seem to have become universally accepted (at least by peoples around the world). Besides, the United States—and to a lesser extent the European Union—should be much relieved, because now they have new company in their worldwide crusade for democracy and freedom.

To some foreign and Chinese observers, however, China's soft power campaign is anything but the dissemination of these universally accepted values. On the contrary, they believe that Chinese leaders are using soft power as a cover to justify and defend China's party-state that apparently contradicts these values.¹² Thus China's soft power campaign is often viewed as an attempt to fend off western ideological infiltration and to defend China's party-state against western criticism.

Ideological self-defense may be the primary reason behind China's soft power push, but there are other factors too. Chinese leaders seem to believe that although China already possesses formidable hard power (i.e., economic and military power), it won't be viewed as a truly global power (like the United States) until it also possesses equally formidable soft power of the sort articulated by Nye. In the fierce strategic competition between the two countries, China cannot afford to lag behind on such an important dimension of power.

More importantly, with extraordinary economic growth in the past three decades, China is back center stage in the international community. In the early years of reform, it was imperative to bring the outside world—particularly its technology and capital—into China. Today it is imperative to introduce a born-again China to the outside world, especially in light of the myriad stereotypes and distortions about China that are still prevalent among many foreigners. Comments by Gordon Chang, a U.S.-based commentator on China, amply illustrate the urgency of countering western discourse on China and to present the Chinese version of China to the outside world. In an Al Jazeera interview in October 20, 2014, Chang went so far as to assert that China today is similar to the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler.¹³

Having explained the rationale behind China's soft power offensive, we will move on to discuss the means by which the Chinese government has adopted to achieve the end.

How

Chinese leaders are fully aware that soft power is as much about what is presented about China as about how China is presented, and that the latter is largely determined by foreign media. Indeed, numerous studies by Chinese scholars indicate that foreign media tend to be highly selective in their coverage of China, highlighting human rights issues, environmental degradation, authoritarian rule, government corruption, or potential threats to regional and international stability posed by China's growing economic and military power. To some Chinese scholars, coverage of China by foreign media—particular Western media—is so biased and distorted that it constitutes a concerted effort to 'demonize' China.¹⁴

Unsurprisingly, Chinese leaders have repeatedly underscored the urgency of improving China's international communication (or overseas publicity) capabilities. The Chinese government reportedly invested \$ 8.7 billion in 2009-2010 on bolstering such capabilities. The major beneficiaries of this huge investment are China's 'Big Four': China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), Xinhua News Agency, and China Daily, plus English- and Chinese-language TV stations abroad (such as Blue Ocean Network and Great Wall TV in the U.S.). The Big Four have undergone dramatic revamping to make them more audience-friendly, including starting 24-hour news broadcasts, using foreigners as news anchors, increasing live coverage of breaking news, and signing up news commentators.¹⁵

Yet to many observers, the chief symbol of China's soft power offensive is the Confucius Institutes, the first of which was founded in South Korea in 2004. By the end of 2013 there were already 440 Confucius Institutes and 646 Confucius Classrooms across 120 countries.¹⁶ These institutes were established to be centers of cultural exchanges between China and host countries, though many foreigners suspect that they are fronts for China's ideological export.¹⁷

Apart from these cultural initiatives, the Chinese government has also used mega-events to showcase its accomplishments and to sway international public opinion. Within two years, China hosted the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai Expo, and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games. The Shanghai Expo, in particular, was often touted by Chinese scholars and government officials as a great opportunity to practice public diplomacy (i.e., to bolster China's soft power), because the Expo was expected to attract 70 million visitors (including 3.5 million foreign visitors).¹⁸ As one senior Chinese official put it just days before the opening of the Expo, 'That is why we regard it as another historic opportunity to promote public diplomacy after the Beijing Olympic Games.'¹⁹

By investing so many resources, Chinese leaders have demonstrated their unwavering commitment to boosting China's soft power. What are the effects of such a massive campaign worldwide, then?

What

Surprisingly, few scholars and analysts—Chinese or foreign—have made attempts to assess the effectiveness of China's soft power campaign.²⁰ Admittedly, soft power is such a nebulous term that it is hardly amenable to rigorous social science measurement. What Nye calls 'attraction' is largely based on perception, rather than objective and reasoned judgment. That being said, there are nevertheless a handful of indicators by which China's soft power campaign can be evaluated, even if imperfectly.

Cross-national surveys conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project allow us to identify changes in foreign publics' perceptions of China in 2002-2014.²¹ The good news for the Chinese government is that perceptions of China in many developing countries have been consistently quite favorable, with Pakistan boasting an annual average favorability rating of 72.5 per cent. Such ratings among Russians and Indonesians averaged above 60 per cent.

The bad news for the Chinese government is that views of China tend to be much less favorable in western European countries, with annual average ratings usually below 50 per cent. Besides, there is a clear downward trend in favorable perceptions of China. Take Germany, for example. In 2006, 56 per cent of Germans had a favorable of China, the highest point in the Pew series. It dropped to 34 per cent in 2007 and 26 per cent in 2008, and has remained below 30 per cent since 2012.

A survey on Soft Power in Asia, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute in 2008, offers additional clues about perceptions of China's soft power in five countries: the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The survey has five sets of



questions that are designed to measure five dimensions of soft power, namely, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and human capital. China was top ranked in cultural power only (and by two countries). By contrast, the United States was top ranked by at least two countries in each of the five dimensions.²² Another study that used similar indices of soft power shows that China's overall ranking of soft power (22nd) lags far behind that of the United States (2nd).²³

The author of this article also conducted an empirical study of macro-level factors that could influence cross-national variations in perceptions of China. These factors include bilateral strategic and economic ties, and similarities in socioeconomic development and political systems, and the number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in those countries. Results from statistical analysis indicates that only socioeconomic similarity has a significant impact: the more developed a country is, the less favorable its public's views of China.

All these findings suggest that China still faces a deficit in soft power, though the magnitude of that deficit varies considerably from one region to another, and from one study to another. Moreover, since China's soft power campaign has a rather short history of only about ten years, it is probably too early to assess the effects of this campaign.

Epilogue

Soft power in international relations sounds so seductive that few governments can resist the temptation of possessing it, and the more the better. China is an illuminating example of the powerful impact that a new idea could have on government policies.

For a number of reasons discussed above, the Chinese government wants to bolster its soft power abroad. But soft power pursued by China seems quite different from that proposed by Nye. The former seems to focus on debunking prevalent western stereotypes and distortions about China. As the Chinese President Xi Jinping said, 'The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and characteristics of China well explained.'²⁴ The latter,

by contrast, tends to focus on marketing one's desirable qualities. In this sense, Chinese soft power is more a negative type, whereas Nye's soft power is more of a positive type.

To be sure, Chinese leaders may have contemplated about marketing the attractions of China, but such attractions—both uniquely Chinese and universally appealing—seem to be in short supply. The so-called China model—'capitalism with Chinese characteristics'—could be a product for export, but the model (or the Beijing Consensus) was not a Chinese invention.²⁵ Besides, the model is still being tested by myriad domestic challenges that include glaring inequality, rampant corruption, environmental degradation, and rising social discontent. In the end, it seems that Chinese leaders are more interested in 'diversity in harmony,' an international order under which countries with diverse political and economic practices co-exist in peace and prosperity. Diversity in harmony is the exact opposite of 'the end of history,' and if the former becomes so widely accepted as to replace the latter, then China is in a position to claim being softly powerful.

Tao Xie is a professor of political science at the School of English and International Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University. He holds a PhD in political science from Northwestern University. Prof. Xie's research interests include the U.S. Congress, public opinion, Sino-U.S. relations, and Chinese foreign policy. He is the author of U.S.-China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill and co-author of Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China. He has also published several articles in the Journal of Contemporary China, including 'What Affects China's National Image? A Cross-national Study of Public Opinion'. He is a frequent guest at CNN, Al Jazeera, China Central Television (CCTV), and China Radio International (CRI). Prof. Xie also writes opinion pieces for the CNN website.

UNDERSTANDING POWER AND HOW TO USE IT

BRIANA PEGADO reflects on power dynamics and the stories we tell.

Those that seek power rarely understand its influence and often manipulate power in ways that suggest it is not in their control.¹ Meanwhile, it is often those that do not seek it who truly have power and with whom real power lies. How we create narratives around power can influence others immensely, and it is through these relationships of interactions and influence that one can exercise force and, therefore, exercise power. Power is distributed, controlled, and created (not destroyed) through actions within power relationships.

Like energy within power dynamics, every action has a reaction and every interaction has a power influence. Power is applied through actions and reactions within these relationships and flows in all directions between the actors participating in the power dynamic. In interpersonal terms, the application of power occurs through the influence of one's actions and behaviours on others. Individuals who master how their actions and behaviours influence others will hold the key to understanding power.

Scholars of politics and international relations spend the majority of their academic careers analysing how power works and how it interacts with various actors on the world stage and in national and local arenas. Power analysis also permeates into psychology, philosophy, and sociology among other disciplines. Indeed, it can operate within the objectivity of science and technology and should be examined within every existing subject area. Power exists in every space, including in relationships between individuals and within institutions governed by rules and constraints.

Where there is authority there is a power dynamic. Where authority does not exist there is a struggle for power amongst those that seek order. Human interaction is constituted by the way we influence, communicate, and interact with others, with objects, and within spaces and arenas. For those who believe that there is no order and only chaos, power exists within that chaos as a form of energy.

Even outside of the macrocosm of the universe and inside the microcosm of our minds, power struggles still exist. Internal struggles between logic and emotion, irrationality and reason are all mental manifestations of a power struggle. How we make sense of our world, organise our thoughts, and then articulate them is governed by power dynamics or relationships. Power permeates life.

There are four different ways of applying power – power over, power with, power to, and power within. 'Power over' is the control over people, resources, etc. 'Power with' is collective strength. 'Power to' is individual agency, a power to influence and act on something. 'Power within' is individual self-worth and efficacy.² These forms of power are applied on different levels – the global, national, and local – and exist in different spaces: closed, invited, and claimed. Power can come in invisible, hidden, and visible forms.³

Closed spaces include those behind closed doors and can be characterised by decision-making that takes place without the consultation of the public. Invited spaces, such as democratic and open trade unions, apply a more inclusive form of power. Power that exists within a created or claimed space is there due to a common concern expressed through a sit-in or protest.

Visible power is demonstrated as a contest over interests in public spaces, such as formal decision-making bodies. Hidden forms of power are used by vested interests to maintain their privilege by creating barriers to participation, by exerting political control 'backstage,' or by excluding key issues from the public arena. Invisible power is often applied through dominant ideologies, values, and forms of behaviour adopted by powerless groups. Through this process, an individual's awareness of his or her own rights and interests is hidden.⁴ In

his theory of Habitus, Bourdieu described a 'socialized subjectivity' – interplay between personal experience (history) and social structure (socialised norms/tendencies) that creates personal or broader dispositions in society.⁵

The only way to understand why these forms of power exist and how they are reinforced is by acknowledging the narratives (or frames) around them. Lakoff once said, 'Framing is a power means of persuasion because once people hold a frame strongly enough, they will reject facts that do not fit with it.'⁶ Politics works through frames. Politicians or actors that engage in national, local, or internal politics use frames to influence the power dynamic within their power relationships. By examining these frames we can see that more often than not people believe stories, not facts. These frames contribute to our cultural narratives, which in many cases help construct and contribute to the existing cultural monopolies. These frames, settled upon in closed spaces, construct dominating ideologies that operate as a form of invisible power. How can we influence this form of invisible power over others within closed spaces? We shift the power dynamic by using power with, power to, and power within to force this power from its invisible to its visible form and into invited or claimed spaces.

We cannot have a conversation about power without discussing what influences individuals' actions and behaviours, which dictates how individuals exert their power. These actions and behaviours are influenced by an individual's thoughts and ideas, which are shaped by and shape an individual's values.

In academia we operate on the premise that no single thought or idea is originally our own. Through our life experiences, we subconsciously mould our thoughts and ideas into our values that are uniquely our own. Our values are a set of ideas that we refer to as our own personal dictionary when we are making sense of propositions that we come across in decision-making. This is what we now call our 'common sense'. Notice that one individual's common sense varies from another's.

There exist certain cultural monopolies and through these monopolies one could argue there is a common cultural sense that may signal a type of common sense. However, people garner or derive experience from many similar but not identical experiences. Hence different individuals have different values based on different thoughts and ideas. Often, in the throngs of an argument someone may shout, 'it's common sense!'; but what may appear to be common to debater A does not resonate in quite the same way to debater B.

Our ideas and thoughts do shape our values. Our values influence our actions and behaviours, which act to exert power in its different forms, in different spaces, and on different levels. We must not let existing structures and institutions shape our thoughts and ideas in a way that reinforces any dominating ideology, because that is power over us in its purest form. If we do not acknowledge that power dynamics dictate our culture and construct narratives, thereby shaping our very understanding of each other and ourselves, we relinquish our individual power to those who chose to exert their own. We must be aware of our actions and behaviours. We must act with conviction to exert our influence in constructive ways. We must frame our stories through those actions and behaviours. And to make sure we have a real impact on our world, when we tell our stories we should make sure they are good stories.

Briana is the President of the Edinburgh University Students' Association (EUSA) and former student of Sustainable Development with International Relations at the University of Edinburgh.



RECONCEPTUALISING POWER

IQAN FADAEI brings us back to the basic assumption of politics and international relations—the human nature of power.

It is difficult to think of a concept as multi-faceted, intriguing and yet warped as ‘power’. The western world is obsessed with power. Not a single discipline at our university that relates to human interaction ignores the concept. Many thinkers see it as a – if not *the* – fundamental factor of their fields. But conceptions of social reality revolving around power are expressions of the way we conceive of other, equally fundamental subjects: human nature and human identity foremost among them. This contribution offers insights into the former and its connection to our understanding and application of power.

Human nature

A prevailing conception of the human being in the western world is the self-interested rational egoist. In this classic Hobbesian view, human beings are born self-interested and seek to survive in a world of limited resources.¹ Since other human beings are self-interested, such a world is a place of competition, insecurity, and suspicion. To challenge this conception is not to question the importance of the individual, its health or survival. Rather, it opens the space for an alternative conception of human nature to emerge, one which actually better serves both the individual and the collective. Currently, though, the conception of the self-interested individual provides the basis upon which are constructed whole economic and political systems.² And these systems are failing to provide the necessary solutions to the profound problems we face today: the inability of the planet to satiate the consumerism central to global economic systems, the untold sufferings to entire peoples that has accompanied such systems, the strife and hatred based on differences, the conflicts over material resources, the suspicion driving many interpersonal and interstate relations, and more. Given such failures, why do we so readily accept this view of human nature?

Unfortunately, one reason is the tendency to deify thinkers of past ages, even though such thinkers were limited by a now archaic worldview, forged in times when, for example, slavery was a norm. Another reason is that students entering into university all too readily accept the theories and assumptions delivered by lecturers as objective truth, usually because they are labelled ‘rational’ or ‘real’ and so appeal to our desire to feel intellectually robust.

So, what is wrong with the rational egoist view? Essentially, it assumes that human beings are inherently self-interested, that this is the defining feature of the individual, and that what ensues is an inescapable reality. Rational egoists observe the selfish behaviour of individuals and extrapolate from it that human beings are inherently and irredeemably selfish. Thus, observations of sacrifice, friendship and altruism are quickly explained away as means to strengthening our material position in the world; as mere expressions of an underlying self-interest. Yet, even without analysing the sheer scale of suffering, loss of human life and other traumas this model has brought us, its explanatory incompleteness is becoming increasingly evident. For, just because we are capable of doing selfish things does not mean our nature is solely self-interested. A particular behaviour might well be an expression of an underlying reality, but it seems an illogical jump that such behaviour is the only expression of that reality.

Thus, even at the level of everyday experience, the model seems to be incomplete. For example, how many of us truly form friendships simply to advance our material standing in the world? The argument that this is what happens at a subconscious level is rather disconcerting. What role does our intellect or sense of reason play in such predetermined interactions? Another response – that of ‘biological determinism’ – holds that competitive, self-interested individuals survived a competitive world and so produced offspring with the same characteristics (i.e. through natural selection). However, the nature of human conscience is still unknown by biologists, who have not yet decreed it as wired for only self-interested competition, while the capacity to cooperate and work for collective goals has been identified as a capacity crucial to survival.³ Ignoring this simply discards an entire element of human nature that also happens to be honed for constructive collaboration.⁴ A third response is that such acts as appear altruistic simply help us survive an emotionally harsh world, which is a fundamentally self-interested goal. Yet this argument is still forced to accept that altruism exists, regardless of any perceived root or motivation. Indeed, the fact that such altruistic acts are observable in a world as competition-based as ours might even be cited as proof of the innate altruism of human beings; that it exists even in a world that makes it materially disadvantageous to manifest. Moreover, the argument assumes the world to be an inherently harsh, competitive environment – such a view is itself constructed upon a faulty model of human nature.

Human nature: an alternative model

What is an alternative model for understanding human nature? According to Michael Karlberg, an inescapably competitive human nature is a myth.⁵ All the human sciences, he argues, demonstrate that we

are wired for both competition and cooperation, egoism and altruism. Thus, we observe altruism and selfishness because human nature itself is both altruistic and selfish. Our institutions and incentive systems, the way we are raised, cultured, educated and trained, shape the development of these two human capacities.⁶ Since our political, economic, legal and other systems operating in society focus almost entirely on the selfish aspect of human nature that can be corrosive when unchecked, that aspect is dominant while the more positive side atrophies.⁷ Furthermore, because that altruistic aspect atrophies, we find it harder to find examples of it in the world.

In this sense, conceptions of human nature are self-perpetuating; the way we understand it will manifest itself in our actions, thereby providing further evidence in support of the belief. As Zamagni explains:

Our beliefs about human nature help shape human nature itself, in the sense that what we think about ourselves and our possibilities determines what we aspire to become. In this precise sense, the self-interest theory is not morally neutral, contrary to what most economists seem to believe. There is growing evidence that the self-interest paradigm may be self-fulfilling ... subjects come to perceive self-interest as a normative characterization of rational behaviour and come to act accordingly. It is here that the effects of the self-interest theory are most disturbing.⁸

Alternatively, were we to believe in our altruistic capacities, our actions would begin to reflect that altruism. Importantly, such altruism does not necessarily necessitate suffering on our part. There is no reason why acting in a way that helps others should not benefit us and, at a basic level, this concept is ingrained in the universe. For example, the diverse and specialised cells of the human body must work together in harmony in order to function effectively. The natural environment is another example; the planet functions according to a crucial balance in its ecological systems which, when upset, causes the numerous environmental problems we see today. In the same way, the good of the individual lies in the health of the collective, while a healthy collective can see to the needs of the individual. A world in which this kind of altruism is at the core of social interaction would, I imagine, be somewhat better than the one we have now.

Such a conception goes beyond the notion of making the best of a bad lot. In the field of International Relations, Realist models observe self-interested groups and not only call such behaviour ‘real’, but suggest that such behaviour reflects the entire reality of human nature. Liberal theories focus on cooperation and ameliorating the anarchical society that Realists propose, but still accept the Realist paradigm of self-interestedness. Unfortunately, it is not enough to reduce the destructiveness of such an anarchical society yet accept its ultimate tragedy and therefore limit the potential of collective life. Rather, an alternative conception of human nature is needed, one that recognises its complexity. The challenge that then emerges is one of prioritising the altruistic element of human nature over its self-interested counterpart.

Conceptions of power drawn from an alternative model of human nature

Current definitions of power can be seen to correspond almost entirely with the more negative human capacities. The traditional notion of power, as articulated by Robert Dahl, sees power as the ability of *A* to get *B* to do as *A* wishes, or else the ability of *A* to prevent *B* from doing something *B* wishes.⁹ Bachrach and Baratz go deeper and highlight a second ‘face’ of power; that of agenda-setting.¹⁰ Lukes presents a yet more complex view of power, describing a third dimension: the two already mentioned and the third relating to the ability of *A* to make *B* believe that something is in *B*’s interest when it is actually in theirs.¹¹ All these views, though, stem from the same flawed conception of human nature. Hence, they focus on the capacity to pursue one’s own interests, to compete effectively, to dominate, to manipulate and to prevail over or against others. The problems such narrow conceptions create are exacerbated when we most commonly think about power in its most tangible physical, political, social and economic forms. Clearly, this kind of power does exist and its manifestations are apparent. But actively promoting it to the exclusion of counter-conceptions will only serve to embellish and entrench the innumerable hardships and inequities we see in the world today.

One beneficial aspect of the prevailing narrow conception of power is its recognition of the importance of ‘ability’ or ‘capacity’ to do something.¹² Unbelievably, Bachrach and Baratz specifically identify this understanding in their work but dismiss it as uninteresting and unhelpful. Yet, if power is about capacity, then their definitions of power are simply focusing too heavily on one kind of human capacity. Were definitions that are based upon a broader conception of human nature applied to human affairs, more optimistic patterns



of behaviour might emerge. In fact, examples of such patterns already exist. For example, many communities around the world make collective decisions through a process of consultation, whereby individuals are free to offer their opinions but remain unattached to their view, instead giving full support to whatever decision is finally made (even if this is eventually decided by, say, a majority vote). Individuals can pool their creative and constructive energies to realising this collective goal and if, through their accruing experiences, questions arise as to the means or ends regarding a decision, such communities are able to reflect and refine the process.¹³

A cursory glance at the state of the world – the suspicion and distrust in local communities, the conflict at national and international levels, the atrocities

committed on a nearly daily basis, and the sense of hopelessness all these have engendered among people from all backgrounds – would suggest that a fundamental challenging of underlying assumptions and myths about human nature are timely. Hopefully, there are among this readership individuals who, dissatisfied with many aspects of our current world order, recognise the need for a new way of conceptualising human nature and are willing to engage in a collective process of learning, in which themes such as these receive critical attention.

Iqan is a second year student of Politics.

POWER, PLUTOCRATS, AND POOR DECISIONS IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

ANU PAULIINA HIEKKARANTA explores how the global economic system reproduces social inequality across the globe.

The Keynesian period (roughly 1945-1970) is often seen as the most prosperous era of capitalism, associated with the emergence of a relatively satisfied society represented by middle-class prosperity and well-being.¹ However, many contemporary critics of today's capitalism, and neoliberalism in particular, point out that current economic policies have worked to create astonishing gains for those at the top of the social pyramid while the costs involved in achieving these profits are being paid for by the lower ranks of society, on both the domestic and the global arena.² This was demonstrated by the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008; a crisis created by a few individuals in the financial sector that has and will be paid for by the global majority.³

David Harvey links the emergence of neoliberalism to the financial crises of the 1970s, and bases this on the premise that neoliberalism by definition is the 'class project' that emerged as a result of the policies put in place from the 1970s onward.⁴ Neoliberalism has been successful in the concentration of capital and power in the hands of few, which in Harvey's view occurred in all countries that followed the guidelines of neoliberalism. The deregulatory policies of the 1970s, which continued to grow in magnitude over the 1980s and 1990s, fashioned a new global financial system that facilitated the stream of capital across and between national boundaries to wherever it could be utilized most efficiently.⁵ To illustrate the effects of the intercontinental spread of advanced capitalism, Saskia Sassen describes the international relations of production in the following way: '...natural resources of much of Africa and good parts of Latin America count more than the people on those lands count as consumers and as workers.'⁶

Existing global financial practices are often described as neo-colonial, illustrating the relations of exploitation between developed countries and a majority of the global South. For example, the IMF, principally controlled by the US, is obliging Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) to pay 20-25 per cent of their export earnings towards debt service, when, historically, European countries' debt has typically been entirely or almost entirely forgiven (for example, post-WW2 Germany).⁷ In today's capitalism, the enforcement of supremacy by the West is not realised by means of imperialism, but instead by financial constraints. As a result, the vast majority of impoverished countries are even less likely to reach the level of consumption required to pass into the capitalist sphere than was the case 20 years ago, due to practises of advanced capitalism.⁸

As illustrated by the recent trends in finance, the majority of investments no longer flow into production, but into assets.⁹ To explain this drift, it is essential to understand that the capitalist economy is currently at a fatal crisis, brought about by the secular trends of capitalism, which are quickly reaching their asymptotes.¹⁰ Wallerstein states that the capitalist system has a cyclical nature, which restores its natural equilibrium routinely post-crises, as has been the case after previous financial crisis. Nevertheless, capitalism is also paradoxical in nature. These trends cannot go on indefinitely; they eventually reach their parameters. In other words, the accumulation of capital cannot keep occurring endlessly, because it relies on finite properties.¹¹

These major secular trends include, for example, the problem of class struggle. In a democratized nation the labour force historically rises to demand higher pay and benefits, which causes relocation of production into cheaper spheres, at present those in the global South.¹² However, there are fewer and fewer areas to be integrated into the capitalist system and eventually through democratization there will be no cheap labour force left. Another major trend is the issue of the global destruction of the environment and the finality of resources.¹³ A clean-up operation should be put in action, but such measures are meaningless if the same practises that caused the destruction are kept in place. The irony is that the idea of endless accumulation of capital is the very premises of capitalism.

Nonetheless, the products of capitalism and perhaps particularly neoliberal

economic policies are spectacular; the standard of living and the amount of convenient commodities and unnecessary luxuries available to many people today is greater than at any point before in history.¹⁴ Magnificent cities and prosperous societies, accumulation of knowledge and, on the face of it, infinite opportunity, have been constructed on account of capital; a seemingly unstoppable force, exponentially growing in magnitude and globally creating unimaginable possibilities for future generations. Geographic obstacles have been conquered, space and time transformed, and increasingly we see every corner of the earth integrated into the capitalist system.¹⁵ On the negative side, capitalism has also produced a world in which the gap between the wealthy and the destitute has never been greater and the environmentally destructive might of humankind has never been clearer.¹⁶ Wealth is increasingly collected into the hands of a small group of individuals, which has entirely distorted the democratic political process, as those in possession of great financial power are free to puppeteer national governments and international organizations.

Inequality in the 21st century pales in comparison to anything seen in previous decades. Humankind has globally broken free of the kin-ordered mode of production, and the gigantic fortunes of the 0.01 per cent of the world's richest today did not come from heritage.¹⁷ Societies are increasingly divided into winners and losers, the winners being in possession of extraordinary wealth that places them in a position of unprecedented cross-national economic and political power. Global economics and social structures are transforming, and the wealth of the entire world economy is rapidly being transferred into the proprietorship of a shrinking group of tycoons.¹⁸ For example, in China the wealthiest members of the National People's Congress now have authority over the vast majority of the economic and political institutions of China. This is to a large extent due to the immensity of their wealth, which exceeds that of all American governmental branches – combined.¹⁹

Currently, the responses to questions about inequality are swallowed by the rhetoric of liberty, innovation, and individual responsibility. On this account, the idea of the American dream, for example, is built on false premises. The capitalist rhetoric serves to dissolve any suspicion over the legitimacy of the wealth of the capitalist class in a globalized world, and certainly in the West. The financial bourgeois is also the very group who engineered the idea of junk-bonds and other financial assets which led to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, in order to collect more wealth.²⁰ The consequences are clear: the profits were private and the gigantic costs public. The ways in which capitalism and globalization are interlinked are numerous and the consequences of the spread of capitalism have created draconian practises, enforced by those in power, principally concerned with reproducing the same power structures that are already in place.²¹ Humankind is globally at a point of transition resembling that of class struggle. At present these parties consists of one which wishes to keep their unwarranted prerogatives, and one which desires to see the dawn of a new era: a more equal, democratic and compassionate world.

Anu is a fourth year student of Psychology and former Editor for Africa at Leviathan. She is currently the Editor in Chief of Think, the Edinburgh University psychology journal.



ENDNOTES

ASIA-PACIFIC

BRAVELY BUILDING A NEW WORLD IN THE WORLD'S SECOND LARGEST ECONOMY

- ¹ Forbes 'China Rich List' [online] Available at: <<http://www.forbes.com/profile/zhang-xin/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ² All-China Women's Federation 'China's Top 10 Career Women Role Models' [online] Available at: <http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/special/12/3577-1.htm> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ³ Forbes, M. (2011) 'Success With Moira Forbes: Zhang Xin CEO & Co-Founder SOHO China'. Interviewed by Moira Forbes [youtube] December 14 2011. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQySaL_hXYk> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁴ Bowlby, C. (2013) 'BBC Radio 4 Profile: Zhang Xin'. March 17 2013 [podcast] Available at: <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01r93sm>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁵ Massoud, J. (2014) 'Zhang Xin - The Real Estate Empress Of China' [online] Available at: <<http://bricmagazine.co.uk/zhang-xin-the-real-estate-empress-of-china/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ Stahl, L. (2013) 'CBS This Morning: 60 Minutes' Interviewed by Leslie Stahl [youtube] March 4 2013. Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTQ-vogH7nI>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁸ Foster, P. (2010) 'Meet Zhang Xin, China's Self-Made Billionairess' [online] Available at: <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7856265/Meet-Zhang-Xin-Chinas-self-made-billionairess.html>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁹ Stahl, L. (2013) 'CBS This Morning: 60 Minutes' Interviewed by Leslie Stahl [youtube] March 4 2013. Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTQ-vogH7nI>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁰ Foster, P. (2010) 'Meet Zhang Xin, China's Self-Made Billionairess' [online] Available at: <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7856265/Meet-Zhang-Xin-Chinas-self-made-billionairess.html>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹¹ Massoud, J. (2014) 'Zhang Xin - The Real Estate Empress Of China' [online] Available at: <<http://bricmagazine.co.uk/zhang-xin-the-real-estate-empress-of-china/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹² Stahl, L. (2013) 'CBS This Morning: 60 Minutes' Interviewed by Leslie Stahl [youtube] March 4 2013. Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTQ-vogH7nI>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹³ Ibid.

- ¹⁴ Von Hase, B. (2008) 'Zhang Xin and Pan Shiyi: Beijing's It-couple' [online] Available at: <<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/visualarts/architecture/article1887540.ece>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁵ Massoud, J. (2014) 'Zhang Xin - The Real Estate Empress Of China' [online] Available at: <<http://bricmagazine.co.uk/zhang-xin-the-real-estate-empress-of-china/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁶ Walker, T. (2013) 'Zhang Xin, the Chinese tycoon seven times richer than the Queen set to buy America's most expensive office tower' [online] Available at: <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/zhang-xin-the-chinese-tycoon-seven-times-richer-than-the-queen-set-to-buy-americas-most-expensive-office-tower-8530251.html>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁷ Massoud, J. (2014) 'Zhang Xin - The Real Estate Empress Of China' [online] Available at: <<http://bricmagazine.co.uk/zhang-xin-the-real-estate-empress-of-china/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014); Walker, T. (2013) 'Zhang Xin, the Chinese tycoon seven times richer than the Queen set to buy America's most expensive office tower' [online] Available at: <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/zhang-xin-the-chinese-tycoon-seven-times-richer-than-the-queen-set-to-buy-americas-most-expensive-office-tower-8530251.html>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁸ T. (2013) 'Zhang Xin, the Chinese tycoon seven times richer than the Queen set to buy America's most expensive office tower' [online] Available at: <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/zhang-xin-the-chinese-tycoon-seven-times-richer-than-the-queen-set-to-buy-americas-most-expensive-office-tower-8530251.html>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁹ Forbes, M. (2011) 'Success With Moira Forbes: Zhang Xin CEO & Co-Founder SOHO China'. Interviewed by Moira Forbes [youtube] December 14 2011. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQySaL_hXYk> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ White, T. (2011) 'Emerging Leaders: Zhang Xin, CEO, SOHO China' [online] Available at: <<http://www.thomaswhite.com/global-perspectives/zhang-xin-ceo-soho-china/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Soho China Foundation (2014) [online] Available at: <<http://www.sohochinafoundation.org/en/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Massoud, J. (2014) 'Zhang Xin - The Real Estate Empress Of China' [online] Available at: <<http://bricmagazine.co.uk/zhang-xin-the-real-estate-empress-of-china/>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014);
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Kroll, L. (2010) 'The World's Richest Self-Made Women' [online] Available at: <<http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/14/richest-women-entrepreneur-billionaire-whitman-oprah-rowling.html>> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)

PEOPLE POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA

- ¹ Harry Harding, 'The Chinese State in crisis', The Cambridge History of China Vol 15, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 105-217
- ² Corinna-Barbara Francis; 'The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of 1989'. Asian Survey Vol. 29, No. 9 (Sept. 1989) pp. 898-915
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Peter L. Lorentzen; 'Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime'; Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2013, Nr. 8 pp. 127-158
- ⁶ Corinna-Barbara Francis; 'The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of 1989'. Asian Survey Vol. 29, No. 9 (Sept. 1989) pp. 898-915
- ⁷ Peter L. Lorentzen; 'Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime'; Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2013, Nr. 8 pp. 127-158

- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Marsha P. Posusney, 'The Moral Economy of Labor Protest in Egypt'. World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Oct. 1993), pp. 83-120; Joel Beinin, 'Workers and Egypt's January 25 Revolution'. International Labor and Working-Class History, Vol. 80, Issue 1 (Fall 2011), pp. 189-196
- ¹⁵ Joel Beinin, 'Workers and Egypt's January 25 Revolution'. International Labor and Working-Class History, Vol. 80, Issue 1 (Fall 2011), pp. 189-196
- ¹⁶ Corinna-Barbara Francis; 'The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of 1989'. Asian Survey Vol. 29, No. 9 (Sept. 1989) pp. 898-915

SPEAK SOFTLY, CARRY A LARGE BANKROLL

- ¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Soft Power' Foreign Policy, Autumn 1990 Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ² Keith Fray, 'China's leap forward: overtaking the US as world's biggest economy' Financial Times [online] Oct. 8th 2014. Available at: <http://blogs.ft.com/ftdata/2014/10/08/chinas-leap-forward-overtaking-the-us-as-worlds-biggest-economy/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run (OECD, 2007). Available at: http://www.ggd.cnet/maddison/China_book/Chapter_2.pdf (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁵ Jin Kai 'Can China Build a Community of Common Destiny?' The Diplomat [online], Nov 28th, 2013. Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/can-china-build-a-community-of-common-destiny/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ Munir Majid 'Southeast Asia between China and the United States.' The New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia [online], 2013. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/sr015/sr015majid-china-vs-us.pdf> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁸ 'At the Double' The Economist [online], May 13th, 2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21599046-chinas-fast-growing-defence-budget-worries-its-neighbours-not-every-trend-its-favour> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Mohan Malik, 'Historical Fiction: China's South Sea Claims' World Affairs [online], May/June 2013. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/historical-fiction-chinas-south-china-sea-claims> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹¹ 'Told You So', The Economist [online], Oct. 30th, 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21629514-protests-hong-kong-fuel-taiwans-distrust-china-told-you-so?> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Trade Statistics, 2013 Available at: <http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/publications/tradestat/exdes.html> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, Oct. 5th 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/HKG/INT_CCPNGS_HKG_18512_E.pdf (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁵ 'Russia and China seal historic \$400bn gas deal' Russia Today

- [online], May 21, 2014. Available at: <http://rt.com/business/160068-china-russia-gas-deal/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁴ David Shinn, 'China's Investments in Africa' China US Focus [online], Nov. 1st, 2012 Available at: <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-investments-in-africa/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁵ Lamido Sanusi, 'Africa must get real about Chinese ties' Financial Times [online], Mar. 11, 2013. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3HdxDjRkh> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Thomson Ayodele and Olusegun Sotola, 'China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment' IPPA Working Paper Series 2014 [online]. Available at: http://www.ippanigeria.org/china_africa_working.pdf (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁸ Paul McGeough 'Hillary's Choice', The Sydney Morning Herald [online], Jun. 28th, 2014. Available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/world/hillarys-choice-20140623-3an2z.html> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014); Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁹ Confucius Says, The Economist [online], Sep. 11th, 2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21616988-decade-ago-china-began-opening-centres-abroad-promote-its-culture-some-people-are-pushing> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Beina Xu, 'Media Censorship in China', Council on Foreign Relations [online], Sep. 25th, 2014. Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²² Kenneth Rapoza, 'The Empire Strikes Back' Forbes [online], Nov. 18th, 2012. Available at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/11/18/the-empire-strikes-back-u-k-beats-u-s-in-soft-power-survey-says/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014); Jonathan McClory, 'The New Persuaders III', Institute For Government [online], 2012. Available at: http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20new%20persuaders%20III_0.pdf (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²³ Jonathan McClory, 'The New Persuaders III', Institute For Government [online], 2012. Available at: http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20new%20persuaders%20III_0.pdf (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²⁴ World Population Statistics 2014. Available at: <http://www.worldpopulationstatistics.com/population-of-africa-2014/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)



AFRICA

ALIKO DANGOTE:
WHAT IS AFRICA'S GREATEST PERSONAL FORTUNE
ACTUALLY WORTH?

- ¹Forbes, 'Profile: Aliko Dangote', 28 October 2014. Available at: <http://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ²The Economist, 'Cementing a Fortune', 23 June 2012. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/21557382> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ³Al Jazeera 'Aliko Dangote: Africa's richest man', [online video], 13 September 2014, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/09/aliko-dangote-africa-richest-man-2014912121920413525.html> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁴A. Okeowo, 'Africa's Richest Man, Aliko Dangote, Is Just Getting Started', Bloomberg Businessweek, 7 March 2013, Available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/africas-richest-man-aliko-dangote-is-just-getting-started#p1> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁵Nigerian Customs Service, 'Import Prohibition List', n.d., Available at: <https://www.customs.gov.ng/ProhibitionList/import.php> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁶A. Okeowo, 'Africa's Richest Man, Aliko Dangote, Is Just Getting Started', Bloomberg Businessweek, 7 March 2013, Available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/africas-richest-man-aliko-dangote-is-just-getting-started#p1> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁷B. Browne, 'Aliko Dangote and why you should know about him', Wikileaks (published online 7 March 2005), Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05LAGOS362_a.html (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁸World Trade Organization, 'Trade Policy Review Nigeria', 13 April 2005, Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trp_e/tp247_e.htm (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ⁹The Economist, 'A Nation Divided', 25 October 2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/>

FATHERS AND FRIENDS

- ¹AMISOM, (2014). Brief History - AMISOM. [online] Available at: <http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/brief-history/> [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014].
- ²Ibid.
- ³Ibid.
- ⁴Roque, P. C. (2009) Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab. Institute for Security Studies Situation Report
- ⁵Ibid.
- ⁶United Nations (2014) 'Member States'. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml> [Accessed 3rd Nov 2014]
- ⁷Murithi, T. (2007). 'Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations', In Dialogue on Globalization. New York, February 2007. New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 1-8.
- ⁸Bellamy, A. (2005) 'Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq', Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 19 (2), pp. 31-53.

- middle-east-and-africa/21627646-africas-iodestar-nation-has-weathered-ebola-extremist-takeover-has-exposed?zid=304&ah=e5690753dc78ce91909083042ad12e30 (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁰Al Jazeera 'Aliko Dangote: Africa's richest man', [online video], 13 September 2014, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/09/aliko-dangote-africa-richest-man-2014912121920413525.html> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹¹OPEC, 'Nigeria Facts and Figures' 2014. Available at: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹²B. Browne, 'Aliko Dangote and why you should know about him', Wikileaks (published online 7 March 2005), Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05LAGOS362_a.html (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹³A. Okeowo, 'Africa's Richest Man, Aliko Dangote, Is Just Getting Started', Bloomberg Businessweek, 7 March 2013, Available at: <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-07/africas-richest-man-aliko-dangote-is-just-getting-started#p1> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁴Al Jazeera 'Aliko Dangote: Africa's richest man', [online video], 13 September 2014, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/09/aliko-dangote-africa-richest-man-2014912121920413525.html> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁵M. Nsehe, 'Nigerian Billionaire Dangote Sets Sights On Iraq, Myanmar And Brazil', Forbes, 26 September 2012. Available at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonbongsehe/2012/09/26/nigerian-billionaire-aliko-dangote-sets-sights-on-iraq-myanmar-and-brazil/> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁶Al Jazeera 'Aliko Dangote: Africa's richest man', [online video], 13 September 2014, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/09/aliko-dangote-africa-richest-man-2014912121920413525.html> (Accessed Nov 2nd 2014)
- ¹⁷CNBC, 'Aliko Dangote: Billionaire African Entrepreneur', 29 April 2014, Available at: <http://www.cnbccom/id/101581305#> (Accessed Nov 2nd)

- ⁹Murithi, T. (2007). 'Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations', In Dialogue on Globalization. New York, February 2007. New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 5.
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹Icpat.org, (2014). United Nations Blocks Change of AMISOM Mandate. [online] Available at: <http://www.icpat.org/index.php/about-us-mainmenu-110/490-united-nations-blocks-change-of-amisom-mandate> [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014].
- ¹²Ibid.
- ¹³UN News Service Section, (2014). UN News - Somalia: Security Council agrees on short extension for mandate of African Union peacekeepers. [online] Available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43402#.VE9z5fSsWFA> [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014].
- ¹⁴BBC News, (2014). Somali forces control key port. [online] Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-29510216> [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014].
- ¹⁵16 October 2014, 'Report of Chairperson of Commission on Situation in Somalia', Peace and Security Council Meeting of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 462nd meeting.

EUROPE AND RUSSIA

DMITRY KISELYOV: AGITATOR, DEMAGOGUE, AND
VLADIMIR PUTIN'S MOUTHPIECE

- ¹The Economist. (2013). 'Ukraine: Russia's chief propagandist'. Available: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/12/ukraine>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ²Lesbiru.com. (2014). 'Hate speech from Dmitry Kiselyov, General Director of State TV Channel'. Available: <http://lesbiru.com/english/Kiselyov-hate-speech/>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ³Russia 1. (2013). 'Host of 'News of the Week' on 'RUSSIA 1' will be Dmitry Kiselyov'. Available: http://russia.tv/article/show/article_id/11901. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ⁴Ibid.
- ⁵RT. (2013). 'Putin orders overhaul of top state news agency'. Available: <http://rt.com/news/ria-novosti-overhaul-putin-960/>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ⁶Michael Pizzi. (2013). 'Putin dissolves RIA Novosti news agency'. Available: <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/9/putin-dissolves-rianovostinewsagency.html>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ⁷Stephen Ennis. (2013). 'Putin's RIA Novosti revamp promotes propaganda fears'. Available: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25309139> (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ⁸Associated Press. (2014). 'Russia could turn U.S. 'into radioactive dust', influential Moscow news anchor

- tells viewers'. Available: http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/17/russia-could-turn-u-s-into-radioactive-dust-influential-moscow-news-anchor-tells-viewers/#_federated=1. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ⁹The Economist. (2013). Ukraine: Russia's chief propagandist. Available: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/12/ukraine>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹Ibid.
- ¹²Daisy Sindelar. (2014). 'In Choosing Kiselyov, Media Critics Say Putin Opts For Personal Propagandist'. Available: <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-media-kiselyov-propagandist/25195932.html>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ¹³Russia Public Opinion. (2014). 'Against Journalists: Russians talk about the current state of the profession of journalism'. Available: <http://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/11428>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ¹⁴Dmitry Kiselyov. (2014). 'Russia and the west are trading places on free speech'. Available: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/10/russia-west-trading-places-freedom-of-speech-sanction-eu-dmitry-kiselyov-putin>. (Accessed 25 October 2014)
- ¹⁵Ibid.

ANOTHER COUNTRY:
POWER IN NORTHERN IRELAND

- ¹K. Meagher, 'Would anyone care if Northern Ireland left the Union?', New Statesman, 5 August 2014 <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/08/would-anyone-care-if-northern-ireland-left-union> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ²History: Good Friday Agreement, BBC, 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ³N. Whyte, 'The 1998 Referendums, ARK Northern Ireland, 17 February 2002 <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ⁴K. Meagher, 'Would anyone care if Northern Ireland left the Union?', The New Statesman, 5 August 2014 <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/08/would-anyone-care-if-northern-ireland-left-union> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ⁵M. Settle, 'David Cameron to deliver Scotland we love you, stay with us message', The Herald, 4 September 2014 <http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/referendum-news/david-cameron-to-deliver-scotland-we-love-you-stay-with-us-message.1409819562> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ⁶J. Kirkup, 'Scottish Election 2011: David Cameron pledges to save the United Kingdom after SNP triumph', The Telegraph, 7 May 2011 (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ⁷<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/scottish-politics/8499376/Scottish-Election-2011-David-Cameron-pledges-to-save-the-United-Kingdom-after-SNP-triumph.html> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ⁸G. Elgenius (2011) Symbols of Nations and Nationalism: Celebrating Nationhood, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, p. 1

- ⁹Ibid, p. 3
- ¹⁰Ibid, p. 57
- ¹¹Ibid, p. 5
- ¹²M. Simpson, 'Police called as Rory McIlroy flag raises Holywood hackles', BBC, 29 September 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-29413245> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹³M. Gibson, 'Belfast's Flag Protests Stir Up Troubles Old and New', TIME, 18 January 2013 <http://world.time.com/2013/01/18/belfasts-flag-protests-stir-up-troubles-old-and-new/> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹⁴H. McDonald, 'Northern Ireland talks: leaders must seize peace opportunity, says Taoiseach', The Guardian, 16 October 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/16/northern-ireland-talks-peace> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹⁵J. Campbell, 'Why Stormont is deadlocked over budget and welfare reform', BBC, 29 August 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-28982792> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹⁶V. Kearney, 'Ronan Kerr murder: Police 'know killers identities'', BBC, 15 January 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-25744619> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹⁷C. Kilpatrick, 'One security alert in Northern Ireland for every day of the year', Belfast Telegraph, 28 December 2013 <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/one-security-alert-in-northern-ireland-for-every-day-of-the-year-29871264.html> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹⁸'NI unemployment benefit claimant figures fall for 15th consecutive month', BBC, 14 May 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27407624> (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ¹⁹Northern Ireland's youth unemployment bill could total £1bn by 2016, says PwC, Business in the Community Northern Ireland (BITCNI), 27 March 2012 (accessed 2 November 2014)
- ²⁰<http://www.bitcni.org.uk/news/northern-irelands-youth-unemployment-bill-could-total-1bn-by-2016>



says-pwc/

¹⁹B. White, 'Northern Ireland flags and anthems: View may be that sports are a good testing ground for any new symbols', *The Belfast Telegraph*, 1 October 2014
<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/bill-white/northern-ireland-flags-and-anthems-view-may-be-that-sports-are-a-good-testing-ground-for-any-new-symbols-30627667.html> (accessed 2 November 2014)

²⁰M. Davenport, 'Census figures: NI Protestant population continuing to decline', BBC, 11 December 2012
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20673534> (accessed 2 November 2014)

²¹Ibid.

²²L. Clarke, 'Northern Ireland says 'yes' to a border poll... but a firm 'no' to united Ireland', *The Belfast Telegraph*, 29 September 2014
<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/northern-ireland-says-yes-to-a-border-poll-but-a-firm-no-to-united-ireland-30622987.html> (accessed 2 November 2014)

²³A. Pollak, 'Does the South really want the North as part of Ireland?', *The Centre for Cross Border Studies*, 22 August 2012
<http://www.crossborder.ie/?cat=6&page=2> (accessed 2 November 2014)

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷C. Page, 'Religion's role in Northern Ireland politics', BBC, 16 October 2014
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-29654069> (accessed 2 November 2014)

²⁸M. Melaugh, Brendan Lynn, and Fionnuala McKenna, 'Religion in Northern Ireland', University of Ulster, 30 September 2014
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/religion.htm> (accessed 2 November 2014)

²⁹D. Harman Akenson (1992) *God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca (NY)

³⁰J. Maxwell, 'Scottish independence: the view from Belfast', *New Statesman*, 2 July 2012
<http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/scottish-independence-view-belfast> (accessed 2 November 2014)

³¹D. Kerr, *The Real McCoy: W.F. McCoy: Prophet of Ulster Nationalism*, 31 October 2000

³²T. O'Neill, 'Television Broadcast: Ulster at Cross Roads', Government of Northern Ireland, 9 December 1968
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/proni/1968/proni_CAB-9-B-205-8_1968-12-09.pdf

POWER AND THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN

¹W. Maas, 'The Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives of EU Citizenship', *German Law Journal*, vol. 15 no 5, 2014, p.819

²W. Maas, 'The Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives of EU Citizenship', *German Law Journal*, vol. 15 no 5, 2014, p.819

³N. Nic Shuibhne (2010), 'The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship', *Common Market Law Review*, vol 47, no. 6, p.4.

⁴E. Kotalárik (2013) 'The EU Citizenship in Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination' (March 7, 2013). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279861> (accessed 2 November 2014)

⁵N. Foster: (2014) 'EU Law Directions' (4th ed.), Chapter 13, Oxford University Press

⁶C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9925

⁷C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9925, paras.9-10

⁸C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 3 CMLR 10

⁹European Union, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, 29 April 2004, 2004/38/EC

¹⁰Ibid., Chapter I, Article 1(b)

¹¹C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi 2 CMLR 46 (2011)

¹²Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Case C 34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi 2 CMLR 46 (2011), para. 88

¹³C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Otignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR-I 6193, para.35

¹⁴E. Kotalárik (2013) 'The EU Citizenship in Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination' (March 7, 2013), p.1 Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279861> (accessed 2 November 2014)

DECISIONS OF THE POWERFUL

¹Schelling, T. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980. p. 126.

²New York Times Editorial Board. 'Mr Putin Tests The West in Ukraine'. *New York Times* [online]. Available at: 25/10/2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/opinion/mr-putin-tests-the-west-in-ukraine.html> (Accessed 28th Aug 2014)

³Buckley, N. 'Sanctions noose begins to tighten on sanguine Russia'. *Financial Times* [online]. Available at: 25/10/2014. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2751e288-5455-11e4-b2ea-00144feab7de.html#axzz3HErZpwHr> (Accessed 15th Oct 2014)

⁴Economist.com. 'The Long Game'. *The Economist* [online]. Available at: 25/10/2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21615582-sad-reality-vladimir-putin-winning-ukraine-west-must-steel-itself> (Accessed 6th Sept 2014)

⁵Spiegel, P., and Kavanagh, M. 'Companies fear Russian sanctions impact'. *Financial Times* [online].

Available at: 25/10/2014. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0965af8-16fe-11e4-8617-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3HErZpwHr> (Accessed 29th July 2014)

⁶Pindyck, R., and Rubinfeld, D. *Microeconomics*. 8th Ed. Boston: Pearson. 2013. p. 492

⁷Schelling, T. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980. p. 126.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Dixit, A., & Nalebuff, B. *Thinking Strategically*. New York: Norton. 1991. p.125

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Goffman, E. *Strategic Interaction*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1969. p. 4

CITIZENS OF THE UNION

¹Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR I, Available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:61962CJ0026> [Accessed: 25 Oct 2014]

²J. Greenwood (2003) *Interest Representation in the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan and M. Tatham (2008) 'Going Solo: Direct Regional Representation in the European Union', *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol 18, No 5, pp 493-515

³M. Dougan (2011) 'What are we to make of the citizens' initiative?', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol 48, No 6, pp 1807-1848 and European Commission (2014) 'Commission says yes to first successful European

Citizens' Initiative', European Commission Press Release Database, Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-277_en.htm [Accessed: 25 Oct 2014]

⁴Moravcsik, A. (2004) 'Is there a 'democratic deficit' in world politics? A framework for Analysis', *Government and Opposition*, Vol 29, No 2, pp 336-363 and Follesdal, A and Hix, S (2006) 'Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol 44, No 3, pp 533-62

⁵See Hobolt, S B and Tilley, J (2014) *Blaming Europe? Responsibility without Accountability in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

LATIN AMERICA

MARIO VARGAS LLOSA: QUESTIONING POWER STRUCTURES IN LATIN AMERICA

¹Mario Vargas Llosa - Facts', Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Available at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2010/vargas_llosa-facts.html (Accessed 28 Oct 2014)

²Andrew Foley (2008). 'Power, Will and Freedom: Mario Vargas Llosa's The Feast of the Goat', *Journal of Literary Studies*, 24:1, p. 3

³Video Player'. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Available at: <http://www.nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=1588> (Accessed 28 Oct 2014)

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Tuckman, J. 'Latin America reacts to death of literary colossus Gabriel Garcia Marquez'. *The Guardian*. 18

April 2014. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/apr/18/gabriel-garcia-marquez-death-latin-america-reaction> (Accessed 29 October 2014)

⁷Video Player'. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Available at: <http://www.nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=1588> (Accessed 28 Oct 2014)

⁸Jaggi, M. (2002). 'Fiction and Hyper-Reality'. *Mail & Guardian*, March 22-29, pp. 30-31

⁹Illman, S. (2002). *Vargas Llosa's Fiction & the Demons of Politics*. Oxford: Peter Lang.

¹⁰Andrew Foley (2008). 'Power, Will and Freedom: Mario Vargas Llosa's The Feast of the Goat', *Journal of Literary Studies*, 24:1, p. 2

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Mario Vargas Llosa - Facts'. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Available at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2010/vargas_llosa-facts.html (Accessed 28 Oct 2014)

THE AMAZON IS OURS

¹ Economist 'Compromise or Deadlock?' *The Economist*, 2 June 2012. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/21556245> (accessed 1 October 2014)

² Romero, Simon 'Brazil's Leader Faces Defining Decision on Bill Relaxing Protection of Forests', *The New York Times* 16 May 2012. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/world/americas/brazils-president-dilma-rousseff-faces-defining-decision-over-forest-bill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 29 October 2014)

³ 'The Brazilian Forest Code, and Reforms! Oh my!' *Forest Justice*. Available at: <http://www.forestjustice.org/2010/10/01/the-brazilian-forest-code-and-ruralistas-and-reforms-oh-my/> (accessed 29 October 2014)

⁴ Romero, Simon 'Brazil's Leader Faces Defining Decision on Bill Relaxing Protection of Forests', *The New York Times* 16 May 2012. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/world/americas/brazils-president-dilma-rousseff-faces-defining-decision-over-forest-bill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 29 October 2014)

⁵ BBC 'Brazil's Congress Approves Controversial Forest Law' 26 April 2012. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-2012-04-26>

latin-america-17851237 (accessed 1 October 2014)

⁶ Romero, Simon 'Brazil's Leader Faces Defining Decision on Bill Relaxing Protection of Forests', *The New York Times* 16 May 2012. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/world/americas/brazils-president-dilma-rousseff-faces-defining-decision-over-forest-bill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 29 October 2014)

⁷ BBC 'Brazil's Congress Approves Controversial Forest Law' 26 April 2012. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17851237> (accessed 1 October 2014)

⁸ CBS News 'Brazil Gums Up International Agreement to End Deforestation' 23 September 2014. Available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/brazil-gums-up-international-agreement-to-end-deforestation/> (accessed 1 October 2014)

⁹ Today Online 'Brazil's Silva, a Lifelong Environmentalist Courts Big Agriculture' 13 September 2014. Available at: <http://www.todayonline.com/world/brazils-silva-lifelong-environmentalist-courts-big-agriculture> (accessed 1 October 2014)

¹⁰ U. Salifu 'The Global South and the International Politics of Climate Change' Proceedings Report of the International Workshop: Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interests on Climate Change 25th November 2011 Durban, Institute for Global Dialogue pp.25-35

¹¹ Ibid.



THE POWER OF MAGICAL REALISM

- ¹'A broken system', *The Economist*, 12 July 2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21606864-citizens-security-regions-biggest-problem-time-improve-criminal-justice-broken?zid=305&ah=417bd5664dc76da5d98af4f7a60fd8a> (Accessed Nov 4th 2014)
- ²F. García Calderón, 'Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 5, 1925
- ³Reproduced from *Wretched of the Earth* (1959) 'Reciprocal Bases of National Culture and the Fight for Freedom' Available at: <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/fanon/national-culture.htm> (Accessed 31.10.2014)
- ⁴D. Kelly, 'Feminism storytelling', *Leviathan*, Vol. 6, no. 1, 2013
- ⁵H. De Bertodano, 'The incredible life of Isabel Allende', *The Telegraph* [online], 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/authorinterviews/10589928/The-incredible-life-of-Isabel-Allende.html> (accessed 4 November 2014)
- ⁶Ibid.
- ⁷Brooke, James, 'Fujimori elected Peru's-president over Vargas Llosa', *The New York Times* [online], June 11, 1990. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/11/world/fujimori-elected-peru-s-president-over-vargas-llosa.html> (Accessed Nov 4th 2014)
- ⁸Kelly, D., 'Feminism storytelling', *Leviathan*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2013

- ⁹E. Krauz, Mexico: *Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*, Harper Collins, 1997, p. 399
- ¹⁰Ibid.
- ¹¹S. Browne, (2012) Review: For Greater Glory: The True Story of Cristiada [online]. Available at: <http://www.stephenbrowne.com/2012/09/review-for-greater-glory-the-true-story-of-cristiada/> (Accessed 3 November 2014)
- ¹²Hablemos (1996) Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNHJLn3xNk> (Accessed: 31 October 2014)
- ¹³A.J.P. Brescia, 'A 'Superior Magic': Literary Politics and the Rise of the Fantastic', *Latin American Fiction*, University of South Florida Follow, 2008
- ¹⁴Y. Grenier, *From Art to Politics: Octavio Paz and the Pursuit of Freedom*, USA, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001
- ¹⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁶O. Paz (1967), *The Bow and the Lyre*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1967, p. 249
- ¹⁷'Tales of Passion', TED Conference Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E11cDeR27ZY> (accessed 3 October 2014)

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

EDITORIAL COLUMN

- ¹'Islamic Militants kill two Iraq journalists', *BBC News*, 14 October 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29613783>, (accessed 2 November 2014).

- ²'What is Islamic State?', *BBC News*, 26 September 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144>, (accessed 2 November 2014).

TAWAKKOL KARMAN: FEMINISM, ISLAMISM, AND A NOBEL PRIZE

- ¹I Sharqieh, 'Case Study: International Intervention, Justice and Accountability in Yemen', in *International Justice and the Prevention of Atrocities*. November 2013, viewed on 17 October 2014, <http://www.ecfr.eu/ijp/case/yemen>
- ²Ibid.
- ³S Yadav, 'Tawakkol Karman as Cause and Effect', in *Middle East Research and Information Project*. 21 October 2011, viewed on 23 October 2014, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero10211>
- ⁴'The Conclusion of the First Session of the Al-Jazeera Ambassadors Program', in *Women Journalists Without Chains*. 29 September 2014, viewed on 24 October 2014, http://womenpress.org/news_details.php?sid=3739
- ⁵Yadav, 2011
- ⁶T Karman, 'Our revolution's doing what Saleh can't - uniting Yemen', in *The Guardian*. 8 April 2011, viewed on 24 October 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/08/revolution-saleh-yemen-peace-historic>
- ⁷A Pal, 'Tawakkol Karman', in *The Progressive Interview*. December 2013, 23 October 2014, <http://www.ebscohost.com>

- ⁸J Nordlinger, 'Three winners: the Nobel peace committee divides its 2011 prize wisely', in *National Review*. 19 December 2011, viewed on 18 October 2014, <http://www.ebscohost.com>
- ⁹'Tawakkol Karman: Yemeni Nobel Peace Prize Winner', *Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East*. April 2013, viewed on 20 October 2014, <https://www.cjpm.org/DisplayHTMLDocument.aspx?DO=795&ICID=4&ReclD=1098&SaveMode=0#ref2>
- ¹⁰I Sharqieh, 2013
- ¹¹S Yadav, 2011.
- ¹²C Schmitz, 'Yemen's National Dialogue', in *Middle East Institute*. 10 March 2014, viewed on 17 October 2014, <http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-national-dialogue>.
- ¹³T Finn, 'Tawakkol Karman, Yemeni activist, and thorn in the side of Saleh', in *The Guardian*. 26 March 2011, 23 October 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/08/revolution-saleh-yemen-peace-historic>
- ¹⁴Women of Peace, documentary, Nobel Media, 2011
- ¹⁵Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, 2013
- ¹⁶T Karman, 'The Expanding Arab Spring', in *Development*. 2014, viewed on 23 October 2014, <http://www.palgrave-journals.com.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/development/journal/v56/n3/pdf/dev201421a.pdf>

IRAN'S SHADOW WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

- ¹Dexter Filkins, 2013. 'The Shadow Commander' (online). *The New Yorker*. Available at: <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander?currentPage=1> (accessed 11/10/2014)
- ²Ibid.
- ³Ibid.
- ⁴Ibid.
- ⁵Ibid.
- ⁶Al-Ghoul, 2013. 'Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Iran Supplies All Weapons in Gaza', *Al-Monitor* (online). Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/gaza-islamic-jihad-and-iranian-arms.html> (accessed 31/10/2014)
- ⁷Levitt, Matthew, 2013. 'Hezbollah and the Qods Force in Iran's Shadow War With the West', *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Policy Document 123. (online) Available at: <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/hizballah-and-qods-force-irans-shadow-war-west> (accessed 24/10/2014)
- ⁸Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander', online
- ⁹Levitt, 'Hezbollah and the Qods Force', online
- ¹⁰Smith, Lee, 2014. 'The Iranian Regime's Mr. Fix It' (online). *The Weekly Standard*. Available at: <http://www.weeklystandard.com/keyword/Qassem-Suleimani> (11/10/2014)
- ¹¹Ben Smith, 2007. 'The Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard'. *Library of House of Commons* (Report, online) Available at: <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN04494.pdf> (accessed 24/10/2014)
- ¹²Martin Chulov, 2014. 'Iraq crisis: rebranded insurgents gain whip hand on streets of Baghdad', *The Observer*. (online) Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/iraq-shia-insurgents>

- ¹³whip-hand-baghdad-isis (accessed 24/10/2014)
- ¹⁴Dexter Filkins, 2014. 'What We Left Behind' (online). *The New Yorker*. Available at: <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind> (accessed 24/10/2014)
- ¹⁵Yahoo News, 2014. 'Iraqi PM in Tehran for crisis talks on IS' (online). *Yahoo News*. Available at: <http://news.yahoo.com/iraqi-pm-tehran-crisis-talks-220858343.html> (accessed 31/10/2014)
- ¹⁶Frederick W. Kagan et al., 2012. 'Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan' (Report, online). *Institute for the Study of War*. Available at: <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianInfluenceLevantEgyptIraqAfghanistan.pdf> (accessed 31/10/2014), pp 14-18.
- ¹⁷Kagan et al., 'Iranian Influence', p 6
- ¹⁸Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander', online
- ¹⁹Ed Blanche, 2012. 'The Hidden Hand in Syria', *The Middle East*, 434, p. 21.
- ²⁰Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander', online
- ²¹Global Security, 2013. 'Syria - National Defence Forces (NDF)', *Global Security*. (online) Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/ndf.htm> (accessed 24/10/2014)
- ²²Karim Sadjadpour, 2013. 'Iran's Unwavering Support to Assad's Syria', *Combating Terrorism Centre*. (online) Available at <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/irans-unwavering-support-to-assads-syria> (accessed 24/10/2014)
- ²³Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander', online
- ²⁴Mehdi Khalaji, 2014. 'President Rouhani and the IGRC' (online). *The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy*. Available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/president-rouhani-and-the-irgc> (accessed 13/10/2014)
- ²⁵Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander', online; John Maguire, former CIA Officer in Iraq
- ²⁶Leonardo Da Vinci. <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/156574-nothing-strengthens-authority-so-much-as-silence>

NORTH AMERICA

RAND PAUL: AMERICA'S LIBERTARIAN DARLING POLARISES EVERYONE

- ¹Griswold, A. (2014). Michael Steele: Rand Paul 'Most Dangerous Man In Politics' [VIDEO]. [online] *The Daily Caller*. Available at: <http://dailycaller.com/2014/10/17/michael-steele-rand-paul-most-dangerous-man-in-politics-video/> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2014].
- ²Politico.com, (2014). Rand Paul – POLITICO 50: Ideas changing politics and the people behind them. [online] Available at: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/politico50/2014/rand-paul-01.html#VEWRGfnF-ul> [Accessed 23 Oct. 2014].
- ³Lizza, R. (2014). *The Revenge of Rand Paul*. New Yorker, (30).
- ⁴Leip, D. (2014). 2008 Presidential Republican Primary Election Results. [online] *Uselectionatlas.org*. Available at: <http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2008&elect=2> [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ⁵Latimesblogs.latimes.com, (2010). Ron Paul defends earmarks, says anti-pork McCain is just grandstanding. [online] Available at: <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/03/ron-paul-defend.html> [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ⁶Wilson, H. (2010). Paul wins Republican Senate nod in Kentucky. [online] *msnbc.com*. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37217504/ns/politics-decision_2010/t/paul-wins-republican-senate-nod-kentucky/#.VEv9GJPF9-g [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸Schreiner, B. (2010). Rand Paul flips, seeks money from bailout senators. [online] *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/feedarticle/9139316> [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014].
- ⁹Ibid.
- ¹⁰Rutenberg, S. (2014). Rand Paul's Mixed Inheritance. [online] *Nytimes.com*. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/us/politics/rand-pauls-mixed-inheritance.html?_r=0 [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014].
- ¹¹Balz, D. and Cillizza, C. (2010). Sen. Arlen Specter loses Pennsylvania primary; Rand Paul wins in

- Kentucky. [online] *Washingtonpost.com*. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/18/AR2010051805561.html> [Accessed 26 Oct. 2014].
- ¹²Steinhauser, P. (2014). Rand Paul: 'Fight for justice now' on unfair sentencing. [online] *CNN*. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/25/politics/paul-urban-league/> [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ¹³Ibid.
- ¹⁴Ibid.
- ¹⁵Henderson, N. (2014). Rand Paul says the darndest things. This time about black voters and the GOP. [online] *Washington Post*. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/10/21/rand-paul-says-the-darndest-things-this-time-about-black-voters-and-the-gop/> [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014].
- ¹⁶Ibid.
- ¹⁷Urbina, I. (2009). In Kentucky, a Senate Candidate With a Pedigree for Agitation. [online] *Nytimes.com*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26kentucky.html> [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014].
- ¹⁸Reinhard, B. (2014). Rand Paul Adjusts Foreign Policy Stance. [online] *WSJ*. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/articles/rand-paul-adjusts-foreign-policy-stance-1411091446> [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ¹⁹Beauchamp, Z. (2014). Rand Paul just gave one of the most important foreign policy speeches in decades. [online] *Vox*. Available at: <http://www.vox.com/2014/10/24/7053561/rand-paul-foreign-policy-speech> [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ²⁰Knowles, D. (2014). Republicans Still Can't Quit Mitt Romney. [online] *Bloomberg.com/politics*. Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-19/republicans-still-cant-quit-mitt-romney> [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014].
- ²¹O'Connor, P. (2014). Poll Finds Widespread Economic Anxiety. [online] *WSJ*. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/articles/wsj-nbc-poll-finds-widespread-economic-anxiety-1407277801> [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014].
- ²²Deng, B. (2014). Even Young Voters Are Turning Away from Democrats in 2014. [online] *Slate Magazine*. Available at: http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/04/29/young_voters_are_disillusioned_with_politics_and_won_t_be_voting_in_the.html [Accessed 24 Oct. 20].



BLACK POLITICAL POWER: BEYOND FERGUSON

¹Dahl, R. 'Who Governs? and A Preface to Democratic Theory' in *The Lanahan Readings in American Polity*, 5th ed., A.G. Serow and E.C. Ladd (eds), Baltimore: Lanahan Publishers Inc, 2011, pp. 88-92.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴'The Ferguson Riots: Overkill', *The Economist* 23 Aug. 2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/unity-states/21613272-police-missouri-suburb-demonstrate-how-not-quell-riot-overkill> (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

⁵Roth, Z. 'Ferguson's lack of diversity goes way beyond its cops' MSNBC 19 August 2014. Available at: http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ferguson-lack-diversity-goes-way-beyond-its-cops?cid=sm_m_main_1_20140814_29785586 (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Fausset, R. 'Mostly Black Cities, Mostly White City Halls', *The New York Times* 28 Sept. 2014. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/us/mostly-black-cities-mostly-white-city-halls.html?%20hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=HpSumSmallMediaHigh&module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1 (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

¹⁰Roth, Z. 'Ferguson's lack of diversity goes way beyond its cops' MSNBC 19 August 2014. Available

at: http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ferguson-lack-diversity-goes-way-beyond-its-cops?cid=sm_m_main_1_20140814_29785586 (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Taylor, E.C. 'Political Cynicism and the Black Vote', *Harvard Journal of African American Policy* 2011. Available at: <http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k74757&pageid=icb.page414109> (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

¹³Dawson, M.C. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 10.

¹⁴Taylor, E.C. 'Political Cynicism and the Black Vote', *Harvard Journal of African American Policy* 2011. Available at: <http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k74757&pageid=icb.page414109> (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Campbell, D. 'Why We Vote', in *The Lanahan Readings in American Polity*, 5th ed., A.G. Serow and E.C. Ladd (eds), Baltimore: Lanahan Publishers Inc, 2011, p. 519.

¹⁸Alcindor, Y. 'Number of new Ferguson registration voters revised to 128', *USA Today* 7 October 2014. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/07/voter-registration-number-only-128-in-ferguson/16874011/> (Accessed Nov 1st 2014)

¹⁹Ibid.

THE GOP, VOTER SUPPRESSION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

¹ Greg Abbot, Press Release, March 12, 2012. <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=3991> (accessed 27 October 2014).

² S. Owen and R. Villalpando 'Election Code Referrals to the Office of the Attorney General Prosecutions³ Resolved', <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ma2j4fpPhqX89vQgPoNYLPwM4e0W2cucXJF85gmNk0/edit>, 2012, (accessed 20 October 2014).

³ Turnout and Voter Registration Figures', <http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/70-92.shtml>, 2014, (accessed 2 November 2014)

⁴ L. Minnite 'The Myth of Voter Fraud' Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010.

⁵ C. Franklin, 'Vote Fraud', <https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2014/05/21/new-marquette-law-school-poll->

<https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=3991> (accessed 27 October 2014).

⁶ E. Pilkington, 'Born and raised' Texans forced to prove identities under new voter ID law', *The Guardian*, 27 October 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/27/texas-vote-id-proof-certification-minority-law?CMP=fb_gu, (accessed 27 October 2014).

⁷ M. Mercer, 'Can We Still Vote?', *The AARP Bulletin*, 30 August, 2012, <http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info-01-2012/voter-id-laws-impact-older-americans.html> (Accessed 2 November 2014).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ T. Williams, 'Federal Judge Orders Ohio to Undo Cuts to Early Voting', *The New York Times*, 04 September 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/us/federal-judge-blocks-ohios-early-voting-changes.html>, (accessed 21 October 2014).

¹⁰ Ibid.

A REVOLVING DOOR OR VICIOUS CIRCLE?

¹ Investopedia.com. Retrieved November 2, 2014, from Investopedia.com Web site: <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revolving-door.asp>

² Flock, E (2013) 'Strange Lobbying Groups That We Swear Are Real'. Retrieved November 2, 2014. Web site: <http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2013/01/28/10-strange-lobbying-groups-that-we-swear-are-real>

³ Madison, J (1757), Federalist paper No 10, Accessed 21st October 2014: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm>

⁴ Jacob, K (2001) King of the Lobby; Accessed 21st October 2014: <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/king-of-the-lobby-74941845/?no-ist>

⁵ Rutenberg, J 2014. 'How Billionaire Oligarchs are becoming their own Political Parties', Retrieved November 2, 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/magazine/how-billionaire-oligarchs-are-becoming-their-own-political-parties.html?_r=0

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Kroll, A (2013). 'Triumph of the Drill'. Retrieved November 2, 2014: <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/oil-subsidies-renewable-energy-tax-breaks>

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Dow Chemicals (2013) 'Number of Employees at Dow Chemicals from 1999 to 2013'. Retrieved November 2, 2014: <http://www.statista.com/statistics/267332/number-of-employees-at-dow-chemical-since-1999/>

<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revolving-door.asp>

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Barringer, F (2007) 'E.P.A. and Dow in Talks on Dioxin Cleanup at Main Factory', Accessed 23rd October 2014: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/us/04dioxin.html>

¹⁴ OpenSecrets (2013), 'Dow Chemicals', Accessed 22nd October 2014, <https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000188&year=2013>

¹⁵ Slivinski, S (2007) 'The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government Subsidizes US Businesses', Retrieved November 2, 2014: <http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/corporate-welfare-state-how-federal-government-subsidizes-us-businesses>

¹⁶ Gallup (2006). 'Do you think the U.S. government is doing too much, too little, or about the right amount in terms of protecting the environment?' Retrieved November 2, 2014: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx>

¹⁷ AIPAC nd (2014), Our Mission, Accessed 22nd October 2014 <<http://www.aipac.org/about/mission>>

¹⁸ Benjamin, M (2012). '10 Reasons Why the Israeli Lobby AIPAC is so dangerous', Retrieved November 2, 2014: <http://www.occupyaipac.org/2012/02/10-reasons-why-the-israel-lobby-aipac-is-so-dangerous/>

¹⁹ Wright, DS (2014) 'Only 38% of American Jews Believe Israel Sincerely Trying to Make Peace', Retrieved November 2: <http://news.firedoglake.com/2014/06/09/only-38-of-american-jews-believe-israel-sincerely-trying-to-make-peace/>

²⁰ Gallup, (2014) 'Israel's actions 'unjustified' in eyes of women, non-whites, Dems, indy's, and those under 50'. Retrieved November 2, 2014: <http://mondoweiss.net/2014/07/israels-actions-unjustified>

²¹ Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, (2002) 'Ten Things You Should Know About Lobbying', Accessed 24th October 2014: <<https://ocl-cal.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00403.html>>

INTERNATIONAL

CHRISTINE LAGARDE: HOLDING HER BREATH UNDER WATER

¹ The Washington Post, 'IMF's Strauss-Kahn agrees to electronic monitoring, house arrest in hope of release', May 19, 2011

² The Economist, 'The downfall of DSK', May 19, 2011

³ Eurodad, 'Conditionally yours, An analysis of the policy conditions attached to IMF loans', April 2014

⁴ The Financial Times, IMF admits to errors in international bailout of Greece, June 5, 2013

⁵ Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration

SOFTLY POWERFUL: CHINA'S PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

¹ Portions of this article incorporated two articles I published previous. Tao Xie, 'China's Confucius Institutes: Self-promotion or cultural imperialism', *CNN*, October 21, 2014, retrieved October 29, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/21/opinion/china-confucius/index.html?hpt=ias_r1; Tao Xie and Benjamin I. Page, 'What Affects China's National Image? A Cross-national Study of Public Opinion', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22(83), 2013, pp.850-867.

² For a review of the three faces of power, plus a discussion of its fourth face, see Jeffrey Isaac, 'Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique', *Polity*, 20(1), 1987, pp.4-31.

³ Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961.

⁴ Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', *American Political Science Review*, 56(4), 1962, pp. 947-952.

⁵ Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, London: Macmillan, 1974

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1990, p.x

⁷ For a review of publications on soft power campaigns launched by Russia, India, and Japan, see Alexander Bogomolov and Aleksandr Lytvynenko, 'A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine', *Chatham House*, January 2012, retrieved October 31, 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0112bp_bogomolov_lytvynenko.pdf; Shashi Tharoor, 'India as a Soft Power', *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp.

32-45; Peng Lam, 'Japan's Quest for Soft Power: Attraction and Limitation', *East Asia: An International Quarterly* Vol. 24 Issue 4, December 2007, pp. 349

⁸ For a comprehensive review of China's internal debates about soft power, see Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, 'Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate', in *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World: a Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative*, ed., Carola McGiffert, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009.

⁹ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

¹⁰ Xinhua News Agency, 'Xi: China to promote cultural soft power', January 1, 2014, retrieved October 31, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/01/c_125941955.htm

¹¹ Xinhua News Agency, 'Xi stresses core socialist values', February 25, 2014, retrieved October 29, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/25/c_126190257.htm

¹² Zhang Boshu, 'What Type of 'Soft Power' Does China Need?', *Human Rights in China*, December 12, 2009, retrieved October 29, 2014, <http://www.hrchina.org/en/content/3176>. Nicholas Dynon, 'China's Ideological 'Soft War': Offense is the Best Defense', *China Brief: A Journal of Analysis and Information*, Volume 14, No. 4, 2014, pp.7-11

¹³ In full disclosure, the author of this essay was on the same panel of discussion with Gordon Chang. See Al Jazeera, 'Hunting China's 'Tigers and Flies'', October 20, 2014, retrieved October 29, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2014/10/hunting-china-tigers-flies-20141020173615631989.html>, Xiguang Li et al., *Yaomo Hua Zhongguo De Beihou [Behind Demonizing China]*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1996

¹⁴ David Shambaugh, 'China Flexes Its Soft Power', *New York Times*, June 7, 2010, retrieved March 20, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion/08iht-edshambaugh.html>

¹⁵ Confucius Institutes Headquarters (Hanban), retrieved October 30, 2014, http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciusinstitutes/node_10961.htm.

¹⁶ Andrea Chen, 'China's Confucius Institute faces backlash at prestigious US school', *South China Morning Post*, May 13, 2014, retrieved October 30, 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china-insider/article/1511268/chinas-confucius-institute-faces-backlash-prestigious-us-school>.

¹⁷ Chen Zhenkai et al., 'Public diplomacy: New luminescence color of Chinese diplomacy', *People's Daily Online*, September 1, 2010, retrieved March 19, 2011, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7125349.html>.

¹⁸ Zhao Qizheng, 'Mobilizing Public Diplomacy', *April 29, 2010*, retrieved March 19, 2011, <http://en.expo2010.cn/a/20100429/000005.htm>.



²⁰ For one assessment, see Ingrid d'Hooghe, 'The Limits of China's Soft Power in Europe: Beijing's Public Diplomacy Puzzle,' *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No.25*, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, January 2010. Some scholars have evaluated several PR campaigns by the Chinese government. Cai Peijuan et al., 'Managing a Nation's Image During Crisis: A Study of the Chinese Government's Image Repair Efforts in the 'Made in China' Controversy,' *Public Relations Review*, 35(3), 2009, pp.213-18; Juyan Zhang and Glen T. Cameron, 'China's Agenda Building and Image Polishing in the US: Assessing an International Public Relations Campaign,' *Public Relations Review*, 29(1), 2003, pp.13-28.

²¹ Pew Global Attitudes Project, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/>, retrieved October. The question is: 'Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China.' Favorable combines 'very favorable' and 'somewhat favorable,' while Unfavorable combines 'very unfavorable' and 'somewhat unfavorable.'

²² Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, 'Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion,' Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2009.

²³ Jonathan McClory, 'The New Persuaders III: 2012 Global Ranking of Soft Power,' Institute for Government, September 6, 2013, retrieved October 29, 2014, http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20new%20persuaders%20III_0.pdf.

²⁴ Xinhua News Agency, 'Xi: China to promote cultural soft power.'

²⁵ Joshua Cooper Ramo, 'The Beijing Consensus,' *Foreign Policy Center*, 2004, retrieved March 22, 2011, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>. For a debate about the China Model, see Barry Naughton, 'China's Distinctive System: Can it be a model for others?' *Journal of Contemporary China*, 19(65), 2010, pp.437-460; Scott Kennedy, 'The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, 19(65), 2010, pp.461-478.

UNDERSTANDING POWER AND HOW TO USE IT

¹ I was sitting at a National Union of Students conference in an hour-long seminar on understanding power in July. James Robertson, an NUS UK consultant, was hosting the session he called his 'Power Masterclass.' The 'masterclass,' an abridged version of the most poignant, impactful and concise lecture I had ever received on power, covered a theory of power and how to use it in a more effective way than four years of my International Relations degree at the University of Edinburgh. Robertson drew on David Fleming's theory of 'Resilience Thinking,' Gaventa's Power Cube, Bourdieu's theory of 'socialized subjectivity,' Gramsci's work on manufacturing consent and how dominance from the ruling class, which

has been imbibed in our economics of their values, has led to Engle's false consciousness that prevents us from recognizing and rejecting our oppression.

² Some of these definitions and some of the presentation of this material are borrowed from a good acquaintance James Robertson. (Robertson, 2014 Power Masterclass)

³ Gaventa, 2003

⁴ (Robertson, 2014)

⁵ Bourdieu's Habitus from (Robertson, 2014)

⁶ George Lakoff in Robertson, 2014

RECONCEPTUALISING POWER

¹ Hobbs, T. (1661) *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*.

² Rose, S., Lewontin, R., and Kamin, L. (1987) *Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature*, New York: Penguin. For a more detailed examination of Hobbes's views on human nature, refer also to Ryan, A. (1973) 'The Nature of Human Nature in Hobbes and Rousseau' in Jonathan Benthall (eds) *The Limits of Human Nature*, London: Allen Lane, pp. 235-74.

³ A challenge of the assumption of an a priori human aggression is challenged in Howell, S. & Willis, R. (1989) 'Introduction' in *Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspectives*, London: Routledge.

⁴ Karlberg, M. (2003) 'The Paradox of Protest in a Culture of Contest,' *Peace & Change*, vol. 28, No. 329-351.

⁵ Karlberg, M. (2004) *Beyond the Culture of Contest*, Oxford: George Ronald Publishing Ltd.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Zamagni, S. (1982) *The Economics of Altruism*, xxi., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

⁹ Dahl, R. (1961) *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City*, United States: Yale University Press.

¹⁰ Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M. (1962) 'Two Faces of Power,' *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 56, No. 4 pp. 947-952.

¹¹ Lukes, S. (1974) *Power: A Radical View*, London: Macmillan.

¹² Michael Karlberg investigates provides profound insights into the notion of 'power as capacity' in 'The Power of Discourse and the Discourse of Power,' *International Journal of Peace Studies* (2005) vol. 10, No. 1 pp. 5-9.

¹³ These are personal reflections based on experiences in various parts of the world, especially where the community-building curriculum developed by the Ruhi Institute, Colombia, is employed, as well as in the actions and activities of the Baha'i international community. Further insights into this can be found in Karlberg's 'The Power of Discourse and the Discourse of Power.'

POWER, PLUTOCRATS, AND POOR DECISIONS IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

¹ Hobsbawm, E. (2011) 'Interview with Eric Hobsbawm,' Interviewed by Tristan Hunt [in person] 19/01/2011

² Harvey, D. (2010) *The Enigma of Capital: and the crisis of Capitalism*, London: Profile

³ Hobsbawm, E. (2011) 'Interview with Eric Hobsbawm,' Interviewed by Tristan Hunt [in person] 19/01/2011

⁴ Harvey, D. (2010) *The Enigma of Capital: and the crisis of Capitalism*, London: Profile

⁵ Hobsbawm, E. (2011) 'Interview with Eric Hobsbawm,' Interviewed by Tristan Hunt [in person] 19/01/2011

⁶ Harvey, D. (2010) *The Enigma of Capital: and the crisis of Capitalism*, London: Profile

⁷ Sassen, S. (2010) 'A Savage Sorting of Winners and Losers: Contemporary Versions of Primitiv Accumulation,' *Globalizations* 7(1-2) pp. 23-50

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Harvey, D. (2010) *The Enigma of Capital: and the crisis of Capitalism*, London: Profile

¹⁰ Wallerstein, I. (2000) 'Globalization of the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System,' *International Sociology* 15(2) pp.249-265

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Freeland, C. (2012) *Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the fall of Everyone Else*, New York: Penguin Press

¹⁵ Harvey, D. (2010) *The Enigma of Capital: and the crisis of Capitalism*, London: Profile

¹⁶ Wallerstein, I. (2000) 'Globalization of the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System,' *International Sociology* 15(2) pp.249-265

¹⁷ Freeland, C. (2012) *Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the fall of Everyone Else*, New York: Penguin Press

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Harvey, D. (2010) *The Enigma of Capital: and the crisis of Capitalism*, London: Profile

²¹ *Ibid.*

IMAGE CREDITS:


Cover Page: *The Victory of Lord Duncan*, John Singleton Copley, Scottish National Gallery
 Staff Photos by Louise Spence Photography
 Zhang Xin portrait, Wikipedia.org
 Aliko Dangote portrait, Wikipedia.org

Dmitry Kiselyov portrait, Vladimir Treflov, RIA Novosti
 Mario Vargas Llosa portrait, Wikipedia.org
 Tawakkol Karman portrait, Wikipedia.org
 Rand Paul portrait, Wikipedia.org
 Christine Lagarde portrait, Wikipedia.org
 Back Cover Page: Western Battle Front, Wikipedia.org



LEVIATHAN STAFF 2014-2015





UPCOMING ISSUE:

BORDERS

International, national, and personal. Physical and metaphysical.
The Building and Breaking of Boundaries and Conventions.

Volume 5 Issue II, February 2015

**SUBMISSION
DEADLINE:**

12 January 2015

CONTACT US
LEVIATHANJOURNAL@GMAIL.COM

FOLLOW US
FACEBOOK.COM/
LEVIATHANJOURNAL 

@LEVIATHANEDUNI 

Submission Guidelines

Found here:
www.leviathanjournal.org

Leviathan is financed through the generous support of the University of Edinburgh's Politics and International Relations Department, the Edinburgh University Politics and International Relations Society, and donations from the public. Please consider supporting our efforts by donating online.

The *Leviathan* Journal of Politics and International Relations is part of the Edinburgh University Politics and International Relations Society. Both *Leviathan* and the PIR Society are academic student organisations. *Leviathan* seeks to promote a wide variety of opinions; published content does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the *Leviathan* staff, the PIR Society, the PIR Department, or the University of Edinburgh.