LEVIATHAN

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Celina Gronningsaeter discusses the findings of her joint research on British colonialism, based on interviews with academics at two leading Scottish universities..

The British empire exerted considerable influence and control over its African colonies and left many permanent legacies, one of the most important being the English language. We wish to explore the effects that this colonial legacy has had on the national identity of peoples living in these post-colonial states. In a recent university research project, we interviewed a number of academic experts about the broad theme of language and identity, with specific focus on the nature of Kenyan and Nigerian national identities. The research project presented an academic perspective on the impact of language on national identity. The interview subjects were academics at the University of Edinburgh and the University of St. Andrews who specialised in nationalism, language identity, language politics, and cultural studies.

Here we further examine the study's findings to illustrate the effect of the English language on national identities in Africa, using Nigeria and Kenya as key case studies. What this analysis makes apparent is that the English language, despite its colonial baggage, can be a promoter of linguistic and cultural diversity within post-colonial states, as populations have re-appropriated English to make it a language of their own. The possibility of such re-appropriation is contingent on government policy towards tribal diversity and socio-economic inequality, but if such policies favour diversity and social mobility, English can have a homogenising effect and simultaneously promote diversity. However, these findings do not disqualify the notion that English may also deepen socio-economic conflict and inequality in post-colonial states.

Colonialism is the domination of a stronger foreign power over a state (Mulchany 2015, 237). The process of that domination partially entails a form of cultural destruction that degrades the self-identity of the colonised (Hogan 2000, 83). Consequentially, post-colonial societies no longer under the domination of foreign powers often have to create, or re-create, an independent national identity. This is particularly challenging as many post-colonial states were created with little consideration for the existing social, lingual, or tribal divides (Mulchany 2015, 238). At the Berlin Conference from 1884 to 1885, the European colonisation of Africa was formalised, with borders determined by European powers' spheres of influence rather than existing social realities. Consequently, many post-colonial states in Africa had several official and national languages. Some individuals with the same nationality may not understand each other due to the language barriers, as in Nigeria and Kenya. There are estimated to be between 150 to 400 different spoken languages in Kenya (Obeighu 2015, 83), which has led to English becoming the preferred language of communication in business, legal matters, politics, and education in order to overcome these challenges. For example, two individuals with the same nationality but who come from different parts of the country might not be able to understand each other without a common understanding of English. In Kenya, however, there are debates as to whether English has become an organic national language or whether it is part of a colonial legacy that is erasing Kenyan native practices (Sure 2003, 259). Currently, Kenya's constitution is written in English, and the judiciary uses English, but politics are primarily carried out in Kiswahili (also known as Swahili). The parliament, however, uses both English and Kiswahili, requiring the president to be trilingual (in English, Swahili and one of the major ethnic languages) as a mandatory requirement (Mazrui and Mazrui 1993, 284). We will argue that English, and other colonial languages such as French and Spanish, can be both an organic national language and part of a colonial legacy.

English has had an undeniably profound impact on the construction of the national identity of former British

colonies, in some cases becoming the dominant language. It has been increasingly adopted by populations, particularly of younger demographics, over their ethnic language, weakening the linguistic link to their native culture (Mazrui and Mazrui 1993, 287-288). Despite this shift, the depiction of English as simply an oppressive colonial legacy that erodes native identities is overly simplistic and it undermines the agency of post-colonial peoples. The interviews we conducted posed a challenge to the view that English is solely an oppressive colonial relic, suggesting that English can have a homogenising effect whilst simultaneously promoting diversity. David McCrone, a professor at the University of Edinburgh who published extensively on nationalism, citizenship and social inclusion, explained that multiple social and political identities can exist within the same society, or within the same person, without necessarily coming into conflict with one another. In the post-colonial African countries, people can speak both English and their native language, whilst maintaining national and tribal identities.

English can also have a homogenising effect as it becomes a common language in post-colonial multilingual societies. This can erode the presence of native languages and cultural practices as English becomes a norm, creating a more homogenous national identity. Some tribal groups can be excluded from a nation's identity formation process, as it cannot accommodate the linguistic and cultural diversity within its borders. Anindya Raychaudhuri, a senior lecturer at the University of St. Andrews with expertise on the production of memory, identity, and the dynamics of language on the personal and cultural level, had a different view: by becoming a neutral language that enables communication across language barriers, English's homogenising effect can ultimately promote diversity. There are circumstances in which choosing to speak a certain native language can reflect a conscious political act, such as the promotion of separatism or supremacy. If the state chooses to utilise English at the national level, it avoids the need to give preferential treatment to some ethnic groups and languages at the expense of others and can thus circumvent some ethnic tension. This enables individuals to participate in the creation of a diverse national identity without compromising their linguistic heritage.

This complex and multi-faceted phenomenon is clearly apparent in Nigeria, where English is increasingly used as a tool with which to broach cultural and linguistic barriers whilst simultaneously eroding local languages in the home (Udofot 2015, 14). As English becomes more prominent, younger generations increasingly abandon local languages, ultimately weakening linguistic ties to cultural heritage. This phenomenon is also apparent in Kenya. A recent study showed that many Kenyans responded positively to the use of Kenyan English, which is English with some linguistic features borrowed from Swahili, in media and education. Kenyan English was, in fact, preferred over both British English and Kenyan English with ethnic markers (Kenyan English with loan words or accents derived from indigenous languages spoken by the Gikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin or Kamba people) (Kioko 2003, 130). This suggests that English is largely perceived as a national language which transcends ethnic boundaries, rather than simply an oppressive colonial legacy.

Daniel Cetra also identified several countries with multilingual societies in which English is used to overcome both language barriers and sectarian conflict. English could therefore help mitigate conflict between tribes that have been forced into the same country by colonial powers. The actions of Nigeria after the Biafran War exemplify how English was used to mitigate these tensions. The Biafran War was a Nigerian civil conflict fought over the attempted secession of the Igbo people as a result of their lack of representation in Nigerian government. Now considered genocide of the Igbo people, the Nigerian government employed starvation tactics killing between half a million and two million Biafran civilians. This conflict itself stems from British colonial policy; the British divided Nigeria into separate North, West and East regions, thus exacerbating divisions between the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Igbo people. Nigerian scholars argue that poetry written in the aftermath of the war emphasizes the use of 'direct simple English' more than pre-war poetry does. One such scholar, Nwachukwu-Agbada, claims that the stated goal of these poets is to 'cultivate a public language, to utilise a civic medium' so as to convey an 'expression of our fragmented and tortured psyche' (Nwachukwu-Agbada 1991, 165). In this sense, direct English is used to convey a national sense of chaos and loss above and across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. English is not simply a colonial burden; it has become, in some circumstances, a vessel for the creation of a unified and diverse national identity.

One of the key challenges in the creation of a unified and diverse national identity through English is the socio-economic impact colonialism has left behind, as well as the role English has played, and continues to

play, in exacerbating these socio-economic divides. English was originally taught to colonial administrators and the upper echelons of societies. These hierarchical divisions still exist and are primarily visible through differing English language skills. In Nigeria, English language proficiency seems to be a key factor in the level of education attained, thereby giving those that can speak English well an advantage when entering the workforce (Fakeye 2009, 490).

The large differences in English fluency in post-colonial societies are mainly determined by an individual's access to higher quality education, which is primarily reserved for wealthier individuals. English, spoken or written, is thus less accessible to the population at large, is limited in its ability to negotiate language barriers and tribal conflict and, at times, even promotes conflict between social classes. This is particularly visible in the labour market of post-colonial societies, as individuals with high English skills are able to secure higher paying jobs than individuals with little to no English skills. In Kenya, the pervasive attitude towards English is that it is indeed vital for social mobility and economic success (Michieka 2005, 173). The socio-economic implications of English in post-colonial societies have led many poorer individuals and groups to see English as the basis for the formation of a bilingual elite, fluent in both English and their native language (Mazrui and Mazrui 1993, 283). English can indeed promote a united and diverse national identity; however, it can also exclude lower social classes and aggravate social divides.

We argue that English can unify more than divide because of post-colonial African societies' ability to re-appropriate English and make it uniquely their own. This can transform English from a colonial legacy to an organic national language. This is clearly the case in Nigeria, where English is increasingly becoming what Chinua Achebe, a prolific Nigerian author and essayist, described as the English language spoken "In African Tones" (Danladi 2013, 1). A key example of this would be Nigerian pidgin English, English spoken in Nigeria mixed with syntax, vocabulary and phonological characteristics inherited from pre-existing native languages (Awonusi, 1990:35). In Kenya as well, in spite of government policy, a distinctly Kenyan form of English is developing and becoming more dominant (Kioko 2001, 209). David McCrone expanded on these issues, commenting on the diversity of English languages in the world: from American, to Australian, to Scottish English. In post-colonial African societies, specific English dialects are similarly developing through different pronunciations and the creation of a new vocabulary that combines English and native words. This re-appropriation makes the history of English in post-colonial African societies less oppressive and, instead, reflects the powerful agency of post-colonial peoples. They are not merely the victims of English's influence but, rather, agents who actively interact with the language, using this colonial legacy as a tool to create a national identity that was taken from them by British colonisers.

English is seen as a colonial legacy, but it is also seen as part of the globalisation process. Viewed in this light, English becomes a useful language to speak when faced with language barriers; it is not seen as an oppressive tool from colonial times but is instead a useful medium of communication (Mazrui and Mazrui 1993, 287). English viewed as a lingua franca emphasises its ability to connect the world and plays down its connection to colonialism. Deborah Bryceson, a professor and honorary fellow at the University of Edinburgh whose research is concerned with transnational families, creole societies and migration, argues that many nations and peoples can easily make the English language their own without regarding it as a colonial legacy. She reminds us that, technically, English is part of a colonial legacy in the United States, but that is never problematised. Similarly, a large part of Nigeria does not see English as part of a colonial legacy, but as an organic part of the world's increased interconnectedness (Mazrui and Mazrui 1993, 287).

English is often seen as a problematic language in the post-colonial world. The colonial legacy of English and the socio-economic divides it exacerbates are the subjects of debate. This article has shown, however, that post-colonial African societies are not simply powerless victims of English. English can simultaneously homogenise societies and promote diversity of cultures. This allows different cultures in post-colonial African states to communicate, share and celebrate their diversity in the process of creating a common national identity. These societies have agency to transform the English language into a new one which is uniquely their own, creating their own dialect through variation in pronunciation and the acquisition of new words. English has, therefore, lost much of its solely colonial connotations and instead functions as a tool for communication across language barriers.

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The interconnectedness of identity, power and justice

Brindley J Fortuin revisits the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the formation of post-Apartheid national identity in South Africa.

South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), active from 1995-2002, has been heralded as one of the most impressive manifestations of restorative justice and post-conflict social order. The emphasis on healing after a violently racialised past is crucial to ensuring and sustaining peace within post-apartheid South Africa. This paper argues that, apart from its grounding in justice, the TRC provided the post-apartheid government with the opportunity to construct an integrated national identity, one based on democratic principles of human rights and freedoms, out of a heavily fragmented society. To understand the TRC and the criticism it has incurred, one must consider its efforts to address the problem of post-apartheid national identity. This problem must itself be considered through examining the construction of existing South African national identity and the ways in which it remains contested. The current public outrage at the continued presence of former President Frederick Willem De Klerk in South African politics is a useful example by which to consider these contestations in the post-apartheid 'rainbow nation'. I hold that they are a result of the continued socioeconomic inequalities manifested along surviving racial lines which mark post-apartheid society.

Apartheid was a racial oppressive political regime founded in 1948 and was upheld until the transition to democracy in 1994 (Holloway 1956). A cornerstone of the apartheid government was the idea of 'separate development', in which political and economic power was concentrated within the controlling white population (Holloway 1956) and away from the non-white population. To enforce this separation, a rigid system of legislation, policing, and violence was necessary to subdue the majority black population (Dubow 1992). Any human rights violations perpetrated by the South African Defence Force were legitimised through a political and legal system which ultimately devalued the lives of non-white South Africans (Holloway, 1956 & Dubow, 1992).

In 1994, South Africa had its first democratic election. The election formally severed the power of the apartheid government by allowing every citizen of the country one equal vote. The ANC (African National Congress) gained parliamentary majority and elected Nelson Mandela as the first black President. Through adopting a new constitution which solidified the rule of law, South Africa further legitimised its new democratic status and received global praise (Hendricks 2003). However, serious divisions and violence persisted during and after the transition to democracy (Hendricks 2003). The democratic state was met with the dual challenge of addressing past injustices while charting a new social order, agreed upon through political negotiations to end apartheid and begin to heal the wounds it inflicted (Mamdani 2002). Central to this negotiation was the granting of amnesty to those who committed crimes, violent or otherwise, which were accepted or legal – even encouraged – under apartheid. The TRC was South Africa's chosen answer to fulfil its promise of amnesty and the creation of new social order. Such truth commissions allow both perpetrators and victims to engage in honest dialogue to uncover truths about the previous violence and injustice in order to devise a way forward (Dimitrijevic 2006). Additionally, they review the past through documenting the extent of human rights violations that have taken place (Chirwa 1997). Furthermore, the sacrosanct authority granted to truth commissions work to legitimise the revised social order through discourses on healing, forgiveness and reconciliation within post-conflict societies. Dimitrijević (2006) argues that this 'moral' imperative does not stand inferior to the outright political transformations that post-conflict nations undergo. Therefore, a truth commission becomes politically

essential in shaping social order in a post-conflict society such as democratic South Africa.

In 1995 South Africa established the TRC. Akin to other truth commissions, its primary objective was to investigate human rights violations with the official period of inquiry spanning from 1960 to 1994 (Hendricks 2003). Consisting of three committees – Amnesty, Reparations and Rehabilitation, and Human Rights Violations – the TRC played a central role in reconfiguring the nation after apartheid (Hendricks 2003). The specificity in the South African TRC is that the commission was the product of the pre-1994 negotiations which both constrained and enabled the extent of post-apartheid state reform (Hendricks 2003). It removed the prospects for various processes of conventional criminalisation whilst also facilitating a process of truth-telling which would bring much-needed solace to the victims of apartheid. Concerning constraints of the TRC, Hendricks (2003) argues that in reality the 'peaceful' transition to democracy as a political system of governance and underpinned by values of equality, justice, and the universality of human rights, presented the new government with virtually no other option for meaningful, enduring reform. The alternative would have been a civil war or a radicalised new state which clearly went against the international capitalist discourse of the 1990s (Herbst 1991). Yet, South Africa did not descend into a civil war or any other form of mass political violence. Through shaping an honest collective memory of apartheid, the TRC constructed a national identity premised on reconciliation through its 'accessibility' and appeal to all South Africans (Gibson 2006). The TRC was thus the ideal institution to embody the values of democracy and restorative justice for the nation and to inspire trust in a new political regime (Hendricks 2003; Baker & Obradovic-Wochnik 2016). The TRC as a body therefore significantly contributed towards the construction of national identity, and this becomes vital to an analysis of how identity, power and justice are interconnected in post-apartheid South Africa.

The TRC did create a space for healing and brought to light the hidden truths of covert murders, bombings, and violence carried out with the approval of the apartheid government. Questions regarding the disappearances of loved ones and the systematic ways in which violent repression was orchestrated by the apartheid government were finally allowed answers and closure (Mamdani 2002). The Commission also refused amnesty to some who gave testimony, for example Eugene De Kock, whose case was one of many referred to criminal court processing (News24 2001). Furthermore, it held proceedings in every province of the country, many televised by the state broadcaster SABC (South African Broadcasting Corporation) – all with the aim of mass accessibility and understanding. As TRC chairman, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu regularly held interviews with many media outlets (Baines 1998). Political leaders, civil organisations, religious leaders, and ordinary South Africans all participated in the inquiries of the Commission (Gibson 2006). The reconstructive justice project encapsulated within the TRC proceeded under the watchful eye of the international community and commanded the full attention of South Africans. Thus, the TRC was central to the construction of post-apartheid national identity by legally (and bureaucratically) delineating the parameters of justice and in conjunction with the socially constructed nature of collective memories, the state had considerable power in deciding what was to be forgiven, on which terms, and what was to be reconciled.

The idea of South Africa as a 'rainbow nation' (a term coined by Desmond Tutu and used by late president Nelson Mandela) referred to the unity of all races within South Africa, a national quality which quickly became the landmark characteristic of post-apartheid state-building (Baines 1998). The 'new' South Africa was to be seen as forgiving, as a just state premised on human rights which could even reconcile with perpetrators of apartheid through amnesty and inclusion within the national identity. The casting of responsibility for violence during apartheid onto both the oppressor and the oppressed further strengthened this integrated national identity. True justice and reconciliation required a collective effort (Gibson 2006); South Africans had to reconcile with the social realities of the end of a long period of violently and legally enforced 'separate development' along lines of racial hierarchy. Norval (1998) argues that processes of reconciliation were considered successful because they offered some semblance of justice and a return of dignity to victims. What happened in the past, often in private, finally came to light and the whole of South Africa had to confront this reality. This important process of confession and reconciliation was central to the peaceful transition, the legitimisation of a democratic state and a new national identity (Wambua 2019).

Yet, despite the triumphs of the TRC, many black[1] people vividly remembered a white government that exerted multiple forms of physical, emotional, symbolic and structural violence upon them. This legacy, both

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1 South African racial terminology used to racially self-identify and for the purposes of apartheid bureaucracy.

entrenched in memory and structural inequality, poses a continued contestation to the supposed legitimacy of a unified nation in a democratic South Africa. The resistance to ideas of a unified nation is aptly illustrated in at least two recent events that surrounded the legacies of apartheid. On one instance, during February 2020, the foundation of Frederik Willem De Klerk made a statement refuting the idea that apartheid was a crime against humanity (The Citizen 2020). On another occasion, the first official State of the Nation Address delivered by President Ramaphosa in 2020 saw chaos ensue around the presence of De Klerk at parliament (eNCA 2020). Political parties, news reports, and social media were all riddled with the fresh denials of apartheid's undeniably inhumane history in light of De Klerk's continued presence in South African political landscape. After more than two decades of democracy, these contestations around the legacy of apartheid persist, often embedded in memory and structural inequality (Harding 2020).

This national 'rainbow' of diversity was in reality cast against the backdrop of serious structural socioeconomic inequalities. Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) recognised the economic challenges South Africa faces, reflected by persistent youth unemployment and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small economic elite (The World Bank 2018) (International Monetary Fund 2020). Despite valiant efforts at post-apartheid reform, the nation remains constrained by massive inequality that is distributed along racial lines (Van Der Berg 2019). Testament to frustrations with socio-economic challenges that South Africans face are the many protests which have come to characterise the South African political landscape; university students and other citizens have been demonstrating since 2015 on issues of decoloniality, free education, universal accessibility of basic resources (known in South Africa as 'service delivery'), the presence of De Klerk in South Africa's political landscape, and other social and economic issues. It is interesting that these frustrations have continuously been centred around reconciliation, as opposed to developmental programs like the Redistributive Programme (RDP) of the government (Mashavave 2020). One might assume that the protests surrounding unequal socio-economic realities would be based on the lack of service delivery or economic reform. However, the centrality of the TRC during protests around socio-economic challenges becomes telling of what black South Africans view as post-apartheid justice. Pairing the legitimate frustration with socio-economic challenges to the TRC illustrates that the project of reconciliation has still left different racial groups unofficially segregated, poor, and stuck within a hierarchy of access to state resources (Hendricks 2003).

Apart from the complexities of establishing non-racial bureaucratic and political institutions, I argue that the new democratic state had to create a viable social order that would bridge entrenched racial divides within South Africa. The creation of social order was paramount to supporting a functioning economy which could remain lucrative to international capital and would reflect the democratic liberal values that dominated governance in the 21st century. The democratic state strategically charted social order through its emphasis on restorative justice, binding justice and the process of nation-building process in post-apartheid South Africa (Becker 2011). This became the mandate of the TRC, rightfully elected to focus on the gross human rights violations and physical violence perpetrated by the previous regime. Yet, this process has not been sufficient. In light of resentment towards the legacy of apartheid which left many black people facing considerable socio-economic challenges, calling for the banning of De Klerk from the South African parliament becomes a legitimate expression for justice that extends beyond a collective national identity. Ultimately, it is the continuation of structural inequalities that contemporarily challenge the very processes and aims of the TRC.

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LEVIATHAN

Making the Nation: Hybrid exceptionalism and the rehabilitation of the Russian Orthodox Church in Post-Soviet Russia

Aedan McCabe looks at Russia's identity crisis following the end of the Soviet Union and how Russian Orthodoxy plays a large role in constructing the nation's sense of self.

Arguably the most significant and enduring consequence suffered by Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major crisis of identity. While this crisis persisted through the turbulent 1990s, the accession of Vladimir Putin to the presidency in 1999 marked the beginning of a concerted effort to understand Russia's place in the modern world. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this has been the rehabilitation of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). One of the foundational pillars of the Russian Empire, the ROC wielded substantial political and social power as the Empire's official religion. While the Church did not disappear entirely following the 1917 revolution, its power and political influence waned significantly under the state-sponsored secularism of Communist rule. Although the ROC was at times co-opted by the Communist Party for purposes of public relations (many retained their faith despite the Party's doctrine of state atheism), it generally became less visible in socio-political life. At the turn of the millennium, the relationship between the Church and the State evolved once again, with the former re-emerging as a prominent political force. Despite ostensibly supporting the notion of a secular state, both Putin and Dmitry Medvedev (President from 2008 to 2012) have nonetheless employed a public narrative on Russian Orthodoxy which places it at the core of the 'new' Russian national identity.

In order to understand both how and why this was done, we have to situate this discourse within the broader context of national identity construction in post-Soviet Russia. First, the nation is 'imagined' in that its members don't necessarily know one another, but they nonetheless form a community because they are all bound by a deep sense of 'comradeship', persisting in spite of the inequalities that may exist among them (Anderson 2006, 7). Second, these 'imagined communities' are constructed discursively through the beliefs about the 'nation' that communicative social interaction continuously produces, reproduces, and transforms (De Cillia et al. 1999). Crucially, it is political and cultural elites who propagate these beliefs in order to foster unity, partly through a willingness to exclude others. Lastly, national identity is not static, it is inherently dynamic, evolving alongside the fluid contexts in which it is constructed (De Cillia et al. 1999, 154).

Within these parameters, Oskanian's (2018) concept of 'hybrid exceptionalism' strongly characterises Russia's post-Soviet identity. This concept follows from Said's (1994) definition of imperialism as a structure of narratives that serves to reproduce the hierarchy of a given nation and legitimise its domination over others. In the post-Soviet period, and under Putin in particular, politicians have engaged in the construction of an imagined community that views itself as 'exceptional' in its dominant hierarchical position within the post-Soviet space. It also views itself as 'hybrid' in that the civilisational sphere it occupies is geographically, culturally, and historically distinct, being uniquely situated between East and West.

So how has the expression of 'hybrid exceptionalism' manifested under Putin? One of the earliest and clearest instances of this concept is in his speech 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium'. Here we can already see elements of identity construction through public discourse, whereby Putin re-asserts Russian derzhavnost, or 'great power status':

"Derzhavnost – Russia was and will remain a great country. This is due to the inherent characteristics of our geopolitical, economic and cultural existence." (Putin 1999)

It is within the context of re-establishing Russia's 'great power status' that we see more explicit manifestations of hybrid exceptionalism in the post-Soviet identity as constructed through Russian political discourse. Against the hegemony of contemporary liberal norms which preclude the formal existence of empire, Russia has attempted to establish itself as the power center of former Soviet territories by employing its own 'liberal' perspectives on economic integration and international law. Economic projects like the Eurasian Economic Union and Moscow's justifications for military intervention such as in Georgia in 2008 are key examples of this ideology put into practice (Allison 2009). Naturally, from the dominant Western perspective, the legitimacy and credibility of Russia's self-declared position as the guardian of liberal values in the post-Soviet space – or the 'near abroad' as it is referred to in Russia – is weakened because Russia does not belong to the Western order. As a result, its own representations of these liberal values will be seen in the West as illegitimate. To mitigate this discrepancy in beliefs, it is therefore necessary to establish and maintain a public narrative that emphasises Russia's distinctiveness from both West and East. This may further the construction of a national identity that places Russia in a unique cultural space and bolsters Russia's claim to dominance over that space (Oskanian 2018, 39-40).

Of course, national identity is built from myriad socio-cultural influences, through which we can expect to observe its manifestation in a variety of contexts, particularly where discussions of language, key historical events, and other indicators of historical continuity are concerned. As noted by Oskanian (2018, 41), 'hybrid exceptionalism' in contemporary Russian identity construction relies on 'imperial and Soviet markers of identity' which serve to reproduce an 'authentic' Russian culture, and, by extension, its dominance in an ambiguous East-West cultural space. However, given its historical significance and renewed importance in the post-Soviet era, it is no surprise that the ROC represents the 'main such marker of authenticity' (Oskanian 2018, 42).

The importance of the ROC is strongly reflected in the views of both Putin and also Medvedev during their tenures as President. It is true that both leaders have continuously reiterated that the Russian state is fundamentally secular, albeit enriched by its multi-confessional character. Putin, during a recent meeting with the leaders of United Russia (the majority party of the Federal Assembly which ensures Putin's dominance in the legislature), emphasised 'unity among our multi-ethnic and multi-confessional people' as one of the core principles necessary in bringing Russians together (Anonymous 2019). Yet at the same time, the broader discussion conducted by both leaders expresses and normalises an active assumption that Russian Orthodoxy is the dominant spiritual force in an authentically Russian cultural space. It is within this discourse that we can see very clearly the expression of 'hybrid exceptionalism' as it pertains to Russian national identity. For instance, in an address to Orthodox leaders on National Unity Day in 2011, Medvedev refers to the Orthodox Church as 'the keeper of enduring values of our country' which 'helps an enormous number of people to not only find themselves, but to understand… what it means to be Russian.' (Medvedev 2011) Here, Medvedev not only establishes a direct connection between the Orthodox faith and Russian national identity, but he also suggests that the latter is a necessary condition for the former. This is corroborated when he later states that 'the entire history of our country… is the history of Russian Orthodoxy' (Medvedev 2011), cementing the belief that the values of the Orthodox church are the most fundamental to Russian identity because they have survived since the birth of the nation. The 'exceptional' character of this identity is further established through the portrayal of Western 'liberal' values as both unauthentic and morally corrupting by comparison with the traditional Russian values associated with Russian Orthodoxy (Verkhovsky 2002). Similar beliefs are promoted by Putin in crafting the public narrative on Crimea and the Ukrainian conflict; during his address in March 2014 following the Crimean status referendum, Putin took the opportunity to once again re-affirm the significance of Orthodoxy when he stated:

'Here [in Crimea] we find the ancient city of Chersoneses, where Saint Vladimir the Great was baptized. His spiritual feat – the conversion to Orthodoxy – represents the core cultural, civilizational, and value foundation that binds the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus together'. (Putin 2014)

By employing a pseudo-historical narrative that frames Crimea as the spiritual birthplace of Orthodoxy – itself a fundamental unifying force within the post-Soviet space – Putin re-affirms the historical authenticity of Russian Orthodoxy (and, by extension, the ROC) and uses this authenticity to justify intervening in Crimea to protect the fount of Russian spirituality. This is not the only example of Putin using the Ukrainian Crisis to consolidate the spiritual authenticity of the ROC. Consider his response to the decision of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) to split from the Patriarch of Moscow:

'A blatant interference into the church life is being carried out, as if its initiators have learned from the atheists of the past century, who have expelled the faithful from the temples' (Anonymous 2019)

By drawing direct comparison to 'the atheists', Putin suggests that an independent UOC would be devoid of (theistic) spirituality. In doing so, he re-affirms that the ROC is the sole authentic spiritual authority within the post-Soviet space, and that others are merely pretenders sowing 'hatred and intolerance' for self-interested political gains (Anonymous 2019). Thanks to an already established discourse tying Russia's fate with that of Orthodoxy, the ROC's moral superiority, as it is portrayed here, ultimately reflects that of Russia, heightening the 'exceptional' character of Russian national identity and further legitimating Russia's right to dominate the distinct civilisational sphere that it occupies.

From this brief analysis, we can see how political elites' control of the public narrative on the ROC has helped to resituate the Church at the center of post-Soviet society and at the foundations of the 'new' Russian identity. By portraying Russian Orthodoxy as an immutable source of cultural authenticity and moral superiority opposed to a corrupt and amoral Western order, Putin and Medvedev have fashioned a powerful tool in legitimating Russia's right to dominate the post-Soviet space. The rehabilitation of the ROC is thus central to the development of the 'hybrid exceptionalism' which now rests at the core of Russian national identity.

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LEVIATHAN

Causes of the problematic government formation in Belgium

Astrid Van de Voorde looks at how a flawed institutional framework and competing political rationales have contributed to turmoil at the top level of Belgian politics.

The 6th of December 2011 was a day for celebration in Belgium, marking an end to 541 days of fruitless efforts in the Federal Parliament to form a coalition government (Goossens and Cannoot 2015, 31). The extreme length of negotiations should not have come as a surprise; Belgium has a history of difficulty in forming coalitions, so much so that it has struggled through various unstable interim governments. In 1979, some claimed that a breakup of the country was the only possible solution for the linguistic divisions in Belgium (Baetens Beardsmore 1980, 145). After the 2007 elections it took 194 days to form a coalition agreement, which itself turned out to be ineffective, breaking down and calling for early elections in 2010 (Louwerse and Van Aelst 2013, 2).

Belgium's seeming inability to form stable governments could be explained by several factors, including Belgium's unique institutional structure and the fragmentation of political parties during its federalisation process. An especially key factor is the linguistic and historical divide between Flanders and Wallonia, a long-entrenched tension which has recently fuelled Flemish nationalist movements and helped to radicalise the political sphere. The Belgian political structure contributes to inefficient government formation, but these structures in turn are an elemental product of the two communities' distinct language-based identities. Academic literature has explored these communal tensions as well as the federal structure in Belgium, but it has only analysed these forces separately, rather than examining how they interact to produce political instability. It is crucial to examine the interplay of these forces and their effect on government formation for a more complete picture. Accounting for socio-linguistic and economic factors reveals nuanced political fault lines that have shifted over time.

Since its foundation as an independent state in 1830, Belgium has been characterised by linguistic heterogeneity and segmentation with an attached set of socio-economic markers (Zolberg 1974, 183, 197). The French language (spoken in the Belgian region of Wallonia) was considered socially superior to Flemish; this stratification, compounded with uneven industrialisation efforts favouring Wallonia over Flanders, produced a pejorative conception of the Flemish as being 'economically backward' (Zolberg 1974, 204). In light of recent developments, there is a clear link between the history of these communities and the current political struggles, as their linguistic divisions tend to correspond to political and economic developments. The rise of Flemish nationalism through the 'Flemish Movement' is a direct consequence of these dynamics and poses a serious problem for the Belgian government. This movement initially advocated the acknowledgement of the Flemish language as an essential part of Belgian culture (Vos 1998, 84). Soon, however, it evolved into a national organisation with a socio-economic agenda (de Wever 2013, 58) naming the goal of some form of Flemish self-rule (Swenden and Jans 2006, 878). This nationalism is still strong today, with the 2010 elections seeing augmented support for the right-wing nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) which complicated the coalition formation with the francophone Socialist Party (Abts et al 2012, 448).

Nationalism can be considered a form of identity politics, as it is derived from shared common markers such as language and ethnic origins (Beland and Lecours 2005, 678). However, Flemish nationalism and Flemish identity are no longer built solely on an ethnolinguistic debate. Blommaert (2011, 241) argues that Belgian language diversity was initially a democratisation effort, but that it evolved into the fabric of potentially divisive demographic and socioeconomic transformations in Belgium. Reflecting on nationalism generally, Gellner

(1983, 38) and Hobsbawm (1990, 170) add that culture and language form the core of nationalism, but only when combined with other social, socio-economic, or political issues, This potentially troublesome combination is seen in recent developments of Flemish identity, as language has become emblematic of greater issues troubling Belgium. Hooghe (2012, 132) endorses this view, claiming that Belgium was originally subject to cultural nationalism, proceeding into economic nationalism during the twentieth century.

German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder stated that depriving a nation of its language (and by extension, its character) is the greatest harm that could be done to it. Cultural nationalism, which involves the pursuit of a set vision of one's national identity, can be a result of such deprivation (Woods 2016, 430-431). The Flemish demand for further regional autonomy arose from the discrepancy between their rate of contribution to the economy and that of Wallonia, incorporating financial incentives into a nationalism previously based on community and culture alone. Although language can be used as a means to identify different groups within Belgium, it is not the only source of communal conflict anymore. Nonetheless, language remains foundational to the socio-economic disparity in Belgium (Blommaert 2011, 241; Gellner 1983, 38; Hobsbawm 1990, 170).

Belgium's cultural and economic nationalism makes it somewhat unique. Although sub-state nationalism and independence issues are present in other nations - such as Scotland - Flemish nationalism is linked more to culture, in contrast to the policy-focused Scottish nationalism (Beland and Lecours 2005, 693). Hence, Beland and Lecours (2005, 698) argue that, while Scottish nationalism is based on ideological, historical, and institutional differences, Flemish nationalism has not promoted any specific social policy. This does not necessarily contradict Hooghe's account of economic nationalism; Beland and Lecours primarily focus on social policy, whilst Hooghe observes the general developments of Flemish nationalism.

Although these cultural and economic identities often translate into political convictions and affiliations, this contrast is not merely based on ideological beliefs. The lack of a left-right distinction is underlined by Howarth and Torfing (2005), who argue that the major difference between Belgian political parties is fundamentally based on opposed cultural attitudes rather than ideological standpoints (Howarth and Torfing 2005, 202). It is likewise posited that policy disagreements between the Flemish and Walloon constituencies lie within a matter of degree, not across the full spectrum of political belief (Reuchamps et al. 2012, 15). For instance, survey data reveals a shared desire for more substate autonomy, though the Flemish community appear to hold this desire to a greater extent than the Walloons (Deschouwer and Sinardet 2010). Hence, compromise on their political issues will involve scope, rather than direction, as a critical point (Reuchamps et al 2012, 15). The division in the Belgian government is thus not solely political, as cultural issues have embedded themselves within the political ones. This interplay of linguistic and socio-economic differences leads to political tension between the two communities, which makes it more complicated for parties representing each community to form a cohesive federal government.

Aside from ethnolinguistic and economic differences, academic literature also points to institutional structure and federal framework as causes of unstable government formation. Sinardet (2010, 353) argues that the inability to form a government is primarily a result of the fully split party system that Belgium adopted as part of its federalisation process. During the 1960s and 1970s, the state-wide parties broke up along linguistic lines so that citizens were only able to vote for parties belonging to the majority language group associated with their region (Swenden and Jans 2006, 879). The federalisation is structured in such a way that the constituency boundaries correspond roughly to those of the linguistic communities, further polarising the process of forming a coalition government (Abts et al. 2012, 449). This lack of federal parties led to the divergence of the two regions, as well as two parallel sub-national party systems (De Winter et al. 2006, 870 ; Bardi and Mair 2008, 155). The electoral structure only further strengthens the communal identities and the schism between them, allowing the regional operations of individual parties to paralyse progress towards an agreement on a national level (Abts et al 2012, 451). The paradox of federalism, which holds that the formal recognition of identity groups can reinforce their presence, can help to explain this problem (Erk and Anderson 2009, 192). To ease communal tensions, the Belgian government has granted each group more autonomy and substantive regional political institutions. Yet, this may have the opposite effect of reinforcing their identities and further deepening the oppositional divide. The political structure thus plays a significant role in the struggle to form a government, even if merely because of its underlying connection to cultural forces.

The impact of the Belgian federalisation - accommodating incongruence between regional- and federal-level realities - came to light during the 2004 elections. Previously, political parties had succeeded in forming symmetrical federal coalitions by cooperating with the opposing communal party with which they most align in policy (Swenden and Jans 2006, 883). Federalisation took shape along similar lines, with regional coalitions tending to ideologically replicate federal coalitions (Swenden and Jans 2006, 883 ; Louwerse and Van Aelst 2013, 13 ; Dandoy 2013, 58). Further compounding this pattern, holding the regional and federal elections simultaneously has been found to encourage election congruence (Dandoy 2013, 58). Structural changes in 2003, however, led to the uncoupling of the federal and regional elections, which now occur non-simultaneously (Swenden and Jans 2006, 883). This increased differences between regional and federal coalitions and widened the margin of strategic opportunity for new coalitions (Dandoy 2013, 61). The process of reaching agreements between the Flemish and Walloon party groups became increasingly tense and complex, and each region's desire for increased regional autonomy increased (Swenden and Jans 2006, 886). Thus, the Belgian federal system is caught between two divergent (and equally damaging) trends: one towards regional and federal alignment along an increasingly polarising communal divide, and another towards a deepening incongruence between regional and federal priorities which could come to destroy the possibility of intercommunal cooperation.

This dual federalism also provides a partial explanation for the results of the 2007 and 2010 elections. The 2007 elections illustrated Belgium's increasingly divided political landscape, inciting the breakdown of the social-liberal coalition which had been ruling for eight years (Pilet and Van Haute 2008, 547, 550). Flanders is dominated by right-wing parties, while socialist and green parties prevail in Wallonia; the three groups need to cooperate in their decision-making on federal policies. The question of greater autonomy and the reformation of the federal system are issues that cause tension between these groups. Due to the unaccommodating federal structure, cultural diversions were thus further amplified. The 2010 elections brought even further radicalisation with large gains for the N-VA, opposed by the francophone Socialist Party (Pilet and Van Haute 2008, 448). This shift in power balances left the opposing parties 540 days to negotiate a government coalition. The record-breaking length of these negotiations cannot be explained only by the left-right cleavage; the communitarian cleavage will have played a decisive part (Pilet and Van Haute 2008, 451). In this way, these elections illustrate how the opposed communities and issues with the federal structure contribute to greater political instability and more complex government formation in Belgium.

Thus, the issues Belgium faces regarding coalition formation are a product of communal identities, reinforced by a flawed institutional design. It is this combination of linguistic, socio-economic and political forces that complicated government formation. The communal identities represent the initial and dominant source to this conflict, whilst the institutional design adds a layer of complexity and strengthens the significance of the linguistic divide. The importance of cultural aspects and their effect on political outcomes also deserves attention. From this perspective, it would be beneficial to correct these structural errors, but this would not necessarily lead to a solution for the communal tensions. The focus on consonance amongst the Belgian communities is thus vital for a stable and efficient government.

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LEVIATHAN

Evo Morales and the politics of indigenous Bolivian identity

Guy Stewart examines the downfall of Bolivia's longest-serving president and whether it risks energising anti-indigenous sentiment in national politics.

T**he political implosion of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, was marked by** significant controversy. After becoming the longest-serving president in the nation's history, Morales' rapid downfall in 2019 was welcomed by communities in Bolivia and around the world. Claims that his government had rigged the election, along with his undeniable manipulation of election laws preventing him from vying for a fourth term, make for a lamentable contrast to the hope offered in his inauguration as the first president of Aymara descent. However, to relegate Morales to the infamous group of authoritarian 'Caudillos' that have historically brought economic ruin and distress to many Latin American states would be an unjust denial of the success his government had in the socioeconomic development of Bolivia (Krauze 2014). His legacy as the first president to emancipate the indigenous population and make strides in the protection of their cultural identity can still be upheld.

The electoral vote of 2019 catalysed the most turbulent year in Bolivian politics in recent memory. The election was destined for controversy, following Morales' widely criticised manipulation of constitutional law that would have prevented him from running for a fourth term. In a 2016 referendum, he asked the people to vote on an extension of term limits (Collyns and Watts 2016). Meeting failure, he claimed it was a 'violation' of his human rights not to permit his continuation as candidate for his party, *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement for Socialism, or MAS) (Reuters 2017). His power over the courts produced a ruling in his favour, and he succeeded in extending his term (Slattery 2019). The Bolivian people, having suffered a history of authoritarian governments and fearful of a local replication of neighbouring violent Venezuelan politics, were rightly anxious about the state of their democracy (Kovarnik 2018). Protests from both pro- and anti-Morales camps ensued, and when he won the election of 2019, tolerance reached a breaking point.

While Morales undeniably defied constitutional law on term limits, further attacks on his integrity served to support the opposition's campaign. After a delay in vote counts raised questions, an investigation was launched by the Organisation of American States (OAS) (Ramos 2019). The organisation, which receives 60 percent of its funding from the US, expressed concerns with the legitimacy of the vote, claiming MAS had rigged the outcome (Lee and Renwick 2019). However, the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) found in their own investigation that the OAS did not provide sufficient evidence to back such claims, and that there was nothing to suggest any illegitimacy in the election results (Long et al. 2019). It is important not to downplay Morales' obvious corruption towards the end of his presidency; he defied the constitution both electorally and ideologically, pushing through infrastructure policy that negatively impacted indigenous people (Postero 2017, 131). However, the opposition's campaign to defame Morales' government and political movement meant possibly endangering the support for pro-indigenous politics that revolutionised Bolivia.

The political security and representation of the indigenous population is further compromised by the interim president, Jeanine Añez. A *mestizo* (of mixed Spanish and indigenous descent) opposition senator at the time of Morales' resignation, Añez declared herself president following Morales' exile to Mexico (BBC 2019). Although accusations that Morales' deposition was a coup remain contested, Añez has been clear in her political message (Chang et al. 2019). Despite holding no legitimate power, marching into office with a Bible in hand and the support of the military at her back, she has already suggested disallowing MAS from running a candidate in the next election (Krauss 2019; Open Democracy 2019). Añez also has a problematically racist

past, claiming that indigenous culture is 'satanic' and that it has no place in politics (Open Democracy 2019). This resurgence in indigenous discrimination is also made evident by the police, who killed pro-Morales protesters and were seen tearing the *Wiphala* (the indigenous flag that Morales instituted alongside Bolivia's independence-era flag) from their uniforms (Kurmanaev and Krauss 2019). While the opposition think they are restoring democracy after the corruption of Morales' presidency, they are in fact an elite minority that is unrepresentative of and threatening to indigenous identity.

This emancipation of the indigenous population came about with Morales' revolutionary political movement, which saw him inaugurated as President in 2006. Growing in political power from a Coca Union Leader to the founder of MAS, Morales' populist movement brought necessary change that Bolivia's indigenous population had been starved of for centuries (Postero 2017, 30). The party itself grew from a syndicate of *campesinos* (peasants) and *cocaleros* (coca farmers) in the mid-90s (Postero 2017, 30). It was, from its nascency, the exemplification of a political party that truly represents the indigenous community: its slogan was '*somos pueblo, somos MAS*' ('we are the people, we are MAS') (Postero 2017, 33). While the party was a revolutionary populist movement, it did not set out to destroy extant political institutions, but rather to develop them for the bettering of Bolivia's society (Quiroga and Pagliarone 2014, 212). This was to be accomplished through the amalgamation of indigenous culture and socialism as a new political ideology. The promotion of indigenous culture, history, and music became key for the popularisation of Morales' political movement, but the politicisation of indigenous culture was more than regalia (Stobart 2019). The key to MAS politics was the indigenous concept of Vivir Bien ('Live Well'), which seeks a more harmonious and holistic relationship between society and the environment (Wever 2017). While Morales has been criticised for promoting Vivir Bien while simultaneously continuing extractive economic practices (the extraction and sale of natural resources), the neoliberal economy that he inherited made it hard for such radical change to be implemented (Postero 2017, 34).

Perhaps the most salient example of the emancipation of the indigenous communities of Bolivia is the new constitution of 2009. Morales set up the Constituent Assembly of indigenous people to re-create the constitution, producing the Plurinational State of Bolivia with aims of ending centuries of discrimination (Postero 2017, 118-21). The constitution positively impacted the indigenous community with the creation of antiracism laws, protections for the coca plant, and the reformation of land and farming laws, all of which are fundamental to the self-determination of the indigenous communities (Stobart 2019; Webber 2017). Jason Wolff, Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, argues that the constitution of 2009 result of the indigenous-led political movement leaves 'no doubt that both Bolivia's government and the new parliament are more representative today than ever before' (Wolff 2011, 5).

Furthermore, Morales' brand of socialism did not just support indigenous identity, but it supported living standards as well. Bolivia has a majority indigenous or indigenous-identifying population, and before Morales' presidency they represented some of the poorest in Latin America (Postero 2017, 26; Stauffer 2018). With the introduction of socialist redistributive policies and the nationalisation of industries that had previously been foreign-owned - with gas being the most significant - Morales was able to rebalance the Bolivian economy (Pineo 2016). Morales' presidency can be characterised by a list of socioeconomic successes: doubling the GDP per capita, which remains one of the highest in Latin America, and the bringing down the poverty rate from two-thirds to just one-third of the population (Pineo 2016, 434-5). Poverty reduction policies have specifically targeted the worst-off, but they are as indiscriminatory as they are universally available (Pineo 2016, 436). Hence, Morales' socialist programme not only directly benefitted the indigenous population, but it guarded against replicating the discrimination seen in past political eras.

Morales' new socialist Plurinational State of Bolivia allowed for the emancipation of the indigenous population through wealth redistribution and by combating the foreign interventionism and imperialism that supported the previous neoliberal system. Indigenous Bolivians faced many challenges in the neoliberal era under a system riddled with conflict. To eliminate the rampant drug problem on their own soil, the US sought the eradication of Bolivian coca farms (Postero 2017, 29). Not only was this culturally aggressive, as the coca plant holds great significance for the indigenous people, but it also created a strenuous economic climate: the neoliberal economic system at the time supported so few industries - especially for the indigenous population - that the burgeoning market for the coca plant was a guaranteed avenue for income (Pineo 2016, 429).

Their eradication represents an insurmountable problem for the indigenous community. The US-led war on drugs was also physically aggressive: security forces committed human rights abuses against coca farmers (Gamarra 2007, 14). Morales has opposed such destructive foreign aggression through the expulsion of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and organisations aiding its operations (Pineo 2016, 433). The protection of the coca plant in the 2009 constitution, along with continued military and police efforts to tackle drug trafficking, has legitimised this industry for the indigenous population (Wolff 2011, 5). Most importantly, enshrining the right to grow such a culturally important plant means strengthening and protecting the expression of indigenous identity in Bolivia.

Despite Morales' rejection of US imperialism, it continued to challenge the power of his government. The decline in financial support from the US over the period of Morales' presidency is attributable to his expulsion of US organisations and politicians, however, the reduction in aid was also seen in Carlos Mesa's preceding government (Wolff 2011, 10). This is particularly important if we also consider the evidence of continued American support for the anti-socialist and anti-Morales opposition. Through its aid policy 'Fortalecimiento de Instituciones Democráticas' (Strengthening of Democratic Institutions, or FIDEM), the US supported opposition groups at a regional government level (Wolff 2011, 11). Thus, historical and continued US intervention made it 'part and party to Bolivia's internal conflicts' and the conflict between the socialist and neoliberal agendas that directly impact the indigenous population (Wolff 2011, 17).

Furthermore, the United States has not shied away from influencing the present course of Bolivian politics. The instalment of Jeanine Añez as interim president is not only marred by her problematic character, but many also believe that public support from the US puts her legitimacy into question (Change et al. 2019). This is undoubtedly because she wishes to see a return to neoliberal politics and economics, a system which is fundamental to the United States' hegemony in the Americas (Petras and Veltmeyer 2007). Are we therefore seeing the surfacing of a scheme employed by the US to dismantle a socialist government, evidenced in their support for Morales opposers? It is hard to prove such a claim, but it remains certain that a political revolution, key to the emancipation of the indigenous people and their identity, is now under an onslaught which echoes racist and discriminatory politics and policies of the past.

Evo Morales' presidency crumbled because of his corrupt and unconstitutional desire to retain power (Johnson 2019). He began to ignore the very people that drove his instalment as Bolivia's first indigenous president, and with that his government lost sight of its core ideology. However, with such a revolution taking place, Morales faced challenges to his movement from the beginning. If Bolivia sees the reinstatement of democracy, it will be offered a chance to continue the important changes that Morales and the MAS set about making. The danger of the current political climate and the anti-Morales sentiment is that the opposition see it as legitimising their anti-indigenous campaign. We are witnessing a resurgence in Bolivia of the ugliest ghosts from the pre-Morales era, and while they may not have disappeared with the nation's first indigenous president, his emancipation of the indigenous people and support for their identity is a legacy that should not be forgotten.

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Identity and violence in post-war El Salvador

Meghan Gauld examines the history of Salvadorian gang violence and its deep connections to identity following decades of social conflict.

Alongside the similarly afflicted Central American nations of Honduras and Guatemala, El Salvador is and has long been suffering a crisis of social violence (Huhn et al. 2017, 45). The nation is fragmented by the pervasive influence of violent organised crime, which makes identity a troublesome concept in El Salvador. Individual identities appear stifled by the culture of fear that permeates a nation held hostage by brutal and arbitrary violence. Instead what matters is the collective identity of the state and the political, economic and sociocultural factors which have helped foster nascent gangs and subsequently allowed them to thrive. This article will firstly explore the role of the streets of Los Angeles, California in cultivating gangs by radicalising individuals, before exploring the material circumstances in El Salvador which allowed these gangs to take hold. We proceed to evaluate the current situation and suggest a possible solution to break up the gangs, allowing the citizens of El Salvador to forge a new identity apart from the violence surrounding them.

El Salvador is largely divided between two rival gangs: *Mara Salvatrucha* (abbreviated MS-13) and *Barrio 18* (abbreviated La 18). Prior to these established gangs (referred to locally as *maras*), there were a number of juvenile gangs operating in and among neighbourhoods, called *pandillas* (Arana 2005, 98). *Pandillas* differed from the *maras* of today as they were less violent, less organised, smaller, and tended to have significantly shorter lifespans (Arana 2005, 16-17). In pre-war El Salvador, inter-war LA, and post-war El Salvador, gangs formed as a means of survival for a poor, disenfranchised population existing in a locality that lacked infrastructure and opportunities for work and education (Rosen et al. 2018, 52). Yet, for the rigid gang structure of modern-day El Salvador to be established and grow beyond its pre-war and inter-war stages, there had to be a catalyst to consolidate gang rule. This trigger appeared after El Salvador's civil war in the form of the forced movement of tens of thousands of young men from the streets of LA into a struggling nation without the resources or will to provide for them (Arana 2005, 9).

The gangs originally formed in the streets of Los Angeles, California during the Salvadoran Civil War of 1979 to 1992 (Arana 1005, 98). The war was a gruelling twelve years of violence and terror, fought between the Salvadoran military-led junta government and a coalition of far-left groups called the *Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front* (*FMNL*) (Huhn 2017, 47). Death squads deliberately targeted civilians and committed a range of human rights abuses, including the use of child soldiers (Huhn 2017, 60). Hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans fled their homeland, settling in Latino neighbourhoods in LA (Arana 2005, 98). The formation of prototype *maras* on these streets was a reaction to the conditions of the Salvadoran migrants' existence; most were poor, all were in unknown territory, and those who were able to were forced to defend their Latino minority community against the violence of the LA streets (Arana 2005, 7). It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that these gangs were precursors to the modern day *mara*, and born out of a struggle against poverty, well established city gangs, and the difficulties of a life in a foreign and often hostile country.

Thousands of Salvadoran men were imprisoned for gang-related crimes (Zilberg 2011, 85). Anti-gang measures implemented in 1992 in the United States (US) meant that minors could be tried and convicted as adults and subsequently sent to prison on felony charges (Zilberg 2011, 83). As a result, LA prisons became hotbeds of gang activity, with time in jail tending to further radicalise young Salvadoran gang members (Zilberg

2011, 83). Once released, they returned to the streets carrying further expertise in crime and violence and virtually no prospects for legitimate employment (Rosen et al. 2018, 53). Upon the end of the Salvadoran civil war, the US Congress passed legislation meant to harden the US' stance on immigration (Zilberg 2011, 84). A wide array of low-level crimes were incorporated into the list of deportable offences and the net of those liable to be deported was widened to include foreign-born citizens (Zilberg 2011, 85). This new legislation deported an estimated 20,000 young men back to Central America, some of whom had been settled in the US since they were toddlers and many who had never learned Spanish (Zilberg 2011, 85).

These deportees posed a significant problem to authorities in the countries to which they returned. The immigration rules imposed by the US meant that no criminal offences could be disclosed, and that local Salvadoran governments and police had no knowledge of their new citizens' backgrounds or criminal records (Zilberg 2011, 85). Underlying this new chaos were the ever-present problems plaguing Central America's northern triangle, and El Salvador in particular. The nation still struggled to rebuild from its devastating civil war and the resulting weaknesses were vital in the establishment of the *maras*.

The peace agreement ending the Salvadoran civil war created a delicate balance in which no faction won, yet none lost (Vilas 1995, 9). The new order presided over a population disproportionately consisting of those fifteen years old and younger, with a GDP per capita of around $1,076 and a 7.9 percent unemployment rate; economists generally agree that unemployment above six percent is unhealthy (Vilas 1995, 10; Marston et al. 1976, 183). El Salvador's economy was in disrepair, poverty was the rule rather than the exception, and lack of infrastructure meant the masses of disenfranchised youth remained idle and hungry (Huhn 2017, 24). Additionally, urban youth populations in cities such as San Salvador and Santa Ana largely came from unstable homes which provided little of the emotional support often believed necessary for young children to become successful adults (Vilas 1995, 11). The gangs presented solutions for many of these children. The *maras* of today have a broad appeal to urban youth and a gang member can be someone for them to look up to. Young boys often find a kind of romanticism in the idolisation of gang members: their tattoos, their clothing, and the power and the familial connections they have realised by collectivising their identity in line with the *maras*. (Arana 2005, 15). As the *maras* formed, they began recruiting from the youth population as their main source of new membership. The *maras* initiated children as young as nine and served as a surrogate family for the disillusioned youth of El Salvador (Arana 2005, 12). These children began as lookouts and petty criminals, but would eventually graduate to drug dealing, burglary and contract killing, as well as colluding with organisations involved in smuggling both people and drugs (Arana 2005, 12). These activities largely explain the astronomical crime rate in El Salvador, as well as its homicide rate of 61.8 deaths per 100,000 people per year - the highest in the world in 2019 (United Nations, 2020).

Crime and its perpetrators are firmly entrenched in the Salvadoran psyche. The sudden influx of young Salvadoran-American gang members established a new and unprecedented reign of organised criminality over a fearful urban populace (Arana 2011, 98). However, their arrival served only as the catalyst for the manifestation of this order. The framework from which it was born already existed in the nation's cities, its disillusioned citizens, and the crumbling economy and infrastructure. As it tried to rebuild and revitalise after the civil war, El Salvador fit the criteria of a 'fragile state' (Rosen et al. 2018, 52): central authority existed but was weak, the police force was disorganised and unable to ensure the safety of citizens (Chavez 2016, 2) and public services were lacking as the new government proved unable to provide such basic services as healthcare, education, and employment (Chavez 2016, 2). The government's neoliberal restructuring of the state's infrastructure and institutions created wide-scale poverty and deprivation in both urban and rural areas (Chavez 2016, 4). Due to these problems, the government was plagued by crippling questions of legitimacy. This confluence of issues left El Salvador vulnerable to the emergence of social violence perpetrated by gangs and their founding members, the Salvadoran-Americans from LA (Arana 2005, 98).

Successive Salvadoran governments were confronted with the growth of gang control and a corresponding uptick in violence. The solution was a drastic crack-down on crime consisting of a series of hard-line, anti-crime measures known as the Mano Dura initiative (Chavez 2016, 5). Most important among these measures was the militarisation of the nation's police force and an increased amount of time served for gang membership (Chavez 2016, 5). While widely reported by Salvadoran media and strongly praised by the public, these measures were only short-term solutions (Chavez 2016, 5). Prisons filled up and joint police-military operations

claimed many lives, yet the gangs retained their hold (Van Der Borgh et al. 2014, 178).

Following a change in government, with the left leaning FMLN coming to power, Mano Dura ended (Vilas 1995, 9). The new government announced a 'de-securitisation' of conceptualising the gang problem, adopting a new approach which sought to prevent the underlying political, cultural and economic causes of gang expansion rather than the gangs themselves (Chavez 2016, 5). The government also stressed the need for dialogue and cooperation between the gangs and the government (Chavez 2016, 7). In 2012, it was revealed that the government had managed to broker a truce between the two major gangs: MS-13 and La 18 (Van Der Borgh et al. 2014, 176). The country was polarised with some against the truce and angry that the government was negotiating with violent criminals (Van Der Borgh et al. 2014, 176). The truce resulted in a sharp decrease in homicides, but other crimes such as extortion of local businesses continued unabated (Katz et al. 2016, 13) Ultimately, the truce fell apart after the succession of a new government (Katz et al. 2016, 666). Public opinion is currently critical of the truce, as well as any potential new dialogue with gangs due to the necessary corollary of cooperating with criminals (Vilas 1995, 8).

Salvadorans remain hopeful, especially at the prospect of new President Nayib Bukele, who has made ambitious promises to eradicate the gangs in three years (Markham 2016, 1). By refusing to cooperate with gang leaders in order to stop the tide of violence, he conforms to public opinion. Furthermore, his policies mirror those of the old conservative administrations, boasting tightened security and securing communities one at a time (Markham 2016, 2). However, militarisation historically tends to only work in the short-term and always has devastating repercussions, most notably loss of life (Zilberg 2011, 85). An ideal fix to the troubles the nation is enduring would be to give young boys and men educational and professional opportunities from a young age, thereby allowing them to build futures and find a place in society without the gangs.

As with many other crime-stricken regions across the globe, the most promising method of reducing crime is eradicating its causes. If the gangs are, as I have argued, a reaction to poverty, lack of infrastructure and a weak government, then addressing these root problems is the best way to go about limiting the power of *maras*. The majority of actions implemented to stop *maras* has been hostile - focus on targeting as many gang members as possible and hope that eventually there won't be any left to lead (Van Der Borgh et al. 2016, 176). The problem with this course of action is that the conditions of El Salvador itself create several new gang members for each one that police forces and the courts send to prison (Van Der Borgh et al. 2016, 177). The government exhausts its resources and the gangs barely contract. If the government were to redirect its focus and its resources on social issues - on educating the youth, creating jobs, and investing in infrastructure- it's possible the once fast flowing tide of new recruits will begin to ebb. Show young men they have the opportunity to build a life and identity that's not contingent on association with the gangs and they may well choose to do so.

In El Salvador, separating one's identity from the *maras* seems a radical thought - the omnipresence of the gangs seems to disallow it. They have killed millions and sent further millions fleeing the nation's borders to find asylum elsewhere (Does 2013, 3). Post-war El Salvador remains embroiled in a conflict that has outshone its civil war. The nation has fragmented with the rise of gangs - whose territories divide it into arbitrary sections- and a struggling government lacking the ability to put a stop to the violence. Questions of identity in El Salvador are complex. Original gang members began as immigrants; Salvadoran Americans forcibly returned to a country they did not know which lacked the infrastructure to provide for them. The streets are rife with young men who come from inescapable poverty, who feel gangs are their only escape, who find bravado and a sense of belonging in the *maras*. Salvadoran citizens inhabit a country haunted by traditions of fragility in authority, in services and in executive legitimacy - a country which provided fertile breeding grounds for the mass expansion of gangs into every facet of public and private life such that the only identities one could discern are gang members on the one hand and victims on the other. But if the government could invest in its people - and especially in the boys and young men struggling through poverty and disillusionment - a reduction in gang influence is possible. If the root causes for the rise of the *maras* is eliminated, so too can the maras be eliminated.

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LEVIATHAN

Failure to construct a common identity: The Iranian Reform Movement (1997-2005)

Marie Anna Reddingius details recent Iranian history and how a failure of identity construction led to the failure of a sinificant political movement.

The Iranian Reform Movement was active from the late 1990s until the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. The movement aimed to democratise the Islamic Republic and united feminist groups, secularists, student movements, and religious intellectuals in order to do so (Khosrokhavar 2002). In 1997, one of the reformers, Mohammad Khatami, was elected president in what was heralded as a 'turning point' for the country (Amuzegar 2002, 59). However, Khatami's reform movement is, now, widely considered a failure, with legal restraints in Iranian politics and Khatami's strategic miscalculations commonly cited as factors (Barlow & Akbarzadeh 2018, 232). It is essential to take issues of framing and identity construction into account – using Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) framework of hegemony and radical democracy, I seek to explain the rise and fall of the Iranian Reform movement from 1997-2005 with an eye to these issues. The absence of hegemonic democratic discourse combined with the failure of some elements of the movement to embrace radical pluralism prevented the construction of the common identity needed for permanent change to take place.

In 1997, Mohammad Khatami was elected President of Iran over his establishment-backed opponent (Kadivar 2013, 1073). Khatami ran on a platform of political reform, democracy, civil society, and rule of law (Ansari 2000, 95-6). Following the presidential election, reformers won the municipal councils and captured parliament in 2000 (Takeyh 2003, 45). Khatami's candidacy and the opportunities it provided inspired and mobilised a large number of political groups to work together. He was backed by a coalition of eighteen groups, which formed a formal umbrella organisation after his election: the 'Second of Khordad Front' (Kadivar 2013, 1073). The organisation included clerical reformists, lay reformists, student groups, nationalist groups, and secular democrats (Kadivar 2013, 1069; Bayat 2007, 111). In return for their support, Khatami's election gave their movement the opportunity to grow (Khosrokhavar 2002). Khatami was thus not so much their leader, but more symbolic and representative of a larger reform movement that consisted of multiple groups and sub-movements (Niakooee 2016, 402). However, after 2000, the coalition that had formed around Khatami in 1997 fell apart (Kadivar 2013, 1069). The reformists' defeat in the municipal elections in 2003, the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, and the popular apathy that followed marked the end of the window of opportunity for the Iranian Reform Movement (Amuzegar 2006, 58). Using Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) framework helps explain why the movement was initially successful, but ultimately failed to sustain this success.

To create a sustained series of collective actions, it is essential for actors and organisations working together in social movements to be able to identify each other as part of a larger collective (Diani & Moffatt 2016, 33-35). Laclau and Mouffe identify three requirements for forming these identity bonds. Firstly, a narrative has to be created which transforms relations of subordination into sites of antagonism, framing them as oppression (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, 153-154). Secondly, in order to unite different social groups against this oppression, a 'chain of equivalences' must be formed, which extends to other struggles by linking them to a pre-existing overarching hegemonic discourse (Ibid, 182). In the case of Iran, this concept could, for example, be applied to the various feminist and secular groups, and their struggles for equal rights and freedom of expression under the Iranian regime. Laclau and Mouffe's thesis is that when 'the democratic discourse

becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to subordination… the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against different types of inequality' (Ibid, 154). This is why, in order to create 'democratic equivalences', Laclau and Mouffe state that 'the democratic principle of liberty and equality' has to become 'a new common sense' (Ibid 154; 183). In Iran, this would mean that different groups could only work together successfully if they could connect their separate struggles to a shared understanding of democracy. Lastly, to unite different groups within one sustainable movement, Laclau and Mouffe state that the concept of 'radical and plural democracy' must be accepted; if different actors truly embrace the idea that in a democracy none of them has a claim to absolute truth, then a new common identity will be created (Ibid, 167; 184).

Initially, Khatami was successful, employing discourses of oppression and emphasizing the principle of liberty. He stated that thinking in society 'has to be based, first and foremost, on freedom' (Khatami 1998, 4). During his campaign, he used 'freedom' as the ultimate thematic frame within which he placed the more tangible directives of a strong civil society, rule of law, and democracy (Niakooee 2016, 399). Furthermore, he argued that 'tyranny could only be opposed through the institutionalisation of rights' (Ansari 2000, 97). By using the word 'tyranny', he employed the language of oppression to characterise the Iranian regime which had trampled civil liberties, imposed strict censorship on the press, and was known to torture, imprison, and execute political dissidents (Ghoreishi & Zahedi 1997, 87). Besides Khatami, other elements of the movement also used frames of oppression. The reformist press reached more than five million people in the first three years after the election (Niakooee 2016, 399) and operated as the movement's driving force and connection to its social base. It spread the movement's discourse by frequently using 'injustice frames' in the years 1997-2000 (Mashayekhi 2001, 300). Students, who formed the backbone of the movement, provided a national network of organisations all advocating for reform (Bayat 2007, 121; Ansari 2000, 97). They also used 'victimisation' as a critical part of democratisation discourse, employing traumatic narratives of victims of the regimes to emphasise the need for reforms (Mohammadi 2007a, 633). Thus, Khatami and the reformist movements as a whole were initially successful in creating sites of antagonism by framing the Iranian regime as oppressive.

Furthermore, reformist groups initially emphasized plural identities, connected by their similar experiences of oppression by an authoritarian regime (Bahravesh 2014, 268; Mohammadi 2007b, 17). For example, Iran's largest student organisation had been an extension of the state from the 1980s to the early 1990s. However, the organisation embraced a discourse of political pluralism in the years before Khatami's election (Bayat 2013, 41; Rivetti & Cavatorta 2014, 296). In the period 1997-1999, student demonstrations occurred frequently, which formed democratic equivalences by combining the struggles of students - such as 'the poor quality of food in the dormitory' - with wider issues of oppression that did not affect the students immediately - such as the lack of freedom of press, political prisoners, and the influence of the non-elected Guardian Council (Golkar 2015, 65). Therefore, it appeared that some aspects of the reformist movement were articulating the democratic discourses of equivalence and pluralism necessary to unite many different oppressed groups against the Iranian regime.

However, a shared hegemonic understanding of democracy and complete embrace of pluralism was missing, and the consequences of this became clear after 1997. To create democratic equivalences, the reformists had attempted to link their struggle to a larger hegemonic discourse of democracy. Since the early 1990s, intellectual debates about democracy had been presented in the Iranian press (Mashayekhi 2001, 303). However, during Khatami's presidency, the democratic discourse was still being developed. In 2001, Mashayeki wrote that 'the formation of a truly collective and democratic consciousness is still remote' (308). Ansari also stated that the social penetration and ideological commitment to civil society and political participation in Iranian society at that time was 'undoubtedly uneven' (2000, 148). It was felt that democracy in Iran was a philosophical debate instead of a possible institutional reality (Bayat 2007, 131).

Additionally, to be allowed publication by the judiciary, any democratic discourse in the Islamic Republic would have to combine democracy with Islam. Khatami had developed the notion of 'religious democracy', which would democratise the Islamic Republic without losing sight of its Islamic character, but the exact meaning of the term remained unclear (Bayat 2007, 96). The fact that the movement aimed to 'democratise' Iran but was unable to articulate a shared and clear understanding of democracy in the religious Iranian context would prove detrimental to its construction of a common identity.

This lack of democracy as a 'new common sense' became clear when Khatami shifted his master frame from 'freedom' to 'law and lawfulness' once he took office (Niakooee 2016, 399). Even though reformists now controlled the government and parliament, Iran's political system and doctrinal foundation of vilayat-i faqih (which prescribes the rule of Islamic jurists) ensured that Imam Khamenei and his hardliners still controlled the unelected judiciary and the Council of Guardians (Abdolmohammadi & Cama 2015). In what was essentially a conservative backlash (Takyeh 2004, 133), the reform movement was 'squeezed between the encroaching nonelected bodies, the security apparatus, ideological institutions and paralegal vigilante groups' (Bayat, 2007, 123). When a student was killed and hundreds arrested during a raid on Tehran University, Khatami did not side with the students (Kurzman 2001, 43). Instead, he urged them to follow the law and labelled their protests 'an attack on national security' (Rivetti & Cavatorta, 2014, 299). By ignoring a clear example of political oppression, Khatami showed that he valued lawfulness over democratic principles. The student movements[1] felt abandoned; the ideological debates that the events triggered caused the national umbrella organisation for student movements to split into several small groups, some of which openly rejected the president or even the system as a whole (Takyeh 2004, 139; Rivetti & Cavatorta 2014, 299). In 2003, the student movements formally left the Second of Khordad Front (Rivetti & Cavatorta 2013, 653).

After 2000, the reformist press was closed down and its leading journalists were harassed, jailed and tortured, leaving the movement with little means to communicate between or connect its various sub-movements (Paidar 2002, 253; Kadivar 2013, 1076). However, the short window of freedom of press before this had enabled debates about the role of the Supreme Leader and the concept of vilayat-i faqih, revealing stark differences between secular and religious-minded reformists. Different groups strongly disagreed on the extent to which the religious foundations of the country would have to be transformed in order to democratise. Afterwards, reformist political elites were reluctant to accept the secular forces as real partners, which severely weakened the movement (Arjomand 2005, 518; Bayat 2007, 131-134) and demonstrated not only the absence of a shared hegemonic understanding of democracy, but also that their embrace of pluralism was incomplete. In conclusion, this article demonstrates that elements of Laclau and Mouffe's framing and identity construction were essential in determining the trajectory of the Iranian Reform Movement. By combining the language of oppression with the concepts of 'freedom' and 'plurality', Khatami created a chain of equivalences and mobilized a large variety of actors. However, the eruption of ideological debates in his second term and the failure to reconcile religious and secular beliefs showed the absence of hegemonic democratic discourse and the failure of the reformist movement to embrace radical pluralism. Combined with severe state-repression, this prevented the construction of strong identity bonds and a sustainable common identity, ultimately contributing to the failure of the movement.

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LEVIATHAN

The Permanence of Middle Eastern Borders

Aaron Boehm argues that the pan-Arab project has failed, therefore solidfying the existence of distinct Middle Eastern states.

On 16 May 1916, the United Kingdom and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement, defining their spheres of influence in the Middle East. This was the first of several agreements that would go on to shape the modern Middle Eastern state system (Del Sarto 2017, 769). Now, in the midst of enduring regional conflict, analysts such as Patrick Cockburn (2013), Robin Wright (2016), and Muhammed Hussein (2019) predict that the region's borders will collapse. Indeed, declaring the 'End of Sykes-Picot' was a critical aspect of the so-called Islamic State's (ISIS) narrative during their 2014-2015 expansion (Belfast Telegraph 2014). Furthermore, a de facto Kurdish state in Iraq emerged after a 2017 referendum demonstrated overwhelming support for independence (BBC 2017). Since the end of the Second World War, however, Middle Eastern borders have proved resilient despite predictions to the contrary. This article will argue that analysts have overlooked significant historical events and misread geopolitical trends which suggest that Middle Eastern states are here to stay. This resilience is most obviously seen in the failure of pan-Arabism – the ideology promoting the unification of Arab states – in the twentieth century, but is also closely related to the increase in state power, and the role that international players have had in maintaining Middle Eastern borders for their own interests.

Perhaps the greatest threat to the post-War Middle Eastern state system in the twentieth century was that of pan-Arabism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the beginnings of a defined Middle Eastern state order emerged. Shaped by the American and European 'core' - the dominant western powers - being imposed on the Arab 'periphery', the dependent states possessed less-developed economies (Hinnesbusch 2015, 23). As a result, the borders of Arab states forwent the evolutionary processes of war and dynastic marriages which had shaped those of the core states, and the question of artificial boundaries became an immediate and important target for criticism in pan-Arab discourse. Three crucial events occurred in the development of pan-Arabism in quick succession: the creation of the Arab League in 1945, the foundation of the Ba'ath Party in 1947, and the rise of Nasserist Egypt following the Free Officers coup in 1952 (Manduchi 2017, 19). The ideologies of Nasser and the Ba'athists were similar in their calls for a united Arab nation. The Ba'ath Party's founding document begins, 'the Arabs are one nation and it is their natural right to live in one country' (Syrian History 2013). Under Nasser, calls for pan-Arab unity increased, culminating in the United Arab Republic (UAR), the political union between Egypt and Syria, in 1958.

Nonetheless, just as quickly as it rose, pan-Arabism began its decline following the collapse of the UAR in 1961 and the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967 (Del Sarto 2017, 777). Elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), less high-profile attempts at political union also failed, including the Federation of Arab Republics in 1971 and the Arab Islamic Republic in 1974 (Deeb 1989, 26). This decline in pan-Arabism was caused by increased state power and identity. National Role Conceptions (NRC) can be helpful in understanding this transition from a supranational to state identity. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) explain that NRCs signal 'a country's identity, its priorities and policies, and how it relates to other states' (Kaarbo 2012, 19). In other words, a state's NRCs reveal how it views itself in the international community. In this case, the Arab States found themselves caught between contradictory roles: sovereignty and pan-Arabism. As Walt (1985) explains, while pan-Arabism was a useful shortcut to establish state legitimacy, in reality it threatened the survival of existing regimes (Walt 1985, 21). The resulting conflict became obvious when attempts at

political union developed into struggles for power 'in which the ideology was used to justify intervention' by a regime against its rivals (Ibid, 22). Thus, using pan-Arabism to legitimise the state created a paradox, whereby a fundamental tenant of legitimacy simultaneously invited foreign interference. Using Egypt as an example, Barnett (1993) illustrates how states 'learned' or adopted new meanings and interpretations of pan-Arabism (Barnett 1993, 275). In the Egyptian case, this meant a fluctuation in inter-state cooperation under Faisal, political unification under Nasser, and 'raison d'etat under Sadat' (Barnett 1993, 289). As the expectations of the pan-Arabist role diminished after the 1967 defeat, Nasser was able to reconcile with much of the Arab world, establishing an alliance with King Hussein of Jordan and making amends with Saudi Arabia (Hinnesbusch, 196). When Sadat came to power in 1970, he successfully merged the pan-Arabism and sovereign state roles, eliminating their conflicting demands. Although pan-Arabist discourse recognised the artificiality of Middle Eastern borders and Arab leaders utilised this discourse as the foundation of their legitimacy, talk of unity ultimately undermined the sovereignty of the state, creating a security paradox. Thus, in order to rectify this paradox, leaders were forced to reassess their adherence to pan-Arabism and instead reassert the sovereignty of their state and borders.

Supranational identity continues to be important in the modern Arab states, however, there are clear differences in the way that this identity is now used by the state. From 1973-2012 the Syrian Constitution still called for 'the Arab revolution' in order to achieve the 'unity' of an Arab nation (Carnegie Middle East Center 2012). There are only three mentions of Syria as a state within this constitution, instead referring to the 'Syrian Arab Region' (Carnegie Middle East Center 2012) as a part of the wider Arab World. In comparison, the Syrian draft resolution of 2017 refers to Syria as a state 55 times, only alluding to its identity as an Arab state through its name: the 'Syrian Arab Republic' (Constitution Project n.d.). Similarly, the Iraqi constitution of 1990 identifies Iraq as a member of 'the Arab Nation' whose 'basic objective is the realisation of one Arab State' (International Constitutional Law 2004), yet the current constitution from 2005 never identifies Iraq as Arab, instead beginning the preamble with 'We, the people of Mesopotamia…' (Constitution Project n.d.). Furthermore, of the twenty-two members of the Arab League, only thirteen states ascribe themselves a primarily Arab identity (Table 1). Instead, the common bind between them is Islam, as all twenty-two members of the Arab League are also members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Table 1). The founding charter of the OIC is quick to recognise the sovereignty of its member states, calling on members 'to respect, safeguard and defend the national sovereignty…of all Member States' (OIC n.d.). Hence, state sovereignty in the Middle East has seemingly prevailed over the threat that supranational identity presented to it.

The fact that the state system has survived, however, does not guarantee the stability of the state itself. Noting that the pace of war over the past 100 years in the Middle East has not changed from that of the nineteenth century, Steven Cook (2016) contends that 'the conflicts unfolding in the Middle East today…are not really about the legitimacy of borders or the validity of [these] places. Instead, the origin of the struggles within these countries is over who has the right to rule them.' For example, the Syrian Civil War began as a protest against the legitimacy of their autocratic dictator, similar to protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere across the Arab world (Hinnesbusch 2015, 20). Protests against Arab governments again rocked the MENA in 2019, and just as in 2011, the symbols and slogans of the protest fell within a national discourse. In Lebanon for instance, far from questioning the legitimacy of the state, protests contain a sea of flags and chants of, 'the people want the downfall of the regime' (Al Jazeera 2019). Dictators have risen and fallen over the past decade, but all within the state system. The fight is not then about the legitimacy of the state, but rather over the legitimacy of the ruling government.

Although these conflicts often begin as crises of domestic legitimacy, maintaining the integrity of state borders is necessary to uphold the complex balance of national and international interests within the regional system. For Iran, the idea of a disunited Syria is unacceptable, and they have made an extensive effort to keep Bashar al-Assad in power and maintain the so-called Axis of Resistance (IISS 2019, 15). Equally important for Iranian regional interests is the building of a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea, to facilitate the arming of Hezbollah and other proxy forces (Melamed 2018). Similarly, Russia insists on Syrian territorial unity, while recognising the possibility of a Kurdish autonomous region (Trenin 2017). This has not only provided Syria an ally in a region once dominated by the interests of the United States (US), but it has also acted as a springboard to develop other relationships within the region. Now, nine years since the

beginning of the Civil War, Bashar al-Assad has claimed a victory; hollow as it may be, the state has been maintained (Khatib 2020).

International interest in maintaining territorial unity is also illustrated in Iraq, where a strong independence movement exists in Kurdistan. Iranian interests in a united Iraq are twofold, the first reason being that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would place a potential US and Israeli ally on its doorstep (IISS 2019, 13). Iranian objectives since the US invasion of 2003 have been to deny the US an outpost in the region (IISS 2019, 13). However, a supra-federated Iraq aids Iranian interests as it would mean that an old enemy could no longer offer a united response to any Iranian aggression, while further allowing Iran to consolidate their influence in the Shi'a south (Aljboury 2020). Secondly, both Iran and Turkey have a significant Kurdish population within their borders. Turkish and Iranian nationalists therefore view Kurdish independence movements, inside or outside their borders, as a threat to national identity. While instability may plague the Middle East, states are not permitted to collapse because of the geopolitical interests of other states.

To conclude, despite predictions by some Middle East analysts, Middle Eastern states are here to stay. The mid twentieth century presented the biggest ideological threat to the existence of Middle Eastern states, yet the interests of the state emerged victorious. While pan-Arabism questioned the legitimacy of each state, it was ultimately untenable, and rather than being a uniting factor, it caused a conflict between the roles that the states had constructed for themselves and was consequently used as a weapon to undermine their adversaries. As pan-Arabism declined and the state increased its power, the roles and identity of the Arab States also changed, resulting in state sovereignty no longer being called into question. Instead, conflict takes place within the existing system, and the chants and slogans used by protesters, from the 2011 Arab Spring to current protests, fall within a national discourse rather than that of supranational identity. Furthermore, regional and international players who have a vested interest in maintaining the unity of Middle Eastern states have proven crucial to their survival, ensuring the stability of the region in order to assert and maintain their own influence. The roles and interests of Middle Eastern States may change over the decades, but their borders are here to stay.

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Can a woman become President?

Ross Gale *investigates whether structural sexism in the American political system, dating back to the American Constitution itself, means that a woman will never sit in the White House.*

As the United States approached the January Iowa caucuses, the non-aggression pact between the progressive Democratic Party presidential nominee contenders, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, crumbled into acrimony (Riley-Smith 2020). Warren alleged that during a meeting between the two senators in December 2018, Sanders had stated his belief that a woman could not win the Presidency (Schwartz 2020). Sanders vehemently denied this, stating that Clinton won the popular vote: 'how could anybody in a million years not believe a woman could become president?' (Schwartz 2020). The idea that the office is inherently gendered would now appear outdated. Yet, since the very first American presidency in 1789, all 45 politicians elected to the post have been men (Friedman 2016). The 2020 election, however, has had a record number of six women campaigning for the Democratic nomination to run against the male Republican incumbent (Becker 2019). Thus, the question arises: could a woman overturn this historic male monopoly on the presidency and reach the White House? To answer this, the role of gender in the legal framework of the presidency must be assessed before considering whether social barriers to political gender parity operate within the media and the electorate itself.

The Constitution:

The US system of government is structured by the 1789 Constitution which outlines the terms of eligibility for the presidency in Article II. Three qualifications for the office are established: you must be a natural born citizen of the US, be at least 35 years old and be resident in the US for at least 14 years (U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5). Although these explicit requirements are ungendered, the use of 'he' in reference to the office-holder in the wider context of Article II fosters conflicting legal interpretation (Nelson 2015). While today it is implausible that the Constitution could be legitimately interpreted not to allow a female president (Nelson 2015), it is debated whether this equality is legislated in the Constitution or is, instead, a product of social change.

On one side of this conflict of legal interpretation are academics who argue the eligibility of female candidacy was mandated by the Constitution. Professor Mike Rappaport contends that the usage of the male pronoun does not imply an implicit requirement as at the time of drafting, the term was also used as a gender inclusive pronoun for all persons (Rappaport 2015). Professor Jon McGinnis argues that the use of 'he or she' is a new convention and, instead, using 'he' was the historical catch-all custom, evidenced in other historic literature such as the Bible (McGinnis 2015). Consolidating this interpretation is the Constitution's listing of requirements for offices, like the presidency and Congress, in clearly designated sections (U.S. Const. art. 1,

Illustration: Ananya Ambekar

§ 2, cl. 2). Rappaport thus criticises the addition of extra qualifications, beyond what is explicit, as in 'conflict with the constitutional structure' (Rappaport 2015). Indeed, as the drafters listed all other qualifications with greater precision, the question arises as to why they would settle on such an ambiguous form for a decisive gendered requirement.

The above school of thought is opposed by academics who, instead, contend the legal potentiality for a female president only emerged after legal reform, reflecting the social changes of the twentieth century. For example, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky believes the drafters had 'the original understanding' that the presidency would be held by a man (Chemerinsky 2013). Women only gained suffrage and explicit rights to hold political office with the 19th Amendment in 1920, centuries after the Constitution was drafted (General Records of the United States Government 1992). Chemerinsky argues that this meant the Constitution had to be interpreted as gender inclusive, regardless of its original intention (Calabresi 2011, 87). It does seem implausible that, prior to this reform, a Constitution that purposefully neglected to guarantee women any other political rights would have simultaneously allowed women to reach the highest political office. Given the contradiction in political rights women would have possessed if they had been fully capable of running for president before 1920, the 19th Amendment must be understood as the moment the presidency gained gender parity under the law. Thus, while the Constitution can plausibly explain why the presidency remained entirely male-dominated from 1789 to 1920, the continued male lineage for the last century raises further questions (Friedman 2016).

Sexism in the electorate:

The law, however, is not the sole force operating within the political sphere. Yet, if it is not responsible for this exclusively male cast of presidents, other factors must therefore be scrutinised as potential causes, such as whether the people themselves are a barrier to female presidency. Given today's social mores condemning its public expression, it is difficult to identify all voters decisively motivated by sexism. Kantar's Index for Leadership polling (2018, 20) showed only 52% of Americans were 'very comfortable' having a female president; although positive, and an increase from previous polls, this nonetheless suggests that female presidential candidates, from the onset, are disfavoured by 48% of the electorate.

Direct misogyny is further complemented by more subtle formations. David Paul and Jessi Smith studied the influence of gender on voters' perceptions of candidates in the run-up to the 2008 US presidential election. Notably, they found that female candidates were perceived as 'significantly less qualified' than men with 'similar credentials' (Paul & Smith 2008, 451). This gender bias becomes more salient given that it is firmly established 'that perceptions about candidates' competence influences voter choice' (Paul & Smith 2008, 453). Even if such findings do not completely prevent a successful female candidacy, this handicap could explain in part why men disproportionately succeed in presidential races (Paul & Smith 2008, 451).

The study further revealed that a misogynist contingent can also colour the political preferences and ideas of 'electability' of other voters in the electorate (Paul & Smith 2008, 452). Polling shows that one third of Americans assume their neighbour would not vote for a female (Paul & Smith 2008, 452) and Professor Kate Manne argues this encourages voters to lend support to the conventional male candidates who appear more capable of winning (Gontcharova 2019). Additionally, the assumption that sexism motivates a considerable swathe of the electorate may even encourage others to assume a misogynistic outlook. Within groups with a shared sense of identity and solidarity, people are more likely to accept beliefs that appear to be held by a majority and will 'go along with the crowd' to maintain good social relations (Sunstein & Vermeule 2009, 214-217). Thus, within electoral groups with a history of misogyny or a vocally misogynistic subset, sexism can be internalised by others as the prevailing social norm and thus not perceived as active sexism (Valentine et al. 2014, 405). This leaves the electorate systematically averse to a female presidency as significant rates of misogyny combine with those who accept and adopt this bias.

Sexism in the media:

Public opinion and, subsequently, electoral behaviour, is significantly influenced by how the media 'shape public debate' and 'focus public interest on particular subjects' (Happer & Philo 2013, 321). It is thus prudent to consider whether there is a distinct treatment of women in the media and whether this affects their electoral viability in presidential campaigns. This subject was the focus of a study by Northeastern University which analysed the treatment of female candidates in the 2020 presidential race through articles published by five prominent American news organisations. Differentiation by gender was isolated by assessing the tone of terms used in the coverage of each candidate. The 'media sentiment' measured revealed that male candidates had received a far more positive coverage across those media outlets than their female counterparts (Thomsen & Machado 2019). Ralf Dewenter contends that media coverage has a 'positive and significant' effect on voting intentions among the electorate, despite its impotency in affecting long-term party affiliation (Dewenter et al. 2018, 18). Specifically, he highlights that positive treatment by the media increases the support for the benefitting party (Dewenter et al. 2018, 18). Thus, given the media's ability to mould the electoral environment (Happer & Philo 2013, 321), it is evident that sexism in the press hinders the chances of female political contenders to a measurable and potentially decisive degree.

The media's distribution of political reporting, infused with misogyny, can plausibly be linked to the institutional dominance of men within the industry (Gontcharova 2019). A study by the Women's Media Centre has found 70% of political coverage and 74% of election news online is conducted by men thus creating an echo chamber of male perspectives (WWC 2017, 4). Given that Kantar's Index for Leadership poll showed only 45% of men were 'very comfortable' with a female presidency (Kantar Public 2018, 20), the statistical constitution of American media means it is likely that sexist male preferences will be amplified to the broader electorate. Furthermore, Martin Wettstein and Werner Wirth find that media output can strongly reinforce existing political opinions amongst aligned voters (Wettstein & Wirth 2017, 267), meaning that sexist coverage can entrench misogynistic attitudes even further. Given the power of the media to shape electoral behaviour (Happer & Philo 2013, 321), it is clear that this environment makes a female presidency less viable.

Are things changing?

While the barriers to a female presidency are clear, some argue that this marked hostility in society and the media is steadily waning. Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign cannot be ignored. Despite losing to Donald Trump and his record-low favourability ratings (Saad 2016), Clinton won over 65 million votes: a considerable swathe of the electorate, and only marginally less than Barack Obama in 2012 (Luhby 2016). Furthermore, this lesser total can be explained by salient factors unrelated to gender. Clinton garnered sustainably less support than Obama amongst ethnic minorities like African Americans (Luhby 2016) due to her reluctance to engage with race-based issues (Gause 2018, 255). Furthermore, she suffered for reasons other than her female identity, with her reputed corruption proving costly (Norton 2019, 40). Amy Pope argues that given Clinton's historically low favourability ratings (Saad 2016), a more 'electable' female candidate has every chance of securing the necessary vote share to win an election (Pope 2019).

This optimism is also backed by recent electoral statistics showing that when women run for political office in the US, they now have the same rates of success as men (Poloni-Staudinger & Strachan 2020). The disparity in gender representation, as only around a quarter of Congress and 29% of state legislatures are female, is, at least partly, a result of fewer women running for office in the first place (Poloni-Staudinger & Strachan 2020). Yet, in this presidential election, a record number of women ran for the Democratic candidacy and in 2018, a record number of women won in the congressional midterm elections (Poloni-Staudinger & Strachan 2020). Not only is this directional shift indicative of an electorate less influenced by misogyny than in the past, but some academics argue that seeing women in 'visible political office' encourages other women to engage in the political process and run for office too (Burns et al. 2009, 9).

David Broockman challenges this, however, instead arguing that his statistical analysis shows the election of female 'role models' has 'no meaningful causal effect' on the rates of female mass political participation or female candidacy (Broockman 2014, 202-3). This suggests that improved rates of female candidacy may not

materialise through the example of trailblazing women alone and gender inequality in political candidature may remain a salient factor weakening the chances of witnessing a female president (Broockman 2014, 203).

While electability may be a diminishing issue for women, polling of voters still evokes significant doubt, especially among women, that the highest office of the presidency is achievable (Scott 2020). While only approximately 9% of men believe a woman could not win a presidential election, around 20% of women thought it impossible (Scott 2020). While this not only explains the limited rates of political candidacy amongst women, this belief also encourages women to assume a preference for seemingly more electable male candidates.

Furthermore, the legacy of unequal political representation means there is a much smaller pool of women in senior political positions who can undertake a viable presidential campaign (Friedman 2016). Even if the traditional political career path can be bypassed, as Trump did on his journey to the presidency in 2016, women are still vastly underrepresented at the top of society, leading less than 5% of Fortune 500 companies (Friedman 2016).

Conclusion:

A woman could win the presidency in the 2020 election. Despite ingrained assumptions of masculinity in the Constitution, this outcome is undoubtedly legal (Chemerinsky 2013). Instead, what restricts the political viability of female candidacy is an electorate with a substantial tendency towards misogyny (Kantar Public 2018, 20) and media that systematically reports on women unfavourably (Thomsen & Machado 2019). Recent electoral results suggest these disadvantages may be decreasing in salience, yet, while they persist, women are discouraged from entering politics and the number of potential female candidates remains highly limited. While progress is evident, the chances of a new female president remain remote.

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Set in stone? Monuments, national identity & Sir John A. Macdonald

Christina Spicer *considers the controversey surrounding statues in Canada and what their existance means for relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in the country.*

National symbols, such as monuments, represent a country's values in public spaces. For this reason, they have become a socio-political battleground. David Kertzer (1988) suggests that the power of national symbols is in their ability to enable unity and solidarity while allowing for a plurality of meanings. That is to say, they provide the idea of unity without actual homogeneity. In Victoria, BC (British Columbia) a statue of Sir John A. Macdonald, Canada's first Prime Minister, was temporarily removed from outside city hall in 2018 as a gesture of reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report (2015) affirmed that reconciliation must go beyond mutually respectful relationships; there is a moral responsibility to make amends for the past. Victoria City Council had been in conversation with the Songhees and Esquimalt Nations regarding the most suitable approach to reconciliation, and, following the statue's removal, the aspects of Canadian history that should be included within Canada's national identity have been the subject of national debate. Debates like these do not just constitute a referendum on national identity but are part of the process of defining and forming it. In analysing the statue's history, context, and significance, Canada's identity evolves.

Monuments present layered meanings, speaking to both the past and present as 'memory system[s] transcribed in stone' - as civic compositions that teach us our national heritage (Boyer 1994, 33-34). Monuments remind a nation of its collective history, act as a cultural expression of identity, and can be used as a tool to legitimise a state. While they tend to have a relatively uniform, straightforward effect in culturally homogenous societies, the same cannot be said for societies which must accommodate a plurality of cultures and identities (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Haines 2018, 3). In North America, monuments have become a topic of contention in discussions of history, memory, identity, and power. American sociologist William Graham Sumner (1940) warned that monuments 'never help history, they obscure it. They protect errors and sanctify prejudices.' Ernest Renan (2013) argued that misrepresenting history is actually essential in creating a nation - due to its potential to be controversial and divisive, historical accuracy becomes a 'necessary' casualty of compromise between differing perspectives in the building of a national identity.

Beyond representing a selective account of history, monuments play a significant role in expressing what is remembered. Halbwachs (1992) distinguishes between history and memory, two different ways of knowing the past. Memory is always constructed and is located in the social environments of the present. Places of memory, including monuments, use the imagery of collective memory to promote commitment to the nation and its narrative. The idea that history and memory are constructed and socially acquired is central to Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (2006). His thesis - that nations are imagined political communities and memory is grounded in a mythic past - provides a framework for an analysis of how public imagination is invoked through the installation of monuments. Through the manipulation of history and memory, monuments can delicately orchestrate either a collective remembering or collective amnesia; a crucial aspect of nation-building.

In North America, the rise of multiculturalism and civil nationalism challenge monuments' symbolic unity. In recent years, the symbolism of monuments has been seriously questioned as racial tensions escalate, societal inequalities accumulate, and states continue to struggle to define the nation. These stone figures, which seemed powerless outside colonial ideologies, now have the ability to mobilise the nation in protest.

As the Macdonald statue had stood outside Victoria's City Hall since 1982, its temporary removal sparked debates about the monument's meaning, the representation of Canadian history, and the pursuit of multiculturalism. Macdonald is remembered as one of Canada's founding fathers and one of the country's greatest leaders, serving as Canada's first Prime Minister from 1867–1873, and then again from 1878–1891 (Creighton 1998). However, he is also remembered as the architect of the Indian Residential School System and as a colonial tyrant whose government oversaw the Indian Act (CBC 2018). At the time of the monument's commission, most Canadians were likely unaware of the cultural genocide caused by residential schools; the Canadian government did not offer a formal statement of regret until 2008 (Dorrell 2009, 28). Supporters of both versions of Macdonald's legacy were present during the monument's removal, some holding signs claiming, 'we're not erasing history, we're making history', while others wrapped themselves in provincial and Canadian flags and sang the national anthem (CBC 2018). The monument can easily represent a dichotomy, yet it can also be critically analysed in an effort to achieve reconciliation and nation-building.

The Macdonald statue embodies the tension between two competing perceptions of history: the first illustrating Macdonald as a founder of the nation, and the second portraying him as the villain of the story of Indigenous assimilation. Confirming Sumner's maxim about monuments, the City recognised that the monument has worked to obscure the nation's history and protect the errors of the powerful, and it now has the opportunity to dictate how the history of Victoria, as well as Canada, is presented. The removal of the monument does not simply correct the Canadian perception of history, however. The discourse surrounding the monument serves to inform society of an alternative understanding of history, bringing the monument's relationship to memory to light and providing a more holistic understanding of history. For some Indigenous people, the Macdonald monument is a 'painful reminder of colonial violence each time they enter city hall' (Helps 2018). For the majority of non-Indigenous Canadians who were opposed to the monument's removal, Macdonald activates an aspect of social memory that allows individuals to see themselves as a part of Canadian history (Dangerfield 2018). Using Halbwachs' theory that memory is socially constructed and acquired, the City is in a position to use the monument to reconstruct collective memory and, subsequently, the nation's identity. Removing the monument from the public sphere and controlling 'the depiction of history does not necessarily control public memory' (Benton-Short 2008, 10). Sir John A. Macdonald will continue to be remembered as a positive part of Canadian identity, whether or not his statue stands outside City Hall. Furthermore, looking beyond the material removal of Macdonald's physical presence, the City's authority could use this opportunity to re-invoke the public imagination and reconstruct memory to build a cohesive, multicultural Canadian identity.

Fundamentally, the motivation behind the monument's removal was reconciliation. The City's Witness Reconciliation Program works with the City to respond to the five recommendations highlighted by the TRC, but it also works towards fulfilling the TRC's mandate of informing Canadians about the cultural genocide that occurred within Indian Residential Schools (City of Victoria 2017). Marianne Alto, one of the City's councillors who voted for the monument's removal, commented that it will be 'a symbol of movement towards a future in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous Victorians share a community growing into one of alliance, understanding, acceptance and collaboration' (City of Victoria 2018). However, the City's failure to recognise the monument's influence on collective memory and Canadian identity excludes many non-Indigenous Victorians, arguably creating a deeper divide within society. Macdonald's removal may have furthered efforts for reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the City, but it neglects a spirit of reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the broader community. Although many anticipated support from the Chiefs of the Songhees and Esquimalt Nations for the removal of the monument, there remains a lack of consensus across Canada regarding the best approach to reconciliation. A poll conducted in Manitoba found that only 38 percent of the First Nations, Metis, and Inuit Manitobans surveyed believe that the removal of statues commemorating the Canadian leaders that participated in establishing residential schools should be considered a major aspect of reconciliation (CBC 2019). Rather, the results suggested that governments should focus on land claims and other structural sovereignty issues. The poll also asked Indigenous respondents for their thoughts on replacing the names of colonial figures who supported the residential school system in public spaces, yet the majority expressed that the increased public education on the province's history is of greater importance (CBC 2019). A focus on transforming collective memory by working to inform Canadians while fostering healing may thus

achieve the TRC's mandate more efficiently than the materialist removal of a monument.

By exclusively focusing on reconciliation, the 'truth' aspect of the TRC has also been overlooked. Made starkly clear by the nation's need for a TRC, Canada was founded on an element of 'forgetting' the injustices suffered by the Indigenous population. Despite warnings that remembering 'everything could bring a threat to national cohesion and self-image', the TRC attempts to awaken the nation from its 'collective amnesia' and promote a cohesively multicultural alternative identity which acknowledges the aspects of the past that were selectively brushed over and collectively forgotten (Misztal 2003). Removing Macdonald's statue does not bring the truth of Canada's history to the forefront of public consciousness; instead it could encourage a continued 'forgetting' of the horrors committed against Indigenous peoples. By ridding public spaces of problematic statues, society forecloses the discussions of their history, which are vital to the evolution of shared identity. A more inclusive process of reconciliation and re-evaluation of the Canadian identity could be achieved by re-contextualising the monument to educate Victorians about the truth of settler Canada.

As previously mentioned, the removal of Macdonald is temporary. Looking towards the future, what solutions are available for Macdonald? Herwitz (2011, 238) recommends a variety of models for the fate of contentious monuments: (1) the Budapest model, in which all communist monuments are put into a park at the edge of town; (2) the Berlin model, in which the population tears monuments down and keeps pieces as souvenirs; (3) the French model, in which monuments are cleansed of atrocity and placed in palaces of national culture; and (4) the American model, in which monuments are privatised and hired guides explain their contentious history for tourists. There is an opportunity now for Canada to pioneer another option: the 'Canadian model', in which colonial monuments are re-conceptualised and used by the state to communicate a new concept of national identity.

There are two ways in which the City of Victoria can follow the 'Canadian model' to foster reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians and cultivate an inclusive Canadian identity. Firstly, the Macdonald monument can be placed in the Royal BC Museum situated close to the City Hall. Although some museums remain highly colonial, many museums take on the role of cultural mediator in multicultural environments and enact strategies of representation for marginalised or forgotten memories. Curators view museums as social spaces which are 'dialogic, rather than authoritative' (Till 2003). Forty-four percent of Canadians agreed that this could be a good solution, although more than one-third of respondents also believed that the monument should return to its original location (Dangerfield 2018). Alternatively, Sir John A. Macdonald can be returned to the social sphere and re-contextualised through an addition to the display. Placing an Indigenous monument at Macdonald's side to capture an alternative version of what ought to be remembered would provide context for his role in Canadian history, reflecting an inclusive multicultural identity. Phillips and Phillips (2009) content that this juxtaposition between realties may not yet be an effective solution to illustrate Canadian's complex history, as Canadians have yet to discover whether two perspectives can occupy the same space. However, I believe that the fear of visual contradictions should not impede the depiction and discussion of the complexities of a postcolonial, multicultural society. The addition of new monuments would facilitate an understanding of the country's past by offering a process for expanding and acknowledging the different identities that have helped form history and memory (Benton-Short 2008; Breakfast, Bradshaw and Haines 2018). Although the Macdonald monument no longer represents a singular version of the past, it remains a necessary point of communication, appreciation, and negotiation for groups with different memories of the same events.

The bitter reality about life within postcolonial multicultural societies is that there will always be varied perspectives of history and memory competing for representation in the social sphere. Removing the Sir John A. Macdonald monument has enraged the Canadian right wing, galvanised nationalists, and failed to contribute to reconciliation within broader society, despite its intended purpose of focusing efforts on the reconstruction of collective memory. Charles Taylor (1989), a preeminent Canadian academic, argues that Canadians must 'learn how to live with these multiplicities of identity and yet achieve some kind of common understanding'. The people in Victoria, BC, along with the rest of Canada, must 'work with each other to preserve these historical identities with their differences intact.' The state will always maintain dedicated places of memory as a part of nation-building; the City of Victoria should not subdue the complex reality by removing monuments, but rather highlight Canada's contentious past to build an effective multicultural society.

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How identity politics defined the 2016 Presidential Elections

Lucy Cowie delves into the identity politics driving Trump's victory in the 2016 US Presidential Elections, followjng one of the most hostile election campaigns in recent history.

I n 2016, Donald Trump won the US presidential election after one of the ugliest and most divisive political campaigns in American history (Schlozman, Brady and Verba 2018, 8). Identity became a central feature of the election as an increasingly diverse nation became more polarised while Democrats and Republicans argued over what it meant to be 'American' (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018, 3). Hillary Clinton focused on recreating the "Obama Coalition" of racial minorities, unmarried women, younger voters and progressives and, in doing so, neglected the concerns of white working-class voters in the Rust Belt (Peele et al. 2018, 81). Since the election, a vast number of scholars and journalists have cited countless reasons, both speculative and concrete, for the Democrats' loss. These ranged from political malfeasance by the FBI to gender bias faced by Hillary Clinton. However, prominent amongst these factors was that 11-15% of voters who had voted for Obama in 2008 and 2012 had now voted for Trump, with higher concentrations in critical Midwestern swing states (states which do not consistently vote for one party, making them highly contested in presidential elections) awarding Trump his win in electoral votes (Cohn 2015). 'Party sorting' is defined as the transfer of voters from one party to another, on the belief that their interests are better represented (Fiorna 2016, 5). Trump's politics of social and racial resentment, economic insecurity, and narratives of elite corruption accelerated the party sorting of white working-class voters, transferring their votes from the Democrats to the Republicans.

The significance of the white working-class vote to the success of the Democratic Party must be explored. Traditionally, white working-class voters across America voted for Republicans, but in the labour heartlands of the Rust Belt/Upper Midwest region, working-class voters had been strong bastions of Democratic support (Masket 2017). Going into 2016, these states had been considered "safe states", with a belief that these voters would hold true. However, in 2016, these voters proved to be a strong core of the Trump coalition, with Trump defeating Clinton 61% to 34% among working-class white women and 71% to 23% among working-class white men (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019, 140), compared to Obama who received 33% compared to 64% (Teixeira and Halpin 2012, 7). Working-class voters have been shifting towards the Republican party since 1970 (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019, 141), yet the shift in

2016 indicated a reshuffling within American politics. The last time Wisconsin voted Republican in a presidential election was 1984, suggesting that the Trump campaign reinforced a longer-term trend.

Simultaneously, college-educated voters have shown a sharp trajectory into the Democratic constituency, creating a "diploma divide" between the Democrats and Republicans. Educated voters discontented with the Republican party have been defecting to the Democrats, whose share of college-educated voters has increased from 42% in 1994 to 58% in 2018 (Pew 2018). Trump's candidacy, and now presidency, has repelled white college graduates and contributed to his decreased vote share amongst this demographic (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018, 224). Michael Stances (2019, 671), using a county-level system of analysis, found that counties calculated to be highly educated had a 28-point swing in favour of the Democratic party over lower-educated counties. This difference increased from just 16 points in 2012, further demonstrating a shift of college-educated voters away from the Republicans, towards the Democrats.

Crucially, however, there are more white voters in America without college degrees (47% of the electorate) than with (22% of the electorate) (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 163). Accordingly, the growing tendency of non-college-educated voters to vote Republican was significant to Trump's win; Clinton would have won by 30 electoral votes if the least-educated 20% of counties had followed the same voting pattern as in 2012 (Stances 2019, 667). A clear pattern of party sorting was apparent in 2016, demonstrating the closer alignment of parties with economic and education levels.

These patterns of party sorting were accelerated by Trump in several key ways. Abramowitz and McCoy (2018, 146) compared the levels of racial/ethnic resentment among educated and non-educated white voters, finding that those with high levels of resentment voted overwhelmingly for Trump, regardless of education. Trump received 87% of support from the most racially resentful white, working-class voters, whilst the Republican party, overall, has witnessed support from the least racially resentful voters fall from 48% in 2000 to 24% in 2016 (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 143). Significantly, 50% of non-college graduates showed high levels of racial resentment overall, compared with 31% of college graduates in 2016 (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 143). Thus, while the education divide in 2016 was considerable, the role of racial resentment was stronger.

By linking diversity and globalisation into a single narrative and railing against it, Trump was subsequently able to link racial resentment and economic insecurity (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 122). High racial resentment became the strongest predictor of voting intention, next to partisan alignment (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 144), as Trump created a strategy based on racial resentment that resonated with many white, working-class Americans. Trump campaigned on economic insecurity, for example, condemning layoffs of American workers due to manufacturing outsourcing (Kivisto 2019, 216). Thus, the perception of economic 'deservingness' became a crucial factor, as demonstrated through complaints in rural areas of Ohio which were adopted by the Trump campaign to argue that job insecurity was created by minorities and, specifically, immigrants (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019, 176). The historically high level of non-white support for the Democratic party, enjoyed during the Obama years, masked the parallel decline in white support and increase in resentment (Peele et al. 2018, 20). Trump's leading role in the "birther" movement of intense racial paranoia alone indicates the role of racism in his campaign. Thus, partisan alignment was particularly distinct in 2016 as economic factors were refracted through social identities (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 80).

Resentment was a critical aspect of Trump's 2016 politics, as socio-racial resentment among the working-class was used to galvanise support. A 'coalition of symbols' is formed by voters around candidates to determine what they stand for (Mast and Alexander 2019, 38). In 2016, Trump successfully built such a 'coalition' which established him as the populist candidate, standing against the political and social elite (Norton 2019, 45). He incorporated 'nostalgia narratives' which constructed a collective identity around race, ethnicity and class (Polletta and Callahan 2019, 58). Katharine Cramer's analyses in The Politics of Resentment demonstrate how powerful this association with social identity was; those who felt disaffected and ignored by the mainstream political establishment were inclined to support the Republican candidate (Cramer 2016, 9). The 'us versus them' mindset was also clearly evident, as individual experience was submerged into that of the identity group (Jacobs 2019). Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political explains how group identity is the core of politics, particularly the animosity which inevitably arises between groups and how it can be used for political aims (Schmitt 2007, 32-3). Trump's campaign became bizarrely akin to Obama's 2008 promise of change, but

with the promise of reverting to more traditional values (Norton 2016, 49). Therefore, through his nostalgic narrative, calling for a return of the white working class to its 'traditional' place at the centre of conceptions of American identity, and for exclusion of those who did not conform to it, Trump was able to accelerate the party sorting of the white working-class into the Republican fold. In 2016, America's electorally dominant group, white Christians, reduced in numbers for the first time due to increasing racial and ethnic diversity on the national level (Sides, Tesler and Varveck 2018, 4). Whilst demographic changes affecting the politics of white voters were not new in 2016, Trump's explicit connection between this consequence of globalisation and the loss of white working-class economic prosperity drew significant support for the Republican Party.

This resentment from the working-class was further linked in the media, as well-rooted identification, as well as class, became a key feature of the election cycle (Crammer 2016, 9). Only four months before the November election, two thirds of Trump supporters who participated in a poll about media preferences stated that their most trusted news source was the deeply and dogmatically conservative Fox News (Suffolk Poll 2016). The frequent discussion of political correctness and the 'dangers' of multiculturalism reinforced viewers' beliefs of a genuine cultural loss, which became a crucial part of the Trump campaign (Polletta and Callahan 2019, 68). While cities are increasingly diverse, outside of these liberal hubs is a predominantly white, rural population with ever-stronger Republican tendencies in recent years (Cramer 2016, 14). Major East coast publications tended to disregard the genuine appeal of Trump in these states where industry had suffered significantly (Jacobs 2019, 92) and where the spread of Republican-leaning voters was critical to the electoral, less so to the popular, outcome. Clinton may have won the popular vote, but she lost the election due to the Electoral College system. If the most predominantly liberal states, New York and California, were removed from the Electoral College, she would have lost the popular vote by three million votes (Mast and Alexander 2019, 2).

It is therefore is necessary to consider whether the American public have significantly changed their political views, or if partisan media has allowed more ideologically extreme candidates to surface. There has been significant party sorting amongst the working-class since the late twentieth century (Fiorina 2013, 60) which chronologically corresponds with a decrease in numbers of swing voters (Stances 2019, 672). The Republicans have more closely aligned with disaffected white Americans, and the Democrats with racial minorities and immigrants (Fiorina 2013, 60). Thus, as social identity converges with partisanship, we see a similar kind of fierce election cycle as 2016 (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019, 134). This is also reflected in two of the defining influences of the 2016 election: negative partisanship (disliking the opposing party more than liking one's own) and affective polarisation (the belief that the opposing party is not only wrong, but dangerous) (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018, 201). Economic and political dissatisfaction were powerfully shaped by political identities, while partisan alignment was increasingly linked to race and ethnicity by Trump's campaign. (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018, 168.)

There are other plausible reasons behind the election's outcome. Fierce debates between Clinton and Sanders in 2016 split the Democratic Party, which struggled to re-align itself in time for the June Convention and isolated certain voting groups (Bitecofer 2018, 84). Clinton was labelled as 'corrupt' by Sanders' campaign early in the nomination process, which haunted her for the duration of the campaign and was magnified by investigations alongside the election (Mast and Alexander 2019, 40). Notions of trustworthiness in presidential campaigns concern whether a candidate is perceived to be truly serving the interests of their voters (Crammer 2016, 38). Trump's emphasis on the untrustworthy political agenda of the liberal elite was crucial in a campaign which revolved around personality and Clinton's arguments against Trump were evidently less convincing to the white working class than his focus on elite corruption in his appeal to new voters (Norton 2019, 49). The notion of untrustworthiness proved to be decisive.

Trump's 2016 election win was a shock to many who failed to recognise the wider trends of party sorting prior to 2016. Trump's election campaign utilised high levels of racial resentment and economic discontent within the white working-class and alienated college-educated voters. Trump's denouncements, directed at 'elites' in Washington working against the working and middle classes, also fell directly on the previous eight years of Democratic government (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 139). The gradual shift of white working-class support from the Democrats was, therefore, rapidly accelerated through Trump's 2016 campaign, creating a powerful coalition of socio-racial resentment and elite corruption, exacerbated by the media and the Electoral College system.

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Ancient DNA and modern identity: the promise and pitfalls

Colleen Gibbs examines the way that studies of DNA provide potential new means of understanding identity, but also how it presents a number of new questions.

In 2018, the Natural History Museum in London unveiled its reconstruction of the Cheddar Man - a Mesolithic inhabitant of what is now Britain found in Gough's Cave in Cheddar Gorge, Somerset - who appeared to have blue eyes and dark skin. 'Was Cheddar man white after all? There's no way to know that the first Briton had "dark to black skin" says scientist who helped reconstruct his 10,000-year-old face', wrote the Daily Mail shortly thereafter, in response to the negative reaction by the British public (Collins 2018). Over the past hundred years, the public's interest in the past, their own personal histories, and that of their neighbours has increased as new sources of both genetic and genealogical information have become increasingly accessible. In the context of archaeology and heritage studies, the process of communicating to the public the nuanced findings of a rapidly changing field of study has descended into an ongoing crisis. Academic research seeks to resolve questions about the past and persuade the reader to incorporate new concepts, but when that evidence challenges widely held beliefs, the very act of sharing it threatens trust between the public and the academic worlds. Politicians and the public crave identities that are monolithic and easily differentiated, but the tools of scientific inquiry have repeatedly shown that populations and societies are complicated and fluid, across both time and geography.

Recently, the settlement of the British Isles and the development of agriculture in Europe have been subjects of contention within archaeology that have been difficult to explain to the public. The Mesolithic-Neolithic transition in human history marks the move from hunter-gatherer collectives to societies with developed agriculture and animal domestication (McCarter 2007, 16-47). While the Neolithic transition occurred at different times and in different places across the globe, the earliest certifiable appearances of agriculture are in the Fertile Crescent, a region of southwestern Asia (Larson, 2007). Typically, agriculture is believed to have spread from there into Europe over a few thousand years (Cummings 2017, 9-10). The impetus for the Mesolithic-Neolithic transition is the subject of two competing theories: that the technology was adopted by the locals (Thomas 2013), or through a migration event that entirely replaced the material culture and genetic composition of European populations within the region (Sheridan 2010, 89-105).

At the turn of the twentieth century, European cultural identity entered a transitional period and the field of archaeology was in its infancy as an academic discipline. This early archaeological theory was heavily influenced by linguistics, classics, history, and antiquarianism - the precursor to the field as we know it today. Gustaf Kossinna, an early twentieth century writer on the spread of Indo-European languages and an extreme German nationalist, was one of the first archaeologists to propose the concept of an archaeological culture (Trigger 2006, 235-242). While his methodology and theories remain important, his theory of Indo-European language spread was controversial, both with his contemporaries and with modern scholars. Kossinna posited that, on the basis of Corded Ware Pottery Culture development and its associated human remains, the Proto-Indo-European language may have originated in a region of Germany in the Neolithic period. His theories were used to support German nationalist beliefs in the period and were influential in the rise of Nazism. Within the field of archaeology, Kossinna's work in the study of Germanic Prehistory is contested, but his contribution of the concept of an archaeological culture is respected. This concept was further developed by the archaeologist Gordon Childe, who solidified the idea of cultural association with artefacts and the remains of the people who were discovered in conjunction with them (Trigger 2006, 240-242). These interpretations came before

there had been large scale studies of the Mesolithic and Neolithic in continental Europe, and long before any chronology was established with radiocarbon dating (Cummings 2017, 7). Communication between academics and the public with regard to the past should be a priority, so that it cannot be used to justify any actions in the present that support personal identity protectionism.

As Britain's oldest near complete human skeleton, the 'Cheddar Man' is an elegant example of incongruous ancestry and location of origin, and provides an unusual look into the representation of Britain's prehistoric national heritage. Recently, the ancient DNA (aDNA) sequencing and subsequent facial reconstruction of the 'Cheddar Man' brought controversy as his genetic make-up indicated dark to black skin, dark hair, and light eyes, generally deviating from the native British public's understanding of their looks and ancestry. When examined further, it became apparent that the 'Cheddar Man' may not have looked like the projections his aDNA analysis indicated, but he was also not from a haplogroup related to more than a quarter of the British population (Brace et al. 2018). This indicated that he did not share a common ancestor along the matrilineal or patrilineal line with the majority of the native British population, and that he did not represent the genetic past of the majority of the British people. A noteworthy detail in the biography of the 'Cheddar Man' is that carbon dating places him in the early Mesolithic, far before the advent of agriculture, and far detached from any known modern society; when the 'Cheddar Man' was alive, Britain was most likely still a part of mainland Europe. At this point, disregarding the actual modelling of the 'Cheddar Man's' genetics, the public backlash to the findings are indicative of a greater issue. When the public's view of the past does not coincide with academia's current findings, the tendency for the public to further discredit academia, even in the case of solid research, becomes an ongoing problem. When academics who research topics that are primarily funded by the public reveal findings contrary to the popular mythos of the public's identity, conflict is bound to occur. With enough backlash, research can become discredited or researchers will even distance themselves from their own work, as is the case of those who performed the genetic reconstruction of the 'Cheddar Man' (Barras 2018).

Deoxyribonucleic-acid (DNA) and the human genome are becoming prominent features of individual identity, as the cost of genome sequencing has dropped, and the public have begun to take significant interest in their genetic past to create more accurate depictions of their personal heritage. Unfortunately, there are some major issues with mass market DNA, testing not just in terms of accuracy, but in terms of method (Rutherford 2018). For the most part, single nucleotide-polymorphisms (SNPs) - which are made up of small mutations on long strings of genetic code - are compared with the genetics of modern populations; ancestry is then determined by matching variations in non-coding regions of genetic code with other groups in modern populations that have those same mutations (Zeng, 2016, 891-896). Most modern ancestry testing takes place in the form of analysing non-coding SNPs from the mitochondrial DNA recovered and does not take into account the nuclear DNA (Williams, 2002, 246-259). This indicates that most DNA analysis is designed to only trace the maternal line, and as such is only indicative of part of the picture (Wallace, 781-785).

Beyond the issues of SNPs' reflection of ancestry in modern samples, aDNA is made up of small fragments of genetic code that are typically significantly shorter in length than modern DNA. Ancient DNA strands tend to be around forty to five hundred base pairs in length, whereas modern DNA consists of 3.2 billion base pairs in the nucleus (Brown 2011, 9-37). This means that contamination by modern human DNA can occur easily and that, even as cases of aDNA genetic reconstruction get better, as geneticists increase their understanding of the human genome, the reconstructions of ancient remains can only go so far; the physical archaeological sample is limited, and sampling must be undertaken with caution due to its destructive nature.

In the late 1990s, the skeleton of a Paleo-American was uncovered in Washington State, the United States of America (USA). The remains of this individual are commonly referred to as the Kennewick Man or, in the Native American community, the Ancient One (McManamon 2004). Under the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) the remains of native peoples found on federal lands are to be returned to the most closely related group. When the Kennewick Man was first uncovered this led to controversy, as the extreme age of the remains made it difficult to determine which group he should belong to. This issue was exacerbated by the popular press when the initial analysis of the remains made reference to the description of 'Caucasoid features'(Burke, 2008, 27-37). This term was quickly misinterpreted in the popular media to mean Caucasian or white. As the confusion regarding the Kennewick Man's lineage spread and became national news, groups all over the country claimed the remains, including the Asatru Folk Assembly, a neo-

pagan organisation (Burke 2008). The controversy around the Kennewick Man's lineage persisted for twenty years and was only resolved in 2015 when aDNA analysis revealed the genetic link between the remains and local tribes, as well as links with a group in South America. While the remains were eventually reburied by the local tribes, the similarity in genetics meant that had a competing group chosen to do so, the claim could have been disputed (Anonymous 2016, 7). This episode exemplifies the complexity of human lineage, and the fact that genetic analysis can be a powerful tool to either resolve uncertainties or to create fertile ground for new disputes. While the perception of academics has always differed from the public to some degree, in the age of targeted advertising it is more important than ever to reinforce the notion that identity is a fluid concept in regards to the past, and that theories reflect the interests of the public and the researchers at present.

Clearly, the reaction in North America is indicative of a wider social phenomenon, and the reaction in the United Kingdom (UK) is also indicative of an opposite phenomenon. The tie between social identity and genetic past is often blurred in North America due to an emphasis on the 'melting pot' of American culture which initially sought to create a cohesive national identity (Stoll 2018, 11-17). The reactions in the USA to the Kennewick Man are in stark contrast to those in the UK regarding the 'Cheddar Man' because, in one case, genetic reconstruction solved the controversy surrounding the remains, and in the other, it was the cause of the controversy in the first place.

However, in Britain, where many people believe that their families have resided there for thousands of years, the idea that new data may suggest that one is descended from colonists or immigrants may provoke ire, even if those immigrants came thousands of years ago (Kumar 2003, 3-7). The benefit of aDNA reconstruction in the study of population migration is irrefutable but, like the exploitation of Kossinna's theories for German nationalist agendas, the overinterpretation of DNA data with regards to modern mythologies represents a danger. In the past three years genetic analysis has revealed that Kossinna's theories of Indo-European language spread have grounding in genetics (Bramanti et al. 2009,137-140). Where the tools of genetic analysis brought clarity to the Kennewick Man case, a thorough genetic analysis of material remains has returned credibility to Kossinna's unpopular theories.

Past material culture, genetics, and intangible culture all inform the development of our identities as we perceive them today. Allowing for any one theory to have a major impact on individual or communal identity is potentially harmful, not just to the study of the human past, but to the relationship between those who interpret our past and the public's understanding of the present. The controversies that developed surrounding Kossinna's theories, the 'Cheddar Man', and the Kennewick Man represent a mismatch between the historical, archaeological, and genetic perspectives in academia and the public present surrounding identity.

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The ethics of humanitarian intervention: the Rohingya and Uighurs

Samantha Kichmann *explores the ethical and political factors at play in an analysis of international humanitarian intervention through a case study of the Uighurs and Rohingya.*

Currently, there are two particularly pressing human rights crises attracting international attention: the state-sponsored persecution of Uighurs in China and of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Both groups are Muslim ethnic minorities who claim victimhood of various abuses at the hands of their governments. The Uighurs are an indigenous Turkic people hailing from the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, with a historically complicated relationship with China: the Uighurs have expressed a desire for independence since the 1980s, while Beijing claims that Uighur nationalists have resorted to terrorism against the government (Terhune & Jonathon 2016, 142-144). In Xinjiang, at least one million Uighurs are detained in 're-education camps' that Western powers can observe only via satellite imaging (Perlez 2019). Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the Rohingya have long been an oppressed minority, frequently subject to detention in internally displaced persons camps and to direct and structural violence, including ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide (Kingston 2015, 1167). Both cases raise the question of whether intervention is necessary and, if so, who has the responsibility and ability to intervene. The liberal West has long considered humanitarian intervention to be an essential duty (Pattison 2002, 268), but how can interventions take place without taking the form of Western-centric neo-imperialism or an imposition of Western interests over local ones?

In an attempt to answer this question, we will review relevant tenets of just war theory and Mutua's 'Savage-Victim-Saviour' conception of universal human rights in an attempt to define ethical intervention and bound it within a theoretical framework. I posit that, though a need for intervention can be rightly recognised, the actual undertaking of intervention requires testing cases through Just War Theory and through frameworks that mitigate the imposition of Western priorities and saviour narratives.

Just War Theory:

There is an effective consensus among just war theorists on the validity of at least 6 constitutive principles of jus ad bellum, which literally translates to 'right to war', denoting the preconditions that must be present in order for any declaration of war to be considered as just. Of those six, humanitarian intervention is most concerned with the following four: 1) War may only be undertaken as a last resort; 2) It must be fought with the right intentions, which include neither self-interest nor punitiveness; 3) There must be a reasonable chance of success; And 4) the war effort should be

proportionate to the threat it means to neutralise, and destruction should be as minimal as possible (Moseley).

Intervention may only be rightly used to mitigate the most egregious of threats such as state-sponsored genocide (ICISS, 31), which allows foreign governments to disregard the sovereignty of the perpetrator state: the state's failure to protect its own citizens from harm subjects it to the open possibility of foreign intervention.

Savage-Victim-Saviour Framework:

The Savage-Victim-Saviour (SVS) framework, first conceptualised by Makau Mutua in 2001, highlights some of the problems within Western interventionism and approaches to human rights. Employing the metaphorical construction of 'savages' pitted against victims and their saviours, Mutua scrutinises discourse within the human rights movement with a critical eye on the fact that contributors to this discourse are primarily 'Western states, the UN, international NGOs, and Western academics' (Mutua 2001, 202). This yields a persistent Western-centric binary of good versus evil (Mutua 2001, 202).

The Savage:

First, there is the savage: normally, the 'perpetrator'. This figure is typically depicted as so unimaginably cruel that their public image becomes one of pure barbarity and amorality (Mutua 2001, 202). In human rights discourse, the perpetrator state often fills the role of the savage by being illiberal, anti-democratic, authoritarian, and resistant to guaranteeing civil rights. Mutua instead posits that it is the cultural foundations of a state that allow it to deny human rights to its people (Mutua 2001, 203).

The Victim:

Those people being denied their rights are most often cast as the victim – they are the innocent and powerless humans under assault by the savage. Only one particular kind of victim is recognised by human rights doctrine: someone who suffers directly from torture or genocide, rather than, for example, someone who dies from a famine in the country (Mutua 2001, 203).

The Saviour:

The final role in Mutua's paradigm is the saviour: the actor who 'protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards'. The saviour promises to restore freedoms embodied in the universal human rights corpus. Mutua (2001, 204-205) points out that this corpus, while well-meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric and firmly located within a historical and cultural context of colonialism that undermines claims of universality. He argues that his metaphorical construction 'rejects the cross-contamination of cultures'; that is to say, Western cultures attempt to make non-Western cultures align with their cultural systems whilst imagining the non-Western cultures to be inferior (Mutua 2001, 205). Western values, therefore, emerge as the panacea to all the world's human rights abuses.

Mutua urges the human rights movement to become 'multicultural, inclusive, and deeply political,' rather than based solely on Western ideology and worldview (Mutua 2002, 13).

Additional considerations: where the West has gone wrong:

Western interventions have been subject to great scrutiny before, which further complicates considerations for future interventions by outside states – it is difficult to set rules for correct justification and conduct of foreign interventions without any accepted precedent for such. Considering intentions, Johanna Damboeck's analysis of intervention in Darfur (2012, 296) found that the UK, USA and France 'were the leading actors in the decision to intervene militarily' and both the UK and the USA's attitudes were influenced by other foreign policy decisions, rather than by human rights alone. Damboeck concluded that while humanitarian responsibility was used as the legal justification, states were largely influenced by their national interests (Damboeck, 296). This outside

influence calls into question the reasons behind the timing of intervention; it also jeopardises jus ad bellum because states go to war with the wrong intentions.

Another case, the 2003 US and UK joint invasion of Iraq, was 'justified' by the aggressors citing humanitarian concerns. However, it is now clear that it would have been more prudent in the long run to tolerate Saddam Hussein, or at least to commit more firmly to exerting diplomatic and economic pressure on his regime, rather than risk the toll of death and destruction that resulted from the invasion (Heinze 2007, 177) and the regional instability that persists even today. Additionally, this war demonstrated that the intended beneficiaries must actually be in favour of foreign intervention and that they receive it only from states of their choice (Altman and Wellman 2008, 243). This links back to the principles of proportionality, 'last resort', and 'reasonable chance of success', none of which were satisfied in the case of the Iraq War.

More broadly, Just War scholar Jean B. Elshtain (2001, 4) claims that 'no one can intervene without getting blood on their hands', meaning that the interveners must proceed with care to not becoming an aggressor themselves, causing the least possible harm while also ensuring that their own combatants are not at unsustainable risk. This caution connects to the cautionary note about overreach within the Just War tradition, reaffirming proportionality and non-combatant immunity (Elshtain, 4).

Case studies: Rohingya and Uighurs:

These frameworks are first applied here to the case of the Rohingya, a community recognised by the international community as victims of an ongoing genocide. Unfortunately, in this case, there is little political will to spur intervention (Kingston 2015, 1170). Without political motivation and multilateral support (especially within the UN Security Council), intervention is unlikely to occur. China and Russia, both holding permanent membership on the UN Security Council (which often discourages significant international response to any of their actions), seldom support interventionist measures. This creates a catch-22 of intentions: without political interests supporting, Western governments have little individual motive to intervene, but if they did have such interests, the purity of their humanitarian intentions would be jeopardised. However, overreach and problematic motivations can be uprooted by multilateralism, that is, an alliance of multiple countries pursuing a common goal, and, in turn, reduce nationalist resistance from Myanmar (Dobor 2015, 501). Unfortunately, most multilateral actions are still determined by Western societies, thus posing the risk of imposition.

Furthermore, it is uncertain if this crisis has reached the threshold of 'last resort'. Recently, Gambia accused Myanmar of genocide in the Rakhine state at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which launched an investigation into these allegations (Bowcott 2019). This investigation allows Myanmar to respond, as well as offering potential justice for the victims. It is also a step taken towards 'last resort': if Myanmar does not respond accordingly, the impetus for intervention increases. Moreover, the ICC case will focus on prosecuting individual, rather than state, responsibility (International Criminal Court, 2019), placing the case more firmly within the purview of Mutua's framework. Additionally, it must be noted that Gambia is a non-Western state, which indicates that inclusive multilateral interests might effectively mitigate the potential primacy of Western imperialist motives.

Based on her research on media coverage of human rights in Myanmar and using Mutua's framework, Lisa Brooten has argued that Western media covers the crisis in a highly selective way. Brooten determined that the Rohingya Community Facebook page, often used as a source by journalists, illustrates Rohingya suffering whilst portraying the Rakhine Buddhists, the Arakan security forces, Bangladeshi officials, and the Burmese police and military as savages (Brooten et al 2015, 725). The saviours are depicted as the international human rights corpus from Mutua's framework alongside various Muslim groups. Additionally, 'justice, rule of law, democracy, freedom, and restoration of ethnic rights emerge as more metaphorical saviours' (Brooten et al., 725). This has then been reflected in Western media coverage of the Rohingya, which tends to characterise the US as the patriarchal saviour of both global and local victims, as well as presenting various roles for foreign investment and Myanmar's media (Brooten et al., 728). Interestingly, she found that the Inter Press Service (IPS) assigns agency to the Burmese themselves in solving such problems, whereas the New York Times reinforces the responsibility of the US and its allies, invoking common humanity to justify a framework with very specific saviours (Brooten et al., 733).

This study demonstrates that Western news should be viewed with scepticism, while reinforcing Mutua's idea that the Western spectator and would-be intervener must consider the agency of the at-risk population to be decisive for the possibility of intervention. These considerations must be made alongside the complex frameworks imposed by Just War Theory. While intervention may theoretically serve to protect, it can become disproportionate, badly intentioned, and often fails to exhaust all possible routes of peaceful resolution. Furthermore, any Western intervention must work alongside multilateral non-Western groups, whilst being inclusive of the 'victims' it would like to protect. Without these considerations, intervention can become a tool of neo-imperialism that disregards cultural differences.

The situation of Uighurs in China is even more complex. Firstly, the one-party Chinese state has a poor human rights record that in theory could jeopardise international recognition of its sovereignty (Altman & Wellman 2008, 233), but the practical likelihood of this is negligible due to China's immense economic and geopolitical power. Furthermore, Uighur separatists have been labelled by China as terrorist threats linked to the West's 'War on Terror' (Clarke 2008, 271), which permits the state to exercise 'defensive' force against them and discourages the West from intervening for fear of being perceived to act in aid of terrorism.

Another element of this problem is that the ongoing conflict in Xinjiang has been labelled a cultural genocide (Clarke, 274). A cultural genocide seeks to diminish or destroy a culture but does not necessarily involve mass murder or ethnic cleansing. Instead, the Chinese have placed Uighurs in so-called 're-education camps', urging them to assimilate into what they call 'Han Chinese' culture. They have also run a program of Han in-migration to the region. While the conditions in these camps are notoriously inhumane – the worst reports describing torture, sexual abuse, and forced abortions and contraception (Maizland 2019) – this genocide does not fulfil the necessary prerequisites to be considered mass crimes against humanity and remains unaddressed as a justifiable case for humanitarian intervention.

Furthermore, China's position as one of the most powerful nations in the world makes the cost of intervention outweigh any potential material or political benefit for the intervenors. This is an unfortunate facet of the global system: the risks of intervening in the affairs of highly powerful nations severely limit the reasonable chance of success, or even potential for a multilateral mission. Furthermore, while the UN and EU have called on China to end the crackdown, Muslim-majority nations have largely remained relatively silent, prioritising economic and strategic relationships with China (Maizland 2019).

As Myanmar is a less powerful nation, intervention and assistance from Muslim organisations is possible and even encouraged. China's global influence makes organising similar aid and action strategically difficult, as many groups would prefer a positive relationship with China. For now, all that anyone can expect to be done in China are the Human Rights Watch recommendations of 'publicly challenging Xi; sanctioning senior officials, such as Chen; denying exports of technology that facilitates abuse; and preventing China from targeting members of the Uighur diaspora.' (Maizland 2019) It is possible that with enough non-violent pressure, China's actions will cease – however, given the brutal nature of the crackdown, this is highly unlikely.

Conclusions:

Just War Theory maintains various dictates, since all war involves a human cost. Humanitarian intervention is, at best, a difficult justification for war. Politically, humanitarian intervention is highly complicated and can only occur under specific circumstances with both parties' consent. Furthermore, when we consider Mutua's SVS framework, it becomes clear that even with mostly good intentions, Western interventionism runs the risk of neglecting other cultures' needs and prioritising cultural imperialism.

Going forward, human rights discourse must consider both of these frameworks and account for factors such as multilateral non-Western approval, the desires and agency of those whose rights are being violated, the intervenor's responsibility to minimise damage, and the media's power to spin public narratives. Additionally, it is imperative that humanitarian intervention remains a last resort, as otherwise it can be easily corrupted to justify wars predicated on non-humanitarian interests.

The two cases we see here offer differing accounts of when intervention can occur. In the case of the Rohingya, minimal international support for intervention makes a political case for it difficult, even when there appears to be a strong moral case. This is why the current ICC case is the best course of action before arriving

at the use of intervention as a last resort. It involves multilateral interests as well as the investigations of individuals, rather than the state as a whole, thus satisfying many ethical dilemmas.

In the case of the Uighurs, China's political power and the reduced severity of the accusations make it improbable, if not impossible, for countries to intervene. If this were to progress to genocide and ethnic cleansing, the case could be re-evaluated, but there would need to be a mass multilateral consensus with a reasonable chance of success to intervene on the Uighurs' behalf. Again, because of China's power, this would be nearly impossible to develop.

Yet, humanitarian intervention remains a compelling ideal. It must be reworked so that the system benefits the many rather than a few specific interests. A new framework should be highly international (non-Western) and seek to minimise the political justifications of intervention, appealing solely to acting in the best and most diverse way possible. Only when the framework is modified as such can it accomplish what it seeks to do.

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Dual citizenship: the economic benefit for governments

Harrison Shum details the potential impact of dual citizenship on national economies, and how the potential issues that it raises are largely offset by the potential for economic benefits.

I n an increasingly globalised world, a growing number of people hold citizenship of two or more countries, and the rise of foreign-born populations in many countries has brought the term "dual citizenship" into common usage in mainstream media. A survey with approximately 50,000 responses conducts in Houston, Texas shows that support for dual citizenship from India is strong among Indian-Americans (The Economic Times 2019). Public opinion is dividing, however some advocate more lenient policies for dual citizenship, as they believe it will generally benefit their country, while others worry about the loyalty of dual citizens to their home and host countries. Dual citizenships can have great economic benefits for most governments, such as encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) and growing the workforce. These benefits can vary in range and degree and done best through a case-by-case analysis, but an examination of the likely benefits and costs of dual citizenship shows that dual citizenships will do more benefits than harms by importing more investments and labours to the host countries in most cases.

Increased gross national disposable income:

One potential benefit to allowing dual citizenship is that dual nationals can indirectly boost gross national disposable income (GNDI) by bringing with them an influx of foreign assets upon emigrating to their host country. GNDI is the sum of disposable income from all citizens; a high GNDI means there is high consumption and saving of each individual citizen (Antonioni et al. 2007, 132). A high GNDI often indicates that the economy of the country is healthy and that residents of the country are generally well-off (Gottfries 2013, 23).

An essential step in growing GNDI is increasing net forex inflow (NFI), which is the aggregate value of foreign currencies flowing into the country. This can come from foreigners in the form of FDI, or from citizens themselves (Gottfries 2013, 24). There are strong evidences suggesting that a country's NFI can expects to increase after they have allowed dual citizenship, as dual citizens are expecting to have more of an incentive to send remittances across borders for the purpose of investment rather than just consumption (Mpofu 2010). Having a high NFI can also provide a government with a budget surplus to use for investment. It will therefore increase not only domestic investments from local governments, but also investments from overseas. Dual citizens are also more likely than non-dual citizens to successfully attract and partner with investors from their home country to invest ventures in their host country (and vice versa), as foreign investors often feel more comfortable partnering with people with whom they share a background with (Siaplay 2014).

The economic benefits of high NFI are seen plainly in the case of the Philippines, a country with an estimate ten percent of its citizens living abroad (Lucas 2019b). NFI has become one of the major sources of GNDI for the Philippines (Mckenzie 2012, 138), hitting a 6-year high in 2019. Remittances from expatriate Filipinos have steadily increasing, as have net inflows of foreign portfolio investments (FPI) in the first quarter of 2019 and net inflows of FDI in the first two months (Lucas 2019a).

Global flows of financial remittances are steadily increasing in volume from the 1990s to the present day. In 2017, migrants who live and work in developed countries sent an estimated $466 billion to families in developing countries (Swing 2018). Money sent home from abroad is shown to be more stable than both

private debt and portfolio equity flows and several times larger than international development aid (Swing 2018). Additionally, governments of both the host and home countries might easily generate additional revenues by placing taxes on remittances leaving or entering the country.

Permanent labour force:

Legalising dual citizenship can not only increase foreign investment, but also increases the labour force, which in turn will predictably lead to higher tax revenues for the host country's government. There can be similar growths in the permanent labour force; immigrant workers are more likely to become citizens of a host country if they are not required to give up their original citizenships. Since Switzerland first legalised dual citizenship in 1992, Geneva has been having a significant increase of dual nationalities, from only 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2014-2016 (Swissinfo 2019). This dramatic increase provides Switzerland with additional stream of long-term workers – as a country with a growing labour supply, the Swiss job market is likely to become increasingly competitive while average wages decrease (IZA World of Labor 2016).

The option for expatriate dual citizens to return to their home countries might in turn affect private investment in human capital, as dual citizens would have larger access to education/human capital due to holding two or more passports. Part-time workers who are seniors returning home countries for retirement will be more available on the job market. For example, nearly a quarter of foreign-born senior Canadians will return to Canada for retirement (Frank and Hou 2012, 18-19). Dual citizens will be able to feel more comfortable to return to their home country if both host and home countries permitted dual citizenship.

Attracting expatriates:

An open-minded and friendly society will have an advantage over societies where citizenship is exclusive in attracting foreign expatriates and foreign investment. Expatriates often bring a specialised or entirely unique skillset that variegates their local pool of skilled and unskilled labour, which often benefits the host society in terms of job creation, market diversification, and competitive innovation (Geraldine 2018). Expatriate entrepreneurs have been establishing businesses that employ many domestic workers across sectors in various industries. According to the UK Department of International Trade, India created 140 new projects in 2015-16, creating and safeguarding thousands of jobs in the UK (Gov.uk 2016).

Two primary things which attract foreign expatriates are a) the availability of quality education for non-local children in the host country and b) a general level of English proficiency in society. A country with a large population of dual citizens will have a significant demand for non-local education, as families with dual citizenship may prefer to send their children to an institute which offers curricula from their home country. The government of Hong Kong issues policies such as interest-free loans and reimbursing government rent in response to demand for international schools, which help to attract more foreign expatriates (International Schools in Hong Kong 2014). Such a policy environment may partially explain why Hong Kong is currently one of the most desirable places for foreign investments and working abroad (Zhang 2019).

Lobbying to increase foreign investment:

On movement across borders can improve relations between the countries in question. According to Leblang (2015, 94), migrant communities can serve as advocates for their home country by lobbying their host countries for foreign assistance, preferential economic and military policies, and better treatment of immigrants from their countries.

Additionally, private firms in the host/home country will be able to expand their operations to foreign markets more easily by taking advantage of the large number of dual citizens in their country. According to Migration Policy Institute, there were 11 million Mexican immigrants in 2018, or 25 percent all immigrants. American firms can expand their Central American business if they hire dual citizens who are familiar with the unique cultural and business environments of Mexico and Central America.

In 2002, the Global Organization of People of Indian Origin lobbied the Indian government for increasing

property and travelling rights for overseas Indians. This is a major step towards dual citizenship in India (Sejersen 2008). Dual citizens can be important lobbyists for more friendly policies in host countries towards their home countries, and in countries with large populations of dual citizens, the government may be more likely to issue such policies in hopes of attracting even more expatriates and FDI. These policies range from issuing subsidies to streamlining administration to enhancing services for foreign investors.

Naturalisation in the host country:

Immigrants from countries that have recently legalised dual citizenship are finding to be more likely to naturalise, and to experience relative gains in employment earnings and lower reliance on welfare. This can be due to the likelihood that dual citizens will only move back to their home country if they can ensure they will have stable employment relative to their employment in the host country. This suggests that dual citizens will be less likely to be reliant on welfare and would, in fact, be able to contribute to the home country's productivity.

Allowing dual citizenship in the home country will also positively impact other countries, as citizens will be likely to naturalise in the host country. After several South and Central American countries allowed dual citizenship in the 1990s, the naturalisation rate in the United States increases by 10 percent, likely because of the significant population of South and Central American citizens in the US (U.S. Immigration Trends 2019). While in many cases these factors indicate that allowing dual citizenship will not lead to increase reliance on welfare, in countries where there are systems of universal-based welfare, dual citizens can actually take advantage of the system while not living in the country.

Moreover, the general public may question the loyalty of dual citizens, the wealthiest of whom could enter the host country only to take advantage of favourable conditions there, such as universal health care, low tax rates, lax market regulations, without adding significant value themselves. Wealthy globetrotters who carry multiple passports usually are primarily concern with their own interests; in this, they are little more than a matter of convenience (Young 2017). Demanding perfect loyalty from them to their country of birth, or to their adopted land, is a high-minded expectation which will never fully be met (Nizamani 2012). Nonetheless, the foreign loyalty of dual citizens is, in fact, perceive to be as high as that of foreign citizens from three studies results inlcuded participants from Finland, The Netherlands and Germany (Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2019).

Conclusion:

Although dual citizenship may be associated with specific concerns about specific circumstances such as conflicts of interest within the loyalties of dual citizens, it can still produce more benefit than harm. As suggested above, allowing dual citizenship can increases the country's productivity by adding to the long-term supply of labour. Lobbying by dual citizens will also be likely to push governments towards policies friendly to foreign investment. Dual citizenship is one of the key ways by which countries should take advantage of the connections that globalisation has made possible.

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To be a refugee in India: Analysing the impact of the Indian Citizenship Amendment Act on Ahmadi and Hazaras refugees

Ryan Mitra explores how the Indian Citizenship Amendment Act promulgates ethnic violence and damaging narratives against Ahmadi and Hazaras refugees.

The Indian subcontinent has historically been a melting pot of different cultures and religions interacting, and often conflicting, with one another. The presence of many disparate communal backgrounds and traditions requires political structures in the region to be either widely inclusive or severely restrictive towards this diversity. Taking the examples of India and Myanmar, the former's constitution was established on the principles of secularism and plurality and embraced heterogeneity amongst its citizens. In contrast, Myanmar's constitutions have been repeatedly altered by totalitarian and oppressive regimes which have severely compromised personal liberties and rights (Ibrahim 2015). In such a complex tapestry of social and political backgrounds, religious and cultural identities play a critical role in the lives of all who reside in the region.

In order to thoroughly analyse the impact of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) on refugee communities trying to flee to India, we examine the social and political history of two such communities which have now been impacted most severely by CAA. India, since its independence, has been a refugee-accepting state. Being surrounded by the Muslim-majority states (and in the former two cases, Islamic republics) of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, the subcontinental country has long been distinguished by its religious tolerance and secularity, making it an ideal destination for communities fleeing persecution and discrimination (Manuvie 2019). This situation was drastically altered following the passing of the CAA, which allowed citizenship for Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Buddhist and Parsi refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh (Ghoshal 2019). The exemption of Muslims from this act legally amounts to religious discrimination and the basis for the exemption runs in direct contradiction to the fundamental rights espoused in the constitution of India (Mitra 2019). The zero-sum attitude towards Muslim and non-Muslim refugees reflects the inconsiderate position of lawmakers in New Delhi towards the often divisive sectarianism in the aforementioned Islamic countries.

The history of the Hazaras and the Ahmadis:

The Hazaras are a Shia-Muslim community, originating in central Afghanistan. They have been subject to continuous waves of persecution, attacks, and systematic oppression since the genocidal campaigns of Abdur Rahman in the 1800s (Chiovenda 2014, 452). Endless attacks from other kings, the Mujahedin and the Taliban have plagued the Hazaras up to the present day (Chiovenda, 452). In Pakistan, they also continue to endure persecution along sectarian lines (Chiovenda, 453). The incumbent Sunni government in Afghanistan restricts their access to state-controlled resources, such as water and electricity, to further manifest this long history of persecution (Chiovenda, 455). For instance, asymmetrical modernisation efforts between the Hazara-majority Bamyan region and the rest of urban Afghanistan provide only the latter with electricity, while the former's existing network of electricity poles remains unutilised by the government. This renders the Hazara community unable to operate heavy machinery or electronic devices (Chiovenda, 456). Although the social position of the community has incrementally improved over the last decade (Alizada, 2019), they are still subject to discrimination based on their appearance, culture, and religion. These ceaseless attacks on the lives and liberty of these people have forced them to flee their ancestral land and take refuge in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and India.

The Ahmadis are a Shia-Muslim group that originated in British-India in the Nineteenth Century, today residing largely in Pakistan. They have been subject to severe persecution and systematic oppression since the Partition of India. The Ahmadis are persecuted on grounds of violating fundamental Sunni dogma and are constitutionally forbidden from calling themselves Muslim in Pakistan. A 1974 constitutional amendment (Sayeed 2019) and a 1984 ruling by General Zia ul Haq (Ochab 2018) legally classify Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Moreover, they are legally liable to prosecution for blasphemy if they identify otherwise. They have also been subject to state-sponsored discrimination whereby they have been denied voting rights, and further targeted by extremist groups such as the Taliban and the LeJ (US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2018, 66).

The treatment of Hazaras and Ahmadis:

The 2019 Annual Report of the United States Commission of International Religious Freedom has again classified Pakistan as a 'Tier 1 Country of Particular Concern' (US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2019, 76). The arbitrary implementation of blasphemy laws poses a genuine threat to the freedoms of religion and speech of Shia-Muslim minorities, such as Hazaras and Ahmadis, as it has to non-Muslim minorities, like Christians. Furthermore, the continued non-recognition of Ahmadis as Muslims has repressed their religious identity and legitimised sectarian discrimination against Shias. In May 2018, a group of 600 people destroyed a 100-year old Ahmadiyya mosque in the Sialkot (Sadiq 2018) and in August, a similar mob attacked another mosque in Faisalabad (Hussain 2018). In both cases, the government failed to hold to account and prosecute the perpetrators (US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2019, 76).

The Hazaras continue to face the same decades-long barrage of violence and persecution, now from the Islamic State, LeJ, and the Taliban. Pakistan's growing population of internally displaced Hazaras has even been colloquially termed 'the walking dead', referring to widespread assaults on them throughout Baluchistan (Iltaj 2019). In May 2018, the Chief Justice of Pakistan condemned the attacks on the Hazaras in Quetta by stating that, 'In my opinion, this [Hazara killing] is equivalent to wiping out an entire generation. We have to protect the lives and property of the Hazaras community.' (Shah 2018). In 2013, three separate bombings targeting the Hazara killed over 200 people and as recently as 2019, a suicide bombing killed nineteen individuals, a majority of which were Hazaras (Yousfzai, 2019). While Prime Minister Imran Khan had vowed to implement the National Action Plan in April 2019 (Shah, 2019), there have yet to be any constructive measures implemented.

The remaking of Hazara and Ahmadi lives in India:

The Taliban's campaign in 1997 to exterminate the Hazaras from Afghanistan forced almost 8,000 refugees to flee their home country, 500 to 700 of whom have since settled in New Delhi (Sharanya 2017). These refugees are now well-established, having built lives in the country's capital and contributing to the societies and economies of their home countries. The Khirkee extension in New Delhi, providing housing for most of the city's refugees, epitomises this reality. These refugees arrived in the country in the 1990s and have since established themselves, many now operating small businesses. (Sharanya 2017). This extension symbolises the complex tapestry of the Indian subcontinent and the principle of plurality, where refugees from different backgrounds, sects and countries share the same food and co-exist, despite their cultural and religious differences.

The Ahmadis in Indian society suffer a similar fate as they did in Pakistan, where other Muslim groups often fail to recognise them as Muslims. This has led to sporadic incidents of violence and even cases of discrimination from Muslim state boards in different parts of the country (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). For example, in February 2012, the Andhra Pradesh Wakf Board issued a decision to take over all Ahmadi mosques and graveyards, as those sites could not be administered by non-Muslims (Shah, 2012). In August 2015, a local Muslim mob attacked an Ahmadi family in West Bengal, injuring ten Ahmadis (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2015). However, India's characteristically secular governance allowed for these refugees to move court and fight for their religious freedom. Indian courts have repeatedly recognised the Ahmadis as Muslims (Kerala High Court AIR 1971, KER 206, 1970) and the government has previously viewed the group's rejection of jihad and adoption of non-violence 'positively' (Ramchandran, 2012). Ahmadi refugees came to India to exercise their right to follow their religion, like any common citizen in a secular country without State discrimination, and they have done so for decades.

The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA):

The CAA was enacted with the intent and purpose of granting citizenship to incoming refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, provided they had entered India before 31st December, 2014 and belong to religious minority groups, excepting Muslims (IANS, 2019).

According to Indian citizenship law, the four paths to citizenship are by birth, by descent, through Indian national registration, and by naturalisation (Jain, 2019), the fourth of which is the only path open to legal immigrants. India's principal piece of immigration legislation is the 1955 Citizenship Act, which defines an illegal immigrant as 'a person who has entered Indian borders without proper documentation or has stayed beyond the permitted time period'. Moreover, in 2015, the Modi government amended the Passport and Foreigners Act to permit non-Muslim immigrants to stay in India even if they did not possess proper documentation, thereby not classifying them as 'illegal immigrants' and making them eligible for citizenship by naturalisation. Additionally, the CAA allows non-Muslim immigrants to become citizens by naturalisation within five years, instead of the previously established eleven years (Tripathi, 2019). Yet, there is no provision for Muslims.

Regarding the exclusion of Muslim refugees from this act, the government's reasoning was that they could not be considered religious minorities as they hailed from Islamic countries. Thus, the Ahmadi situation presents a dilemma whereby they are persecuted in an Islamic country by being denied legal recognition as Muslims but are then denied refuge and legal protection in India, where their legal recognition as Muslims disqualifies them from refugee status. Minority Affairs Minister, Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, has gone on record to state that Ahmadis may still apply for citizenship in the regular manner, devoid of the impact of the CAA (Katiyar, 2020). Amit Shah, the Union Home Minister, has on multiple occasions defended the bill on the grounds of protecting persecuted minorities in the neighbouring Islamic countries. However, the bill's text fails to define the word 'persecution' and neglects to specify the grounds for any individual's classification as a 'refugee' (Mitra, 2019). Shah has failed to give any constructive backing to this claim, and consequently the CAA classifies all Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan not as foreigners, but as illegal immigrants.

It is important to note that these refugees will most likely be placed in detention camps and refouled if they are not considered eligible for citizenship under the CAA (Press Trust of India, 2020). Moreover, India will be in violation of its international obligations if it forcibly refouls refugees to their origin country, where they will once again be at severe risk of targeting and persecuted. Originally, the 'principle of non-refoulment' was embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which India is not a signatory. However, today the principle is elevated to the status of customary international law, to which India is bound in compliance like every other UN member state (UN High of Commissioner ,1994).

The status quo for Ahmadis and Hazaras in their origin countries has changed little in decades, and the systematic discrimination and targeted attacks to which they are subject continue to existentially threaten them. If India refouls the Hazaras and the Ahmadis to Pakistan and/or Afghanistan, not only will it be eschewing its international obligations, but it will also unjustly condemn innocents who have sought a peaceful and meaningful life to a hellish existence. Within the country, it is important to dispel the stigma around the word 'refugee', who are typically portrayed in media as anarchic groups of destitute people arriving en masse on the nation's borders. While this is true in some parts, the act is largely going to hurt people and communities settled in the country for decades past, with established lives and livelihoods which contribute to country's economy like any other citizen.

Conclusion:

These communities once again face an existential threat as the CAA has continued to create a narrative whereby Muslim refugees are seen as infiltrators (Changiowla, 2020). The Modi administration has remained deafeningly silent on correcting this narrative or condemning the violence that has ensued because of it (Trivedi, 2020). The blanket consideration of all Muslim refugees under one religious grouping is a dangerous oversight of sectarian realities within the neighbouring Islamic countries. The CAA has potentially pushed thousands of people back into a vicious cycle of discrimination, persecution and uncertainty, all because of their religious beliefs and identity. Granting citizenship to refugees who have resided in the country long enough to be naturalised is a noble idea but being selective about this idea's implementation tarnishes its nobility and makes it discriminatory. This discriminatory act has hampered India's image as a refugee-accepting state and has critically damaged one of India's fundamental and founding principles: secularism

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'The century of humiliation' and the politics of memory in China

Lihe Wang looks at how selective national memories play a part in the construction of Chinese identity in the context of increasingly nationalistic politics in the country.

In early February 2020, a *Wall Street Journal* (*WSJ*) op-ed article discussing the coronavirus caused a massive backlash on Chinese social media. Two weeks later, three *WSJ* reporters were expelled from China by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as punishment (Shepard & Manson 2020). For a newspaper that is blocked in mainland China, the amount of attention generated by this single article was astonishing. The reason lay in its title: 'China is the Real Sick Man of Asia'. This title seems rather innocuous at first glance, considering that similar phrases have been used multiple times to describe weak states in the West. While some may accuse the editor of insensitivity for applying such a phrase to describe a global pandemic with immediate human consequences, the real reason for the massive outcry lies behind its unique historical significance. The phrase 'sick man of Asia' first emerged in the Chinese context to describe the century of humiliation, one of the darkest chapters in China's history (Yau 2020). This was a period of internal fragmentation and external subjugation, followed by a series of unequal treaties that were forcefully imposed upon China.

While the century of humiliation officially ended with the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, it has entrenched a deep sense of indignity and victimisation into the Chinese national identity. Indeed, this understanding has guided many to argue that dignity and humiliation are the main drivers of Chinese foreign policy (Garver 1992; Nathan & Ross 1997). However, this perspective fails to explain why this period became so salient in Chinese historical memory. For a 'civilisation of 5000 years', one might think cultural focus would be on brighter periods of Chinese history. There is no denying the atrocities that China suffered during the century of humiliation, but as a country that is already a great power in many aspects, why does its national identity remain so scarred by a deep sense of victimhood and insecurity? The answer may lie in the broader trend of selective politicisation of public historical memories, used to bolster regime legitimacy and accommodate changing foreign policy needs. Instead of treating historical legacies as verifiable absolutes, this article problematises them and focuses the analysis on how collective historical memories are selectively fashioned by the Party to solve present preoccupations (Halbwachs 1992).

Victimisation as a tool for legitimisation:

State history propaganda designed to increase regime legitimacy plays a big part in the lasting presence of the powerful victimised national identity. This is clearly demonstrated in the 'Patriotic Education Campaign' of the early 1990s (Zhao 1998, 288). As a response to the crisis of 'belief in the party' following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the campaign saw a change in the focus of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) official historiography (Liao 2013). Previously, the official historical narrative had been that of a 'victor narrative' focused on Maoist class struggle (Wang 2008). The campaign marked a shift to that of a 'victimisation narrative' that instead focused on China's suffering due to the actions of the West and Japan, and, more importantly, how the CCP led the country out of these adversities to achieve independence (Wang 2008). By emphasising its indispensable role in protecting the country from foreign aggression, the CCP managed to reclaim its competency and moral legitimacy as the single ruling party (Liao 2013). The victimisation narrative was taken further by adding a xenophobic tone through 'China Dream' discourse cultivated in the campaign and formalised in 2012 (Callahan 2015). This discourse relied heavily on the dream of 'national rejuvenation', as opposed to

the Hu era discourse of China's 'peaceful rise' (Zheng 2005; Xi 2013). When the premise of 'rejuvenation' is returning China to its former greatness before the century of humiliation, the sources of humiliation – the West and Japan – are thus rendered impediments that must be overcome.

'There is no force that can shake the foundation of this great nation… No force can stop the Chinese people and the Chinese nation forging ahead' - Xi Jinping at the reception in celebration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC (CCTV Video News Agency 2019).

In this sense, the China Dream discourse is not merely a positive expression, but one that promotes a civilised Chinese identity through the contrast of constructed barbaric Western and Japanese identities (Callahan 2015). Alternative portrayals of history, such as the films Devils on the Doorstep by Jiang Wen, and Ang Lee's Lust, Caution, that fail to conform to the dominant narrative of a victimised nation fighting to redeem itself from foreign domination are heavily censored and condemned (Edwards 2016, 74). Therefore, when the CCP stakes its legitimacy on wiping out past humiliations, its success is achieved at the expense of reinforcing victimisation in the first place.

Historical memories as a foreign policy instrument:

    Not only are historical memories selectively represented to increase domestic regime legitimacy, they are also used in foreign policy to accommodate various strategic objectives. First, this is reflected in a sense of righteousness and moral authority. During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, China's ambassador Liu Xiaoming accused the UK of a 'colonial mind-set' when then UK foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt called on China to honour its commitment of 'one country, two systems' and understand the root cause of the protests (Smith 2019). Similarly, memories of a 'China carved up by imperialist powers' are frequently invoked to defend an absolutist notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity (people.cn 2016; Xinhuanet 2019; people.cn 2019). China's repeated demand that Japan should hold a 'correct view' of history and apologise for its aggressions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been used as leverage in Sino-Japanese relations (Suzuki 2007). Similarly, the history of imperial China is reconstructed as that of a benevolent hegemon to advance the peaceful rise agenda (Zhao 2013). However, this argument largely ignores China's history of expansion, leading some to question whether the history of the tributary system can be completely rewritten when studied from the perspectives of China's neighbours (Yu 2014).
    The CCP's official historiography is adapted to suit the different foreign policy objectives arising from the fast-changing international environment. For example, in Sino-Japanese relations, there were several times where memories of humiliation were intentionally downplayed. In early February 2020, Japan's coronavirus donations won massive praises amongst the Chinese public. As a show of good will, twenty episodes of a popular television series, Red Sorghum, were taken off air because they would have painted Japan in a negative light (Radio Free Asia 2020). Similarly, when China was seeking to restore economic and diplomatic relations with Japan in the early 1970s, Japanese wartime atrocities were downplayed and demands for war reparations were renounced (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972). A further example is the CCP's changing official historiography of the Kuomintang (KMT), whose contributions to World War Two (WWII) were largely ignored under Mao (Weatherley & Zhang 2017, 120). This first changed in the 1980s, marked by the posthumous recognition of KMT generals Zhang Zhizhong and Li Zongren (Weatherley & Zhang 2017, 120).
    The second change took place in the early 2000s, when Hu Jintao met with Lian Zhan, the then leader of the KMT, and subsequently recognised the contributions of the KMT in the war against Japan (Hu 2005). An important reason for both moves was to improve relations and eventually achieve unification with Taiwan. This is especially clear in the second instance, which was part of a broader campaign by the CCP to engage with the pan-Blue camp in Taiwan to isolate the pro-independence Chen-Shuibian administration. These efforts seem to suggest the Party's awareness of the pressure of growing nationalist sentiments, which would in turn bind the Party's hands in foreign policies, trapping it in a tight balance between looking weak to the domestic audience and acting overly provocative overseas.

Alternative perspectives:

As Zha Jianying once said, 'China is way too big a cow for anyone to tackle in full' (Zha 2011, 8). In studying China, one should always keep in mind the diversity and fluidity of such a vast country. As a person can have multiple identities, so can a country (Shambaugh 2011, 9). On the one hand, there are already positive signs that the CCP leadership is actively moving China away from the victimised identity towards one that is more inward-looking, benign, and confident. On climate change, China had traditionally viewed itself as a 'victim of the ecological imperialism', resisting emission-reduction commitments and arguing firmly for the principles of equity and sovereignty (Zhang & Orbie 2019). This is in contrast with the increasingly flexible approach it has adopted in recent years, where China have begun to embrace the role of a 'torchbearer of the global climate change regime' (Zhang & Orbie 2019). While this was partly fostered through changing domestic and economic landscapes, the move reflects the leadership's aspirations to improve China's international image as a 'responsible great power' and sends a strong signal of its willingness to shoulder more responsibilities in global governance. On the other hand, the official discourse of Chinese identity often reinforces Han Chinese identity at the cost of ethnic minority identities, like the Tibetans and Uyghurs. The binaries of modernity and backwardness that China suffered due to the West are now transferred onto an internal hierarchy of civilisation and barbarism (Tobin 2019, 743). Under this historical materialist perspective, ethnic minorities are framed as passively dependent on the majority Han; their backwardness can only be overcome through economic progress and cultural homogeneity under the guidance of Han (Tobin 2019).

Despite the CCP's iron grip on all things 'politically sensitive', national identity is not the product of elite manipulation alone. For example, the contending functionalist perspective views national identities as essential for economic development, whereas the culturalist perspective places a greater focus on causes such as the shared roots of ancestry and cultural origins (Tang & Darr 2012). Additionally, it is worth acknowledging that the selective representation and interpretation of history and physical reality is not a strategy employed only by the CCP. For example, some have discussed the China threat theory, which is often used to justify the United States' (US) 'Pivot to Asia' policy, constructed based not on material forces but on ideational ones that threaten the equally constructed American identity of freedom and democracy (Pan 2004; Turner 2013). In this sense, as China and the US continue to view each other through the lens of 'otherness', their national identities will become increasingly mutually constitutive. Similarly, the Shinzo Abe administration has been accused of whitewashing the Empire of Japan's war crimes during WWII to stoke nationalist fervours (Onishi, 2007; Fackler, 2014). Therefore, acknowledging the propaganda behind the memories of humiliations is not to condone the acts of the aggressors, but rather to encourage all countries to reflect on their approach to historical education and understand their actions through each other's eyes.

Conclusion:

The foundation of the dominant Chinese identity lies not in history itself, but instead in the selective representation and reconstruction of historical memories as a mobilisation tool. The victimised identity remains relevant today because it was chosen to be, in order to bolster the CCP's legitimacy and justify China's narrative of a peaceful rise. Is it likely to remain relevant? Some evidence points against optimism. First, under Xi, efforts have been made to increase the omnipresence of state propaganda, particularly in the education system and the cyberspace (Luqiu 2020; Cook & Truong 2019). Second, under the current climate of strategic competition, many western democracies, not least the US, are becoming increasingly wary of China's growing influence (Smith and Taussig, 2019; Zakaria, 2020). Policies that seek to deny the great power status that China feels it rightly deserves, such as technological decoupling and the US Pivot to Asia policy, run the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not only will they reinforce the existing victimised Chinese identity which relies on the existence of an American 'other' determined to sabotage China's development, they also risk forcing China into adopting a similarly provocative foreign policy which could in turn reinforce US perception of the China threat theory. Nonetheless, how the contestation between the top-down, victimised and xenophobic identity, and the bottom-up, confident and benign identity, will turn out remains to be seen, as the CCP does not have a monopoly on historical memories and must fight hard against alternative Chinese identities emerging from other sources.

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