

LEVIATHAN

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EURO VISION

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Dear Reader,

Welcome to all students, staff and interested readers. To those reading *Leviathan* for the first time, a short introduction is in order. This is a student-run journal which aims to provide reasoned debate and analysis on pressing yet sometimes overlooked issues in politics and current affairs. In order to address a topic as comprehensively as possible, each issue focusses on a specific theme and the theme for this issue is “Euro-vision”.

“Euro-vision” aims to assess the future of the European project, be it in the short, medium or long-term. Reflecting the precarious place that Europe seems to find itself currently; our submissions have been fascinatingly diverse and in-depth. Articles include discussions on Turkey’s bid for membership, critiques of the common security and defence policy, and analyses of the economic situation and the inadequate efforts by policy-makers to respond to the Great Recession.

Before concluding, we must acknowledge those who made this issue possible. The Europa Institute at the University of Edinburgh has generously sponsored this issue while the paternal support of the Department of Politics and International Relations and the Politics Society is also much appreciated.

However, the most immediate and essential contribution has been from our writers and tremendously diligent staff without whom this issue would simply not have been possible. Production for this issue was indeed an inter-continental effort, and the staff adeptly and efficiently took on the challenge of multiple time zones and other simultaneous summer commitments. I cannot thank them enough for their sterling work.

As always, we urge you to critically analyse and respond to the articles by sending in your thoughts. Letters to the editor are welcome and should be sent to leviathanjournal@gmail.com.

Thank you for your time and I hope you enjoy the issue.

Uday Jain
Leviathan Editor-in-Chief

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The European Union: Global

Dr Elizabeth Bomberg, senior lecturer in environmental politics discusses

The European Union (EU) plays a unique role in international climate change agreements. Its ability to take part in any international negotiations may at first seem surprising: it is not a sovereign state and its complex multi-level structure – which must accommodate a staggering array of multiple levels, nationalities and interests - tends to favour inertia over collective action. Yet, since the early 2000s the EU has taken robust collective action on climate change. It has adopted an impressive array of targets and initiatives designed to reduce carbon emissions and has been labeled a ‘global champion’ of binding international agreements on climate change.¹

The EU’s leadership role began in the late 1990s when it endorsed and nurtured the 1997 Kyoto protocol on climate change. When the US backed out of the agreement in 2001 and the protocol’s future seemed in danger, the EU stepped up its pressure on others, managed to bring Russia on board as a signatory and helped seal ratification of the protocol in 2005. That same year the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) - a cap-and-trade system to limit CO₂ emissions from large industrial sources - came into effect as the world’s largest, most ambitious and first mul-

tinational trading scheme. By the late 2000s climate change had become the EU’s flagship policy. The area of ‘Climate Action’ was given top priority by the Commission President José Manuel Barroso who described the issue as the ‘ultimate political test for our generation’.²



Perito Moreno Glacier, Argentina. Photo: Dominic Alves

The EU’s leadership role on climate change illustrates its occasional yet remarkable capacity to overcome profound barriers to collective action. In the area of climate policy that capacity resulted from a combination of internal and external drivers. Chief amongst these were concerns about energy security and supplies, the mounting scientific evidence about potentially harmful effects of climate change, and growing public awareness of climate (European populations generally express more concern about climate change than popula-

tions in other western polities or in the developing world). Add to this the development of ‘green’ technologies by European firms and the attractive market prospects such technologies bring. Institutional and political incentives were also important. The embrace of climate change has served

leadership role. Advocates of climate action (including environmental NGOs but also dedicated ‘champions’ within the EU’s institutions, the business community and broader civil society) successfully mobilized action by linking robust targets with the promise of greater EU energy security and economic advantages.

The result, by the late 2000s, was an impressive package of targets, programmes and legislation.³ These included the adoption in 2007 of the ‘20-20-20’ targets, which required the EU to achieve by

2020 emissions cuts of at least 20 percent (from 1990 levels) and to source 20 percent of energy from renewable sources. The following years additional provisions were added, including a legal framework for developing carbon capture and storage, a strengthening of the ETS and further cuts on sectors outside the ETS.

The ambition of these initiatives intensified in the run-up to the United Nations climate change summit in Copenhagen in December 2009. The EU sought not only to lead by example, but to directly chal-

2020 emissions cuts of at least 20 percent (from 1990 levels) and to source 20 percent of energy from renewable sources. The following years additional provisions were added, including a legal framework for developing carbon capture and storage, a strengthening of the ETS and further cuts on sectors outside the ETS.

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Climate Change Leader?

the European Union's latest successes and failures in collective action

challenge other negotiating parties to match their targets. Indeed the EU's pledge included 'automatic triggers' to increase emissions cuts from 20 to 30 percent provided other parties to the conference did the same. The EU sent a huge delegation to Copenhagen, and its Commission president called on the world to 'join forces in the great project of our generation'.⁴

Yet, climate change agreements and their outcome also illustrate the limits of the EU's collective action. For all its promise, the EU's leadership in the late 2000s did not result in any meaningful impact on the 2009 UN talks in Copenhagen. The outcome was not an EU-inspired legally binding agreement, but rather the 'Copenhagen Accord' - a vague, document with no binding targets, hammered out and signed by a small group - the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa - and merely 'recognised' by other parties.

Several causes of this disappointing outcome were outside the EU's control, including distrust between developing and developed countries, flaws within the UN negotiating process, and the US's on-going inability to commit to meaningful targets in the face of domestic intransigence. But the EU's failure points to the contingent nature of the EU's leadership role and is an example of its 'capability-expectations' gap: in Copenhagen the tremendous rhetorical promise of the EU's role was not matched

by its resources, coherency or ability to deliver results.⁵

The EU's climate and energy package, specifically its targets, were the result of delicate internal 'effort sharing' negotiations - sharing the burden of cuts between EU member states at different stages of economic development. Yet, those tenuous internal agreements began to unravel following Copenhagen.

On one hand the outcome urged some to push even

harder for a distinctively robust role for the EU. For instance the Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, stressed the potential economic and security benefits of low carbon technologies as grounds

to support a unilateral move to tougher emissions cuts.⁶ But those promised economic and security benefits were both long term and diffuse. By 2010 a growing financial crisis not only distracted policymakers but also encouraged a shift in priorities and an emphasis on the more immediate costs of low carbon transition. The EU's Commissioner for

Energy publically voiced concern about the 30 percent target.⁷ More vehement opposition came from Poland, who held the EU's rotating Council Presidency in late 2011 (and was thus responsible for helping to set the EU's agenda). In the June 2011 Environment Council, Poland - which secures the vast majority of its domestic energy from coal - formed a blocking minority of one against further EU climate proposals.

Its move led the UK Energy Secretary, Chris Huhne, to lament the arrival of 'a dark day for Europe's leading role in tackling climate change'.⁸

In other institutions, too, the EU's future leadership role was challenged. In July 2011, the European

Parliament - once considered the EU's green watchdog - rejected a move towards the more ambitious emission targets. Writing in the *Financial Times*, Nicholas Stern, author of the influential *Stern Review*, bemoaned the EU's 'missed opportunity' to lead the way.⁹

These setbacks could well be temporary. Neither

Poland's recalcitrance nor Parliament's vote sink the move towards tougher targets. Negotiations continue and an eventual agreement on an ambitious, coherent policy is still a possibility. Additionally, the EU as a whole and most of its member states are on track to meet their emission reduction commitments. However, the continuing lack of agreement signals challenges ahead.

In sum, the EU's leadership role post-Copenhagen has lost some of its sheen. But while it is no longer the assured global climate change 'leader', the EU is still one of most promising contenders for that title. Proponents of climate action would welcome more competition in that leadership race - not least from the US or China. Given that such leadership is not likely to emerge anytime soon though, the EU's global role remains hugely significant.

“...the EU's failure points to the contingent nature of the EU's leadership role and is an example of its 'capability-expectations' gap: in Copenhagen the tremendous rhetorical promise of the EU's role was not matched by its resources, coherency or ability to deliver results.”

¹ see Damro, C. and MacKenzie D. (2008) 'The EU and the Politics of Multi-Level Climate Governance' in H. Compston and Bailey, I. (eds.) *Turning Down the Heat. The Politics of Climate Policy in Affluent Democracies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp65-84; Wurzel, R. and Connelly, J. (eds.) (2010) *The EU as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics* (London: Routledge); Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) 'EU Leadership in International Climate Policy. Achievements and Challenges' *The International Spectator* vol 43(2):35-50.

² Barroso, J. M. (2008) 'Boosting growth and jobs by meeting our climate change commitments' Press release available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3nq6lxx>

³ Kulovesi, K., Morega, E. and Munoz, M. (2011) 'Environmental Integration and Multi-faceted International Dimension of EU Law. Unpacking the EU's 2009 Climate and Energy Package' *Common Market Law Review* vol 4: 829-91.

⁴ *Financial Times* 23 January 2008

⁵ Hill, C. (1993) 'The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe's International Role' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol 31(3): 305-25

⁶ Hedegaard, C. (2011) 'Connie Hedegaard' Commission home page. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3e9hnyx>

⁷ *Guardian* 10 Feb 2011

⁸ <http://euobserver.com/9/32529/>

⁹ *Financial Times* 14 July 2011



End of the

Lisa Lange on the various problems that face Turkey's bid

The membership negotiations with Turkey have stalled. According to Premier Erdogan Europe needs Turkey more

model, political identity must become central.⁴

As stated in article 49 of The Treaty of the European

the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities; existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union and the acceptance of the community acquis, the ability to abide by the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.⁶

Although the reforms that Turkey has implemented to become eligible for membership are worthwhile in their own right, the changes

seem primarily symbolic. The practical implementations of the reforms have been problematic.⁷ Since the accession negotiations began in 2005 only one of the 35 chapters has been concluded, 18 alone have not been opened because of Turkish non-recognition of Cyprus.⁸

Even though Erdogan's AKP - which returned to their third term in office

on the 12th June - promises more democracy and continued stability⁹; their human rights record is questionable. According to Human Rights Watch, domestic violence and vio-

lence against minorities, such as the Kurds, are still wide-

spread. However, the Council of Europe "Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence" signed in Istanbul this May shows the Turkish commitment to this cause.¹⁰

Restrictions of free speech are worrying. For example, Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk was recently persecuted for discussing the genocide of Armenians committed by Ottoman forces. Furthermore, European Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, believes that fines on Dogan Yayin for tax evasion, a media conglomerate critical of the government, were politically motivated.¹¹ Premier Erdogan while superficially the greatest catalyst for reform, simultaneously uses his power to silence opposition in the media, academia and military.¹²

From a pragmatic geopolitical perspective, the benefits of an accession would be energy security and less dependence on Russia. Demographically, the young population would be a boost for the aging economy of the EU. Furthermore, Turkey could act as a bridge to the Muslim world.¹³

The Financial Times noted that "admitting a fast-growing country, such as Turkey, with clout in the Middle East would strengthen the EU economically and strategically".¹⁴ As the sixth largest European economy with a growth rate of 8.9% p.a., this stable market economy would be a beneficial addition to the EU.¹⁵ However, the extent to which this would strengthen



Premier Erdogan addresses the Security Council. Photo: United Nations Photostream.

than Turkey needs Europe. Frustration over this long courtship has begun to show, today only 50% of Turks still believe in membership. In spite of this, foreign minister Dovutoglu stresses that rationally the EU needs Turkey for their energy security, influence over Arab nations and as a strong political alliance that shares the common values put forward in the Copenhagen Criteria.¹

This issue ignites the debate over the identity, direction and self-image of the EU. Helene Sjursen suggests that there are three possible identities of the EU: an economic problem-solving entity, a values-based community and a rights-based union.² The most ambitious choice of a rights-based entity would promote both the "deepening and widening" of the EU.³ Thus to become a truly cosmopolitan federation in the Kantian

Union, "Any European state" which respects the principles set out in the Copenhagen Criteria "may apply to become a member".⁵ Consequently, they should also be the basis of the verdict. If this issue remains restrained by the dominant discourse that uses language speaking of a cultural heritage that sees Turkey as its natural "Other"; the EU will never gain a political identity that could unite a union of such diverse nations.

The question that has to be answered is if Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen

Criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,

“Premier Erdogan while superficially the greatest catalyst for reform, simultaneously uses his power to silence opposition in the media, academia and military.”

lence against minorities, such as the Kurds, are still wide-

Courtship?

for membership of the European Union

the EU is often overstated, since Turkey already has a free trade agreement on manufacturing products.¹⁶

Premier Erdogan unsuccessfully tried to woo German chancellor Merkel into giving more support to Turkey in their negotiations with the EU. Disappointingly for him, both chancellor Merkel and premier Sarkozy are pushing for a “privileged partnership”.¹⁷ The European Commission itself, in evaluating the first 5 years after the negotiations began, gives a negative verdict. Although constitutional reform is seen as a step in the right direction, Turkey still needs to improve significantly¹⁸.

The potential accession stirs up many fears. Populous Turkey would have considerable political weight, especially in the European Parliament where it would have one more MP than Germany. Further, it is argued that this power given to a predominately Muslim state that is ostensibly outside the geographic borders of Europe would have the potential of causing conflict in this presently Christian dominated organisation.

There are “unspoken cultural requirements that form the fundament of a European identity”.¹⁹ Even though the accession of Turkey should be judged on a purely political level, the unarticulated concerns of the EU as a values-based community cannot be ignored. Many dread that Atatürk’s secularization was a “cultural revolution without a social revolution”²⁰ and that the internalized values

diverge from the present EU countries too drastically. 63% of EU citizens believe that “the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too significant to allow for this accession”.²¹ These numbers are especially high in countries with a high number of Muslim immigrants such as France and Germany. This large opposition of the population calls the legitimacy of the EU itself into question if Turkey is allowed to join.

The direct consequence of the inability of the centre parties to discuss meaningful solutions for problems such as the integration of Muslim immigrants is the increasing success of far-right populist parties²². One in five Finns voted for the “True Finns”. It is a party notoriously sceptical of Muslim immigration and the EU. This is not an isolated incident:

the increased support for the Front National in France, the FDP in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy or the Sweden Democrats are all part of a worrying European trend²³.

The debate over Turkish membership is caught in the web of seeing “Europe” as a purely cultural and geographical concept. Although its accession has to be pragmatically discussed in respect to the satisfaction the Copenha-

gen Criteria, it could be fatal to ignore the emotional unrest that the cultural differences of Turkey stir up. A tacit consensus among the most powerful European leaders that the EU should remain predominantly Christian is in conflict with official EU institutions that promote diversity. The prospect of membership has been a dramatic force for change and reforms in Turkey.

EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele said that he understands and shares Turkey’s frustration. For him,

“A tacit consensus among the most powerful European leaders that the EU should remain predominantly Christian is in conflict with official EU institutions that promote diversity.”

it is only fair that the EU remains committed since it has granted Turkey candidate status.²⁴ However, at this time Turkey does not satisfy the political criteria and the EU faces

too many internal problems to be able to relinquish its self-image as a cultural unit. The incapability of centre parties to both solve internal integration problems of immigrants and come to terms with the political identity of the EU makes the debate over the accession of Turkey fuel in the engines of far-right populist parties.

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²The Treaty of the European Union available: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF>, Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

⁶Copenhagen Criteria available: www.europa.eu, accessed: 1 Last accessed 1st Aug 2011

⁷“Foreign Relations” 2011. Turkey Country Review, pp. 73-86. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost. Viewed 30 July 2011.

⁸Ibid.

⁹The Economist. (Jun 30th 2011). *Turkey after the election: business as usual*. Available: http://www.economist.com/node/18898268?story_id=18898268&fsrc=rss. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

¹⁰Human Rights Watch. (2011). *Turkey*. Available: www.hrw.org/en/news-filter/218. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

¹¹Castle, S & Sebnem, A. (October 14, 2009).

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¹²Steinvorth, D. 2011. *Der Sultan von Iltancool*. *Der Spiegel*, 06/09/2011. 93.

¹³Kylstad, I. “Turkey and the EU: A “new” European identity in the making?”. *LSE “Europe in Question” Discussion Paper Series. No.27/2010, p11*

¹⁴The Financial Times. 09/11/2010. *Turkish despair*. Available: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6da5b29c-ec39-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Tg36x500>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

¹⁵Arditi, T. (Jun. 6, 2011). *How Far Away Is Turkey From Gaining EU Membership?*. Available: <http://www.businessinsider.com/how-far-away-is-turkey-from-gaining-eu-membership-2011-6>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

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¹⁷Der Spiegel. (27.02.2011). *EU-Beitritt Erdogan-Besuch entfacht neuen Streit*. Available: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,747991,00.html>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

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¹⁹Kylstad, I. “Turkey and the EU: A “new” European identity in the making?”. *LSE “Europe in Question” Discussion Paper Series. No.27/2010, p. 6.*

²⁰Anderson 2008 in Kylstad, I. “Turkey and the EU: A “new” European identity in the making?”. *LSE “Europe in Question” Discussion Paper Series. No.27/2010, p10.*

²¹European Commission. (2005). *Eurobarometer 63*. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_de.pdf. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

²²Barber, T. (15.11.2010). *Immigration: Tensions unveiled*. Available: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd54377c-f104-11df-bb17-00144feab49a.html#axzz1TOBxi1F>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

²³Der Spiegel. (25.04.2011). *Rise of Populist parties Pushes Europe to the Right - Brussels Fear of the True Finns*. Available: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,758883-2,00.html>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

²⁴BBC News. 14/01/2011. *EU seeks to unlock Turkey membership talks*. Available: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12185904>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

¹Steinvorth, D & Zand, B. (2011). *Wir sind sehr emotional*. Available: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-78832465.html>. Last accessed 1st Aug 2011.

²Kubicek, p 2005. “Turkish Accession to the European Union”. *World Affairs*, 168, 2. pp. 67-78, Academic Search Elite, EBSCOhost. viewed 31 July 2011, p.71

³Ibid. p.75

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Would Turkey vote

Scott Dickson discusses the implications of Erdogan's leadership

Unlike any other country, Turkey has faced a titanic struggle to get into the European Union, whilst others have strolled in. France, Germany and Austria have played bouncers preventing an unwelcome guest from spoiling their party, whilst Turkey looks elsewhere, disillusioned with its failure to get even close to membership. However, with David Cameron unambiguously vowing to ensure Turkey's accession to the EU, it is worth exploring the risks this would entail.

It is no secret that the EU has acted inconsistently and unfairly towards Turkey. It proved a reliable ally during the Cold War, acting as a source of stability in a volatile region. However it has not been rewarded for its attempts to court Europe. Its formal membership application was lodged in 1987. However, it was humiliated in 1997, when the EU invited multiple countries from Eastern Europe to enter negotiations, some of which now hold membership, despite showing little historical attachment to the European project. As it stands, only 13 of the 35 necessary chapters to accede have been completed, and with great difficulty.

Much of this unfair treatment stems from public opinion at the core of the EU. In the 1980's, only 20% of EU citizens supported Turkey's accession, whilst 30% opposed. Time has not reversed Turkey's fortunes, as today opposition stands at roughly 50%.¹ This has little to do

with economic self-interest; throughout Europe, majorities at both ends of the income scale oppose entry. Most cite the view that there is a culture clash as the basis for their opposition.

There is nothing new in this attitude. Historically Turkey has been viewed as a different entity than the rest of Europe: a Muslim country on a

Christian continent. Political cartoons in centuries past portrayed Turks as backwards, and leaders treated them with contempt, notably William Gladstone who declared his wish to "to bundle the Turk, bag and baggage, out of Europe".² Far right populist politicians in mainland Europe continue to espouse a similar creed. Given Turkey's friendship for much of the 20th century, the hostility towards Turkey seems rooted in prejudice. However, regardless of Europe's coldness, the last decade has seen Turkey develop in ways that should be of worry to those who support Turkish membership.

This can be explained by the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002. There is no

doubting Erdogan's popularity, winning three consecutive elections and overseeing huge economic development, with the second highest growth rate in the world following

China.³ Seemingly emboldened by his success, he has unfortunately ditched subtlety for populism within his own country, resorting to provocative statements and ugly threats which have nonetheless been subject to little criticism outside Turkey.

This should force those who label him

a moderate to think again. His actions in 2009 when he threatened to veto the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the head of NATO highlighted his crude approach on the world stage. This was not in opposition to Rasmussen's qualifications, but rather, under pressure from Arab countries, out of concern with his support for a free press during the Jyllands-Posten cartoon controversy.⁴ Whilst the threat of a veto was eventually withdrawn, such reactionary posturing from the leader of a secular country in an international forum highlights the damaging ways in which Turkey could wield its power within the EU, given the chance.

Erdogan's failure to come

to terms with Turkish history, and criticism of those who try to do so, reveal more serious character defects. In the wake of multiple foreign parliaments acknowledging the Armenian Genocide, in 2010 he proclaimed: "In my country there are 170,000 Armenians; 70,000 of them are citizens. We tolerate 100,000 more. So, what am I going to do tomorrow? If necessary I will tell the 100,000: okay, time to go back to your country. Why? They are not my citizens. I am not obliged to keep them in my country."⁵ One can only imagine the plight of the Armenians, who not only endure their genocide being denied wholesale by the Turkish government, but who now face the threat of being forcibly removed. Not only that, but Turkish citizens who do raise this ugly chapter of their past are threatened with imprisonment. This is not his only denial of history. He stated that Sudan's Omar al-Bashir was not capable of genocide due to his Islamic faith, and has also made it known that he is welcome in his country, despite indictments from the International Criminal Court.⁶

The issue of Cyprus poses an obvious source of opposition to EU membership. For a country to enter whilst illegally occupying the territory of another member state would be unthinkable. He has attempted to deflect blame, noting that the Turkish half of the island voted for reunification in 2004, whilst the Greek half strongly rejected it. This fails to take into account

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for Christmas?

for Turkey's prospects of joining the European Union



President Erdogan of Turkey. Photo: E.T. Studhalter, World Economic Forum

the serious limitations of the deal, which admonished Turkey of any responsibility for the illegal invasion, and the subsequent destruction of Cyprus's cultural heritage. Contrast this with Germany, a country that unreservedly apologised for its part in the Second World War and has sacrificed swathes of its sovereignty and economic power to integrate with the rest of Europe. If Turkey followed a similar path it would enhance its chances of entry. However, one suspects as long as Erdogan is kept in power by the Turkish electorate, the prospect of a humble evaluation of Turkey's past and its continuing legacy is unlikely.

Not that EU membership is as important as it used to be. Erdogan has begun creating his own sphere of influence.

His offer to enrich uranium for Iran showed a complete lack of tact, both serving to undermine US efforts to prevent Iran developing nuclear capabilities, whilst

also failing to criticise Iran for its continual desire to enrich to higher levels, never mind its other gross human rights abuses. The moral ambiguity on display shows how unfit Turkey would be to contribute to EU foreign policy.

It must be acknowledged

that states are always liable to have rulers whom we disapprove of, and admitting Turkey post-Erdogan would not prevent a similar leader from coming to power in the

“It is unfortunate that Europe has walked over Turkey in the past, despite its friendship. However, this does not mean that we should ignore the many risks Turkey's admission brings with it.”

future. It is unfortunate that Europe has walked over Turkey in the past, despite its friendship. However, this does not mean that we should ignore the many risks

Turkey's admission would bring with it. The world in the past decade has become increasingly hostile to the West.

Welcoming Turkey to the EU would mean our borders now lie with Syria, Iran and Iraq: a worrying prospect given these nations' animosity towards ourselves. Practical security considerations would warn against this.

We are forced to choose between two unwelcome scenarios: admitting Turkey, which could nonetheless pursue its own policy courting the most reactionary figures in the Middle East and undermine our own policy as a result; or not admitting Turkey and creating an increasingly anti-Western state on our border. Ultimately, whilst Turkey elects a leader who makes thuggish threats to citizens within his country, undermines Western efforts against the Iranian nuclear program and disapproves of those who support a free press, Turkey is rightly a long way off from becoming a member of the EU.

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⁴ "Muslim nations ask Turkey to veto Rasmussen - Erdogan," *Reuters*, March 28th 2009. Available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/28/idINIndia-38756420090328>

⁵ "Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatens to expel 100,000 illegal Armenians," *The Times*, March 18th 2010. Available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7066218.ece>

⁶ "Turkey PM: Israel war crimes worse than Sudan," *Haaretz*, 8th November 2009. Available at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/turkey-pm-israel-war-crimes-worse-than-sudan-1.4547>



Greens/EFA: “We Need A Boost”

Marika Andersen speaks to the youngest MEP, Emilie Turunen

Emilie Turunen is the youngest member of the European Parliament. Elected in Denmark in 2009, she is now nearly half-way through her five-year term. Her first experience of politics was as a member of the youth division of the Danish Socialist People’s Party. When asked if she would ever consider the European stage, however, she took the opportunity few consider and left Copenhagen for Brussels where she currently sits with the Green/European Free Alliance (EFA) group. In an interview with Edinburgh’s Marika Andersen, she reflects on her own impact on what she deems a crucial time for Europe, touching on issues from the origins of the financial crisis, to Euro-skepticism.

There is a center-left crisis in the EU today. The last elections were the worst for our parties in the history of the EP. While the European People’s Party (EPP) has nearly 300 members, we, the Greens/EFA, have 55.

In a parliament of 756 consisting of five other groups in addition to the Independents (or the “loose hounds”, as they are referred to in Danish), this is not a whole lot of hard power. But Emilie and the Greens’ message is clear:

Why ask those who have if not created, then allowed the current financial, social and climatic crisis to evolve, to handle it?

While she recognizes that there are other reasons for which people might vote for the same old familiar faces and policies, she would implore you to really think about today’s problems.

You have the climate crisis, caused by overproduction and over-consumption. Then you have the social justice crisis of increasing disparities despite rising GNP. I hardly need to explain that this means a few rich are enjoying life while a growing number are struggling to keep their heads above water. Then of course there is the financial crisis, caused by the last 30 years’ liberalizing and de-regulating craze. I would like to talk more about the opportunities posed by this crisis in a moment, but for now let me also mention other, less media-grabbing and more slow-moving problems such as growing migration and demographic shifts (older in the West, younger in the Third World).

She asks me if I would not agree that this is the state of the world? I answer yes, to which she asks who I really believe will think and act in ways that will not cause us to regress. This is why the Green group seeks to take advantage of the current crises and proposes what it calls “The New Green Deal”, an economic plan modeled after Roosevelt’s New Deal. It proposes public investment, Keynesian economics, and a democratic handling of the crises, with of course a green flare.

Our aim is to somewhat remake what was in fact a great emergence of the USA after the deep crisis of the 1930s. The public sector, which has the means and pressure, must get the private sector going on the right track. Do not build more coal plants, build wind mills. Do not build more motorways, build train tracks. There is a common perception that being green hurts the economy, but



Photo: Emilie Turunen

working for the environment is not a ‘growth killer’. Energy efficiency saves money. And if the EU is to get ahead they need to get going. China certainly is. But our, the Greens’, ideas are somewhat forgotten. We need a boost.

Voting-participation for EP elections is shockingly low and the million-dollar question is how to change this trend. A lot of people see the EU as a faceless paper mill, and to an extent it is. But the parliament is composed of directly elected representatives, from left to right, and aged 26 to 99.

The EU is huge and pretty

dry-looking from the outside, but one should not give up on understanding it for that reason. I wish more people would have the opportunity to spend some weeks experiencing our work. I think they would then recognize that we need such large platforms for today’s problems. And most importantly that the people within these organizations, often seen to be concerned with semantics and other nit-picking, do not lose sight of the bigger picture. I remind myself everyday of where I want to be, and my job is to bring these visions down to the necessary concrete levels.

The Scottish contribution to European Union

Fiona Longmuir reflects on a conversation with Ian Hudghton, MEP



Photo: Ian Hudghton

Scotland is a nation that inspires great fondness in its people. Anyone who has watched *Braveheart* and felt a sense of pride and patriotism and momentarily managed to drown out the cringing horror of Mel Gibson's Scottish accent will tell you this. As the airport slogans say, we're the biggest little country in the world. And one man who wants us to keep on growing is Member of the European Parliament, Ian Hudghton.

Ian joined the Scottish National Party at 16, believing that Scotland had made valuable contributions to the world, and could do so again. He went on to represent Scot-

land in the European Union, raising Scotland's voice on an international scale with one small glitch: Scotland was being represented as a part of the United Kingdom.

Talking to Ian, his frustration at this is palpable. The needs and priorities of the United Kingdom are often far removed from those of Scotland, and getting his views through to the EU parliament can often be like a game of Chinese whispers, with the UK MEPs altering, misunderstanding, or completely ignoring Scottish opinion at their convenience.

In his articles, Ian often writes of the UK govern-

ment's failure to meet EU targets and goals, their plundering of Scotland's resources and their ignoring of Scottish needs. When I bring up this negative picture of the Westminster government, and how our ties to the UK might affect Europe's opinion of Scotland, Ian laughs and shakes his head. Once I have promised not to misquote him - as an extremist, Saltire-wearing, UK hating, raving nationalist - he concedes that it inevitably shows Scotland in a poor light. In his opinion, the United Kingdom is seen within the European Union as a reluctant participant at best, and a destructive influence at worst. "There have been many examples", he continues, "of the United Kingdom holding the EU at arm's length, enabling it to take credit for EU successes while eschewing blame if things go pear shaped".

Ian believes that if Scotland can break away from this, it has much to offer Europe. From traditional (that is, "stereotypical", to the cynics) Scottish fare such as whisky and fisheries, to recent breakthroughs in energy provision and scientific research, Scotland could open a gateway to many emerging and intriguing policy areas. Scotland has already been recognised as an individual identity within the United Kingdom, with the European Union hosting a "Scotland Week" in December 2009, marking the end of the Year of Homecoming. During this week, the First Minister and the Cultural & External Affairs Minister met with various key figures of the

European Union, and hosted a series of talks on maximising Scottish contributions to the European Union. With events like this in mind, a strong Scotland within Europe seems far from impossible.

But now to the big question: how do we get from here and now, to that stronger, positive Scottish influence within Europe? Here enters a potential criticism of the SNP's attitude, whose vision for Scotland's European future hinges solely on the idea of Scottish independence. As the character Leo demonstrated in the film *Inception*, an idea is resilient, an idea can take over within you; it will define you, or destroy you. And this may in a way have happened with the SNP. Of course, independence is the most natural solution to the problems faced by Scotland within Europe. With independence, Scotland would be awarded equal rights of representation within the European Parliament. It would be entitled to vote and to veto and to freely discuss issues relating to it. But when I ask the forbidden question - what if independence were to fall through, what would the next step be for Scotland then? - I am met with a slightly bemused smile. "The only thing to do then", he says, "is to keep campaigning for further rights within Parliament, to keep taking baby steps in the right direction. I want Scotland's voice to be heard in Europe as much as anyone else does, but with independence being such a huge uncertainty (and the A-Team nowhere in sight) I think we need a Plan B."



Europe, why are you not more indignant?

Marie Alter questions our indifference to Europe's scandals and misfortunes

Let us give Dominique Strauss-Kahn the presumption of innocence, and David Cameron the benefit of the doubt concerning his knowledge and implication in the *News of the World* phone hacking scandal. But we cannot ignore that Greece is screaming and aching, Italy suffering from an unviable economy and humiliated by its scandalous Premier, and Spain plagued by political gridlock and rising unemployment. Not to mention that Ireland is undergoing treatment of dramatic debt restructuring and extensive government cuts and Portugal may be next in line.

And yet, we citizens continue being deaf and blind to Europe's sufferings. Although the European disease seems to be spreading further every time, infecting our politics, economics and endangering our social *acquis*, nothing seems to stir a real popular reaction. How can that be?

If we read 93-years old French WWII Resistant

Stéphane Hessel's recently published manifesto *Indignez-vous!*, he acknowledges the fact that in the era we live in, the motifs for social and political revolt in Europe are not that strong

nor that clearly defined.¹ There is no obvious enemy, no radically evil force we can fight, no ideological Manichaeism: there is no Nazism or totalitarian communism to revolt against. Nowadays, only few of us in Europe are exposed to radical poverty; despite their many

flaws, our political systems are far from being oppressive and we have the extreme privilege of not having to experience the hardships of war. If you look at it this way, we should be thankful for everything we have and stop complaining.

But Europe is about much more than living at ease in comparison to other times and other places. Stéphane Hessel reminds us that we should always be indignant about the things that shock us, revolt us: that is the only way we can participate in making History.² He himself looks at cases like the living conditions of the population in the Gaza strip in Palestine as an example of a cause for indignation.

What I want to point out to is much closer to us, restricted to the European geography: when we see that our dignity as citizens and the basic rights for which we fought for so long are challenged, there is a motif for indignation. When ethical politics and accountable politicians, basic financial security

“...in our democracies, we are given the space to protest, but it seems as if we are either unaware of it, or lacking an active political conscience. Or worse, we are indifferent.”

and social wellbeing are challenged, it is our duty to be indignant. We cannot be voiceless. And in our democracies, we are given the space to protest, but it seems as if we are either unaware of it, or lacking an active political conscience. Or worse, we are indifferent.

Only Spain's *indignados*, some of who directly follow Stéphane Hessel's call for indignation (they often carry the booklet in their hands), seem to have realised this. Protest-



ing against the political and economic situation of their country in general, this citizens' movement requests a more 'real' democracy where politicians truly represent the people, where the financial markets are more strictly regulated, and social rights guaranteed. It is organized around the successful fusion of the classical physical protests in the urban hearts of the Spanish towns - the *plazas* - and the efficient use of the social networking opportunities on the web. It is non-violent, creative and highly intellectual. It is independent from powerful political parties and corrupting corporations - both financially and ideologically- but there is nothing marginal about the participants, who have the support of 81% of the population. Most of them are young but not exclusively (many over-qualified suffering from unemployment), and although mostly adhering to a leftist ideology they can be from any political orientation. Maybe Spain's particularly tense economic and political situation is the direct driving force of the Spanish *indignados* movement; but at the root, there is the fear that the pillars of our democratic systems are in danger.³

Attempts to Europeanize the movement have mostly failed. In Paris, even the revolutionary Place de la Bastille where some French *indignés* replicated the Spanish protests, did not inspire more French to react. In London, the unusually rebellious demonstration against tuition fees stayed limited to these matters and did not inspire the British youngsters to further indignation either. Only in Greece, where the situation was more than ripe for indignation, has the movement started to spread firmly.

For the vision of a democratic, fair and egalitarian Europe to be perpetuated and further fulfilled, its citizens need to stand up for their values and ideas and stop thinking that History is a predetermined entity independent from their actions. If there is no need to join the *indignados*, there is a necessity to step out of indifference and actively voice the opinions we have about the state of our European democracies.

¹ Stéphane Hessel, 2011. *Indignez-vous!*. Barcelona: Indigènes Editions, p. 14

² *Ibid.*, p. 12

³ F.G. 2011. Apoyo a la indignación del 15-M, El País, (online). 27 July. Available at: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Apoyo/indignacion/15-M/elpepisp/20110605elpepinac_12/Tes. Accessed on 27 July 2011



The EU and Antibiotics: Facing Bacterial Resistance

Alexander Ross asks how the EU can respond to the overuse of antibiotics

The invention of antibiotics presented a paradigm shift in healthcare. Over the past seventy years antibiotics have saved millions of lives as they fight bacteria by killing, or preventing the growth, of microbes - from staph infections like MRSA, to salmonella, to bacterial pneumonia. However the overuse of antibiotics in livestock farming is placing human anti-microbial protections in jeopardy. The problem is one of the most prodigious challenges facing the European Union.

By using antibiotics indiscriminately, Europe and the rest of the world are encouraging resistant pathogens to emerge and reproduce, leading to a higher prevalence of bacteria that are unresponsive to our drugs. From farms bacteria can spread to society at large, whether through food itself, through animal-worker contact or indirectly through the environment. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control estimates that twenty five thousand Europeans die every year because of antibiotic-resistant infections.¹ This number will only multiply with current levels of antibiotic abuse in livestock farming.

The Commission is not ignorant of the dangers. Following a comprehensive ban in 2006, antibiotic growth promoters (AGPs) are now prohibited in the EU, as AGPs are considered our last resort against potentially deadly multi-resistant bacteria. But despite strict AGP regulations, the use of antibiotics in livestock farming is more prolific than ever. The use of cepha-

losporins, fluoroquinolones and macrolides has increased approximately eightfold in Britain in the past ten years.² Each is categorised as “critically important in human medicines” by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for treating a variety of bacterial infections and diseases.³ Similar trends exist in Europe: almost half the antibiotics prescribed on the continent are now for animals.⁴ The problem also exists globally. There has been a 307 percent increase in anti-microbial use on poultry, per bird, since the 1980s.⁵ We are recklessly accelerating the rate at which our protections are becoming obsolete.

In April MEPs called on the Commission to curb the worrisome trend. But any meaningful limitation or ban within the EU must be matched by third country exporters, both for competitiveness and world health concerns. The use of antibiotics means farmers can be more efficient producers, so the advantage gained by the third country that uses antibiotics over a regulated importer would be exponential. From a world health perspective, stringent standards even in several markets would not be addressing the problem.

Pathogens can spread across half the world on an eight-hour flight.

If the EU is serious about meaningful farm to fork policies, it will have to look outside itself for a solution. The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), enacted in 1995, states that trade restrictions can be implemented on grounds of public health. The risk associ-

ated with anti-microbial overuse should fall within the agreement, but no action has been taken. Instead the problem has spiralled further out of control.

Bruce A. Silverglade observes that “there is nothing in the (SPS) agree-

ment that permits a nation to challenge another nation’s standards as being too low;”⁶ while historically this holds true, challenges to policy have only emerged when food safety regulation has been too high. The global trade system must raise food safety standards to a consistently high level, particularly in concern to regulating antimicrobial use. In the words of Bill Clinton, a “levelling up” of regulation is needed, not a race to a lowest common denominator solution deemed acceptable by powerful industry actors

and acquiescent populations.

Evidently the SPS has been ineffective. Reform of the agreement needs to ensure hard regulation, based upon scientific evidence, making clear what minimum standards are needed for sustainable global trade, standards that will ensure safe practices to protect citizens not just in Europe, but throughout the world. Since the 1970s the EU has consistently committed itself to improving farm to fork policies as threats to consumers emerge; hard regulation against antibiotic overuse ought to be their next priority. Whether the EU is willing to push for meaningful reform through the WTO, in the face of opposition from a strong U.S. and European farming lobby, remains to be seen.

“Since the 1970s the EU has consistently committed itself to improving farm to fork policies as threats to consumers emerge; hard regulation against antibiotic overuse ought to be their next priority.”

¹ WHO. (2011). Antimicrobial Resistance. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3l97jy9>. Accessed 28th July 2011.

² Laurance, J. (2011). How antibiotic use has soared on British farms. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3ps02f4>. Accessed 26th July 2011.

³ World Health Organisation Department of Food Safety, Zoonoses and Foodborne Diseases, 2007. Critically important antimicrobials for human medicine: categorization for the development of risk management strategies to contain Antimicrobial Resistance due to non-human antimicrobial use. Copenhagen, 29-31 May 2007. Geneva: WHO Press.

⁴ European Parliament. (2011). MEP calls for tougher controls on animal antibiotics. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3pv52s7>. Accessed 26th July 2011.

⁵ World Society for the Protection of Animals, 2004. Industrial animal agriculture – the next global health crisis? Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3j2n5zv>. Accessed 24th July 2011.

⁶ Silverglade, A. (2000). The WTO agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures: weakening food safety regulations to facilitate trade? Food and Drug Law Journal, 55 (4), pp517-524.



Thistles in Brussels

Andrew Merry reflects on the prospects of an independent Scotland in Europe

Since the SNP's victory in May, it seems that the debate on independence, conspicuous by its absence in the last term, is going to be highly pertinent to their time in office, with a referendum likely. First Minister Alex Salmond addressing Parliament after his landslide victory reiterated his desire for independence. He indicated that independence was: 'a means to a better nation' where Scottish values of equality and fairness could prevail over English individualism; his vision is of a socialist sovereign Scotland¹. The vision of Salmond alone will not break up the union considering the majority of Scots at present do not want to do so. However, he has proven himself to be politically astute and his protestations about the role of the English Supreme Court in Scots Law could be construed as sublimated nationalism. This may set a precedent for more politically motivated battles with Westminster. It should be remembered that many thought the creation of the Scottish Parliament would kill off the SNP; it didn't and the prospect of Scotland voting for independence is far from out of the question.

The SNP have made clear they want to see an independent Scotland in Europe. They highlighted the success of other small countries in the EU with strong comparisons drawn to Norway, Denmark and before the economic crisis, Ireland. The benefits small countries can gain from being



Scottish Parliament, Photo: Andrew Wilkinson

part of large international organisations are vast. Heseltine has highlighted the outcome of 'enhanced sovereignty' giving disproportionate influence in decision-making². Scotland would roughly double its representation in the European parliament and the SNP hope this would enable Scotland to bolster trade with member states and further accentuate the clear strengths of renewable energy, North Sea oil reserves and tourism³. The SNP, previously in favour of the Euro have moved away from this position as the difficulties of fusing contrasting economies

plays out before the world in countries such as Greece and Ireland⁴. Macleod and Russell indicate clearly that Scotland would gain from having the freedom to exploit

“When Scotland looks towards a better future: we should focus on bolstering our position and exploiting assets within the union.”

advantages of an independent floating currency. Economic decisions could be specifically tailored to Scotland; resulting in a degree of economic growth⁵. Scotland could clearly exploit the advantages it has as a country but it is easy to forget the difficulties of breaking away from the powerbase.

Scotland faces a deficit with annual tax receipts below the overall Scottish budget; it is Westminster funding that fills the gap. Nationalists claim that oil and gas revenue could

largely ease the deficit. However, maintaining such luxuries as free prescription charges and free higher education may result in

a general increase in income tax. This could cause considerable pain for Scotland where high levels of public sector employment are witnessed.

Without the union, many things held dear by the Scottish people may be jeopardised and in the long run one must ask if basing your economy around the finite resources of oil and gas is wise. It is hard to envisage the union being resurrected in fifty years when oil could struggle to sustain our economy. To achieve the necessary political success in the EU Scotland would have to overcome many hurdles. Independence could be enshrined in law but Scotland would have to fight hard to assert itself in the International arena. Dissociation from England would have to be clear for all to see in order for any Scottish stance to be seen as credible and influential.

An independent Scotland that was part of the EU would potentially see influence within the international arena grow. Certain economic benefits would also be gained. However, it is all too easy to forget the stability and prosperity that comes with the UK. When Scotland looks towards a better future: we should focus on bolstering our position and exploiting assets within the union. One can take fragments of the argument and make good cases for independence within the EU although overall the grass may not be greener.

¹ “The new word for socialism... independence. Iain Macwhirter. *The Herald*. June 2011

² “Scotland Resurgent’ *The EU: A New Chance for Scotland*. Paul Henderson Scott (2003)

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Grasping the Thistle*. Dennis Macleod and Michael Russell (2006)

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

EU-US Relations Reconsidered

Katerina Kobylka on the necessity of an effective EU-US relationship

To speak of a “foreign policy” for the EU is still premature. Though the EU has integrated in fits and starts over the course of its history, it is important to remember its roots: an economic project based purely on an internal focus. A foreign policy aspect to the EU is only in its infancy.

What then, is it to speak of the future of EU – US relations? The two sides made a significant institutional stride when they established the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007. It is a “political body that oversees efforts to strengthen economic ties.”¹ Economic ties are strong, and though trade disputes grab headlines, they only account for 2 percent of all EU – US trade². The question remains: what of its non-economic relations?

A unified and coherent EU

foreign policy toward the US faces challenges from both within the EU and the US externally. The EU’s latest

power-expansion venture into a common foreign and security

policy has been met with staunch criticism, especially in regard to Catherine Ashton, the union’s High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy. Her slowness in responding to the Arab uprisings, as well as other breaking world events, have lead the larger, more powerful, members of the union such as France and Great Britain to call for a more facile,

“Economic ties are strong, and though trade disputes grab headlines, they only account for 2 percent of all EU – US trade”

faster policy³. (Ms. Ashton’s M.O. consisted of painstaking paperwork and bureaucracy, checking the policy response

with every member state.) Conversely, smaller countries in the north called for more consultancy

and transparency of documents in foreign and security policy. The post is further assailed by all for its addition to the budget – bringing it to a whopping €500 million for 2012⁴. Ms. Ashton’s ambit is certainly unenviable.

Even if the EU could manage to coordinate a common policy toward the US (its stance on the US presence in Iraq, for instance, would be

a good place to start; the union’s member states have been divided on the issue since its inception), the US could not care less about Europe’s policy position in regard to the US: it has bigger fish to fry.

The shift in US foreign policy priorities is perhaps best evidenced in the National Security Council chief of staff Denis McDonough’s digital clock displaying the times of five

different cities ranked highly on the White House’s priority list: not a single European city is present⁵. Europe has effectively become obsolete in US foreign policy.

The US is involved in two wars and the crises that have unfolded in the Arab countries that are taking up its foreign policy attention. However, given that both the US and EU are faced with financial crises of somewhat similar dimensions, it would be advantageous for the two governmental organisations to develop their ties and look at ways to coordinate their efforts. It remains to be seen whether the US, led by a President who is faced with an intransigent opposition in Congress and the heavily bureaucratic EU will be nimble enough to move forward in a partnered effort to address this issue.



Divergent visions of Obama and Sarkozy? Photo: cabezadeturco.

¹European Union website. *External Relations: Biggest Trade Partner*. http://europa.eu/pol/ ext/ index_en.htm. Last accessed 12 August 2011.

²European Commission. *Countries: the United States*. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ creating-opportunities/bilateral- relations/countries/united-states/>. Last accessed 12 August 2011.

³Traynor, I. (2011) ‘EU foreign ministers round on Lady Ashton’. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/23/eu-foreign-ministers-attack-ashton>. Last accessed 11 August 2011.

⁴Castle, S. (2011) ‘Discontent Over E.U. Foreign Policy Chief Goes Public’. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/europe/24iht-ashton24.html?_r=1&ref=catherineashton. Last accessed 12 August, 2011.

⁵Cohen, R. (2010) ‘Europe and Benign Neglect’ Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/opinion/07iht-edcohen.html>. Last accessed 11 August, 2011.



Indefensible

Ryan Jacobs asks whether the

Perhaps it was naïve to expect a satisfactory level of European Union (EU) involvement in operations against Qaddafi's regime this past year. After all, my American upbringing predisposes me to a belief that brilliantly executed military maneuvers supported by the most advanced weaponry come easily and swiftly. This product of American Exceptionalism is of course false and dangerous. However, it still stands that the EU's response to Libya was found wanting.

Why was the EU's performance so unimpressive? The answer relies on a combination of absent capabilities, failed institutional linkages, and differing national priorities.

EU military operations have always focused on conflict management or peacekeeping rather than war fighting. For example, modestly successful recent deployments like Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR saw EU Battlegroups patrolling in low-intensity conflict zones.¹ Thus, it is fair to say that EU deployments have provided little practical experience for crises necessitating high-intensity conflict.

Contrastingly, it is also fair to say that some EU member state militaries do have experience setting up no-fly zones and running prolonged

bombing campaigns due to their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The presence of experience, however, does not mean a thing when European wide defense spending is abysmal and incorrectly appropriated. According to Anand Menon, "Although European Union member states have some half a million more personnel under arms than the United States does, around 70% of their land forces cannot operate outside national territory."²

European states lack weapons and platforms in enough quantity to deal with fundamental missions, including suppressing enemy air defenses and cruise missile strikes. In the opening days of the Libya campaign, these tasks were instead accomplished by technologically advanced and numerically superior forces from the US.

The problem is not just one of missing capabilities. In fact, the EU has always known its inexperience in war fighting to be a hindrance. Therefore in 2003, the Berlin Plus initiative, a EU-NATO cooperation pact, which "sets out the terms of reference and procedures permitting the EU to conduct crisis management operations with recourse to NATO's assets, capabilities and planning facilities," came into force.³ Hypothetically, this gives the EU access to NATO assets from non-EU

members like the US. So why then not rely on Berlin Plus to enable a greater EU role in Libya?

The reason is twofold. First, Berlin Plus "has not become the institutional link it was envisioned to be."⁴ It has been muddled by competition between NATO and the EU in regards to civilian and military responsibilities in Europe. Additionally, Turkey's NATO membership and Cyprus's EU membership has led to Turk-Cypriot log jamming over issues of sovereignty and military openness, consequently inhibiting formal EU-NATO cooperation.⁵

Secondly and more importantly, a failure to traverse differing national priorities of EU members has been a perennial obstruction, and a decision to even intervene militarily in Libya was implausible whether Berlin Plus was utilized or not. Suggestions that members like Germany or Poland had any direct security interest in military intervention were wholly unconvincing. EU members like Italy had deep economic ties with the Libyan regime. Thus, some of the most blatant flip-flopping since America's 2004 Presidential election occurred as Franco Frattini, Italy's foreign minister, argued against and then for military action.

Without a consensus for EU engagement inaction was inevitable. Accordingly, some EU members and particularly Germany, whose leader bent to the necessities of domestic politics, did not voice

encouragement for United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1973. With the added goal of regime change and sense of mission creep which beset the longer than expected NATO campaign, the EU's hesitance to become involved in Libya seems prophetic. This does not mean though, that the EU will not become in some way militarily involved in Libya in the future.

The strain from financial and diplomatic pressure, Transitional National Council (TNC) military advances, the NATO bombing campaign, and covert foreign assistance, eventually overwhelmed Qaddafi. Additionally, in the vague language needed for such predictions, Saskia van Genugten is right in saying "Any democratic transition in Libya is likely to be protracted and fragile."⁶ Inevitably, as Libya enters a post-conflict space mired in pluralism with guns, the call will go out for some outside force to provide humanitarian gateways and conflict deterrence.

The EU will have to be convinced of the larger role it must play in a post-Qaddafi Libya. A NATO post-conflict operation is likely to be a non-starter. With its overt American reputation, and the inevitable domestic backlash against troop deployments, any US administration is unlikely to support a NATO mission on Libyan soil. Considering the African Union's (AU) recent performance in Somalia, it would

"Why was the EU's performance so unimpressive?"

Inaction...

EU has done enough in Libya?.

also be a mistake to rely on AU conflict management. The UN looks to be the best option. However, post-conflict Libya presents an opportunity for the EU to shoulder more responsibility, and perhaps a joint EU-UN mission could be organized.

While an EU deployment must occur with permission from recognized representatives of the Libyan people, it may also prove extremely costly.

Man-portable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles have been disappearing from arm caches.⁷ Regime loyalists have melted into a post-Qaddafi Libya, still fuelled by rage and vengeance. Libya's rebels, united by a hatred for Qaddafi, now find it hard to find common ground. Plus, with no experience in democracy or indeed institutionalized government, Libya resembles a shell of a state.

Rather than strict national interest, cosmopolitan unity and a sense of moral necessity were more persuasive to Sarkozy, Cameron, Obama and other NATO participants in Libya.

Press releases, sanctions and harsh words from Eurocrats



EU soldiers on the ground in North Africa. Photo: Obrony Narodowej

certainly made it seem as if the EU also felt a moral imperative to act. Yet, in the end empathy did not equal willingness or capability.

“Rather than strict national interest, cosmopolitan unity and a sense of moral necessity were likely more persuasive to Sarkozy, Cameron, Obama and other NATO participants in Libya.”

Moral necessity though will not be the only impetus for action. Migration, the new bugbear of the European Right is only set to increase if Libya's empty shell of a state collapses. While this author disagrees with the racist premise behind migration-related fear mongering, the ability of crafty

European politicians to frame an EU deployment to post-

conflict Libya, as an anti-migration strategy may reconcile initial uneasiness. Similarly to Somalia, Libya also has the potential to become a transit point for terrorist groups.

Decision making in the EU is often coalition based, and a multinational EU Battlegroup in Libya would not have troops from each or most member states. Though those not participating could still allocate resources such as helicopters, or at the very most not act as an obstacle. Occasional peripheral crises like Libya do not pose enough of a risk towards the EU to warrant a true growth in Europe's war fighting capabilities, especially when the US occasionally stands ready to enforce humanitarianism. However, a future EU conflict management operation in

Libya is an opportunity for it to use the military resources it has, not the resources everyone wishes the EU had.

¹ Rodt, A (2011) Taking Stock of EU Military Conflict Management. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 7:1. Pg. 46-7

² Menon, A (2011) European Defense Policy from Lisbon to Libya. *Survival*, 53:3. Pg. 79

³ Koenig, N. (2010) The EU and NATO: Towards a Joint Future in Crisis Management? Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe. Pg. 12

⁴ Koenig, N. (2010) The EU and NATO: Towards a Joint Future in Crisis Management? Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe. Pg. 19

⁵ Koenig, N. (2010) The EU and NATO: Towards a Joint Future in Crisis Management? Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe. Pg. 13

⁶ Genugten, S (2011) Libya After Gadhafi. *Survival*, 53:3. Pg. 61

⁷ Chivers, C.J. (2011) Antiaircraft Missiles on the Loose in Libya. *The New York Times*. July, 14, 2011. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/world/africa/15libya.html?pagewanted=all>



Should We Have

Mike Yeomans ponders the legality

Should we have interfered in Libya's domestic conflict? Under principles of sovereignty in international law: certainly not. By these principles we ought to have left the domestic uprising to the 'rebels' and the Gaddafi regime. Yet on humanitarian - and arguably peace and security - grounds the intervention as authorised by the United Nations was justified. The motivation – selfish or otherwise – behind British and French actions is difficult to ascertain.

Arguably, despite the passing of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, the intervention via NATO was illegal. Under article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, interfering in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state is outlawed in international law.¹ Furthermore, international law is the best basis to assess whether or not an action is normatively right or wrong. Hence intervention is wrong.

Libya's conflict is domestic, not between multiple states, thus the UNSC should not be intervening to restore global peace and security.²

However, a justification for intervention can be found under the grounds of inter-

national peace and security. The mass exodus of refugees to states neighbouring Libya is arguably destabilising the region, potentially meaning peace and security has been compromised, so intervention is just.

Additionally, legal justification for intervention has also been developed in theories on intervention on humanitarian grounds. The question of whether human life should be valued over state sovereignty has become a pertinent issue within the global community. Theories like Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have been developed by Canada, calling for intervention in domestic conflict, to save lives. However, this theory is highly unpopular

“Furthermore, international law is the best basis to assess whether or not an action is normatively right or wrong. Hence intervention is wrong. The conflict is domestic...”

with many states, and is regarded as weak compared to state sovereignty, which is guaranteed in international law as a far older and tested justification.³

Despite the unpopularity of R2P, intervention to uphold

human rights has precedent. The 1994 intervention in Haiti bears many similarities to the plight of Libya. The despot – ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier – subjected his citizens to brutal hardship and inhumane conditions, despite UNSC de-

mands to desist. When he did not a multilateral task force was sent to Haiti, forcing the dictator's instant surrender. This case gives humanitarian intervention precedent, establishing a legal principle.

On the other hand, while UNSC Resolution 1973 permits “all necessary measures”; it only allows this “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”.⁴ Open attempts at regime change would be illegal.⁵ Allowing the Libyan rebel council to push for regime change is permissible, so long as NATO only strikes to prevent harm to civilians - as they are doing. This is however a very fine line to walk.

Intervention on humanitarian grounds is all very well. However, we must remember that the NATO-led 1995 UN mission in Bosnia Herzegovina was also on humanitarian grounds, yet it resulted in the slaughter at Srebrenica.⁶ Action by the UN actually caused a massacre, because intervention was incompetently handled, allowing Mladic, Karadzic and Milosevic to butcher the Bosnian Muslims in a single, easily targetable location. It can be argued then, that even if intervention is legally justified, it most certainly is not always moral, as it only makes things worse.

Vested interest – in the form of oil – is without doubt a factor for all concerned in Libya; the rebels depend on selling it to make revenue,

whilst the UK and France need Libyan oil to survive. The UK in particular is concerned due to outstanding BP contracts for Libyan oil, so it seems logical they are attacking to ensure they have good relations with who they believe will be the next regime. Trying to deny that oil is the only concern seems very difficult when France and the UK are the chief actors. In fact Egypt is arguably the country best suited to lead this mission;⁷ their military is intact, their revolution peacefully resolved, and their strategic positioning perfect for intervention in Libya. These facts demand response.

One factor to be noted is that the no-fly-zone was called for by Arab States as well as Western powers. The rationale for France and the UK leading the conflict rather than Egypt is simple. Egypt has just had a revolution. At present little or no government structure is in place, and they continue to suffer turmoil and protests. In place of Egypt, Qatar has sent fighter-jets to assist with enforcing the no-fly zone,⁸ and it should be noted NATO – not the UK or France – is in charge. The task force is a multilateral one. It is acting on a UNSC remit. The UK and France are acting in their capacity as P5 members, since even today they remain significant military powers. The P5 were always expected to supply the bulk of troops in any intervention force and the UN Charter actually called for the P5 to

Intervened In Libya?

and morality of the NATO campaign



Former leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. Photo: Creative Commons

have rapid response military bases to rapidly deploy force, to help restore peace and security. UNSC resolution 1973 has enacted this principle, therefore intervention is not only just, but a landmark case in allowing the Security Council to operate as originally intended.

Overall this case is difficult to assess. It is a domestic conflict rather than inter-state, but legal rea-

sons for intervening must be based on humanitarian over sovereignty grounds. Yet there is little precedent for such an intervention, and even less evidence of wholly successful ones.

All activities undertaken in Libya are wholly legal due to UNSC resolution 1973. The Resolution authorises the use of force to restore peace

and security to protect the civilian population, provided this remit is not exceeded.

“Intervention is not only just, but a landmark case in allowing the Security Council to operate as it was originally intended.”

The question of self-interest due to the presence of oil doubtless blurs the agenda of Western powers. Yet the Arab League has signed on to the mission, thus legitimising intervention.

Ultimately the UN is acting legally. It acts within a framework designed to produce morally just and favourable consequences. Intervention in Libya is the right course of action if the doctrine of R2P is more important to you than sovereignty. If it is not, then the intervention is wrong.

¹ The United Nations Charter (1945) Article 2(4). Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>

² Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (1965), United Nations General Assembly, in Harris D., Harris D. (2010), *Cases and Materials on International Law*, ed. 7, Sweet and Maxwell (eds), Thomson Reuters; London

³ The United Nations Charter (1945) Article 2(1). Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>

⁴ The United Nations (2011) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

⁵ Verdict of the International Court of Justice on Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986), in Harris D. (2010), *Cases and Materials on International Law*, ed. 7, Sweet and Maxwell (eds), pp.727-738, Thomson Reuters; London

⁶ Hanhimäki J. M., (2008), *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press; Oxford

⁷ The Right and Honourable Douglas Carswell MP for Clacton (2001) BBC News, Politics Points east, Deborah McGurran, The British Broadcasting Service. Accessed April 19th 2011.

⁸ Pierre Tran (2011) Defense News, Gannett Company. Accessed 20.4.11. Available at: <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6012669>



The Growth of EU Military Might: An

Rachel Laidler questions whether the ends justify the means with

Since the late 1990s, following the meeting of the British and French heads of state at St Malo, there has been continuous growth of EU military capabilities.¹ Most regard the establishment of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a natural progression, an inevitable consequence of the deep economic and continuing political integration that has transformed the geographical area of Europe. And yet, this development could compromise the existence of a central tenet within the EU's *sui generis* identity: its 'civilian power' nature.

The concept of civilian power (CP) requires some clarification, if the impact of the EU's military build-up it is to be understood: it places an emphasis on 1) non-military means of action, relying instead upon traditionally 'civilian' ones (economic, trade and diplomatic capabilities), 2) interaction with third parties based on a more passive influence, rather than coercion, and 3) international cooperation as a means of resolving global problems, through international rules of law. Before the advent of the CSDP, the EU reflected these factors perfectly: its major relationships were based around trade, its economic power a magnet attracting third parties into its sphere of influence; it promoted

international law, especially in relation to human rights and democratic standards, through its trade and aid policies.² Lacking a military dimension, the EU was unable to use military coercion as a tactic. As a result, third parties viewed the EU as a possible ally rather than a threat.

Unsurprisingly, many have assumed that the emerging defence and security component would signal the death of CP Europe as military power is considered completely different from its civilian counterpart – they create a contradiction in terms. And yet, it appears that the EU has been able to mostly retain its CP identity, subsuming its new military instruments under latter's banner. How can they be reconciled when they have been so diametrically opposed?

The answer appears to lie in the old aphorism that the ends justify the means; the EU intends to use its military means, not to pursue militaristic outcomes, but solely to foster the civilian ends that its CP identity

demands. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU sets forth the types of operations that its military capabilities would be used for: the 'Petersberg Tasks' limit military activities to those traditionally seen as having a 'civilian' component, namely humanitarian missions, peacekeeping activities, and peace-making operations.³ These are believed to have their emphasis on civilian outcomes – the promotion of democratic standards, rule

“Has the EU forfeited its civilian power identity in the eyes of others just through the acquisition of military means, notwithstanding its actual intentions?”

of law, and human rights being the foundation stones of all EU military action. Also, the EU has promised never to act without a UN Security Council Sanction. These facts jointly project a highly CP-based use of military power.⁴

Yet, actors do not necessarily abide by the rules that they set themselves, and capabilities can be used for activities that creators did not intend; even if the EU is propagating its military means as a CP tool, it does not mean that this will be the case in practice - it is through its actual activities in this area that we should judge it.

For the moment, the EU seems to abide by the constraints it has laid down in

relation to its military means and so far the majority of EU missions have been of a civilian nature.⁵ Even Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, which deployed military forces, was focused upon civilian outcomes.⁶ Military capabilities were only used to reduce levels of conflict within the area, and the overall focus was upon reconstructing state infrastructure. More often than not, the focus is purely civilian, with police forces and other civilian actors such as engineering and financial experts being deployed to aid in the redevelopment of damaged states.⁷ Remarkably, the EU appears to limit its military actions to those promoting civilian ends; it has done what many doubted could be done – it has found a way to include a military dimension within a CP identity, using military means in order to promote civilian outcomes.

However, this is not the end of the story. It is possible that the mere acquiring of a military dimension may remove the EU's CP identity in the eyes of third parties.⁸ Within the international system, a growth of military force is usually associated with an increase in aggression and self-interestedness. Unfortunately, despite the EU's best intentions, this could result in third parties taking a reactionary posture,



attack on its Civilian Power Identity?

regard to the European Union's newly acquired military capacity.

perceiving former as rising power bloc intending to get its own way through military action. Has the EU forfeited its CP identity in the eyes of others just through the acquisition of military means, notwithstanding its actual intentions?

Such concern is not limited to third parties alone; many theorists of EU politics fear similar repercussions, including apprehension that the EU may eventually turn its new military capabilities to more selfish purposes. Allison Bailes even suggests that the CSDP could eventually be used as an instrument for the protection of EU trade routes.⁹ While this appraisal appears to be quite far-fetched, especially given the current level of militarization, it demonstrates the extent to which military instruments are seen to carry an inherent threat, and the problems that EU acquisition of military instruments can indeed have for its CP identity.

Concerns by third party states and theorists are not only based upon the sometimes reactionary nature of the international system; despite being firmly anchored in CP the EU's approach shows a certain ambiguity, for instance, in the 2003 European Security Strategy. It contains civilian aims but also encompasses a more self-interested approach,

one intent on securing the Union's position within the international system. Such is not surprising considering the historical background against which the CSDP arose – the USA's withdrawal from the European continent, along with the EU's lack of ability to enforce order in the wake of the Balkan conflicts, suggest that the EU's desire to establish the CSDP has at least in parts been related to its own security.

There appears then, to be two avenues open to the CSDP: the civilian, or the more selfish and securitized – how can we predict which direction the EU will eventually take? Recent EU responses to the events in Libya present an opportunity to examine where it could be heading.

As of yet, there is no EU military presence in Libya. Although a military option has come to light, this proposed mission will only enter into effect if sanctioned by the UN, and would be constrained by a civilian remit, EUFOR Libya promotes the use of troops for humanitarian purposes, protection and

evacuation of displaced persons, and aiding humanitarian agencies within Libya.¹⁰ Even in relation to these most recent events, the EU's focus remains civilian. It has been overshadowed by its military superior, who has been responsible for launching a mission within the Libyan state; so long as NATO remains a functioning body there appears to be no opening for a more outwardly militaristic build-up of EU defence.¹¹ NATO's supremacy is further highlighted by comparing its efficient decision making procedures with the EU's internal bickering, a factor that has played a role in preventing the implementation of an EU military mission to Libya.¹² If EU decision making continues to lack consensus, it seems impossible that the EU will

ever evolve its military means, and its military ambitions, beyond those of a CP body.

It appears that the CSDP will most likely remain a

civilian instrument partly due to the EU's desire to retain this CP image, an attempt visible through the restrictions it has itself placed upon its military capabilities. However, it is

not merely through design that the EU kept its CSDP civilian; in many cases the EU's military means remain civilian by default. Its lack of internal consensus, and its weakness in relation to NATO suggest that at least in near future the CSDP will remain civilian, whether the EU chooses to or not.

¹ Howorth, J., (2007) *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.

² Whitman, Richard (2006), "Muscles from Brussels: The Demise of Civilian Power Europe?," in *The European Union's Roles in International Politics*, Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, eds., 101-117. Oxon: Routledge, and McCormick, J., (2006), *The European Superpower*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

³ Smith, K. E., (2005) 'Still 'Civilian Power EU'?', *European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper*.

⁴ Bailes, A. J. K., (2008) 'The EU and a 'better world': What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?', *International Affairs*, Vol.84, Issue.1, pp.115-130.

⁵ Solana, J., (2009) 'Ten Years of the ESDP', *European Security and Defence Policy Newsletter: 10th Year Anniversary Issue*, Issue 9, p.8-11.

⁶ Bailes, A. J. K., (2008) 'The EU and a 'better world': What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?', *International Affairs*, Vol.84, Issue.1, pp.115-130.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Hyde-Price, A. (2008) 'A 'tragic actor'? A realist perspective on 'ethical power Europe', *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, Issue 1, pp.29-44.

⁹ Bailes, A. J. K., (2008) 'The EU and a 'better world': What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?', *International Affairs*, Vol.84, Issue.1, pp.115-130.

¹⁰ <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eufor-libya.aspx?lang=en>

¹¹ Howorth, J., and Keeler, J., (2005), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

¹² <http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/politiques/politiques-europeennes/military-intervention-in-libya-where-is-esdp.html>

“As long as NATO remains a functioning body there appear to be no opening for a more outward militaristic build-up of EU defence.”



The EU in the Medium Term:

Dominic Whitwham-Biroth on how the financial crisis has revealed that

Until the recent financial crisis the future prospects of the EU for continued ‘ever closer union’ appeared bright. The single currency, helped by the Schengen free travel agreement, was facilitating trade and travel between member states and helping to create the European dream of a true single market. The Lisbon Treaty created an EU diplomatic service and Eurosceptics screamed that the EU had become a super state. Yet since the Euro faced its first financial crisis starting in 2008 this inexorable march towards statehood appears less certain.

The crisis has revealed the truth that no national government will ever be willing to sacrifice its own national interest for the good of the EU as a whole. The debt

limits imposed on members of the single currency by the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ intended to prevent the situation that has arisen in Greece, were loosened by France and Germany as it suited their interests. Similarly, the recent suspension of the Schengen Agreement in response to the flood of migrants from the recent ‘Arab Spring’ has shown the desire of states to place their own interests above those of the community.¹ Even the recent bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal by the wealthier states in the union have been sold to the public as in their own national interest. In the UK our contribution to the bailout fund is based on our interest in a stable Eurozone to buy our exports. Similar arguments are being used across

the union, however across the wealthier nations in Europe public resentment against the subsidising of others is growing. In Germany, the current generation no longer feels the war guilt that was used to justify outflows of money to the rest of Europe. Instead they ask why hard working Germans should pay for the early retirement of the

Greeks?²

This backdrop of increasing resentment against the EU is a bad sign for the future of the European project. For the single currency to survive, the economies of the Euro states need to be more in harmony with each other. The current crisis in the Eurozone has

been caused at least in part by interest rates that were good for the countries of Northern Europe while being too low for the economies of Spain, Ireland and Greece. This resulted in huge spending booms in these countries that created the high levels of debt they now suffer³. The only way to prevent the Eurozone from falling

apart is for a closer union that would create a greater harmonisation of member state economies. When the Euro was created it was believed by many, including German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that it could only survive in the long term if a European state was created to support it⁴.

This is already coming closer with the European Financial Stability Facility which establishes a system for members to underwrite each other’s debt. With members now having a direct investment in each other’s budget it seems reasonable that they will want some form of oversight of each other’s budgets⁵. Jean-Claude Trichet, the governor of the European Central



Photo: William Murphy.



Photo: William Murphy.

“The crisis has revealed the truth that no national government will ever be willing to sacrifice its own national interest for the good of the EU”

An Ever Looser Union?

national interests prevail over European integrationism

Bank, has built upon this and called for the creation of a single European finance ministry and common budget⁶. A common budget would bring the benefit of gathering taxes more efficiently and by pooling borrowing risk the union would



Photo: William Murphy.

be able to raise money at a lower rate than individual members⁷. Further a common budget would also not only permanently establish the transfer of funds between states but likely increase it. It would also remove the incentive of nations such as Greece and Spain to liberalise their economies to promote growth if their unemployment benefits were being paid by the French and Germans⁸. To gain the support of all 27 member (states and in many cases their electorates) for this highly ambitious project, or even a watered down version, is highly unlikely. For the first time it is becoming apparent to the citizens of the EU that the 'ever closer union' is not in everyone's best interest, whilst the weaker economies of the union would benefit from the support of the stronger ones the countries with more liberal and productive economies gain no benefit from subsidising their less competitive neighbours.

Calls have been made by

various sectors within Germany for the expulsion of weaker economies from the Euro unless they radically liberalise and restructure their economies along German lines. The

former head of the Federation of German Industries has suggested that the Euro be split into two separate currencies, a southern group led by France would then be able to devalue their way out of the economic crisis; this seems highly unlikely. However, public opinion in Germany and other countries providing bail outs will not allow this constant subsidisation to preserve the

Euro to continue. Yet unless the Greeks rapidly gain a Thatcherite budget cutting zeal and

a Teutonic work ethic, which seems unlikely, it is the only way the Euro can continue in its current form. The ever more likely solution to the Eurozones problem would be for the PIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain – to

regain their own currencies. Whilst politicians and civil servants in Brussels claim that this is impossible it is being promoted by an increasing number of newspapers and public figures across Europe including the *Bild* newspaper in Germany, Irwin Stelzer and many other leading economists and politicians including Britain's own Boris Johnson. It appears that the Eurozone has failed in its role as a tool of European political integration and that its future is as a more exclusive club of well-managed economies.

This more exclusive Eurozone will be the result of the people of Europe rejecting the ideal of a unified Europe and instead forcing their political elites to accept a view of the European project based on the national interests of its members. Whilst the EU can undoubtedly help the Europe-

“It appears that the Eurozone has failed in its role as a tool of European political integration and that its future is as a more exclusive club of well-managed economies.”

an economies by creating a single market with increased competition in many respects it is a hindrance on effective

decision making. The 'community method' of making decisions through European institutions in order to promote integration has already been rejected by Merkel who prefers to transact business directly with other member

states⁹ and this is likely to become more common as states seek to promote their interests above those of the EU. In short in the immediate future Europe will become a less ideologically driven and looser union working to promote the best economic interests of its members: A concept that was sold to Europeans back in 1957.

⁶Stephens, P 'Nobodies in Charge' *The Spectator*, 11th June 2011.

⁷Ibid

⁸'Fixing Europe's Single Currency' *The Economist*, 25th September 2010 at: <http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/ehost/detail?sid=d22ede23-b550-4cde-b53e-e7561066d3f7940sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=21&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=53949744>

⁹'Soft Centre' *The Economist*, 13th June 2009 at: <http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/ehost/detail?sid=3fced2f8-49f0-4c82-97d1-5b27e03b2074%40sessionmgr13&vid=1&hid=21&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=41567110>

¹⁰'Fixing Europe's Single Currency' *The Economist*, 25th September 2010 at: <http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/ehost/detail?sid=d22ede23-b550-4cde-b53e-e7561066d3f7940sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=21&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=53949744>

¹¹Forsyth, J (2011) 'Politics: Don't let Europe's crisis go to waste' *The Spectator*, 11th June 2011

¹²'Fixing Europe's Single Currency' *The Economist*, 25th September 2010 at: <http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/ehost/detail?sid=d22ede23-b550-4cde-b53e-e7561066d3f7940sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=21&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=53949744>

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Stephens, P (2011) 'Nobodies in Charge' *The Spectator*, 11th June 2011.



The SGP Six Pact: A New Vision

Mateo Urquijo gives a brief overview over the seriousness

In the wake of the financial crisis, a host of new proposals have been devised to help mitigate the shortfalls of EU-level economic policy coordination. Chief among these are proposals aimed at reforming the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which Jean-Claude Juncker describes as “the cornerstone of European economic policy coordination”.¹

As such, it is unsurprising that it has been riddled with conflict and drama since its very conception: Germany’s Kohl government, for example, originally insisted that the pact include firm rule-based automatic sanctions to ensure maximal economic stability. But under pressure which threatened to bring the European Monetary Union (EMU) project to a halt, Germany eventually compromised down to accepting what it termed ‘quasi-automatic’ sanctions instead.² While not a major blow, neither was this loosening of the strict sanctions they desired, a happy compromise. It was therefore with a healthy dose of irony, on 25 November 2003, that Germany and France convinced the European Council’s Economic and Finance (ECOFIN) ministers to essentially suspend the SGP in order to avoid the Commission’s recommendation for sanctions against the two states.³ The Commission, of course, quickly filed against the Council in 2004.⁴ The European Court of Justice



Is the short-sighted, inadequate SGP a result of beer goggles? Photo: Michelle Tribe

(ECJ) ruled that the Council had acted illegally in adopting its own text, but also ruled that it had the right not to follow the recommendations of the Commission.⁵ In the end, Germany and France were not sanctioned; however, the Commission did move to reform the SGP, and in 2005 the revised version was in effect.⁶

The 2005 reform resulted

in a ‘softer’ approach to the question of sanctioning: It allowed for

“It was therefore with a healthy dose of irony... that Germany and France convinced the European Council’s Economic and Finance ministers to essentially suspend the SGP in order to avoid the Commission’s recommendation for sanctions against the two states.”

“special circumstances” (aka ‘exceptional circumstances’) when the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) could be temporarily suspended; i.e. it was accepted that the SGP’s 3%

deficit limit could be breached without penalty.⁷ Determining

these special circumstances, which remained undefined, was left to the discretion of the Commission, much to the chagrin of many Member States.⁸ Still, despite this move away from Kohl’s rules-based ‘German model’ under which the original pact was conceived, in the years of growth that directly followed the 2005 reforms, the EMU seemed entirely unaffected. It was even pointed out, in a 2006 paper on the stability of long-term EU government bond yields during and after the 2003 suspension, that “Owing to its political nature, the EDP does not matter for investors”.⁹

This assertion, and those similar to it, are contentious for at least one reason: two years does not comprise a



or Economic Beer Goggles?

and sobriety of EU fiscal policy (in)coordination

full economic cycle, so the full extent of the functioning of the reforms was yet to be seen. According to Quarles, “when governments have discretion, markets and citizens cannot be sure how the government will act,” leading to instability and opening the door to moral hazard.¹⁰ Rather, if governments are forced to intervene, markets prefer they do so “by developing and sticking to clear, predictable rules for action”.¹¹ In this case, the SGP acts as the ‘predictable rules’, but there had not been a situation in which the ‘government’ was forced to intervene. That is to say, in response to LeBlond, at that point in time (2003-05) things were improving economically; there were no exceptional circumstances against which the reforms could be tested.¹²

Luckily for this analysis, in 2008, precisely such circumstances arose. Brushing aside the specifics of the financial crisis, when it was clear that it would hit the EU hard, the SGP framework of allowing for exceptional circumstances could come into full swing. However, it did not mean that it was altogether cast away. On the contrary, as Heipertz and Verdun have pointed out, the fact that the SGP was still taken as the basis for fiscal policy coordination at all, is a dramatic sign of its political resilience.¹³ That is to say, the Commission could easily have put the entire SGP framework on hold to address the crisis on an ad hoc basis, but it did not. Captivatingly,

they also predicted (in 2009) that if the SGP no longer functioned as a sanctioning mechanism, no matter how weak, it could continue as an anchor for policy coordination, between future member states.¹⁴

This brings us to the question at hand: the so-called six-

pack of reforms. The simple fact that the SGP persists as a hot topic in 2011 shows that just as predicted, rather

than insignificant, it is still being taken seriously as the ‘cornerstone’ of EU policy coordination (however weak the cornerstone may be). The reforms themselves aim to/include: 1. Enhance the ‘preventative arm’ of the EDP by including new surveillance criteria, 2. Enhance the ‘corrective arm’ of the EDP by placing debt concerns on a more equal footing with deficit concerns, 3. A directive to increase transparency and planning of national fiscal policies and budgets, 4. The ‘Excessive Imbalances Procedure’ would list state-specific indicators to prevent macro-economic imbalances across the EU, 5. Stricter budgetary oversight and earlier sanctions including a ‘reverse qualified majority’ to prevent a repeat

of the 2003 suspension, and 6. The ability to sanction eurozone states in the event of an EIP breach.¹⁵

Currently, the main criticism of the reforms, or indeed of the SGP as a whole, is the credibility of the sanctions.¹⁶ First, they have never been enforced. Second, potential

“...the economic crisis has given the need for a tighter fiscal policy framework a brand new context. And criticisms seem to beg the question: Are sanctions really necessary?”

enforcement is seen to be highly unlikely. Still, whatever its weaknesses, the economic crisis has given the need for a tighter fiscal policy framework a brand new context.

And criticisms seem to beg the question: Are sanctions really necessary? It is fair to point out that those countries that have been historically in line with SGP mandates are significantly better off today than those who have not been. Whether this is incentive enough or not, only time will tell.

If ‘six-pack’ refers to a muscularly well-defined abdomen, the term can also refer to a package of beer. And, according to a 2003 study in the UK, consumption of 1-6 UK units of alcohol was shown to increase the attractiveness of the opposite sex (i.e., give the drinker ‘beer goggles’), possibly leading to risky (sexual) behaviour.¹⁷ Resisting the temptation to overburdening this allegory, one

can only question: is the SGP actually getting fitter, or is our ‘Euro’-vision improving with the help of new lenses? With the recent failure of the Hungarian presidency to pass the six-pack proposals before its term ended the prospects are not promising: Just as EMU appeared to be doing its first sit-up, it became obvious that it was merely reaching for another beer.

¹ Juncker, J. 2010. ‘Foreword’, in Heipertz, M, & Verdun, A 2010, *Ruling Europe: the politics of the Stability and Growth Pact*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Kindle Edition

² McAllister, R. 2010. *European Union: an historical and political survey*, Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge.

³ Nugent, N. 2010. *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan; Verdun, A. 2010. ‘Economic and Monetary Union’, in *European Union Politics*, Ed. Michelle Cini, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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¹⁵ “Package of six legislative proposals” 2010, Website of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, viewed 23 July 2011; Available at: <http://www.eu2011.hu/package-six-legislative-proposals>

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The European Union's

Natasha Turak reviews Europe's

As many as 30,000 North African migrants have reached the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa since the start of the Arab revolts.¹ Significantly positioned between Tunisia and Malta, the island is ordinarily home to just 5,000 inhabitants. Now though groups of dishevelled young Arab men huddle together in tents and behind roped-off quarters. Many sleep outside on the ground. Makeshift tents scattered over the island provide a semblance of shelter, while refugees can be observed sifting through trash to find food. "And these" the generic voice of a reporter would narrate, "are the lucky ones."

Meanwhile, across the Mediterranean, European political leaders and immigration authorities anxiously eye their borders. European Union officials and political leaders and officials gather around tables to deliberate over the massive influx of North African immigrants following the turbulent revolutions of the Arab Spring.

A crucial point of the policy talks is the decades-old Schengen agreement, consisting of 25 European countries and encompassing over 400 million people. The Schengen area enables passport-free travel and unfettered transport of people, labour and capital across EU member state borders. For 26 years this treaty has been a symbol of the EU's integration and unity. Now, confronted with the prospect — or what some see as the threat — of a new wave

of immigrants, EU interior ministers have called for radical reforms to the system.

According to the International Office of Migration statistics, over 1.2 million people have fled North Africa since the Arab revolutions began at the dawn of this year.² Up to 30,000 of those have tried to reach Europe.³ Often leaving family members behind, the migrants board fishing boats headed to a better place — or so they believe. Already 1,400 people have died at sea since the uprising in Libya began in February, Al Jazeera reports.⁴ Upon arriving either at Malta,

Lampedusa or another Southern European port, the *sans-papiers*, as they are called in France, generally wait days or weeks to be processed before obtaining visas

or being sent to other sites in Europe. "UN observers have found the immigrant reception centers in Lampedusa chronically over-crowded, an issue that continues to plague the current wave of refugees and asylum seekers from North Africa."⁵

Many human rights groups claim that Europe, a continent

ostensibly supportive of the democratic uprisings, has done a particularly unsatisfactory job in dealing with its consequences. The optimistic rhetoric and promises of solidarity with Arab revolutionaries seem to stay within the confines of televised addresses, but when it comes down to policymaking, the enthusiasm is not replicated. Human Rights Watch worries that border controls will lead to racial profiling, and that the proposed reforms will "lower standards with respect to detention, access to social assistance and health care, and

fast-track asylum procedures."⁶

Dublin II is one regulation in particular need of reform, it "requires asylum claims to be heard in the first EU state a migrant reaches".⁷ This is an enormous burden for

the EU's Mediterranean border states, leaving them with a disproportionate amount of migrants. Greece's financial state and the questionable quality of its detention facilities⁸ — as just one example — gives human rights advocates reason to be alarmed. The European Council summit in Brussels on June 24 seemed

only to focus on border and migration control, rather than on the repatriation, health, and fair treatment of migrants. The European Commission aims to reach a common asylum policy, with approval of the Council, by 2012.

The struggle to carve out a common system and revise Schengen rests on an underlying tension—the ever-growing strain between the supra-national EU and its individual member states. Demark, one of the EU's most adamant proponents of immigration control, has already reinforced its frontiers with extra customs officers, disrupting Schengen and distressing many of its neighbors. The BBC reported in July that "The Danish reinforcements come on top of a force of about 160, which will grow to 260 by the end of this year."⁹ The right-wing Danish People's Party (DPP), a powerful advocate of this legislation, wields substantial influence as its votes are needed to pass legislation in Denmark. Danish ministers cite cross-border crime as the motivation for the new controls, but European Commission experts have reported "they were unable to get sufficient justifications from the Danish side for the intensification of the controls at the internal borders." They found that "the risk assessment required to justify the controls was not sufficient."¹⁰

Far-right parties like the DPP have hit a growth spurt and are using their new popularity to influence lawmaking.

"Upon arriving either at Malta, Lampedusa, Italy or another Southern European port, the *sans-papiers*, as they are called in France, generally wait days or weeks to be processed before obtaining visas or being sent to other sites in Europe."

Migration Migraine

ongoing debates on migration



Migrants head into Lampedusa. Photo: Creative Commons

These anti-immigration populist parties feed constituent's images of a Europe inundated with immigrants, and often campaign from anti-Islamist platforms. The increase in populist power reflects the desires of many citizens to distance themselves from EU control. This shift also says to the world that growing parts of Europe's population have regressed into xenophobia, adopting a "my home is my castle" attitude.

EU leaders face growing pressure as populist parties in member states like Denmark, France and the Netherlands attempt to set the agenda. France's Front National and the Swedish Democrats

party, among several others, label Muslim immigrants in particular as an "economic

drain," who "don't fit in with the West."¹¹ Constituents of these parties fear more unemployment and too high a population for an already financially squeezed continent. According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, "The number of Muslims in Europe rose from 29.6 million in 1990 to 44.1 million in 2010, and are projected to reach 58 million by 2030."¹²

As if there was not enough pressure on policymakers already, Libya's Muammar Gadhafi threatened to

"turn Europe black" by opening the floodgate of Sub-Saharan immigrants to Europe if EU leaders continued to contribute to NATO's effort for his ouster.¹³ The collapsed

regime allegedly encouraged "boatloads of migrants" to leave Libya for Europe.¹⁴

Previously Gadhafi was tolerable—he kept the immigrants out of Europe with his draconian police-state measures and €4.6 billion in annual aid money from the EU. He was seen as a reliable partner for patrolling immigration, in turn for turning a blind eye to human rights violations. Now, of course, the tables have turned.

Alienating migrants and manipulating fear of outsiders is not the solution. Preserving integration is, as well as a balanced set of compromises which addresses both the EU and the individual states' needs. EU Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom has described Schengen as a "beautiful achievement for the mobility of the people of the European Union ... a gift to the citizens."¹⁵ The Lisbon Treaty does allow "special exceptions" to the Schengen rules under certain situations, and the system is indeed due for careful reforms. The reality, however, by and large, is that fear rather than fact motivates the desire for increased controls. Only 4-5% of all displaced migrants have actually tried to reach Europe. Despite the fear mongering of right-wing groups, statistics show that "less than 3% of the world's Muslims are expected to be living in Europe in 2030, about the same portion as in 2010 (2.7%)."¹⁶ And all the while European leaders sit behind desks pointing fingers at one another and worrying about their next elections, as

people suffer.

"I'm fed up [that] every time people are in difficulty, they're the problem," European Parliament Green Group co-president, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, said. "The problem's not them, it's us! It's our ability to show solidarity, it's our ability to throw open our door."¹⁷

“EU leaders face growing pressure as populist parties in member states like Denmark, France and the Netherlands attempt to set the agenda.”

¹ European Affairs (2011) EU Haunted by Fear of Refugees Not a Reality. July, 27. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3fo6hy>

² IRIN (2011) From Libya to Lampedusa. July 11. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3r2q6md>

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⁴ Ulack, C (2011) The Arab Spring's looming refugee crisis. Foreign Policy Magazine, June 23. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/693otvr>

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⁷ Human Rights Watch (2011) EU: Summit Misses Opportunity on Migration. June 24. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/4y28785>

⁸ European Union (2003) Dublin II Regulation. February 18. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3rffvgo>

⁹ Agence France-Presse (2011) Greek detention centers for illegal immigrants 'inhumane'. March 9. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3mfa3ht>

¹⁰ BBC News (2011) Schengen state Denmark beefs up border controls. July 5. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3gauybs>

¹¹ Sofia News Agency (2011) EC: Denmark's Stronger Schengen Border Controls Not Justified. July 18. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/4y7ylcl>

¹² Greenblatt, A (2011) Arab Refugees Finding Harsh Welcome In Europe. NPR, March 18. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3cr7nk7>

¹³ The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life (2011) The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030. January 27. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3nc4dmm>

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¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Schultz, T (2011) EU lacks long-term plan to safeguard Schengen Treaty. Global Post, May 28. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3tg4z6n>

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¹⁸ Schultz, T (2011) EU lacks long-term plan to safeguard Schengen Treaty. Global Post, May 28. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/3tg4z6n>

Inviting interested editors, graphic designers, illustrators, and writers to contribute to our next issue

For the next issue, the theme will be “People Power”. This past year citizens around the world have been bravely defending their freedoms and ensuring that their voices are heard; both in brutal dictatorships in the Middle East and ostensible democracies in the West. From an unprecedented expression of solidarity for teachers and public-sector workers in Wisconsin, USA, to demonstrations across Europe against the coming age of austerity and a stirring anti-corruption campaign in India, the people of the world seem to have had enough of political opaqueness and irresponsible governance. *Leviathan*'s next issue will aim to cast a wide net across the global polity in order to analyse these public outcries and to assess their ability to bring meaningful change.

Upcoming lectures and events

September 27:

Normalisation and legislative exceptionalism: counter-terrorist lawmaking and the changing times of security emergencies by Andrew Neal, Edinburgh Politics Department, Ken Mason Suite, Basement, Old College 13:00 to 14:30

The 'Death of the Author' idea in copyright and its unwelcome effects by Dr Andreas Rahmatian, School of Law, University of Glasgow, Lecture Theatre 175, Old College 18:00 to 19:30

October 6:

Regulating the Press: the Options for Reform by William Gore, Press Complaints Commission, Lecture Theatre 175, Old College 18:00 to 19:30

October 14:

Transatlantic Seminar Series: Has the European Parliament come of age? by Richard Corbett (Cabinet of European Council President Herman Von Rompuy), David Martin (MEP), John Peterson (Edinburgh Politics/IR), and Michael Shackleton (Head of UK EP Information Office, London), Seminar Room 1, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 13:00

Time to call it a day: reflections on finality and the Law, by Rt Hon Lord Dyson, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Playfair Library, Old College 17:00 to 22:00

November 23:

Too Neutral or Not Neutral Enough? How Media Law Became Medium Law, by Dr Daithí Mac Síthigh, Law School, University of East Anglia, Lecture Theatre 175, Old College 18:00 to 19:30

These events are open to all, for updates and more information please visit <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/events/> and <http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/events/index>.

