Language and Psychoanalysis

ISSN 2049-324X

Volume 9, Issue 1, 2020

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Scope

The journal of ***Language and Psychoanalysis*** is a fully peer reviewed online journal that publishes twice a year. It is the only interdisciplinary journal with a strong focus on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of language and psychoanalysis. The journal is also inclusive and not narrowly confined to the Freudian psychoanalytic theory.

We welcome a wide range of original contributions that further the understanding of the interaction between Linguistic Analysis and Theory & Psychoanalytic Theories and Techniques. Any relevant manuscripts with an emphasis on language and psychoanalysis will be considered, including papers on methodology, theory, philosophy, child development, psychopathology, psychotherapy, embodied cognition, cognitive science, applied dynamical system theory, consciousness studies, cross-cultural research, and case studies. The journal also publishes short research reports, book reviews, interviews, obituaries, and readers' comments.

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All manuscripts will be peer reviewed by the editors, a member of the editorial advisory board, or another qualified person appointed by the editors.

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Manuscript:

- Authors need to confirm with a cover letter that the manuscript has not been published previously and is not being submitted currently to another journal.
- Manuscripts are only published in the English language.

Word limit:

- Submissions for main articles should be approximately 3,000-10,000 words in length and include an abstract of about 200 words and up to seven keywords.
- Short research reports, book reviews, and readers' comments should be approximately 500-2,500 words in length.
- Interviews and obituaries should not exceed 4,000 words in length.

Style:

- Manuscripts should be double-spaced, in Times 12-point font, and in .doc, .docx, or .rtf format.
- Manuscripts should follow the style conventions as outlined by the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association*, 5th edition.

Content

A Computerized Text and Cluster Analysis Approach to Psychotherapy Talk Across Time

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Abstract

This paper illustrates an analytical approach combining LIWC, a computer text-analytic application, with cluster analysis techniques to explore 'language styles' in psychotherapy across sessions in time. It categorizes session transcripts into distinct clusters or styles based on linguistic (di)similarity and relates them to sessional progression, thus providing entry points for further qualitative exploration. In the first step, transcripts of four illustrative therapist-client dyads were scored under ten LIWC variables including 'analytic thinking', 'clout', 'authenticity', 'emotional tone', and pronoun types. In the next step, agglomerative hierarchical clustering uncovered distinct session clusters that are differently distributed in each dyad. The relationships between these clusters and the chronological progression of sessions were then further discussed in context as contrastive exemplars. Applications, limitations and future directions are highlighted.

Introduction

Psychotherapy, the 'talking cure', is a mental health activity that applies clinical methods and interpersonal stances to modify behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and/or other attributes (Norcross, 1990). Though grounded in psychological principles, its verbal and interactive nature has fostered a tradition of linguistic analysis (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Pittenger, Hockett & Danehy, 1960). Various types of language features have been analyzed in therapist-client talk. While these features are of inherent interest to linguists, attempts are often made to bring linguistic theoretical perspectives to bear on therapy processes and outcomes. For example, clients' use of first-person pronouns (e.g., *I, me, we, myself*) have been investigated as a reflection of constructs like client agency and self-focused attention. While some found increased use associated with positive outcomes (Demiray & Gençöz, 2018; Van Staden & Fulford, 2004), others found it predictive of depressive symptoms (Zimmerman, Brockmeyer, Hunn et al., 2016). Another well-known approach is Conversation Analysis, which moves beyond individual words to examine how social actions unfold sequentially as participants take turns to converse. This has also been applied to various aspects of therapy talk including how people (mis)interpret each other, ask questions, build relationships, exhibit empathy, and so on (Ferrara, 1994; Peräkylä, Antaki, Vehviläine et al., 2011). The use of metaphors to describe abstract things in terms of more concrete things (e.g., *HIV is a large dark cloud hanging above me*) (Kopp & Craw, 1998) is another widely studied feature. Metaphors perform functions

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like clarifying concepts and expressing emotions (Cirillo & Crider, 1995; Lyddon, Clay & Sparks, 2001; Tay, 2011) and are helpful for therapist training (Aronov & Brodsky, 2009; Stott, Mansell, Salkovskis et al., 2010; Tay, 2013). More critical discourse analytic perspectives that relate observed language to "broader social structures, meanings, and power relations" (Spong, 2010, p. 69) have also been adopted. An example is how the very notion of psychological difficulties is culturally constructed, prompting critical reflection on attitudes towards therapeutic practice (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007).

In summary, psychotherapy language research examines how therapy talk reflects relevant psychosocial processes to provide insights and prompt critical reflection. A promising tool in this regard is Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), which has been used in descriptive and comparative studies of language across many social contexts (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) including psychotherapy (Huston, Meier, Faith et al., 2019). LIWC is a computer program for word-level sentiment analysis in English and a growing number of other languages. It classifies words used under a range of socio-psychological and linguistic categories with well-validated algorithms. In particular, summary variables can be derived to measure the extent of speakers' analytical thinking, clout, authenticity, and emotional tone. The approach can complement semantic annotation tools well-known to linguists like USAS (Archer, Wilson & Rayson, 2002) that focus more on content categories like 'food and farming' or 'science and technology'. Despite these possibilities, rich accounts of talk fragments are still more forthcoming than automated analyses of large datasets in psychotherapy language research. A key reason is the traditional emphasis on linguistic variability and its resonances with claims that no two therapy sessions are ever alike (Wohl, 1989). Quantitative approaches are thus criticized as capturing larger patterns at the expense of fine-grained analyses believed to be more useful for therapists' critical self-reflection. Therefore, although general psychotherapy research has a rich and continuing tradition of using computerized and/or various forms of quantitative analysis (Althoff, Clark & Leskovec, 2016; He, Veldkamp, Glas et al., 2017; Mergenthaler & Bucci, 1999; Watson & Laffal, 1963), work oriented towards the nature of language in psychotherapy is less inclined to do so. It is thus timely to show that computer tools like LIWC, combined with appropriate forms of statistical analysis, have a role in complementing traditional methods. This paper focuses especially on an approach that can be used by therapists to describe, monitor, and reflect on aspects of their own language, in ways difficult to achieve by qualitative analysis alone.

LIWC and Therapeutically Relevant Variables

Pennebaker et. al (2015) details the approximately 90 variables analyzable with LIWC and their psychometric evaluation. We focus here on two specific sets of psychotherapeutically relevant variables. The first set is the four aforementioned summary variables – analytical thinking, clout, authenticity, and emotional tone. Analytic thinking is based on observed differences between 'categorical' and 'dynamic' language in college admissions essays (Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee et al., 2014). A high score suggests formal, logical, and hierarchical thinking, while a low score informal, personal, here-and-now, and narrative thinking. Clout is based on relationships between word choices and perceived social power in chats, emails, and letters (Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Jeon et al., 2013). A high score suggests

speaking/writing with high expertise and confidence, while a low score a more tentative and humble style. Authenticity is based on relationships between language features and deception when expressing opinions on social issues (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry et al., 2003). A high score suggests more honest, personal, and disclosing discourse, while a low score a more guarded and distanced discourse. Emotional tone is based on relationships between language features in journal entries and psychological changes following the events of September 11, 2001 (Cohn, Mehl & Pennebaker, 2014). A high score is linked to a more positive and upbeat style, a low score to anxiety/sadness/hostility, while a neutral score suggests a lack of emotionality or ambivalence.

These variables offer useful multivariate profiles of how language is used to perform psychotherapy functions. They include the way therapist and client narratives are told, the stance of therapists when dispensing advice, the negotiation of relationships, and linguistic displays of emotional well-being. For example, a therapist offering a solution could speak in a highly logical way (analytic thinking), and yet hedge his advice (clout) to come across as more personal (authenticity). They are each scored from 0-100 based on standardized scores from large comparison samples in the mentioned studies. They are the only 'non-transparent' variables in LIWC in the sense of not being direct frequency measures of specific words.

The second set of variables are pronoun types. Pronouns are relatable to psychotherapeutic concerns like self-presentation and attention, ego (Rizzuto, 1993), other persons and entities, and engagement between the dyad. Different than the four summary variables, LIWC directly calculates the frequencies of pronouns as a proportion (0 to 1) of all words in a text. The pronoun types are personal (first-person singular [e.g., *I, me, myself*], plural [e.g. *we, us, our*], second-person [e.g., *you, your*], third-person singular [e.g., *he, she, him, her*], plural [e.g., *they, them, their*]) and impersonal (e.g., *it, those*). Differences between first-person singular (e.g., *I, me, myself*) and plural (e.g., *we, us, our*) can suggest whether the speaker is being 'exclusive' or 'inclusive' when talking about self-related issues, as often observed in political discourse (de Fina, 1995). The reported internal consistency of the six pronoun types; i.e., the extent to which items of the same type co-occur across texts, range from 0.7 to 0.85 (corrected α). LIWC does not detect more pragmatic pronoun meanings that may bear therapeutic implications like agentive *I* versus non-agentive *me* (Demiray & Gençöz, 2018; Van Staden & Fulford, 2004). It can nevertheless still give a useful indication of the overall degree of interpersonal reference and engagement in a transcript.

We can thus derive multivariate linguistic profiles of different session transcripts according to these variable sets. However, these raw profiles are of limited use because the variable scores are inherently relative. This brings us to the next step of the present approach - to systematically compare and classify sessions within a specific therapist-client dyad. Given that therapeutic progress is seldom linear, how language patterns change dynamically across sessions and their potential therapeutic implications remain underexplored. Hunston et. al (2019), for example, used LIWC to compare between good and poor outcomes as well as within each type of outcome, but broadly defined the latter in terms of just two time periods (early vs. late). Cluster analysis, a class of data analytic techniques that classifies similar objects into groups,

can be a useful resource to capture language patterns across time in more nuanced ways.

Cluster Analysis

Data analytic techniques like principal components, factor, discriminant, and cluster analysis share the key purpose of data reduction; i.e., reducing a large number of cases or variables in some dataset into a smaller number of groups based on similarities and/or relationships. These techniques derive groups where members within each group are maximally similar, and the groups themselves maximally dissimilar from one another. Specific inter-group differences are then often further analyzed. Cluster analysis is particularly used on cases rather than variables. For the present purpose, this means classifying a dyad's sessions into distinct groups/clusters based on their linguistic profiles, with each cluster representing a distinct language style. Cluster analysis methods are either non-hierarchical or hierarchical. The former (e.g., *k*-means clustering) specifies a hypothesized or desired number of groups beforehand and tries to assign each case to the best-fitting one, while the latter is more exploratory with the eventual groups determined by the data alone. Hierarchical clustering is more relevant here since there is no clear reason to assert a certain number of linguistic styles in any dyad beforehand. There are two sub-types of hierarchical clustering: divisive and agglomerative. As their names suggest, the former starts with all cases as a single cluster and iteratively splitting it into smaller ones, while the latter starts with each case as a separate cluster and iteratively merging them into larger ones. Agglomerative clustering is more common due to its lower computational costs and more straightforward application. This paper therefore applies agglomerative hierarchical clustering.

Agglomerative hierarchical clustering in turn involves two key processes which require specific methodological considerations often not critically discussed (Clatworthy, Buick, Hankins et al., 2005). The first is how to measure the similarity/distance between cases. The most ideal distance metric depends on the nature of the information characterizing the cases (e.g., quantitative vs. categorical) as well as whether its definition of similarity aligns with theoretical assumptions of the study. The most common distance metrics include the Pearson's correlation coefficient, Euclidean (squared) distances, Jaccard's coefficient, and so on. Euclidean distance is presently used because i) the linguistic variables are quantitative, and ii) as opposed to non-Euclidean measures that consider cases as similar if their scores on different variables are correlated, Euclidean measures consider how close the actual variable scores are (Kassembara, 2017). For the present purpose, this would be a better indicator of similar linguistic style; i.e., whether two sessions are closer in terms of analytic thinking/authenticity etc. rather than whether a high/low variable score in one session is also correspondingly high/low in the other.

The second methodological consideration is the linkage measure. This basically means the distance between clusters, which cannot rely on Euclidean or other measures between single objects if there is more than one object per cluster. There are again different methods based on how distance between clusters is defined (e.g., minimum distance between permutations of one case from each cluster vs. average of distances between pairs of cases). The most common ones include Ward's method, simple linkage, complete linkage, average linkage, and so on, again to be chosen

based on theoretical considerations of the study. Ward's method has been applied to linguistic variables (Szmrecsanyi, 2012) and is chosen for its theoretical consistency with standard procedures for computing group differences. By defining the distance between two clusters as the sum of squares between them across all variables, it essentially takes an analysis of variance (ANOVA) approach to clustering. It should also be noted that various studies using different statistical criteria like the Rand index and Cohen's kappa to evaluate clustering outcomes with different types of simulated data have also found Ward's method to outperform others (Blashfield, 1976; Ferreira & Hitchcock, 2009; Hands & Everitt, 1987; Kuiper & Fisher, 1975).

Different choices of method will generally lead to different clustering outcomes; i.e., group number and/or membership (Saraçli, Doğan & Doğan, 2013). As justified above, this paper will only present the outcomes from Euclidean distances and Ward's method, mostly because of its focus on illustrating the utility of clustering in general rather than an empirical comparison between different clustering methods. Readers interested in such comparisons and their implications, as well as accessible technical explanations of different methods beyond the present scope, may refer to Yim & Ramdeen (2015) and Everitt et al. (2011).

This paper will detail four exploratory analyses of different therapist-client dyads. It demonstrates the combined use of LIWC and agglomerative hierarchical clustering to i) classify sessions into clusters according to language styles discovered in bottom-up fashion, ii) relate these styles to the chronological progression of sessions, iii) provide entry points for further qualitative analysis, and iv) offer insights for research and therapists' self-reflection.

Method

Data Selection

Transcripts of four illustrative dyads each lasting 20 sessions (472,009 words) were selected from *Counselling and Psychotherapy Transcripts, Client Narratives, and Reference Works* (www.alexanderstreet.com). This database adheres to the American Psychological Association's ethics guidelines for use and anonymity. The transcripts were checked for formatting and spelling errors with annotations (e.g., [laughter], [inaudible]) that should not be coded by LIWC removed. We will see that the overall word count balances between the requirements of statistical analysis and tractability for manual discourse analysis.

The four dyads involve different therapists and clients but all clients showed symptoms of depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem. Dyads A and B reportedly followed a client-centered approach where therapists are open, non-judgmental, and empathetic towards clients, and allow them an active role to discover potential solutions (Rogers, 1951). Dyads C and D followed a psychoanalytic approach where therapists explore the unconscious 'inner world' of clients, often in the form of early life experiences, that are deemed to interfere with their present lives (Freud, 1924). It is important to emphasize that this study does not make claims about how language tends to be used with certain therapy modalities, symptoms, or topics. The samples are therefore not controlled as such. It instead showcases an approach that can be used by therapists to analyze the language of their own sessions. For example, one can examine how this language varies within and between his clients, as he develops

professionally, and/or for research purposes on representative samples. Furthermore, therapist and client utterances will not be separately analyzed, and the language styles therefore reflect a composite of both speakers in the dyad.

LIWC Coding and Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering

The first phase of the analysis was done with LIWC (2015 version). All transcripts were scored under the four summary variables (analytical thinking, clout, authenticity, and emotional tone) and six pronoun types (first-person singular, first-person plural, second-person, third-person singular, third-person plural, and impersonal) for a total of ten variables. This resulted in four multivariate linguistic profiles with 20 sessions each.

The next phase was to perform agglomerative hierarchical clustering on each profile with the Python programming language (version 3.7.1). As the variables were scored on different scales - the four summary variables from 0 to 100 and pronoun variables from 0 to 1 – they were first standardized as z-scores (number of standard deviations from their respective means). Euclidean distances and Ward's minimum variance method were then used as distance and linkage measures respectively. Cophenetic correlation coefficients were used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the clustering outcomes. This yielded four dendograms (Figure 1), one for each therapist-client dyad, which visualize the clusters and the extent of (dis)similarity between them.

The final phase was to explore patterns between session sequence and clusters; i.e., how sessions are distributed by language patterns as they progress chronologically. Since each cluster is by definition distinct, it is assumed to represent a distinct language style with a unique combination of variable scores. These variable scores were thus analyzed in detail and supported by illustrative examples from corresponding session transcripts. In this way, we gain a fuller account of how language use in each case evolves across the span of treatment.

Results and Discussion

Overview of Clustering Solutions

Figure 1 shows the four dendograms representing the clustering solutions for dyads A-D. The y-axis indicates Euclidean distances with higher values representing greater dissimilarity. The x-axis indicates session numbers. Euclidean distances are also shown on each node, indicating the similarity between the sessions under that node. The cut-off point of 7.0 indicated by the dotted line yields three color-coded clusters for all four dyads, but the sessions that belong to each cluster expectedly differ for each dyad. Cophenetic correlation coefficients, which measure how well the clustering solution represents the dissimilarities among observations (Sokal & Rohlf, 1962), are all adequate at 0.774, 0.76, 0.786, and 0.733 respectively. We can now claim that each cluster represents a distinct language style, with all sessions in a cluster reflecting that style. Note again that the clusters are not made up of different variables; rather, the ten variables used remain the same throughout, but each cluster is defined by a unique combination of variable scores.



Figure 1

Dendograms and similarity measures for dyads A-D

Table 1 is an alternative representation of Figure 1 focusing more on the relationship between the clusters and chronological order of sessions. Each color-coded cluster is now represented by a number; for example, the green cluster of dyad A is now called ‘style 1’, the cyan cluster ‘style 2’, and the red cluster ‘style 3’.

Since each dyad was individually clustered, style 1/2/3 of dyad A is likely not equivalent to their counterparts in the other dyads. Furthermore, since the dyads all discuss different subject matters, it is more useful to contrast styles within rather than across dyads. We may nevertheless begin the interpretation with a broad overview of the latter. In Table 1, the green blocks represent at least three consecutive sessions where the same style is used. The uncolored blocks show an otherwise intermittent switch between styles. We quickly observe that in terms of stylistic consistency, dyad A shows the least extent and only towards the beginning of therapy. Dyad B has intermittent blocks, and dyads C and D have relatively more contiguous consistent blocks. We will interpret and exemplify these style distributions with short extracts of actual therapy talk from each dyad below. Together, they outline four different distributions of language patterns that showcase how the present approach is useful for comparative and self-monitoring purposes.

Table 1

Overview of style distributions across the dyads

Session	Dyad A clusters	Dyad B clusters	Dyad C clusters	Dyad D clusters
1	1	1	1	1
2	2	1	1	1
3	2	1	1	1
4	2	2	2	1
5	2	3	3	1
6	2	1	1	1
7	1	1	1	1
8	2	1	1	1
9	2	2	3	2
10	3	1	3	2
11	2	3	3	2
12	3	2	1	3
13	2	1	1	2
14	3	2	1	2
15	1	1	1	3
16	2	1	1	2
17	1	1	2	2
18	1	1	3	3
19	2	3	1	1
20	1	2	3	1

Dyad A

Figure 2 shows the variable scores defining the three styles in dyad A and a reproduced style distribution for easy reference. The mean/standard deviation refer to the average variable scores/standard deviation of the sessions that belong to that style. For clarity of presentation, although all five personal pronoun variables (first-person singular [e.g., *I, me, myself*], plural [e.g. *we, us, our*], second-person [e.g., *you, your*], third-person singular [e.g., *he, she, him, her*], plural [e.g., *they, them, their*]) were analyzed in the clustering process, they are summarized in the following figures as just one category of personal pronouns (*ppron*), versus impersonal pronouns (*ipron)* as a whole. The variable scores are also plotted with 95% CI error bars. Inferential statistics to compare them between the three styles were not performed due to the relatively low number of sessions per style.



	Style	Analytic	Clout	Authentic	Tone	ppron	ipron
Mean	1	12.0	19.8	86.6	24.8	12.1	10.5
	2	17.1	34.8	76.3	31.4	11.7	10.1
	3	21.8	44.8	60.8	27.1	12.6	8.95
Standard deviation	1	3.01	4.09	7.07	10.5	0.556	0.430
	2	4.44	4.83	6.84	8.76	0.837	1.00
	3	2.42	9.25	6.27	13.3	0.881	0.471

Session	Dyad A clusters
1	1
2	2
3	2
4	2
5	2
6	2
7	1
8	2
9	2
10	3
11	2
12	3
13	2
14	3
15	1
16	2
17	1
18	1
19	2
20	1

Figure 2

Style properties of dyad A

It is interesting to compare these scores with mean scores from other discourse contexts like blogs, expressive writing, novels, natural speech, the New York Times, and Twitter (Pennebaker et al., 2015), collected by LIWC developers and reproduced in Table 2. One might expect the scores for psychotherapy talk to be close to natural speech but in general, only analytic thinking and pronoun use in the present dataset are similar. Otherwise, there are noticeably lower levels of clout and emotional tone, and higher levels of authenticity than natural speech. Clout and authenticity are instead more comparable with blogs and expressive writing, and emotional tone with expressive writing and novels. We will not elaborate on these comparisons here, but note that this type of analysis offers a new perspective on the discourse analytic question of just how psychotherapy is different than 'ordinary' conservation (Ferrara, 1994; Mondada, 2010).

Table 2

Average variables scores from other discourse contexts

Variable	Blogs	Expressive writing	Novels	Natural speech	NY Times	Twitter
Analytic	49.89	44.88	70.33	18.43	92.57	61.94
Clout	47.87	37.02	75.37	56.27	68.17	63.02
Authentic	60.93	76.01	21.56	61.32	24.84	50.39
Tone	54.50	38.60	37.06	79.29	43.61	72.24
ppron	10.66	12.74	10.35	13.37	3.56	9.02
ipron	5.53	5.28	4.79	7.53	3.84	4.60

Going back to dyad A, recall that style 2 dominates the beginning phase of therapy (sessions 2 to 6). The sessions thereafter reflect an intermittent switching between the three styles. We now see from Figure 2 that compared to styles 1 and 3, style 2 has a mid-level of analytic thinking (17.1), clout (34.8), and authenticity (76.3), low-to-middle pronoun use, and the highest emotional tone (31.4) by a narrow margin. These suggest that on the linguistic level, the present course of therapy begins with a moderate approach. It is relatively informal with a narrative rather than logical style, which appears to be consistent with the avowed client-centred approach of facilitating an open-ended dialogic environment. This will later develop in either direction to become even more informal or more formal. The same goes for clout as we observe a considerable positive correlation between the two variables ($r=0.606$, $p=0.005$). At the beginning phase the speakers do not immediately assert a high degree of expertise and confidence. Later on, this likewise moves in both directions as therapy proceeds. Authenticity also starts at mid-level but is thereafter negatively correlated with analytic thinking ($r=-0.459$, $p=0.042$). and clout ($r=-0.776$, $p<0.001$). As with the previous aspects, the language becomes most honest and disclosing, as well as more guarded and distanced throughout the course of therapy. Emotional tone fluctuates minimally, but the beginning phase is slightly more positive and upbeat than later. Pronoun use across the styles do not vary by more than 2%.

The following extracts provide a brief contextual illustration of these trends. The first extract (style 2) occurs near the beginning of therapy. The mid-level analytic thinking, clout, and authenticity can be discerned from the somewhat vague nature of the discussion. Both therapist and client appear to be figuring things out and exploring what would be important to talk about, not (yet) committing to a specific mode of therapeutic analysis. The emotional tone is noticeably lower than other discourse contexts like blogs, natural speech, and social media (see Table 2) but slightly higher than the remainder of the sessions, when the client's issues are discussed in detail.

> Therapist: I will go through my usual beginning spiel which is I don't have anything particular that I need to know. I'd like you just to start where you feel like starting.
>
> Client: You want me to start where I feel like starting, wherever I feel like starting I take it. Well, I suppose that's real direct. I don't really know where I'd

like to start either. I wouldn't know where to start. I suppose we need to start about how I ended up here.

The next extract illustrates style 1, which is even more informal and personal than style 2 (lower analytic thinking and clout, higher authenticity). As mentioned, style 1 occurs intermittently with styles 2 and 3 after the initial stretch of style 2. We can observe a high level of personal disclosure as the client discusses his drug habits, and a more casual mode of interaction as both therapist and client use highly informal language (*bum, whatever, oh god, christ*).

Therapist: I want to hear what you're saying. You wouldn't like it if you did?

Client: Well, no I wouldn't. I wouldn't, definitely. I've always... One of the reasons that I ever considered it OK to me, for me, to use marijuana, is that it wasn't an escape and I wasn't just freaking out somewhere and letting reality trip on by, and it'd really bum me out if it ever became that to me.

Therapist: There's something, it sounds like, about these evenings feeling tired, tense, or whatever.

Client: Oh God I haven't slept in three days. I just... I get in bed and I start worrying about something or other. And I've got to get to sleep. Christ I get up at 5:30 in the morning and I'm used to going to bed at 5:30.

The final extract from dyad A illustrates style 3, which is the converse of style 1 (higher analytic thinking and clout, lower authenticity). Personal pronouns increase but impersonal pronouns decrease, suggesting a shift in focus towards the client's self and relevant others. We can observe a more analytic approach as the therapist performs his institutional role - explicating his inference and interpretation of what the client said, and providing insight on the client's feelings.

Client: Right, I just...well, I can't say I can imagine but I know that Matt must be extremely terrified. Even if it has come to the point where he can take it calmly, he is still scared. He has not talked to me like that but he has talked to Jack Larkin about how terrified he is - constantly. It would almost be proving the non-connection of those things around him, to him, if we were to just throw him out and forget about him.

Therapist: You would be just reinforcing his view of the world is. I guess I also...this is an inference I am making - I don't remember you saying this - but it sounds to me that there is something very horrible to you to think of a person alone with that terror all of the time. Like I said before, you don't know what effect it has - having him staying there - but somehow if it has any, it is worth doing.

In summary, the clustering and contextual analysis of dyad A reveals a particular interactional style – a relatively prolonged and moderate approach at the beginning to set the scene, followed by a more linguistically varied approach where both ends of the variable spectra are manifested. Such information is of potential interest to

therapists wanting to reflect on their own interactional style, as we continue to show below for the remaining dyads.

Dyad B

Figure 3 shows the variable scores defining the three styles in dyad B



	Style	Analytic	Clout	Authentic	Tone	ppron	ipron
Mean	1	12.2	33.6	74.5	36.5	13.1	9.81
	2	8.93	19.3	85.2	34.8	13.3	10.7
	3	8.87	30.8	80.0	56.0	12.6	10.9
Standard deviation	1	3.45	6.15	5.53	8.07	1.03	0.755
	2	2.32	3.79	5.64	4.63	0.936	0.725
	3	1.18	9.94	3.71	7.65	1.39	0.522

Session	Dyad B clusters
1	1
2	1
3	1
4	2
5	3
6	1
7	1
8	1
9	2
10	1
11	3
12	2
13	1
14	2
15	1
16	1
17	1
18	1
19	3
20	2

Figure 3

Style properties of dyad B

Dyad B begins similarly as dyad A in that one style predominates the beginning phase (style 1). In dyad B, however, the same style 'returns' towards the end of the 20 sessions (sessions 15 to 18), with intermittent style switches in the middle phase. We see from Figure 3 that style 1 has the highest level of analytic thinking (12.2) and clout (33.6), lowest authenticity (74.5), and low emotional tone (36.5). While impersonal pronoun use is also the lowest for style 1, pronoun use in general does not vary by more than 2% across the styles. It is interesting to further note that similar to dyad A, clout is negatively correlated with authenticity ($r=-0.728$, $p<0.001$), but its positive correlation with analytic thinking is not significant ($r=0.352$, $p=0.129$).

We can tell from this general overview that language use in dyad B differs from dyad A in two ways that are worth further contextual investigation. Firstly, while dyad A begins with a moderate style, dyad B begins with a more formal and analytic style that was seen only intermittently in the later stages of dyad A. Secondly, consistency is seen at both ends of the treatment span in dyad B, which may dovetail with a therapeutic strategy (deliberate or otherwise) that can be described as 'letting the conclusion mirror the introduction'. These linguistic differences are observed despite both dyads ostensibly following a client-centred approach, cautioning us against overly generalizing linguistic patterns as a function of therapeutic modality without a more comprehensive dataset designed for that purpose.

This consistency at both ends is illustrated by the following two extracts from session 1 and 18 respectively. The first extract from session 1 suggests that the therapist immediately adopts an analytical style that is echoed by the client. In the first turn the therapist summarizes what the client had previously said, providing an analysis of the situation. The client concurs and elaborates on her feelings, although in a general way without full disclosure of details. The therapist again provides an interpretation in the following turn. This exchange clearly contrasts with what we saw in dyad A where the therapist "don't have anything particular that I need to know" and the client "don't really know where I'd like to start either".

> Therapist: And it sounds like that's a signal of something wrong when you can't make a clear decision to go do something you really love to do. Like that really says that's really sad for me.
>
> Client: Yeah. Because that's - then that's part of the - that just repeats that into the whole problem of I mean part of I'm sure what's causing it is all of the feeling that you know here I am really just sitting around and going over not doing anything that I really feel is worthwhile. And just really wasting time. And as a result I just sit around and waste more time. It's just very strange thing.
>
> Therapist: It's like everything that happened that piles another thing on top of that. As if nothing happens to break it or to break into it or to loosen it at all for you. But it just all becomes an additional weight. Is that what you were saying?

The subsequent middle phase for dyad B is similar to dyad A where we see some cycling between the three styles and the continua of analytic thinking, clout, authenticity, and emotional tone. In many instances this is the phase where therapists engage closely with clients' experiences, memories, thoughts, and feelings, which corresponds to a general picture of inconsistency in language styles. However, the following extract from session 18 illustrates how the previous analytic style returns in the final stretch of sessions.

> Client: And in fact I could sort of conceive of some kind of an ideal where you can work through your feelings, the more you can talk them out. But I'm not sure of what it consists of and I'm not sure how to go about reaching out to him.
>
> Therapist: Yeah, and it sounds like right now too you don't see, I mean, you feel like the feelings themselves ought to change before you could start to work them through. At least that's the impression I'm getting is that they ought to be somewhat different maybe in intensity or something. It isn't just a matter of learning how to do it.
>
> Client: Yeah, they ought to be less intense and I ought to express them in different ways.

We observe that, expectedly, the client can now express some insight on how she should work through her feelings. The style of language and interaction nevertheless mirrors the beginning as the therapist still plays an analytic and interpretative role. It would be interesting from the perspective of training and feedback (Claiborn &

Goodyear, 2005) to query if this represents a deliberate or subconscious attempt by the dyad to revisit a certain mode of language and interaction.

Dyad C

Figure 4 shows the variable scores defining the three styles in dyad C.



	Style	Analytic	Clout	Authentic	Tone	ppron	ipron
Mean	1	23.8	39.1	63.3	33.0	11.7	7.84
	2	38.5	47.4	51.1	28.6	9.63	7.10
	3	21.1	53.1	58.5	22.4	12.8	7.52
Standard deviation	1	4.80	4.06	11.3	11.7	0.663	0.932
	2	7.54	6.14	4.16	2.00	1.11	0.693
	3	3.17	4.68	6.05	11.3	0.989	0.566

Session	Dyad C clusters
1	1
2	1
3	1
4	2
5	3
6	1
7	1
8	1
9	3
10	3
11	3
12	1
13	1
14	1
15	1
16	1
17	2
18	3
19	1
20	3

Figure 4

Style properties of dyad C

We first observe that the correlations between analytic thinking, clout, and authenticity seen in dyads A and B do not exist for dyad C. While this implies that the variable scores for dyad C are relatively eclectic, it also has the longest stretch of stylistic consistency so far. Style 1 predominates for up to three quarters of the sessions with a short three-session switch to style 3 in the middle phase (sessions 9-11). The sessions then end intermittently in the final quarter. Figure 4 shows that style 1 is relatively low in analytic thinking and clout but high in authenticity and emotional tone. Style 3 is also low in analytic thinking and high in authenticity. However, it sees a large increase in clout and decrease in emotional tone from style 1. Style 2 has large error bars as it defines only two sessions. Overall, we can discern interesting similarities and differences with the previous two dyads that underline the comparative import of the present approach. Dyad C bears some structural resemblance with dyad B as it begins and ends with the same style, but differs in that it has an additional consistent stretch in the middle – a 'transition block' of sessions so to speak. However, the nature of the styles is neatly reversed. The beginning and end of dyad B is more formal and analytic but that of dyad C is less formal and analytic compared to the remaining sessions. On the other hand, while dyad A does

not have a consistent beginning and end, the quality of its beginning resembles dyad C.

The following extracts illustrate the general structural character of dyad C – a beginning and end that is relatively informal and personal, sandwiched by a transition block in the middle that becomes more authoritative and emotionally negative. The first extract occurs at the beginning (session 1) where the client takes considerable time discussing her recent experience at a career fair. The descriptive is narrative-like, and the therapist follows this conversational style without adopting an expert stance.

> Client: I feel like the projects I worked on for my imaging class and my circuitry class were definitely worth talking about, but they were class projects not a thesis. And I feel like everyone's - I don't know, maybe I shouldn't be going in expecting everyone to ask me about my thesis instead of, you know, what are you interested in or what have you done. But it seems to me that the obvious thing to talk about is grants and your thesis and not like a general project for a class.
>
> Therapist: I don't know, you tell me. You're probably closer to this - surely closer to this than me. But I imagine what they really want to know is how you can talk about what you've done and show that you can think.

The next extract occurs towards the end (session 16) where the conversation returns to events in the client's life. She had been talking about difficulties with opening an account with a brokerage firm after her impending graduation, to which the therapist adopts a similar approach of replying in a fairly informal style and concurring with what was said.

> Client: That was hard and so now I feel even worse about not doing it, because now I don't have the excuse of well, I've been under a lot of pressure and I can't - don't have the energy to cope with it.
>
> Therapist: Right. Right, so it - I mean different task, same shit.
>
> Client: Yeah.
>
> Therapist: And ah, yeah, and I guess part of the whole paradigm is that not only is it different task, same shit, but it's different task, same shit, no accounting for the task that you've just gotten done.

The quality of these extracts can be contrasted with the following, taken from the transition phase (session 9) which considerably increases in clout and decreases in emotional tone (style 3). Consistent with the avowed psychoanalytic approach, this is the period when the client discusses her marriage problems in detail, accounting for the substantial drop in tone. The therapist becomes less informal in his responses to the client. Although there is no obvious increase in analytic thinking, he begins to adopt a more explicit expert stance instead of the more agreeable tone observed earlier. We can see this in the final turn where he dispenses concrete advice and makes reference to his professional identity.

Therapist: This is very sad and hurtful. It wouldn't surprise me that you were bitter.

Client: No. But I should get over it. That's what I keep telling myself. I'm like well that could be dumb.

Therapist: For what it's worth I mean, and of course I'm going to say this, you're going to have better luck getting over it talking about it and looking at it than being annoyed with yourself and sweeping it under the rug. I mean I know spoken like a psychologist but I do believe it's true.

Dyad D

Figure 5 shows the variable scores defining the three styles in dyad D.



	Style	Analytic	Clout	Authentic	Tone	ppron	ipron
Mean	1	23.1	49.9	64.0	30.7	13.4	6.82
	2	17.5	29.1	75.0	20.3	13.0	7.91
	3	13.5	61.4	86.7	21.6	16.0	7.32
Standard deviation	1	4.63	9.07	6.48	10.8	1.16	0.524
	2	9.03	5.78	12.1	10.2	0.721	1.29
	3	4.90	3.47	3.65	11.0	0.897	1.32

Session	Dyad D clusters
1	1
2	1
3	1
4	1
5	1
6	1
7	1
8	1
9	2
10	2
11	2
12	3
13	2
14	2
15	3
16	2
17	2
18	3
19	1
20	1

Figure 5

Style properties of dyad D

Dyad D also reflects a distinct pattern of style distribution. The first half (sessions 1 to 11) is dominated by a large block of style 1 followed by three sessions of style 2. The second half then switches to an intermittent series featuring all three styles. We could describe this as a therapeutic 'tale of two halves' where an initial display of consistency is distinct from the subsequent display of inconsistency. The consistent half begins with style 1. It scores relatively high for analytic thinking, emotional tone, and clout, but low for authenticity and personal pronouns. Analytic thinking appears to be, but is not actually negatively correlated with authenticity ($r=-0.323$, $p=0.371$). However, unlike other dyads, it is positively correlated with emotional tone ($r=0.624$, $p=0.003$). This suggests that while neither emotional tone nor analyticity is high overall, a more formal/logical way of speaking co-occurs with moments that are relatively positive. The transition to style 2 towards the middle is noteworthy for the abrupt decline in analytic thinking, clout, as well as emotional tone, and a corresponding increase in authenticity. This suggests a switch to an even greater

narrative style as the client begins to elaborate on his experiences, as expected under a psychoanalytic approach. Unlike dyad C, however, the sharp drop in tone is not accompanied by the therapist using more authoritative language to address the issues. The following extract from session 9 (style 2) instead suggests that during this phase, the client begins to take extended turns as he narrates his negative situation with observed long pauses. We also observe a greater sense of uncertainty in his reflection of the reasons for his anxiety, accounting for the decline in clout.

> Therapist: So, do you know what was making you so anxious that it was hard to work yesterday?
>
> Client: I don't know. I mean, I think it's (pause), since I did the affidavit and sent it off that, I don't know, because I like, I had the meeting and then I did the affidavit and that was enough work for the day. You know, just wanted to kind of go home and sleep. And as I'm driving home I remembered about the envelopes, the letters. And, I don't know, it's not like it's, the anxiety yesterday wasn't as bad as it has been (long pause). It really sucks about the $3,100 for the car. I had to ask my parents for 1,500 for the car. And right now I'm spending all the money for the past tickets. So I'm supposed to have a closing with the bank, I don't know when the hell that's supposed to happen. Just no other business coming through the door, you know. (long pause) I don't know if I'm so tired because I'm getting up early every day this week; semi-early. I get to sleep in tomorrow. (long pause) I may have to pick up Ian from school today which means that the work I'm supposed to be doing I can barely do. Most rational people would do it when they got home and I, I just can't. Once I hit the apartment I'm, I haven't been bringing my laptop home. I've been leaving it in the office. I've been checking access through home. I've got a desktop that's really slow, but I can, you know, I can go to my PC I can access. And I kind of joked with myself that I would do the letters that way, that I would at least get the addresses done.

Subsequent to the short stretch of style 2 with extended client turns as seen above, the remaining sessions for dyad D cycle between the three styles. The switch between styles 2 and 3 from sessions 12 to 18 is of some interest. From Figure we see that analytical thinking continues to drop and authenticity continues to rise from style 2 to style 3. This suggests a continuation of narrative-like talk, accompanied by a curious rebound in clout. The following extract from session 12 (style 3) offers some explanation. While the client continues to narrate with uncertainty, the therapist begins to assume a more authoritative stance. Crucially, however, this stance is relatively less prolonged than for other dyads as reflected in the intermittent switches between styles 2 and 3.

> Client: And then you just couple it all with I'm just - I don't want to say I'm paralyzed, but I'm just so - my motivation is just not there. You know, it's like, today, I've got a client coming in at 2:00 o'clock to sign a health care proxy. You know, there's $150 or whatever I told him I'd charge him. And then there's a thing online about short sales, and I'm just going to - you know, it's like an hour long; figured I'd watch that because it's free. But just - I don't know. I'm just so - I don't know. I just don't have the motivation to do stuff, to do my work. Put everything off until the last second. Yeah.

Therapist: Well, I think you're really worried about getting deeper and deeper into a hole financially again. I think it's really hard to step back at all from that worry so that you have some space to think and I think you just shut down. You know, you are - trying to think - to me, doing a lot more stuff. I mean you're really able to focus a lot more on work. And, you know, I remember us talking not that long ago about all of this networking stuff. And you're saying like, "Yeah, I know I should be doing this, I know I should be doing that. I just can't get myself to do it." Well, now you can. I mean you really have been - it's been gradual, but you've really been ramping up a lot over the last, I guess, nine months or so, especially in terms of just what you can do. I mean your capacity to work has really increased a lot. I remember when it was, you know - you weren't doing any of the networking. And I guess you're doing E&G but...

Conclusion

This paper demonstrated the combination of computerized text, clustering, and manual analysis to gain insights about evolving language styles in psychotherapy. For more research-oriented purposes, the relationship between style and session sequence is an underexplored perspective on language variation in addition to more familiar factors like therapist/client groups, modalities, and cultural contexts. There is also potential for studies to investigate associations between evolving language styles and different therapy outcomes. In terms of reflection and training on a more personal level, the present approach allows therapists to critically reflect upon their own language use with modest samples collected from personal practice. It gives therapists greater awareness of (linguistic) changes that can take place within the context of a single client rather than across clients.

An important methodological point about this approach is its compatibility with traditional approaches like conversation and discourse analysis. Having determined the clusters, we may choose to qualitatively scrutinize them in different ways. The four dyads illustrated different degrees of consistency and variation in language styles. All four opened with a stylistically consistent stretch of sessions, but the exact nature of these styles varied in each dyad from being more/less analytic and authentic. Furthermore, there is variation in how long this consistency is maintained, ranging from several sessions to the entire first half of treatment. In the case of dyad B we also observed a 'return to consistency' as the closing stretch mirrored the initial stretch. These examples showcase an open-ended range of possibilities, each of which warrants further analysis in their own right. It is worth reiterating that the present study makes no claims about language tendencies in particular therapy modalities.

There are several limitations to the study to be addressed in future work. Firstly, given enough sessions, more detailed time series analyses with ARIMA models or other approaches can be conducted to depict how each summary variable changes on a per-session basis (Tay, 2017, 2019). This would complement the clustering approach which is more concerned with grouping sessions than modeling the entire time series, and offer more clarity to present observations of structural resemblances (e.g., between dyads B and C). Secondly, the present study considers language style as a composite of therapist and client language, but future research could separately examine and compare the two. This would allow more detailed insights into the relationship between language use and the expectations imposed on therapists/clients

in particular modalities; for example the 'non-directive' client-centred therapist. It would also be a relevant approach to investigate the notion of 'synchrony' (Koole & Tschacher, 2016); i.e., how therapist and client behavior echo each other. The final limitation is the inherent inability of LIWC to capture figurative language such as metaphor and irony.

Although figurative language occupies a small proportion of general language use (Steen et al., 2010), it was explained in the introduction that metaphors can be particularly impactful in psychotherapy. This is one reason why the present approach complements but does not replace qualitative methods of therapeutic language analysis. More generally, it is also incumbent upon computerized methods to enhance their validity and reliability for more insightful analysis of pragmatically complex contexts like psychotherapy.

Funding

This work was supported by the HKSAR Research Grants Council (Project number: 15601019).

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Encapsulated Skin-Ego and Anti-Corporeal Manichaean Myth of Femininity in Transmission*

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Abstract

We propose, within the context of a *Skin Model of Ego Development* (SMED), that Didier Anzieu's work of the skin-ego is a useful entry point into understanding the Manichaean mythic view of femininity as creating an *encapsulated skin-ego*, that tends to enclose the feminine object in a defensive-isolative capsule, through culturally transmitted ideals, shaped by misogyny. Utilizing this perspective, the unconscious and the myth are seen as being, in general terms, intertwined and expressed in epidermal psychoanalytic dialogue. As a result, the psyche and the body are radically split from one another through the dysfunctioning of the skin-ego that is an asexualized phantasmal-mythic dome of 'womanhood', which preserves misogynistic norms and ideals and blocks any possibility of femininity as a subjecthood. Moreover, a culturally transmitted myth-fueled psychic alienation is conveyed through a *linguistic mythic time machine*, which, in turn, results in transmitting a mythic mindset from one generation to another. In this sense, it is of utmost importance to mention that dysfunctional skin-ego leads to dysfunctional thinking ego therein the result is the isolated mind. Encapsulated thinking ego rejects embodiment, spontaneity, and connectedness with anything that has to do with emotional life. To enrich our discussion, the *Matrix movies* are used to discuss how the Manichaean system of thought is in motion and survives in transmission.

> They [Greeks before Socrates] knew how to live: for that purpose, it is necessary to keep bravely to the surface, the fold and the skin; to worship appearance, to believe in forms, tones, and words . . . were superficial—from profundity!
>
> Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom*, 1882/1924, p. 4

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* A primary version of this paper accepted in 25th International Psychoanalytical Studies Organization (IPSO) Congress July 2019, London, as "A Manichaean Portrait of Femininity in the Psychoanalytic Anthropologic Mirror".

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Introduction

Freudian theory viewed the conscious ego as being a very early form of "a bodily ego" (Freud, 1923/1961. p. 27) that originated from within the body itself. Moreover, according to Anzieu (1990) it "is implicit in Freud: 'the unconscious is the body'" (p. 43). This fact has opened a new line in psychoanalytic theory which is focused on a shift from bodily ego to skin-ego, the importance of skin, and good handling of the body (Anzieu, 1990, 1995/2016; Bick, 1968; Winnicott, 1955). Mohammadpour-Yazdi and Jandl (2019) called this conceptualization of bodily-ego *the Skin Model of Ego Development* (SMED) that is focused on the theoretical line from bodily ego to skin ego and three layers of experiencing unconscious: Oedipal, pre-oedipal and primal skin (Hinshelwood, 1997). For our paper, unlike Manichaeism and its bodiless ideology, this theoretical movement that began with Freud's bodily ego and continued with Bick's primal skin and Anzieu's skin-ego, is called epi*dermal psychoanalytic approach* by us*,* a significant shift from phallus to breast and finally to skin*.* In addition, the epidermal psychoanalytic approach is a hypothesis of embodiment in psychoanalytic thought that seeks to explain how body-skin can play a role in psychic development.

From a corporeal psychoanalytic point of view, body is the speaker of the unconscious (Anzieu, 1995/2016) and bodies tell stories (Campbell, 2000). Based on this approach, mythic ideas manifest themselves through body organs such as Achilles' heel and Esfandīār's eyes, they are two mythic ironsides respectively in Greek and Persian myths who had just a physical vulnerability. Moreover, a mythic mindset can develop and be passed onto an individual from one generation to another. Under certain circumstances, such a mythic mindset can even be transferred from one culture to another with the help of what we call a *linguistic mythic time machine* and we will discuss it later.

The development of cultures is inherent in the nature of societies, and cultures depend on the fabrication of myths, which hold those cultures together. Within this context, "a myth is simply any story that is foundational for the identity of a people" (Weaver, 2011, p. 96). As a foundational reality, "a myth is a projection of an aspect of a culture's soul" (Leeming & Leeming, 1994, p. vii).

For our paper, "psychoanalysis as a body of thought" (Evans, 1996, p. 155) can help to trace shared unconscious cultural expressions and understandings of the world through our myths, movies, poems, folklore, and literature (Abraham, 1924/1988). Indeed, Freud (1913/1961) emphasized that culture and cultural background affect psychic functioning. On the very subject of myths, Freud (1908/1961) noted that they are "distorted vestiges of wishful fantasies of whole nations, the secular dreams of youthful humanity" (p. 152). As such, by its very nature, psychoanalysis tends to be complementary to the fields of mythology and anthropology, which accept that unconscious thoughts may meaningfully influence human life's affections and motivations in the past and present (American Anthropological Association, 2019; Paul, 1989). Moreover, the study of humankind as a main task of anthropology cannot be dependent on an ancient or modern era (Langness, 1974).

We consider Manichaean myth of femininity as a case study and, consequently, the instant paper takes such an approach to Manichaean mythology and, in so doing, it

reveals that in certain societies this anti-corporeal mythology can function as the source of misogynistic notions and actions. For this paper, we conceptualize misogyny as a concept which has a bodiless or imaginary nature and is passed on from generations to generations with the help of superego's functioning and the linguistic aspect of myths. These misogynistic beliefs are located in a capsule (Mohammadpour-Yazdi & Jandl, 2019) which is separated, alienated, and isolated from contextuality and intersubjective impact (Stolorow & Atwood, 1996). This isolated encapsulation has an influence on developmental shifting from skin-ego to thinking ego (Mohammadpour-Yazdi & Jandl, 2019). To command a more tangible view of femininity, the need is felt to tackle a theoretical explanation from Freudian theory to Manichaean mythology, in other words, from a Western phallocentrism to an Eastern one, in the next part. Needless to say, our paper investigates myth and ideology within the context of a Manichaean misogynistic context so a reader could feel a nonpositive approach to myth and ideology as a phenomena in motion that is more related to the subject of our paper and not to the nature of them that could be positive in other applications. At the end of this introduction it is necessary to say that Anglophone readers of Anzieu's works are used to seeing the work of Anzieu through the lens of Bion but we have tried to stay with Anzieu in a contemporary Freudian manner.

Femininity and Psychoanalysis

Modern scholars accept that the notion of femininity is itself a multifaceted phenomenon deeply rooted in culture. Just as the reduction of gender to the male-female binary may be challenged (Benjamin, 2000; Butler, 2000), femininity itself cannot be oversimplified (Dunphy, 2000; Grosz, 1994). Instead, it is a complex phenomenon structured by biopsychosocial aspects. In that regard, for us, Freud's theory of femininity now seems outdated and the product of Freud's time and culture. Indeed, it is controversial and "frankly, rather dismal" (Akhtar, 2009, p. 109) to the point that Freud (1926/1961) initially admitted that he found "the sexual life of adult women is a dark continent for psychology" (p. 212). In this darkness, Freud (1933/1961) developed the theory that women's sexuality is similar to the sexuality of men who had they been trapped in the body of a boy. This masculine account of femininity is created around phallic monism "i.e., the question of possessing the penis or not—was the key to [Freud's theories of] psychosexual development" (Quinodoz, 2004/2005, p. 64).

Indeed, Irigaray (1977/1985) criticized Freud's phallocentric attempts to form an imaginary body, which explains the feminine difference. Based on her explanation, the difference between femininity and masculinity are biopsychosocial concepts, heavily influenced by the culture. In this sense, she is heavily influenced by Lacan (1966/1977), who held that sexuality is in large part resultant from cultural roles projected onto a child. Indeed, Lacan saw that words and language signifying sexual differences are foundational in the formation of children's notion of themselves Within this context, Irigaray (1977/1987) saw Western phallocentrism as being projected onto the feminine aspect, thereby robbing the feminine quality of its own unique expression of itself. In connection with this, Butler (1997) noted that although Freud's ideas in this area were accepted by traditional psychoanalysts, one must not fail to understand the significant effects that social power can develop and exercise. For example, what happened for many women in Victorian Viennese society was experienced by them in the context of misogynistic stereotypes. This is true even in

the psychoanalytic context where a psychoanalyst can use their authority to form the feminine identity to satisfy their will to power and avoid violating zeitgeist.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that, the psychoanalytic theory seeks to understand the interaction of femininity and misogyny within the context of body and culturally specific transmission. In light of geographical and cultural background, certain parts of the Middle East are frequently perceived as having culturally ingrained expressions of misogyny inherent in them. These expressions can be directly traced to some myths like Manichaeism and its dualistic cosmogony. To understand why this is the case, the next part turns to the transgenerational function of superego.

In this, similarities can be found to Freud's thinking. Freud himself noted that he thought women were incapable of meeting the standards of ethics applicable to men, "for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men" (Freud, 1925/1961, p. 257). It can be said that Freudian theory of femininity occupies a benighted place in the modern body of research as a mythic system—magical and isolated in its nature (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992).

Manichaeism

Manichaeism is an ancient Near-Eastern religion which was established by Mani, who was born in 216 CE in the early period of the Sassanid Empire, in Mesopotamia. Ultimately, Mani died in 277 CE at the age of 61, in prison for practicing his faith, having been put in heavy chains by Wahram (or Bahram). His faith was considered as a Christian heresy for a long time. Manichaeism extended from Babylonia to the Roman Empire from the West and to China from the East and lasted until the 14th century; it lived in the Middle Ages in Europe (Manichaeism, 2019) in terms of neo-Manichaean sects. Mani's religion, as a new dualistic approach of Gnosticism, has had significant effects on some Islamic Gnostic doctrines to this day (Skjærvø, 2006); a good example is Sufism (Zarrinkoob, 1995), which follows the redemption of the light or soul from the prison of the body like Manichaeism (Corbin, 1983).

In broad terms, it is essential for present purposes to note that Mani's thought followed the concept of the Zoroastrian duality, which sees the world as being composed of the two distinct essences: good and evil. In orthodox Zoroastrianism and especially in *Bundahishn* (Bahar, 1989), Ahura Mazda, also being known as Ohrmazd, is seen as being the creator of good and evil, light and darkness. In the extreme dualism of Manichaeism, these two forces were seen as being in direct and eternal opposition to one another, having separate and mutually exclusive essences as well as different natures (Darmesteter, 1880; Zaehner, 1961).

Manichaean cosmogony and cosmology include four stages that each follow a mytheme or a central generic unit, all connected through the interaction of mythic characters amongst each other (Bahar, 2001; Boyce, 1975; Coyle, 2001, 2007; Lieu, 1992; Esmailpour, 2005; Sundermann, 2009).

The first stage was the Golden Era, when the light was primordially separated from the realm of Darkness. The different natures of Light and Darkness resulted in great wars and battles, starting when the King of Darkness became envious of Goodness

and Light, which were governed by the Father of Greatness who had a celestial spouse called the Great Spirit or the Mother of Greatness. Secondly, there was the First Creation, when the amalgamation stage started, due to the King of Darkness (Ahriman)'s envious nature. Initially, Ahriman prevailed, and the demons imprisoned the First Man and his five sons as a part of Father of Greatness' troops. Thirdly, the Second Creation began, the First Man was rescued, and the motionless universe was given motion too. However, a second war broke between Ahriman's and the Father of Greatness's troops; the latter includes the Friend of the Lights, Great Builder, and the Living Spirit. The Father's forces were victorious. Lastly, the Third Creation, Narisah Yazd made the Sun and the Moon move, and through changing the seasons saves the light particles through rain and dewdrops. In the process, the universe was given motion and a conflictual war started between two forces. Mani taught that salvation was achieved by humanity through successfully warring against eternal darkness and its demons that try to save the particles of light from the prison of the body.

Manichaean Notion of Femininity

Manichaeism divides existence into Light and Darkness, good and evil. As such, it transmits this perception that certain aspects of life are "good," and others are "bad". In this extreme dualistic cosmogony, it is imperative that one notes that Mani saw women as being inherently inferior to men. Indeed, he saw women as being the creatures of Darkness. In his mythic system, the first woman (Mordiyänag) was created by demons (the Greed Demon, Ašqalun, and Namrāʾīl), and their sexuality was a product of evil. Mani attributed certain roles to women. Technically, some roles were seen as belonging to the realm of Light or good, while the others were seen as belonging to Darkness or evil. In essence, however, even the roles that were seen as being good can be seen as being inherently negative and reductionistic. For example, on the one hand, the Great Spirit feeds the dwellers of the kingdom of light, the Mother of Life prepares the son to send him to war. On the other hand, the Greed demon encourages to sexual corruption, and Mordiyäng cheats on her husband Gehmord, because of her ignorant nature and moral weakness. Ultimately, in an ideal situation, women were to give birth to children and to prepare them as pious people for war with evil, both spiritual and physical.

The pessimistic view on women in Manichaeism is derived from the notion that more sexual relationships send more particles of light into the prison of material and diabolic bodies. Although marriage and sexual affairs were prohibited for Manichaean Elects, the Hearers (the common Manichaeans) were allowed to marry and have children, but when they wanted to climb up the ladder of spiritual progress like the Elect, they had to avoid sextual relationships.

Manichaean Studies on Femininity

In terms of the connection of Manichaeism to misogyny, at first glance, one can see that the mythic system robbed women of their inherently creative and natural femininity. Within this system, femininity was seen as being derivative of and in the service of masculinity, it can be seen from the work of such authors as Zarshenas (2011), Tongerloo (2003), Coyle (2001, 2007), Franzmann (2007), Oort (2015), Malek Behbahani (2011), Burrus (1987), and Yorioka (2010). Moreover, in a psychoanalytic sense, it could be noted that Manichaeism shunned the material world in a misogynistic manner. For example, Jesus, a masculine figure, told Gehmord to

avoid Mordiyäng because she is an evil creature, and it had to be said, accused the first female human being to moral weakness. After receiving the message, Gehmord moaned as a lion, pulled his hair out, beat on his chest, and said: "Curse, Curse to the fashioner of my body, who drew me into slavery" (Esmailpour, 2005, p. 76).

This anti-corporeal point of view gives a bodiless character to Manichaeism and, consequently, it converts into a mythic discourse which is empty of corporeal qualities. After searching multiple databases such as Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing (PEP), European Psychoanalytical Federation (EPF), EBSCO, PsycINFO, Google Scholar and Science Direct, the psychoanalytical study on Manichaean notion of femininity in transmission has not been able to capture researchers' attention. To reach the purpose, a qualitative method uses to study Manicheanism as a case study through textual analysis in a psychoanalytic fashion, with a special focused on the SMED.

Misogyny in Transmission

In terms of a psychoanalytic understanding of superego formation in Manichaean underlying dualistic-phallocentrism and misogyny and its cultural transmission, it must be noted that the superego is viewed as being the internalization of the ego ideal, which is representative of the external influence of parents, teachers, and external authorities (Freud, 1933/1961). In that regard, it is noteworthy that when Freud conceptualized the superego in this fashion, he demonstrated his interest in the influence of culture, society, and time on the individual: "Thus the super-ego takes up a kind of intermediate position between the id and the external world; it unites in itself the influences of the present and the past" (Freud, 1938/1961, pp. 206-207). In this context, the cultural transmission is in line with Freud's notion of phylogenetic inheritance, the phylogenetic inheritance addressed by Freud (1913/1961) for the first time in *Totem and Taboo*. This transmission depends on identifications (Freud, 1923/1961); and the superego is the agent used in cultural transmission from one generation to another (Freud, 1933/1961) as an archaic foundation like misogyny, which can survive among generations. In essence, the superego is seen as an embodied, time-bound, future-focused thing, located in a transitional space between the soma and external reality (Loewald, 1980c). This transgenerational aspect of the superego and its impact on cultural transmission is important for this paper.

In setting up this dualistic-phallocentricity in which the first female human being (Mordiyäng) was deemed to be inferior to the male one—if not necessarily outright evil—Manichaeism established the groundwork for the cultural transmission of misogyny. This occurred through its use of mythological ideological tools to culturally skin the femininity from its subject, thereby eliminating the natural connection between sensation, perception and apperception (interpretation) (Hopp, 2008). In other words, a "magical communication between" ego and reality (Loewald, 1980a, p. 19) is hidden in the heart of Manichaeism in the case of the cultural transmission of misogyny.

From Bodily Ego to Skin-Ego and Encapsulated Skin-Ego

Considering skin as a "leading organ" (Segal, 2009, p. 56), Anzieu (1995/2016) innovatively developed the concept of skin-ego, which is a temporary developmental surrogate ego that plays an essential role in psychic development (Lafrance, 2013). As

Anzieu (1990) noted, the skin-ego arises from the skin's function, a function that is designed to provide the developing infant with information about and strategies toward, the inner and outer worlds. While the skin-ego is normally developed to the "thinking ego" (Anzieu, 1995/2016)—which enables the person to think symbolically through their language and desires as a secondary process, the skin-ego is akin to Freud's primary processes (Freud, 1905/1961), impulses and drives. Needless to say, the primary processes are the most fundamental mode of being in the world (Anzieu, 1990, 1995/2016) and "it is fundamental for the ego to have a skin that is consistent, with safe limits and a flexible structure. Grounded in these foundational capacities, a thinking ego emerges that can speak and think associatively" (Anzieu-Premmereur, 2015, p.676). As skin is the wrapping for the body, the ego is the wrapping for the psyche, and the thinking ego is wrapping thoughts that keeps thoughts in a coherent unity. Seeing that the body is the first object, "each of the functions of the skin-ego carries across to a function of the thinking-ego" (Segal, 2009, p. 52) and, consequently, the thoughts will be the next object; it means thinking tries to bring thoughts into a single body of ideas. It is necessary to say that the thinking ego depends "anacltically on the body and on bodily sensations and images" (Anzieu, 2016, p. 274).

Within this context, Anzieu (1979, 1990, 1995/2016) assigned eight functions to the skin-ego, which are a linkage between skin and self: including containment (handling), protection (against stimuli), maintenance (holding), individuation, inter-sensoriality (consensuality), sexualization, libidinal recharging (energization), and inscription (signification). Considering the skin-ego is a product of biology, it can be said that its function is intersubjective, these functions are immediate in nature and related to life and libidinal drives (Anzieu, 1995/2016). He added a ninth function to the skin-ego under the title of "attacks against the Skin-ego" (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 114). This negative activity of skin-ego is considered as a self-destructive function against itself in the service of death drive. It shows how the skin-ego tends to the state of "non-self" (Anzieu, 1995/2016) and, consequently, the "unconscious attacks to the psychical container" (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 116). For Anzieu, the protective cover of the ego, the skin-ego, because it is under attack from this self-destructive function, becomes toxic and coats construction with destruction (Segal, 2009).

For us, as a reader of Anzieu in a contemporary Freudian manner, the relationship between functions of life and death's drives acts in a such a way that disturbs the developmental shifting from the skin-ego and its main accomplishment (i.e., primary thought) to the thinking ego and its secondary thinking process. In other words, considering that the skin is wrapping the body and it is also a living organ, it can be affected by diseases such as eczema or cancer. To shift from the body to psyche, for example, itching could be considered a part of horror (Segal, 2009). For this paper, the skin-ego functions are very important and lead to a new conceptualization of the superego in relationship with the skin-ego when the skin-ego finds an entity within the context of a deprival system of affects and cognitions.

Moreover, Stolorow and Attwood (1992) and Stolorow (2007) asserted that the isolated mind as a myth and a mode of being in the world becomes manifest in three states: alienation from nature and the physical world, alienation from social life and, most importantly, alienation "from the nature of subjectivity itself" (Stolorow & Atwood, 1996, p. 191). For us, how the encapsulated-skin-ego affects the experience

of femininity in Manicheanism is important. In line with Stolorow and Atwood (1992) and Stolorow (2007), the Manichaean account has alienating impacts on three areas to encapsulate feminine object in a dualistic way:

1. Natural area: Manicheanism denies the body as the first object and denying the body equals repressing the unconscious. It calls "the differentiation of gender a particularly diabolical invention" (Chadwick as cited in Coyle, 2007, p. 142).
2. Otherness area: Sending the body to a diabolic corner of existence deprives the individual's perception of sensual qualities of an object that can only be perceived on the skin. The symbolic formation cannot be created without continuous contact with (m)others and their containing function. Even though the myth has respect for the mother and other pious women, it has a major conflict to recognize the earthly women as significant others and consider them as a femme fatale in collaboration with the evil part of life. In addition, it disconnects the dialogue among selves and provides a place for the motherhood to be separated from its womanhood (Coyle, 2007).
3. Subjectivity area: With the help of Manichaean culture and literature, the myth adverts for the alienation of woman from her subjectivity. This is because it sees femininity, which is the quality of being woman, especially in a subjective way, as a threat to being a virtuous woman. In the presence of this misogynic ideologic point of view and encapsulated feminine (m)other, enclosing skin-ego through encapsulation ends in an encapsulated thinking ego too, i.e., the isolated mind.

Due to this fact, the isolated mind is considered by us as the mother of all myths. It means not only the isolated mind is separated and alienated from the nature of human being and its contextuality, but it can also be encapsulating affects and quite isolative thoughts in a mythic way. In other words, for us, the isolated mind governs a magical linguistic distortion instead of the thinking ego's reality testing, and it connects language and thinking through a magical participation (Loewald, 1980b). As a result, the process of having the notions of femininity indoctrinated by the inaccurate cultural perceptions can rip the person from their immediate and spontaneous contact with the world, thereby creating the isolated mind and a mode of enclosing femininity in a capsule.

A close connection can be seen between the skin-ego, intersubjectivity, and seeing the world in terms of an immediate and non-dualistic fashion, as discussed by Lafrance (2013). Accordingly, based on Anzieu's theory (Anzieu, 1984; 1995/2016), it can be thus said that the connectedness of the skin-ego to object prevents the development of the state of isolated mind within the individual. As a result, it could be concluded that the isolated mind is a lack of connectedness or the feeling of belonging to the external world and otherness through the skin-ego.

To fill the gap in the literature review, this paper pays attention to the role of the deprival system of mythic-ideologic teachings on skin-ego development. Mythic-ideologic discourse can limit skin-ego and its developmental functions through filtering sensations and controlling perceptions. It means mythic-ideologic systems can control the ego's experimental discharge through implanting guilt feelings and horror about good and evil. Then, they gain control over the skin-ego to deprive it from experience. Additionally, encapsulating the skin-ego with the help of mythic-

ideologic teachings can deprive the skin-ego from normal contact with nature, gender, otherness, and its own subjectivity. It gives a bodiless characteristic to this kind of ideological doctrine. This encapsulation produces an encapsulated object that has the isolated mind to perceive the external world and otherness, and is manipulated by ideologic-mythic systems. In other words, the ego considers everything out of its encapsulation state as a stranger, bodiless object, and perceives it in terms of ego-dystonic.

Within this context, encapsulation means enclosing femininity in the mythic-ideologic capsule in an abnormal manner. For us, the mythic-ideologic capsule demonstrates a distorted point of view to the human being ideologically. It is necessary to say, for our paper, ideology is a distorted world-view and "camera obscura" (Marx, 1845/1998, p. 47) that wishes to mislead people to merge into an undeniable ideological system (Kølvraa & Ifversen, 2017). As a result, Mohammadpour-Yazdi and Jandl (2019) called this state of encapsulating the skin-ego *the encapsulated skin-ego* which is an extreme wrapping in reaction to the chance of possible and potential threats which can lead to losing continuity of self which, indeed, is provided by "continuity of contact with the object" (Ulnik, 2008, p.66).

In this sense, based on Anzieu's reading of Meltzer, the sense of object is not separable from sensual qualities that are related to perception through surface or skin (Ulnik, 2008). This encapsulation state of the skin-ego deprives higher cortical functions, the thinking ego, such as cognition of sensory input such as vision, hearing, and somatic sensation. It is necessary to say that from Anzieu's approach (Anzieu, 1984; 1990; 1995/2016), without sensation there is no perception and "not touching is like not thinking" (Ulnik, 2008, p. 32), then dysfunctional skin-ego leads to dysfunctional thinking ego. In other words, a frail skin-ego cannot protect the individual against internal world drives and external world stimuli so it fails to provide a protective shield. Subsequently, if the skin-ego is seen in the context of sensation and primary process thinking, the thinking ego would be considered as perceptual and apperceptional attempts to sort chaotic impulses (Anzieu, 1995/2016; Bion, 1967; Loewald, 1980b).

We integrally use the term of *encapsulated skin-ego* to refer to the overprotective reaction of the skin-ego to a mis-attuned caregiver, culture, or ideologic-mythic system. In another sense, in the face of traumatic and extreme situations, the skin-ego takes shelter in a capsule to protect itself against stimuli. The dome of this capsule consists of imaginary mythic-ideologic skin. Based on this formulation, the encapsulated skin-ego handles any radical ideologic system of beliefs. As such, the superego's will to govern over the ego is targeted to satisfy the id by itself, as Lacan (1975/1988) noted controversially. Following Anzieu (1995/2016), who asserted that the superego wants control over the ego to replace itself "as a psychical wrapping" (p. 92), it had been said that this superego's will to dominate comes true through transmitting encapsulated skin-ego among generations similar to a *keep away* game. Within this context, the superego is the agent that is used in cultural transmission of value systems from one generation to another (Freud, 1933/1961) like a conveyor. Therefore, the superego transmits encapsulated skin-ego through generations as a mythic system of thoughts that is immune to change. It can explain why some mythic mindsets like misogyny are transmitted across generations through the intergenerational transmission of mythic-religious beliefs to a new generation. As

discussed previously, the superego is the outcome of the identification process; therefore, the encapsulated skin-ego is the result of encapsulation with "defective identification" (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974, p. 352), which involves bizarre mythic-ideologic teachings in order to protect the self from a threating external world (Abraham & Torok, 1976/1986). It is the idea of the mythic system in authority, incorporated into the self through alienating identification, so that the self has to represent itself through the encapsulated skin-ego, which can transmit the mythical descent.

As the skin-ego represents a primitive, biological stage of ego development, however, we posit that a similar culturally founded prototypical encapsulated skin-ego develops in early childhood through an intergenerational process and with the help of mythic-ideologic discourse. In that stage, a distorted view of reality and what is necessary to negotiate it can be transmitted to the next generation within a mythic-ideologic capsule based on now culturally irrelevant mythic systems, which no longer function as practical cultural ideas, but which are, nonetheless, transmitted from society to the child through identification in service of regulating affects effectively (Krystal, 1988). The introjection of such inaccurate images and phantasies have profound effects on society-for when confronted with an inaccurate mythology that contradicts reality, thinking and language- myth centered societies tend to distort reality through magical usage of language rather than correct the inaccurate perceptions. Identification with these magic-mythic ideals forms a malignant superego and leads to disturbed regulation of self and its affectivity.

For our paper, the mythology of every culture is critical for its identity, but sometimes a mythic system such as the Manicheanism can encapsulate freedom of the feminine aspect of a society in a gnostic way. As a result, a dissatisfaction can be beheld throughout this text about the gnostic core of Manicheanism, which has a misogynistic and ideologic character. Moreover, Manicheanism in transmission has fueled other following religious systems such as Sufism (Skjærvø, 2006; Zarrinkoob, 1995), which believes in blaming worldly life (Corbin, 1983).

Linguistic Mythic Transmission as a Time Machine

Lévi-Strauss (1974) distinguishes between langue and parole, that respectively the first involves the structural aspect of language and is related to a reversible time and the second, speech, refers to the statistical side of language and belongs to a non-reversible time. However, myth can be considered as the third level of language that is timeless and consists of language and speech characteristics at the same time. Myth can extend itself in a range of time from the past and the present to the future. In other words, myth has a universal nature in a historical and ahistorical fashion. Also, it is not definable at certain times and in certain places and can be understood in the level of a sentence because the basic units of myth are not phonemes, morphemes or sememes but the myth is reducible to the smallest component units which are called mythemes (Lévi-Strauss, 1974).

Considering the Manichean myth of creation, Mani uses binary pairs of light and dark as structures to put his mythic units within a tension of the relation among pairs opposites: light-dark, spiritual-earthly and woman-man. According to Lévi-Strauss (1955) that myth functions culturally "to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction" (p. 443), as the Manichaean myth of creation tries to

solve this contradiction of light-dark opposites. In other words, Mani hires the binary opposition of light and dark to think better as Lévi-Strauss (1974) explained "natural species are chosen not because they are "good to eat" but because they are "good to think" (pp. 161-162). Within this context, binary opposites are basic structures of all human cultures and, for example, the light is better than the dark, and this binary can be transmitted from one generation to another without being under structural influence of paraphrasing, distorting or reducing by translation. This survival aspect of the myth gives the transmission character to the Manichaean notion of femininity to survive among generations.

For us, llinguistic communication is not only the transmission of concepts from one brain to another, but it transmits conceptualizations from one generation to another. For humans, traveling in time is a big dream, while few people think that they travel through generations in the channel of their culture by means of language, or what we call linguistic mythic time machine. The mythic systems of thought are a source of knowledge about cultural contextuality of humanity that show us how a certain myth tries to transmit its mythic structure of thoughts in a completely modern shape and form. Thus, myths can emerge in dreams or phantasies or even art, literature and cinema in the contemporary world. For instance, binary opposites and the radical dualism of the Manichaean point of view can be seen in *The Matrix* movies, 1999-2003. Let us give an example of *The Matrix* movies in the next part, the discussion, to show how the mythic structure of mind is passed on from one generation to another, from one era to another and even from one millennium to another. Moreover, with the help of what has been reviewed thus far, it is possible to present the discussion.

Discussion

This discussion uses a cultural extension of Anzieu's (1984) notion of the skin-ego, and "the skin [is seen as] functioning as a boundary" (Bick 1968, p. 484). In this context, the opposite force of the skin-ego that interrupts shifting from the primary thinking process to a secondary one is the encapsulation of the skin-ego, which is governed by a need to protect the self against extreme situations. The encapsulated-skin-ego can adhere to mythic-ideologic doctrines to transfer mythic ideas through generations, with the help of the superego's role in transmission. For us, the Manichaean account of creation is considered as a sample to analyze the process of encapsulating the object, such as woman from her womanhood. It has to be said that the Manichaeism notion of femininity is an imagined skin, instead of a living skin-ego, against corruption of the soul based on Mani's teachings.

In Anzieu's theory (1995/2016), the body is the speaker of the unconscious. Moreover, Klein "regarded the body as the vehicle of mental life" (Gomez, 1997, p. 36); therefore, it can be stated that denying the body in the Manichaean point of view runs a defense mechanism against the unconscious manifestations that reflect through the body. The presence of a woman with her female body can disturb this schizoid defensive operation, which tries to disavow the quality of womanhood. By calling gender and body diabolic creatures, Manichaeism sees femininity as a frightening representation of the body's personification. This fear produces a fusion between representations of the self and the object (Jacobson, 1964, 1967). As a result, in Manichaeism, a feminine object perceives a stranger, who must leave her feminine body and femininity behind to be able to enroll into the circle of the blessed women.

In this sense, separating womanhood from motherhood hurts the totality of being a woman. In pregnancy, for example, mothers (previously young girls) are the psychical container of existence, and through this wrapping of existence dialog with the self and others begins. These (m)others' voices, smells, looks, warmth, and hugs surround the babies and define the mother-infant's existence in a mutual-relational-reactional matrix of wrapping which is called the skin-ego.

As a result, the Manichaean view tries to see the world and its phenomena through a non-embodiment glass and instead of experiencing the subject through exposing bodily experiences, it attempts to deny sensuality. The skin-ego is related to experience through bodily proximity with internal and external worlds. This connection at the surface is vital to create a sense of self based on its developmental functions. It is obvious that the Manichean system of thoughts believes in a non-touching manner in order to free believers from the diabolic body and get them to salvation. Manichaeanism's strategy is enclosing and encapsulating the skin-ego and its functions to prevent its hypothetical human being's soul from corruption. Within this context, femininity perceives a threat for the faith of believers and must be put into the encapsulation state and be separated from subjecthood because the woman's nature is unstably unreliable. Additionally, in Anzieu's theory, body, skin, touching (sensation) and perception are directly related to epistemology because "each of the functions of the skin-ego carries across to a function of the thinking-ego" (Segal, 2009, p. 52).

Talking about the Manichaean myth of creation highlights a myth that uses an anti-corporeal language and bodiless discourse and tries to suppress any bodily-temptation and avoid all drive-related impulses. It means Manichaean language involves anti-corporeal grammar and fundamentally prevents articulation of the biological aspect of the psyche. To come back to Anzieu's reading of Freud that says the unconscious is the body (Anzieu, 1990), it can be said that psychoanalysis is an epidermal discourse that begins with the body as an object to support when an infant is not able to speak, i.e. the pre-Oedipal stage of psychic development. While mythic-ideological discourses like Manicheanism are bodiless and empty of corporeal aspects it gives them a phantasmal character targeted to salvation rather than well-being and well-saying. Considering that the body is the invention of devils in Manicheanism, it is then seen as a powerful tool of distraction and deception especially in the feminine form.

As a result, this certain austere mythic system used a seductive superego to manipulate its believers by promises that there is a pie in the sky and consequently, Manichaeans passionately followed a moral masochistic lifestyle, in other words, Manicheans needed to sacrifice their body and also to send the skin-ego into the encapsulated state of mind to reach spiritual transcendence. This masochistic manner is notable in every single detail of Manicheanism, for example, they avoided slicing or tearing bread with their hands because it may damage tiny light particles that are hidden inside bread (Esmailpour, 2005). To sum up the aforementioned points, Manichaeanism sends the body to the encapsulated state of mind and the same goes for the skin-ego, then ultimately leads to a muted body (unconscious). As an example, imagine a gnostic ascetic who places a stone under his tongue in his mouth to deprive himself from the ability to talk, the question here is: what is the outcome of this austerity? The body is the unconscious and clearly when it comes under the control of

such masochistic behavior, it is unable to articulate the bodily manifestation of the unconscious, as a result individuals speak of an extraterrestrial life rather than deal with their earthly realities and here is where the bodiless discourse is formed in terms of ideology.

Manichaeism, however, culturally transmits the idea that not only a feminine other is dangerous for the belief of believers, but her gender and body are hands made of evil. By encapsulating the object, feminine other, from its femininity in this way, Manichaeism creates an isolated mentality of the feminine object and develops the encapsulated feminine, which is separated from its nature and subjectivity. The feminine object cannot, consequently, experience itself as a subject with sexual desires. This deprivation of womanhood occurs through encapsulation by mythic-ideologic instruction. Considering that the encapsulated-skin-ego—through imaginary wrapping of mythic ideas and notions—is formed in a culture, which itself is anathema to the notions of sexualized and spontaneous motherhood through emphasizing the misogynous world-view, enclosing women in the encapsulated feminine object is inevitable.

From our new conceptualization, it could be seen that the Manichaean notion of femininity mythically encapsulates the feminine other in its mythic skin and separates femininity from the body and skin-ego from sensual qualities of (m)other. As if through encapsulation similar to the isolated-mind, which refers to the encapsulated thinking ego which causes to a bigoted approach to femininity. When the skin as a primary ego is encapsulated in a deprived mode of being in the world, the resultant encapsulated feminine object cannot rightly be called a real woman or the (m)other any longer. In other words, from a non-dualistic approach, the feminine (m)other that is separated from her body and her external world does not exist as Heidegger says “a bare subject without a world never “is” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 116).

In transmitting the notion of the encapsulated feminine object in this fashion, the skin-ego is actually encapsulated by the deprival system of mythology and ideology culturally, which can be conceptualized as a situation, where a societally introduced foreign parasite attacks the person’s individuality and inherent truth-and-connectedness abilities. This is what Anzieu would characterize as the “toxic function of the skin-ego” (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 117). Thus, cultural transmission wraps colonized and eradicated innate facts of femininity in a toxic envelope by activating the culture of destruction. This toxic function in collaboration with external threats and sometimes punishments, sends and keeps the skin-ego in its capsule in an isolative way. It must be said that Mani is one of architects of the culture of destruction and renunciation of real life historically, who established an anti-material, dualistic and mythic-ideologic system of thought in a misogynistic manner. Wilhelm Reich (1973/1927) sees psychic armor as a defensive reaction to naturalness and, what is alive. In this vein, ideology deprives people of real life and creates the negation of life in terms of social ideology:

> To be able to cope with this world, people had to suppress what was most beautiful and most true, what was most basic in themselves; they had to strive to annihilate it, to surround it with the thick wall of the character armor. (p.186)

In that regard, it is interesting that misogyny and misogamy, as the mythic mindset, are passed onto children by (m)others in terms of transgenerational transmission, within an isolated capsule of the skin-ego, and with the help of the superego as a conveyor. In this context, however, Butler (2015) pointed out:

> The superego, with its transgenerational transmission of rules and laws; the id, where drive representatives meet what has been repressed; the ego, which comprises countless other egos—all are concepts which offer a way forward into thinking about ideology as "how we live ourselves" as sexually differentiated beings. (p. 58)

In order to make our discussion more engaging, we need to give an example to show how the Manichaean system of thought can be transmitted to a contemporary film. Binary opposites of the Manichaean approach are analogues to *The Matrix* movies that are a trilogy which was created by the Wachowskis.

In around 2199, a war happened between machines with artificial intelligence (AI) and humans. With the intention of depriving the machines from the sun's light as the source of power, humans planned to defeat the machines by imprisoning them in darkness. Despite the fact that the strategy of humans limited the machines' power sources they found another solution to supply the needed energy in a creative way. Machines, with the help of their AI, succeeded in using human bodies as a bioelectrical and thermal source of energy in terms of brains in vats. AI started to cultivate human bodies in farm fields to use the power of their brains and gained control over the bodies through creating a computer program simulation which was called the *Matrix*. In order to keep the activated human brains generating power, the machines kept humans in a hypnotic state of mind and stimulated their brains by simulation. Under the control of the Matrix, no one had an identity and all were only a brain in a vat like an isolated brain (Ford, 2016; Clover, 2008).

The main theme in the *Matrix* is the contrast between machines and humans and the efforts of machines to exploit humans as a source of energy. Moreover, the envatted life in the *Matrix* is hypothetical, worthless and tempting, in fact, the reality of body and bodily pleasure is denied, i.e. a modern mythic account of the anti-corporeal Manichaean myth of creation. The machines in *the Matrix* that used the brain power of mankind are comparable with Ahriman's agents in the Manichaean myth of creation that imprisoned the particles of light. It can be said that they used humankind like living batteries and the *Matrix* was invented by Ahrimanic intelligence in terms of the Manichaean mythic system. In Manicheanism, demons wished to keep the mixture of light and dark and, consequently, they invented the human body as a prison to detain the particles of light. On the one hand, in Manicheanism, demons hired material life to imprison the light and on the other hand, in the *Matrix,* cyber illusion is applied to create a hoax to control human brains.

In other sense, the existence and the survival of the AI is dependent on keeping humankind in the prison of the Matrix, similar to the Manichaean point of view that Ahrimanic agents have to get control over material life to survive by keeping the particles of light as hostages. As the significant similarity between the Matrix and the Manichean myth of creation can be seen, this example shows how *linguistic mythic time machine* can transmit the mythic mindset from one generation to another, from one era to another and even from one millennium to another. This aspect of mythology, which can repeat and rewrap itself in a new and a modern skin elevates itself as a crucial topic for contemporary psychoanalytic research and gives a specific position to the psychoanalytic study of mythology. It can explain why the mythic mindset is transmittable through generations and survives through the linguistic nature of myth.

Conclusion

The isolated mind as a mother of all myths, generates the encapsulated skin-ego, which demonstrates the skin-ego separated and alienated from nature, the other, and subjectivity. The encapsulated skin-ego considers everything out of its dome as a stranger and inhibits experiencing and introjecting new experiences. The Manichaean account of femininity attempted to keep encapsulated femininity as a deprived capsule of the woman as a diabolic creature who owns an empty and a blank body. With the help of encapsulating the (m)other from her humanistic-affective aspects in a non-contextual and bodiless way, Manichaeanism even went beyond this and considers human beings and the soma as the devil's invention in terms of bodiless ideology and an anti-corporeal world-view. The encapsulated skin-ego and its mythic mindset can be transferred from one generation to another through identification and, to be exact, the cultural transmission under the influence of the superego as a conveyor. Moreover, a linguistic mythic time machine is activated by ahistorical and timeless aspects of myth as a part of language. This time-free and history-free dimension of the Manichaean point of view allow it to survive with the help of its binary opposites and radical dualism among generations, as we analyzed in the case of *the Matrix* movies. In conclusion, for us, the skin is the place for the representation of cultural tensions, social limitations and mental (unconscious) conflicts. There is a significant trend in history of thoughts to conceptualize how mind, society or culture are under attack from diabolic agents or destructive machines who wish to gain control over the skin and body to survive or spread themselves. We have shown it in the Manichaean mythic view and the Matrix trilogy which put the finger on encapsulating the skin-ego to be dominant over the gateway of sensations and the generator of thoughts to conceptualize their ideological discourse in an anti-corporeal way. In our paper, there was not enough space to discuss the relationship between the dualistic mythic mind, ideology, and the creation of the encapsulated skin-ego with the help of clinical examples. Therefore, the formulation requires some clinical case studies to evaluate the theory in a psychoanalytic setting.

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The Sexual Throughout the Body of the Tongue

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Abstract

In Fragment 19 of the *Harvard Manuscripts*, Saussure claims that difference, since it admits degrees, is an uncomfortable term. If anatomy as destiny (Freud, 1912, 1924) is more nuanced than one would like, since it also admits degrees, and anatomical difference does not mitigate the ultimate impossibility of conjugation between speaking beings (Lacan, 1991), how to think of the transit/translation between bodies and where to situate the differences that belong to them? In order to propose an answer, this paper starts from this hypothesis that it is advisable to develop this reflection about sexual difference a couple of feet above the waistline, foregrounding another organ (the tongue), what allows us to critically rethink the entanglement between gender and anatomy in psychoanalysis, in favor of the notion of style.

Style is language clearly understood;
punctuation is style clearly understood.
George Sand (1871/1873, p. 91)

Introduction

According to etymologists, the Low-Latin word *anatomia* (*anatomy*) has traveled through history from the Greek *ἀνατομή* (*anatomḗ*), "dissection", its corresponding verbal form *ἀνατέμνω* (*anatémnō*) meaning the act of "cutting into pieces". From this starting point, in several modern languages the term would come to denominate i) the art of dissecting but also ii) the dissected body (the piece of anatomy); iii) the science dedicated to the study and morphology of living, especially human, beings; iv) and also, in a so-called "figurative" sense, "by extension", any kind of methodical investigation (Serça, 2015, pp.173–184). Thus, along its polysemic transit, anatomy is: i) a *practice* of *difference* within the body; ii) the result, within the *body*, of a *practice* of *difference*; iii) a *body* of *practices* with *difference*; iv) and an exercise in recognizing the *difference* that was first distinguished in a *practice* with the *body*, regarded as something susceptible to fragmentation, precisely in the interstices where *difference* sprouts up. However, not all is a bed of roses…

In the Fragment 19 of the *Harvard Manuscripts*, we shall witness Saussure forgoing any peace of mind by affirming that *the* difference, much desired as a sound guarantee, consists in a "uncomfortable term", once it "allows for degrees" (Parret, 1995-1996, p. 92). And now, what is to be done? After all, in the field of language, resemblance and difference are tangled up with each other, their nuances mixed up.

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And there is no escaping the fact, which is known to be anxiogenic, that, even though acknowledging the possibility of distinction may seem inevitable, it is also difficult to understand structurally speaking, which elements should be distinguished and in which terms. However, if anatomy as a *term* (both word or end) seems to have more shades than we would like them to[2], neither is it possible to categorically deny the suspicion that the differences perceived on the body (its *sections*) are, first of all, *designated* by the names they receive. These names, once put forth by a subject and accepted by a few others (Ambra, 2018, pp. 69–70), will in practice *mark* the first limits of their territory, and thereby determine both what will be inscribed in a certain way and what, in turn, will remain on the sidelines. The verb *diferir*, which in Portuguese means not only "to differ" but also "to defer" and, at the same time, "to extend", bears witness to this. If these antithetical meanings of a not-at-all-primitive word bring a timeless problem back, it does so because differences, loaded with meaning and producing an *anatomized body*, establish dynamic and disproportionate limits not only within the body, but mainly within the commerce between bodies. And bodies are haunted by a mythical search in the other for complementarity, for something they cannot find within themselves: we should recall that the myth of the emergence of sexes narrated by Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium* tells that a sectioned body is, by all means, a sexed body. That said, how should we regard the traffic (the multiple attempts of access, the *intercourses*) between theses sectioned/sexed bodies which, to top it all, *speak*?

To attempt an answer to this question, I start from the hypothesis that it is appropriate to take this reflection about sexual difference to a place situated a couple of feet above the waistline, bringing up another organ, the only exposed internal organ of the human body. Thus, let us speak about a viscus[3] which, not by chance, short-circuits the inner and outer parts of the organism it inhabits, becoming, in many languages, perhaps the most renowned as well as the most mundane of the catachreses, getting away unnoticed as such: the *tongue*.

From the Greek *κατάχρησις* (*katákhrēsis*), catachresis used to mean, within the context of rhetoric and figures of speech, using an expression regarded as *inappropriate*. In Latin, the word was *abusio*, an "ab-use", a deviant use that, in an act of naming, would arise in order to make up for the inexistence of a specific word. Therefore, it would be possible to identify which named thing had come before and, later on, lent its acoustic image to the one that followed. And thus, it is also assumed that, as for the term *tongue*, we would be equally capable of pinpointing which organ had been named first: the *φύσις* (*phýsis*) organ, internal, so to speak (piece of flesh stretched along the vocal tract and *with* which a particular species, ours, had the privilege to set itself up to speak), or the *νόμος* (*nómos*) organ, which stems from the use, the habit, and *within* which the function of speech is confirmed and conformed: the "formative organ of *thought*", according to W. von Humboldt (1836, p. 50). However, regarding the tongue, it remains to be seen whether this timeline is possible.

[2] After all, it also allows for its degrees. For example, the spectrum of cases of so-called genital ambiguity.

[3] It should be noted that the idea of "viscus", which may be circumscribed in several ways, seems somewhat unclear, even though its purpose seems, in equal measure, rather unquestionable, thus approaching the idea of "word". See Di Dio (1948, pp. 187–198) and Benveniste (1964/1971, pp. 101-111).

After all, if, on one hand, the historical preexistence of the biological body in relation to language might lead to the belief that it was precisely the emergence of languages that enabled several of them to name themselves as such, in the same way they had previously named the organ; on the other, we are confronted with a circularity as soon as we notice that nothing can be named before there is a language that makes it possible to name anything. Thus, even though we may assume that every name emerged as a *proper noun*—or, in accordance with the tradition in Arabic grammar, literally a "flag-noun": إسم علم (*ism 'alam*)—the very act of naming carries within itself an impropriety. After all, in the field of deixis, a pure act of indication, we find a gesture pointing to an object that, if anything, allows itself to be indicated, but recedes at the slightest attempt at touching and completely circumscribing it, expropriating itself, so that the object has forever been lost. This means, at the very least, guaranteeing that *there is no Other of the tongue*, because the very tongue is always Other, even the m(O)ther tongue; and that the syntagm "foreign tongue", for instance, is pleonastic, once that every tongue is *heterogeneous/extraneous/foreign to what becomes a name within it.* That said, every tongue is, as a matter of principle, an impropriety and, in the extended sense of the term, a constellation of catachreses: as Quintilian used to say (*Institutio Oratoria*, 8.6.35), when something bears no name and the name of something that *is perceived as similar* is extended to it, i.e., when one commits an *abusio* by *generalizing* a designation, by situating it within a *generic constellation*. However, when defining *abusio*, the grammarian also says that the deviant use ought to be differentiated from the usage of a name *that exists* in place of another which also exists: in this case, it would be within the realm of *translatio*, which the Greek language referred to as *μεταφορά* (*metaforá*): transportation and—why not?—transference. Therefore, if the tongue *institutes itself* in the abuse (from nothing to name), it *is put into practice* in translation (from one name to the other): a practice in speech and writing, but also a practice in listening and reading.

Here, when we say *tongue*, we are talking about this tongue that preceded us, which is in constant change, and was transferred to us from others, which, in turn, received it from other others. A tongue which we were invested with, which gave us a voice and taught us, by force, to invest the body at our disposal in a particular way, providing us with the opportunity to inhabit it, as it has been loaded with the *gestures* of speech and with the *borders* they draw (with the senses and nonsenses they single out)[4]. A tongue that corrupts the objects and that, whilst spoken, speaks us: just one slip of the tongue is enough and no sooner said than done (it tells on us and there is no tongue-in-cheek). But also a sharp tongue that profanes itself (in the infamy of mistakes, in the prestige of poetry) and breaks the silence it soon learns to violate. Likewise, the tongue has also been acknowledged as the very object of retaliation for transgressions which some were, for some reason, trying to silence. For instance, during the 16th century Reformation, within the context of torture methods aimed at silencing women in particular: executioners "prepared two little irons between which the tongue was screwed, which being seared at the tip with a glowing iron, would swell to such a degree, as to become immoveable, and incapable of being drawn back" (Brandt, 1671/1720, p. 275). Or as in Germany, Spain and Italy, where there were accounts of

[4] "Evolution has made of us the only primates capable of hearing gestures that may, in a variety of ways, point to other gestures, inaudible but full of meaning" (Albano, 2001, p. 179).

a practice that punished offenders by piercing their tongues with a fiery iron rod (Portal, 1770, pp. 310–311).

Between attempts at dialogue and attacks which, at all times in history, sought to create an obstacle to communication (more or less literally), it seems that the body of the tongue has frequently been an object of attention. If *intercourse* is precisely a term that carries within itself both senses of communication and sexual relations, maybe it is not a coincidence that, in many cultures, the presence of tongues in the act of kissing is so prevalent; or the power, on the order of separation, of a tongue stretched out of the mouth, solitary and exhibited to others, constituting a sign of mockery (for the adult) or a serious offense (for the child). And with the notion of *intercourse* we once again find the *translatio* mentioned by Quintilian: the metaphorical translation, the copulation between the terms of that which aspires to be a relationship or, so to speak, a *counterpoint* (as in music, when a melody is added as accompaniment to another). If every tongue, as a constellation of catachreses, is founded in abuse, it is practiced during intercourse. Thus, it is during dialogue that the other's tongue is transformed into our own, transforming ourselves in the process, therein marking not only a discrepancy between one and oneself (after all, the speaker may see themself, beyond the mirror, as a third person), but also placing the human, which is *subject* to that, within constellations of possible similarities with other elements, which were named and grouped in advance according to the presence or absence of *characters* that were given meaning throughout history, and through which they are *read*, immediately at times. At the time of birth—or, due to technical advances, even before that—*the subject to be*, endowed with their characters, *is*, first and foremost, *a subject to be read*; and, at first, nothing can be done to counter this reading. Let us call these letter constellations, based on which the subject is read and positioned, *genders*.

"Genders" in plural, since they are many. From a broader viewpoint, grouped within the constellation of those who speak, for instance, we (of the *human gender*) see ourselves as capable of creating the world in the image of our likenesses. If the catachresis, a deviant use, will be in charge of naming in an extensive way, it is not surprising that the generalization one's own body will find a breeding ground therein: on the "head of a nail" or at the "foot of the page", it is the human body that, whilst fragmented, finds a direction through which to extend itself[5]. And thus, the genders also extend to words. However, Brazilian Portuguese speakers should not naturalize that grammatical genders may get mixed up with the *masculine* and the *feminine*, though they invariably do and though they are in fact capable of infesting the imaginary of any given speaker (Jakobson, 1959, pp. 232–239; Lakoff, 1987). There is no need to have a certain interest towards, for example, German (in which "miss", *Fräulein*, is gender-neutral) or Russian (in which "man", *мужчина* [*muzhchína*], despite being a masculine noun, is morphologically constituted as well as declined according to the paradigm of the feminine) in order to reflect upon the fact that *bolso* ("pocket" in Portuguese) is not exactly more masculine than *bolsa* ("handbag" in Portuguese). The examples here are numerous. Nevertheless, we should not even naturalize the notion of grammatical gender as being attached to the classical bipartition between masculine and feminine, as demonstrated not only by German and

[5] An example of this is the 个 (*gè*) in Mandarin Chinese, which is mainly used in reference to people and easily replicated to words of different genders, especially in informal situations.

Russian (with their neuter genders) or Romanian (with its neuter, which is a peculiar mixture between masculine and feminine), but also Chinese and several indigenous languages of the Americas, in which genders are frequently grouped around characteristics such as form and function.

What is at stake, then, in dealing with this *anatomy of the tongue* is that these elements, available within the body and the language, boiling over in the cauldron of history, eventually sink in different severing possibilities and, of course, prompt the imaginary. However, from the moment they take on a meaning, leaving the pure empire of catachreses and migrating to the world of metaphors, to interpret them as destiny (term, end, target) hangs on how we distinguish the subject's function as that which is read or which, at times, makes itself capable of writing: as one who *punctuates* that which is written about oneself. Thus, towards their bodies and their characters, as well as towards the act of writing (the writing itself regarded precisely as a set of characters), there are at least two possible exemplary attitudes. The first one, so to speak, would be falling into the so-called Arabian fatalism, the legendary مكتوب (*maktub*, "it's written"), or even, with regard to characters, wanting to be not only normative but also universalistic: Leibniz's *characteristica universalis*, for instance. In this sense, it is a well-known fact that Didot, an embodiment of the 19th century typographic thinking, punctuated in the same way every text that fell under his responsibility, as if resuming Beauzée's conclusion on the entry "Punctuation" in Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopedia*: "it would be desirable that, in whatever language the books printed today were written, editors introduced the system of punctuation used in all living languages in Europe" (Beauzée, 1765, p. 24).

In April 1876, proceeding in that direction, in the 137th edition of *L'Imprimerie*, a French magazine devoted to typography and lithography, the editorial declared that "punctuation is the anatomy of language and thought" and that "to punctuate is to dissect the phrases". Based on logic, punctuation would thus be universal: valid, therefore "for languages of all times and all countries, applied, without any distinction, to Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, English, German and French" (Lorenceau, 1980, p. 52).

> The typographers [who wrote the aforementioned editorial] may certainly aim at the figurative sense, and thus we think of what the school tradition called the "logical analysis" of the sentence; but, above all, we think of the autopsy, the anatomy plates, these representations of the *écorchés*, which reveal the inner structure of a body—of a *dead* body. (Serça, 2015, pp. 173–184)

We are definitely not talking about dead bodies here; in the same way this is about living tongues. And if according to Whitehead—author, along with Russell, of the renowned *Principia mathematica*—"life lurks in the interstices" (Whitehead, 1929/1978, p. 105), it is to be expected for Sand to say, sparking off a hostile reaction

from typographers of that time, that "a correct distribution of stops requires tact", which "are not within the province of the proof-reader" (Sand, 1871/1873, p. 96). George Sand, the enigmatic pseudonym of Amantine-Lucile-Aurore Dupin (Sand, 1856, p. 45), argues for the possibility, within the ambit of characters, of a punctuation—thus, of an anatomy of the language, according to typographers—that is in line with fantasy and tact, open to the desire of the one who writes and that, like her, wishes to be read; wishes to be read in a certain way. And what her very own public presentation as cross-dresser was capable of pointing out, during the first half of the 19th century, was that the experience with one's own body and with the body of the other, in the level of their various characters, is culturally punctuated (so that the body, like the text, may be presented with distinct punctuations in different civilizations, tongues and eras) but is also *punctuable*: in the most diverse senses of the term, Sand, regarded as the first woman who lived off her own royalties, *made herself read* in the masculine (Sand, 1856, p. 5). Once the elements are given in the condition of a *mark*, they still do not find themselves hindered from being punctuated according to the likes of the speaker's fantasies, who includes points that are capable of supporting their desire and, thus, throwing the dice for, on contingency, opening themselves up to the possibility of encounters and altercations: the so-called intercourses between bodies, *always* im-probable, in the sense that they cannot be proved[6]. The composer Frédéric Chopin, for example, maintained a relationship with George Sand for almost his entire stay in Paris, creating a "musical-literary, political and gender counterpoint" (Wisnik, 2013, p. 19).

Finally, the intercourses present one dimension of the politics of traces, of characters which, with the aid of psychoanalysis, may be thought of as a poli-*tíkhē*: politics as the management of multiple chance events, each with their own destiny (*τύχη*), which translates from Greek to German as *Schicksal*. Not by chance, the Napoleonic statement that "politics is destiny" is precisely what Freud claims to be paraphrasing when making the notorious assertion that "anatomy is destiny" [*die Anatomie ist das Schicksal*], a formulation that appears in writing in two moments of his work: "On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love" (Freud, 1912/1970, p. 209) and "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (Freud, 1924/1970, p. 249). The context for that statement borrowed by Freud seems to be paramount however (Moi, 2001, pp. 374–377).

The year is 1898; more precisely, September. Napoleon and Goethe meet in Weimar. The subject: theater; more precisely, the gothic melodramas, which were popular by the end of the 18th century, the so-called "destiny plays (*Schicksalsstücke*)" (Goethe, 1808/1952), p. 1416). According to Goethe's notes on that conversation, Napoleon completely disapproves of this kind of play, since they supposedly belonged to dark times: "What does one want destiny for now?", he asks, following with: "Politics is destiny". "Destiny", what an uncomfortable term! Whether in the gothic melodrama or the classical tragedy, I would like here to raise the question: would it not be better, in order to set up a discussion about anatomy *starting from* the psychoanalytical experience—i.e., from *a certain experience with language*—to think of another term to translate Freud who translated Goethe who translated Napoleon who, as history

[6] Note: according to Lacan (2011), the sexual act does not exist precisely because it cannot be written.

shows, did not translate anyone who did not recognize the imperious insignia on his uniform?

If Freud says that the *goal/intention/purpose* of life is death by using the term *Ziel* (Freud, 1920/1975, p. 248), why not think about *Schicksal*, through which echoes the verb *schicken* (to send), not so much like destiny or end, but as the *fate* that is devised along the way. Or, better yet, as they say in the theater, the *denouement* that, taken literally, is precisely the opposite of a closure? Therefore, even delving into the origins did not freeze Freud in the past, since he was capable of foreseeing, in the myth and the primeval, the possibility of thinking the present of the clinic to which he dedicated himself and the theory underpinned by it. As psychoanalysts, would it not be precisely the opportunity we present: that in building an analytical path the transference investment might be capable of connecting the fragments of that which is primary with a future that, from then on, is rebuilt? Therefore, the clinic would be nothing less than an investment in possible recombinations within the original experience on behalf of a subject development that is less stagnant in the midst of their circumstances, through building the ability to deal with one's own marks and acting on them.

Characters, marks, insignia: limits with which we must cope, but also emblems capable of sending, communicating, remitting to the other the history of those who create and, with more or less pride, carry them. In the body of the text or the text of the body that is written in order to be read therefore lies the compulsoriness of an act of addressing, of sending, which is articulated with contingencies of style and of all that is made possible by techniques and artifices. A style that, as an incision, also lurks in interstices, just like life; a style that, although may seem to be resisting alterity, is constituted by it. We shall remember, after all, that Lotman (1996/1999, p. 58) defines the *trope* (the figure of speech, the figure *of style*) as "a mechanism for constructing a content which could not be constructed by one language alone" since it is "a figure born at the point of contact between two languages"; and Lacan (1960-61/1991, p. 372) connects the idea of trope to the idea of destiny by saying that destiny "is the trope par excellence, the trope of tropes". And if Lacan, while translating Buffon for an audience that was his own, said that "style is the man to whom one addresses oneself" (Lacan, 1966, p. 9), a hundred years before Sand anticipated an adage that would still take a while for Freud, then a teenager, to eventually understand and which not even Lacan, to the best of my knowledge, has ever commented on: "punctuation is much more the man than style is" (Sand, 1871/1873, p. 920). There is an adage we might gain from bringing back; us, who have translated Lacan who translated Buffon, but still face a bit of challenge—we must admit—in translating George Sand and many others who, with their brave truths, dared to translate themselves through the course of their own histories.

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Writing Lived Experience – A Melancholy Elegy

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Abstract

This paper explores the limitations of language in psychotherapeutic writing about lived experience and how psychanalytic concepts can help us both understand and work through the inevitable loss that results from these limitations. It is illustrated by the author's experience of undertaking a doctoral research project in psychotherapy where the experience of narrative incoherence was explored through writing. Paralleled to the doctoral research project was the challenges the author faced in writing the experience of incoherence. By reflecting on and analysing these challenges, this paper explores the sense of loss that is located at the core of writing lived experience through psychoanalytic concepts including the third position and melancholia. Light is shed on the limitations of language in capturing the fullness of lived experienced. Connecting the psychoanalytic concept of melancholia to Romanyshyn's (2013) writing as elegy, this paper proposes writing lived experience as a melancholy elegy in which what is lost in language can be acknowledged and kept alive in the writer's psyche. The continuous engagement with the sense of loss in writing lived experience as a source for creative power and an ethical commitment are discussed.

Introduction

I often struggle with telling 'coherent stories' of my own and articulating my experience. While coherent narrative is widely seen as closely related to one's sense of self and identity (e.g., Adler, 2012; Baerger & McAdams, 1999) and as an indication for psychological well-being (e.g., Baerger & McAdams, 1999), it is often the demand for a coherent narrative and articulation that brings me anguish. There is experience deeply felt but somehow unspeakable and inarticulable. Insisting on articulating them in linear form, in my experience, can be a violent act of imposition and alienation. My personal struggles with telling coherent stories and articulating lived experience drove me to write my doctoral thesis on the theme of narrative in/coherence (see Liu, 2019). My thesis questions the dominant emphasis on language and narrative, especially coherent narrative, in psychotherapy. I enquired into the lived experience of narrative incoherence in psychotherapy and sought to honour those moments when words fail us.

Because I was researching into the incoherent, the unspeakable, and the unnarratable, instead of asking others to tell me their experience, I engaged in a process of in-depth experiential self-searching. In this process, I found myself naturally engaging in

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writing as inquiry (Richardson, 1997, 2000; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005) where my writing was not a final presentation of what had been done or discovered but a process of discovering, a process where my "thoughts happened in the writing" (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 972). I wrote from and into the experience of incoherence, the unspeakable and the unnarratable. Writing took me to places of my inner world that I was not aware of previously and contributed to the everchanging interior of my world. The writing was thrilling and yet unsettling. What troubled me was the conflict between the nature of what I was researching – what is beyond language – and the nature of writing.

The underlying belief of writing as inquiry is that "language matters" (Pelias, 2011, p. 660). Another idea perhaps embedded in writing is to establish order: "[s]imply to line up words one after another upon a page is to create some order where it did not exist, to give recognisable shape to the sadness and chaos of our lives" (Smith, 2007, cited in Pelias, 2011, p. 660). This quote cited by Pelias, one of the pioneers in writing as inquiry, suggests that the process of writing is ordering and giving shape to our experience. This is similar to the widely suggested and often accepted therapeutic effect of narrative and story-telling in psychotherapy. Narrative coherence is often viewed as a positive outcome or the goal of psychotherapy (Angus & McLeod, 2004), which was what I challenged in my thesis. I was confronted by the challenge or even impossibility of languaging what cannot be languaged.

Could I write about the fragmented in the language of order? Could I write about the unknown in a recognisable shape? Could I give words to what is beyond language? Throughout the process of researching into the experience of narrative incoherence, the more I wrote, the more I sensed what could not be written. I recognised in my thesis a melancholic attachment to the unspeakable that was lost in my writing. Throughout the thesis is the presence of the absence, the "unspeakable absence" of loss as an 'ineffable presence' (Stillwaggon, 2017, p. 60). When it was pointed out in my viva that I wrote about the incoherence in such a coherent way, I recognised that something could not be captured and communicated through my writing. Writing, therefore, is not only creating, recording or presenting, but also a process of mourning for what cannot be written.

This paper delves into the loss of what cannot be written in language when we write about lived experience. I will firstly examine the gap between being in the lived experience and symbolisation of the lived experience through a psychoanalytic concept, the third position (Britton, 1993), shedding light on the inevitable loss and pain brought by the symbolisation of lived experience. Reflecting on my experience of writing for my thesis, I will then move on to discuss how the order and linearity of language miss out the formless realm of lived experience. Based on these discussions, I draw on Romanyshyn's (2013) proposal of writing as elegy and the psychoanalytic concept of melancholia (Freud, 2005) to encourage writers and researchers of lived experience to keep in mind the inevitable experience of loss that results from the limitation of language. I will discuss the creative potential of melancholia in the writing of lived experience. The last section of this paper proposes writing as a melancholy elegy as an ethical commitment when we write about lived experience.

Loss in the Separateness

> *[I]n that space of transition and transience, where light fades into darkness and darkness begins to shimmer with light, something of the soul is always left behind and needs to be mourned.*
> *(Romanyshyn, 2013, p. 30)*

In psychodynamic theory, the development of the capacity to symbolise is viewed as closely related to the development of the third position (Bondi, 2013). In early infancy, the child's needs are met without language, and having his/her needs accurately responded to gives the child a sense of omnipotence and merging with the world and the mother or carer (Bondi, 2013; Winnicott, 1960). Later in the development, after the external reality is experienced by the infant, the links that connect the infant to each of the parents separately are confronted by the link between the two parents in which s/he is an excluded third (Britton, 1993). The child comes to realise that each of the parents are separate others who do not solely exist for him/her (Bondi, 2013). This position as an observer rather than a participant is the third position (Britton, 1993). Its establishment provides us the capacity for "reflecting on ourselves whilst being ourselves" (Britton, 2004, p. 48). And the achievement of the movement between immersion in lived experience and the third position brings the capacity to symbolise and reflect on our experience (Bondi, 2013).

The concept of the third position and its crucial place in the development of the capacity for symbolisation and reflexivity indicate a separateness, or to borrow Balfour's (2005, p. 51) phrase, a "linked separateness". As Bondi (2013) points out, there is always a gap between the being in the experience and the reflection on or being curious about the experience without which symbolisation is not possible. Thus, there is an implicit acknowledgment in symbolisation that the experience being symbolised has gone and we are no longer at one with that experience (Bondi, 2013). As Colman (2007, p. 22) writes, "a symbol cannot be a symbol of something unless it represents something other than itself. Therefore, the thing that is symbolised must be absent from the symbol". Language as a form of symbolisation intrinsically carries with it the sense of absence and loss.

Moving to the third position is a key developmental experience, from the psychodynamic perspective, yet at the same time, it is also "suffused with unavoidable pain and loss" (Lanman, 2005, p. 147). It shatters our fantasy of a world as an absolute oneness with the mother or carer in which language is not necessary. Obtaining the capacity to reflect on our experiences is to know that "we have lost an archaic sense of one-ness with the world and with ourselves" (Bondi, 2013, p. 15). Elaborating on Kristeva's work, Stillwaggon (2017) explains that the individualisation of the child as they are introduced to language is experienced as a loss by both the mother and the child. It is a loss of the previous identity in the stage where the child's survival is completely dependent on the mother's active presence. There is no return to this identity through language and it brings an unspeakable grief.

From the perspective of a qualitative researcher, Romanyshyn (2013) points out the complex relation between the discipline of psychology and what it studies – the soul[2]. The difference between "the standpoint of consciousness" and "the reality of the unconscious" determines the problem of language (Romanyshyn, 2013, p. 26). The belief of the unconscious determines that our psychic world is always beyond the reach of language (Romanyshyn, 2013). Drawing on poet Brendan Kennelly's reflection on his struggles to write down his experience with the figure "the man made of rain", Romanyshyn (2013, p. 30) raises that writing down the soul might be similar to applying the language of 'the daylight view of conscious' to the things in 'the night time view of unconscious'. Language use in research that concerns our psychic world is a way of "speaking of meaning as a presence that is haunted by absence" (Romanyshyn, 2013, p. 29).

Loss in the Ordered and Linear

While writing my doctoral thesis, I was particularly drawn to the limit of language in capturing the fullness of our lived experience in relation to the ordered and linear nature of writing. I came to realise this through my struggle in writing or typing on the computer.

As I walked to the library in a morning which was to be devoted to my thesis writing, I felt a sense of reluctance. I was puzzled, because I had been feeling excited about finding a research direction and eager to read and write. While I attended to this feeling, what appeared in my mind was the computer screen. I imagined myself sitting in front of the computer with the Word document open, struggling to type on the blank screen. I imagined myself starting to type, feeling unsatisfied, deleting and then re-writing. Sometimes I spent a long time 'rehearsing' in my mind before I could type even just one sentence. This is an anxiety-provoking process. However, I then realised that while typing drained me, when I wrote with pen and paper, it was usually a lot more relieving. When I had a spark of inspiration, I had to go for pen and paper even when I was sitting right in front of a computer. Thus, in that morning, I started to wonder (with pen and paper) what this was about, what was my trouble with writing on the computer. I had both my notebook and the Word document in front of me, and then I noticed how neat the words looked on the computer screen.

The words on the screen stood one after another, neat and tidy, straight line, equal spacing. There was no trace of crossing, shifting, inserting; no trace of my process, struggle or excitement. When something was deleted, it was gone. When something was amended, it looked like it had always been how it looked like in the present time. So much was left out in the neat screen text. On searching my way to the research focus and methodology of my doctoral thesis, I handwrote most of the materials. I wrote here and there, with all the crossing, adding and grammar and spelling mistakes. They were 'all over the place'. I wrote thoughts that crossed my mind. I copied the quotes that I loved, and I wrote my responses to them. They were bits and pieces. After I put them in order on the computer screen, the text could never tell this

[2] The use of the word 'soul' in Jungian theory, on which Romanyshyn's writing is based, has its ambiguity and I interpret Romanyshyn's use of soul here as the totality of psychic world and process (Samuels et al., 1986), including the unconscious.

'all over the place' and 'bits and pieces'. Sometimes I was surprised when I read the Word documents I typed previously by how ordered and logical they appeared to be. When I read them, I saw a person with a clear mind who knew exactly what she was doing, whereas in my memory I was not like this at all. These texts did not tell the struggles, the putting together, the adding in, the clutter and my messy writing process. There was an academic requirement for me to write in a presentable manner, to cut out the parts that did not fit. It is always comforting to see my thoughts come together as a whole, and that I am making sense thus others can understand me and give feedback, which makes communication possible. However, the parts of me and my process that these neat texts cannot tell are left out and abandoned. Just like the keyboard and computer screen leave behind the messy writing process, writing itself can leave behind the non-linear and messy aspects of the experience being written.

Stierlin (1963) describes us human beings as the heir to the law of causality. Order, coherence and continuity indeed are what we are deeply concerned with and even our sense of self rest on them (Mattingly, 1998). We would love to experience our lives as "personal, generally coherent, emotionally meaningful, narratively knowable, and tellable" (Richardson, 1997, p. 62). However, life lacks form (Frank, 2010; Mink, 1987). As some anthropologists argue, the deep human concern with order and coherence is not in accord with our experience of life (Mattingly, 1998). When we capture our formless life experience with ordered and coherent narrative, we are also taming our experiences (Mattingly, 1998). To quote Mattingly (1998, p. 34), who elaborates on some narrative theories that doubt lived experience and narrative have much to do with each other: "Narrative […] is a mythical imposition of coherence on what is otherwise formless experience". Writing as a way to establish order (Smith, 2007, cited in Pelias, 2011) is also an imposition of form on the formless aspect of our lived experience. This is another inevitable and painful loss to be recognised in writing lived experience. Writing lived experience is writing down as well as leaving out and cutting off.

Writing as Elegy

The development of the capacity to reflect and to symbolise and the inadequacy of language in speaking the fullness of our experiential world which includes the unconscious and the formlessness entail a profound sense of loss. Thinking about this loss, I am particularly drawn to one of Romanyshyn's (2013) proposals for qualitative researchers to keep soul in mind while writing down the soul: writing as elegy. In this proposal of elegiac writing, he honours the sense of mourning for what has slipped away, what has been "lost, forgotten, left behind, abandoned, and yet haunts our efforts to know the world and ourselves and to say what we know" (Romanyshyn, 2013, p. 313). He sees the researcher as the 'failed poet' who 'stands in the gap between the fullness of experience and the 'failure' of language to command it', who "is able to bear the tension between knowing and not knowing" (Romanyshyn, 2013, pp. 9-10).

Poet Louise Glück (2000, cited in Pelias, 2004) says there is nothing more exciting than being able to say fully and exactly about something and to get to the bottom of something. Writing as elegy is to resist the lure of exactitude and relinquish the attempt to reach to the bottom of our experience. To write about lived experience is to write a hymn of lament (Romanyshyn, 2013) for what has been lost in language. It is

the necessary grief that Butler (2005) writes about – the necessary grief for the loss of something we never had which is the fully articulate and narratable self. When I wrote about what I could write, I also held in mind what I could not write and the necessary grief for this loss. To add on Romanyshyn's (2009) elegiac writing, writing for me is not only an elegy in which what has been lost is mourned, but also the melancholy attachment to the unknown loss, a refusal to relinquish the unspeakable and unknown that cannot be written.

Early in his essay *Mourning and Melancholia*, Freud (2005) points out a main difference between mourning and melancholia which is related to the explanation of feeling and behaviour. Freud points out that although mourning and melancholia can bring the same intensity of pain, same level of loss of interest and inhibition of any kind of performance, the only reason why mourning, unlike melancholia, does not strike people as pathological is that it can be easily explained. Freud argues that compared to mourning, in the case of melancholia, the loss is more notional in nature. Mourning can occur for not only the death of a loved one but also for a loss in an abstract form, for example, for freedom or an ideal. However, what is lost is easily identified. In the case of melancholia, the loss may well be a real or concrete loss of a loved one through events such as death. Alternatively, it can be the loss of the loved one as a love-object, for instance, being abandoned. However, in some cases, Freud says, it is difficult to see what has been lost. In other words, the melancholic is not conscious of what has been lost. In some other cases, what or who is lost is clear, but the melancholic is not aware of what it is about that person or that thing s/he has lost. Therefore, Freud relates melancholia to the loss of an object which is withdrawn from consciousness, whereas in mourning, "no aspect of the loss is unconscious" (Freud, 2005, p. 205).

This indicates to me how writing and language in general fail in the face of melancholia which is situated in the unknown and the unexplainable. The sense of loss involved in the inadequacy of language in speaking the fullness of our experiential world includes the loss of something unknown to our consciousness. When writing my thesis, I continuously struggled with the inadequacy of writing. My every attempt to use words was "a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure" (Eliot, 1944, p. 21). Something always slipped away in between my words. The bigger struggle, yet, was the impossibility of knowing what had slipped away. The sense of melancholy permeated the whole research project. It often woke me up before the daybreak and led to many writings in vain. I tried to fight against it and to find a solution but realised eventually that it was exactly this impossibility of symbolisation in melancholia (Leader, 2009) that my thesis must contain and that I as a researcher and writer on lived experience needed not only to tolerate but also to cherish.

Leader (2009) explains the melancholic's struggle with language based on Freud's (2005) argument. According to Freud's theory, there are two psychical systems involved in thinking. One is linked to the perception of things which he calls thing representation and the other is linked to words and speech which he terms word representation. Thing representation, which consists of collection of memory traces of things, and word representation, which is constituted by acoustic and semantic aspects of language, are usually linked together. Mourning is made possible through the moving between thing representation and word representation. Through the pathway

of preconscious, the unconscious ambivalent battle between love and hate towards the lost object is made conscious. In the case of melancholia, this pathway is blocked. Unconscious thing representation cannot be reached through conscious word representation. Therefore, as Leader (2009, p. 189) concludes, "at the heart of melancholia is a problem to do with language. Words and things seem radically separated for the melancholic". A symbolic impasse is then present for the melancholic (Leader, 2009). Leader (2009) identifies in melancholia the failure to speak properly and articulately about the lost object and the individual's relation to it.
In the first sentence of her provocatively book *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia,* Kristeva (1987) writes about the challenge of writing from the place of melancholia:

> For those who are racked by melancholia, writing about it would have meaning only if writing sprang out of that very melancholia. I am trying to address an abyss of sorrow, a noncommunicable grief that at times, and often on a long-term basis, lays claims upon us to the extent of having us lose all interest in words, actions, and even life itself (p. 3).

As Leader (2009) and Kristeva (1987) suggest about melancholia, my words failed to touch their referent.

Freud (2005) suggests that to preserve the loved yet lost object, the melancholic identifies with the object. A choice of identification with the dead or the lost object for the melancholic, according to Leader (2009), is to die with them, physically or psychically. This situates the melancholic in a particular position of in-between two worlds: the world of the dead and the living. It becomes a torment to find words that can describe this dual existence, this impossible experience of being in two places at the same time. This standing in-between two worlds and the impossibility of being in two places at the same time were my struggles as the 'failed poet' (Romanyshyn, 2013). In the melancholia was knowing that I had failed yet not knowing what I had failed.

Freud (2005) thinks that melancholia is related to the unresolved grief in which the lost object cannot be let go. Approaching the (unsatisfying) end of my research project, I identified in the research project the refusal of letting go what had been lost, what could not be known and spoken in my writing about lived experience. I saw my writing as an unconscious melancholic returning to the unknown and the unspeakable. Aligning with Romanyshyn's (2013) proposal of elegiac writing, I propose that writing lived experience inevitably comes with a melancholy sense brought by the loss of what is unknown and unknowable, what is unspoken and unspeakable. This failure of language and perhaps our consciousness needs to be held in the mind of the writer and be constantly engaged with.

The Creative Potential of Melancholia in Writing Lived Experience

In Freud's (2005) original conceptualisation of melancholia, the melancholic's identification with the lost object and the refusal to let it go are pathological and damaging. The ego of the melancholic becomes empty (Freud, 2005). However, this view of melancholia as merely pathological has been challenged. For example, in the context of the everyday life of the ethnic minority, Eng and Han (2000) view melancholia as an ethical commitment of the minority and the immigrant to preserve the important yet lost ethnic origin and identity. It is a way of expressing that something is so important that the ego is willing to preserve it at the cost of its own wellbeing (Eng & Han, 2000). For Eng and Han (2000, p. 695), the melancholic process is one way in which "socially disparaged objects […] live on in the psychic realm". Eng and Han (2000) see not giving up the lost object too easily as an ethical commitment which holds the power for political change. For me as a researcher and writer of lived experience, what cannot live in written words, I hold it alive in my psychical world by not ignoring it, not fighting against it, not letting it go easily, and acknowledging, living with and engaging with the sense of loss and melancholia during and after the research and writing process. It is an act of refusal to allow what is beyond language and words to "disappear into oblivion" (Eng & Han, 2000, p. 695). Taking this position holds in mind the fullness of lived experience and declines the false certainty that we can fully know and write about the lived experience that we are delving into.

The creative and productive potential of melancholia has been recognised and discussed (e.g., Eng & Kazanjian, 2003; Ruti, 2005). Instead of a problem, Brady and Haapala (2003, para. 6) see melancholy as 'a mature emotion in which reflection calms a turbulent soul'. The state of melancholy does not debilitate, instead, Brady and Haapala (2003) argues that it involves the reflection and contemplation of things that we long for and love. In this opportunity for reflection and contemplation lies the productive function of melancholy (Brady & Haapala, 2003). According to Brady and Haapala (2003), the most distinctive feature of the emotion of melancholy is its involvement of reflection. The reflective feature of melancholy lies on the fact that its object is absent and unattainable and is experienced indirectly through memories, imagination and thoughts (Brady & Haapala, 2003). Another feature of melancholy is that is it often associated with solitude (Brady & Haapala, 2003; Burton, 2001). Solitude facilitates the imaginative reflection of melancholy; through imagination which makes links between the past, the present and the future, our reflection is deepened, which in turn deepens our feelings (Brady & Haapala, 2003).

Its connection to imagination, reflection, contemplation and solitude often makes melancholy an aesthetic emotional state that is appreciated for literature, art and music, but it is seldom written in relation to academic writing. However, isn't writing in qualitative research that delves into lived experience an imaginative, solitary and reflective process? Alone in my room, sitting under the warm orange light of my desk lamp and writing these words in this quiet evening, I am dipping into my emerging thoughts and feelings. As early as in the 17th century, Burton (2001) recognises not only the sadness but also the sweetness or pleasure of melancholia. It is out of the sweet sorrow of melancholy (Brady & Haapala, 2003) that this paper is produced.

Instead of a purging of emotion, melancholy is a full and ripe emotion that allows us to indulge into memories, thoughts and imaginations (Brady & Haapala, 2003).

As Eng and Kazanjian (2003) argue, the productive and creative potential of melancholia lies in its continuous engagement with the loss and its remains. It was the engagement with the loss that is unknowable and unspeakable that gave my thesis creative power. The engagement with the inexpressible loss drove me to end my thesis with a photo of the trace of my touch on the sand. The presence of the absent touch spoke for me the tension between holding on to and letting go and the impossibility of being in two worlds. It spoke for me my lack of full control over the work I produced. It spoke for me the loss of some aspects of self when my experience was written down on paper.

Interestingly, along with other embodied methods, writing was what I naturally turned to when I explored the unspeakable and unnarratable. While experiencing the limitation of language and narrative, it became obvious in my writing that I desired to tell in language. It was the impossibility of expression and the necessity to tell and be known that brought me difficulties. As Edkins (2003, cited in Andrews, 2010, p. 155) says: "[I]t is both impossible to speak, and impossible not to speak". This corresponds to some people's experience of trauma and catastrophe. For example, in his diary about the life in Warsaw Ghetto, *Cups of Tears*, Abraham Lewin (cited in Andrews, 2010) talks about both the impossibility and the necessity of expressing his thoughts and feelings. As mentioned, a problem for the melancholic is the impossibility of making words to touch their referent, which brings them the self-reproach about not being able to tell with exactitude about the lost object and their relation to it (Leader, 2009). For Leader (2009), the solution (if I can call it so) to this is less about unblocking the passage from things to words than taking the impossibility seriously, "to find words to say how words fail" (p. 191).

Holding in mind this tension between the necessity and impossibility of expression motivates researchers and writers to search for different ways to approach, express and make sense of lived experience. Pelias (2004, p. 78) sees exactitude and closure in writing as tasks that can never be accomplished, and he writes, 'it is the search that matters'. While humbly acknowledging the losses and unbridgeable gaps between language and lived experience, many writers and researchers have made heart-warming and valuable efforts to write down the soul, to show lived experience, to know, to convey meanings and at the same time to allow themselves to be transformed by the writing (e.g., Richardson, 1997; Speedy, 2015).

One of the examples is the use of poetry. Leader (2009) recognises the necessity to speak about loss creatively in a form of language that suits the individual. As Leader (2009) and other authors (e.g., Kempler, 2003; Neilson, 2004, cited in Prendergast, 2009) recognise, this is one of the functions of poetry. Although I had been engaging in non-verbal methods when working on my thesis, I nonetheless had a sense that words were all I had. As Kempler (2003) might say, while non-verbal methods assisted me to experience and express, I was still left fumbling for words to communicate myself. Free from external regulations including the rules of grammar, poetry offers the writer an opportunity to re-invent a language that belongs to his/her own, not one that belongs to one's parents, teachers and others (Kempler, 2003). This feature of poetry responds to my above critique of the linearity of language, offering a

potential to allow the messiness, the fragmented and the incoherence to show on the paper.

An Ethical Commitment

> *The wisest know that the best they can do … is not good enough. The not so wise, in their accustomed manner, choose to believe there is no problem and that they have solved it.*
> *(Malcolm, 1990, cited in Josselson, 1996, p.71)*

The melancholy elegy of writing does not end in consolation. Instead, in writing lived experience, there is always this inevitable and necessary discomfort, about intruding others' lives (Josselson, 1996) or about mispresenting one's own (e.g., Tamas, 2008). As Josselson's (1996) opinion on doing narrative research on others' lives, I believe that writing lived experience, others' or our own, is a work that we need to do in anguish.

The above quote by Malcolm (1990, cited in Josselson, 1996) touched and, more importantly, validated the part of me who has always felt inadequate as a researcher when facing others' and my own unspeakable experience. It comforted me as the 'failed poet' who bears the tension between knowing and not knowing (Romanyshyn, 2013) and who tolerates the losses in the process of symbolisation.

Recognising both the therapeutic and problematic aspects of writing lived experience, Lieblich (2013) asks a question in the end of her article:

> […] a final narrative, put in words and writing, replaced a vivid, quivering, and colorful recollection. Furthermore, the mere writing process, the search for words, phrases, and metaphors for the representation of inner experiences, sometimes changed the memory, adding to or subtracting from the nonverbal, fully alive image one tries to convey. Thus, writing has a price in replacing the unwritten or unnarrated memory, with a final version, a constant "thing." Do we always wish this to happen? (p. 52)

This is a question that I have been asking myself when I write and a question that I do not have an answer to. This tension between the need to write and the loss involved in writing, between the curative effect and the problems of writing was what I had been grappling with in the process of writing my thesis. I could not write without leaving something out and I could not write without replacing the unspeakable with the spoken.

In the research context, therefore, I see the endeavour to write while holding in mind the problems of writing lived experience as an ethical commitment, to our research participants including others and ourselves, our audiences, and ourselves as writers.

Holding in mind the problem of writing stops us from assuming that we know, or that we can know. It holds us back from asserting that we can speak fully for others and even for ourselves. Being aware of the inadequacy of our language allows us to honour the circumstances and individuals by putting down on paper careful and hard-won words (Neilson, 2004, cited in Prendergast, 2009). By being with the necessary discomfort and anguish (Josselson, 1996), we honour rather than alienate and ignore that which cannot be spoken. This commitment is also the drive for the creative and productive power from which the poetics of research (Hope, 1971; Romanyshyn, 2013) can be generated and from which reflexivity of the researcher springs. It is the engagement with the loss that drive researchers and writers to seek for creative ways, for instance, poetry as mentioned above, to write about lived experience. It is this commitment that allows us to be aware of what we are doing and thus protects us from going too far (Josselson, 1996), and it is this commitment that enables us to keep searching and to dance with the impossibility (Neilson, 2004, cited in Prendergast, 2009).

Conclusion

Drawing on psychoanalytic concepts including the third position and melancholia, this paper analyses the limitations of language in writing lived experience. The capacity to reflect upon one's experience and symbolise it in language requires separation from one's immediate experience, which brings the unbridgeable gap between one's lived experience and its symbolisation. Meanwhile, the ordered and linear nature of language misses out the realm of lived experience that is formless and structureless. The language of known cannot capture the experience of unknown. Thus, when language is used in writing lived experience, there is always an inevitable loss. This paper argues that writing lived experience, therefore, is also a process of mourning in which the writer of lived experience holds in mind what cannot be written and what slips away. It is this engagement with the inevitable loss and pain that brings the creative potential and deepens our reflection on our unspeakable and unconscious experience. Writing as a melancholy elegy is to acknowledge our words are never good enough when writing down the lived experience, our own or others'. It is a homage to the complexity of human experience much of which cannot be storied, spoken and even imagined.

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Film Review

Review of *Lou Andreas-Salomé, The Audacity to be Free (2016)*. Directed by Cordula Kablitz-Post. USA: Cinema Libre Studio.

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"The question of knowing if psychoanalysis can promise a new love, beyond the symptoms of love life that are addressed to it, has been there from the start…[F]rom the beginning, Freud postulated that the bonds of the passions of love, incomprehensible as they are, escape neither rationality nor logic."
-Colette Soler, Lacan: the Unconscious Reinvented (2014)

The tug of war between love and logic in the discipline of psychoanalysis is nearly as old as the Freudian field itself; and is still heard today in the utterances of our analysands. "I love him, but I know he's no good for me". *"Then why did you go back to him?"* "...good question". This question of love and its logics are at the heart of writer and director Cordula Kablit-Post's 2016 film *Lou Andreas-Salome: The Audacity to be Free*.

The German language film begins when a young scholar, Ernst Pfeiffer (Matthias Lier), seeks out an interview with the ailing and embittered psychoanalyst Lou Andreas-Salome (Nicole Heesters); now suffering from a variety of regrets and ailments at seventy-two. It is ambiguous as to whether Pfeiffer is seeking to write a biography of Andreas-Salome during the waxing days of National Socialism in Germany-or is making a demand for analysis. Andreas-Salome, despite her own prolific writing, and contributions to analytic theory that impressed even Freud, is less known today for her own writing, and more for being the muse of tortured men. Kablit-Post does a commendable job in showing there is far more to the "who" of Lou Andreas-Salome, and that she was exceptional in her time and ours.

Pfeiffer's demand is met by a series of vignettes of Andreas-Salome's past; recalling the riddle of the Sphinx, we see "Lou" at all stages of life from childhood on (played by Helene Piske at age six, Liv Lisa Fries at age sixteen, and Katharina Lorenz from twenty-one to age fifty). The stories of her love, and loves with figures such as Paul Ree (Phillip Hauf), Friedrich Nietzche (Alexander Scheer, with a truly excellent mustache that is either an impressive prop or a feat of personal grooming), and Rainer Maria-Rilke (Julius Feldmeier) are worth telling, and worth viewing for the watcher of this film. But she reluctantly gives them, haltingly, and with some censorship in spite of herself, for what Pfiester believes is a story that must be told. In Seminar XX, *On Femminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge* Jacques Lacan writes "After a while, a light bulb flashed on in the heads of certain commentators-it dawns on them that, if they are obliged to work so hard, maybe there's a reason for it…".

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The reason "for it", is discovered in Salome's analysis with Dr. Sigmund Freud (Harald Schrott); "it" being the scene of trauma that affected so much of Andreas-Salome's life, from childhood onward. To give this scene away, the result of the hard work of Lou Andreas-Salome's analysis with Freud would be to give away the lynchpin on which the whole film turns, and would be far more satisfying for the viewer to see themselves. However, I will say that the scene of Salome in analysis render the analytic situation far better than I have seen it in many films. I believe those who know nothing of psychoanalysis, as well as those who are more acquainted with it may find themselves more curious about the process.

The scene looks small and extremely uncomfortable. Cramped. Freud sits close to the back of the couch, his ear tuned to the frequency of his analysands words. Andreas-Salome herself lies upon Freud's divan with a pensive look, and seems as though she cannot quite get comfortable. Many more films which choose to feature psychoanalysis should take a page from this-psychoanalysis is not always a pleasant chat, or a home for neurotic ramblings, straight out of *Annie Hall*. One potentially could get a surprisingly accurate view of the analytic situation that is not often depicted in American film and television: that of the quiet and patient work of psychoanalysis.

Amid flashbacks, such as this scene of analysis, most of the film takes place in the "present day" of Nazi Germany, in which the Freudian school of thought was consigned to flames; Freud, a godless Jew, was burned in effigy after his flight to England. To return back to the beginning of the film, Salome, by the admission of her erstwhile housekeeper, Mariechen (Katharina Schuttler) has retired, and is no longer taking patients. Yet, despite the dangers associated with being a psychoanalyst, with practicing psychoanalysis ("the Jewish science") in a hostile regime; Andreas-Salome accepts Pfiester's demand for her to recount her exceptional life. Thus begins Andreas-Salome becoming the analyst of her own case. In the process of this recounting, Pfiester's symptoms, such as issues with his work, or his wife, are spoken of. Andreas-Salome provides the occasional interpretation; but more importantly, she follows an injunction put to her in childhood by her father to "become who you are".

Who is Lou Andreas-Salome? A writer, a feminist, a revolutionary, a woman driven in equal measure by logic and love-but at her core Andreas-Salome is a psychoanalyst. And it is as a psychoanalyst she acts of her own case, and Pfiester's during a time of crisis. In *Lou Andreas-Salome: The Audacity to be Free*, we can see that the analyst must still act in a way that transmits psychoanalysis, no matter the material conditions of the world they live in. Overall, the viewer is left with the impression that Andreas-Salome was a woman far ahead of her time; and that, despite the limitations society (and her lovers) attempted to impose upon her-she is in many ways ahead of our time as well. Kablit-Post has written and directed an excellent film; if I have one qualm it is that it ends too abruptly. But, this too may be grist for the mill and may inspire the viewer to explore more of Andreas-Salome's early and overlooked work as one of the true pioneers of psychoanalysis.