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Content

Emblematic Mechanisms and Psychoanalysis (Iconic-Conventional Convergence and Psychoanalytic Diagnostics)

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Abstract

In the paper the parallels between the emblematic "mechanisms" of signification and the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud as well as Carl Gustav Jung have been studied. The Viennese founder of psychoanalysis has discovered template schemes that become a visual delineation, the blueprint for developing his scientific vocabulary, methodology, classification of psycho-emotional behavioral types in mythological plots. The Eros and Thanatos images handling, the exploitation of mythical tales about Oedipus and Electra, Prometheus, Narcissus, and many other ones to specify the behavioral complexes denote the presence of "emblematic methodology" in the formation of psychoanalytic conceptions and categories. His interpretations of famous mythological plots are boiled down to emblematic reduction.

Carl Gustav Jung frequently selected symbolic notations as his research targets, which were a denotative space for expressing internal mental receptions and historic constellations of cultural axiology. In his writings we see the intention to assemble the concepts of image (iconic) and socio-cultural idea (conventional) into a sole compound that syncretically denote unity of meaning. Such an arrangement of iconic-conventional interdetermination is often significative elbowroom in Jung the decoding of which may allow to discern complex mental reflections. Notwithstanding the fact that he considers a symbol to be the standard unit of cognitive-cultural experience "conservation", its functional semantics definition is fulfilled in emblematic patterns. This emblematic-cognitive form is not only a method of determining the initial images-ideas of the unconscious, "the mythological figures" of inner conflicts, typical experience of generations, but also the principle of justification and expression of his theory conceptual foundation. To a certain extent, it is an element of the Swiss psychologist's scientific thinking style and language.

Introduction

A lot of psychoanalytic definitions have emerged due to the interpretation of myths; the peculiarity of individual and collective psycho-development is constantly the subject of the system of idiosyncratically coordinated mythological patterns. Psychoanalytic theories use iconic-conventional concordance of myth as the fundamentals for structuring and accentuating conscious and unconscious mental

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mechanisms. The significance of mythological visual and verbal convergence in the completion of psychoanalysis methodology and terminology is quite straightforward. Sigmund Freud, Carl G. Jung, Jacques Lacan, and Melanie Klein adapt in part mythological images and plots so as to employ them in their theories, which are manifested via emblematic reduction. Identified by way of visual representation, the purports of bygone "events" fulfill the function of internal schematic ostensiveness for the design of psychoanalytic concepts meanings. The emblematization of psychoreaction, stadiality, archetypes, the definition of visual and verbal meanings significance, their interconsistency and frictions project psychoanalytic generalizations.

The Emblem and Cognitive Mechanisms

In this context, it is pertinent to focus on the description of epistemological features of an emblem and the categories associated with it, and to determine how structural-semiotic model of an emblem, its signification precepts are related to the psychoanalytic theory, which connections and interdependence point to the effectiveness of emblematic modeling in consciousness assessing procedures and mental activity.

The notions of "emblem" and "emblematicity" have been widely treated in contemporary studies. Jelena Grigorjeva (2005) endows them with the functions of "the cultural universal" (p. 11) which "adjust the mechanisms of meaning making and retain sense in culture" (p. 13). Thus, an emblematic form is regarded as a phenomenon that generates and accumulates historical and artistic experience within specific semiotic structure. Schematically, it is reduced to the interaction of iconic (visual) and conventional (verbal) signs of meaning expression; hermeneutically – as a relation between the text and the expounder, a peculiar version of "translation" based on decoding, interpretation. The classical embodiment of it is considered to be the triad matrix which consists of an image (*pictura*), an inscription-headline (*inscriptio*) and an epigram-caption (*subscriptio*).

Highlighting the long-standing historical projection of this genre development is considered to be a compelling and obligatory in the philological interpretation, so its origin can be traced back to its links with the hieroglyph, pictography (Jelena Grigorjeva, Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Aleksandr Mikhailov). The priority in defining sense bearing coordinates of this concept is assigned to the emphasis on the diachronistic functioning of a specific model, a kind of semiotic mechanism that pulls together verbal and visual presentations in a single unit for notional clarification and stabilization. That's the kind of conclusion that a Canadian scholar Peter M. Daly is inclined to make.[2]

In European literature, the advent of the emblem as a genre is identified with the appearance of Andrea Alciato's *Emblematum libellus* (1531), which has quickly acquired vogue and has undergone numerous reissues, imitative refinements and transcreations. Since then, the term "emblem" in the popular science is associated

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[2] Daly, P. M. (1998). *Literature in the Light of the Emblem: Structural Parallels between the Emblem and Literature in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 3.

with the form, which is indicated in the book tradition of 16th-18th centuries. However, this interpretation only partially encapsulates the connotations that modern scholars attach to the notion of emblematicity. It denotes the genre formed in the 16th century and embowers the iconic-conventional principle and organizational design, the "inner form" of emblematics as a spiritual, philosophical, artistic and literary phenomenon, which is inspired by the nature of cognitive research and their arrangement.

The etymology of the word "emblem" is related to the Latin *emblēma*, Greek *ἔμβλημα*, which initially meant an "inserted part", a "plug-in element"; it was associated with the verb *emballo* (to cast into, throw in), establishing the effect of "procedurality", emphasizing "immersion" and "penetration" into a certain structure or phenomenon. Incorporating visual and verbal *significata*, the emblem was granted the status of a schematic image hinting at a semantic volume, which it partially reconstructs, "The emblem, so much as taken apart, is still a representation of the entire world, but one that immediately implies a long – perhaps infinite series of similar images" (Mikhailov, 1994, p. 361). A Baroque-period German intellectual Georg Philipp Harsdörffer considered the image, the shape of an emblem to be its body wherein the inscription was its soul. Whilst symbol is potentially ambiguous, versatile and its hues are contextually altered, an emblem is a holistic meaning generator and its components are meaning distinguishers (Grigorjeva, 2005, p. 47). A symbol can be a component of an emblem, the structure of which defines its semantic version. Initially, the source of a symbol is a sensory image, which is detached and isolated from the receptive current as a separate, discrete entity. Becoming the object of internal mental reproduction, this image turns into a sign and is fixed via the nomination. If the iconic and conventional elements in an emblem are separate structural components and feature external manifestation, in the symbol they belong to the inner form hidden in the internal iconic-conventional corrections. Therefore, an emblem externally enhances, details and elaborates the latent, opaque process of symbolization; it is a kind of a structured illustration of its functioning and procedurality, which have received modified originality and have been transformed into an individual genre.

It should be kept in mind that today it is still difficult to determine the total number of emblematic collections, especially those "structurally" and ideologically related to them, which popularized the emblematic semiosis. While tracing the transitivity of emblematic themes, motifs, iconic and verbal reductions, both Peter M. Daly and Mary Silcox (1990) back-to-back assert that there are more than two thousand emblematic books in European languages, which had a large number of compilations in turn. Underscoring the popularity of emblematics in the Baroque period, which granted it the status of "mass literature" (p. 331), Dmytro Chyzhevsky (2003b) notes the particular efficacy of figurative-verbal presentations in registering ethical and moral, philosophical and psychological axiologemes. The sign of "generality" justifies the universal validity of semiotic model; it is responsive to interpretation, providing cognitive pleasure within the realm of the iconic-conventional homogeneity intelligible to the public. In different environments, it exhibited its hermeneutic efficiency by modifying the interpretive depth to match the recipient's intellectual perspectives.

The popularity of emblematics is characteristic of the whole European context. The emblematic books have travelled across national boundaries, at times significantly

affecting local literary, artistic and even folklore traditions. Ukrainian scholar Dmytro Chyzhevsky (2003a, p. 100) points out that the picture replicas, which were enlarged copies of emblematic images, adorned the halls of a great many of cultural and educational institutions as well as the halls of the Ukrainian nobles' haciendas in the 17th-18th centuries, and the emblems from *Symbola et emblemata selecta* (1705) by Tesing and Kopiyevskiy, were rendered even on the stove tiles in the Ukrainian dwellings.

The effect of an "emblem" and associated with the emblematic mechanisms phenomena is primarily that they are created in conformity with the leading cognitive principle, function according to its rules, which reduce perception and its nomination, observation and its verbal description, rectification and analysis to a synergetic unity. A universal all-permeability of an "emblem", according to John Manning (2002), can only be understood in terms of broad cultural assumptions (p. 9), through a historical overview of the form, in the scope of rhetorical habits of mimesis and imitation, "traditional habits of thinking, writing and reading" (p. 10). The key contexts for interpreting an emblem for an English scholar are the "context of ways of thinking and ways of feeling, ways of conceptualizing what we are and what we might be" (p. 11). Such an approach is due to the fact that supervision of emblematic mechanisms, the structure of senses they produce, reveal the immensity horizons, antiquity, transience and connectivity of this phenomenon both as a semantic form, as a cognitive principle, and as an interpretive method.[3]

Having applied a variety of visually shaped constellations to reveal certain truths, an emblem "demonstrated" that any observation, simple or complex analytic structuring requires visual specification (optical "separation") and verbal clarification which provide conditions for a metaphysical generalization or psychoanalytic actions in general. Emblematic mechanisms and structures display their methodological relevance explicitly and implicitly in different authors' psycho-theories.

Sigmund Freud's Theory and Iconic-Conventional Correlation

In *Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (1916–1917) Sigmund Freud has defined the researcher's ability to self-reflection as a compulsory constant for employing his diagnostic method. In solving these problems Freud focuses on representation and signification phenomena apprehension, examines asynchronous semiotic practices as well as the role of iconic and verbal designations in the reflection of collective and individual psychosphere. He conducted this review in a broad multidisciplinary context, seeking confirmation and important indications for his generalizations in various scientific discourses.

It is in this projection that psychoanalysis is understood by its researchers. Michał Paweł Markowski (2006) emphasizes that psychoanalysis is a therapy, hermeneutics, metapsychology, anthropology, and the theory of creative process at the same time (p. 49). Volodymyr Vashchenko (2014) examines psychoanalysis in the context of

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[3] For details refer to: Soletskyy, O. (2018). *Discourse emblematic forms: From myth to postmodernism.* Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileia-NV.

historical "transits", noting the importance of archaeological discourse and "models of historical writing" for its formation (p. 25).

Freud's theory do has broad epistemological immersion, abounds in myth criticism, comparative religion, literary history, a distinct "artology"; thus, the outline of its provisions, in particular the concept of the unconscious, is polyvalent in various scientific-and-methodological systems (Petrushkevych, 2011). This is largely due to the psychoanalyst's focus on the study of different representative models of reality, monitoring of the structural-and-semiotic ordering of universal combinative paradigms. Despite the apparent importance of categories of sign, symbol, and image for his theory, they nonetheless become sense bearing, though not apart, albeit in specific models, which rest on the complementary meaning coordination of iconic and verbal signs. Jung held that to Freud "the unconscious is of an exclusively personal nature, although he was aware of its archaic and mythological thought-forms" (Jung, 1969, p. 3).

There are notable tendencies of psychoanalysis semiotic orientation apologetization in philological studies (Durkalevych, 2008). In the works of Edward Fiała and Danuta Danek, the significance of structural and semiotic aspects in Freud's theoretical and methodological practice as well as in interpretation strategy has been highlighted (Danek, 1997; Fiala, 1991). In either event, the scholars and the followers of Freud's doctrine assess the importance of both consciously and unconsciously manifested iconic and conventional *significata*, their syncretism and structural logic diversely. It was precisely what Jacques Lacan built his reasoning on when equating the teachings of Sigmund Freud with Ferdinand de Saussure's ones:

> *Entstellung*, translated as 'distortion' or 'transposition', is what Freud shows to be the general precondition for the functioning of the dream, and it is what I designated above, following Saussure, as the sliding of the signified under the signifier, which is always active in discourse (its action, let us note, is unconscious). (Lacan, 1989, p. 177)

Myth and Emblematic Structurology in Freud

The Eros and Thanatos images handling, the use of mythical tales about Oedipus and Electra, Prometheus, Narcissus, the dispute with Jung about the relevance of the Electra complex nomination,[4] and many others to specify the behavioral complexes

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[4] When describing the female variant of the Oedipus complex, Freud, in a number of ways, points to the importance of certain visual distinctions and recognition of one's own body, first and foremost anatomical and physiological ones, which become a vital part of the girl's inner self-conception formation being developed into a complex. The defined by Freud "envy of the penis", that allegedly causes a hostile attitude towards the mother who has created a corporal "inferiority",

denote the presence of "emblematic methodology" in the formation of psychoanalytic concepts and categories. He makes use of mythological images and plots as ancient schematic expressions that mark visually and symbolically certain atemporal algorithms of ad hoc motivated behavioral types. The French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist contributes interpretative comments to them that re-emphasize the archaic narratives in the terminological *instrumentatum* of psychoanalysis. As a matter of fact, their representation and classification, the practical manifestation is boiled down to emblematic reduction. In form and structure, such arrangements are similar to the methods of organizing sense bearing representations in the emblematic collections of the 16th –18th centuries, mythological tales in which generally become part of the visual and symbolic re-accentuation. In particular, one of the most recurring emblematic pattern depicting Narcissus (see Figure 1) transfixed by his own reflection in water has already been found in the Padova edition of Andrea Alciati's[5] *Emblemata* collection (Alciati, 1621, pp. 305–306), from whence it travels further through a number of other ones and appears in the Amsterdam edition of *Symbola et emblemata selecta* with a signature "Know thyself" (*Знай самъ себѧ*) (Tesing & Kopiyevskiy, 1705, p. 240).

Figure 1

Narcissus as featured in Alciati's Embelmata

underscores the significance of visual effects for the construction of his psychoanalytic category.

[5] A Latin caption has been added to the image *Quod nimium tua forma tibi, Narcisse, placebat,/ In florem, et noti est versa stuporis olus./ Ingenii est marcor, cladesque [philautia], doctos/ Quae pessum plures datque, deditque viros:/ Qui veterum abiecta methodo, nova dogmata quaerunt,/ Nilque suas praeter tradere phantasias* ("Because your figure pleased you too much, Narcissus, it was changed into a flower, a plant of known senselessness. Self-love is the withering and destruction of natural power which brings and has brought ruin to many learned men, who having thrown away the method of the ancients seek new doctrines and pass on nothing but their own fantasies").

In different works, among them *Leonardo da Vinci, A Memory of His Childhood* (1910), *Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia* (1911), *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics* (1913), *On Narcissism: An Introduction* (1914), Sigmund Freud employs the term "narcissism". In the author's interpretation this nomination is implicitly tied to mythological visualization, it does also designates the individual who "unifies his sexual instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own body, as his love-object" (Freud, 1955, p. 2430) or he defines 'narcissism' as "the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated" (Freud, 2012, p. 3). Such interpretations are echoed by the mythological treatment of the Narcissus image and refer to the culminating plot scene, which becomes an additional visualization, a clear illustration of bodily self-admiration, and hence a conventional "etymological" foundation for affirming the psychoanalytic category significance.

But then again, his central psychoanalytic notions Freud reveals in a similar way and in a similar structural form, i.e. the main categories of his theory he manifests by focusing on the mythological plot situation which acquires a modification interpretation. From an extensive Theban cycle of tales about Oedipus, the Austrian neurologist and psychotherapist picks out the pivotal storyline trope – that of the patricide – while defying the plot matrix of the myth *in favorem* his theory. Anecdotal, mythological and contextual justification of this murder "fortuitousness" Freud rejects positing that, "The sense of guilt in the case of taboos is not in the least diminished if the violation occurs unwittingly […] the guilt of Oedipus was not palliated by the fact that he incurred it without his knowledge and even against his intention" (Freud, 2001, p. 79).

Freud was searching for the deployment history of primitive archetypical behavioral stereotypes in mythologic story lines; hence, he considered them all as symbolic presentations encoding impressions and representations in an illustrative and visual form that appear from the depths of the unconscious and must have application for the identification of latent psychological conflicts of man of today. In the same way he treats "synthesizing" of religious senses claiming that, "The truths contained in religious doctrines are after all so distorted and systematically disguised that the mass of humanity cannot recognize them as truth" (Freud, 2009, p. 44). In order to decode the truths that have been covered with millennial layers of senses, one "must learn the grammar of the symbols" the key to which, in the view of Joseph Campbell, is psychoanalysis (Campbell, 2004, p. xxi).

Interpretations of ancient stories are often narrowed down by the originator of psychoanalysis; he distinguishes particular situations as emblematic expressions that, in conjunction with verbal exegeses, need to be decoded, unclothed. The development of psychoanalytic conceptions based on them also involves reconciling the ancient visual representations and modern verbal markers on the model of an "emblem".

Even in the ancient Greek reception the myth of Oedipus, according to Freud, served a warning function and substantiated an essential moral and ethical behavioral stereotype, "while the poet, as he unravels the past, brings to light the guilt of Oedipus, he is at the same time compelling us to recognize our own inner minds, in

which those same impulses, though suppressed, are still to be found" (Freud, 2010, p. 280). The scholar is convinced that the plot of the myth is an oneiric material, as evidenced by the open clarifications found in the text of Sophocles' tragedy:

> There is an unmistakable indication in the text of Sophocles' tragedy itself that the legend of Oedipus sprang from some primaeval dream-material which had as its content the distressing disturbance of a child's relation to his parents owing to the first stirrings of sexuality. (Freud, 2010, p. 281)

Thus, the concept content of "Oedipus complex" is defined via the mutual reconciliation of the ancient mythological situation and its contemporary verbal accentuation that by its representativeness is close to the arrangement of senses in the European emblematic collections of the 16th-18th centuries, most of which were focused on noting the problems of morality and ethics. On the whole, they cataloged a set of household or esoteric rules (norms, cautions) of conduct in the vortex of temptations and emotional stresses. Its employment and application is effected by symbolic identification involving the decoding of the emblematic equation enclosed in the name.

A similar pattern Freud makes use of to interpret the Prometheus myth. By dividing it into parts, he focuses on separate plot details enabling him to relate symbolic representations to their possible meanings. The legend of Prometheus as well as fire myths, in Freud's opinion, is tied to the fact that "primitive peoples must have regarded fire as something analogous to erotic passion – as we would say, a symbol of the libido. The warmth irradiating from a fire provokes the same sensation as that which accompanies sexual excitement" (Freud, 1932, p. 213). Such conclusions can be drawn if one correctly "reads" the "descriptive" details of the myth. In particular, a bird bites the liver of the chained Prometheus on a daily basis. It is no coincidence that liver is chosen for the object of punishment, because this anatomical organ was the seat of desires and passions in the mind of a primeval man. Providing fire to mankind Freud equals with a rejection of passion, which is its peculiar kind of interchange. Hence, the punishment of Prometheus, summarizes Freud, is an undisguisedly expressed "resentment felt by instinct-ridden humanity toward the culture-hero" (Freud, 1932, p. 212). The father of psychoanalysis focuses then on this composition detailing, as if breaking it down and explaining the symbolic micro-images of the emblematic drawing, "since the liver is the seat of passion, it must have the same symbolic meaning as fire, and that its daily consumption and renewal is a fitting description of libidinal desires, which, sated for the day, reappear on the morrow" (Freud, 1932, p. 213).

To unfold complex mental processes, the Austrian scholar employs an emblematic scheme as the method of scanning human consciousness. Interpretation of "false actions", analysis of dreams, and the complexes dependency on childhood neuroses Freud considers in the correlation of visual pictorial representations (experienced emotional diseases that are fixed and regressed in memory in the form of symbolic figurative markers) with embedded emotional stereotypes that are also displayed by means of a word.

In the essay *A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession* (1916) Sigmund Freud covers a case from his practice that reinforced the significance of unconscious mental activity manifestation not only in the form of compulsive ideas that have been outerly mediated by a word but also in syncretic combination with accompanying pictures or images. One of his patients established a strong link between obsessive word and its compulsive figurative representation, when he was seeing his father, "The word was '*Vaterarsch*' ['father-arse']; the accompanying image presented his father as the naked lower part of a body, provided with arms and legs, but without the head or upper part" (Freud, 1997, p. 180). Freud speculates, the word '*Vaterarsch*' stands for ironic alteration of the honorary title '*Patriarch*', whereas its rendering is a notorious and old-established grotesque scheme in which the image of a person is substituted for the image representation in the form of a body part or an organ with a view to humiliating, belittling the social status of that person. In this manner there were revealed the hidden complexes of fear and respect for the father that have been formed as ironic substitutability for respect / disrespect, honor / derisiveness, head / buttock (arse).

To specify the diagnosis, the Austrian neurologist and psychotherapist tries to unravel this visual and verbal symptomatic manifestation on the model of the emblem as a complementary and syncretic "message" of the language of the unconscious. Tentatively speaking, in order to identify deep inner conflicts, experiences and complexes, he resorts to "assembling" verbal symptomatic markers that appear under the influence of the "stimulating substance" and the accompanying visual associations into a single structure. He reads this unity as a universal model of the language of the unconscious manifestation, unimitated variant of the human psyche functioning made of chaotic (often caused by previous life experiences) internal figurative-imaginary appearances and verbal *significata* attached to them. Freud exploits mythological analogies and contexts that have similar presentableness and are the repository of encoded psycho-emotional reactions and states in order to interpret them.

The scholar pores over the comparison of his patient's visual associations with similar graphic presentations in different cultural contexts with an eye to treat the aforementioned case. At first, he makes mention of the French caricatures and then – the Greek legend of Demeter, who while seeking for her daughter, got to Disavla and his wife Baubo. The latter, willing to amuse the ill-fated Demeter, lifted suddenly up her clothes and exposed her ventral region, which bears the contours resembling a human face. The explanation of this "magic ceremony", according to Freud, is found in the work *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions* (1912) by the Jewish historian Salomon Reinach. There is made reference in it to the discovery of Baubo's terra-cotta images during the excavation at Priene of Asia Minor showing "the body of a woman without a head or chest and with a face drawn on the abdomen: the lifted dress frames this face like a crown of hair" (Freud, 1997, p. 181). The description is followed by the very picture (see Figure 2). He considers the image to be a part of the "magic" ceremony, but unfortunately he does not go on further with the analysis as well as does not substantiate relation to a similar image-bearing representation of his patient. He just focuses on the single-type expressiveness of modern neurosis and ancient mytho-image. Obviously, both metonymical constructions are an exhibition of unconscious transfer and manifestation of emotional experience in symbolic form, which displays emotional and mental notions and senses formed under the influence of specific situations. Since the language of the unconscious has not got some definite

verbal configuration and it functions as a complex system of syncretic visual and semiotic contractions of collective and individual memory, these similarities seem quite reasonable. At the same time they are an expression of the protective symbolic manifestation of inner conflicts provoked by various (intrinsically contradictory) interpretations of one event or person, causing resonant experiences in the mind of the subject. It might be well to point out that Freud's incomplete comparisons and analogies have given impetus to deeper diachronic trailing and commentary by Larissa Bonfante. She explicates Freud's conceptions resorting to a more thorough analysis of similar iconizations ranging from Sumerian-Akkadian mythology to political cartoons of the twentieth century (the image of King Edward VII with a face on the buttocks) (Bonfante, 2008). It appears to her, such visual symbolizations denote unconscious reactions that are associated with complex and ambivalent (variable) emotional processes of "sexual boundaries" and bodily taboos experiences. This semantics becomes an effective contrast to the evaluation of various phenomena and processes in the projection of fertility (fecundity, development, enrichment) and decay (degradation, destruction, castration). One way or another, their expression rests on the emblematic matrix.

Figure 2

Baubo's terra-cotta image as retrieved from Freud's *A Mythological Parallel to a Visual Obsession*

One may state that Freud modifies the traditional conception of art and literature to the focus of psychoanalytic theory of personality by considering personal experiences as emblematic forms read with the aid of various cultural similarities, contexts and mythical schemes. To explain the mental processes, he concentrates upon the interpretation of symbolic associations which makes it possible for him to create generalizations about certain banality and expressive uniformity of human emotions; moreover, emblematic structuring do plays its part here. Hence, comparison of emblematic books' depictive art traditions and Freudian analogies is well-weighed, especially of mutilation as castration, and this is what Ellen Spolsky points up while studying cognitive and cultural fictive contrasts (Spolsky, 2015, p. 219).

Dream Interpretation and Emblematic Matrices

Extremely significant here is his theory and practice of dreams interpretation, which he considers as one of the forms of psychoanalytic diagnosis. As Sonu Shamdasani posits:

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, one sees the confluence of the associative and the symbolic traditions. As the dream was made up from the association of given elements, it followed that the practice of soliciting associations would eventually lead back to the basic elements of the dream. The interpretation reversed the process of dream formation. (Shamdasani, 2003, p.131)

In common with the symptoms of some neurotic disorders, Freud contends the dreams do have meaning (Freud, 1920, p. 63). From the stream of oneiric images he picks out individual visualizations and tries to identify the causes of neuroses and life anxieties by way of interpreting them. So, to explicate them, Freud employs two contexts – the context of personal life and the context of culture. The isolated visual images or dream scenes require concretizing, i.e. compulsory referencing to a word, since "interpretation means finding a hidden meaning" (Freud, 1920, p. 66). Difficulties that occur during the dreams retrieval are due to the fact that "all the dream experiences are predominantly pictures […] we have to transpose these pictures into words" (Freud, 1920, p. 69). Nonetheless, the reproduction of dream images, their verbal description is merely an arbitrary construction of an "emblem", which must be reduced and "read" as a unity that harmonizes the meaning of the visual dreaming polyimage and verbal comments, "The dream does not simply reproduce the stimulus, but it elaborates it, it plays upon it, places it in a sequence of relationships, replaces it with something else" (Freud, 1920, p. 74). The founder of psychoanalysis is aware of the impossibility to study the dreams by precise methods; hence, he mentions he follows the ancient exegetes. In dreams, we experience something in visual images. This language of the subconscious proclaims the symbolic *articulata* important for our emotional existence which is the result of internal visual auto-communication. Therefore, the establishment of the true meaning of dreams is possible via the interpretation of individual visual impressions employing conventional verbal notation. Freud reveals individual by means of general, suggesting that personal experiences, neuroses, dreams are heavily dependent on social contact. The efficiency of dreams emblematic structuring and interpretation method lies in that it enables one to reconcile individual and visual connotations, translate the figuratively chaotic and potentially polysemantic language of the unconscious into specific historical and cultural *significata*. Encouraging his patients to recall vivid (climactic) images from their dreams and aligning them with the latest life emotions, he conventionally applies verbal signatures to oneiric visions. A compound developed in this way becomes a psychoanalytic work premised on the artistic convergence of individually iconic (language of organism, body) and verbally conventional (language of society) on a compositional level. Individualized visual impressions that have figurative notional logic are semanticized and reduced by way of verbalization. Here again, in fact, surfaces the problem of conformity and coherence of intra-figurative notions and their verbal markers, generalizations, mental impressions and words.

Freud emphasizes that his "dream technique is very simple" (Freud, 1920, p. 82). He is convinced that the person who saw a dream knows a thing or two about it but is unable to decipher, to define, to specify and to reveal it. To interpret oneiric images, the father of psychoanalysis exploits any first explanation that crosses the patient's

mind when he focuses on initial idea. It should be considered a free verbalized association. Thus, in consistency between an image and a dream, these verbal markers determine important internal resonators and denote (materialize) emotional and psychological experiences. The psychoanalyst underscores that such verbal comments may be too distant and seemingly unrelated to the oneiric vision. They are a latent manifestation of affective processes, interests and complexes from the depths of the unconscious. A conventional formation of an emblematic amalgam – an oneiric vision and a free verbal association – allows one to identify and organize an iconic-conventional form that symbolically "substitutes" ("replaces") for true emotional experiences. By way of psychoanalytic interpretation through interconsistency and when projecting "substitutions" on the emotional and cognitive context of a person's life, his inner conflicts are determined. Visual accommodations of individual intentions with generalized signification, explication of abstractivized visions through linguistic specification play heavily here. Properly speaking, the language serves as a means of simplification or conventional accentuation of complex oneiric images. It is the emblematic structure that authorizes us to organize such an interpretation procedure, since ideas and conceptions that emerge in dreams have explicit figurative markers and latent meaning behind free verbalized associations. We should resort to several Freud's interpretations in exemplification of the abovementioned issue.

One of his patients was dreaming that he "c*limbs a mountain from the top of which he has an extraordinarily distant view*" (Freud, 1920, p. 97). While analyzing these quasi-images (after all, he does not recall his own ascent of a mountain), the patient notes that an acquaintance of his is publishing a "*Rundschau*" where the relations with distant countries have been comprehended. Freud claims, "The latent dream thought is therefore in this case an identification of the dreamer with the "*Rundschauer*" (Freud, 1920, p. 97). The researcher emphasizes that there is a particular type of relationship between the explicit and hidden elements of dream vision, synergism of an image and a word in clarifying the complex processes of the unconscious. In this format, it is possible to isolate and analyze individual experiences from an infinite stream of consciousness, whereof the representatives of the phenomenological school (Edmund Husserl, Roman Ingarden) will write in greater detail later. We concurrently see how an old emblematic principle becomes the basis of the psychoanalytic methodology functionality, a modified principle of diagnosing consciousness.

Emblematic Mechanisms and Behavioral Stereotypes

It can be observed the way Sigmund Freud extrapolates emblematic mechanisms both to short-lived, relatively "fresh" psycho-emotional contexts and long-term stereotypes fundamental for behavioral existence. In *Leonardo da Vinci, a Memory of His Childhood* (1910) he turns to the interpretation of the Italian artist's childhood fantasy which resonated powerfully throughout his entire life, since it was a sole significant memory he was recalling in his scientific notebooks:

It seems that I was always destined to be so deeply concerned with vultures; for I

recall as one of my very earliest memories that while I was in my cradle a vulture

came down to me, and opened my mouth with its tail, and struck me many times

with its tail against my lips. (Freud, 1999, p. 29)

In Freud's view, this sort of memoir is in fact the fantasy of the Florentine artist, which he weaved and transferred to his childhood. In this visualization, valuable evidence of spiritual development important features, psychological makeup, character and outlook of the artist is covered. Freud reveals its sense bearing implications through the use of symbolic interpretation, singling out distinct signs and pointing to their semantics in different mythological and cultural contexts. "A tail, '*coda*', is one of the most familiar symbols and substitutive expressions for the male organ" (Freud, 1999, p. 33), among other things, is apparently suggestive of da Vinci's ticklish psycho-somatic self-determination, which may have influenced over the Italian painter's particular aesthetic axiology. At the same time, this visualization has also got another symbolic reading associated with the reminiscence of sucking the mother's breasts, which is presented in the dream in the form of a vulture. This remote analogy, in Freud's judgment, emerges from the sacred hieroglyphs of the ancient Egyptians, which pictographically denoted a mother in the form of a vulture, and the goddess of maternity was represented "as having a vulture's head, or else several heads, of which at least one was a vulture's" (Freud, 1999, p. 35). The name of the goddess was *Mut* in tune to the German *Mutter* (mother). Putting forward his explanations, Freud recalls the interpretation of Egyptian hieroglyphs done by Horapollo. In his *Hieroglyphica* discovered in 1419 on the island of Andros, there's an individual chapter giving account of vulture. Among them there is a separate connotation of "motherhood", for in the minds of the ancient Egyptians these species seem to have no sex division, only the monotype "hen" (female bird) – mother. Procreation is done when "birds pause in mid-flight, open their vagina and are impregnated by the wind" (Freud, 1999, p. 36).

Thus, employing Horapollo's interpretations of Egyptian ideography as well as similar parities in mythological contexts, Sigmund Freud construes da Vinci's fantasy. In European scientific community, *Hieroglyphica* is considered to be the book that has led to large-scale fervor for emblematics and was the source of imitation for many emblematic collections. Its peak of popularity coincides with the life of Leonardo da Vinci, so he was obviously familiar with its content. Freud assumes that it was from this book that the image of a vulture (chiefly, its iconic-conventional significativity) was adapted as a neuro-image and incorporated into the internal emotional visual expressions of the Italian artist. For the scholar, the ancient mythological *significata* form and semanticize the oneiric projection of Leonardo da Vinci. The Austrian psychotherapist "embeds" the artist's dream into the format of a psychoanalytic emblem the elucidation of which provides the way of denoting the internal stereotypical behavioral reflexes according to the old schemes formed under the weight of celebrated contemporary biographical clashes. So the fantasy-vision of Leonardo centers on the fact that he spent the first years of his life with his mother. Being deprived of male parental love, he has started to look for the answers from a young age and to study serious issues that have been reduced to a large extent in visual cultural *significata*. In estimation of Freud, all this affected the author of *La Gioconda* epicene focus after all. For not to delve into the detailed reconstruction of extensive and free interpretive generalizations of the analyst we are to note that emblematic mechanism and scheme bear an enormous weight for his method.

However, Freud's own method did not help him to unravel his own phobias and intravisional imaginary forewarnings. In his memoirs Carl Gustav Jung (1989) recalls conversations with his colleague several times in which the Austrian physician and founder of modern psychoanalysis described his own emotional states and the accompanying peculiar imagery, for instance, the menace of "black tide of mud" (p. 152) or, "My conversation with Freud had shown me that he feared that the numinous light of his sexual insights might be extinguished by a "black tide of mud" (Jung, 1989, p. 154). Freud asked Jung to promise he would never abandon the sexual theory from which they would have to make a dogma in turn, an unshakable bulwark against "the black tide" (Jung, 1989, p. 150). From Jung's perspective, this quite archetypal situation of fight between darkness and light arose in the wake of the false adoration of "sexuality" phenomena and the impossibility to realize and to confess to this falsehood by oneself. "Proneness to conflict" and the growth of this visualization into a complex may otherwise be explained by the structurally incomplete "emblematic" ascertaining, which is due to "mechanisms of repression". The haunting inner imagery ("black tide of mud") signaled the need for verbal interpretation, some sort of "notifications" that the Austrian psychotherapist gave so often regarding the iconic images of culture and his patients, and did not dare to apply to him. The Swiss psychologist was convinced that the unconscious signaled the falsity of inferences and unreasonable subordination to Eros via symbolic image which Freud tried to canonize, endowing it with the status of "religious" dogma.

Individual visual and verbal manifestations of human experiences Freud construes in a broad cultural and semiotic context by setting up various analogs and by establishing certain expressive patterns of conscious and unconscious ascertaining. As a psychoanalytic practitioner, he obviously felt latently (or perhaps searched for) some emotional-behavioral algorithmicity, tautologicality and their expressive approximation respectively. In any event, there is clearly outlined the relevance of different types of visual and verbal signification connectivity in Freud's methodology.

Carl Gustav Jung and "Emblematic" Hermetic Art

As a target of research, Carl Gustav Jung picks out symbolic notations that are a denotative space for expressing internal mental receptions and historic constellations of cultural axiology for him. He traces "harmonizing of conscious and unconscious data" in symbols that establish conscious states and perform "transcendent function" (Jung, 1969, p. 289). The production of symbols, according to Jung, "has the closest affinities with alchemical ideas, and especially with the conceptions of the "uniting symbol" (Jung, 1969, p. 289). At the same time, the symbols in his conception have got an archetypal explication, since they are treated as "images of unconscious contents" that correlate "genetically fixed primordial images and socio-cultural ideas that are the property of "the collective unconscious" (Shelestiuk, 1997, p. 135). Already in this definition, which focuses on the affirmation of archetypal entities linguistic nature, we see the intention to shackle the concepts of image (iconic) and socio-cultural idea (conventional) in a unique combination that syncretically denotes sense bearing unity.

Such a format of iconic-conventional interdetermination is ever so often a significative space in Jung, the decoding of which may allow to discern complex mental reflections. Despite the fact that he considers a symbol to be the standard unit

of the cognitive-cultural experience "conservation", the definition of its functional semantics is implemented in emblematic models. This "emblematic-cognitive" form is not only a method of determining the initial images-ideas of the unconscious, the "mythological figures" of mental conflicts, standard experience of generations, but also the principle of justification and expression of his theory conceptual foundation. To a certain extent, it is an element of the Swiss psychiatrist's scientific thinking style and language. Sonu Shamdasani underscores:

> Jung was dealing with broad issues concerning the conditions of possibility of psychology and the human sciences, upon which many figures in other disciplines were also engaged. His psychology was so deeply intertwined with these networks, that it simply cannot be understood in isolation. (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 27)

The Meanings and their Visual Correlations

Jung frequently supplements his important reflective generalizations with iconic visual aids, performing the function of additional meaning visualization. In particular, describing the incongruity of the psyche, Jung underscores:

> Consciousness should defend its reason and protect itself, and the chaotic life of the unconscious should be given the chance of having its way too – as much of it as we can stand. This means open conflict and open collaboration at once. That, evidently, is the way human life should be. It is the old game of hammer and anvil: between them the patient iron is forged into an indestructible whole, an "individual." (Jung, 1969, p. 288)

The emblematic schemes were the form that allowed asserting the fundamental metaphysical notions most effectively, where a particular visual experience became the basis for the expression of abstract senses. Making his understanding of the process of "life" more evocative and distinctive one, Jung underlined that this phenomenon has always seemed to him like a plant that fed on its own rootstock, "Yet I have never lost a sense of something that lives and endures underneath the eternal flux. What we see is the blossom, which passes. The rhizome remains" (Jung, 1989, p. 4).

Visual meanings, visible images of the material world have largely determined his theory development. From them, he brought out a transitive, interconnected continuity and awareness unity of space and chaos, man and nature. Marking out the plants as a key demonstrativeness of the eidos of life, Jung posited that "They expressed not only the beauty but also the thoughts of God's world, with no intent of their own and without deviation" (Jung, 1989, p. 67). However, they were only a link between the

same forms of assertion of meanings and associative sense-clusters. Therefore, he turns from showing the receptive significance of the images of the "plants" to the "trees", "Trees in particular were mysterious and seemed to me direct embodiments of the incomprehensible meaning of life. For that reason the woods were the place where I felt closest to its deepest meaning and to its awe-inspiring workings" (Jung, 1989, pp. 67–68). However, these sublime figurative sense incentives were only the invariant of a particular model manifestation. Into the paradigm of "plant-wood" series, profuse to visually connote and to state correspondingly metaphysical and psychoanalytic meanings, Carl Gustav Jung also introduces the image of "cathedral". The experience of fear and grandeur of the world created by the Almighty:

> was reinforced when I became acquainted with Gothic cathedrals. But there the infinity of the cosmos, the chaos of meaning and meaninglessness, of impersonal purpose and mechanical law, were wrapped in stone. This contained and at the same time *was* the bottomless mystery of being, the embodiment of spirit. (Jung, 1989, p. 68)

Contemplation of various natural and human creations, the definition of their existential purposes is a source for more profound philosophical generalizations about the world Will, the Creator, the Spirit, the "universe model as a fundamental concept" (Svirepo, 2004, p. 36). Ultimately, one may find a lot of such examples in the texts of the cultural studies scholar. His interpretations are always aimed at the convergence of various types of visual manifestations (in a dream, fantasy, neurotic fantasy, symbol) and their verbalized explications. His phrasing is methodologically and stylistically very similar to the well-known sense-expressive practices that date back to myth.

Jung repeatedly stressed that in the process of developing his theory he sought to find an unbroken tradition, a logical and semantic "line" combining the modern psychology of the unconscious and the primitive natural philosophical practices:

> As far as I could see, the tradition that might have connected Gnosis with the present seemed to have been severed, and for a long time it proved impossible to find any bridge that led from Gnosticism – or neo-Platonism – to the contemporary world. But when I began to understand alchemy I realized that it represented the historical link with Gnosticism, and that a continuity therefore existed between past and present. (Jung, 1989, p. 201)

It was medieval alchemy that made it possible to determine a special continuity that was formed due to the presence of a similar method of estimating and analyzing the nature of the unconscious. The subject for such generalizations was definit symbols;

their sense conformity and equivalence was substantiated by emblematic schemes. We may state that the scholar was looking for a related "oculographic" model (Gorobets, Ognivov, Kovalev, 2014), "ideological constant", which reflected a particular type of *Weltanschauung* and mental outlook in a symbolical form.

The categories considered by Jung can only be emblematically distinguished and explained. They are usually complex, abstract metaphysical and psychic phenomena (life, death, self, soul, and individuation), the meaning of which is difficult to reduce verbally solely, especially when they are considered diachronically, have long-standing attempts of semantic clarifications. In Gnosticism, in particular, the Supreme Deity, according to Jung, bestowed on people "the *krater* (mixing vessel), the vessel of spiritual transformation" (Jung, 1989, p. 201). This "female principle" has been disregarded by the "patriarchal" Sigmund Freud; it was continuously ignored by the Catholic Church, whereas the Protestants and the Jews only put God the Father at the center of their religion. The "*krater*" as a "female" symbol of the alchemists is an object wherein the rebirth and transformation of energy took place at once, resting on ancient imitative rituals and partaking of a pointedly mediated nature. Its importance is formed through visual associativeness (bowl–womb), via the symbolic transfer of pictorial manipulations to the modification of the transfiguration object. Jung exploits this ancient visualization to justify his psychoanalytic categories, "Through the study of these collective transformation processes and through understanding of alchemical symbolism I arrived at the central concept of my psychology: the process of individuation" (Jung, 1989, p. 209). Ancient iconic *significata* are often the key elements in outlining the fundamental categories that combine religious anxieties, contemplation and thought.

Carl Gustav Jung, as we can see, was exceptionally in sympathy with symbolic signification, sought out conceptual semantic clarifications behind iconically reduced representations, delved into various traditions. In his writings *A Study in the Process of Individuation* (1933), *The Phenomenology of Spirit in Fairytales* (1945), *Concerning Mandala Symbolism* (1950), *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (1963) the Swiss psychologist pointed to diverse attempts at the interpretation of isolated signs in religious, mythological, folkloric, mystical contexts. The scholar intended to discover and associate disparate significative forms as expressive uniformities in Buddhism, Christianity, alchemy, ritual ceremonies, dreams, phobias, contemporary neuroses, and to decode the ambiguous language of sacred and unconscious by means of comparative analogies. Time and again, such interpretations are reminiscent of broad-based emphasizing of visual and verbal interaction issue, the definition of what stands "behind" and "between" them via "reproduction of quintessential motifs and characteristic images of mythology" (Romek, 1997, p. 6).

Jung's Bibliographic Sources and the Tradition of Iconic-Conventional Signification

Among various bibliographic sources used by Jung one may single out a whole text corpus that represent the tradition of iconic-conventional signification, the role of visual and verbal signs in meaning formation of devotional and cultural systems. The priority here is assigned to the works on the functional nature of ancient Egyptian ideographic writing, symbolic implications of myths, medieval allegorism and

symbolism, baroque emblematicity, visual determination of meanings in Buddhism (Mandala), Judaism (Kabala), etc.

A survey of Jung's bibliographic quotations and citations confirms his profound interest in iconic-conventional signification in different systems with regard to their purport, expressions and temporal outlines. For instance, the Swiss psychiatrist and psychologist quoted the study of the Italian naturalist Ulisse Aldrovandi on dendrology *Dendrologiae naturalis scilicet arborum historiae libri duo sylua glandaria, acinosumq* (Bologna, 1667). The emblematic patterns of this book, wherein the pictures of plants and trees and their structural components were part of the scientific presentation of botany essentials in relation to metaphysical alchemy, have led Jung to philosophical generalizations about cosmic synergy. Having suggested the notion of anima (Jung, 1969), the founder of analytical psychology rested on Aldrovandi's account of the concept, for his lengthy chapter *Anima et eius facultates* starts with indicating the relevance of the tree crowns unique forms for conveying the metaphysical essence of a soul (Aldrovandi, 1667, p. 146).

Jung repeatedly referred to the collection of Latin alchemical works *Artis auriferae* (1593), a collection of symbolic mysticism and emblematic constructivism in search of secret formulas for the transformation of substances. He also gave due consideration to the studies dealing with Egyptian symbolics, in particular, *De symbolica Aegyptiorum sapientia* (1654) by the French Jesuit Nicolas Caussin. There are frequent references to esoteric texts which, owing to distinctive practice of symbolic visualization, demonstrate the relevance of such forms in the design of hidden meanings. Jung alluded, *inter alia*, to *Mutus liber, in quo tamen tota philosophia hermetica, figuris hieroglyphicis depingitur, ter optimo maximo Deo misericordi consecratus, solisque filiis artis dedicatus / authore cuius nomen est Altus* (1677) when he was describing the archetypes of the collective unconscious and the notion of anima; this is embodied iconically in the images of sirens, melusinas, hamadryads, undine, Erlking's daughter, lamiae, succubi, who bewitch young men and suck their lives out: "The nixie is an even more instinctive version of a magical feminine being whom I call the *anima*" (Jung, 1969, p. 25). These figures are long-standing projections of illicit (dangerous) sensuous states, fantasies and mental contents that complicate life or open new stretches of metaphysic. On one of the pictures in *Mutus liber...* a subject of conversion fishes and hooks a mermaid whereas his dualistic opponent nets birds. In general reception, the entire book features a large number of connotations; it particularly demonstrates significance of "balanced partnership of masculine and feminine energies" (Warlick, 1998, p. 46) in major alchemic processes. Jung relates this visualization to the natural archetypal representation of anima, which bears its gender identity:

> Either sex is inhabited by the opposite sex up to a point, for, biologically speaking,
>
> it is simply the greater number of masculine genes that tips the scales in favour of
>
> masculinity. The smaller number of feminine genes seems to form a feminine
>
> character, which usually remains unconscious because of its subordinate position.
>
> (Jung, 1969, pp. 27–28)

Supplementary visual undertones enabled Jung to determine hidden meanings in the traditional nomination, to resort to a kind of re-accentuation of senses or the discovery of new semantic planes that should manage and propel its explanation. The scholar tried to apply new verbal expressiveness to ancient visualizations, patterned schemes that often become the fundamental categorical amalgam of his theory.

Similar to Freud, the Swiss scholar mentions Horapollo's *Hieroglyphica* time and again, most notably the reason for designating mother goddess as vulture, which he subsequently accommodates to the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary (Jung, 1969, p. 46). Horapollo's descriptions of mother-vulture impregnation via the wind Jung binds with approximation of wind to spirit. This influential sacral constant is present also in Christianity, where it has the format updated for a new iconic (national, mental) horizon. What counts is that while rendering it Jung refers to medieval images among which he singles out the picture-description depicting the fructification of Mary "with a tube or hose-pipe coming down from the throne of God and passing into her body, and we can see the dove or the Christ-child flying down it. The dove represents the fructifying agent, the wind of the Holy Ghost" (Jung, 1969, p. 52). If in the Egyptian mythology the conception of the mother goddess is described by the image of the wind, then the Virgin Birth of Christ in Christianity is accompanied by the descent of the Holy Spirit embodied in the image of the pigeon. In these symbolic representations of Immaculate Conception recurring in different temporal and religious systems, the Swiss psychoanalyst acknowledged "a most important psychological fact" (Jung, 1976, p. 271) which does not admit rationalization, and is a true one only in this form.

One of such cases is documented in *Approaching the Unconscious* (1964); Carl G. Jung emphasizes that many scientific discoveries have been implemented owing to symbolic prompting performed by the subconscious while a person was asleep. The German chemist August Kekulé von Stradonitz, researching into the molecular structure of benzene, dreamed of a snake with its tail in its mouth. The founder of analytical psychology considered this oneiric vision, which has a ramified presentation in various mythologies, as a hint that the structure of benzene is a similar one – the six carbon atoms are bonded into a hexagonal ring (Jung, 1964, p. 38). The structural form of the ancient symbol, one of the meanings of which was to convey the idea of "eternity", "immutability" via the image of corporal circularity of a creeper (see Figure 3), defined a schematic representation of the organic chemical compound, the properties of which are revealed by means of emblematic reduction.[6]

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[6] A while later Stanislav Grof will develop the parallels between the symbolic language of consciousness and the scientific theories denoted by Jung at the end of his life. With the aid of holographic explanations, he exemplifies the idea of the physicist David Bohm that energy, light and matter consist of interference patterns that carry information about all the other, "Thus, each part of energy and matter represents a microcosm that enfolds the whole" (Grof, 1992, p. 10). Due to the analogy between the works of David Bohm and the neurophysiologist Karl H. Pribram, cell biologist Rupert Sheldrake and many others, Grof establishes the great dependence of "the problem of form in nature" and the scientific maxims, the connection of the primitive symbolic signification, which distinguish and copy certain naturalistic images, and subsequent scientific

Figure 3

A Representation of the Benzene Molecule by Kekulé von Stradonitz as exemplified in Jung's Approaching the Unconscious

All systems of alchemical transformations, the attempts of gold alloy, the philosophical stone, universal solvents, and elixirs relied on the organic and spiritual identity of macrocosm and microcosm, with a heavy dependence of visual similarities. The visual potential of denotatum senses and the symbolic interconversion of organic matter are always at the forefront of alchemical meaning-making. Therefore, when denoting the meaning of the concept archetype, Jung refers to Hermes Trismegistus's *Tractatus aureus* (1610), namely, "As God [contains] all the treasure of his godhead ... hidden in himself as in an archetype [in se tanquam archetypo absconditum] ... in like manner Saturn carries the similitudes of metallic bodies hiddenly in himself" (Jung, 1969, p. 4). The Swiss psychologist defines his idea of "archetype" in line with the one proposed by the French diplomat, cryptographer, and alchemist Blaise de Vigenère, who believed "the world is "ad archetypi sui similitudinem factus" (made after the likeness of its archetype) and is therefore called the "magnus homo" (Jung, 1969, p. 4).

Emblematic Reduction and Cultural Experience

Almost all works by the founder of analytical psychology are replete with illustrations, various issue-based pictures, graphic diagrams or verbal descriptions of explicit rendering. These are often the iconographic images that determine the course of the interpretative statements of the scholar, and significant reflective generalizations he makes more distinctive by the use of visualizations. From this perspective, suffice it to mention his speculations on the archetypes of the collective unconscious, which he has always tried to render concrete with the aid of visualizations:

I can best illustrate my meaning by taking as an example the Swiss mystic and

hermit, Brother Nicholas of Flüe, who has recently been canonized. Probably his

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theories, since they are the result of abstraction and illusion of separation from the Whole. In this context, according to Czech psychiatrist, it is of particular interest to study Jung's synchronicity phenomena, which prove that psychological events often form patterns of coincidences with various aspects of universally acknowledged reality on personal level, thereby pointing up the close connection between the material and the mental world (Grof, 1992).

most important religious experience was the so-called Trinity Vision, which

preoccupied him to such an extent that he painted it, or had it painted, on the wall

of his cell. The painting is still preserved in the parish church at Sachseln. It is a

mandala divided into six parts, and in the centre is the crowned countenance of

God. (Jung, 1969, pp. 8–9)

For many years he has been trying to fathom the crux of his vision and "to get his original experience into a form he could understand" (Ibid.). Jung (1969) refers to this process as "elaboration of the symbol", which can be expounded as a clarification remark on picture fantasy, its exegesis and the attendance by a word. Iconic *significata* have always been in the center of the scholar's sense bearing structures.

The whole cultural-mythological, esoteric, sacred legacy and their iconic-like constellations Jung considers as the space for storing up unconscious collective archetypal representations, as a signifying domain of approximation to the understanding of Essence. Visual and verbal markers of historical and cultural experience are inverted images of the collective archive that "nominates" and preserves the shadows of memory:

All the mythologized processes of nature, such as summer and winter, the phases of

the moon, the rainy seasons, and so forth, are in no sense allegories of these

objective occurrences; rather they are symbolic expressions of the inner,

unconscious drama of the psyche which becomes accessible to man's consciousness

by way of projection – that is, mirrored in the events of nature. (Jung, 1969, p. 6)

The structure of experience and sense, the processes of introspection and interpretation are emblematically formatted for the Swiss scholar. The conventional iconic-verbal complementarity and structuralicity become the method of refining and decoding the meaning of a symbol, it is the structure that enables to display "unconscious meaning", to semanticize the natural, archetypal language of the subconscious. Although Jung does not emphasize this openly, yet the logic, style, and philosophy of his interpretations often demonstrate the relevance of this kind of "emblematic" method.

The continuous process of consciousness is a complex paradigm of various relations that thwart active situational receptions with conscious and unconscious emotions from memory repositories; specific observations and reactions interact with the previous visual markers and determine the final content of our perception. This universality is embodied in the emblematic model. The effectiveness and popularity of emblematic schemes is due to the fact that they are close to mental sense-arranging mechanisms. Specific figurative constants are singled out of the continuous flow of visual impressions, the meaning of which is formed by the use of additional verbal

comments. Just as the isolated image or image in the emblem latently anticipated engagement with its original context and the role of its meanings in the general structure was heavily reliant on previous semantic associations, so is the sense bearing stabilization of visual impressions rested on former experience:

> Our conscious impressions, in fact, quickly assume an element of unconscious meaning that is psychically significant for us, though we are not consciously aware of the existence of this subliminal meaning or of the way in which it both extends and confuses the conventional meaning. (Jung, 1964 p. 40)

All cognitive experience, which is stored in cultural universals, is considered by Jung as a repository of various "psychic manifestations", which are formatted according to a certain pattern and are composed of the same symbolic designations. The founder of analytical psychology obviously believed that the visual concepts, notions of a specific person are individual manifestations of the general semantic algorithm of the language of the unconscious that is present in every man as a figurative legacy of the unconscious memory having its own distinctive symbolic code, its iconic language, the decryption of which is possible only in terms of the involvement of supplementary, for the most part verbal clarifications. His commentary on mandalas symbolism, passing the lines connecting the visual imagery psycho-reflections of contemporaries and the ancient ceremonial drawings are a sound argument for this. Actually, this "emblematic law" permits us to elaborate on the expressive psychological and existential homogeneity of people behavioral stereotypes of different periods, cultures, nationalities, emerging from the common "form-perception" order and morphogenetic naturalistic systems, "Similar causes (other things being equal) have similar effects, and similar psychological situations make use of the same symbols, which on their side rest on archetypal foundations, as I have shown in the case of alchemy" (Jung, 1969, p. 383).

In general, there is clearly evident Jung's passeism, infatuation for "proto-world", ancient texts and primitive signification series as judged from his texts. It is under the influence of such beliefs that the distribution of the "blessings" of civilization he conformed to the image of a "raptorial bird" assertively searching for prey away from its nest, "All the eagles and other predatory creatures that adorn our coats of arms seem to me apt psychological representatives of our true nature" (Jung, 1989, pp. 248–249).

Conclusions

A large number of psychoanalytic categories rely on mythological and medieval iconic and conventional representativeness. Their main concepts, schemes, definitions and contextual comparisons are based on the primal ideological axiology, which is reconstructed from well-ordered visual and verbal correlations, and the peculiarity of individual and collective psycho-development is permanently considered in the system of iconic-conventional congruencies and differentiations.

Sigmund Freud and Carl G. Jung have adapted mythological images and plots to apply them in their theory that is expressed through emblematic reduction. Identified by way of visual representation, the purports of the ancient "events" fulfill the function of internal schematic ostensiveness for the design of psychoanalytic concepts' meanings. In particular, the originator of psychoanalysis focuses on comprehension of representation and signification phenomena, examines semiotic practices employed at different times, the role of iconic and verbal designations in portrayal of the collective and individual psychosphere. To nominate specific complexes, the scholar has exploited literary and artistic prototypes, underscoring the considerable, articulated as far back as in mythology, interaction relevance of specific experiences (phobias, pleasures), conduct and destiny.

The Austrian psychotherapist employed an emblematic scheme as a method of human consciousness scanning in order to disclose the complex mental processes. Freud studied the interpretation of "erroneous operations", dreams, conditionality of childhood neuroses complexes in correlation of visual figurative representations (experienced emotional outbursts that are fixed and regressed in memory in the form of symbolic figurative markers) and embedded emotional stereotypes.

A conventional formation of emblematic amalgam – an oneiric vision and a free verbal association – allows designating and constructing an iconic-conventional form that symbolically "substitutes" ("replaces") true experiences. Through application of psychoanalytic interpretation via interconsistency and projecting "substitutions" on the emotional and cognitive context of a person's life, his inner conflicts are determined. Of paramount importance here are visual accommodations of individual intentions with generally conventional signification, exegesis of abstractized visions via linguistic specification. Relatively speaking, the language here serves as a means of simplification, facilitation or conventional expressiveness of complex oneiric images. It is precisely the emblematic structure that makes it possible to organize such an interpretive procedure, since dream representations display explicit figurative markers and hidden behind free verbalized associations contents.

Emblematic mechanisms texture Carl G. Jung's theory too. Emblematic schemes were the form that allowed establishing fundamental metaphysical concepts most effectively where a specific visual experience became the basis for the expression of abstract senses. Visible images of the material world have largely determined the formation of the Swiss psychologist's theory. Of them he deduced the transitional, interdependent continuity and unity of understanding the cosmos and chaos, man and nature.

Jung believed that the visual representations of a particular person are individual manifestations of the general semantic algorithm of the language of the unconscious, which is in evidence in each individual as a figurative legacy of the unconscious memory having its own specific symbolic code, its iconic language, the decryption of which bears the involvement of complementary, first of all, verbal clarifications. Maintaining the general model and the principle of analysis, the expressive psychological and existential homogeneity of people behavioral stereotypes detail above all the search for cognitive and sign-oriented combinations and iconic-conventional formations to explain the complex mechanisms of functioning of the "conscious" and "unconscious".

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'Extimacy' *(Extimité):* From Structural Theory of Language to Affective Theory of 'Ex-Centric' Subject[*]

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Abstract
The following exposure of the RSI topological complexities, orienting all the possible (inter)subjectivity, plays on the following two pairs of polarities: external/internal and linguistic/affective (it may be added: structure and topology). Lacan introduces the third possibility of human experience: "extimacy", linking what is both excluded and intimate. The concept is the lacking link leading from structuralist approaches to language to thoroughly affective subjectivity of any speaking being. Spinosa's geometrical, highly dynamic system and his "differential calculus of affects" may account for the part that the vicissitudes of drive play in human existence as rooted in the deeply "extimate" sources.

Introduction

The main focus of this paper is to render how different layers of language in Lacan's theory account for differing topologies of interiority/exteriority relations of affect. The RSI dimensions, in terms of which the concept of 'extimacy' (French *extimité*) will be exposed, are regarded here as different levels of the topological determinants of the human subjectivity, which always exists as intersubjectivity. Otherwise speaking, they are the three ways in which the outside/inside relationships manifest themselves linguistically and affectively. The word 'levels' doesn't denote the higher or lower 'place' this manifestation would allegedly occupy in the (inter)subjective experience of the human being. Rather, it renders the degree of externality in its relations with regard to the intimate of the subject in each of these spheres. It has to do with the quantitative difference which distinguishes each of them (however, there is an
assumption here: some growth in quantity may change the quality, and even the essence, of the thing in question). The three distinct, although interrelated (in fact, even interpenetrated by one another), structures account for the fact that in every of

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[*] This paper was inspired by my participation in the series of lectures 'Logic and Trauma' by Andrzej Leder, conducted in GSSR under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy and Sociology of Polish Academy of Sciences in the period of 2011-2017. I would like to express my deep gratitude for the possibility to attend this seminar and draw on the ideas born and brought up during its course, and also for all the help I received from the lecturer and my tutor, whose profound and insightful remarks as well as the constant and patient, generous support were of great help for me in correcting and completing this text in the present form.

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the three cases both the 'outside' and its contradiction are defined in their own (and perhaps even incomparable with the two remaining definitions) ways. However, not without an eye to a bit of intelligibility, the goal of these short remarks would be aiming at a sort of comparison of the three incomparabilities. Of course, it will be accompanied by a reluctant admittance of the unavoidable - perhaps even reductionist in some measure - privilege accorded to the chosen aspects of the triplex phenomenon of 'extimacy'[2].

The Methodological Difficulties

The following exposition of the RSI topological complexities, as orienting all the possible human (inter)subjectivity, is based mainly on the following, two fundamental pairs of polarities: external/internal and linguistic/affective. The Lacanian great trinity (RSI) appears in any particular case as resulting from multiform vicissitudes of drive. As such, it constitutes the three basic, indispensable factors, generating the structured reality[3]. In this case affects might be understood as different manifestations of the phenomenological derivative of drive, that is, desire. The structural[4] generates[5] these or those affects, experienced by people on the daily basis. The totality of all the affects is interrelated with the set of particular, singular effects[6]. Here we have the necessary equivalency to the indispensable other side of the (post)structure as determining the linguistic (inter)subjectivity, so to say, its twin-like reverse. Obviously, this approach is inseparably joined with a serious methodological difficulty. There is one problem underlying such topological, obverse-reverse, two-

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[2] However, after having written these last three sentences I realize the total impossibility of rendering the radicalism of this idea. How to put the way the Lacanian approach functions – as it is connoted by the term 'extimacy' - into words of our common language? Perhaps the solution would be something like that which Lévinas applied in one of his latest books Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, where he attempted to show the ineffable something of his intuitions concerning the 'transcendence-in-immanence'. Namely, he just tried, literally, to 'break the links', 'resolve', in any way remaining at his disposal: somehow 'undo' the linguistic 'ties' or 'knots', disorganizing the structural order of the human thought, by deforming it to the ultimate limits of intelligibility. Or rather: he left us with only a minimal residuum of this structure, nearly balancing (in fact: very skillfully 'dancing') on the edge separating sense from nonsense, in order to manifest this 'plus-de-sense' that is conditioned by the necessary element of the nonsensical, hidden behind the common possibilities of speaking.

[3] Here 'reality' means that which is revealed and displayed in the framework of the analytic experience.

[4] Although Lacan tends to consider 'structure' and 'topology' as equivalent, however, his understanding of 'structure' is rather transgressing its traditional definition, and that's why I tried to take into regard his ambivalence by writing the most frequently '(post)structural', to remind the reader the depart from the 'classical' structuralism

[5] And is constantly being generated by them.

[6] The words 'affect' and 'effect' have much in common, not only understood in the categories of 'family resemblance', or as two similar constellations of letters and their pronouncement but also the nodal point in the signifying net.

sided[7] characteristics of any subjectivity as such. It consists in the impossibility of seeing the polarized aspects all at once. If you are focused on one pole within each pair of different - and differing from each other - polarities[8], it's very difficult not to be partial, or at least superficial, trying to render justice to both one and the other of the two. This usually seems to result in the other (more or less involuntarily meant to be less important) remaining at least partly concealed. In the worst case, it may disappear out of sight in its totality. However, even in case of such unfortunate (for any rigorous analysis) circumstances, it's helpful to think that the underestimated 'side' is always, if only silently, included in the contradictory dyad. Actually, each of the terms is logically[9] present in its absence as far as absent in its presence, assuming that presence and absence mutually condition each other. They seem to function as, alternately, the indispensable foreground and background, and - as is known - both of them are necessary for any sense to be generated. As such, they are indispensable for any meaningful opposing, negating (and also affirming, etc.), contradicting operations. In this way, they can enable all the necessary differentiations to provide us with the bases that are the fundamental condition of any possible communication. This neglect or disregard of the 'eclipsed' polarity has its source in the dualism being the leading rule of the human cognition and representing what is deemed to be the 'true' reality. As Lacan jokingly notices, we must learn to count, as only this can enable us to follow his investigations, proceed in apprehending what he wants to say and - possibly – embracing our own destiny [10].

The Main Problem

How to pass from the (post)structural to affect is a difficulty that any viable theory of the subject must face and take into consideration. This is necessary, if it tries, firstly, to preserve the requirements of logic (also in its non-classical formulations), rigor and consistence, postulated by contemporary philosophy. Secondly, this necessity obtains if we want to stay unwaveringly faithful to the actual reality of the human (inter)subjective experience in all of its highly nuanced complexity, intricacy and, sometimes, ineffability.

Some of the crucial problems connected with certain modern approaches constitute the main 'culprits' of the omnipresent, dualistic beliefs. For example, the commonly acknowledged convictions about the rigidity of language-affect separateness, about intellect-passion isolation. What seems forgotten is the known and experienced fact of the impossibility to conceive any purely intellectual thought without its emotional 'aura'. And *vice versa*: emotions normally have its cognitive contents. This tendency

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[7] Even if in the Moebian sense.

[8] Like, for example: linguistic vs affective, structural vs topological (according to Lacan, there is an important difference between them), external vs internal, intimate vs public, objective vs subjective, immanent vs transcendent, empirical vs transcendental, etc.

[9] Based on the logic of language /thought/sense as operating by means of oppositions.

[10] The anxiety-related connotations of the word 'apprehension' are used here quite intentionally: if we knew the future happenings of our life, our fate, for the most part we probably wouldn't wish to live any longer out of horror felt as a result of this knowledge.

to reason in terms of the contradiction between the just characterized concepts is prevailing in the contemporary thought. As its core consists in clinging to the uncontested belief in the inside/outside opposition as if its terms were two extreme kinds of 'space', having nothing in common. The split between the linguistic and affective realms opens into an authentic abyss, ready to swallow every daredevil who would try to surpass it. It finds its reflection in the relevant 'turns' that appeared quite recently in the course of the history of philosophical thought and the general cultural orientation[11].

Summerizing, the 'ex'/'in' dualism makes it extremely difficult to pass from the (post)structural to the affective, and join them in order to get some consistent characteristics of the subjec[12]. The Lacanian theory calls into question these contradictory pairs of 'sides', constituting the human (inter)subjectivity. It tries to reconcile what is imaginarily separated. Its means are various examples taken from mathematical topology, especially of 'impossible' figures, like the Moebius strip, the torus, as well as other paradoxical forms, e.g., the cross-cap; the Klein-bottle, etc., denouncing the relevant oppositions as illusive and untenable in their hitherto forms.

For example, as far as the Moebius band is concerned, what we take to be its two sides somehow turns out to be only one, although no clear, distinct 'passage' is perceived. Similarly, as far as the 'two-sided' (structured as polarized in any of the above-mentioned ways) vision of human (inter)subjectivity is concerned, there are certain, special points where the exterior and the interior imperceptibly pass into each other. Applying the Lévinasian concept of the 'transcendence-in-immanence' (Lévinas, 1911), the otherness is constitutive of the sameness[13] (and the other way round). The same could be said about the language/structure-oriented and affect-related aspects of the human mind. We can look at them like Wittgenstein's analysis, found in the chapter *xi* of *Philosophical Investigations*, shows. What we perceive alternatelyas a rabbit/hare and a duck must be considered, as the author concludes, to be the two possible 'ways of seeing' of the one and the same picture (Wittgenstein, 118, p. 204). A quite similar reasoning might be applied to the idea of the human mind, as essentially relational in joining concepts. Or even better: its multi-referential characteristics enable us to see the same from two or more possible points of view[14]. Perhaps the described methodological difficulty might have something to do with this – sometimes difficult - 'flip-flop' jumping from one interpretation to the other. In

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[11] We know how difficult it is to reconcile different linguistic and affective characteristics of the human subject, although functioning nearly seamlessly together on the daily basis. This explains the necessity of 'turns', focusing for the most part or nearly exclusively on one of these two terms of the regarded dualism (and other ones).

[12] Phenomenologically manifesting itself as a certain determinate stream of the indiscrete, seamless experience, unless 'punctuated' in a way proper to the process that is governed by desire.

[13] The dualism of transcendent/immanent or otherness/sameness is just another example that may be applied to the range of problems investigated in this paper. The Lévinasian expresssion 'trancendence-in-immanence' might be another way of expressing the ideas encapsulated in Lacan's neologism extimité.

[14] In the Lacanian reformulation of the above-mentioned division: structural and affective, external and internal, etc.

order to avoid any ambiguity, we prefer stay a bit too stiff. However, at the same time we lose the possibility of gaining knowledge, or what's more important, according to Lacan: getting closer to the truth [15].

Another problem to be taken into consideration consists in the following trouble: the connotations of the word 'structure' evoke the static concepts, suggesting something essentially immobile, inert and inflexible. Meanwhile, the dynamic experience of affect doesn't seem to harmonize with our common, habitual trials to describe its process-like, fluid, unstable nature by using these 'stiff', unrelenting terms. This problem will be undertaken in the next part, perhaps allowing for the discussion and a certain resolution of the difficulties just described. The proposed solution would perhaps seem surprising, as it implicates referring to the old, classical philosophy of Spinosa. Let's take a closer look at his system.

Return to Spinosa as a Solution

Why should we regard the return to such an old theory, as is the Spinosian one, in the context of the Lacanian investigations, as one of the instruments which may turn out the searched-for solution. Namely, the one the consistence of which would be helpful in the dissolution of the described dualisms within the framework of a strictly systematic, unitary theory, able to form a multifaceted but non self-contradictory concept of the subject. The answer lies in the fact that the rigorous and stringent, quasi-mathematical system, based on axioms, definitions, deductions, etc., elaborated by the author of *Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order* is at the same time a highly dynamic theory of affects. It conceptualizes the affective subject and renders the energetic movement of his/her emotional experience in such a way that it can be interpreted in mathematical terms, as situated in a kind of linguistic 'quasi-space'. As Lacan would say, any change of affect is inseparable from a certain change of the subjective configuration in the net of signifiers, that is, from the corresponding movement in the linguistic realm. This set of concepts joins neatly the (post)structuralist approach with the notion of the language-affect inseparability. It also undermines other, above-mentioned oppositions, which disappear in the universal 'space' that doesn't need any 'outside' or 'inside', pierced and penetrated by the never-ending movement of *conatus*. We could even qualify this dynamic geometrical approach - using more contemporary terms - a differential theory of the affective speaking-being. In fact, it seems to constitute the only, unique example of something like a differential calculus of affects, providing us with a kind of ancestor of the strictly topological formalizations conceptualized by the later Lacan. Using Spinosa's differential, energetic categories of the smallest possible increase and decrease enables us to formulate movements and transformations of affective energy in such a way that seems to preserve the characteristics of credibility and reliability of any viable theory. When increasing or decreasing energy that characterizes *conatus*/drive achieves a certain critical point, the change of the corresponding mathematical/linguistic sign takes place. These transformations account for the always changing, sometimes literally 'swirling' dynamics of human discourse and affect in their mutual interpenetration, their milder 'moves' as well as more violent

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[15] Let's repeat: we tend to lose from our sight that perhaps more than one aspect may be exactly what comes into play, that we must take into account the third, fourth, etc., factor, to be able to perceive the whole complexity of the situation.

turbulences [16]. These differential concepts of the smallest possible increase and decrease might be regarded as discrete 'elements', a sort of 'points', distinguished from one another, however appearing and manifesting themselves as the basis for some presumed continuity [17].. They prepare the fertile ground for the theory of the human subject that would be based on 'extimacy' and 'de-centeredness', linking structural and affective approaches into one coherent conception of (inter)subjectivity.

'Referentiability' and The Three Levels of 'Extimacy'

As is clear now, the subject of Spinoza, since it is driven by *conatus*, desires to be and that's why it needs more desire, which explains its 'extimate' nature and the necessity to reach beyond itself. However, what must be explicitly underlined, is the fact that the concept of 'extimacy' *(extimité)* will be exposed here in a deliberately not quite orthodox way [18], as the manner of rendering the inseparability of the linguistic and affective aspects of the human subject. The logic of the concept of 'extimacy', which is a neologism deriving from 'exterior' and 'intimacy', seems to call into question – as has already been said - some presumptions underlying certain contemporary philosophical and psychological theories. As has been said above, by means of this seemingly vague, at first sight 'estranged' concept, Lacan delivers a different conceptualization of the human psyche. The result is a kind of an essentially 'referential', separate but dependent, non-individualistic subject. That is, whose intimate 'center' is continuous with what is 'external' and 'peripheral' ('ex-centric', 'de-centered') with regard to him or her. The underlying idea is that every human being, even before his or her birth [19], is immerged in, and defined by, the apparently 'outer' – especially relational – world, becoming at last his/her own 'inner' realm. That's why the main terms of this approach are concepts of 'relationality',

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[16] The full theory of affective experiences requires underlining the essential differences between them. There's little place here for a detailed analysis, however, one remark is important: needless to say, there's an important, not only etymological, difference between 'emotion' and 'affect'. The former means a certain active movement forward ('out of oneself'), directed to the determined 'exterior': as suggests Latin *[e]movere*. While the latter's sense (Latin *affectus*), understood also in its meaning of 'direction') preserves a compelling association with passiveness and surrender to the unavoidable (like an *affection* – which even has 'illness', or 'sickness' as certain of its meanings) that attacks us as helpless and defenseless. Let's notice in passing that the prefix 'a' often signifies powerlessness and inertness in the face of that to which we must subdue and give in (this 'a' doesn't of course determine, whether the dominating factor is 'positive' or 'negative') That remains highly relative, as it may be good, helpful, supporting, or inversely: destroying and devastating for us. Incidentally, it would be interesting to explore the possible links joining the prefix 'a' with objects *a*, especially with an eye on some of their characteristics.

[17] According to Lacan, the continuity of drive would correspond to the incessant movement of the metonymic chain. The 'rings' of this string would tie the elements of the sequence, signifying substitutional objects of desire.

[18] Although, the precise Lacanian use of the term will be indicated in the text.

[19] Moreover, even before any idea of his or her any possible conception.

'intersubjectivity', or more radically: 'referentiality'[20]. It denotes not only an ability but, first of all, necessity, characterized by contingency – of being a term of numerous 'references' to (and for) many different 'others'. Or, otherwise speaking, a singular 'point of reference', to and from which invisible 'rays' radiate in, and from, all conceivable directions, to and from other 'points of reference'. 'Referentiability' (the ability/necessity to refer) is what actually enables one to live and enacts any acting in accordance with one's desire. It's the earliest affective mark left on everything that happens (on the first and any following one another element of the signifying chain) and in the speaking creature it always takes the form of a linguistic sign (or of its substitute). That is why the human subject is not any pure distanced mind but a speaking-being whose existence starts at the exact moment of experiencing affect, that is, of being affected, by realizing the first originary reference. As defined by any affective event written in language (linguistic matter), he/she is unavoidably determined by his or her own incarnated, bodily status. In the measure of experiencing ever and ever bigger, more complicated 'pieces' of the world (that is, being affected by diversified aspects of the Other), the 'text' becomes ever and ever longer. Then certain sequences start to repeat themselves and 'writing' engages both affect and linguistic thought, which are indivisible. These are the basic assumptions of the further investigation as well as the searched premature answer that requires scrupulous analyzing of the ways it was formulated.

Let's start this difficult enterprise from accentuating the main assumption: what we desperately need here is a 'good enough' metaphor. Instead of some chaotic metonymic circulation characterizing displacement, it must be able to deepen the hidden meanings that in the vertical order of substitution (condensation) may enlighten one another. The metaphoric chain could be compared to anchoring our thought to a kind of Ariadne's thread that would show us the way out of the labyrinth of metonymic *errance* among innumerable significations. As we have just established, the best paradigmatic category would be the Spinosian figure of differential increases and decreases as the smallest energetic changes in the (inter)subjective field. This choice allows for illuminating even the slightest nuances of affective-linguistic processes, rooted in the highly ordered, systematic framework. This is especially important for grasping different transformations of the way in which the subject represents himself/herself. However, first of all, this enables us to understand these changes of the self-representation that have their origin in the internalized Other as the primary source of affection. This radical otherness which can never be assimilated totally by the sameness, which is equally transcendental as transcendent, always escaping dissolution in the immanence that tries to devour anything that differs. The ineffable otherness enacts all the multiple differentiations of the subject's identity that are presented to the Other as the most important point of reference.

Spinosian 'Substance' as Constitutive of (Inter)Subjectivity: Exposition and Sharing

Before the characterization of 'extimacy' in its triple manifestation, let's focus on some Spinosian contributions to understanding how Lacan defines the human subject. Although it seems obvious, it's never superfluous to remind that Lacan remains in perfect agreement with Spinosa's first definition in the section "Definitions of the

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[20] As is obvious, we needn't relate with, while referring to, or being referred to by, someone or something.

emotions" in his *Ethics*: (I) 'Desire is the very essence of man insofar as his essence is conceived as determined to any action from any given affection of itself' (Spinosa, 2002, p. 311). The next similarity has its roots in the basic logical requirements that both of the authors assumed as best summarizing the nature of the human subject. The subject is defined in terms of this or that affect. What Spinosa calls 'substance' acts or operates by means of affects, which causes the emergence of the incipient subjectivity as referenced to what appears as other. In this sense the 'substance' could be considered as a formal, logical vehicle (with no strictly defined empirical content), for which we might substitute anything, like for example, the human nervous system, or any other 'matter', being a kind of 'hardware', into which any particular (because dependent on the randomness of the particular human fate) 'software' might be 'installed'. As it was mentioned above, Spinosa underlines the contingency of the human destiny: '[…] we are in many respects at the mercy of external causes and are tossed about like the waves of the sea when driven by contrary winds, unsure of the outcome and of our fate' (Spinosa, 2002, p. 310).

Let's follow further this metaphorization. We must omit the answer to the question asking what the 'substance' is, what form and characteristics of its existence are. It's unessential for our further investigations. We must focus on what is necessary from the perspective of its every, newly born, 'inhabitant'. Does the 'substance' have any boundaries? From the point of view of its 'guests', it is infinite and unlimited, it has neither origin nor end. As far as the human entity is unaware of its possible limits, he or she can preserve to a greater or lesser degree a certain sense of security, trust and self-confidence. Even the little child has many examples of 'the otherness' (in the beginning often assimilated to 'the sameness') that he/she can refer to. They function as a kind of 'corrective experience', allowing to alleviate the anxiety, even panic, the source of which is equivalent to more or less remembered suffering, being the remnants of the primary trauma. It must be mentioned that this first trauma may constitute the described-above originary experience of a strong affect that starts the process of 'signifierness' *('signifiance')* that is, of linking every signifier with its signified (generation of significations). It is only in this way that it brings to life a kind of pre-subject and becomes a condition of possibility for a kind of (inter)subjective proto-space that will contain later experiences. The primary subjectivity has two universal crucial attributes: sharing and exposition: It shares the nature of all similar linguistic-affective beings, especially their vulnerability, as well as it exists as constantly exposed to anything regarded as other, for good and evil. If the process of the corrective 'healing' isn't endangered by any serious disturbance, the little human subject remains initially for some time immersed in the state of the uninterrupted primary narcissism and very rarely shows any signs of consciousness[21]. If this 'autistic', totally passive state[22] lasts long enough, the drive can begin to flow

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[21] As may be a bit pessimistically said, the developing psyche 'rests' after the mentioned initiatory trauma (be it, e. g., the trauma of birth, or any other 'thallassal'-like apocalypse) and reintegrates its forces to survive the next traumatic event to come. According to the 'thalassal' theory of Ferencsi, the personal history of becoming a subject reaches as far as to the pre-historical sequence of catastrophes transgressing the limits of any individual life (Ferencsi, 1968).

[22] However, abounding in intensive, although usually externally imperceptible transformations of the dynamics of libido.

freely and try some first cathexes. The young organism starts to register what happens around with a 'fresh' eye and in a non defensive way. At first sight the 'substance' seems to be in a constant, highly dynamical movement, its surface producing multiform waves, wrinkles, turbulences and whirls. It provides its 'foundlings'- those at first totally helpless and vulnerable entities - with its overflowing energy of life. It shares itself with them its potency and resistance, which allows for the growth of the ability to differentiate and valuate. It is just this ability that enables them to change themselves and the world by making use of the constant, gradual intensifying and diminishing energy, resulting in the production of the first meanings. The all-embracing 'substance' is constantly circulating and especially encircling those who need it most (the most traumatized and unable to survive without help). The energy, never stopping its flow, actuates and excites partly dormant drives, sharing with 'castaways' its own dynamism. It does so trustingly exposing itself on whatever an individual does with this gift – like wasting it, squandering it or maybe…sharing it with the closest ones, with the neighbors. Otherwise speaking, becoming similarly exposed and sharing. It could be said that the 'energy' of these above mentioned movements becomes greater or smaller depending on the fact in whose 'hands' it will find the 'proper' place, where it can fully develop its dynamics. If the quantity of energy grows or diminishes to the sufficient degree, what follows is the change of value marked by the change of the sign into the opposite one ('plus' becomes 'minus' and *vice versa*), which initiates the process of *'signifiance'*[23].

In summary, the first symbols of primary affective experiences (according to Lacan, we substitute «1» for what is experienced as 'good' and «0» for 'bad') are the effects of the fact how the all-surrounding otherness refers to us (and of how we refer to it). In the beginning, the meanings of these first events of sharing and being exposed are 'borrowed' from the Other, offering them to us when we try to make sense of what happens in our life. And it is never enough to repeat and accentuate that it is at first the Other that 'estimates' the greater or smaller degree of closeness to, or remoteness from, the desired perfection, which the 'substance' strives to achieve. It is only later on that the particular subject takes over the task of evaluating which meanings tend to signal the growth connected with the desired ideal attributes and starts to ascribe values. Such is the origin of rivalry and aggressiveness that may be destructive when they reach their extreme degree. The basic difference between human beings and other living entities appears when the energy of the animal instinct, becomes structured for the human subject as 'binarized into drive' by means of symbols and the *parl'être* starts to manifest one's own desire by way of a whole gamut of affects, emotions, feelings, moods and other affective experiences.

The Genesis of the Subject and the World

The origin of the world consists in the fact that the 'substance' undergoes further and more complex structuration of the imaginary in terms of symbolizations of more and more higher order. The Other introduces law, the rules of which are supposed to be observed. The differentiation is accompanied by condensation of signifying elements into 'meta-signifiers' until, finally, certain 'master signifiers' take the lead in the person's life. The particular 'wrinkles' on the surface of the ever-changing topology

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[23] The result of the process is the development of particular configurations of the first pairs of signifiers.

of the world, although designated by the same word, are different from one another. However, they are supposed to join into greater entities, like 'waves', thanks to the common signifier that subsumes them into more complex wholes. All of this produces (as, so to speak, its effect) the speaking subject. What we could remark here is that the beginning of the subject's existence starts at the same time when he/she recognizes (but never gets to know) the Other in the absolute otherness. This total otherness is impossible to be penetrated, although it appears to have something to do with the last trace referring to the desired, primal object. It points at the direction of this object, the one that always comes too early to be remembered by the subject - who's always too late to register its presence - and that's why it seems to be always already and forever lost. The nostalgia for the desired Other incessantly accompanies the process that consists in the fact that the rules, laws, and the whole order structured by the net of signifiers organize themselves into the world as such, and the lost object of longing recedes to the unconscious. At this precise moment the subject may easily 'forget' that he/she desires and what is the object of this desire.

If the Spinosian 'substance', in its constant energetic flow, can be interpreted as something like an ocean or river, this forgetfulness takes over at the moment when the main 'stream' (conscious thinking) starts to produce subsequent metaphoric substitutes of the desire. Then the consciousness would be equivalent with the signified, generated by the signifying elements, which constitute the unconscious, the stream's hidden 'undercurrents'. These are constantly circling around certain peculiar 'areas', which could be described, by reason of their unique character, as the points that center around themselves the deepest flows of water.

The analytical experience confirms that there are certain singular points of 'peculiarities', having absolutely particular character as their status of 'attractors' exerts great influence. Of course, what comes into play here, is that which Lacan distinguishes as 'objects *a*' by referring them to what is archaic, a kind of 'remnants' of something that was lost and doesn't seem to have any place in the present reality. The loss is all the more poignant, deep and intense that the 'cut-off' objects *a*'s status is highly unclear: it's not sure if the 'remainders' were parts of the subject or of the lost object of desire. That's one of the reasons to define their mode of being as 'extimate' *par excellance*. When we apply the above metaphor, their essential destiny is staying in the stream with their parts being partly 'cut off' and remaining outside the current, like 'castaways' thrown by the waves onto the shore, not devoid of their highly attracting, if ambiguous, character. Therefore, anyone who has become the subject of the signifier, the desiring subject, is 'extimate' throughout: what is the most precious to him/her, remains outside, deeply hidden in this outside that forms the center of the unconscious. One can only search for its substitutes in others, not knowing what exactly one is looking for, since the best word to describe it is 'lack'. The subject's most intimate interior, equivalent with the essential center of his/her being is, in fact, external: while staying in the stream, he/she is constantly attracted by what is 'out'.

What is worthy of repetition and underlining is the potent, incessant dynamism of the process, which, beginning with the initial, omnipresent, 'thalassal' chaos, through the first 'differentials' singled out, leads to delimiting the ordered 'substance' of the (inter)subjective world. Along with it, through the movement of its own logic, particular subjects are called into existence. Maybe, as some theorists believe, the life

in this world, especially when realized in the form of genital love relationships, would be only the consolation after the loss of that 'thalassal', pre-apocalyptical, blissful existence. Referring to this traumatic loss, we can say that the appearing of the Spinosian 'substance' (however interpreted) after the trauma, might be compared to the origination of a necessary spatiotemporal matrix, the 'place' where the first signifying elements can appear[24].

The trauma as enforcing the formation of the spatiotemporal psychical matrix would play an ambiguous role. Firstly, it leaves its traces as a way to remember the pre-traumatic, paradisiac state of being and incite the striving to achieve a partial, substitutive, thoroughly 'extimate' recreation of its memories. The traumatic, however repressed, is a cause of painful affects: anxiety and suffering associated with this loss, although, at the same time, it paradoxically assures protection before similar, future damages by helping the psyche to strengthen itself[25]. The 'thalassa' and the later primal traumas remain 'coded' as partly conditioning the awakening of the psyche of the future subject[26], in-sisting not to be forgotten, which requires constant repetition.

The Singularized Topology as a Source of the Individual Fate and Human Destination

In the previous section it was said that the 'substance' differentiates itselfinto distinct, independent 'waves', by distinguishing out of its fluent, continuous flow some singular discrete elements, scattered but ordered. The 'calculation', availing itself of topologico-affective 'differentials', proceeds incessantly from the beginning, forming a sequence of operations that become more and more complicated. That's how the subject and its particular reality (the world as a specific constellation of the signified, resulting from the relation with the Other) is constituted. The distinguished net or nets

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[24] If this way of thinking makes sense, trauma is necessary for the formation of this proto-spatiotemporal matrix, enabling signifers to appear. Without the traumatic element, the human psyche most probably wouldn't start to function, remaining perhaps in the previous undisturbed, narcissistic state.

[25] As it is presented in Ferenczi's theory of catastrophes: each catastrophe repeats the previous one and at the same time prevents its repetition in terms of affective change.

[26] The 'thalassa' and the later primal traumas remain unquestionably 'inside', in the mind of the survivor, in the interior of the subject's heart. Their 'external' origin doesn't deprive the phenomenon of its essential character of deeply intimate experience, the more that it never lets the individual forget them. Working it through (as it is in the more severe examples of traumatization, like nightmares, hallucinations or even fully-develloped PTSD) requires the first step consisting in the necessity to allow them to come outside, leave their hiding place, then gradually learn to accept their 'extimate' presence in the psyche and finally try to integrate them with one's present reality. There is also constant possibility of sublimation, which is achieved, according to Lacan, when the subject can reach for the substitute and refer to the lost intrauterine coexistence with a loved object through a genital relationship, which would be the full and authentic realization of the de-centered (inter)subjectivity in the most promising way, allowing for getting as close as possible to what was lost forever.

of signifiers, while gaining topological characteristics, represented by all sorts of seemingly paradoxical forms of ambiguous, 'impossible' figures, may be regarded as reflecting the singular, unique destiny of the particular person. The Spinosian categories of pleasure and pain may be of use here. As the author of *Ethics* says in the above-mentioned section in the two next definitions of emotions: (II) 'Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection' and (III) 'Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection'. However, Spinosa underlines: 'pleasure is not perfection itself' but the transition to it (i.e. to perfection). The use of the term 'transition' (instead, for example, of 'state', etc.) underlines the fact that the whole business is about the dynamic, energetic operations on affects. As was mentioned above, these differential operations could – by reason of some gradual increases or decreases - bring about radical overturning of the sign and substituting it by its opposite. If such a transformation is important enough, something like a new curving of the particular, (inter)subjective topology may emerge as a result. The hitherto prevailing topological characteristics may be totally overturned, with the new curvature not resembling in anything the previous system of the specific (for a particular subject) coordinates. It is worthy of emphasizing that the Spinosian system perfectly accommodates the slightest possible changes (as little as differentials are) as well as the great, total transformations of the so-and-so curved subjective geometry.

But why do these changes occur? Because of otherness in its multiple forms and multi-leveled epiphanies. We have just outlined the Spinosian contributions to the project of joining an example of a post-structural theory of language with a dynamic, differential theory of affectivity. The result is one consistent, topological approach to the 'extimate' (inter)subjectivity and the subject of language as well as of affect (subjected to them both). Now we can investigate these reflections more deeply and – using further conceptual instruments – complete the above remarks more fully and precisely. The title concept of 'extimacy' is strictly connected with the conception of the 'ex-centricity' of the subject with regard to his or her own 'essence'. Now, the essence of any human being is just there where one thinks it is not - in the unconscious, inhabited by the Other. The essence is understood to be desire, according to Lacan, directed always towards the Other. The human essence was traditionally thought to be the most interior and hidden germ of what a human being is to become, containing his/her most important characteristics to be developed. Here, all of this intimate realm is as if turned inside out – residing in the Other, even earlier than we realize it. Until recently we were used to think about ourselves as autonomic: our inside is 'in', far or undependable from influences of others, and the outside is 'out', separated and independent. However, 'otherness', 'externality' and 'outside' seem to start to be the main organizing, actively operating principles, even when there's not yet any distinct subjectivity. There is only the mentioned kind of proto-space where the conditions are in the course of being prepared in order to constitute the unique 'place' for the future human subject, who doesn't even recognize the agent of these preparations. He/she knows nothing of the all-embracing, pantheistic 'substance', nor does he/she know of the Other who 'curves' the spatiotemporal matrix in order to make of it the environment suitable to sustain life. The more the child recognizes the Other, realizes his/her presence and internalizes it, the more these processes must implicate a sort of exclusion of not-always-so-easy-worked-out intimacy with differing, not always cooperative others. However, the cognitive abilities develop gradually, permitting of the more advanced repression, enforced by the 'Oedipal drama', when the third member of the familial constellation comes into

play. The repression proceeds by splitting off certain 'particles', 'molecules' of the life-giving 'substance', leaving the conscious mind partly emptied and substituted by that which we could call the newly formed 'interior'[27]. Nonetheless, the one who is ready to listen, might hear in the void the calls of longing, certain sometimes getting weaker but persistent calls filled with the desire to return to the most true, even if unattainable rejected 'center', equivalent with one's most authentic being. This sometimes leads to the construction of the newly formed subjective topology, which is particularly, sometimes even peculiarly formed, curved, folded, etc., in such a way that its unreachable 'decentered center' somehow subsists, even if unconscious and unrecognizable. Actually, it never stops operating in its 'close remoteness', supporting the subject in the process of 'coming to be'. Of course, it's possible only when the circumstances are so good enough as to prepare the subject to survive the unavoidable, gradual or sudden withdrawal of the hitherto unfailing presence of the figure of the 'carer'. The resulting singular and unique being, which has the source in the 'substance', acquires the status of the model for further 'topologizing', that is, forming new characteristics in accordance with the (pre)determined coordinates and, by the same token, the destiny of the individual person.

The Structure of Language and Topology

Since the topological matrix, perhaps being the result of a serious, deeply forgotten trauma, is ready to receive whatever appears in it and signifies something, the question is: who or what provides and juxtaposes the first signifiers? Spinosa would say: the substance is modified. And he is right, as far as he would state that the 'agent' is desire (Spinosa's *conatus*). However, if the first signifiers should be received as such (as signifying something), certain affects must precede their appearance and accompany appearing them. The reason for this is that, since what they signify must be important enough for the recipient so as to be registered as having attributed to them a certain signified, announcing pleasure or pain, usually associated with the presence or absence of the Other. The matrix constituted as the result of trauma is open to receive the meaning of what enters it. In fact, the sense of the appearing signifiers is important so much that the rules of the first syntax are constructed and remembered to make it easier for the subject to act depending on the concluded general meaning of certain situations.

The role of otherness (which, to a certain degree, becomes assimilated as what is own, however, not in its totality) is crucial for the genesis of (inter)subjectivity as 'decentered' and 'extimate'. The other subject is necessary for the flow of drive to start its circling and this often happens when there has been a certain trauma. This is because even the perceived presence of the Other may be experienced as traumatic by reason only of his/her separation, of his/her enigmatic desire (*Che vuoi*?) and the constant, unanswered question of the subject: am I desired by this Other? If the response is negative, the individual is unable to survive (cases of the anaclitic

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[27] Such as it was affectively marked, the 'writing' in the unconscious as essentially formed by its, now rejected, 'outside'. However, it doesn't stop operating from within because of the fact that the repression was so immature that the child's psyche was unable to cope with the impossible to be assimilated. Even 'filled up' with apparent emptiness, it somehow preserves the basic primary coordinates and primal reference points that may turn out useful later on.

depression and death) because the source of the life-energy, defined in just this way, is absent. There's no intimacy, even 'decentered', that would be indispensable to initiate the birth of the newborn's own desire.

Some Affective Operations as Conceptualized by Spinosa, Interpreted According to Lacan's Approach

The first kinds of affect are pleasure and pain (as it seems in the both theories). The inaugurating trauma, however interpreted (which may be the famous 'initial catastrophe' of birth, as Ferenczi would say it, then 'translated' into the trauma of weaning, next becoming the traumatic impact of the 'primal scene', then returning in the form of retroaction, etc.) must be forceful and overpowering enough, that is, causing great anxiety and/or excitation and/or pain for the incarnated, affective, perhaps not yet able to speak. This is necessary for the proto-subject to start functioning and retroactively 'count' experiences as affectively marked in the linguistic terms of 'good' or 'bad'[28].

And as long as we are staying with Spinosa, we could say that these first emotions differentiate into further 'vacillations of spirit', as he calls them (Spinosa, 310). There's no place to go through them all but let's look at the three of them. The first is love (VI) defined as 'pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause' (Spinosa, 312). As Lacan describes love in the seminar *Encore*, he doesn't only think that love is the substitute for, or disguise of, the lack of sexual relationship. He wants also to say something much more important, positive and optimistic: love has really ontological meaning, it truly lets us touch the being of our loved one, behind all the 'little objects' that attract, seduce and – finally – deceive us. Our loved other is, when really loved, an authentically other Other and so our idea of him/her must be nearly totally unclear or confused – otherwise he/she would be transformed into one of the worldly objects. It seems to be possible to define love as a specific practice of what we can call by the famous name of 'mindfulness'. Our mind becomes filled out with pure 'signifierness' of this otherness, exceeding our possibilities of attributing a specified signified to it but attracting us with this unclear, indescribable 'something', characterized by some unfathomable allure and spell. This aspect of love has something in common with wonder, being the second emotion in the Spinosian theory that is worthy of being focused on, and defined by this philosopher as 'the thought of any thing on which our mind stays fixed because this particular thought has no connection with any others' (Spinosa, 312). What we need here is the specifically Lacanian correction of Spinosa: our mind doesn't function in this way. The signifiers generate so many links and chains of thoughts that our mind is constantly busy and has no opportunity to fix itself on any single idea. However, even in love we cannot have 'an idea of an external cause' in its wholeness, as there's always something in the shadow, unpredictable with regard to any good or bad – that's when love is tied with wonder. This is an important question: if the idea is nearly totally without content, representing in its signifying emptiness the eluding characteristics of the Other, whose actions may completely surprise us, is it wonder that we feel? What if

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[28] The interpretation of a signifier's meaning may go in a few directions: not only be exactly 'on time', but it equally often might lead to the future and, especially, the past.

we feel pleasure and attraction to this unknown? It may be said that it's only then that we meet a certain other as a true Other, whose idea 'has no connection with any others' (other ideas). According to the Lacanian interpretation, the true love always embraces wonder. That's why it is affirmed that love is one of the most singularizing emotion.

Hatred and the Construction of the Linguistic/Affective Subjectivity

Returning to Spinosa, the third emotion that is worthy of focusing on is hatred, defined by this philosopher as 'pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause'. It might seem that this definition isn't quite sufficient: pain accompanied by the awareness of an external cause of it doesn't necessarily have to be hatred. It may be equally despair, melancholia, sadness, etc. This affect may be referred to Sloterdijk's analyses of rage, which seem to describe the nature of hatred more accurately. However, among them, we find the critique, formulated by this author, who accuses Lacan's theory of confusing 'erotologic' and 'thymotic' affects in his approach to desire. As he says about the author of the alleged 'amalgamate' of *thymos* and eroticism: 'At the kernel of his project is the freebooting mixture of the Freudian death wish with Hegel's struggle for recognition' (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 24). Nothing could be more misleading. However, the correction of this mistake demands thorough investigations. First, we must take into account what Lacan has to say about subject, precisely referring to the (Es)-Other relationship (the symbolic axis) and ego-alter ego specular relationship (the imaginary axis). The two characterize any encounter with a certain other. However, as was above said about erotologic effects, when this or that of our 'neighbors' turns out the one we fall in love with (here Lacan uses the Freudian term *Verliebtheit*), we see that the situation is completely contradictory to Sloterdijk's conceptualization. The negative idea may accompany the nascent affect when its object is unattainable or doesn't reciprocate our love. Even in this case we don't usually feel hatred or rage, rather: frustration, melancholy, even, contrary to the circumstances, hope. (After all, Lacan used to underline, that love is, on a certain level, always reciprocated). In fact, the both kinds of affects – erotologic and thymotic, are not only taken into account but also meticulously (in Lacan's obsessively detailed style) differentiated from each other, analyzed separately, and described as ruled by their own specific logical laws. In the very general terms, using the above-introduced, topological characteristics of levels of language, we might differentiate between something that could be called the symbolized, 'structural' hatred, and the pre-symbolic, imaginary equivalent of it, the source of aggressiveness (the same regards, for example, love). It is their strict and precise separation that can account for the Lacanian version of an 'ethics of singularity' – since even hatred, when situated on the symbolic level, seems to singularize its 'object' as well as love [29]. The source of the imaginary hatred would be our ego and its specific object – alter ego – the rival in the Hegelian struggle for life or death, the object of envy.

The structural hatred is a prerogative of the subject of language, whose desire goes hand in hand with the organized chain of signifiers. In this case the two struggling individuals know that they are equal in the light of law and none of them can really

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[29] Love and hatred as being the affective effects of the dynamic movement, delimited only by the particular framework of the linguistic structure of the "one", "unique", or better: "unitary" (traits of) being of each of the two subjects.

annihilate the other. There's no master, no slave, because both of them are subjected to law. The content of the imaginary hatred could be – as in the mirror stage – the counterpart's 'better' coordinated, integrated body, as compared with one's own, 'dismembered' one, seeming not to form any whole at all, imperfect and clumsy. In other words, the imaginary enemy has always something that the ego doesn't have – usually one of the dual, opposite characteristics[30]. When the 'struggle' rooted in rivalry takes place between two adults, the stake may be power, money, control, authority, etc. The "see-saw" of desire enforces the exclusion of one term and the always risky equilibrium may be destabilized any time. Now, taking into account the two of Hegelian struggling individuals, we understand that one of them must risk one's life so as to win the mastery, in order not to die. However, these prerogatives and attributes can always change into their opposites: weakness, slavery, etc. When we feel hatred on the structural level, these feelings are more integrated and don't exclude their opposites. There is one permanent object of hatred (as is one object of love) instead of its splitting into two or more parts. Contradictory characteristics are regarded as different attributes of the one and the same object, however complex operation it would demand to undertake in order to include them into the multi-faceted, highly singularized subjectivity of the other.

It follows from what has been said so far that - on the basis of the Spinosian geometrical work and the Lacanian topological transformation of investigations of it – there is the only way of defining any singular being speaking-affective, like the human subject. It refers precisely to particular affects as manifestations of the individual's specificity and particularity. They are in turn reflected in the crucial linguistic relations that constitute the unique net of signifiers, constantly being written letter by letter and registering the course of this speaking-being's fate. Love and hatred are distinct from all the other affects because of their most singularizing character.

The Triple Topology of 'Extimacy'

The above remarks refer to what can be regarded as the foundation of the affective theory of the subject, rooted in the linguistic (post)structure of the unconscious. The strictly defined concept of *extimité* could be explicated in more general as well as precise terms by referring to the Lacanian theory of the three registers. Each of them involves a sort of 'exteriority' and, as such, constitutes an indispensable aspect under which the 'extimate' may be seen. As linguistically structured, affectively manifested, and generating energetic dynamics of desire-ridden (inter)subjectivity, 'extimacy' may be defined from three points of view described below.

Imaginary Exteriority

On the Imaginary level the proper externality is the ideal ego. The primordial ego is formed on the basis of what is purely exterior to oneself. It may be, for example, the Gestaltic counterpart, being the specular image of one's or another child's body (however, the 'mirror' needn't be of a visual kind). The image of the unified body, enjoying self-mastery, is idealized for ever as the model, which will remain for good and evil the goal of exercising its physical powers and enhancing them. The problem

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[30] In perfect agreement with the tendency of an ego-centric individual to think in dualistic terms.

is that the jubilation, the feeling of omnipotence ascribed to the idea of one's wholeness and the triumphant attitude towards *alter ego,* are both realized by the child at the same moment when the fact of its real bodily fragmentation, which results from the initial lack of coordination. This may be accompanied by the 'emotional aura' of envy, rivalry, aggressiveness, especially directed at these children who's mastery of bodily movements is greater. It leaves the subject internally splitted.

When reminded of the very important discussion of the see-saw of desire, we discover the possibility of reducing this seemingly irreducible gap. Namely, we come to realize that the ideal-ego doesn't exist without support provided by the rudimentary ego, by means of the numerous 'alienating identifications' *(identification aliénante)* with what seems ideal to him/her. The idea is to try to identify with which is other; and from which from a particular subject is alienated. The see-saw of desire, when it is set into movement, separates and joins the two main position: the one is of desiring, rudimentary ego, personified in a little child, captured by the fascinating attributes of the ideal ego and all its admirable attributes. While in the second position, he child is exactly what is desired, in that omnipotence that is attributed to the ideal ago. The change has happen exclusively thanks to the change of positions of the see-saw. The see-saw seems to be en especially lucky metaphor. What was saw previously alternately, now constitutes two aspects of – the incipient subject.

It results from the above argumentation, that the price of constituting oneself as a separate whole is based on an irremediable alienation from one's true being. Along with the symbol, and more accurately, the first substitution, an element of otherness starts to form the person's identity. Of course, it will be further supported by subsequent identifications and next 'layers' of the primitive ego. It will launch the process of constructing the reality in a projective-introjective way, that is, as based on these two mechanisms. The process of acquiring knowledge *(connaissance)* proceeds, in fact, on the basis of building the un-knowledge or mis-recognition *(mé-connaissance)* of the ego. What is 'taken in' and becomes a part of the immature ego is used to construct the 'outside' world by throwing out the introjected elements. At this stage, what we know of the reality is, in fact, indistinguishable from our own ego (Lacan, 1966, p. 70), and that is why the strict separation between 'external' and 'internal' domains is questionable from the start.

Before any topological 'opening', the affective dynamics constitutes the basis of Lacan's repeated critique of all theories describing the human ego as autonomous and independent. Every attempt at the characterization of the human subjectivity must take as its starting point 'an organic insufficiency of its natural reality' (Lacan, 1966e, p. 96) This weakness, on the basis of which the ego is formed, brings along with it the resulting splitting or internal gap, understood as the 'alienating tension' between the ego and its image (Lacan, 1978a, p. 371) or even as 'internal' rivalry (Lacan, 1966d, p. 117). The outlined process, which is summarized in Rimbaud's phrase: 'I is an other' *(je est un autre)* (Lacan, 1966d, p.118) and marked by the advent of a *double* (Lacan, 1966d, p. 109), constitutes the indispensable dimension of the human psychism as inherently 'extimate'. This stadium is highly narcissistic in nature: the 'outside' is not yet truly 'out' (even if it seems to be already 'decentered'). It's again and again basically the same individual as the idealized mirror image that becomes the ideal ego. This ideal is in turn projected on the first loved others, although infallibly 'returning' to the developing psyche, enriched with their introjected characteristics.

The affective stakes of this process are the mentioned 'triumphant jubilation', accompanied sometimes by aggressiveness (as different from aggression) and rivalry, described in terms of the process of alternating, switching positions between *O* and *O'* (the mentioned two positions of the see-saw). The former stands for the 'little other' (ego) and the latter for the 'counterpart' (alter ego). The movement between them, although partly described here, must be completed by means of the author's optical schemas inserted in the text of the first volume of his seminar, as representing the real image and the virtual one

What can be already marked here is that their 'interaction' is the effect of the specular dialectics of the early movement of desire in its primary, narcissistic, egotical form. However, it is preserved also in all later manifestations of drive. It seems to be a dynamic, energetic movement, whose nature is useful in explaining the situations of *Verliebtheit* (the situation of rupture, when the desiring subject is captivated by all the 'treasures", he/she sees in another subject but doesn't find any trace of them in himself/herself. This phenomenon takes place, when desire tends to alternately wander between the mentioned two positions, having its affective implications: love, or more precisely said (at this stage): 'enamourment' *(enamoration)*. It is worth repeating: The ego sees the virtual image of himself as the ideal ego (or as his/has partner), feeling its 'triumphant jubilation' which alternately changes to self-helplessness due to the alleged inflicted harm, and when it is confronted with the idealized alter ego or another 'little other' tends to feels the contradictory, aggressive feeling (the most dangerous are hatred, envy, rivalry, even hatred, giving birth to revenge and possesion0. This is not a quiet and peaceful process but rather a difficult walk on the imagined line spread between the two dangerous abysses.

Everything changes when the Symbolic appears, with at first totally 'outside' regulations of law, rules of using language in agreement with the new structure imposed on the here-to-fore Imaginary (inter)subjectivity and the 'external' world, which, gradually substitutes (or rather: organizes) the Imaginary. It is only at this precise moment when the subject can encounter the true Other with his/her both positive and negative characteristics and treat his/her as equal in the light of law. The affective characteristics of love/hatred change accordingly. On the later stage of his reflections Lacan even coins – on the basis of constant transformations and even intermixture of the affect-related concepts – the term *hainemoration*. The concept is a result of fusing these seemingly opposite affective states into one 'hate-loving', preserving both the characteristics of hatred and enamourment. This fusion underlines the fact that Imaginary sort of 'outside', even if unquestionably formative of what is deemed to be 'inside', is not yet truly external and some more radical kind of exteriority must come into play with its own topological stakes. Otherwise speaking, the ego must be distinguished from the subject as rooted in the Symbolic.

Symbolic Exteriority

The subject's constitution imposes more complicate challenges on the established 'extimate' origins of the 'decentered' being of any individual human entity. The earlier ego-ideal becomes superego, which assimilates the moral rules of the society as unquestionable and acts in agreement with them, assuming them to be one's own, and their 'external' origin becomes forgotten. The subject acquires customs, ways of behaving and speaking, thinking, and even all the surrounding world as his/her natural home and their structured, topologically curved character remains unconscious. What

comes into play seems to be in a certain way much more 'external', relative to anything that is regarded as 'intimate', although the borderline is more or less unclear. Certain parts just become more 'tamed' and 'domesticated' as belonging to a newly formed subject. It is only then that the 'one' starts to truly 'be', and only the unexpected 'breaks', 'cracks' and the fissures on the smooth surface suggest that not everything functions as it should. Therefore it must be assumed that there exists the third register, which refers to the 'outside' that is 'external' *par excellence*, and it is just in the middle of our safe, cozy 'inside' we managed to create thanks to the structure of the Other that organizes and orders everything. That means that from then on the subject exists as even more divided, staying in the three dimensions at the same time. Another subject – meaning another speaking-being – becomes to be recognized as "one-in-three' - as a similar subject but also a totally unknown unknown (and unable to get to know the Other) since we don't even know where our search should begin.

As we know, the formation of the primary ego in the mirror stadium is mediated by the big Other as the guarantor of the developing imaginary identity, for example, it is often the Other (like a parent of the child) who decides what the positioning of the mirror's angle is and what shows itself in the reflection (Lacan, 2004, p. 42). The symbolic function is though even earlier: every human being (even before the advent of the mirror stadium) appears in the world, which is already structured by symbolic meanings. Things are created by words, which 'kill' things for their part (Lacan, 1966b, p. 319) – this is how the famous 'negativity' of concepts functions. Signifiers exert their effects as well as affect us before we start to understand language, they structure our (inter)subjectivity even before our birth. In this way they prepare places in the symbolic network for people, these 'real beings, who, coming into the world, right away have the little tag which is their name, the essential symbol for what will be their lot' (Lacan, 1978d, p. 31). This all-embracing character of a symbol can't be overestimated as truly formative of subjects in their complex relationships: 'Founding speech, which envelops the subject, is everything that has constituted him, his parents, his neighbors, the whole structure of the community, and not only constituted them as symbols, but constituted him in his being.' (Lacan, 1978d|, p. 30). This 'envelope' penetrates the very inside of the subject. The external (which is quite contingent), in the measure as it becomes a part of the 'extimate', is able to impassively and relentlessly distribute the playing cards to those totally unaware of whatever fate is attributed to them. The cards must be played by those who appear in the 'game' in flesh and blood. In every case of this very singularized and incomparable process, what is 'external' is 'interiorized', and what is 'internal' is 'exteriorized', of course, the dynamics of movement is twofold.

This is the origin of the subject in the full meaning of the term: the child becomes 'sub-jected' to the symbolic law at the same time when he/she acquires norms as well as the ability to respect norms and repress desire. This happens as a result of the 'paternal metaphor', whatever form it takes. Now the only *raison d'être* of law and its rules is securing the proper satisfaction of desire and adequate *jouissance*. However, desire gains, even if repressed, an additional, unintended support: as originating in the unfathomable lack of the primary Other it is paradoxically sustained and consolidated in its unconscious state by the paternal interdiction (Lacan, 1966a, p. 852).

The 'extimate' character of human (inter)subjectivity is made evident by the statement that desire takes the form of the Other's desire (Lacan, 1966h, p. 814). It may be read, firstly, that we desire as the Other desires, that is, *qua* Other, in the similar way, starting from the premier Other whose ungraspable desire is interrogated. Secondly, desire appears 'in the margin where the demand separates itself from the need' (Lacan,1966h, p. 814), that is, we desire to be desired by the Other, even when our needs expressed in demands are fully satisfied, leaving as unfulfilled that part of the demand which expresses the human longing for the Other. Thirdly, the desire belongs to the unconscious, being the site of the Other. 'Non-knowledge' *(nescience)* of desire accounts for the fundamental alienation: desire is that which we don't want (Lacan, 1966h, pp. 814-815). Therefore we speak of the thoroughly 'extimate' subject: the unconscious composed of signifying chains is what forms our decentered 'inside', originating from the 'outside', understood as the transindividual structure of signifiers. The 'in-sistence' of the signifier is correlative with the 'ex-sistence' of the subject of the unconscious (Lacan, 1966f, p.11). The subject is 'ex-centric', that is, 'decentered in relation to the individual', the latter being constantly occupied by what he/she regards as his/her true center – the conscious mind (Lacan, 1978c, p. 17).

The Other is 'the locus in which is constituted the I who is speaking with him who hears […] the locus in which speech is constituted' (Lacan, 1981, p. 309). This undercuts the illusion of self-transparency and self-control attributed to the subject by the modern thought, epitomized in the Cartesian philosophy of Cogito (Lacan, 1978c, p. 15). It is not the conscious 'I', the thinking substance, that speaks, or rather: 'It speaks' (Lacan, 1986d, p. 244). This is another example of 'extimacy' and 'decenteredness': the subject must be regarded as different from the 'I', the latter being the linguistic entity he/she strives to identify with, The human being, in opposition to what the philosophical tradition used to state, is never a fully 'well-integrated' [31] entity. The affective-linguistic 'intimacy' of the 'inner' realm, overflowing with pieces of the (introjected) 'external' incessantly tries to infringe the separating barrier. There are cracks, scratches, breaks… all of them possibly able to become the most fragile and vulnerable points, which always endanger us with into a kind of 'annihilating' waterfall, capable of transforming everything into a deep chasm or ocean of chaos.

The sketched above structuralization of the supposed 'inside' by the established 'outside' has as its reverse the structuring of the surrounding 'reality' by subjective factors The so-called 'subjectivation of the external world' (Lacan, 1986a, p. 59), results in the incessant mutual 'interpenetration'[32].
The castration complex, as understood by Lacan, can be regarded as an unprecedented[33], nodal point - in fact, the liminal moment of a particular, metanoic change of affects. As it seems, the most important part is played by the appearance of

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[31] This doesn't mean the total disintegration, as in a schizophrenic episode, rather: the concept of the perfect integration is a myth. Of course, a person may experience various degrees from the radical decomposition of the psyche (like in case of psychosis) to the stabile and balanced living in the more or less elaborated agreement with one's extimate nature.

[32] Of course, the word is not quite appropriate as it calls into mind just the dubious opposition that is questioned here.

[33] Although evoking, in a way, all the earlier traumas.

a new, more radical exteriority, which implicates breaking the interchangable ego-alter ego amalgam, which was not until now finally separated. Ego-ideal, having internalized all the rules of law and order starts to fulfill the function of the superego. This critical event involves such affects that seem similar to those associated to the mirror stage but of essentially different nature. For example, frustration, instead of becoming the usual source of aggression, must be subordinated to strict regulation of law, in order not to avoid transforming itself into rage. It's important to differentiate also between sense of guilt and sense of shame. The former tends to appear when I broke a certain law and was punished or not but I ascribe to myself the harm I caused and feel guilty. The latter is different, for example, having done something wrong about which even no one knows, I am afraid of the denunciation not because I am afraid of the punishment but because this damage to my self-image becomes known, and even if only myself know, I feel ashamed.

The described symbolic coordinates, incorporated usually in the closest family members, don't exhaust, of course, the varieties of exteriority that in the more or less propitious conditions may feel at home with the 'intimacy' of the human psychism. Some 'one' is always some 'body' and the wisdom of language discloses that the most singularizing factor in the 'external' world is a person's body: the homonymy ('some one' and 'someone') is supported by synonymy; that every 'someone' always exists as a certain 'somebody'. As it was said above, the neighbor is that being, *vis-à-vis* whom the subject is situated - as far as his or her (inter)subjectivity is constituted firstly as a body taking position with regard to his or her 'against' or 'en face'. Then he/she becomes a partner in the conversation, playmate, or companion with whom one engages in various enterprises and adventures.

If the word 'extimate' may be considered to be a gradable adjective, the consequence of such a state of matters is that sometimes a certain degree of 'exteriority' becomes tamed and domesticated, so to say, and its impact as 'alien' is diminished or annihilated. This usually happens when the nearest 'neighboring', previously truly 'external' beings: our closest family, friends, lovers, etc., lose their signifying (first of all, signifying their otherness) traits. Then they become reduced to the signified, the all-too-known, even boring - because completely predictable - entities. This could be explained by the fact that someone becomes too close, to (apparently) familiar and stops being received at all as a 'stranger' This could occur as one of pathologies of 'extimacy', its contradiction being separateness and alienation of a particular human entity, becoming closed on oneself, as a monad, not allowing for any part of 'otherness' to penetrate one's 'inside'.

Real Exteriority

The Imaginary and the Symbolic can be said to encapsulate the more or less smooth functioning of language, whose roads are constantly traversed by the subject, trying to reveal or conceal the truth of desire. The Real might be described as certain dystopic 'places of nothing', where this functioning failed – implicating a sort of 'failure' that invades the structure, threatening to break it. They are absent on any linguistic map, previously non-existent, and appearing only when someone happens to leave the safety of the structured world. These are the invisible recesses, being examples of the perfect 'no-where'. One becomes lost in some chaotic 'nothingness', feeling

unheimlich[34], disoriented because suddenly devoid of the familiar world and any useful word to describe one's experience. One remains unable to find any ways to render the character of the horrifying 'phantoms' of the inexpressible ghostly appearances, usually excluded from the common reality (Real is the only realm where they can be 'disincluded'). They 'subsist' and 'insist' in certain archaic, forgotten areas, being the places of trauma and loss *par excellence*, leaving the subject led astray with no symbolic means to describe the nature of their traumatic character. Something unforeseen happens and the previously smoothly functioning elements stop their operating in a proper way. They don't even operate improperly, it is more accurate to state that something, so to speak, 'breaks the flow'. It is impossible for the subject to represent the 'event' in any understandable way, because the conventional linguistic acts are not able to accommodate the overwhelming 'totality' of this excess. That is why the Real can be defined as an extreme, thoroughly different from any known difference, 'exteriority'. Even the term 'exteriority' unjustly enforces us to join the Real with the symbolizable, were it doesn't belong. We can talk of the Real when some cracks and holes in speech appear (as Real itself is lacking nothing, even more: everything is in its place in the Real). These are 'white spots' in the linguistic meaning, the ones that can't be in no way filled. As an unwanted remainder of the symbolic structuring of the world, the Real is limited to introducing breaks or fissures into the hypothetical, primordial unity of that which is 'at first confused in the *hic and nunc* of the all in the process of becoming' (Lacan, 1966b, p. 276).

On the one hand, it is in relation to the subject of the Real that Lacan explicitly defines *extimité* as equivalent with the Thing (*la Chose*), referring to Freud's concept of *das Ding*, designating mother or her symbolical substitute. She is usually (but not necessarily) the first, primordial Other of the child, and is defined by the author as the 'intimate exteriority' (Lacan, 1986c, p. 167) or the 'excluded interior' (Lacan, 1986e, p. 122), that is, being 'at the center only in the sense that it is excluded' (Lacan, 1986b, p. 87). This 'non-object', around which the unconscious is organized, although foreign to the future subject, seems to define his or her destiny [35]. The impossible character of the Thing as that which is truly Real in the Lacanian sense of the term is experienced as traumatic, it is 'the object of anxiety *par excellence*' (Lacan, 1978b, p. 196). This vision of the unspeakable, even horrifying 'alien' kernel of the human psyche undermines all conceptions of the subject as separated from any would-be 'outside', to which he or she can become more or less peacefully adapted. On the other hand, it is only along with the Thing, its attracting strangeness, evoking something long forgotten, that the importance of the number "two" is emphasized and highlighted. During the 1972-73 course of his seminar, Lacan will say that it is always two *(deux)* of them *(d'eux)*, of two unique, particular cases of 'one'[36] that we should begin with (Lacan, 1975, p. 10). The pair of 'them two' *(deux d'eux)* consists not only in lying beside each other in bed *(au lit)*. Not only just 'sleeping together' but also

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[34] *Unheimlich* which can be translated as 'uncanny' is asssociated by Lacan with anxiety *(angoïsse)* so it is closest to the Real, as one of its remainders, and reminders)*.

[35] 'The Thing as *Fremde*, strange and even hostile on occasion, the first outside in any case, is that which orients around itself all the wandering of the subject' (Lacan, 1986a, p. 65).

[36] By not writing this noun in the plural the irreducible 'singularity' of any person seems to be even further underlined.

'lying' in the sense of saying lies to each other in that which can be read, in the read *(au lit)*. 'Lying beside' each other creates the newly structured space or surface which brings a different topological quality: the unprecedented character of these bonds as ontological links between man and woman. The loved Other exists 'side by side', as closest to me but unavoidably distinct from what I call 'my own'. Here it would be useful to make the 'extimate' topology of (inter)subjectivity become more sharply and radically polarized by being ordered and further differentiated by the male and female structures.

The Thing as the ineffable leftover in which the 'internal' and 'external' are paradoxically united, although irreversibly lost[37], leaves as its only traces the mentioned objects little *a (objets petits* a*)*. A certain 'extimate' impression seems to account for the enigma of the paradoxically magnetic but threatening character of every love object: 'inexplicably I love in you something more than you' (Lacan, 1973, p. 241). This special 'something' that just this (and no other) person 'has', emanates attraction which produces its main effect: the metonymic movement of desire which carry us with itself for good and evil. The irresistible quality of any *objet petit a* resides in the fact that it represents the lost (due to the Oedipal prohibition) *jouissance.* The lost excessive 'enjoyment' that in Freud's terms is situated 'beyond the pleasure principle'. This 'surplus *jouissance' (plus-de-jouir)* points to the boundary that can't be crossed, otherwise pleasure becomes pain. Paradoxically, desire having as its cause the *objet petit a*, seems to constitute a defense against crossing a certain limit of *jouissance* (Lacan, 1966h, p. 825), that is, allows to satisfy drive 'safely', only to some supportable degree. The result is the constitutively conflicted being of the human psychism and the ultimately impenetrable source of its discordant character. The more so that the 'extimate', as much 'included' as 'beyond', transcends every conceptualization in terms of the dualistic pairs: 'inside-outside', 'linguistic-affective', 'transcendent-immanent', 'otherness-sameness', etc., regarded as irreconcilable oppositions. 'Extimacy' hasn't any localizable roots in us, nor having any cause situated in the other subject, is situated somewhere 'in-between'. It seems to resume everything that 'referentiality' is about, when it reaches its fullest and most developed form. The source of this 'inner beyond', inseparable from the primordial relation – may be conceived as fulfilling an important transcendental function as the basis of the human (inter)subjectivity, its condition of possibility *par excellence.* However, as transcending any attempt at rendering it in symbolic terms, our innermost soul amounts to 'non-being' so that the 'extimate' condition is, paradoxically, the condition of the ultimate impossibility of the subject, of his/her thorough definition.

The Real, being the incoherence of the symbolic system itself, is constantly penetrated by all sorts of affects, although they are not experienced on the daily basis and escape explications or descriptions in a way that would be intelligible enough to be understood (lest the listener has personally experienced the invasion of the Real). Among the affects induced by the intrusion of the Real, we can especially enumerate the often overpowering and unexplained fascination or obsession with someone, enormous anxiety bordering on panic, even strong disgust or repulsion aroused of particular objects *a* (which is well developed in Kristeva's work on abjection). However, the unquestionable first place, as far as objects *a* are concerned, is anxiety. This anxiety is – as Lacan often used to repeat – 'not without object'. Since objects *a*

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[37] We can never enjoy it enough, it always disappears too early.

are remainders of the blissful unity with the Thing, they play the part of the most genuine supporters of desire as such. What is of great importance is that anxiety is the only affect that doesn't deceive, it may even fulfill the function of something like a sort of ontological proof, as it is the only reliable source of certainty that's possible at all.

As the formula of the unconscious phantasm shows, the thoroughly 'extimate' reference is what characterizes the relationship between the 'barred subject' and *a*. For the subject's unconscious the two terms of the relationship are linked by the sign of 'diamond' between them, which signifies the relation of desire [38]. The relation is necessarily equivocal and ambiguous, since its terms tend to be confused with each other and their positions are interchangeable[39]. This concerns especially the two specifically Lacanian 'fallen objects' (added to the three, introduced earlier by Freud), which are gaze and voice, the most frequent, as it seems, objects-causes of desire (not to be confused with love objects). The scopic and auditory drives seem to belong to the primary Other as well as to the future subject, and along with the Freudian three originary drives are 'shared'' by all the human beings ready to expose themselves on whatever destination awaits them. Their 'decentered' and 'extimate' characteristics determine their whole lives. Every human subject's sexual bodily parts or their derivatives (voice, gaze) are shared with the chosen Others, are being exposed, letting the basic drives circle around them, constituting the most dreamt-of sources of *jouissance*. Every object-cause of desire is one-off, unique and singular. It may be even said that the only thing that is shared by all the humans is being unrepeatable and irreplaceable, as well as their vulnerability and finitude. They may expose themselves as such, may expose their vulnerability, their one-and-only, never possible to repeat existence to different others, who don't always have good intentions[40]. These

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[38] As *a* is what has fallen from the subject due to the strongly experienced affect of anxiety, we can speak of a certain ambiguous element in the mentioned matheme of the unconscious desire: the 'barred subject' and the 'fallen object' are joined (and separated) by the sign pointing to the mutuallity/bilaterality of whatever relationship links them (as desire manifests itself in diverse affects, they may appear on the both sides of this 'extimate' quasi-equation).

[39] To offer one example: the child gazing at their parents (e. g. during their sexual act) starts to more or less unwillingly phantasize of its being gazed at by them.

[40] The good term introduced by Derrida (who doesn't believe in an 'angelic' version of the neighbor) seems to be 'hostipitality' *(hostipitalité)*: being hospitable but not tolerating any form of hostility Derrida, 2000). This reminds us of the Lacanian *'hateloving' (hainemoration),* although the intention of the thinker was to present the usual 'hustle and bustle' of any partner's sometimes quite stormy and turbulent interactions with his/her loved one, however the term might be applied not only to partnerships but to much broader social context. And also the third of the most influential thinkers nowadays E. Lévinas, underlines the non-angelic, egocentric, sometimes outwardly cruel relationships between neighbors, and finds a solution focusing on the reference to the 'third' (of the 'brothers'), then on these foundations constructs the suggested foundations of the society. These thinkers seem to have elaborated more mature notions of justice and, in general, the ethical dimension. Here we can mention also Derridian *khôra*, meaning 'place' (Derrida, 2016). This mysterious place is shared (shares itself) with those who need it and starts gradually to recede in the

unique - in case of every single person – partial 'objects' of oral, anal, genital, scopic and auditory drives may be regarded as different sorts of isolated 'singularities' (as this term is understood in topology). Each of them may be regarded as delimited by a kind of 'event horizon', the crossing of which suddenly and unexpectedly curves the time-space of our reality in a total and unforeseen way. The passage may transfer us – like through a sort of spatiotemporal tunnel – into something like hiperspace – the multidimensional 'space' we have 'forgotten', we know and don't know at the same time. The partial objects form the five 'disseminated' human 'centers of gravity' with relation to which we are essentially 'decentered' but at the same time constantly attracted to - and repelled by – their magnetic, compelling influence exerted on us. It sometimes happens that the subject we suppose to know, appears in a complete different light because of a certain, seemingly unimportant, tiny detail, having to do with one of the little *a*'s like enigmatic flash in his eyes. This feature may incite us to fall in love in this person or start to hate him/her. The affect that appears in such situations may be what was named by Freud, as mentioned before, by the term *unheimlich*. This affect could be described as connected with an impression of being estranged with regard to what was always so familiar and obvious, and now seems alien and 'strange', without its cozy aura of domestication. Such effective experiences might be called 'extimate pointers', as they point in the two contradictory directions: the habitual, common, 'external' perception we got used to, and the personal intimate, interior experience.

We may talk of the sequence of the three degrees of ever more radical (with every level) 'exteriority', constitutive of, correspondingly, the three indispensable kinds of ever deeper 'intimacy' of the psyche with its 'internal' memories belonging to some forgotten levels of the archaic past. If a sudden, unexpected break or momentary lack of coherence in the symbolic order of (unconscious) signifiers, which generate and correct our usual projections, constituting the signified as the conscious 'knowledge'. In fact, signifiers refer always only to other signifiers (called signifieds, however it doesn't change anything in their signifying nature) in the net of the symbolic structure. The net is spread among the mentioned 'singularities', supporting them in the framework of a determined topology of the 'extimate' (inter)subjectivity. The curving of the surface determines possibilities of affects that can be experienced by the individual as 'decentered' with regard to that which exactly accounts for just this experience.

This is the outline of the transition from the (post)structural approach conceptualizing particular levels of language theory taking into account the affect-driven and 'extimate' subject in his/her 'decenteredness'. This formulation would be very difficult without taking into consideration the dynamics of energetic transformations of the economy of drive. The reference to the Spinosian approach provides us with a precise, quasi-mathematical investigation of energetic movements in terms of

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measure of its receiving by everything what is other. And so, the unique quality of this space is vanishing in order to make more space for those who most desperately need it for survival. The memory of 'thalassa', the traces of *conatus*-driven 'substance' become the living and live-giving space. Spatialisation and temporalization proceed in the measure they are needed, becoming the spatiotemporal dimension where all the humanity is immerged, exposed and sharing.

intensification and weakening of their strength, as their increasing or decreasing effectuates changes of values attributed to the experienced events. The result of these transformations are changes of affects that are the basic modes of the operation of the 'substance'. The affective changes are strictly connected with shifts in representing oneself by the subject in the net of signifiers. The subject is finally defined as someone who is represented by one of the signifiers, which is in turn represented to another signifier, determined by the changes of the signifying slides and slippages, which lead to the master signifiers - those representing the subject immediately to the Other. In sum, the calculus of affects is set in movement by the Other, to whom the subject is in an 'extimate', 'decentered' way continuously referring.

Conclusion

The anti-dualistic concept of *extimité* would demand a much longer exposition of the reasons why 'extimacy' in its full (inter)subjective realization transcends the simplified dualistic pairs of the most common contradictions. Summarizing, the neologism may be understood as comprising the essential linguistic and affective characteristics of the human 'de-centered' (inter)subjectivity, translated into topological terms in the three completely different ways: the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. Each of them implicates the particular, unique revelation of 'exteriority' as formative of what is regarded the 'intimate' sphere of any subject (and, of course, the formation is always reciprocal).

It must be remembered that the triad of the mentioned 'spheres' is, strictly speaking, the three separate levels or dimensions of language, three purely linguistic realms. However, as it turns out, they are inseparably permeated by affects. If we take, as a starting point, Spinosian 'substance', the differential operations of increasing (marked by '+') or decreasing energy (marked by '-') lead by means of further decreases and increases to changes of values. When increasing energy of a chosen affect reaches the critical point, the change of value is marked by the opposite of the previous sign. The drive *(conatus)* joins the pairs of '+' an '-' into more and more embracing sequences of linguistic signs and with every level of new symbols, the new human subject comes into being. The constitution of the origin of grammar, when accompanied by the construction of the first signifiers, when set into movement, proceeds by itself until the first syntax, affectively marked, is ready to function without help[41]. Then the

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[41] In my opinion, the Lacanian theory of the linguistic-affective subject is a bit unclear unless we discriminate different 'stages', 'processes', so to say, of the formation of the subject. I've used above, perhaps too chaotically, the three different 'verbal nouns', which could be better enlightened. The first is 'subjection' – this is, the point of departure of every living entity: being somehow 'thrown' into the world, into certain independent circumstances. The newborn is always already sub-jected: to its first Other, to the generational, to the common discours that preceeds its appearance, and at last to its 'own' discourse constituted of the sequence of unconscious signifiers. It is dependent on all the 'mirrors' it meets, then to the paternal law, at last to the Other as such, that is, groundless and hanging in the void. The second term/phase of the genesis of the subject (in the full Lacanian meaning of this word) is 'subjectivation' the individual actively takes on his/her back what was piled up on it while, as a child, it remained in a much more passive state. This is what perhaps Lacan has in his

system starts to generate its own grammar, producing further rules as needed. At last the newly formed 'rings of string' appear, constituting in each particular case an inimitable constellation of Borromean knot (such that when one of the three rings, Imaginary, Symbolic, or Real falls apart, the whole knot is broken). Each knot gains their own topological traits, stemming from the whole affective-linguistic history of the subject. Every knot represents everyone as singular and unique. Later on, Lacan introduces the fourth element - 'sinthome'- reconstructed, rebuilt old symptom, now endowed with new, elaborated, unique qualities, allowing for such a way of living in which 'it stops not being written' and a person has found one's own way for achieving *jouissance*. It is the singular *sinthome*, that keeps strongly together the whole of RSI. During the sexual linguistic-affective development [42] [43] of the young

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mind while he speaks of 'eating one's Dasein'. However, maybe not all of this 'repas' is nourishing, or even digestible, and then the advent of the third 'avatar' of subjectivity becomes indispensible – 'subjectivization' – assimilating what is needed and rejecting what is dangerous or uselesss. If 'subjectivation' means a becoming a countable individual, one of many others, the singular number as contradicted to plurality of what is similar; then 'subjectivization' means transforming all of this into truly unique and particular, not to be repeated nor substituted. The subject must be passive and active at the same time ('medial' in the sense of old Greek grammar) and it is just then that one's most own 'sinthome' is formed. The previous 'subjectivation' consists in being condemned just to one or some of many possible symptoms, where there's not much choice). While one's own extimate relationship to the 'decentered center' can be realized with the sublation of all dualisms, and the advent of the subject reaching the fullest range of his/her potential (sometimes it may be regarded as 'litter', however, litter may contain many treasures).

[42] There's too little place here to deepen the subject that may be very relevant to the explored topic and highly interesting in itself, the question of linguistic *jouissance* and its 'extimate' characteristics. Lacan develops the concept of 'enjoy-meant' *(jouis-sense),* strictly connected with the affective dimension of any linguistic material. The words as specific material groupings of sounds, provided with concrete meanings, are permeated by the peculiar energy, by a certain irreducible kind of pleasure. For example, it often happens that a certain special aspect of a word or of a group of words is associated with 'the happy atmosphere' emanating from it. Remember for example the almost ecstatic 'aura', experienced by the subject who at a certain moment hears or articulates the name of the most loved person, the warmth and joy felt in the blissful atmosphere of excitement and pleasure that surrounds and penetrates this small group of phonemes. Although the subject doesn't necessarily think of their meaning, he feels happier – he is affected by the 'extimate' in its extreme. Let's remember also about *jouissance* accompanying neologisms, word-plays, especially containing a pinch of humor.

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representatives of the two sexes, each of the three enumerated *dimensions* undergoes profound restructuration. The advent of the Oedipal complex (when what was Imaginary undergoes a total 'rewriting' in terms of the Symbolic structure) implicates the strict, uncompromising accustoming oneself to the norms of language and law. However, as the logical consequence of the development of linguistic capabilities of the subject, the Symbolic register reveals its Realness (its non-completeness, splits and slips, its 'hanging' in the void, since there's no Other of the Other). This results in loosening the stiffness of the connections in the net of signifiers, in sequences of sounds, etc. This is sometimes accompanied by the much more (than previously) individual assimilation of linguistic structures, permitting of their transformation into various neologisms, word-plays, etc. This proceeds not without reference to one's symptomatic limitations – resulting sometimes in the transformation of what limits and disturbs into what reduces the impact of the relevant symptom on the life of the individual, and even sometimes helps to retrieve at least a part of the hidden potential of a particular human being. As was mentioned, this is called *sinthome* – which means an important linguistic-affective-behavioral change, often equipping the person with his or her own, sometimes quite expressive and vivid, however always highly individualized dialect-like language [44].

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irreducible kind of pleasure. For example, it often happens that a certain special aspect of a word or of a group of words is associated with 'the happy atmosphere' emanating from it. Remember for example the almost ecstatic 'aura', experienced by the subject who at a certain moment hears or articulates the name of the most loved person, the warmth and joy felt in the blissful atmosphere of excitement and pleasure that surrounds and penetrates this small group of phonemes. Although the subject doesn't necessarily think of their meaning, he feels happier – he is affected by the 'extimate' in its extreme. Let's remember also about *jouissance* accompanying neologisms, word-plays, especially containing a pinch of humor.

[44] The concept of *sinthome* couldn't be omitted in the presentation of the 'extimate' constitution of any linguistically (post)structured subjectivity. The subject expresses his intimate world in worlds he/she has acquired from other language-speakers and assimilated as his/her own way of not only communicating with others but also externalizing what he received from the 'outside', while acting and realizing in action his/her singular individuality. So the concept of 'sinthome' is connected with the striving to work one's own unique way of linguistically expressing oneself, based not only on one's abilities, talents, successes, etc., but also on what hurts, on painful experiences and symptomatic ways of coping with one's limitations. So the basis of forming a personal, particular *sinthome* is not only structural-linguistic but also affective, expressing all the perturbations that resulted in the most important transformations of one subjective's surface of sense and its fractures and breaks (compare Deleuze's concept of the 'surface of sense' in the *Logique du sense*), and being the accepted way of repeating certain traumas. *Sinthome* appears seemingly from nowhere, as the biblical 'Mane, Thecel, Phares', written by an invisible hand, and constitutes the person's most own (although surprising even for the subject himself or herself), particular way of presenting one's transformed relatedness to the Other. This underlines the importance of the 'flesh and blood''- *la chair et le sang* - of letters, the 'litteral' (in all of its senses),

As was said above, the constitution of the Lacanian subject is an effect of the connection of the linguistic structure and its affective dimension, accompanied by various topological transformations of relationships between 'inside' and 'outside', among others[45]. Perhaps we could say: the Imaginary may be defined as 'pre-structure', the Symbolic – as 'structure' *tout court*, and the Real would deserve to be called 'post-structure' (that is, what remains of the 'structural' when something 'fails' or 'falls' and a certain impasse breaks and stops the whole proper operating). Each of the three registers necessarily generates affects because of the 'extimate', ex-centric constitution of (inter)subjectivity, which is revealed more and more by Lacan in the course of the development of his thought, finally summarized in the author's equation of 'structure' with 'topology'. We can think of the notion of 'extimacy', as a sort of the 'intermediary' concept, joining the structural/linguistic conditions with the dimension of affectivity of a living being.

The mentioned elusive, vague remainders and reminders at the same time, which are the *objets petits a*, are 'localized' in the central part of the figure of the Borromean chain, close to the 'point', where the three dimensions intersect (Lacan, 10.12.1974, p.19, online). As the above considerations indicate, this 'structure' is far from being a harmonious synthesis, the interdependence is inseparable from tension. The later elaborations focused on this (inter)subjective knot reveal it as the 'structure' constantly vulnerable to dissolution unless held together by the mentioned fourth element – the *sinthome* – the essential way, 'chosen' by the subject, of organizing one's being strictly in relation to one's 'extimate' essence. What is important in this new presentation is that although such a formation seems to be the result of a certain compromise, nonetheless introducing the *sinthome* resists ultimately any further analysis. Although being the subject's own, particular mode of channeling *jouissance* (otherwise speaking, realizing the 'extimate' possibilities in an acceptable way), its economy remains alien to him or her, it is impossible to 'put our fingertips on' it (Lacan, 1975b, p. 116). The sinthomatic 'extimacy' finally constitutes the 'dit-mension of body', enjoyment of speech, of the written, inseparable from *jouissance*, the source of which are the bodily piece(s), surrounded by the never-ending movements of drives. These singular points, where not only 'it speaks' but also 'where it speaks, it *enjoys' (là où ça parle, ça jouit)* (Lacan, 1975b, p. 104).

What is the final goal of the analysis then? Could be the enactment of a particular *sinthome a* justified reason to end the analytic process? Perhaps the proper time to terminate the analysis depends on the attitude of the analyzed person to the form of the *sinthome* and the sufficiency of its potential to reenact the 'extimate', long

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material 'heart' or 'core' of language, so often treated as waste matter, rubbish, instead of the indispensible vehicle of sense.

[45] If we tried to deepen our understanding of people's relationship to linguistic elements, we would have to refer to nothing else than what permeates – whether we know it or not – all of our references to the world as the incarnation of language as such, and especially of our own 'sinthomatic' language. That would point at the 'extimate' curving of any trajectories of sense-giving, of sense-appearing, of sense-operating, accounting for any paradoxical (simultaneously inner and outer) unique 'fold', any particular 'folding' of every entity that we refer to or that refers to us. And that's why nearly nothing is totally indifferent to us.

dormant sexuality? The most preferred moment of conclusion seems to be when the person is able genuinely say that the commandment: 'love your symptom (meaning *sinthome*) as yourself' is in his/her case fulfilled.

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Superego and Will to Dominate Over Ego:
A Synthetic Approach to Ideology Through Encapsulated Skin-Ego

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Abstract

The study of superego and ideology within the context of bodily ego and skin as a psychic wrapping is vital to understanding the intersubjective aspects of those individuals who are living in a mal-attuned or extreme situation. This paper investigates superego's will to dominate over the skin-ego to satisfy the id by itself and takes an intermediate position between id and external reality. The authors further attempt is to conceptualize superego formation in a skin model of ego development in a synthetic way and redefine ideology within the context of this conceptualization. The term *Encapsulated Skin-Ego* may explain how when the skin-ego is dysfunctional, a certain part of superego comes into being a psychic wrapping instead of the skin-ego and has left its developmental position. Consequently, the skin-ego takes refuge in the encapsulated skin-ego to be secure. In addition, ideology has a hegemonic character and wishes to control social symbols to continue its domination over people's minds and bodies. Ideology tries to encapsulate the skin-ego and deprive it of natural sensations to lead it to an isolated corner ultimately to suppress the thinking ego. Two-case studies present the psychoanalytic application of the authors' ideas.

> We have still very much to learn about the nature of that institution [the superego].
> S. Freud, 1927/1961e, p. 159

Introduction

Seeing the mind on the mirror of the Freudian structural model has occupied the psychoanalysts' brain beyond Sigmund Freud (1915/1961i, 1920/1961b, 1923/1961c, 1933/1961g, 1938/1961h). Within this context, an ongoing debate has occurred over the origin of superego and especially in the case of ego-ideal and superego formation (Britton, 2003; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984; Fenichel, 1928, 1931; S. Freud, 1927/1946; Jacobson, 1946; Kernberg, 1975; Klein, 1927/1975b, 1932/1975e, 1933/1975c, 1935/1975a; Lacan, 1994; Sandler, 1960). The debate has mainly shown how the genesis of superego has increasingly captured the interest of psychoanalytic community.

According to Lagache (as cited in Anzieu, 1987a, p. 423), Freud interchangeably used superego, ego ideal, and ideal ego to represent the superego. As a comparison between ego-ideal and ideal ego, Britton (2003) declared that the ideal-ego is an

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"illusional perfect self" (p. 105), while ego-ideal depends on what superego wants the child to be. In addition, Lagache (as cited in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973) comprehended the ideal ego in the context of narcissistic formulation and omnipotence, and identification with praiseworthy figures; further, Chasseguet-Smirgel (1984) viewed ego-ideal as a tendency toward reinstating illusion while the (benign) superego helps encourage reality (p. 76).

Investigating superego formation depends on the level of experiencing in the unconscious chosen by researchers. According to Hinshelwood (1997), three levels or layers are evident in the interpretation of the unconscious. The first layer interprets the level of repression and symbolization by considering Oedipal rivalry, for example, like Freud and classical psychoanalysis. The second layer understands the unconscious through pre-oedipal object-relations and in terms of primitive defense mechanisms such as Kleinian psychoanalysis. Finally, the third layer of understanding the unconscious is primal skin, which considers the skin as an apparatus of containment as explained, for example, by Bick (1964, 1968), Montagu (1978), and Anzieu (1979, 1984, 1990, 1995/2016).

This paper selected the third layer of experiencing and understanding of the unconscious and called it the *Skin Model of Ego Development* (SMED) in psychoanalysis, which is the cornerstone of the study of this topic. This system of psychoanalytic thinking involves three characteristics. First, the origin of SMED goes back to Freud's concept of bodily ego (S. Freud, 1923/1961c); therefore, for this model, the self is a "pre-individual psychic whole" (Anzieu, 1979, p. 23) and existed before the ego, which constructs through defining boundaries and limits later. Second, the SMED's findings are based on observation of the infant-mother relationship (Bick, 1968). Finally, SMED focuses on the non-defensive functions of skin as a primary ego (Anzieu, 1987b). This way of beholding the skin gives an opportunity to the self to feel the sense of unity through the skin as a psychic envelope (Anzieu, 1995/2016). In this topographical model of the mind, the skin is a psychic container and "in fact found to be in front of the psychic apparatus as a filter, as a screen, as an interfacing between external reality and internal reality" (Anzieu & Anzieu, 1985, p. 43). As a result, the skin provides integration and characterizes SMED as a non-dualistic approach that operates within the context of intersubjectivity (Lafrance, 2013).

The term *ideology* has multiple meanings in different disciplines, but in this paper, ideology is viewed through the lens of superego, ideal-ego, and ego-ideal formation. Moreover, ideology is considered a distorting illusion and "camera obscura" (Marx, 1845/1998, p. 47) that tries to deceive and seduce people to join a certain ideological system (Kølvraa & Ifversen, 2017). Ideology gains control over the body/skin because the soma is the home of the psyche and subjectivity (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Consequently, ego strength can be perceived in the context of the boundaries of the body and its envelope, skin, which symbolizes social boundaries (Douglas, 1966), resulting in a mutual relationship between bodily ego and society. According to Broughton and Zahaykevich (1988), "the power and significance of ideology reside in its ability to penetrate silently into every aspect of human development" (p. 196). The nature of ideology is to serve as a defensive fortress that can reduce anxiety by producing handmade idols and a shared system of ideas (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984). Indeed, ideology supplies a sharing space for transferring the omnipotent power to its

believers because "behind the ideology there is always a phantasy of narcissistic assumption" (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985, p. 49).

Psychoanalysis as a critique of ideology (Barratt, 1985) and oppressive-fundamentalist discourses try to reveal a route from the primary to the secondary process thinking: from magical thinking to realistic thought (Loewald, 1962/1980c, 1978/1980b). In contrast, ideologic-oppressive systems attempt to disturb this process to govern the person's mind through invisible cultural controls thereby producing confusion of the symbolic formation and generating an ideologic discourse in service of producing oppressed objects without independent thought or a harmonious identity. Additionally, ideological systems apply suggestion and brainwashing methods to gain control over minds in order to recreate a mythical ancient past and its idols (Britton, 2002; Kernberg, 2003a, 2003b).

The reader will realize how the authors will see classical terminology through a contemporary lens. This implies that what someone sees in the structural model's mirror could not be a perception of contemporary human beings but only reflects them. Concerning this matter, for example, Britton (2003, p. 93) asserted that how Melanie Klein "was happier using the term the unconscious than the id". Additionally, Klein applied the term self to refer to the entirety of the individual and considered ego as a part of self that calls these days subjective self.

From a psycho-socio-political point of view, this paper views ideological systems as the generator of extreme limitation to normal ego development (Broughton & Zahaykevich, 1988) in order to pose a danger to ego independence (A. Freud, 1937/1993). The limited milieu refers to the importance of sociopolitical context in a historical background where the individual sometimes lives in an extreme situation (Bettelheim, 1967) such as prison, war, and asylum.

Upon reflection on superego formation within the context of SMED, this paper follows three essential theoretical lines: First, considering superego functioning within the context of domination and affect-regulation. Second, looking the superego through the SMED lens with a special emphasis on dysfunctional skin-ego and how superego can be re-understood within the framework of skin-ego and thinking ego (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Finally, redefining ideology with the help of a new formulation of the relationship between superego, skin-ego and thinking ego.

The Importance of the Paper and Method

Sigmund Freud (1923/1961c) believed "the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego" (p. 27), one which shows the primary process of thought. This means bodily sensations are important in forming the primary ego, and some key psychoanalysts thought about the SMED. Bick (1964, 1968) and Anzieu (1979, 1984, 1990, 1995/2016) developed their theories based on the Freudian term *bodily ego*. Anzieu (1979) recognized Winnicott (1945/1958) among those who supported the SMED because Winnicott accentuated "the visual signals" (p. 23) in reference to Winnicott's (1971) quotation, "When I look I am seen, so I exist" (p. 114). Winnicott (1955) promoted "living in the body" (p. 264) and asserted that without a sense of embodiment, no sense of otherness is possible (Winnicott, 1963/1965a, 1971).

The concept of skin as a subjective boundary refers to the soma as a home for psyche (Winnicott, 1962/1965b). Good enough handling of the body and its needs facilitates developmental shifting from skin-ego to thinking ego in terms of personalization (Winnicott, 1962/1965b) and individualization (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Synthesizing Winnicott's and Anzieu's notions indicates that individuation (personalization) depends on a "tactile envelope, which is also an envelope of warmth, softness, and firm holding" (Anzieu, 1990, p. 65). Within this context, depersonalization is the outcome of a split between the psyche and soma, and it rises because of non-good-handling (Anzieu, 1990, 1995/2016; Winnicott, 1962/1965b). There is a strong tendency for psychoanalysts to formulate an intermediate position that protects the self from mental pain, trauma and extreme situation. During depersonalization, the second skin operates following extreme frustration and tries to protect the individual through the second skin's omnipotent phantasies and overusing some mental functions (Bick, 1968). Furthermore, Winnicott described transitional space "as the resting place of illusion" (in Rodman, 1987, p.123) and Rosenfeld (1950) considered confusion as intermediate stage between splitting and reintegration. Additionally, Freud (1938/1961h) suggested that the superego locates itself at a strategic position between the id and the external world to become an intermediate function. This fact draws authors' attention to the role of superego as an intermediate agency which functions developmentally and pathologically.

Following Atwood and Stolorow (1993) that emphasized on context as a generator of our hermeneutics, it is necessary to describe a little bit about the first author's contextuality that as a clinical psychologist had an analysis with a Post-Kohutian analyst and as a psychoanalysis candidate is in a Freudian psychoanalysis. Both valuable experiences have encouraged him to build up his identity as a contemporary Freudian within the matrix of SMED through his Ph.D. dissertation under supervision of the second author. Thereupon, for authors, the outcome of depersonalization is the disturbance of the developmental line from skin-ego to thinking ego; thus, the dysfunctional skin-ego opens a space for an imaginary skin to occupy the key position instead of skin-ego to wrap the psyche, even transitionally. In other words, when the skin-ego does not function as an envelope it seeks another skin shelter or refuge as a halfway home. After searching psychological-psychoanalytical databases such as PsycINFO, PEP, Google Scholar, Science Direct and Humanities Source, the psychoanalytical study on a synthetic approach to superego formation, skin-ego and ideology with a focus on SMED has not been able to catch a significant attention.

The paper plans to conceptualize this imaginary and defensive skin in order to understand the superego's will to dominate over the skin-ego. Within this context, ideology will define into the matrix of SMED. For this purpose, the paper uses a qualitative method to shift from convergent thinking to divergent thinking through a fresh pair of eyes. It wishes to refer the gap in literature review and consequently re-understanding the literature through two-case studies the first is based on a deep interview and its qualitative analysis, and the second is discussing a refugee experiences with the help of his written works, textual analysis.

Towards a Synthetic Conceptualization of Skin-Ego

To find common ground in the presence of the tower of Babel in the psychoanalytic discourse, Anzieu (1990) asserted that "…(it) is implicit in Freud: "the unconscious is

the body" (p. 43), accordingly, gathered id, body and unconscious in one place in harmonic way. The body-unconscious as a corporeal foundation cannot meet the external reality by itself and bodily ego as a forerunner faces reality at the surface or skin, like a tree trunk that develops from a pitch to bark and its bark is a shield against external stimuli. This bodily ego for growing and developing the thinking ego, subjective self, needs to attunement and containment within a relational atmosphere. In this sense, the self cannot find itself directly but needs to perceive itself with the help of some representations such as ideals and defense mechanisms and, resultantly, "The self arises as separate structure out of the relation between ego and superego, just as the superego arises out of the ego's relation to the world" (Havens, 1986, p. 370).

The superego is rooted in its biological origins and involves "acoustic roots" (Freud, 1923/1961c), such as parental rules, while ego is formed on its tactual experiences (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 105). The ego envelops the psyche, and the two egos are the skin-ego and thinking ego (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Anzieu defined *skin-ego* as a first bodily-psychological organ that is in contact with the surrounding environment. Anzieu (1995/2016) listed the following eight non-defensive functions of the skin ego: (a) maintenance or holding (b) containment, (c) protection, (d) individuation (e) inter-sensoriality, (f) sexualization (g) libidinal recharging, and (h) inscription. Most important to the current revision of the present investigation is Anzieu's formulation of an auto-immune activity as a ninth function for the skin-ego called "attacks against the skin-ego" (p. 114) or "the attacks on the psychical container" (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 14). This function follows a self-destructive manner and wishes to remove the self and sets up a state of "non-self" (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 115) in a pure thanatic way and in the opposite direction to the attachment drive (Unlink, 2008).

Specifically, the skin-ego is a primary structure that will later be replaced by the thinking ego. After this replacement, the ego can think symbolically through two elements: (a) desire and (b) language. Besides, the thinking ego is close to the secondary process of thinking and operates symbolically in close relationship with language and consciousness (Anzieu, 1989, 195/2016). As a result, the basic assumption of Anzieu's theory is clear: Without sensations, perception cannot exist. That having been said, thinking ego cannot be created without a normal development of skin-ego, "not touching is like not thinking" (Ulnik, 2008, p. 32), because the intersubjectivity depends upon recognizing an individual's feelings, thoughts, and wills through the caregivers (Fonagy et al., 1995; Ogden, 1994). Deprivation of the ego of its tactual experiences results in a dysfunctional state of skin-ego.

Anzieu. (1995/20160 explained how "archaic sadistic Superego" (p. 184) is activated from the initial development of language and begins to show itself in the position of the regulator of cognition and behavior. In other words, the superego has language structure and children learn it not only through words, but also rules related to acquisition of speech. (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 105). Further, superego can operate in two levels of functioning—benign and malignant, and utilizing only the superego cannot reflect the destructive and pathological aspect of the superego. It is necessary to say that the nature of (benign) superego suggests the "primary taboo on touching replaces the tactile wrapping as the essential anaclitic support for the Ego" (Anzieu,

1995/2016, p. 105). Additionally, the abnormal superego disturbs the process of affect-cognition regulation and, consequently, the development of the symbolic formation and language, and deviates the shifting from skin-ego to thinking ego. Superego, then, resulting from constructive identification can regulate affect effectively, but when it is the outcome of defective identification with mal-attuned parents, the superego cannot regulate the self and its affect (Krystal, 1988). In this sense, abnormal superego is anti-object-relational and originating from earliest dissociations and separated from ego functions (O'Shaughnessy, 1999).

The question is then raised: How can the dysfunctional skin-ego disturb the function of the thinking ego in the presence of superego's will to dominant? The answer comes back to the nature of superego formation and the SMED. In line with superego's domination, Anna Freud (1937/1993) showed how the ego could be overwhelmed in dealing with id's manifestation and found refuge in the superego. Subsequently, the ego under pressure of anxiety opens its gate to the superego's troops and loses its independence "and [the ego] is reduced to the status of an instrument for the execution of the superego's wishes" (pp. 111–112). Moreover, Lacan (1988) helped to understand the role of the superego by noting that the superego wishes to govern the ego and to satisfy the id by itself. Further, in terms of the domineering nature of the superego, Anzieu (1995/2016) decided the id, ego, and superego are competing for superiority on the surface to be a psychic wrapping, and even the id tends "to offer itself too as a total wrapping" (p. 92). Considering this rivalry as a will to power, the failure of the skin-ego to provide a wrapping for the psyche ends in the sense of the discontinuity of the self (i.e., anxiety).

In addition, within the context of SMED, it is important to clarify the differentiation between primal skin and second skin. Bick (1968) explained how the inadequate containing object pushes the infant to generate omnipotent phantasies to hold himself by another skin called second skin:

Disturbance of the primal skin function can lead to the development of a "second-skin" formation through which dependence on the object is replaced by a pseudo-independence, by the inappropriate use of certain mental functions, or perhaps innate talents, for the purpose of creating a substitute for this skin container. (p. 484)

According to Bick (1968), there is a need for a containing object in case of experiencing the unintegrated state by the infant and it generates "a frantic search for an object" (p. 485). The authors think that this frantic search for the containing object in overwhelming states of mind opens the way for a defensive skin to provide continuity through projecting the entire of self into a capsule object. This capsule assumes that replaces itself as a protective skin/object and is related to abnormal superego. Anzieu (1995/2016) believes that the superego wishes to be dominant over the ego: "Superego tends to make itself coextensive with the whole surface of the Ego and to substitute itself for the latter as a psychical wrapping" (p. 92). Following Bick

and Anzieu, the current investigation contends that the current conceptualization of the second skin in the matrix of the skin model of ego is confusing and misleading because of its overlap with abnormal superego and dysfunctional skin-ego. The present paper recognizes that abnormal superego has desire to dominate over skin-ego to protect the individual from "transitory states of unintegration" (Bick, 1968, p.136) through building a psychic protective capsule against hurtful reality. The authors apply a new term, *encapsulated-skin-ego* to explain an isolative aspect of dysfunctional skin-ego that is separated, alienated and dissociated from emotional experiences.

The encapsulated-skin-ego wishes to wrap its capsule closely about the dysfunctional skin-ego in order to be an alternative-imaginary skin to protect the self, although this protective function belongs to skin-ego developmentally (Anzieu, 1990). Encapsulated skin-ego succeeds in encapsulating the skin-ego through two types of imaginary defensive wrapping: 1) an encapsulation related to superego and its components and 2) an encapsulation related to overusing some skin-ego's functions. The first one shows itself in identifying with authority figures (Lorenz, 1973) and defective identifications. Within this context, the individual wishes to use the imaginary skin of the object as a coat phantasmically that is more related to ego-ideal and its idealized objects, thus providing internal security for the vulnerable and fragile skin-ego. Moreover, taking refuge in the ideal ego and its illusional struggles to the reunion with the perfect-self and its omnipotent phantasies in order to regulate painful affects. This type of wrapping is more interconnected to the concept of second skin, it means unlike the previous type of wrapping the omnipotent self and its phantasies replace itself with dependence on the object.

Furthermore, encapsulated skin-ego uses certain functions of skin-ego extremely to provide wrapping through current mental functions. In other words, to patch the sieve ego-skin a certain protective function of skin-ego overused by the individual. For example, imagine somebody who is addicted to massage to support his skin with the help of masseur's hands. This overusing pattern creates a substitute for the first function of skin-ego, holding.

In this sense, the encapsulated skin-ego as an imaginary skin is a thick and non-sensitive skin which is created by filtering sensations to protect the dysfunctional ego from stimuli and, consequently, provides distorted mental functioning, in conclusion, it is strongly believed by authors that if you don't touch and if you are not touched, you won't be able to reach higher levels of language and thinking. Resultantly, it could be said the encapsulated skin-ego supplies the prohibition to touch not to define normal borders but to gain control over shifting from touching to thinking. For this reason, the encapsulated skin-ego builds a secure capsule for insecure self that cannot stay current home, i.e., dysfunctional skin-ego. This type of psychic-encapsulation is defensive and is not restricted to people with traumatic experiences, but everybody can use it to different degrees.

Discussion

If ideology were redefined in a dysfunctional system of skin-ego, one might reconsider ideology in the framework of the encapsulation of skin-ego with the manipulation of skin-ego functioning. Thus, for these authors, ideology as a mass

production of depersonalization and the main outcome of second skin development can be redefined in the SMED and be revised under the umbrella of encapsulated skin-ego formation. In this sense, the ideal-ego grandiosely gathers inside itself defective identifications, and the ego-ideal tries to reinstall an illusionary guideline in the face of disappointment (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974,1984). Fleeing to the superego makes the wounded self be left unprotected, and the individual feels the gap between the ego and the ego-ideal painfully and perceives it as "a very deep wound" (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974, p. 352). This gap is experienced as a "defective identification" (p. 352) by the individual, and the gap blocks any sublimating attempt. In this way, the defective identification develops a pathological superego, and the constructive identification creates a developmental superego.

A clear definition of ideology was not offered by Anzieu (1987b, 1990, 1995/2016); he simply referred to ideology in parentheses in trying to explain how patients fill an inner space through "the imaginary presence of an object or an ideal person" (Anzieu, 1995/2016, p. 137). From a pathologic point of view, the superego sends auditory commands to deprive the skin-ego from touch and its tactile nature, presenting a double taboo on touching (p. 149). This deprivation can create the emptiness within the self, and the individual has to fill the gap by consuming ideologic figures. In the following discussion, an attempt is made to synthesize what was reviewed in order to define ideology within the context of an epidermal system of thought. One could argue that ideology with its hegemonic character (Boggs, 1984) and encapsulated skin-ego with its domineering nature constitutes a destructive twin to threaten the psyche's integrity.

Consequently, in a synthetic way (Anzieu, 1995/2016; Bick, 1964; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1974,1984; Winnicott, 1962/1965b), ideology is a defensive fusion of ideal-ego (illusionary perfect-self) and ego-ideal with a dysfunctional skin-ego to wrap the discontinuity of the self with the help of the encapsulation as an alternative skin. This fusion is an outcome of the activated encapsulated skin-ego to regulate the self and its affects pathologically. In fact, it is a response to a disturbance of the primal skin's functioning (Bick, 1964), de-personalizational states of mind (Winnicott, 1962/1965b), or inner empty space of the self and the dysfunctional skin-ego (Anzieu, 1995/2016). It means that the ideologic system tries to replace the defensive epidermal fusion with skin-ego to gain control over the sensory-motor gateway. Ideology wishes to inhibit the thinking ego or a secondary process thought on a cortical level (Anzieu, 1995/2016) in order to remove "individual critical power and moral sensibility" (Flugel, 1945, p. 182) and it means ideology wishes to removes or manipulates the developmental superego (Brainin & Teicher, 2015); consequently, implanting an idealized imaginary object instead of an actual object. The function of the idealized imaginary object is to satisfy the individual narcissistically when faced with external situations of frustration (Jacobson, 1946).

Unlike the ideologic discourse and its hegemonic domination, Winnicott (1950) defined *democracy* in mutual relationship between society and its members, suggesting a democratic "society [is] well-adjusted to its healthy individual members" (p. 176). Furthermore, Winnicott believed that the individual who is "personally-immature" and "prosocial but anti-individual" is obviously the one who governs an anti-democratic society (p. 178) or, as these authors view it, the idealized imaginary object. In other words, the idealized imaginary object as democratic discourse serves

the same function for people as an attuned mother or caregiver does for the child. The mother or caregiver supplies an affect regulation and feeling of continuity or, in the case of a mal-attuned caregiver, generates the feeling of discontinuity. For these authors, a democratic system prepares a containing environment for skin-ego and personalization.

Using the idealized imaginary object and ideological teachings to fill the gap that emerges following self-discontinuity causes some disturbance, disturbing the process of thinking and language—the fundamental functions of the thinking ego (Anzieu, 1990, 1995/2016). In the same way, the ego across the individual's development forms word-presentation and speech and thinking in a more creative way (Anzieu, 1995/2016). Loewald (1962/1980c) showed a missed link between the ideal-ego and primary narcissistic identification through "magical participation" (p. 47) in the world that is connected to the bodily origin of early language. Additionally, the earliest language experiences led to a magical power of words (Loewald, 1978/1980b). This magical usage of language encapsulates the individual and makes him more susceptible to projecting the ego-ideal onto an idealized leader, the idealized imaginary object who is prosocial but anti-individual (Winnicott, 1950).

Filling the gap with the idealized leader or ideological teaching can prevent the individual's collapse (Simmel, 1948) through using projection, idealization, and splitting (Kernberg, 2003a, 2003b; Summers, 2006). For these authors, ideology takes on this magical linguistical aspect of ego-ideal intentionally to dominate its discourse by putting emptied objects from any independent thought in the first line of defense against democratic discourse. Maybe because of this, ideological systems try to span the gap between skin-ego and thinking ego with the help of producing traumatic experiences, for example white torture. As Ferenczi (1933/1949) suggested, traumatic experiences disturb the capacity for symbolic representation, which is a required prior condition for developing language.

Shifting from primary to secondary process thought (Freud, 1915/1961j, 1923/1961c) depends on normal development. The encapsulated skin-ego inhibits functions of skin-ego as a primary process and defines a distorted lens to see the external world in terms of "magical communication between" ego and reality (Loewald, 1951/1980a, p, 19) in the secondary process. Ideology comes and uses this magical communication to gather omnipotent images as a false self-concept in terms of identity (Hollander, 2006), which is illusionary and imaginary. In this sense, extreme situations (Bettelheim, 1943) and traumatic events (Stolorow, 2007) like prison, torture or asylum experiences dramatically recall the certain part of superego and dysfunctional skin-ego's failures to play the epidermal role to protect the self instead of skin-ego. The first case study is of a young man who experienced prison and is explained from the SMED point of view.

Case Study: Horror Room

A young man with a history of prison experience accepted to participate in a deep interview with the first author by signing consent forms. The three sessions of the interview showed Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depersonalization symptoms, and psychosomatic symptoms due to physical torture and white torture. In addition, the interview considered his personality before prison, especially the

positive parts of his character. One important symptom was psychosomatic symptoms involving losing weight and appetite at the beginning of his arrest and continued after the prison by Gastrointestinal disturbance. The case family history demonstrates a calm atmosphere during childhood, and he found the house in which he spent his childhood secure and described how he started to stay home alone from age 12. Based on this paper's aims, a short report of the interviewee's experiences follows:

When I was arrested by them, they sent me to solitary confinement, which was an isolated cell. Before the arrest, they explained you are under arrest on suspicion of collaboration with Group X which was a shock for me because I had serious ideological conflicts with that group and also any participation in mentioned group was a serious crime in my country. Following the shock and two intense interrogations my body reacted with nausea, loss of appetite and diarrhea and spent a week not eating anything and just drinking water and tea. I started to have hair loss consistently in enormous amount. After the somatic reactions, they started to give me some tablets under the pretext of treating my anxiety and medical condition. During the day, I was indifferent after taking pills, but during nights, I experienced a strange state of mind that was something between sleep and wakefulness I woke up in panic every morning. I started to refuse to take pills and put them on the back of my tongue or sometimes vomited after ingesting oral tablets. I had to collaborate with interrogators under pressure and threat of torture, but I told myself they cannot be your friends so do not trust their smile and do not be afraid them because "Black will take no other hue". I had understood that I was going to lose my mind and I do not have any control over my thoughts. They threatened me with execution or imprisonment for life and said to me, "Your collaboration can reduce your sentence". I felt a deep feeling of emptiness, and during that time, I waited to meet my interrogator impatiently maybe I can convince him that I am not guilty.

One terrible memory that comes to my mind is one night I wanted to eat my dinner, but the prison guards called me they wanted to carry me to the interrogation room. We went downstairs to a dark basement where a horror room had been arranged to interrogate prisoners. A new interrogator asked me the earlier questions aggressively then started to hit me after he had turned off lights. Suddenly feelings of terror started running through my body and I felt my heart was about to stop. After a while, I found myself in prison's medical service. I felt awfully bad—a deep feeling of being a toy in the hands of the interrogator as a broken individual.

I should even make a confession that I had a reoccurring dream of an anonymous object which was believed to be a ghost by me approaching me along with my inability to move my body as if I had been paralyzed with fear and I need to even state that the closer that ghost was getting to me the more fears were being struck into my body and finally when that so-called ghost got close enough to touch my bed I would be awakened.

About empowerment factors during prison, I used to take the longest showers so that I could feel more secure. Another refreshing factor was relationship with other prisoners especially after I was transferred to a cell shared with two other prisoners. They gave me spirit and wisdom to resist.

Placing a great deal of pressure on the interviewee did not meet their objectives and after three months of intensive interrogations he was bailed out from prison. He had the courage to pursue his dreams and finally immigrated to a country to study and work freely. The man obviously experienced attacking skin-ego to control thinking ego. In other words, the white torture was used to replace abnormal superego instead of the normal psychic wrapping to suffocate ideologically opposing voices. A psychoanalytic analysis of the man follows:

- Breaking the borders of the body/skin by accusing him of being a member of Group called X which filled him with feeling of terror and insecurity, and the skin-ego felt helplessness that could not function to protect the body and psyche.
- Semi-Sensory deprivation and prevention of any resistance to changing the deprival atmosphere (Mason & Brady, 2009) served to send the skin-ego into the isolated capsule like a sending into a skin cyst.
- Cutting the relationship between the psyche and the soma in order to create depersonalization and empty space through giving unknown pills with psychological effects disrupted the border between sleep and wakefulness as a part of skin-ego's envelope.
- Producing terror and panic about being or not being alive for the victim and also sending to the horror room to break the last line of skin-ego's resistance, all eight functions of skin-ego were broadly under attack. Panic attacks could be seen as a possibility of skin-ego's collapse.
- The helpless and dysfunctional skin-ego took refuge in the encapsulated skin-ego. The encapsulated skin-ego came to protect him by identifying with the interrogator and satisfying his demands as a part of a hypnotic type of relationship, "addiction to illusional otherness" (Dorsey & Seegers, 1959, p. 56). In addition, this process could be understood in terms of negative attachment, which refers to "the alliance of the attachment instinct with the self-destructive instinct rather than with the self-preservative instinct" (Anzieu, 1993, p. 45). Fortunately, he did not trust his interrogators and also never fought with them. A psychoanalytic explanation is he had a kind and stable father and a protective mother during childhood. It helped him not to accept their allegations and did not fall into the trap of negative attachment.
- To continue, after prison, the panic attacks showed the ego loses its functioning when the encapsulated skin-ego envelopes and encapsulates the skin-ego. It appears when the skin-ego functions normally, and the role of the superego is going with the skin-ego developmentally in a normal situation. In extreme situations, the dysfunctional skin-ego recalls the malignant part of superego to help it, but the superego, in this new functioning, changes to a sort of non-natural skin because the superego has to supply the skin-ego's psychic wrapping, too. The encapsulated skin-ego never can be a psychic envelope in the long-term and needs some compensating backup. For example, in this case, psychosomatic symptoms were a part of a fruitless attempt to compensate the lost skin-ego's functions through controlling fears with somatic pain. It could be said the soma tries to contain the trauma with psychosomatic symptoms painfully or as McDougall (1980) says "Pain is a bridge that spans psyche and soma" (p.421).
- The dream of ghost refers to two facts: First, having near experience to skin-ego's collapse is very important factor that symbolize the integrator as an

intrusive ghost who entered his protective skin. In the disturbance of tactile wrapping of the skin-ego, the wrapping of dreams (Anzieu, 1995/2016) started to protect the psyche as a protective shield. Second, the dream shows after a long time the protective shield has not been repaired and Nocturnal panic attacks have stayed and had the permanent influence on ego functioning. The horror room penetrated the unprotected skin-ego by implanting panic ideas.

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His immigration shows that the encapsulated skin-ego cannot suffocate the ego forever. A window of opportunity is needed to activate the linkage between skin-ego and thinking ego. It appears under the epidermal coverage of encapsulated skin-ego in a dictatorial manner, and the skin-ego continues to live in looking for an opportunity to come back to the previous functioning. As a matter of fact, the first author's clinical experiences with refugees and traumatic cases have demonstrated that scars and injuries on the self and skin-ego need plenty of time to be cured. Any compensative over-activity such as substance abuse and gambling with a compulsive and self-destructive nature makes the cure process more difficult and challenging. The process of cure is depending on the capacity of analyst to bear primitive projective identifications of client to use therapist as an ancillary container skin. In other words, analyst needs to survive when client tries to live under their skin in symbiotic way and recognizes client's intense fear of intimacy, individuation and separateness (Lothstein, 2019) better understand the roots of client's shame about seeing their defects of skin-ego and being seen by analyst.

Case Study: Boochani

Another extreme situation that invoked the encapsulated skin-ego is the asylum experience. Behrouz Boochani (2018b) was an imprisoned refugee on Manus Island, a remote part of Papua New Guinea, for more than 6 years. In *No Friend But the Mountains,* he demonstrated how Manus Prison was created in the heart of contemporary democracy, where human beings are daily reduced to a number and receive psychological torture (2018a, 2018b, 2019). He painfully reported his feeling of depersonalization in the vicious circle of panic attacks:

> I imagine myself looking back from an unknown place beyond—myself looking back at me. I see a dead body, but with eyes still alert, struggling to survive.
>
> *In that moment everything is absurd/*
> *I search in my unconscious/*
> *For whatever shaped my existence/*
> *In the depths of my mind and soul/*
> *Or the ground/*
> *For belief in a god/*
> *Or a metaphysical force/*
> *I don't find anything at all* (emphasis added)…*I uncover nothing but myself and a sense of enormous absurdity and futility.*
> (Boochani, 2018b, pp. 112-113)

In an article for the Persian BBC, Boochani (2019) wrote, "In fact, Manus Prison is a pure version of a system which is emptying Man from identity, human freedoms and individuality" (para. 14). Surprisingly, he stands for a realistic picture of the ideologic attempts to empty the individual's self and to offer the illusionary idealized objects in

the framework of the encapsulated skin-ego. It means anti-immigrant policies try intentionally to create a depersonalization state in refugees to push them to return to their homeland. Boochani explained how Manus is a human experiment of repressed ideologic policies of Australian government immigration to send skin-ego to the isolated corner and invoke encapsulated skin-ego to produce helplessness among refugees:

> You can see clearly that the most vulnerable people of society have been ignored.
>
> The system is designed in a particular way to treat their fellow beings and each
>
> other in a ruthless manner and they have been educated as robots indifferent to the
>
> suffering of others. (para. 17)

Ideologic systems, then, are machines organized to break the individual's spirit with the help of a perverse formula of torture which is deprival in its nature. Ultimately, a sick refugee can do nothing other than search for his name on waiting lists, but no one ever receives medical care. In fact, this is all very well-planned, and after persevering through countless trouble and stressful situations, the refugee experiences the full force of this perverse form of torture (Boochani, 2018a, 2019). The nature of ideology as a mass product of the encapsulated skin-ego is given control over the skin-ego and generates more traumatic experiences to overwhelm sensations to block following perceptions, such as the thinking ego. The result of this organized sabotage ideologic system is disturbed symbol formation and limited secondary process thought, which are represented in restricted usage of language. Slavoj Žižek (2002) explained this alexithymia, disability in emotional awareness, very well: "We 'feel free' because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom" (p. 2).

Manus Island itself is regarded as a very exact symbol of an encapsulated unwanted cyst over the skin of Australian democracy and a capsule into which refugees are forcefully pushed which makes confined people inside it end up committing a suicide, being addicted to drugs and finally dying of not being provided with critical medical care, despite the fact that doctors are within an easy reach of them.

Boochani exemplified well living the skin-ego under the epidermal repression of the encapsulated skin-ego as he tried to connect his repressed skin-ego by text messaging his writings via WhatsApp to a translator. He won the Victorian Prize for Literature as a result. Consequently, within the context of encapsulated skin-ego, the individual experiences ideology as a wound and makes an attempt in curing this wound through "bringing the two edges of the wound closer together [that] may involve elaboration, thinking, creation, culture, and humanization" (Jacobson, 1946, pp. 108-119).

Conclusion

A competition is evident among id, skin-ego, and superego to occupy the surface and to be the psychic wrapping for the psyche. The superego has two types of functioning. First, when the primal skin functions well and the superego helps skin-ego and thinking ego to operate normally, the functioning is based on the acoustic nature of

superego and word-presentation. Second, when the skin-ego is dysfunctional and cannot wrap the psyche, then the malignant superego in company with the skin-ego's failures, and sometimes over using its functions, tries to dominate over the skin-ego and fill the emptied and deserted self through negative attachment, defective identifications and omnipotent phantasies. Considering the superego wishes to be a psychic envelope and regresses to its idea's origins, the authors named this type of wrapping and patching the *encapsulated skin-ego* to show the regulating character of superego to regulate thoughts and affects instead of the ego.

In conclusion, the core of the encapsulated skin-ego is functioning as a psychic wrapping instead of the skin-ego to provide an illusionary skin to protect the self. As a result, ideology as an isolative and phony configuration is a "lazyish" solution to fill the empty self of a group of people or nation through mass-producing prosocial but anti-individual leaders and shared systems of idealized ideas. This paper discussed the theoretical argument with the help of two cases. The first comprised psychoanalytic deep interview with an interviewee who had imprisonment experience, and the second was Behrouz Boochani's book (2018b) that explained his experience as an imprisoned refugee on Manus Island. In both cases, the encapsulated skin-ego attempted to encapsulate the skin-ego and gain control over the psyche. In addition, the ideological discourse wanted to manipulate the encapsulated skin-ego of these two cases to break their spirits to acquire control over their minds and bodies. The discussion explained how the ideological machinery system designs white and perverse tortures to recall the encapsulated skin-ego to implant their illusionary idealized objects pathologically and govern a magical linguistic cognitive distortion instead of the thinking ego. It remains, however, debatable to apply this contribution to other analytic topics such as clinical cases, mythic and religious areas of theoretical investigation.

Acknowledgements

Authors' Biographical Note

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Book Review

Review of *Psychoanalysis, Clinic and Context: Subjectivity, History and Autobiography.* By Ian Parker. Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 208 pages, £29.99 (paperback). ISBN 978-0367144326.

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Structure was a key signifier, and a logical quilting point, informing Jacques Lacan's return to Freud, which amounted to his reinvention of *the unconscious as structured like a language.* Lacan read, and reinvigorated, Sigmund Freud's classic texts primarily through the lenses of Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics and Claude Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology—not mentioning Hegelianism (via Kojève), surrealism, and mathematics as other equally important lenses. The structure of subjectivity was the central question for both Freud and Lacan. While the former understood psychic structure in terms of topography, the latter explicated it through topology. What then of the structure of Ian Parker's recently published book?

Parker is a psychoanalyst among many other things, or as he puts it in Lacanian terms: "I am a divided subject. I divide my time between work in the clinic, research on the construction of subjectivity and political intervention" (p. 196). In other words, in addition to being a clinician, Parker is both a teacher and a researcher with expertise in critical psychology and qualitative research. He is also an activist, a Marxist (Trotskyist). On this last note, although Parker identifies as an Allouchian (or a follower of Jean Allouch), he actually is not.

In the context of an idiosyncratic signifying chain (reminiscent of the following one: if Freud→Lacan→Miller then Marx→Lenin→Stalin), Parker draws a parallel between the schismatic histories of both Marxism and psychoanalysis, which is a problematic, or a thread, that sinthomatically ties and knots the entire book together around this question, which Parker raised with Ruth, one of his early analysts: "I [Parker] am interested in the connection between psychoanalysis and politics" (pp. 64-65). Here is the syncretic logic of Parker's idiosyncratic signifying chain: if Millerians are the first international, Solerians are the second international, and Melmanians are the third international then Allouchians are the fourth international. This is convenient because Parker, a Trotskyist, is an active member of the Fourth International, which rejected Comintern or alignment with the Soviet Union given its perversion of the Marxist project. However, Parker is more than a Freudian/Lacanian/Allouchian, for he is "located in a range of different contradictory social practices" (p. 196); in other words, he is a Parkerian. First, because that is the name of his personal website (www.parkerian.com), which is both an anagram of his full name (Parker, Ian) and the adjective form of his last name (Parkerian). Second, because his practice of psychoanalysis "is actually much closer to the most humanist imaginable ethic, close to a quasi-existentialist approach to each human subject in its *singularity*" (p. 195, emphasis added). This tells us a little bit about the structure of

Parker's divided subjectivity (after all his book is a memoir), but what about the structure of the book itself? How is the book divided?

The book is structured in five acts like a Shakespearean play. Each act revolves around a central question, and is comprised of four chapters. Finally, each chapter is divided into three sections, and the titles of the chapters are made up of keywords, or signifiers, like 'sex', 'Japan', 'Islam', etc. In the first act (1960's/1970's), Parker writes about his reasons for avoiding psychoanalysis as someone who grew up scared of psychiatry and who ended up studying psychology primarily to know the enemy. Parker traces his personal/political journey, as a scholar-activist, from Marx and Freud through the Frankfurt School, Fromm, Reich, and Foucault to Lacan. Parker documents his navigation of the treacherous terrain of psychoanalytic organizational politics in the United Kingdom. One of the villains in the story is, of course, the International Psychoanalytic Association, which was founded by Freud and which excommunicated Lacan. After Freud's death, the IPA—"no small beer" (p. 21) Parker reminds us—ended up being a conservative, heavy-on-regulations organization representing ego psychology, which is the most popular strand of psychoanalysis in the United States. The other villains, in Parker's account, include Kleinian psychoanalysis and the Anna Freudians (British representatives of the IPA); these are the dominant psychoanalytic strands in the UK, which dwarf Lacanian psychoanalysis. The only IPA group sympathetic to Lacanian psychoanalysis is the IPA's "the Middle Group" (p. 55)—followers of Bowlby and Winnicott—, who are often mistaken for Kleinians. Of course, this politico-theoretical drama does not take into account the schisms within Lacanian psychoanalysis itself (remember the four internationals?). I have intentionally left out the Jungians and the humanistic psychologists, so I am only mentioning them now to avoid accusations of repression.

In the second act (1980's), Parker moves from reasons for avoiding psychoanalysis to attempts at engaging with it both as a therapist and as a client with experiences not only with psychoanalysis, but also with psychodrama and group analysis. His move is inspired, in part, by the following practical reason: "It was, I admit, rather fraudulent of me to teach counseling approaches in the final year of an undergraduate degree course [at Manchester Polytechnic or Manchester Metropolitan University] when I had no first-hand experience of counseling or psychotherapy [let alone psychoanalysis]" (p. 51). A more theoretical reason, however, is this one: "I was interested in psychoanalysis as a set of stories we told about ourselves, and that if we knew they were stories we could then be in a better position to believe them or not" (p. 173). In chapter 5, the question of the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics comes to the fore, and here Parker turns to one of his heroes (Joel Kovel), who argued for "psychoanalytic descriptions of 'defences' that people used to shield themselves from feelings of threat" and against "seeing those defences as only operating at the level of the individual" (p. 45). In other words, Kovel's argument is to not psychologize distress (a psychosocial condition in capitalism), but rather to politicize it through the lens of psychoanalysis as both a "theory of subjectivity, of our lived bodily experience of being human" (p. x) and a "weird practice" (p. ix).

Parker cautions us throughout the book that psychoanalysis is "not what you think" (p. ix) and that it is not a "world view" (p. 47). That would be the equivalent of treating psychoanalysis as a religion, which is Foucault's

critique of psychoanalysis as a cultural practice that gives a more insidious twist on confession demanded in the Christian church. Not only are we disciplined, and not only do we discipline ourselves, but we revel in that discipline every time we agree to speak to a psy-professional, whether it be a priest or a therapist, about what we desire. (p. 18)

The alternative to this reactionary—psychologized or Christianized—version of psychoanalysis is a radical one, which does not use psychoanalytic theory to interpret the world, but which is committed to the clinic as a space, where the world can change (à la Marx) one analysand at a time (à la Freud). This change, of course, comes from the analysand herself, for she is the one who does most of the work in analysis. Parker later adds:

The placeholder for Reich as a radical force in psychoanalysis in Manchester in the 1980s was Lacan. Or, rather, the signifier 'Lacan' evoked a possible connection with a radical rereading of Freud, much more so than did 'Reich'. This was, perhaps, because Reich conjured up a vision of an already-existing, energetic unconscious comprising libidinal forces that sought release – the pressure-cooker hydraulic model of the mind – while Lacan was more in tune with the 'social constructionist' idea that what was repressed was created in the very process of repression. (p. 75)

In this act, particularly in chapter 8, Parker delves more in depth into some key concepts in Lacanian psychoanalysis, such as the big Other: "a diffuse, generalized sense of otherness" (p. 71). However, what really stands out in the same chapter is the Freudian notion of *Nachträglichkeit* (afterwardness), which describes one of the 'weird' features of psychoanalysis as a practice: non-linear time. In Parker's words, "Psychoanalytic time is not linear, not ordered in terms of cause and effect…Things are given meaning after the event" (p. 72).

In the third act (1990's), Parker turns to the process of psychoanalytic training; it took him six and a half years to become a registered psychoanalyst with the Center for Freudian Analysis in London. Parker was going to train as a group analyst (along with his partner Erica Burman), but due to a "complicated chain of circumstances" (p. 88) he ended up beginning his training as a Lacanian psychoanalyst with CFAR in 1997. The rigorous training (or *formation* as the Lacanians like to call it) entails attending lectures and seminars, practicing as an analyst-in-formation, participating in cartels, and being in supervision, and, of course, in analysis. This act, like the rest of the book, is full of anecdotes and jokes, which are one of the ways one can encounter the unconscious according to Freud. For instance, the fifty minutes (or regular-length) session was one of fundamental rules in psychoanalysis according to the IPA, a rule that Lacan ignored with his variable-length sessions. Parker writes, "the fifty minutes available between Martha's [Freud's wife] plant-waterings this became the basis of standard analytic practice" (p. 98). This joke, of course, speaks to the arbitrariness of rules, which mirrors the arbitrariness of signs themselves (a key concept in structural linguistics). This act in particular will be very enjoyable to readers who desire to become Lacanian psychoanalysts one day.

In the fourth act (1990's/2000's), Parker problematizes the application of psychoanalysis outside of the clinic, which is a further exploration of his earlier critique that *psychoanalysis is not a world view* because some theoretical concepts

(like transference) are applicable only in the clinic to describe a specific relationship with a particular function between the analysand and the analyst. Žižek is an important figure in this act given his influence on Parker, particularly his linking of Marxism with psychoanalysis (through the symptom) since the publication of *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Parker, of course, wrote *Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction*, and, in chapter 15, we are treated to some amusing behind the scenes encounters between Parker and Žižek in Slovenia in 2003.

Parker, like Neue Slowenische Kunst, eventually outgrows Žižek due to the ambiguity of his political project (or lack thereof) and his self-avowed position as a "commissar" (p. 147). Žižek, after all, is a philosopher and not a psychoanalyst, a Hegelian more than a Marxist. Nevertheless, Žižek's concept of 'over-identification' is an interesting intervention at the intersection between psychoanalysis and politics, particularly in terms of how Laibach applies it not as a world view but as embodied in their music and their self-representation as a group. Laibach's over-identification with fascist imagery and symbols empties them of their significance, but also enacts a radical critique of the ideological fantasies that sustain liberal democracies (like Slovenia).

In the fifth and final act (2000's), Parker is concerned with the limits of psychoanalysis as a universal theory and practice. He unpacks his experiences with psychoanalysis in Brazil, Japan, and Russia to make a point about the cultural specificity of psychoanalysis as a product of European modernity. Although one can argue that even though Freud was an atheist who believed in science, he was also a Jew who came from a transmodern culture that is exterior to European modernity—this is why Edward Said identified *Freud as a (non)European*. In Parker's words:

Kabbalistic concern with the meanings of symbols, including letters and numbers, can be detected in Freud's decomposition of dream texts into their component parts, and the nature of psychoanalytic training itself as a craft based on oral tradition and the reinterpretation of classical texts is further evidence of the influence of elements of Judaism. Perhaps it would even be possible to characterise the first wave of psychoanalytic theory and practice as operating as a form of secularised Judaism. (pp. 176-177)

This historical argument has nothing to do with the racist conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a 'Jewish science' because it is neither a religion nor a science. As such, it ought to be compatible, as a pluriversal praxis, with any culture as long as no ideological fantasy is informing the analysis, which is tricky. This point takes me to chapter 19 on Islam, wherein Parker reflects on the Islamic Psychoanalysis/Psychoanalytic Islam conference that he co-organized with Sabah Siddiqui in Manchester in 2017. I presented at this conference, and in my paper I was critical of how secularism, particularly in the form of *laïcité*, can operate unconsciously as an ideology for Euro-American psychoanalysts working in particular with Muslim analysands. This critique ties in well with chapter 20, the final chapter, which is on transference and the ethics of psychoanalysis (i.e., the desire to listen). After a long journey down memory lane, and a struggle with the question of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis politics, Parker is driven full circle to what radical psychoanalysis is (not):

Psychoanalysis is not what you think; it challenges, subverts the very idea, challenges and subverts each and every normative notion about subjectivity. That is what makes it *radical*, and that is why I remain committed to it as one among many different radical frameworks for grasping what is it to be a human being. (p. 198, emphasis added)

In conclusion, this book is a must read for anyone interested in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis, particularly those who aspire to become practicing psychoanalysts one day as well as those who are interested in theoretical psychoanalysis's applicability outside of the clinic. For those readers who are not interested in psychoanalysis or who do not know much about it, this book is an enjoyable memoir regardless of the reader's expertise because it is a personal/political narrative that is full of amusing stories and vivid characters—not mentioning lots of jokes!

Autobiographical Note

Reviewed by Robert K. Beshara, Ph.D., M.F.A. (www.robertbeshara.com), author of *Decolonial Psychoanalysis: Towards Critical Islamophobia Studies*; founder of www.criticalpsychology.org, a free resource for scholars, activists, and practitioners; and Assistant Professor of Psychology and Humanities at Northern New Mexico College.

slight paradigm shift in the way Islamophobia needs to be critiqued and analyzed. Instead of solely relying on modern Western concepts and systems of analysis, the author is choosing a different route altogether, one that by its nature is anti-colonial and against most systems of Western hegemony. And above all else one that empowers the subject being victimized and scapegoated.

The author also decides upon a more appropriate terminology that reconceptualizes the nature of Islamophobia in a way that takes into account all the contributing factors involved in the (re)production of this phenomenon. Beshara introduces the concept like this: "anti-Muslim racism, which is my preferred term for Islamophobia because it is more precise, is not only a form of cultural racism but also an expression of coloniality—the dark side of modernity" (Beshara, 2019, p. 6). The comprehensive nature of this new terminology encompasses ideas that are apparently important to the author. Nuances of particular terms tend to clarify the aim and intent of the user. This becomes evident when Beshara begins to discuss certain underpinnings of his methodology, one of which he describes in the following manner: "critical social psychology, which is indebted to critical theory, is interested in the study of ideology—a concept that is intimately tied to power" (Beshara, 2019, p. 11). Again, ideas and concepts such as power, ideology, racism, colonialism, and modernity are important for the reader to understand and keep in mind if they are to grasp the essence of what the author is trying to convey. The book, in its inception, is a reaction to policies and discourses that are set in place by political and social forces that create actual victims in the real world.

In chapter two "The Discourse of the University: Islamophobia as an Ideology", the author plunges fully into the workings of ideology and discourse. As with all the chapters in the book, the author begins each heading with a relevant quote that thematically sets up what will be discussed. And very much like the previous chapter, the author ends each chapter with a "coda" that summarizes the main points that were covered. This helps the reader tremendously to retain the essential concepts that the author sought to expound upon. Relying again on the work of other scholars, the author supports his arguments by introducing their established theories. He does this, for instance, when he refers to the work of Slavoj Žižek and his ideas concerning ideology: "Žižek (1989) distinguishes between two main forms of ideology critique: (1) the symptomatic reading, which is discursive and aims to discern the unspoken assumptions underlying a discourse; and (2) the fetishistic reading, which is extra-discursive" (Beshara, 2019, p. 27). The notion of ideology is important to grasp because it is one of the primary mechanisms that sustains and perpetuates the anti-Muslim racism that the author is so critical of. It is the false beliefs and ideas that are held by individuals who then in turn create a very real and hostile environment for those being targeted by such ideologies.

previous problem in approaching the discourse of Islam and Muslim subjects that has been complicated by the approach of psychology/psychoanalysis, the definition and rhetoric of postcolonial studies, and the reality of the contemporary world as the subjects of this study actively deal with it.

Ian Parker in the Series Editor Forward of the book voices several rhetorical questions one might pose in questioning psychoanalysis' role in problematizing an approach toward Islamophobic studies. He ends this inquisition by saying, "All of these accusations against psychoanalysis must be encountered and answered in the affirmative if we are to take any steps forward to a genuinely anti-colonial critical psychology" (Beshara, 2019, p. x). Parker's most significant statement referencing the implicit approach Beshara takes in *Decolonial Psychoanalysis* however, is where he posits, "The best of critical psychology goes beyond psychology as such, showing how subjectivity is embedded in forms of materially-effective strategies of power and connecting with debates in neighboring disciplines" (Beshara, 2019, p. xi). The 'critical' of Critical Psychology clarifies itself here because he is well aware that psychology itself is not immune to being subjectively infiltrated by the objective content it purports to observe and analyze.

Chapter Two, "The Master's Discourse: an Archaeology of (Counter)terrorism and a Genealogy of the Conceptual Muslim" is the longest of the chapters and establishes the War on Terror as the crux of the Master's Discourse in the position of the Master Signifier (S1). Opposed to the Master Signifier is the Knowledge (S2) represented through the ideology of terrorism. Simply between these two elements alone we have an extremely complex relationship. Beshara informs the reader "The war metaphor involves condensation: war (S1) becomes a substitute for freedom (a), the object that the interpellated (counter)terrorist ($) very much desires" (Beshara, 2019, p. 52). This manifests into what the author clarifies several sentences later as the "interpellated" barred American ($) contraposing themselves against the Muslim (a) in a logic that implies "if I destroy this other, I conquer terrorism altogether (as [counter]terrorist) and secure my own freedom simultaneously in a move that puts myself into a position of power". Beshara himself says "the conceptual Muslim eventually becomes the embodiment of freedom itself" (Beshara, 2019, p. 53). This critical structure between war (S1), terror (S2), and the conceptual Muslim (a) sets up the entire argumentative structure for the subsequent chapters. The (counter)terrorist narrative is the phantasy that the Islamophobic subject cannot release themselves from. It is their encounter with the "Real" that structures their reality to where their own self-deluded argumentation for their actions need not contain any ounce of truth: all that is required is perceptual investment into an object cause of desire. This is why the author notes "She can be either a Muslim or someone who is perceived to be 'Muslim-looking' (Cashin, 2010)" (Beshara, 2019, p. 55).

Chapter Three sees Beshara delve into the role of psychology with regard to Islamophobia. At the beginning however, he wishes to make a distinction between the psychologization and the politicization of the subject, of which the latter is his goal. He quotes Jan De Vos from his article "Psychologization: Psychoanalysis' (Double) Political Appointment with History--the Accoyer Amendment Revisited" where he says: "Psychoanalysis, the theory and praxis of the subject, spawned a psychological discourse that lives off swallowing *subjects* and spitting out *individuals*: psychologized, medicalized and infantilized (De Vos, 2011, p. 316, emphasis in

original)" (Beshara, 2019, p. 65). The repercussions here are clear. As soon as psychoanalysis moved beyond its discovery stage with Freud and into its institutionalized form it has now become, the danger was always reducing its core elements to sterotypical tropes and "appliques" used to label and stigmatize any subject at will. The problematic result is a discipline that factory-presses patients in an assembly-like fashion, professing to have "solved" a particular ailement, when all that was achieved was the substitution of one brandished reproach for another. Beshara avoids this in "psychosocializing" the contents and conditions of Islamophobia and by utilizing the advantages of discourse analysis. It has already been implied that discourse analysis allows for narrative structural analysis that goes *beyond* the topical surface appearances of interrelated phenomena. This was Lacan's whole point for constructing the discourses in the first place, because ordinary subjectivized psychologizations were completely inadequate and misplaced in dealing with the psychoanalytic subject as he saw it. The author's concordance with Lacan is resolute because his eighteen-pages of analysis through the University Discourse produces associations, links, and interpretations that one would not be able to generate or construct utilizing conventional everyday media discourse or empirical extrapolations.

The fourth and fifth chapters are independent from each other but conceptually can be considered part of a tethered unit. The Hysteric's Discourse and the Analyst's Discourse are closely related and fundamentally represent the basic relationship between the analyst and the patient. For general purposes, the analyst frames the Analyst's Discourse and the patient the Hysteric's. The hysteric is the one who is asking all of the questions, who is framing the context for the analyst to be the one who is supposed to know all of the answers. One's first assumption would be that the analyst is in the power position within the dynamic, but upon looking closely, it is actually the hysteric. The imposition is being demanded upon the analyst *by* the hysteric, that is, the hysteric is attempting to draw up the Knowledge out of the Master Signifiers represented through their questioning. The analyst's role is to speak *through* the hysteric with answers as "Truth". From the analyst's perspective, their engagement with the hysteric's discourse (Master Signifiers) is intended to produce Knowledge as Truth for themselves. This doesn't quite work however, because the hysteric produces questions from a battery of confused signs and meanings from which *they* want answers for. It may be easier to see now the push and pull and antagonistic relationship between the analyst and hysteric in how they feed each other, but not quite to the point of a definitive resolution.

This leads us back to Chapter Four "The Hysteric's Discourse: Epistemic Resistance, or US Muslims as Ethical Subjects" where the author says, "The truth of the infinitely demanding subject ($) is the Real of divine justice as *objet a*, or object-cause of desire...the infinitely demanding subject ($) is questioning the (counter)terrorist Other of the Law...the product of this exchange is critical knowledge (S2) as surplus *jouissance*" (Beshara, 2019, p. 82). In Chapter Four, this takes place through the US Muslims in the interviews the author engages in with them, where they actively question the actions and motives of Islamophobists and Islamophobia which produces the critical knowledge the author learns from. These interviewees desire "divine justice", to be treated just like any other citizen living out their lives, and it is through their elucidations that Beshara and the reader learn about the complications of what it means to be misidentified and targeted in an irrational discourse designed to reduce them to nothing, literally.

In Chapter Five "The Analyst's Discourse: Ontic Resistance, or US Muslims as Political Subjects", Beshara notes: "The agent of the analyst's discourse is the *real muslim* (a), whose truth is epistemic resistance (S2). The Real Muslim (a), having subjectified the cause of divine justice, *gazes* at the American analysand ($), causing his/her desire. The product is a new master signifier (S1): not-(counter)terrorism…" (Beshara, 2019, p. 110). The purpose of the interview extracts in this chapter is to highlight what the author calls "ontic resistance". Whereas the previous chapter highlighted "'epistemic resistance', or resistance through (critical) knowledge", Chapter Five focuses on "'ontic resistance', or resistance through being". Beshara even notes a petite phrasing of this idea as "'To exist is to resist...and to exist as a *hijaabi* is to resist Islamophobia' (Aisha)" (Beshara, 2019, p. 109). New knowledge as Truth is being produced in a positive cycle by the Real Muslim, because their questioning of the American analysand generates the signifiers the Real Muslim would prefer to be identified with. One example of this is where the author quotes one of the interviewees as saying "'I try really hard to *be in the world* as a person and not as an identity' (emphasis added)" (Beshara, 2019, p. 111). The response is a complex one because the statement is specific but denotes an explicit contrast: "as a person and not as an identity". The obvious contradiction here is the synonymous conflation of both being necessarily unified, and the author addresses this and details his curiosity about it within the same paragraph.

By the time we reach the final chapter "Towards a Radical Master: From Decolonial Psychoanalysis to Liberation Praxis", Beshara's goal of detailing how a decolonial psychoanalysis can be instituted through the lens of critical psychology, Lacanian Discourse Analysis, and a host of other methodologies along the way, has largely been achieved. The War on Terror discourse has been thoroughly turned on its head and he quite rightly states "...I am using the logic of that hegemonic discourse against itself to develop a counter-discourse" (Beshara, 2019, p. 127). I will readily admit my limitations here as the author engages Lacan's Graph of Sexuation, something I am still getting a handle on. Nevertheless, it is used to introduce the concepts of Mythical Jouissance and Divine Jouissance. While my limitations prevent me from explaining the concepts fully, I will borrow an equivocation from a quote the author uses from Walter Benjamin: "If *mythical violence* is *lawmaking*, *divine violence* is *law-destroying*; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them…" (emphasis added) (Beshara, 2019, p. 130). Beshara follows this up by saying "...Benjamin is identifying mythical violence with the Law and with the State, but not with justice" (Beshara, 2019, p. 131). The reader receives the hinting that socially corrective measures intended toward the rectification of restoring the rights of the oppressed and maligned are the events of Divine Violence that oppose the Mythical Violence propagated by the state in their suppression and oppression. One of the final salient points the author makes supporting justice is partitioning liberation from freedom: "Whereas freedom is a Liberal-Conservative value that concerns the individual, *liberation* is a Radical value that pertains to both the individual *and* the collective" (Beshara, 2019, p. 136). This point could not have been made any clearer as it shows precisely where the concept of freedom encounters the limits of the Real, but where liberation is capable of being symbolized.

Decolonial Psychoanalysis is a book that is long overdue to appear within the domains of [critical] psychology and psychoanalysis. It is even more astonishing that it appeared in the United States as opposed to Europe and South America where

Lacan and Lacanian-oriented studies have been held more consistently in higher regard. However, it may be exactly for that reason why *Decolonial Psychoanalysis* birthed itself where it did, in an environment that made its subject matter all the more prescient in concurrence with political discourse destroying the real lives of those discussed. The contents of *Decolonial Psychoanalysis* are materials that desperately need infiltrating into *everyday* discourse along with those of Islamophobia studies. If there is any criticism to be had, it is the same of all critical and academic studies--that of finding a way to integrate it into everyday discourse at a level comprehensive and speakable by the average individual. Lacan was notable for moving in the opposite direction. Stuart Schneiderman in his book *Jacques Lacan: the Death of an Intellectual Hero* recounts a television appearance of Lacan's, noting that "...he would not alter his notoriously impenetrable style because he simply did not care to speak to idiots: my discourse, he said, is for those who are not idiots" (Schneiderman, 1983, p. 19). Contemporary terminology would qualify Lacan's disposition as elitist, even though he was being maligned by the very institutional domain he practiced in. This is antithetical to the direction *Decolonial Psychoanalysis* points in. Its contents are about empowering the subject *and* all others engaged in the discourse of and around Islamophobia to systematically deconstruct its contents and lay its illogicalities, mystifications, and demoralizations bare for all to see. Beshara undoubtedly wins this match by knockout.

References

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Autobiographical Note

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