Language and Psychoanalysis

ISSN 2049-324X

Volume 1, 2012

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Contents

Hallucinatory and Verbal Modes of Thinking

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Abstract

At the beginning of *Freud and the Scene of Writing* Derrida announced the way he would use Freud: "to locate in Freud's texts (…) those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure" (Derrida, 1978, p. 249). In this paper I want to take over Derrida's reading angle under the form of a question: the question of what escapes the logos in Freud's work?
I tackle this question at two different levels:
1. The level of Freud's model: in Freud's model of the psyche what are the modes of functioning that cannot be verbalized?
2. The level of Freud's formulation: in Freud's writings what is not exclusively formalized under a verbal form?
In the first part I identify within the hypothesis that Freud imagined to describe the genesis of the psyche: a primary *hallucinatory mode of thinking* and a secondary *verbal mode of thinking*. I try to show how the creation of unconscious presentations by the hallucinatory mode of thinking operates beyond the logos. Moreover I propose that meaning produced by the verbal mode of thinking covers and hides the hallucinatory mode of thinking, which would constitute a form of functioning of repression. In the second part I try to define the ways Freud invented a form of writing in order to model hallucinatory modes of thinking. I propose to name *metapsychological writing* this form of writing that uses scientific formulations, graphics, analogies and myths. I argue that what is at stake in the invention of a metapsychological writing is the creation of a conceptual framework to express clinical phenomena specific to psychoanalysis.

Introduction

The question I would like to raise in this paper comes from Jacques Derrida. With *Of Grammatology* Derrida undertook one of his main philosophical endeavours: to challenge what makes objectivity possible, "the originary constitution of objectivity" (Derrida, 1976, p. 88). Derrida searches an alternative to a philosophy of consciousness and intentionality, which "from Descartes to Hegel" apprehend "presence as consciousness,

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self-presence conceived within the opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness" (Derrida, 1978, p. 248). But in his escape from 'the cogito', Derrida's aim is also to overcome structuralism. Indeed in *Of Grammatology* Derrida argues that notions of sign and signifier have a fundamental link with Western metaphysic. By using the sign to reach objectivity, structuralism limits "the sense of being within the field of presence" under "the domination of a linguistic form" (Derrida, 1976, p. 23). In structuralism's view objectivity becomes what in the object subjects itself to the sign (Safatle, 2011). In his criticism of an objectivity defined around reason or defined around linguistic structures, Derrida identified Freud as an ally. Derrida finds in Freud's model of the unconscious intentional processes beyond consciousness, which seem to play a part in the constitution of objectivity. Contrary to Lacan, Derrida thinks that those unconscious processes cannot be apprehended through structuralism. In Derrida's view, the language of the unconscious described by Freud isn't organized around the notion of sign. To describe this language of the unconscious Derrida invents the term *psychical writing*. Thus objectivity would have its roots in "psychical writing", a language that functions beyond the sign and beyond self-presence. This use of Freud comes from a reading that Derrida summarized very clearly at the beginning of *Freud and the Scene of Writing*: "Our aim is limited: to locate in Freud's texts (…) those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure" (Derrida, 1978, p. 249).

It is this aim of Derrida's in his reading of Freud that I would like to take over under the form of a question - the question of what escapes the logos in Freud's work? I think that this question has a great significance beyond the use that Derrida made of it for his own researches. My aim is to use this question to understand what is at stake in Freud's metapsychology. I would like to propose that Freud's metapsychology describes the evolution from a mode of thinking that cannot be reduced to the logos towards a verbal mode of thinking. According to this hypothesis metapsychology would give a model of the genesis of the mental apparatus and its functioning through the cohabitation of two modes of thinking: a primary *hallucinatory mode of thinking* and a secondary *verbal mode of thinking*.

Hence, my starting point will be the question of understanding what cannot be verbalized in Freud's work. But this question can be read at two different levels:
1. The question can be understood at the level of Freud's model: in Freud's model of the psyche what are the modes of functioning that cannot be expressed through words?
2. The question can be understood at the level of Freud's formulation: in Freud's writings what is not exclusively formalized under a verbal form?

The two aspects of the question are in fact linked. It is precisely because Freud identified mode of functioning of the psyche that are non-verbal, that he felt the need to theorize them under a non-exclusive verbal form. However in this paper I will deal with the two aspects of the questions separately.

Firstly I will try to show how Freud's metapsychology is an account of a psychical apparatus that generates a primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal mode of thinking.

Secondly I will attempt to understand the way Freud's writing is distorted by the modelling of a mode of thinking beyond the logos.

I. To verbalize is to repress

In the last part of his paper *The Unconscious*, Freud proposed that the character of strangeness attributed to schizophrenic symptoms in comparison with symptoms found in transference neurosis comes from the schizophrenic's use of words (p. 200). Words that compose the speech of the schizophrenic are used in the hallucinatory grammar of dreams: the primary psychical process made of condensations and displacement. Hence the impression of strangeness comes from the hybrid nature of the schizophrenic language that hallucinates words or, to use Freud's metapsychological code, that treats words-presentation like thing-presentation. In "schizophrenia object-cathexes are given up" but "the cathexis of the *word*-presentation is retained" (Freud, 1915c, p. 201) and therefore words seem invaded by an unconscious mode of functioning. These 'schizophrenic' utterances or the way "the dream-work occasionally treats words like things" lead to the idea that "the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of things plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone" (Freud, 1915c, p. 201)

This conception of the system unconscious populated by 'thing presentations' functioning in a hallucinatory mode of thinking goes way beyond a reductionist hermeneutic view of the unconscious. A hermeneutic model would reduce the unconscious to a container of hidden meanings: the unconscious understood as a psychic store of repressed mental contents that would be accessible only through the analytical process. Against such a view Freud's papers on metapsychology of 1915 present the unconscious as a system that generate a hallucinatory mode of thinking. At the core of the description of this unconscious mode of thinking is to be found the paradoxical notion of 'unconscious presentation'. The German word for 'presentation' is '*Vorstellung*'. In the standard edition James Strachey has translated it by 'idea' or by 'presentation'. In this paper I will translate '*Vorstellung*' only by 'presentation', which seems to me more faithful to the philosophical origins of the word. Indeed '*Vorstellung*' is a key concept of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Ola Anderson pointed out the possible influence that the notion of 'mechanic of presentation' developed by Johann Friedrich Herbart may have had on Freud (Anderson, 1962, p. 224). But even more that Herbart it is from Franz Brentano that Freud took on the notion of presentation and more generally the philosophical assumption "that every mental state can be analyzed into two components": a presentation and its charge of affect (Wollheim, 1991, p. 35). In Brentano's view a 'presentation' is not a psychical content, not the idea derived from an object but the perception of the object in its actuality: the 'presentation' is not the colour but the vision of the colour (Merleau-Ponty, 1956, p. 1293). This understanding of presentation remains empirical since a presentation is the outcome of the world as perceived by the senses. Brentano's concept of presentation prefigures much more Husserl's phenomenology than Freud's metapsychology. Indeed Freud used the concept of 'presentation' in a completely original way that led him to this specifically Freudian notion of 'unconscious

presentation'[2]: not a deeply buried memory trace but a mental processes of a different nature. A mental process that is not a perception but a transformation of the object and whose functioning draws the outlines of psychical reality. Freud's metapsychological texts propose a "fiction" that describes the genesis of the structure and function of the mental apparatus. In this fiction "at the beginning of our mental life we did in fact hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it" (Freud, 1917, p. 231). Hence according to Freud, the hallucinatory perception of reality that appears in dreams or in hypnosis is also the way through which psychic life begins and what "once dominated waking life, while the mind was still young and incompetent, seems now to have been banished into the night (…). *Dreaming is a piece of infantile mental life that has been superseded*" (Freud, 1900, p. 567).[3] Through this primary hallucinatory mode of thinking a biological need is transformed into a psychical wish. The mnemic image linked with the object subjectively perceived in 'the experience of satisfaction' of a need is reinvented under the form of a presentation in the hallucinatory experience of the wish. As a consequence, psychical reality must be distinguished from the subjective perception of material reality. Jean Laplanche proposed to name the latter 'psychological reality' (Laplanche, 1993, p. 77). Freud usually distinguishes two levels of reality: psychical reality and material reality. To add this third level of 'psychological reality' clarifies the specificity of psychical reality. The 'object' belongs to material reality. The subjective 'mnemic image' attached to the perception of the object belongs to psychological reality. The 'presentation', which is the result of the 'mnemic image' reinvented through a hallucinatory mode of thinking, belongs to psychical reality. Psychical reality transforms the subjective perception of material reality into a hallucinatory unconscious reality. What motivates this transformation is not the perception of the external world but this psychical force that Freud named the *Trieb*, the drive. The drive is this force "lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical" that put the mind at work (Freud, 1905, p. 168). Thus with the notion of 'thing-presentation' that results from a hallucinatory act of creation, Freud described a "psychical writing" that functions beyond consciousness, beyond self-presence. Psychical reality is the outcome of this "psychical writing": the outcome of a hallucinatory mode of thinking that escapes consciousness.

The knowledge drawn upon by Freud from dream, infancy and madness demonstrates the hallucinatory core of the psychic apparatus. The first kind of mental process is the unconscious mental processes. In Freud's metapsychological account, in the beginning was the unconscious, primary consciousness being reduced to sense organ monitoring the psychical qualities of pleasure and unpleasure: it "is probable that thinking was originally unconscious (…) and that it did not acquire further qualities, perceptible to consciousness, until it became connected with verbal residues" (Freud, 1911, p. 221). A mode of thinking of consciousness emerges from a *verbal mode of thinking*: the capacity for an idea to be connected with verbal presentation "whose residues of quality are

[2] Freud takes over major philosophical concepts in a curious way: as if he was making illegitimate children with the philosophers from whom he borrows concepts.

[3] Thus a dream is not only a way to reveal repressed wishes through its analysis but also an expression of the most primitive way of thinking.

sufficient to draw the attention of consciousness to them and to endow the process of thinking with a new mobile cathexis from consciousness" (Freud, 1900, p. 617).

I would like to put forward the hypothesis that this *verbal mode of thinking* specific to consciousness covers and hides the *hallucinatory mode of thinking* specific to the system unconscious. I propose to think of repression in the light of this hypothesis. In his paper on *Repression* Freud indicated, "repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity" (Freud, 1915b, p. 147). Since conscious mental activity is characterized by a verbal mode of thinking, Freud's statement can be rewritten: "repression cannot arise until the acquisition of a verbal mode of thinking".[4] Hence *primal repression*: the first phase of repression, "which consist in the psychical" representative of the drive "being denied entrance into the conscious" corresponds to thoughts that cannot be connected with verbal presentations and as a consequence these thoughts exist only under a hallucinatory form.

A primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal mode of thinking cohabitate in the human psyche, but those two modes of thinking are not in a one-to-one correspondence. I propose that the censorship exercised by *primal repression* is not a matter of moral but rather the outcome of the irreducibility between two modes of thinking: because of the limits of language, some thing-presentations are caught in a hallucinatory mode of thinking. Presentations that cannot be expressed in the language of consciousness establish in the mental apparatus '*fixations*' of very primitive thoughts - primitive not only because of the hallucinatory mode of thinking that produced them but also because of the bodily aspects of these thoughts. Infantile fixations in the unconscious are hallucinations produced by the anus, the mouth, the genitals and any regions of the body that can operate as an erotogenic zone. The various libidinal stages would correspond to the erotogenic zones through which thing-presentations are hallucinated. The infant would create presentations from memory traces of the external objects through specific erotogenic parts of its body. Hence the hallucinatory mode of thinking is closely linked with infantile sexuality because it is produced from parts of the body that are capable of producing sexual excitations. The connection between the primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and infantile sexuality has also an exogenous origin. Through the care carried by the adult, the infant also receives elements of the adult's sexuality. Not only a set of erotogenic stimulus (made of rubbings, of quivering, of smells, of warmth…) but also, in a more enigmatic way, the infant receives something of the conscious and unconscious fantasies through which the adult invests his/her own body. The hallucinatory presentations created from parts of the adult's body involves in a complex way the different stimuli and messages received from the adult.[5] The infant

[4] Before this stage the defensive mechanisms have a hallucinatory nature that have been first explored by Melanie Klein.

[5] Jean Laplanche has developed his general theory of seduction from the idea that the sexual message originating in the adult is an enigmatic message for the infant. With this theory Laplanche proposes an account of the origin of the psychic apparatus and the drives, starting from the adult-infant relation.

creates presentations hallucinated on the body through auto-erotism. In such a way that auto-erotism is paradigmatic of the hallucinatory mode of thinking. Infantile sexuality, which is at the core of the hallucinatory mode of thinking is incompletely transposed in the verbal mode of thinking. The auto-erotic activity bears witness to the incapacity of a verbal mode of thinking to link sexual thing-presentations to word-presentations. It is because some presentations of infantile sexuality are fixated under a hallucinatory form that the sexual drive is so to speak 'obliged' to behave auto-erotically at first. The hallucinatory mode of thinking is performative, what is thought is created: "unconscious processes (…) equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes with their fulfilment (Freud, 1911, p. 225). Thing-presentations created by the hallucinatory mode of thinking generate a reality: the psychical reality. Hence those presentations have a psychical truth-value. For that reason the presentations produced by the hallucinatory mode of thinking are similar to the suggestions that the hypnotized receives from the hypnotist. The state of hypnosis put forward a hallucinatory mode of thinking and the hypnotized understands the messages from the hypnotist as orders. It is as if at the centre of the self, was to be found a hypnotist who produces suggestions. Except that this hypnotist who sits at the core of the self would use the enigmatic language of unconscious presentations.

Presentations that exist only under a hallucinatory form create a terrifying world in which thoughts are omnipotent. Unconscious presentations of infantile sexuality are like suggestions experienced on the one hand in a hallucinatory way on the body through auto-erotism. On the other hand infantile sexuality is experienced in the language as an eternal quest for meaning, which is expressed with such an acute intensity in children's sexual curiosity that Freud "considered giving this epistemophilic urge the status of a separate drive" (Temperley, 2005, p. 62). An effect of this curiosity that motivates the child to discover answers in language is to hide the hallucinatory nature of the sexual wish. In the same way one of the functions of masturbatory scenarios built by the adult is to create a meaning that covers the hallucinatory noise of the sexual wish. The psychical apparatus generates: a hallucinatory mode of thinking whose characteristic is to be performative and a verbal mode of thinking whose characteristic is to bring meaning. What comes first is the demand of the unconscious wish that result from the hallucinatory mode of thinking. Meaning is brought secondarily in the *après-coup* of the hallucinatory wish as a way to hide the hallucinatory nature of the wish. In this perspective one of the psychical functions of verbal language is to produce meaning that would, in the *après-coup*, conceal the hallucinatory nature of wishes. I propose to understand this masking function of verbal language as a repression *après-coup*, an 'after-repression'.

A metapsychological perspective has revealed a system unconscious that does not work on the mode of the logos: a system unconscious understood not as a receptacle of hidden meaning but rather as a creator of illusions. Illusions generated by thing-presentations created through a hallucinatory mode of thinking. I propose to think of repression as the outcome of the superimposition between this hallucinatory mode of thinking and the verbal mode of thinking of consciousness. *Primary repression* results from the irreducibility between the hallucinatory mode of thinking and the verbal mode of thinking and as a result some presentations are fixed in the system unconscious. It would be

around these fixations that we hallucinate reality subjectively perceived. The meaning produced by verbal thoughts would conceal those hallucinations from consciousness. Verbal language generates meanings as an *après-coup* of a hallucinatory psychical reality. Meaning produced by consciousness is in the *après-coup* of unconscious wishes. Derrida identified this aspect of Freud's model and used it against an objectivity that would be subjected to a metaphysic of presence. In fact the repressive function of the logos in Freud would rather open the possibility of an objectivity of the absence. The performative aspect of the hallucinatory mode of thinking and the enigmatic nature of the unconscious presentations mean that unconscious wishes open up a breach in the subject. Quest for meaning would rather consist in a perpetual race behind this absence that unconscious wishes open up in the self: "signified presence is always reconstituted by deferral, *nachträglich*, belatedly, *supplementarily*: for the *nachträglich* also means *supplementary*" (Derrida, 1978, p. 266). I believe that Derrida formed his alliance with Freud around a conception of the logos that is not in the field of presence: logos as marked by the *après-coup* – logos as secondary to an enigmatic psychical writing,[6] that I have tried to define in this paper as a hallucinatory mode of thinking.

II. A metapsychological writing

The idea that meaning generated by verbal language achieves a repressive function is not only a theoretical one. It has, in fact, a very direct application in the analytical practice. The fundamental rule of the psychoanalytic cure: the rule of free association, "which lays it down that whatever comes into one's head must be reported without criticizing it" (Freud, 1912, p. 107) is a method to verbalize beyond the logos. Likewise on the side of the analyst this unusual way to listen, which consist in not directing the attention to anything particular, the so-called 'evenly suspended attention' is a way to listen beyond conscious meaning. The psychoanalytic technique endeavours to trap verbal language in order to bypass its repressive function. The aim of this technique is to generate a dialogue that challenges the repressive aspect of verbal meaning. As a consequence the defence mechanisms that rest on verbal narratives are somewhat thwarted by the analytical framework. Therefore more primitive defence mechanisms may manifest themselves in the analysis.

These primitive defence mechanisms - of which Freud gave an outline: "reversal into the opposite or turning round the subject's own self" (Freud, 1915b, p. 147) - are of a hallucinatory nature. I think that these hallucinatory mechanisms of defence appear on the analytical scene through what Freud had described in his letter to Groddeck as "the hubs of treatments": resistance and transference.

Firstly I will try to show how hallucinatory mechanisms can manifest themselves through resistance to the rule of free association. The stroke of genius of *The Interpretation of Dreams* is to establish "in the face of 'scientific' prejudices" that manifestations of the

[6] One of Derrida's axioms is that a form of writing is a requirement for speech and that it is precisely the "repression" of this primary form of writing that constitutes the origin of western philosophy as a branch of knowledge.

unconscious - dream, parapraxis, symptoms, free association – have significance: they obey the laws of the primary process, "which constitute a primary mode of functioning of the *logos*" (Laplanche Pontalis, 1973, p. 306). A purpose of the analytical framework is to give birth to such productions of the unconscious in order to decipher them. Hence the utopia of free association would consist in a speech guided by the grammar of the primary process: a kind of spoken dream. The rebus constituted by this ideal chain of free association could then be interpreted. In the reality of the practice a constant flow of free associations is an ideal never attained. The speech of the one who free-associates comes up against more or less explicit resistances. I think this resistance to free associations is the expression of psychical phenomena that are not understandable through the primary process. The *primary process* describes the functioning mechanism of unconscious presentations. What I named *hallucinatory mode of thinking* describes the hypothetical psychical act that creates unconscious presentations from memory traces. Because this hallucinatory mode of thinking is partly a bodily mode of thinking - as it appears in auto-erotism - unconscious presentations resist being verbalized. Thanks to free association the subject reproduces the functioning mechanism of unconscious presentations and the non-verbal aspects of those presentations can thus appear so to speak negatively: the pattern of the resistances to free associations draws the outlines of presentations that are 'unrepresentable' in verbal language. Unconscious phenomena revealed by the psychoanalytic practice, which seem irreducible to a verbal expression, resist the primary process as for instance: resistance to free associations, failure of the dream or acting out.

I propose that non-verbal phenomena also manifest themselves in the clinic through what Freud qualified as "the more specific finding of analytic work" (Freud 1914, p. 112): the transference. I think that it is partly because the analytical framework reduces the censorship of verbal meaning that the analysand hallucinates the analyst. In transference, the meaning of the analyst for the analysand gets lost.[7] The analysand creates unconscious presentations of the analyst in a similar way to how an infant creates unconscious presentations of the world that surrounds him/her.

The transference and the resistance to the cure replay, in the here and now of the analytic situation, a mode of thinking that was at the origin of psychical reality. Hence, part of the logos gets lost in the analytical encounter. The great specificity of psychoanalytic empiricism is to generate clinical phenomena that operate beyond the logos. It is this peculiarity of the psychoanalytical phenomena that raises so many questions to both the positivist and the hermeneutic tradition. In a way the task of psychoanalysis is not only to study those psychical phenomena but also to invent a framework that can describe them. I

[7] As Freud put it: "psycho-analysis does not create it [transference], but merely reveals it to consciousness and gains control of it in order to guide psychical processes towards the desired goal" (Freud, 1910, p. 51). Psychoanalysis doesn't have the monopoly on the phenomena of transference and one experiences it in day-to-day life, especially in situations of love. And certainly novels and plays have described the many ways through which reality of the language gets lost in love. I believe it would be interesting to think of love as a situation that generates a hallucinatory mode of thinking.

believe that it is this very task that Freud addressed by searching a form of writing that would describe psychical events functioning beyond the logos. I propose to call this form of writing, paraphrasing Derrida: *a metapsychological writing* a metapsychological writing whose purpose would be to transcribe *psychical writing*.

Anyone, analyst or analysand, who has tried to write the content of a psychoanalytic session, knows how complex an exercise that is. The complexity comes partly from the great heterogeneousness of the analytical material in which becomes intermingled: an event from the day before, a dream, a type of silence, a fantasy, a certain noise, a distant memory and so on… But at a deeper level, I believe it is the nature of some clinical phenomena produced by the analytical encounter that explains this difficulty. The psychoanalytic practice generates phenomena that contain hallucinatory thoughts using the bodily writing of unconscious presentations. Hence to write about an analytical session, one needs a writing that could transcribe this antic hallucinatory non-verbal mode of thinking. I believe that Freud's metapsychology is also an attempt to create such a writing. In Freud's metapsychology, what is at stake behind the hypothesis about a genesis of the unconscious is also the creation of a conceptual framework to express clinical phenomena specific to psychoanalysis. I think that when Freud compared metapsychological analogies to scaffolding (Freud, 1900, p. 536) or when he wrote of metapsychology as "the theoretical assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be founded" (Freud, 1917, p. 222, fn 1) he expressed this very issue: the need to create conceptual resources to express the non-verbal phenomena that appear in the clinic.[8]

The exhaustive research of the stratagems Freud invented to write beyond the logos is an extraordinarily complex and rich task. Indeed the problem raised by Freud's metapsychological writing goes beyond the difficulty to formalize knowledge about non-verbal presentation.[9] What is at stake is the link between a form of writing and the psychoanalytical practice. Hence some aspects of this practice structure this form of writing. In the scope of this paper I would like to draw a first sketch of the metapsychological writing. In order to do so I will mention two aspects of it that are conditioned by the psychoanalytical practice and then two of the main systems used in a metapsychological writing.

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[8] The epistemologist Gilles-Gaston Granger argues that this "conceptual insufficiency" actually constitutes a richness of the psychoanalytic clinic because it raises in a "radical way" the problem of the transposition of a subjective phenomenon into an objective knowledge (G-G Granger, 1967).

[9] The idea that verbal language is incapable of communicating the affects is very much present in Nietzsche: "Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not communicate themselves even if they tried: they lack the right words. We have already gone beyond whatever we have words for" (*Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" § 26). Patrick Wotling (2008) used this very idea to explains the specificity of Nietzsche's philosophical writing.

1. An esoteric writing

Since a characteristic of psychoanalytic objects is the difficulty to prove their existence, a metapsychological writing describes phenomena whose positivist existence remains speculative. What makes the existence of psychoanalytical objects so hard to prove comes partly from the warning that Freud had addressed to his listeners at the beginning of his introduction to psychoanalysis: "The talk of which psycho-analytic treatment consists brooks no listener; it cannot be demonstrated" (Freud, 1915-1916, p. 17). Psychoanalytic clinical phenomena come from a dialogue that cannot be observed without losing its internal truth (Mosès, 2011). Like the phenomena it tries to describe, the first traces of a metapsychological writing appeared in the privacy of a dialogue: the one of the correspondence between Freud and Fliess. Unlike the neologism 'psychoanalysis' that Freud used for the first time in a scientific publication,[10] Freud created the word 'metapsychology' in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess.[11] Freud made up this new form of writing in the secrecy of this correspondence and in the intimacy of his self-analysis. I believe that this esoteric aspect is a first characteristic of Freud's metapsychological writing that is linked with the analytical practice.

2. A writing of the incomplete

The second aspect linked with the analytical practice that I would like to stress is the incompleteness of the project elaborated through metapsychological writing. Firstly because metapsychology has constantly to take into account new clinical material. Secondly because when clinical material stops being informative, metapsychology is the only way to carry further the theoretical reflexion. In his introduction to Freud's metapsychological papers Strachey moans the loss the seven metapsychological papers destroyed by Freud: "It is difficult to exaggerate our loss from the disappearance of these papers"(Strachey, p. 106). Together with the five existing papers, they would have made up a comprehensive metapsychological work.[12] Yet I would argue that the project of an exhaustive description of metapsychological concepts is not conceivable. When Freud speaks of metapsychology as "the furthest goal that psychology could attain" (Freud, 1925, p. 59) it is, in my opinion, a way to ascribe an asymptotic value to such a goal. In the word metapsychology, "meta" is often understood as designating "beyond" the consciousness. It has been proposed as well that "meta" stands for "beyond" psychology or "beyond" clinical observations (Assoun, 2007). The point I would like to make here is that "meta" can also be interpreted as "beyond" completeness. Metapsychology is therefore a constant work in progress, a place for exploration, something similar to the laboratory of the scientist or the studio of the artist.

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[10] In a paper published in March 30, 1896 in the *Revue Neurologique*

[11] Letter of February 13, 1896: "I am continually occupied with psychology – really metapsychology".

[12] The book would have been entitled *Zur Vorbereitung einer Meta-psychologie (Preliminaries to a Metapsychology)*.

3. The three points of view

In the middle of Freud's major paper on *The Unconscious*, arises the definition of the metapsychological "way of regarding": the description of "a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects" (Freud, 1915c, p. 181). This definition of a "metapsychological presentation" is in fact extremely radical because each of those three aspects hits an impossibility which is to be named: a limit of the logos.

Freud built the topographical point of view on the idea of psychical localities, which are not determine of in any "anatomical fashion" but rather as the constituents of a "fiction" (Freud, 1900, p. 598) to model our mental functioning: the mental (or psychical) apparatus. The topographical point of view consists in locating a psychical process in the mental apparatus. Precisely because he didn't base the mental apparatus on any anatomical ground, Freud has to invent the geography of the mental apparatus. He cannot refer to any anatomical reality and so he has to draw a new map that corresponds to the dissection of a concept: the one of the mental apparatus. In order to map a psychical process, Freud needs to invent a graphic, such as the graphics that appear in chapter seven of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. From a textual angle that corresponds to the replacement of writing by drawing. I propose that the replacement of verbal writing by the graphic of a fiction constitutes the topographical limit to the logos.

The dynamic and the economic point of views rest on the ideas of force and energy: psychical processes would be the outcome of forces and they would be cathected by amounts of energies. These two point of views are inspired by physical sciences: the notion of force is at the core of Newtonian mechanics and the one of energy at the core of thermodynamics. For that reason many criticisms have been addressed to the dynamic and the economic point of view arguing that Freud's concern with psychical force or psychical energy was a scientific anachronism (Gedo, 1977). In particular the fact that the medium of psychical force remains unclear and that quantitative changes of psychical energy are impossible to measure in a clinical observation have appeared as "the weakest element" of a dynamic and economic theory of psychological causations (Kubie, 1947).[13] Against this view I argue that those two points of view are not so much the testimony of Freud's scientism but rather a means to write psychical phenomena in a non verbal way. They both lead toward a mathematical formalization of psychical processes in which forces could be modeled by vectors and energies by numbers. However, unlike some post-Freudian psychoanalytic thinkers such as Lacan or Bion who have proposed mathematical approaches of the psyche, Freud never really went through this path. I nevertheless believe that he initiated it. When he wrote that the economic point of view "endeavours to follow out the vicissitudes of amounts of excitation and to arrive at least

[13] As noticed by Mark Cousins in his introduction of a selection of Freud's theoretical papers: " Within psychoanalysis it is more the idea of the economic dimensions and its relation to the drive that has come in for criticism or simply neglect. Faced with the inexorable progress of measurement within psychology there has been an increasing reluctance to refer to a quantitative dimension within psychical life without being able to assign numbers or measured relations to it" (Mark Cousins, Introduction of *The Unconscious*, Freud, 1915c, pp. xiv-xv)

at some *relative* estimate of their magnitude" (Freud, 1915c, p. 181) one feels a numerical writing looming on the horizon. And yet "the indefiniteness of all our discussions on what we describe as metapsychology (…) due to the fact that we know nothing of the nature of the excitatory process that takes place in the elements of psychical systems" constrains to operate "all the time with a large unknown factor, which we are obliged to carry over into every new formula"(Freud, 1920, pp. 30-31) This unknown factor carried in the economic and dynamic description of a psychical phenomena constitutes, I believe, the economic and dynamic limit to the logos.

Freud's transcription of a psychical process into a metapsychological presentation is not written exclusively under a verbal form. Along the topographical axis it takes the form of a graph and along the economical and dynamic axis it is represented through "formulas" that carry over "a large unknown factor".

4. The Mythology

In his quest to formalize unconscious psychical determinism, Freud used the Greek myths. Already at the time of his self-analysis Freud had raised the hypothesis that Oedipus tragedy could seize "on a compulsion which everyone recognises because he feels its existence within himself"[14]. Then throughout Freud's work, Greek mythology seems to furnish his metapsychology with paradigmatic figures, whose evolution could be summarized around the succession of three of these mythological figures: Oedipus, Narcissus and Thanatos. Oedipus would correspond to the discovery of infantile sexuality, Narcissus to the introduction of the concept of narcissism and Thanatos to the apparition of the death drive. Greek mythology is a fundamental element of Freud's metapsychological writing. In his endeavours to formalize unconscious presentations the logos of a theory of psychological causations is transformed into the pathos of Greek mythology.[15] Moreover, by writing the subject's psychical reality through the Greek tragedies, Freud gave back a significance to the violence of destiny contained in these myths: the determinism of unconscious presentations disguised in the form of destiny. I believe that the use of mythology is one of the main solutions Freud found to the problem of writing the hallucinatory nature of the unconscious.

Conclusion

In *Character in Fiction* a paper given in 1924 before the Cambridge Heretics Society, Virginia Woolf proposed a "scientific" reason to explain the appearance of modern fiction and that reason was Freud:

[14] Letter to Fliess of October 15, 1897.

[15] Gilles Deleuze in *Proust and Signs* developed this distinction between pathos and logos. Deleuze proposed a reading of Proust in which the world of pathos contrasts " with the world of logos, the world of hieroglyphs and ideograms with the world of analytic expression, phonetic writing and rational thought" (Deleuze, 1972, p. 108).

> “If you read Freud you know in ten minutes some facts - or at least some possibilities - which our parents could not have guessed for themselves: to read Freud was to come to know something that even scrupulous scrutiny could not divine.” (Woolf, 1924, p. 504)

The new knowledge that made of Freud the catalyst of modernity in literature was of course the explicit knowledge of the unconscious. However, even more than the unconscious as a concept, I wonder if Freud’s influence on literature might have more to do with the transcription of the unconscious in the practice of writing. This idea rests on the hypothesis that I have tried to explore here in my paper: the psychoanalytic mechanism generates psychical phenomena, which replay in the here and now of the analytic situation a hallucinatory mode of thinking that was at the origin of psychical reality.

To create a form of writing to describe those psychical phenomena is a challenge for the analyst who searches for an epistemological framework in order to make sense of the clinical encounter, but it is also a challenge for the writer. I believe that to put the language at work in order to create a writing of the psychical reality revealed by the analytical cure is one of the great challenge that has arisen for the writers of modern fiction, for the writers after Freud.

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Psychotherapy across Languages: beliefs, attitudes and practices of monolingual and multilingual therapists with their multilingual patients

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Abstract

The present study investigates beliefs, attitudes and practices of 101 monolingual and multilingual therapists in their interactions with multilingual patients. We adopted a mixed-method approach, using an on-line questionnaire with 27 closed questions which were analysed quantitatively and informed questions in interviews with one monolingual and two multilingual therapists. A principal component analysis yielded a four-factor solution accounting for 41% of the variance. The first dimension, which explained 17% of variance, reflects therapists' attunement towards their bilingual patients (i.e., attunement versus collusion). Further analysis showed that the 18 monolingual therapists differed significantly from their 83 bi- or multilingual peers on this dimension. The follow up interviews confirmed this result. Recommendations based on these findings are made for psychotherapy training and supervision to attend to a range of issues including: the psychological and therapeutic functions of multi/bilingualism; practice in making formulations in different languages; the creative therapeutic potential of the language gap.

Introduction

Migration, acculturation processes, living with plural worldviews and identities and communicating across languages are all experiences which permeate contemporary communities. Increasingly, people are moving across borders in pursuit of work, safety and refuge. An inevitable consequence of this is that there are many people accessing services, including counselling and psychotherapy services, who do not speak the official language of the country in which they find themselves. In London alone it is estimated that over 300 languages are spoken by schoolchildren (Burck, 2004, p. 315). To complement this, the number of multilingual people training to be therapists has increased in recent years. The current data does not present a very clear picture but where organizations keep data on therapists' multilingualism, the current situation (2012) for active members registered with the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy, for

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example, shows that 1,298 are able to conduct therapy in more than one language out of a total active membership of 7,085. For the purposes of this paper, we use Li Wei's (2000) definition of the term bilingual, namely "describ[ing] someone with the possession of two languages" (p. 7), but he also states that it can cover any number of languages. We do not make a distinction between bi- and multilinguals, so all speakers of more than one language will be included in the category of the multilingual. We use the terms "client" and "patient" to refer to the users of mental health clinical services.

Increasingly therapists are becoming aware of the psychotherapeutic implications of being multilingual both for the patient and for the therapist. It is an area that straddles the disciplines of psychotherapy and linguistics. This research paper attempts to reflect this by adopting a multi-disciplinary approach: the researchers are from the two different disciplines of Applied Linguistics and Psychotherapy. Although there is increasing interest, the role of language in therapy for multilingual patients and for multilingual therapists has attracted relatively little investigation compared with the amount of interest dedicated to the role of culture in therapy. It is, of course, difficult to separate out language from culture but the aim of this research is to focus as closely as possible on language. This is an area which merits attention and consideration not least because many therapists may share Perez Foster's (1998) early concerns that work in English with non native English speakers could be: "a pseudotherapy" which simply sides with the patient's resistance to the mother tongue and the mother era, or a "quasitherapy" where the essential material is lost in the complex cognitive traffic of bilingualism…" (p. 202). Some therapists may not even consider this as a potential issue and will not address their patients' choice of language at all. Sometimes it is the patient who is left to ponder on its meaning. The following is a self-report from a patient interviewed in Dewaele (2010, p. 204). The patient's mother tongue was Greek and her next additional language was English:

> *I think when I talk about emotional topics I tend to code-switch to English a lot. I remember when I was seeing a psychologist in Greece for a while I kept code-switching from Greek to English. We never really talked about this…To my mind it may have been some distancing strategy.*

Patients may feel distressed as a result of unacknowledged language proficiency differentials between the patient and the therapist. The migrants who took part in the European study "Health for all, all in health" were asked about their experiences with mental health care. They indicated that the healthcare providers underestimated their language issues and that language barriers resulted in greater feelings of paranoia and aggression during their encounters with healthcare providers (De Maesschalck, 2012).

Although, as already stated, there is relatively little written about the experience of multilinguals in psychotherapy, there are some notable exceptions. For example, Amati-

Mehler, Argentieri and Canestri (1993) consider the issues from a psychoanalytic perspective and draw principally from case material with both clients and clinicians who are bi/multilingual (see also Altarriba & Santiago-Rivera, 1994; Santiago-Rivera, Altarriba, 2002; Schrauf, 2000). More recent research includes Bowker and Richards (2010) and Stevens and Holland (2008) who focus their research principally on monolingual therapists working with bi/multilingual clients. Our research paper focuses on a comparison between monolingual and multilingual therapists in order to identify possible differences between the way they operate across languages, when they share a native language or when they do not share a native language with their patient. Our purpose is to discover what can be learned from each other about working effectively with multilingual patients, which could benefit the practice of psychotherapists working across languages. Amati-Mehler et al. (1993) feel that it is important to include other theoretical models besides psychoanalysis although as previously stated, the researchers aim "…to set out the difficulties facing those who try to deal with the subject of multilingualism from one specific angle – in this case of psychoanalysis. As can be seen… there are many queries to be answered, numerous disciplines are involved, and various theories can be used" (p. 221). We have chosen to conduct our research with therapists from a wide range of theoretical orientations.

Language and Psychotherapy

The psychoanalytic concept of splitting has a particular relevance for people who are bilingual. Splitting can be defined and understood in many different ways in the different theoretical models of the psyche. For our purposes here, we refer to the process of separating the self from difficult emotions and experiences in order to defend from pain. This can serve a protective function or it can result in a distorted view and disconnection from the self and others. With regard to multilingualism Amati-Mehler (1993, p. 264) view this not as the cause of splitting but that "splitting processes lean on and in a certain way exploit the different linguistic registers as a means for organising and expressing themselves" (p. 264). An excellent example of this is given by the examination by Patrick Casement (1992, as cited in Amati-Mehler, 1993, p. 176) of Samuel Beckett's bilingualism stating that "the only expedient by which he could gain his internal freedom and chances for creativity was, in Casement's opinion, the repudiation not only of his mother and his motherland, but also and above all of his mother tongue". It was by writing in French (Beckett's second language) that Beckett was able to find his creative voice. As the example of Beckett demonstrates, multilingualism in itself need not be the cause of difficulty and hence the split. It may, however, provide a means whereby the splitting can occur and may provide expressive as well as defensive opportunities.

For people who are multilingual, the way in which experiences and emotional reactions are encoded becomes more complex when more than one language is spoken. One of the ways in which multilinguals cope is by splitting and creating new selves for each of the languages spoken. Priska Imberti (2007, p. 71) who migrated from Argentina to New York as a young woman refers to the new self she had to create - "When we change languages, both our worldview and our identities get transformed. We need to become new selves to speak a language that does not come from our core self, a language that

does not reflect our inner-connectedness with the culture it represents". Pavlenko (2006) investigated the question whether multilinguals feel that they become different people when they change languages. She also looked at how they make sense of these perceptions and what prompts some to see their language selves as different. Her analysis of the feedback of 1039 multilinguals on an open question about "feeling different in a foreign language" revealed that two thirds of participants reported feeling different when using another language. Participants linked their perceptions of different selves to four causes: "(1) linguistic and cultural differences; (2) distinct learning contexts; (3) different levels of language emotionality; (4) different levels of language proficiency" (p. 10). Pavlenko concluded that the perception of different selves is not restricted to immigrant multilinguals, but is part of the general multilingual experience. She also cautions that "similar experiences (e.g. change in verbal and non-verbal behaviours accompanying the change in language) may be interpreted differently by people who draw on different discourses of bi/multilingualism and self" (p. 27).

Wilson (2008) investigated the relationship between the extent to which multilinguals felt different when switching language and their personality profiles. She found that introverts were more likely to feeling different when operating in an L2 when they had at least intermediate or advanced proficiency in the L2. Participants who had learned their L2 at a younger age were more likely to feel differently. Differences in a felt sense of self were also explored by Ozanska-Ponikwia (2011) to include different ways of expression of emotion in differing languages by Polish immigrants in English-speaking countries. She argues that most people feel different when using a second language but that some are more aware of it than others, especially those with higher levels of emotional intelligence.

Dewaele and Nakano (2012) looked at multilinguals' perceived shifts on five feeling scales (i.e., feeling more logical, serious, emotional, fake and different) in pair-wise comparisons between their different languages. A systematic shift was found across the four languages, with participants feeling gradually less logical, less serious, less emotional and increasingly fake when using languages acquired later in life. It can be argued that being able to access a range of languages, also gives one the possibility of the expression of different emotions. As Harris (2006) describes, intense emotions from the formative years will have been encoded in the native language. Nevertheless there are many situations where emotional expression is facilitated by speaking another language. We feel that this occurs frequently when the additional language can circumvent the superego (as embedded in the native language) and so taboo words or emotions can be allowed to be expressed in a way that would not be allowed in the native language. Pavlenko (2005, p. 22) points out that as a Russian-Jewish immigrant to the US, Russian is for her a highly emotional language: "words brim with intimacy and familiarity (…) permeated with memories of my childhood and youth". However, these emotional associations are not systematically positive:

> …it is also a language that attempted to constrain me and obliterate me as a Jew, to tie me down as a woman, to render me voiceless, a mute slave to a hated regime. To

> abandon Russian means to embrace freedom. I can talk and write without hearing echoes of things I should not be saying. I can be me. English is a language that offered me that freedom (…) (p. 22).

Dewaele (2010) similarly reported that several Arab and Asian participants stated that they switch to English to escape the social taboo in their native languages and cultures. One Chinese participant, Quipinia (Cantonese L1, English L2) reported an incident in which she burst out in English at her parents who know English but with whom she usually speaks Cantonese:

> *But I remember one time when they were arguing with me and I was soooooooooo angry that I shouted out 'IT'S UNFAIR!!!!' I guess it's regarded quite impolite if I shouted at my parents (you know Chinese Traditional family) but at that point I feel that I had to express my anger and let myself just do it in another language; perhaps I feel I'm another person if I say that in English*...(p. 121)

Tehrani & Vaughan (2009, p. 11) show how bilingual differences and language switching in therapy can increase emotional mastery and how exploring past problems in a new light can be aided by a new language "...where an individual is equally fluent in two languages the most significant factor in increasing the quality and emotional content of the recall is the language and context in which the incident was encoded". Imberti (2007) elaborates further on this theme:

> Sometimes the acquisition of a new language can provide a person with the "right expression" for a particular sentiment, and thus can be used as a coping mechanism to express emotionally loaded experiences…a second language served as a vehicle to become more self regulated by finding ways to verbalise feelings that were once censored or restricted by external forces (p. 71)

These examples imply that individuals who are multilingual may have access to a greater emotional range and have a more developed facility for managing plural cultural identities than their monolingual peers. A further implication is that this process should be acknowledged and worked with in the therapeutic encounter.

In the early years, acquisition of the first language can be understood in attachment terms as the main way in which the infant begins to separate from the mother (Winnicott, 1963) as well as the means to relate to others (Stern, 1998). The relationship the child has to their acquisition of language and the experience of separation are therefore inextricably linked. This, in part, explains why some people find it so difficult to learn a new language when they migrate. It may excite all types of anxieties around separation and loss – not only from the mother but also from the motherland and mother tongue. Perez Foster (1996) summarises the dual functions of the language operations in the psyche of defense and expression as "the power of bilingualism to both ally itself against the experience of psychic pain and to work in transformative adaptation toward the development of new self experience" (p. 262).

Some findings from earlier research

One previous small-scale research with bi/multilingual clinicians (Costa, 2010) revealed that bi/multilingual clinicians were using a range of techniques to address their clients' multilingual experience. For example a client could be encouraged to speak his or her own language in specific moments for which "in some cases when clients can't find any similar words in English they may use phrases or words from their language which I may not be able to understand but allows them to express the emotion" (p. 21).

The bi/multilingual clinicians interviewed felt comfortable with this and were able to tolerate not understanding a phrase or sentences initially and then exploring the meaning together, after they had been spoken, in English. The research by Bowker & Richards (2004) and Stevens & Holland (2008) with mainly monolingual, English-speaking therapists who work with bi or multilingual clients has provided a variety of examples of ways in which therapists have engaged or struggled with patients where there has been a language differential and some anxiety about the communication. For example, Stevens & Holland (2008, p. 19) note that when working cross-lingually, counsellors commented that they felt outside of their comfort zone. A therapist interviewed by Bowker & Richards (2004) commented on her sense of inadequacy and envy as a monolingual clinician working with a client who could speak more than one language, and further comments echoed this: "…it is almost embarrassing, their English is almost more correct than mine is…" (p. 471).

Research question and hypotheses

In order to build on previous research findings and to shed some light on the complex issue of multilingualism in patient-therapist interactions, the present study will address the following question: "Are there significant differences between monolingual and multilingual therapists in their beliefs, attitudes and practices with multilingual patients?"

Philosophical underpinning

We have adopted a Critical Realism approach (Bhaskar, 1979) to this research, where understanding of the world through causal explanations or phenomenological meaning-

making are not the only foci for the development of knowledge. Through a Critical Realism approach we have tried to refine our knowledge by using information about the functioning of the brain and observing and describing more fully that information via questionnaires and reflective conversations, in order for that full and rich description to provide an evaluative critique of the social phenomena we have observed.

Method

Participants

Qualified therapists were contacted by email via one of the author's professional networks inviting them to take part in a piece of research which considered the question: "Are there significant differences between mono-lingual and bilingual/multilingual therapists?" A total of 101 therapists agreed to fill out a short sociobiographical questionnaire. It contained questions about sex, age, nationality, language history and present language use, and theoretical orientation in their therapeutic work. A majority of participants were women (N = 84) and 17 male colleagues. The mean age was 46 yrs (SD = 11.8), ranging from 25 to 85. The therapists had worked an average of 10.6 years (SD = 9.2), ranging from zero to 40 years in the profession. Participants are generally highly educated: 4 have a Bachelor's degree, 31 a Master's degree, 25 a PG, and 23 a Doctoral degree. This majority of highly educated, mostly female therapists is typical for the profession. For example, The British Association for Counseling and Psychotherapy has a total of 9,671 accredited members of which 8,219 are female and 1,452 are male (May 25th 2012). The participants reported 20 different nationalities, including many participants with double nationalities. The largest group was British (N = 58), followed by British and some other nationality (N = 8). Other nationalities included American, Chinese, Egyptian, French, German, Greek, Indian, Iranian, Irish, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, South African, Spanish, Swedish, Swiss, Taiwan, Turkish and Venezuelan. Most participants were resident in the UK (N = 93). Two thirds of participants (N = 63) had lived abroad for longer than 3 months. English was the most frequent L1 (N = 51), followed by Turkish (N = 5), Greek (N = 4), and 21 other L1s. A little under half of the participants had grown up with two L1s from birth (N = 45). The sample consists of 19 monolinguals, 30 bilinguals, 22 trilinguals, 20 quadrilinguals, and 11 pentalinguals. Most frequent L2s were English (N = 24) and French (N = 18). The pattern was similar for the L3 with French (N = 8) and Spanish (N = 8) as the most frequent languages. The most frequent L4s were Italian (N = 5) and Spanish (N = 4). No single L5 appeared more than twice. Most therapists used the Humanistic Integrative approach (N = 30), followed by the CBT approach (N = 29), the Systemic approach (N =17), and the Psychodynamic approach (N = 16).

Instrument

The main questionnaire was exploratory in nature. It contained 27 items in the form of statements with 5-point Likert scales (ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree") (see appendix A). The items covered linguistic practices with multilingual clients, perceptions and attitudes towards mono- and multilingual interactions, multilingualism

and multiculturalism. The questionnaire was first submitted to four experts (two psychologists and two applied linguists) who rated each item and commented on them. After that the questionnaire was pilot-tested with 10 therapists. This led to the deletion of some items and the reformulation of others. The final version of the questionnaire was put on-line on Survey monkey and the first author used her contacts in the profession to recruit participants. The questionnaire was anonymous but the last item allowed participants to leave an email address if they agreed to be interviewed on the issues covered in the questionnaire.

Interviews

Following university ethical approval and the completion of the questionnaires, we conducted a series of interviews with one monolingual, and two multilingual therapists who had given their consent to be contacted in the questionnaires. The aim of the interviews was to provide additional information, which might enrich the data gathered from the questionnaires. Interviews were recorded and transcribed shortly after the recording. All quotes used were checked with interviewees first for their approval to publish. Clearly any qualitative research is potentially influenced by the stances and beliefs of the researcher. This can be regarded as a limitation. It can also be regarded as an inevitable reflection of the complexity of working with individuals' multiple realities. In this research we have chosen to embrace that complexity with an honest attitude to its limitations rather than attempt to eliminate complexity and strive for an elusive simple and neutral position. Our results are an attempt to reflect the full and rich description of our findings.

Results

Quantitative analysis

An exploratory factor analysis, using a principal components analysis (PCA) was performed on the 27 items, followed by an independent t-test for post-hoc comparison. Assumptions for factorability of the data were sufficiently met based on Bartlett's test of sphericity, $\chi^2 = 867$, $df = 351$, $p < .0001$) supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, $KMO = .067$, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970), and the anti-image correlation matrix. A varimax solution was used for rotation. The number of factors to retain was determined by examining (a) eigenvalues greater than 1.5; (b) the scree plot of eigenvalues; (c) factor loadings greater than .30; (d) interpretability of the factor structures.

The results of the PCA yielded a four-factor solution accounting for 41.2% of the variance (see Appendix B). Item content suggested that the first factor reflects therapists' attunement towards their bilingual clients (Attunement versus Collusion). This first factor explains 17.2% of variance. The second factor was about effective communication where language is shared opposed to advantages to working in a second language in therapy. Thus, the factor was named "Shared understanding versus Acting on assumptions" and it explains 8.9% of variance. The third and fourth factors describe "Freedom of expression

versus Difficulty of challenging", and "The distancing effect of the second language versus The advantage of a shared language", explaining 8.1% and 6.6% of variance respectively. Factor loadings for the variables are shown in Appendix C.

Individual factor scores on the various dimensions were used as the dependent variables. An independent t-test showed that the 18 monolingual therapists differed significantly from their 83 bi- or multilingual peers on the first dimension (Attunement versus Collusion) (see table 1). The multilingual therapists are situated more towards the attunement end of the dimension compared to the monolingual therapists (see figure 1).

Table 1

Independent t-test: Monolingual versus Multilingual therapists on the four dimensions

Dimension	*t*	*df*	*p*
Attunement versus Collusion	-3.51	99	0.001
Shared understanding versus Acting on assumptions	-0.42	99	0.676
Freedom of expression versus Difficulty of challenging	-1.56	99	0.121
Distancing effect of L2 versus Advantage of a shared language	0.31	99	0.76



Figure 1. Mean scores on dimension 1: Attunement versus Collusion for both groups of therapists.

Interviews

We used the dimension where there had been a significant difference between monolingual and multilingual therapists in the questionnaires to form the basis of the questions in the interviews. The therapists interviewed were from a range of theoretical backgrounds. The monolingual (L1 English) and two multilingual therapists (L2 English) worked within CBT, Systemic and Integrative theoretical frameworks and were all currently employed by the NHS. All of them also had extensive experience of working in the voluntary sector and had worked with monolingual and multilingual clients. Although the conversations were structured around the first factor or dimension (Attunement versus Collusion) where we had found a significant difference between monolingual and multilingual therapists, the therapists sometimes made comments which corresponded to other dimensions which we had hypothesized would be significant and these comments are included in this text.

Dimension 1: Attunement versus Collusion

As the results from the questionnaire showed, the multilingual therapists tend to view their ability to share a language, or to have a facility for languages with a patient as positive with respect to their capacity for attunement with the client. They are also mindful of the potential for boundary breaches and collusion but do not see this as a negative issue and have adopted strategies to deal with this. The following quotations illustrate their position. Multilingual Therapist 2 (M2):

> *There is a kind of a familiarity that they (patients) experience with me, that probably they wouldn't with a (native) English speaker or through an interpreter…We know nobody else understands us, it's only us…probably more private, less threatening, less stressful, more relaxed.*

Although the following example could be construed as crossing a boundary, this therapist makes it very clear that she is aware of the potential for collusion and is mindful in her practice of how to manage it. M2:

> *…if somebody's feeling bad in the room, I would very easily say "Let me get you a cup of… you know some water, can I get you anything?…I'm here to help you and I want to help you. Would you like a glass of water, you seem in distress?"…And I don't mind going and getting it for you. And I think it helps the engagement a lot.*

For the next therapist, it is the act of learning and knowing different languages, which affects her belief that this has made her more attuned to people's levels of understanding. Multilingual Therapist 1 (M1):

> *How would I find that I communicate differently? I think that if you have to learn various languages for whatever reason, you become much more attuned to what the other person is saying, to try to understand, because…you know what it's like to be a foreigner or in a foreign situation, so you can make that effort and you can be more flexible. (Patients also have) to adapt much more and be more flexible. You are more attuned to whether people understand or don't understand. If I feel they're not understanding. I'll try to get my point across in a different way.*

And in answer to the question about what she noticed and what she did, she demonstrated how she applies her beliefs in practice. M1:

> *I suppose it's sort of a dead-like hue in the eye that they haven't really understood or they haven't caught the thought and followed it in their own mind…I guess I check more...if they've understood or if we've arrived at the same conclusion.*

In an unpublished Masters Thesis Bick Nguyen (2012, p. 73) concluded that some of the bilingual therapists she had interviewed were aware of the possibility for over-identification with clients who shared their native language and culture. The multilingual therapists interviewed for this paper are aware of this possibility and the possibility of collusion and show that, in their practice, they are aware and take measures to address it. They also shared a belief that the benefit of reducing a sense of isolation for the patient outweighs the potential for collusion. An example of this is given in the previous section and a following one is included here. M1:

> *This particular client liked it, that I knew Spain, that I could speak Spanish…and that she wasn't so alone. Being South Asian in England, it's all very difficult, and having wanted to go to Spain, and made this attempt to live in Spain and have that*

relationship break up, she felt so dislocated. In the therapy she wasn't that alone, she realised there were other people who knew about Spain, knew what was happening.

The following two extracts show the therapists discussing the issue of disclosure. They take different stances in their practice from a considered and non-collusive position. The differences may be attributed to the different theoretical models they apply in their practice. M1:

…and she (the client) said, "Oh you speak Spanish" and I said "Yes, I do speak Spanish" So then I had to decide whether I reveal that I'd lived 13 years in Madrid and that I do know Madrid very well or not. I decided not to.

And M2:

They (patients) ask, and I do tell them, I just say that…maybe we don't have the same ethnicity and religion. And it's important because in that context it's actually useful, because they do not perceive me as someone from the authorities or from that more oppressive kind of background. I think it helps me to engage with them. When I feel that they are curious, I might even volunteer, because from my theoretical way we work, we are quite transparent.

This therapist also gives a more detailed example of her practice with relation to patients' behaviour, which invites the therapist into a collusive relationship. M2:

But maybe there is a feeling of appreciation. There is so much appreciation that I'm giving my time to them and it's in Turkish, to get the service in Turkish…And they might also ask things from me, like "Can you do that for me, can you write this letter for me, we are from the same place, can you do this favour for me?" And I…just explain what I can and what I cannot do.

The monolingual therapist interviewed for this paper did not say anything actively about collusion. Perhaps this is due to the fact that therapists, in their professional formation, are careful to avoid being judgemental. The comments by this therapist included in the section on Assumptions could also have fitted easily into this Collusions section. A decision was taken to include her comments in the Assumptions section to mirror the therapists' choice of vocabulary. The following quotation is included, however, as it alludes to the possibility of following a lead and imagining a familiarity when that is not the case. Monolingual Therapist (M3):

I'm a little bit suspicious of kind of making assumptions about body language when I don't know what people are saying because I have experience of times when people's body language might have made me think that something was going on when that hasn't actually been the case.

Dimension 2: Shared understanding versus Acting on assumptions

Even though there was no significant difference between both groups of therapists for this dimension (Shared Understanding versus Assumptions), the interviewed therapists made some interesting comments, and a distinction emerged between the multilingual therapists and the monolingual therapist in terms of beliefs, attitudes, behaviour and practice. The multilingual therapists commented on shared experience and behaviour with clients. M1:

…a monolingual won't have that experience, of going home or thinking that home is elsewhere, or being bored as I was as a child, being dragged back home and thinking "Oh but I really would like to go like everyone else (on holiday) to Portugal."

and shared attitudes. M2:

I feel that because of some of the language they use, or the way they sometimes come in and say, "Hello, how are you?"…"I feel that it's something about that we are in a foreign country and we are…you know where I come from, I know where you come from" kind of an idea, so I think they do relate in a different way.

However, the monolingual therapist felt that the shared language led to shared assumptions. M3:

...when you don't share a language people assume that you probably don't have that shared understanding...People assume you have a shared understanding or shared agreement about, you know, what is shameful in culture or whatever, when you share a language.

This therapist believed that shared assumptions through a shared language was not always useful. Although the word "collusion" was not used, the lack of potential for collusion by the monolingual therapist is highlighted. M3:

I think that sometimes it's actually quite an advantage to not have that assumption and to be able to make explicit a conversation about understandings of culture and ways of thinking or ways of expressing things. It opens up space that actually there may be alternative ways of understanding, that you don't necessarily have to be bound by what you've been brought up with, but you can in some ways choose.

The therapist also added:

I'm very careful not to impose my culture on my client.

For Dimension 3 "Increased freedom of expression versus Challenge less easy" and Dimension 4 "Additional language promotes distance versus Shared language is an advantage" no significant difference emerged in the quantitative analysis between monolingual and multilingual therapists. This lack of difference is echoed in the interviews with the three therapists, although they refer to increased freedom of expression and the benefits of distance when working in an additional language. The fact that the questionnaire revealed no significant difference between monolingual and multilingual therapists in Dimensions 3 and 4 may be explained by the relatively little exposure many therapists have to ideas about emotional expression in multiple languages, as explained in the introduction to this paper. Dimensions 3 and 4 specifically draw on ideas about emotions in multiple languages. However, both the monolingual and multilingual therapists make some observations about these dimensions. Being able to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity is a key skill for therapists. The gap produced by not-knowing can be a source of therapeutic spontaneity and creativity. Winnicott (1971) referred to this as the "potential space". Moreno (1953), the founder of psychodrama, defined spontaneity, the fundamental change agent of psychodrama, as "a new response to an old situation or an adequate response to a new situation" (p. 336). It can be argued

that speaking another language is a "new response to an old situation". All the therapists interviewed reflect Nguyen's (2012) observation that a gap across languages can have therapeutic benefits proposing "bilinguals have most likely had opportunities to experience and to live with not-knowing and not understanding. This may be an aid and a resource when needing to stay with and to work with ambiguities in the counselling relationship in terms of the language gap" (p. 97).

The following excerpt illustrates how the monolingual therapist describes how she uses the distance produced by the additional language to pay extra attention to body language. M3:

> *When (using an interpreter) the client is talking in their own language and I don't know what's being said, it gives me space to able to attend to the facial expressions, for example, in a way that might be different from when we're sharing a language.*

The following extract shows how the language gap can facilitate ways of challenging the patient as well as allowing for freedom of expression. M2:

> *I was working with an (English) couple and she'd referred to her mother being a fishwife. I said I don't understand really well, but what is a fishwife? And then she started saying what it is and what she really meant by using that word (...) My intention really was to understand more about what was loaded in that word, which if I was English, for example, I might not have said, "what is a fish wife?" That (not being English) allows me to ask that question.*

Her belief is that:

> *Probably I found out things that maybe a monolingual wouldn't have been able to find out in that way.*

Freedom of expression is again referred to with reference to the behaviour of language switching. This differs from the study by Nguyen (2012) who found that therapists believed that the principal function of swapping between two languages was to increase comprehension. The therapists she interviewed did not mention the potential for a change

in emotional expression or level of closeness. This is referred to by one of the multilingual therapists below. M2:

There's a difference in what they're saying by switching, by saying, "you know what I mean, I'm from this place". So the act of switching is more important than the switch.

However the monolingual therapist also expresses concern that freedom of expression may be at the expense of safety. M3:

There are times I know when other therapists have done…a testimony on a reliving exercise with somebody and they were speaking in their own language and the therapist didn't understand it. Now, I wouldn't do that, I think there's just too much at the time going on therapeutically that you need to be able to be in touch with for that to be a safe or comfortable process really for the client or the therapist.

Additional Findings

None of the therapists interviewed had tried inviting their patients to express themselves in their own language (which they did not share) and then have them translate it for them afterwards. In conversation after the interviews, they all felt that (apart from safety considerations) this was an interesting intervention which they would consider. They saw the potential for mending splits and allowing for integration in the therapy room by welcoming the different linguistic identities of the client into the room. It is intriguing that none of the therapists had tried this yet, given the multilinguals' beliefs that the sharing of the patients' language could help the patients to feel less dislocated and isolated. Reference has already been made in this paper to multilingual therapists interviewed by Costa (2010) who endorse inviting other languages into the room. Finally, although there were not specific questions about these topics, two other themes emerged clearly. The first was the fact that the multilingual therapists had trained in English and that this was their professional language. They believed that this affected the way in which they conducted (or didn't) therapy in their native language. The following example illustrates this issue. M1:

Well, when I was thinking about coming to do this interview, I wondered whether I wasn't really a fraud, because although I do speak various languages, I've always been trained in only one, so when I tried to, even when people in Switzerland ask me

about the kind of therapy I do, I find it incredibly difficult to explain, because I've never picked up a French textbook about CBT.

But this therapist also went on to mention another point. M1:

...if you don't have the language and it's not tripping off your tongue and you're having to search for it, you're in the same position as the client.

Perhaps there is an interesting point to be made here about the levelling of power and the increased sense of empathy. This compares with a therapist's response in Costa (2010): "I also think that when people realise English is not my first language either, that changes the balance of power" (p. 19).

The final theme to emerge was about opportunities for learning languages. The multilingual therapists felt that if you are a speaker of a minority language you have little choice but to learn other languages. Whereas for the monolingual therapist even with a will to learn it was not so clear-cut. M3:

Even having worked overseas quite a bit, I find it very difficult to practice the language where I'm English and other people very often want to speak English, so I find it very difficult and to practice and not get it right without people jumping in and speaking to me in English.

Conclusion

The research set out to discover if there are significant differences between monolingual and multilingual therapists in their beliefs, attitudes and practices with multilingual patients. Although the statistical analysis of the questionnaires showed a significant difference between both groups in only one dimension extracted by principal components analysis (namely Attunement versus Collusion), a variety of points have emerged from the conversations which seem to be applicable to multilingual therapists, others to monolingual therapists only and some which apply equally to both categories.

Multilingual therapists interviewed suggested that they were able to help patients to feel more connected and less isolated although they also mention the importance of attending to boundaries in a way that shapes patients' expectations and the limits of their role. Perez Foster (1996) proposes that when speaking in their shared native language: "both members of the therapeutic couple are pulled into a sensorial space…this experience is

similar to the child and early caretaker's sharing of affective states and moods" (p. 71). This clearly heightens the potential for empathy and intimacy but might also lead to possible collusion. This is why the therapists felt that attention to the appropriate setting and maintenance of boundaries and the issue of disclosure is so important. These therapists also mentioned the problems of training as therapists in English and the difficulties they experienced working in their native languages in therapy where they did not have access to the professional vocabulary or experience in relating professionally in their native language. Although this was an example of the difficulties the distance of working in an additional language can bring, they also showed some awareness of the potential benefits of working in an additional language. The point has already been made that the limited attention to this issue paid by the therapists reflects the limited input into therapists' training of the psychological and psychotherapeutic functions of multilingualism.

The key point highlighted by the monolingual therapist was the fact that she was free of assumptions and less likely to collude with patients. All the therapists believed that learning a language made them better attuned to other languages and other language learners. They all believed that through working across languages they had learned to think carefully about how they used language, to check understanding and to simplify their language. Although no therapist had tried out inviting other languages in to the therapy they were interested and saw the potential of trying this. They all warned against making any cultural assumptions and in the words of Perez Foster (1996) viewed therapy "as a meaningful co-construction of the patient's life where both members of the dyad are equally involved in the enterprise" (p. 167). Perez Foster (1996, pp. 203-208) describes her ability as a bilingual therapist to work creatively with bilingual clients whose native language she does not know. She uses the term "quasitherapy" to refer to the way in which essential material may be lost working across languages and she illustrates ways in which she has worked with her clients' dual-language worlds with fascinating tips and examples. From our own piece of research the authors would like to make supplementary recommendations for practice.

Recommendations

We have three recommendations for research, practice, training and supervision. Firstly, it would be useful and interesting for further research to be conducted on language switching in therapy – how it is initiated and what it signifies. The second recommendation relates to practice. This research highlights the need for therapists to pay attention to the way in which the inherent self-disclosure is managed by the therapist who speaks multiple languages. Therapists interviewed for this research have given examples, which are included in this paper, of ways in which they manage this. It is also suggested that therapists consider if, when and how to initiate inviting languages they may not understand into the therapeutic space and the therapeutic implications of such an initiative. Finally, it is suggested that training of psychotherapists needs to include a component on the psychological and therapeutic functions of multi/bilingualism and underlying implications for therapy. Training and supervision for psychotherapists could also include practice for therapists to make formulations in different languages. With

increasing numbers of multilingual people now accessing therapeutic services and becoming therapists, it seems timely for the curricula of psychotherapy courses and therapeutic practice for all therapists – mono and multilingual - to be revised in order to take into account the changing profile and language needs of users and providers.

Acknowledgements

Our thanks to Professor Rachel Tribe and Dr. Joan Painter for their advice and input on the questionnaire design and ethical issues. Thank you also to Dr. Malcolm Edwards for sharing ideas and experience and to Ruxandra Comanaru for her administration of the questionnaire. Finally, we would like to acknowledge our appreciation of the participants for sharing their thinking with us.

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Appendix A

The Likert scale questionnaire. Instruction: "Tell us to what extent you agree with the following statements (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree)"

1. I avoid certain topics when working with people with whom I do not share a first language.
2. Clients with whom I share a first language relate differently from people with whom I do not share a first language.
3. It is easier to form a therapeutic relationship with someone who shares a first language.
4. I use more non-verbal forms of communication with people who do not share my first language.
5. Speakers of more than one language can accommodate more easily in therapeutic work with a client.
6. I consider that the client's language plays a role in how they behave in therapy.
7. I consider that the languages used by the therapists in therapy play a role in how they behave as a therapist.
8. I think there are advantages to using a second language for the client in therapy.
9. I think it is an advantage being familiar with a client's culture.
10. I think being from the same culture as the client is an advantage.
11. I think my ability as a therapist has been improved by working with people who speak a different first language from my own.
12. I think that therapists with bilingual skills are able to understand clients in a different way than therapists who are monolingual.
13. I think therapists who speak more than one language are able to communicate more effectively with clients from different linguistic backgrounds.
14. I think that therapists' ability to speak more than one language attunes them more to cultural differences.
15. I think clients can use a second language as a distancing device in therapy
16. I think therapists can use a second language as a distancing device in therapy
17. I think that therapists who speak more than one language can understand clients whose first language is not that of the therapist.
18. I think the transference is likely to be affected by the client's choice of languages used in therapy.
19. Working with the transference is easier when the therapist and client share a first language.
20. I think my proficiency in my first language affects the way clients view me.
21. I think that the first language of the therapist is not relevant in therapy
22. I think that the first language of the client is not relevant in therapy
23. It is easier to express strong feelings and emotions in a second language
24. I feel that being able to work in a second language would give me more freedom to express myself
25. From my experience, I feel that levels of empathy between clients and therapists are affected by the language in which the therapy takes place
26. I feel less able to challenge clients if I share the same culture or language
27. I feel more able to challenge clients if I share the same culture or language

Appendix B

The principal component analysis

Component	Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.718	17.476	17.476
2	2.409	8.924	26.4
3	2.2	8.148	34.548
4	1.79	6.629	41.177

Appendix C

Varimax rotation of Four-factor solution for the 27 items

Item	1	2	3	4
1. AvoidTopicswitLXusers	-0.049	**0.487**	**0.433**	-0.033
2. DifferentRelationLXusers	0.353	0.392	0.308	-0.01
3. RelationEasierL1users	0.025	0.159	**0.725**	-0.114
4. MoreNonVerbalLXusers	0.049	0.327	0.348	**-0.561**
5. MultilingMoreAccomod	**0.587**	0.236	0.104	-0.166
6. LangClientPlaysRole	0.321	**0.437**	0.218	0.018
7. LangTherapPlaysRole	0.139	**0.454**	0.387	0.161
8. AdvantageinUseL2	0.236	**0.421**	-0.326	-0.051
9. FamiliarCultisAdvantage	0.25	-0.21	**0.527**	-0.038
10. BelongSameCultAdvant	0.287	-0.267	**0.467**	**0.437**
11. BetterTherapLXusers	0.428	0.303	0.066	-0.103
12. BilingTherapUnderstandDiff	**0.749**	0.097	0.151	0.077
13. BilingtherapMoreEffect	**0.805**	0.088	0.073	0.118
14. BilingTherapMoreAttuned	**0.748**	0.007	0.209	0.148
15. ClientsL2DistancingDevice	0.079	**0.681**	0.005	0.048
16. TherapL2DistancingDevice	0.095	**0.699**	-0.053	0.064
17. BilingTherapUnderstandMore	**0.496**	0.092	-0.417	-0.049
18. TransferenceAffectByLang	0.201	**0.444**	-0.093	**0.606**
19. TransferenceEasierL1users	-0.21	0.251	-0.042	**0.629**
20. L1ProfaffectClientview	0.135	0.107	**0.597**	0.008
21. TherapL1irrelevant	0.116	-0.034	-0.097	0.101
22. ClientL1irrelevant	0.143	-0.249	-0.185	**-0.606**
23. StrongEmoEasierL2	0.075	-0.064	0.046	0.235
24. AbilityworkL2Freedom	0.275	0.086	0.279	-0.076
25. EmpathyAffectLang	0.125	0.179	**0.592**	0.285
26. LessAbleChallengL1user	-0.381	0.264	-0.024	-0.009
27. MoreAbleChallengL1user	-0.1	0.358	0.222	0.041

An Exploration of Language-Based Multiplicity in Fluent Bilinguals

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Abstract

This study used projective tests to explore the language-based shifts in aspects of personality observed in fluent bilinguals. The Rorschach Comprehensive System (RCS) and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) were administered in Spanish and in English to 26 fluent Spanish/English bilinguals, and protocols were compared based on measures of affect, self-perception, cognitive complexity, and object relations. No significant differences were found between language protocols for most measures, nor did these measures relate to age of second language learning, relative use of English and Spanish, or participation in therapy. However, cognitive effort was significantly greater on English RCS protocols, and a strong correlation between level of acculturation and freedom of expression in English was found. Further exploration of the data revealed very important differences between most subjects' Spanish and English protocols. Most notably, in 73% of the cases, RCS protocols differed so extensively by language that different key variable for cluster interpretation and diagnosis were indicated, and 42% of subjects' modes of decision making (EB style) varied according to language. These findings are remarkable because these key variables are believed to measure constant, dominant and trait-like features of an individual's psychology. The findings underscored the need for norms based on this population, and development of culturally-based constructs for interpretation of the RCS.

Introduction

In the past century, a good deal of investigation has been made into the role of language in clinical work with bilinguals. One of the most intriguing aspects of this inquiry focuses on how the fluent bilingual's languages, and the particular cultural origins implicit to them, create and function as discrete contexts for experience. Exploration within the diverse fields of psychoanalysis, psychology, linguistics and anthropology has generated compelling evidence that language, as it is used to express and organize experience, asserts a salient influence on emotional experience, cognition, and the perception of the self, others, and one's environment. From this perspective, language may be regarded as a lens through which the world and the self are perceived and known. If this is true, then

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language also has a fundamental influence on the development and expression of personality, and we may assume that bilinguals experience and convey multiple aspects of personality that are influenced by language.

In fact, the literature on bilingualism is replete with reports by bilinguals of their subjective experience of language-based aspects of personality (Amati-Mehler, Arentieri, & Canestri, 1993; Ben-Rafael, 2004; Dewaele, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; Hoffman, 1989; McMahill, 2001; Kaplan, 1993; Panayiotou, 2004a; Pavlenko, 1998, 2002a, 2000b; 2008). For example, in his interviews with bilinguals, Grosjean (1982) recorded several conversations with bilinguals who said they were aware of presenting themselves differently in their two languages. One man said that he perceived himself to be relatively aggressive or caustic when speaking his native language; and a woman said she felt she was polite and relaxed when speaking her second language, but anxious and rude in her first. Unsolicited accounts from sources outside the field also attest to this bilingual experience. Multilingual author, Natasha Lvovich (1997), writes about how she used her knowledge of French to "transcend the conditions of her Soviet life, to create a fantasy, to join an exclusive club" (p. ix). Sante, a French/English bilingual author stated compellingly in a New York Times article (Sante, 1996):

> The first thing you have to understand about my childhood is that it mostly took place in another language. I was raised speaking French...This fact inevitably affects my recall and evocation of my childhood, since I am writing and primarily thinking in English. There are states of mind, even people and events, that seem inaccessible in English, since they are defined by the character of the language through which I perceived them. My second language has turned out to be my principal tool, my means for making a living, and it lies close to the core of my self-definition. My first language, however, is coiled underneath, governing a more primal realm.

> French is a pipeline to my infant self, to its unguarded emotions and even to its preserved sensory impressions. I can, for example, use language as a measure of pain. If I stub my toe, I may profanely exclaim, in English, "Jesus!" But in agony, like when I am passing a kidney stone, I become uncharacteristically reverent, which is only

possible for me in French. "Petit Jesus!" I will cry, in the tones of nursery religion…but French is also capable of summoning up a world of lost pleasures.

Findings from the linguistic study of bilinguals and their languages have offered explanations for these varying language-based experiences. Cross-linguistic differences in emotion concepts[2] (Pavlenko, 2008) have been found to include varying causal antecedents, appraisals, physiological reactions, and consequences and means of emotion regulation and display. For example, emotion can be seen as generated by internal organs (causal antecedents), (Heelas, 1983). Various kinds of emotion will evoke culture-bound judgments, for example, Westerners look down upon people who overtly express dependence, while this expression might be seen as positive by the Japanese (appraisals) (Doi, 1973; Morsbach and Tyler, 1986). When a Greek speaker experiences, *stenahoria* (discomfort/sadness) he/she often also experiences a feeling of suffocation, while English speakers do not tend to associate suffocation with discomfort/sadness (physiological reactions) (Panayiotou, 2004a). Expressions of anger are frowned upon in some cultures, but in others are seen as a show of healthy self-assertion (consequences and means of emotion regulation and display). These language and culture-bound emotion concepts surely impact the speaker's sense of self, and engenders an experience of context and language dependent multiple selves Panayiotou, (2004b). Pavlenko (2008) also points to the nonequivalence of conceptual categories for emotion words between languages that make translation of certain emotional experiences difficult or even impossible. To illustrate, the English concept of frustration, (Koreneva, 2003, p. 383, Panayiotou, 2004a), the Greek concept of *stenahoria* (discomfort/sadness/suffocation), (Panayiotou, 2004a), and the Japanese concept *akogare* (Japanese women's desire for the Western lifestyle and Western men) (Piller & Takahashi, 2006) bear no counterparts in other languages. However, socialization in a second language allows for understanding of new concepts over time. Pavlenko (2008) proposes a 7-phase model that describes the speaker's progression from having no appropriate representation new emotion concepts in a second language through full integration of new concepts, and eventually to attrition of old native language concepts. She also posits a co-existence of emotion concepts in bicultural bilinguals. If this is true, then certainly a bilingual person's emotional experience in each language will vary, and will be directly correlated with the degree of fluency in each language.

Both Rintell and Pavlenko have explored the role of language in the interpretation of emotional cues. Using tape recorded conversations in English as stimuli, Rintell (1984) asked non-English speaking foreign students enrolled in an intensive English program to

[2] Emotion concepts are "prototypical scripts that are formed as a result of repeated experiences and involve causal antecedents, appraisals, physiological reactions, consequences, and means of regulation and display. [They] are embedded within larger systems of beliefs about psychological and social processes, often viewed as cognitive models, folk theories of mind, or ethnopsychologies" (Russell, 1991, as quoted in Pavlenko, 2008, p. 150).

describe the emotion expressed in the conversations. When these students' responses were compared with native English speakers' responses, Rintell found that the foreign students' assessments were mediated by linguistic background and cultural background, but the most significant effect was found for language proficiency. Her findings that even proficient speakers had difficulty with the task, and that speakers of certain languages had significantly more trouble identifying the emotions leads to the conclusion that the interpretation of emotions varies across cultures, contexts, emotion categories, and individuals, as well as across languages. With monolingual and bilingual Russian and English speakers as subjects, Pavlenko (2002a) employed a film with no dialogue as stimulus in a cross-linguistic study of the conceptual domains of private and personal. She found that the monolingual speakers differed significantly in their conceptualizations of the film, with high intra-group consistency. In contrast, bilinguals were more similar to the English monolinguals, but their recognition of concepts of private and personal was positively correlated with their proficiency in English. A bilingual's sense of having multiple self states therefore is also underpinned by the cultural aspects embedded in their two languages, and again is mediated by proficiency.

Clinicians who work with bilinguals have written extensively about their experiences with language-based aspects of their patient's personalities. In the mid 20th century, Buxbaum (1949), Greenson (1950), and Krapf (1955) described the role of language in the psychoanalysis of bilinguals, noting differences in emotional expression, defense mechanisms, self-perception, recall of early memories, and transference based on the language of the treatment. They theorized that language could be co-opted by defensive processes, acting as a mechanism for isolating or splitting off features of personality. This idea that language can segregate aspects of cognitive and emotional functioning, rendered in the language of various psychological and psychoanalytic orientations, has been supported and elaborated by many authors over the ensuing decades. For example, Del Castillo (1970) described several bilingual patients whose psychotic symptoms were only apparent in their first language, and Malawista (2002) reported a case where conversion symptoms occurred in an analysis performed in the patient's second language. Javier (1995) reported that bilinguals' verbalizations differed in richness and detail as they recalled memories in one language or the other. The heightened emotional potency of narrative produced in the native language in therapeutic settings has been observed by many clinicians (for example, Marcos, 1988; Marcos & Alpert 1976; Marcos & Urcuyo 1979; Rozensky & Gomez 1983) and the relationship between language choice and the quality of transference, defensive reactions, and self-experience has been described extensively (Antinucci-Mark 1990; Clauss, 1998; Kitron 1992; Lijtmaer, 1999; Marcos, Eisma, & Guimon (1977); Amati-Mehler, Argentieri, & Canestri, 1993; Mohavedi 1996; Perez Foster 1992, 1996, 1998).

Studies that have looked at emotion and native language have found empirical support for observations of the analysts cited above who found their bilingual patients' native language to be spoken more "from the heart." Drawing from findings that emotion words are recalled more easily in memory tasks (Rubin & Friendly, 1986), Anooshian and Hertel (1994) found that bilingual speakers recall significantly more emotion words than neutral words in their first language, but remember the same number of emotion and

neutral words in their second language. Harris, Aycicegi and Gleason (2003), found that when used as a measure of physiological reactivity to taboo words and childhood reprimands (e.g. "Shame on you!"), skin conductance responses (SCRs) were slightly higher in the bilinguals' first language. Those who learned the second language early and balanced bilinguals showed comparable SCRs in Spanish and English. Age of acquisition of the second language seems to be a strong predictor, with subjects who learned their second language after puberty showing greater strength of emotion expressed in the first language (Amati-Mehler, Argentieri & Canestri, 1993; Bond & Lai, 1986, Pavlenko, 2002b).

Contemporary psychoanalytic authors (Bromberg, 1996; Davies, 1999; Stern, 2003; Chefetz & Bromberg, 2004; Stern, 2004) have developed and expounded upon the concept of multiplicity, positing that the compartmentalization of experience through dissociation is part of being human. Analytic authors who concern themselves with different experiences of self that are tied to multiple languages (Perez Foster 1992, 1996, 1998; Hill, 2008) have speculated that dissociation also plays a significant role in these experiences of multiplicity. However, the concept of language as an organizer of experience is not new to the field of anthropology; in fact, it is regarded as axiomatic. Contemporary anthropologists regard the assumption of a stable, bounded, coherent sense of self as an ethnocentric "folk model" reflective of our western emphasis on individualism (Geertz, 1984; Lutz, 1988; Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990). These theorists posit that selves are fluid systems that provide an experience of wholeness through clearly defined, contextualized self representations. These self representations are largely discernible through dialogue, in which a sense of the experience of wholeness within the individual can be observed. Not only is dialogue regarded by these anthropologists as a means for studying shifts in self representations, but language itself is viewed as both a cause and effect of self experience (Ochs & Capps, 1996). Narrative has also been thought to reflect affective responses that are characteristic of the culture in which the language is learned (Goddard, 1991; Lutz, 1988; Rosaldo, 1984; Wierzbicka, 1992). These findings have been validated by qualitative interpretation of projective tests (Ervin, 1964; Ervin-Tripp, 1968).

Although language is a primary tool in the assessment of cognitive, perceptual, and affective functioning, there is little research that explores how the perspective on language as an experiential context relates to the psychological assessment of bilinguals. Given the clinical evidence, we are left to wonder if our assessment tools can detect and confirm such language-based multiplicity, and if so, whether we are missing something by performing assessments on bilingual people in only one of their languages. The present study attempted to address this dearth of research by using the Rorschach Comprehensive System (RCS) and the Thematic Apperception Test in a repeated measures design to explore how language creates discrete personal contexts for the bilingual. Several hypotheses were developed and questions posed about how protocols might vary by language (see Tables 1 and 2). It was expected that RCS protocols administered to fluent bilinguals in their native tongue would indicate greater emotional and cognitive engagement and complexity than those administered in their second language. Statements made by clinicians regarding language-based shifts in transference

led to the expectation that TAT protocols would indicate a language-based variance in the quality of object relations.

In addition, an attempt was made to identify some variables that moderate these language-based shifts. Since most of the relevant clinical literature is based on work with patients, it was hypothesized that factors that lead to seeking therapy, or the therapy experience itself, related in some way to these shifts. To test this idea, the subject pool was divided into "therapy" and "no therapy" groups, and their protocols were compared using a measure of object relations (SCORS). As discussed earlier, some research has suggested that the earlier a bilingual person learns a second language, the more readily he or she will become emotionally and cognitively engaged in therapy using that language (Amati-Mehler, Argentieri & Canestri, 1993; Bond & Lai, 1986, Pavlenko, 2002b). Contrary to the idea that the native language is the language of emotion, Rozensky and Gomez (1987) also suggested that bilinguals are more cognitively and emotionally engaged in the language that they use the most. These variables – age of second language acquisition, and relative amount of use of each language - were evaluated as moderators of cognitive and emotional engagement, and as an extension of this idea, a comparison of scores on a measure of acculturation and measures of emotional expression was made.

Table 1

Hypotheses and Variables

Hypotheses	**RCS Variables**	**Construct**
• Emotional Engagement will be greater in the native language (Spanish); more pronounced in therapy group.	Afr	Responsiveness to emotional stimuli
	FC:CF+C	Affect modulation conceptualized as a continuum from FC (most reserved affect) to C (most uninhibited)
	SUMC'	Affective constraint
• Cognitive Involvement and Complexity will be greater in the native language (Spanish); more pronounced in therapy group.	Lambda	Cognitive involvement
	Zd	Effort and economy of perceptual processing
	Blends:R	Emotional complexity
• Differences in self-perception between first (Spanish) and second (English) languages will be greater in therapy group.	(3r + (2)/R)	Self-evaluation (Egocentricity Index)
	Fr+rF	Narcissistic orientation
	FD	Introspective tendencies
	V	Negative introspection (self loathing)
• Affect tone of object relations ratings will vary according to language.	SCORS Affect Tone Scale	Emotional loading of self- and other representations

Table 2

Exploratory Questions and Variables3

Questions	RCS Variables	Construct
• Is there a relationship between level of acculturation and expression of affect in first and second languages?	Afr	Responsiveness to emotional stimuli
	FC:CF+C	Affect modulation, conceptualized as a continuum from FC (most reserved affect) to C (most uninhibited)
	SUMC'	Affective constraint
• Is emotional engagement greater in language used most? • Does emotional engagement in English correlate with age of English acquisition?	Afr	Responsiveness to emotional stimuli
• Is cognitive engagement greater in language used the most? • Does cognitive engagement in the second language (English) correlate with age of acquisition?	Lambda	Cognitive involvement

Method

Participants

The subjects were 26 Spanish/English bilinguals who were recruited from college campuses and outpatient mental health clinics in the New York area. They ranged in age from 18 to 48, (M = 27.7, SD = 8.9) and had diverse cultural heritages. Half were born in the United States of immigrant parents; the other half were born outside of the United States. 20 were female, and 6 were male. With the exception of one subject who had completed a GED, all subjects were either in college or had completed bachelor or graduate degrees. 16 subjects were college students, 6 were employed, 1 was unemployed, and 3 did not specify their occupation. The majority of subjects had never had psychological testing, and none had been tested within ten years.

The procedures for this study bear some limitations due to the fact that the data were collected from 1996-1999, prior to the development of the sophisticated measures of biculturalism and bilingualism that are currently available. Marin and Gamba's (1996) Bilingual Acculturation Scale (BAS) was used to assess the subjects' relative acculturation in English and Spanish domains. According to this scale indicated that all subjects were in the bicultural range. At the time of the planning of this study, it was

[3] For an alphabetized list of variables and a somewhat larger description of them, please see Appendix A.

believed that bilinguals could judge their proficiency in each language as well or better than any of the existing measures (Ardila, 1998, Roberts 1998; Costantino, personal communication, March 25, 1996). Therefore, all potential subjects who stated that they were comfortable speaking both English and Spanish were considered to be fluent bilinguals, and were asked to participate. All subjects stated that their first language was Spanish. Dewaele's (2009) study of bi- and multilinguals, which examined the relationship of age of language acquisition and self-perceived linguistic competence, language choice for expression of emotion, and language choice for mental calculation was also far in the future at the time the data for this study were gathered. Lacking Dewaele's conclusions, age of second language acquisition was compared to emotional and cognitive engagement on the RCS, but no formal hypotheses were made regarding this comparison. In this sample, the age of English Acquisition ranged from 3-42 years (M = 11, Mdn = 6.5).

Half the subjects were assigned to the therapy group, and the other half, to the no therapy group. Therapy group members (N = 13) were those subjects who had sought therapy more than once (N = 9), and/or had been in a treatment in the past for at least a year (N = 4), and/or were currently in therapy (N = 10). The no therapy group members (N = 13) either had never sought therapy (N = 10), or had one therapy experience in the past that lasted less than 3 months (N = 3). The two genders were equally represented within these groups, and the groups were matched for socioeconomic status. The groups did vary in terms of immigrant status, occupation, and age. Significantly more members of the therapy group were born outside of the United States (N = 9) than members of the no therapy group (N = 4). The majority of subjects in the no therapy group were students (N = 10), while the therapy group included a more balanced mix of students (N = 6) and professionals (N = 5). The mean age of the therapy group was 33 (SD = 7.43) years, and the mean age of the no therapy group was 23 (SD = 7.57) years. Subjects were paid $15 for their participation.

Materials

Participants were asked to complete the Bidimensional Acculturation Scale (BAS; Marin & Gamba, 1996) to assure bicultural status. Data regarding age, national origin, socioeconomic status, age and context of language acquisition, and therapy experience were gathered using a self-report questionnaire developed by this author.

The Rorschach Comprehensive System (RCS) was administered and scored according to the guidelines of the Comprehensive System (Exner, 1993). The RCS employs the ten standard Rorschach inkblots to elicit perceptions from subjects which are scored along several dimensions. These are too numerous to list here, but they include such dimensions as complexity of the subject's percept based on integration of various areas of the blot, emotional expressiveness based on the use of colour in the blot, nx need for physical intimacy as shown by perceptions of texture. Four Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; H. A. Murray, 1943) cards were also administered to all participants (#2, #5, #7BM, #7GF). TAT cards are realistic but ambiguous pictures that are used to elicit stories from the subject with minimal cueing from the examiner. TAT protocols were

scored using the Social Cognition and Object Relations Scales (SCORS) Affect Tone scale (Westen, Lohr, Silk, Kerber & Goodrich, 1985). Both the Rorschach and TAT are meant to reveal conscious and unconscious data about the subject, for example, perception of self and other, mood, defensive structures, impulsivity, ease of self-expression and clarity of thought. The RCS also suggests various diagnostic categories based on the analyses and coding of the percepts.

Design and Procedure

Each subject participated in one Spanish and one English administration of the RCS and four TAT cards, scheduled no less than four weeks apart. Each subject's administrations were conducted by the same bilingual administrator. The order of administrations was counterbalanced according to membership in the therapy and no-therapy groups so that an equal number of first and second administrations occurred in each language. Each administrator conducted the same number of administrations within each of the groups (+/- 1 subject).

Administrators and coders were seven fluent Spanish/English bilingual psychology students who had received extensive training in the administration and scoring of the Comprehensive System, the TAT, and the SCORS. As was done with the subjects, determination of the administrators' and coders' level of fluency in English and Spanish was based on self-report.

Results[4]

None of the hypotheses regarding variance of protocols by language or interaction between group and language was validated at the alpha .05 level. Due to non-normality, RCS measures of affective engagement (Afr, FC, CF+C, and C) were transformed using a rank transformation. A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures MANOVA showed no difference between language protocols, *Pillai's* = .14, $F(4, 20) = .78$, $p = .55$. However, 14% of the variability for these measures was accounted for by language, with relatively low obtained power. No interaction between group and language was found, *Pillai's* = .16, $F(4, 20) = .95$, $p = .25$. Contrary to the expectation that speaking the native language would be more conducive to cognitive involvement in the stimuli, a MANOVA of the cognitive variables (Zd, Lambda, Blends:R) reflected more intellectual engagement in English, *Pillai's* = .47, $F(3, 20) = 5.80$, $p = .005$; $\eta^2 = .47$, *power* = .90. In addition, a significant interaction between Language and First Language of Administration, *Pillai's* = .49, $F(3, 20) = 6.31$, $p = .003$ was found. Follow-up univariate analyses revealed a significant effect for Lambda, $F(1, 22) = 5.02$, $p = .04$, and Zd, $F(1, 22) = 7.60$, $p = .01$, and a trend for Blends:R, $F(1, 22) = 3.41$, $p = .08$. The main effect for language for the Zd variable appeared to be an artifact of this interaction between language and First Language of Administration. No significant Language by Group effect, *Pillai's* = .13, $F(3, 20) = .99$, $p = .42$, for RCS measures of complexity of processing was found,

[4] RCS variables are explained in Appendix A.

however, this interaction was found to account for 13% of the variability for these measures (*power* = .23).

Difference scores were calculated for the measures of self-perception (Egocentricity Index, Fr+rF, FD, and V) by subtracting the Spanish scores from the English scores for each variable, thereby automatically embedding the language effect into analysis of these variables. The Egocentricity Index difference scores were transformed using a rank transformation, and an Analysis of Variance was performed for that variable. For FD, V, and Fr+rF, transformations did not normalize these difference scores due to the limited number of values obtained. These variables were analyzed using the phi coefficient. An ANOVA of the difference between scores on the two language protocols for the Egocentricity Index revealed no group main effect, $F(1, 22) = .009$, $p = .93$, nor did the analysis of differences in introspective tendencies (FD), *phi* = .36, $p = .63$, V, *phi* = .28, $p = .56$, and Fr+rF, *phi* = .36, $p = .49$, disconfirming the hypothesized interaction between group and language for RCS measures of self-perception.

An ANOVA of SCORS Affect Tone of Object Relations scores for TAT stories showed no main effect for language, *Pillai's* = .01, $F(1, 22) = .22$, $p = .65$ and no interaction between group membership and language of protocol, *Pillai's* = .001, $F(1, 22) = .02$, $p = .88$. No relationship was found between the age of English acquisition and emotional engagement in English as indicated by Afr, $r = .00$, nor was any significant relationship found between age of English acquisition and cognitive involvement in English as indicated by Lambda, $r = .23$. Language used most was not related to Lambda, $\chi^2 (2) = 2.39$, $p = .30$, or to Afr, $\chi^2 (2) = 2.15$, $p = .34$.

Higher levels of acculturation in the English domain as measured by the BAS scale were strongly associated with more open displays of emotional expression in English as measured by the RCS variables C, $N = 26$, $r = .40$, $p = .04$, and CF, $N = 26$, $r = .42$, $p = .03$, in English. No significant relationship was found between acculturation in English and the variables FC, $N = 26$, $r = .15$, $p = .48$) or SUMC', $N = 26$, $r = .13$, $p = .53$. No significant relationships were found between levels of acculturation in the Spanish domain and RCS variables FC, $N = 26$, $r = .12$, $p = .57$, CF, $N = 26$, $r = .02$, $p = .92$, C, $N = 26$, $r = .18$, $p = .37$, or SUMC', $N = 26$, $r = .08$, $p = .70$, in Spanish protocols.

Further exploration of the data, beyond the scope of the hypotheses, revealed differences in the content and quality of RCS verbalizations. Furthermore, identification of key variables (see Appendix B) that would be used for a comprehensive (cluster) interpretation for each individual's Rorschach protocol showed that 42% of all subjects changed Erlebnistypus (EB) across language protocols. The EB variable indicates the relative amount of use of affect as compared to thought in decision-making, where "extratensive" indicates a larger role for emotion, "introversive" indicates a larger role for cognition, and "ambitent" suggests no consistent style. 6 subjects were found to be extratensive in one language and ambitent in the other, 4 were introversive in one and ambitent in the other, and 2 were introversive in one and extratensive in the other. EBPer calculations ranged from 1.8-4.0, indicating a strong commitment to EB style in both languages. Moreover, 73% of protocols changed key variables for cluster interpretation

and diagnosis. 54% changed key variables in the no therapy group, (see Table 3), and 92% changed in the therapy group (see Table 4). The difference between the number of changes in key variables of the therapy and no therapy group was significant, χ^2 (1) = 4.89, p = .03.

Table 3[5]

Cluster Interpretation Key Variables by Subject and by Language in No Therapy Group

Subject	Key Variable Derived from Span	Key Variable Derived from English Protoco
1.	D < Adj D	D < Adj D
2.	SCZI	Ref > 0
3.	DEPI	SCZI
4.	p > a+1	Lambda
5.	Lambda	Lambda
6.	SCZI	CDI
7.	CDI	CDI
8.	SCZI	SCZI
9.	SCZI	SCZI
10.	M- > 0	D < Adj D
11.	CDI	DEPI
12.	SCZI	SCZI
13.	Adj D is minus	SCZI

[5] See Appendix B for explanation of key variables.

Table 4[6]

Cluster Interpretation Key Variables by Subject and by Language in Therapy Sample (n = 13)

Subject	Key Variable Derived from Span	Key Variable Derived from English Protoc
1.	Lambda	D < Adj D
2.	Adj D is minus	Extratensive
3.	DEPI	SCZI
4.	SCZI	SCZI
5.	DEPI	Lambda
6.	SCZI	D < Adj D
7.	SCZI	DEPI
8.	Lambda	D < Adj D
9.	CDI	SCZI
10.	SCZI	D < Adj D
11.	Lambda	Introversive
12.	D < Adj D	Adj D is minus
13.	D < Adj D	CDI

Content analysis of TAT stories given in Spanish and English also revealed differences. For example, the following stories are given by the same subject in response to TAT card #2, a farm scene depicting three people whose age, style of dress, and activity vary, creating a highly ambiguous picture. The subject shows different levels of emotional engagement, creativity, and focus on detail, and distinctive self-presentations and approaches to conflict resolution in Spanish and English. Spanish: (first administration):

OK. This is a girl that has to go by a ranch on her way to school every day, but she is in love with the man that works on the ranch but he is married and at this moment she goes by there and sees the wife of the man she likes and she realizes that the wife is pregnant. Now she is realizing that she is only a girl and this man belongs to a more mature woman. (A conclusion?) She is going to change the way she gets to school, she will take the longer path so as not to see this man anymore and accept that she still

[6] See Appendix B for explanation of key variables.

has a lot of time to grow and to meet a man that will truly be only hers. (How does the man feel?) He does not realize everything that has happened but his wife did know and that is why she went and stood there so that the girl would see her. (Something else?) No.

English:

OK. This story takes place somewhere in Ohio and what has happened before is this couple lived on a farm and the wife was twice the age of the husband and the wife had a really hard time getting pregnant, she was having a lot of miscarriages and the husband was getting frustrated. He was the good looking youthful and very hard working man who only wanted a child in life and it was the one thing his wife couldn't give him. His neighbor was a 16 year-old shy, pretty girl. Everyday she would pass by and see him working on the field and wonder why he was so unhappy. One day she finally decided to have a conversation with him in which he asked her, I mean told her, that he had been watching her too and was in love with her and asked her if she would be the mother of that child he wanted. So the young girl agreed and fell in love with the man and eventually really became pregnant, so one day as she passed by the farm again she looked out and saw the man's wife and she was 7 months pregnant… the wife was 7 months pregnant. Enraged that this man had lied to her and had tricked her into also having his child the young girl ran up to the woman and beat her to death with her school books. When the man saw what happened he grabbed the girl and with tears rolling down his eyes exclaimed "That lady was my Mom, not my wife!" and the man never spoke to the young girl ever again. Oh, and his wife, she eventually had 3 kids and they lived happily ever after. (How did girl feel after he

didn't speak to her?) She lost her mind and took it out on the kid she eventually had. (How did the wife feel?) He never told her.

As shown in Table 5, the means of several of the RCS variables gleaned from this sample differed significantly from the published norms (Exner, 1993).

Table 5[7]

Comparison of Means with Normative Data for Nonpatient Adults (N = 26)

Variable	Language	M	T	df	p	+/-/s[a]
R	English	23.12	.31	25	.76	s
	Spanish	25.62	1.57	25	.13	s
Lambda	English	1.08	3.26	25	.003	+
	Spanish	1.32	3.50	25	.002	+
Zd	English	.19	-.59	25	.56	s
	Spanish	-1.85	-2.53	25	.02	-
Blends	English	4.73	-.67	25	.51	s
	Spanish	3.35	-3.27	25	.003	-
Blends:R	English	.21	-.811	25	.43	s
	Spanish	.13	-5.12	25	<.001	-
3r + (2)/R	English	.40	.03	25	.98	s
	Spanish	.40	-.16	25	.88	s
Fr+rF	English	.58	1.43	25	.17	s
	Spanish	.50	3.03	25	.01	+
FD	English	1.38	-1.01	25	.32	s
	Spanish	.96	-.68	25	.50	s
V	English	.46	1.73	25	.10	s
	Spanish	.27	.088	25	.93	s
Afr	English	.57	-2.35	25	.03	-
	Spanish	.57	-2.83	25	.01	-
FC	English	1.65	-9.60	25	<.001	-
	Spanish	1.96	-6.19	25	<.001	-
CF	English	.73	-7.98	25	<.001	-
	Spanish	.46	-10.70	25	<.001	-
C	English	1.38	5.01	25	<.001	+
	Spanish	1.27	4.51	25	<.001	+
SUMC'	English	2.54	2.15	25	.04	+
	Spanish	2.35	1.61	25	.12	s
WSUM6	English	17.35	5.50	25	<.001	+
	Spanish	13.69	4.54	25	<.001	+

[7] See Appendix B for explanation of key variables.

Variable	Language	M	T	df	p	+/-/s[a]
X-%	English	.24	7.93	25	<.001	+
	Spanish	.26	8.04	25	<.001	+
D Score	English	-.85	-2.84	25	.01	-
	Spanish	-.92	-2.82	25	.01	-
T	English	.38	-4.72	25	<.001	-
	Spanish	.46	-2.63	25	.02	-

[a] Indicates that the mean is significantly higher than the normative mean (+), significantly lower than the normative mean (-), or similar to the normative data mean (s).

Discussion

The primary purpose of this study was to determine whether projective assessment instruments can confirm and describe the language-based experiences of multiplicity reported by bilinguals and the clinicians who work with them. If so, a second goal was to formulate empirically-based generalizations about these differences. The third objective was to identify factors that might serve as moderator variables in these shifts in aspects of personality.

Although the hypotheses set forth in this study were not confirmed, RCS protocols rendered by Spanish/English bilinguals were found to differ according to the language of administration. In fact, in the majority of cases, RCS protocols given by bilinguals in their two languages varied so extensively from one another that they indicated different key variables for Comprehensive System cluster interpretation (see Tables 3 and 4). In the Comprehensive system, key variables are essential guides to the formulation of an interpretation and diagnosis, permitting "the identification of the data that would contribute the most substantial information about the core psychological features of the subject." (Exner, 1991, p. 144). Given that key variables have been demonstrated to be such valuable beacons for interpretation and that the Comprehensive System has been shown to have good test retest reliability (Exner, 1980; Haller & Exner, 1985), we are left to conclude that the shift in key variables constitutes a substantive finding that reflects the bilingual's discrete language-based cultural and personal contexts. As found by Ervin (1964) several decades ago, content analysis of TAT protocols administered in the bilingual's two languages also illuminates these differences.

Based on these data, a few assumptions can be made about how protocols might vary according to language. Contrary to the hypothesis that the native language would elicit greater cognitive effort, it was found that more cognitive engagement and complexity were involved in creating English protocols. This finding was true even for subjects who reported that their Spanish was slightly stronger than their English, and for those who stated neither English nor Spanish was stronger. This association between English and cognitive effort may relate to the fact that most of the subjects learned and spoke English in school. Previous research that focused on the contexts for language learning supports this interpretation (Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Ervin, 1964).

These data also suggest that further light may be shed on language-based differences if moderating factors are considered. Two of the proposed moderating factors, therapy experience and level of acculturation, did relate to the differences between Spanish and English protocols. Significantly more subjects who had therapy experience produced protocols with key variables that varied from Spanish to English. This variation seems to lend some credence to the hypotheses regarding the differences between the therapy and no therapy groups. However, these data suggest that the differences are based on constellations of factors rather than on variance in a single dimension, such as emotional expression. Based on this finding, we might theorize that the difference in key variables reflects a division between two language-related inner realms, and that this division may contribute to the subjective distress that led these subjects into therapy. Although this theory is appealing, this study offers it very little empirical confirmation. The differences between key variables is not quantifiable - for example, a shift from DEPI (Depression) to SCZI (Schizophrenia) cannot be said to be greater than a shift from CDI (Coping Deficit Disorder) SCZI (Schizophrenia) - and therefore, although significantly more members of the therapy group switched key variables, it is impossible to tell whether the shifts in the no therapy group were more dramatic than those in the therapy group. Moreover, there were important demographic differences between the therapy and no therapy groups (e.g. age, country of origin, percentage of students vs. professionals). These differences may have acted as confounds, relating in some way to the switches in key variables.

In sum, it is difficult to say whether the moderating variable was indeed therapy experience, or whether some other salient characteristics distinguished the groups. The other proposed moderating factor, acculturation, was shown to play a significant role in the content of the RCS protocols. Greater levels of acculturation in the English domain on the BAS scale related to more freedom in displays of emotion in English (greater incidence of C determinants). At first, this relationship seems to make good intuitive sense, suggesting a connection between feeling “at home” with a language (and its implicit culture) and freer expression. However, this interpretation begs the question of why this relationship was not paralleled in the Spanish protocols. An unpredicted moderating factor, order of language administration, had a significant effect on the content of RCS protocols. Protocols administered in Spanish first tended to show significantly less cognitive complexity and engagement than any other protocols, with higher levels of Lambda, and lower levels of Zd and Blends:R. As already discussed, English protocols showed more cognitive effort in general, but they were especially high in Zd and Blends:R when they were produced by the second administration.

The literature on psychotherapy with culturally diverse groups suggests some answers to the questions that these data raise about the role of acculturation and order of language administration. The literature emphasizes that Hispanic Americans, relative to other groups, may take a reserved approach with strangers (Casas & Vasques, 1989) and may be hesitant to disclose personal information (Rosado, 1980; Torres, 1983). As discussed below in the context of overall variations in norms, Vinet’s (2000) findings also support a cultural basis for this reserved attitude. Although generalizations about the heterogeneous group of Spanish speaking people that participated in this study must be made with

caution, we might conjecture that some of the findings are due to this inclination towards formality. If we assume that language both stimulates and reflects cultural frames of reference, then we would expect more constraint when subjects speak Spanish. We might also assume that this tendency would be heightened during the first administration, especially if it is performed in Spanish. More constraint in general would be expected from subjects who are less acculturated to the English domain.

Although the sample size was small, the RCS norms derived from this study are worth some discussion. Clearly, the protocols gleaned from this group of people varied from the original norms in important ways. With regard to the Lambda, FC, X-%, and T variables, these results corroborate those found in a recent study of nonpatients by Shaffer, Erdberg, and Horoian (1999), and reaffirm their statement that revised norms for general use are needed. However, the means of the measures of quality of ideation and affect modulation were significantly different from those found by Shaffer et al and from the published norms. Vinet's (2000) interpretation of RCS data compiled from four Iberoamerican countries (Chile, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela) offers some insight into the variation between the original RCS norms and those gleaned from this study. As was found here, Vinet's data shows that Iberoamerican subjects scored higher on the variables Lambda and X-%, and lower on Zd, Afr, and T. Drawing on Hofstede's study of work-related values in 40 countries (Hofstede, 1980), Vinet explains that the scores on Lambda, Zd, and Afr reflect attitudes that are typically displayed by Iberoamericans during high stress situations in which interaction with authority figures is required. Specifically, according to Hofstede's codification, the scores can be interpreted as reflections of high Power Distance, which reflects respect for authority figures, and high Uncertainty Avoidance, as demonstrated by mistrust. Viewing the data within a cultural context, Vinet sees the Lambda, Zd, and Afr scores as signifying an adaptive response to the testing situation that is consistent with Iberoamerican values rather than as a defensive withdrawal of emotional and cognitive engagement. Vinet also points out that Iberoamericans perceive a sharp dichotomy between ingroup and outgroup, and while conformity is implicit in the collectivist orientation of Iberoamericans, they can be quite nonconformist in response to rules generated by the outgroup. She attributes the high X-% and low number of popular responses found on Iberoamerican protocols as a function of this reactive unconventionality. To explain the relative low number of T responses on the Iberoamerican protocols, Vinet employs findings from research focused on the presence of T in "contact cultures" protocols (Fuster, Sifre, Barriusi, Lobato, Martinez, 1997). Fuster et al suggest that in these cultures, in which physical closeness throughout the lifespan is normative, the need for this kind of intimacy is satisfied, therefore, protocols generated within this cultural context will have fewer T responses. Based on Vinet's statement that all countries touched by Iberoamerican influences are part of the same cultural unit, we can consider her interpretations as relevant to the current sample. If we do so, the high WSUM6 mean found here can be explained by the same pull towards unconventionality that generated the high X-% scores. Costantino, Flanagan, and Malgady (1995) reported that a higher number of color responses can be expected from Hispanics. The norms generated by this study show that color responses varied from the original norms more by quality than by quantity, that is, there were significantly more C responses, while the mean value for FC and CF responses was similar to the normative

group. Again, Vinet's (2000) explains this phenomenon by drawing on the data regarding contact cultures. In these cultures, there is little inhibition in the expression of emotions.
The outcome of this study encourages more exploration into the many levels of interaction between language, culture, and the RCS. In particular, employment of current instruments that measure biculturalism and language fluency would allow further refinement of the subject pool. The role of age of second language acquisition in the assessment of bilinguals is also worthy of further exploration. However, regardless of the methodological limitations of this study, its findings lend empirical support for the clinical and anecdotal evidence already cited depicting language based multiplicity, and provide further evidence that language and culture must be regarded as key elements in the psychoanalysis of multilingual people.

Acknowledgment

I am grateful to the Society for Personality Assessment for their help in funding this study. I also wish to thank Barry Ritzler, Rhiannon Allen, and Paul Ramirez for their invaluable input into the design of the study. I am especially indebted to the many administrators and coders who worked so hard gathering and scoring data, especially Ysa Nunez, Richard Rapp, Tania Serrata, and Glorianna Valls. I also thank Sarai Batchelder for her help with statistical analysis, Chris Nutini for lending his translation skills, and Brian Levine and Jorge Pina for their help in recruiting subjects at the Postgraduate Center and the Hispanic Psychoanalytic Studies Center. I am also grateful to George Frank, Lew Aron, and Richard Dana for their thoughtful feedback on an earlier version of this paper which was presented at the 2001 Midwinter Meeting of the Society for Personality Assessment in Philadelphia, PA.

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Appendix A

Variable	Alphabetized Description of Variables and Constructs
3r + (2)/R	This is the Egocentricity Index, which measures appraisal of self-worth.
Afr	Measure of the subject's openness to processing emotional stimuli.
Blends	Total number of responses that include more than one determinant, for example, a perception of movement and texture. The use of blends suggests a willingness to become involved in thinking about new stimuli.
Blends:R	Blends:R is a measure of psychological complexity.
C	Measure of the reference to color in the blots, and is associated with great emotional displays.
CF	Measure of the reference to color in the blots, and is associated with fairly pronounced emotional displays.
D Score	Measures impulsive tendencies, thought to be a reaction to an overload of stress.
FC	Measure of responsiveness to color in the blot, and is associated with relatively mild emotional demonstration.
FD	Measures capacity for introspection.
Fr+rF	Total number of responses that included perceptions of reflections. A key part of the formula for the Egocentricity Index, when this sum is :>0, indicates some inflation of self-worth.
Lambda	Approximates how psychologically available subject is to engaging in a task with an unfamiliar stimulus. Low lambda shows that the subject is amenable to involvement in the stimulus; but the lower the Lambda score the more likey the subject is to becoming over involved or lost in detail. Conversely, the higher the Lambda score the greater the tendency to narrow focus, and pay less attention to detail.
R	Total number of responses to all ten inkblots.
SUMC'	Sum of percepts that included achromatic color, which suggests dysphoria.
T	Measure of need for physical intimacy.
V	Measure of negative introspection or self-loathing.
WSUM6	Determines quality of ideation. A higher score contributes to evidence of psychotic processes, a very low score suggests conventionality.
X-%	Percentage of percepts that either rarely or did not occur in the norming sample, and are thought to be caused by perceptual inaccuracy or mediational distortion.

Variable	Alphabetized Description of Variables and Constructs
Zd	Measure of scanning efficiency. The lower the value, the more likely the subject is to make hasty assessments of the stimulus field, and to neglect important pieces of information. Conversely, higher scores can indicate a tendency to get mired in detail.

Appendix B

Definition of Cluster Interpretation Key Variables Shown in Tables 3 and 4

Adj D is minus: When this index is positive, it suggests that the subject has difficulty with impulse control due either to situational stressors, chronic stress, or insufficient psychological resources.

CDI: Suggests that the subject is particularly susceptible to stress, and will function poorly in environments where there are high expectations placed on him/her.

D < Adj D: Indicates that the subject is experiencing situationally-related, possibly transient stress.

DEPI: This is the depression index. A positive score on this index suggests affective instability.

Extratensive: This key variable indicates that the subject employs emotion in decision making more readily than logic.

Introversive: This key variable indicates that the subject prefers to make decisions based on logic rather than feeling.

Lambda: Indicates that the subject has a tendency to narrow the stimulus field, and process only partial information. May also signal reluctance to engage in the task.

M- > 0: Inconclusive finding, but alerts the examiner to possible idiosyncratic features of the subject's thought processes.

p > a+1: Suggests that the subject has a passive coping style.

Ref > 0: Suggests that the subject has an inflated sense of self-value.

SCZI: This is the schizophrenia index. Although the RCS often renders false positives for this index, a positive SCZI can point to some difficulties with the subject's perceptual accuracy and clarity of thought. Because of the unreliability of this index, the authors of the RCS (Exner, 1991) caution the examiner to make a thorough assessment of the protocol to find supporting evidence of a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

The Symbolic Function of Transmodernity

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Abstract

In this article transmodernity will be described as the symbolic context within which, in the last decades, new formulations of selfhood and community have emerged that challenge consolidated representations of the world. The aim will be to examine and map out an illustrative range of discourses at the core of the transmodern scenario, highlighting the counterhegemonic potential of its symbolic function vis-à-vis modern representations of reality. In doing so, particular focus will be put on some of the major effects of globalisation, namely spatial displacement, virtuality and fragmentation, arguing that these factors help us to understand the 'critical' dimension of globalisation as a traumatic process of dislocation of social space. It is by scrutinising these factors that we grasp the ability of 'transmodern' formulations of space and community to challenge the position of modern discourses.

> *To speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. 10).*

Introduction

In his 1983 lesson on the Enlightenment, Michel Foucault defines modernity as an *attitude* rather than an historical time:

> Thinking back on Kant's text, I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history. And by 'attitude,' I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no

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doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos (Foucault, 1984, p. 39).

The value of this passage is that it avoids fixed categories and historicist explanations while maintaining the relevance of modernity as a 'scenario' against which certain historical or social manifestations can be measured and understood. In the attempt to transpose the Foucauldian notion of 'attitude' upon a discursive plane it might perhaps be useful to point out that as 'a way of thinking and feeling', 'of acting and behaving', 'attitude' reflects, first and foremost, a way of engaging with contemporary reality through the symbolic forms of language. From this perspective, modernity and tradition can be thought of as the symbolic contexts within which certain 'attitudes' have moulded more or less coherent vocabularies around the theorisation of specific cultural and political paradigms.[2]

This article aims to examine a particular type of 'vocabulary', one that competes with tradition and modernity in the attempt to make the world 'readable': *transmodernity*. With this term I wish to transcend the classical definition of postmodernity as a specific historical epoch or sociological condition (exemplified by the prefix post- of post-modernity indicating a condition following modernity) highlighting a discourse-centred reading of this analytical category. My interest here will be to describe the capacity of transmodernity to figure as the discursive context within which, in the last decades, new formulations of selfhood and community have emerged, challenging the role of modern and traditional discourses. In order to do this, I will begin by focusing on globalisation, pointing to its ability to displace the symbolic coordinates that have organised established representations of the world so far. This linkage will then be used, in the last part of the article, to 'map out' an illustrative range of discourses which I consider to be central to the structuring of the transmodern symbolic scenario.

Tradition, modernity and transmodernity: a discursive reading

What does it mean for modernity, tradition and transmodernity to stand as discursive contexts through which definite sets of symbolic codes are articulated in their depiction of reality? In order to answer this question, and for the purposes of this article, we need to establish a central reference to a post-structuralist reading of language and, particularly, to the idea of an endless circulation and movement of meanings. From a post-structuralist position, it is well known that language is characterised by a continual fluctuation of meanings, resulting in the impossibility of grounding stable representations. To hold this position, however, does not exclude the possibility for more precarious or temporary representations to be formed as means of organising social and political life. In his early study of psychosis, for instance, Lacan observes that the impasse produced by the continuous sliding of the chain of signifiers is solved by virtue of a *fiction* establishing the illusion of a stable reference. This fiction, appearing in every type of discursive field, is made possible by the *point de capiton*, which 'retroactively and prospectively' organises a range of signifiers, thereby making a process of signification possible by

[2] A paradigm stands, here, as the inner *logic* informing the construction of a certain discourse: whether, for instance, its spatial representations and subjectivity formations privilege a principle of exclusivity and closure towards externality and alterity (*dualism*) rather than inclusiveness and openness (*universalism*).

condensing that universe of fluctuating elements into a fictional totality: a discourse (Lacan, 1955-56/1993, pp. 267-268). The term *condensation* is crucial here, for it highlights the ability of a discursive agglomeration to slow down the circulation of meaning and signifiers, freezing them within the borders of its discursive realm, and creating a sense of temporary closure. From this perspective, a 'discourse' can be thought of as a fictional totality or, in the words of Laclau, a 'structured totality articulating both linguistic and non-linguistic elements' (Laclau, 2006, p. 13). Now, I contend that broader agglomerations of signifiers than a discourse can be imagined. I am suggesting here that we consider linguistic space as marked by the imaginary existence of major poles of attraction that draw discourses and signifiers to them, creating constellations, around which fictional totalities of signifiers (discourses) condense and gravitate in apparent *proximity* to one another. These poles of attraction function as discursive meta-structures, or vocabularies, from which discourses draw. Hence, signifiers temporarily condense within discourses, while discourses temporarily gather, gravitate and condense around symbolic poles of attraction. It is by referring to such meta-structures that I propose to read major analytical categories such as tradition, modernity and transmodernity.

What explains the *proximity* of discourses around broader constellations is the repetition of certain signifiers that resonate in the manner in which they articulate dominant paradigms within each meta-structure, (e.g., dualism for modernity; fragmentation and over-development for transmodernity; universalism for Christian an d Islamic tradition). Although discourses within each constellation might express differing views over specific essential issues, their proximity in terms of shared language and styles of discourse allows the meta-structure to appear as a coherent history or discursive attitude. In other words, despite the way people themselves tend to describe a particular narrative, for instance as 'modern' or 'traditional', the description of broader constellations in terms of modernity, tradition and transmodernity needs to manifest a certain discursive resonance in the way the social is organised and accounted for. In the light of such a perspective, I take tradition, modernity and transmodernity as *convenient indicators* or *indexes* in the organisation of discourses; they figure as *fictional horizons* of the linguistic space, horizons to look upon in order to identify a series of more or less coherent discourses. As broader constellations, tradition, modernity and transmodernity can also be seen as *imaginative containers* - vocabularies delineating a plurality of discourses and embodying for that very reason the range of signifiers that each discourse articulates. In comprising specific constellations of signifiers and discursive representations, they also exert a certain symbolic appeal when new articulatory practices are set in motion. In this sense, they work as *symbolic reservoirs* from which discursive articulations draw in order to construct their respective representations. Naturally, discursive articulations are both enabling and constrained by their reference to these symbolic *contexts, horizons, scenarios,* or *reservoirs*. I should stress that neither discourses nor symbolic reservoirs are fixed, closed and stable totalities. The very fact that discursive agglomerations, whether discourses or symbolic reservoirs, remain temporary and fictional condensations of signifiers, overcoming at any one moment the inner *fluidity* of language, means that their temporary sense of closure remains exposed to contingent dislocation. The possibility is always present for them to release the elements that previously converged within their discursive and symbolic boundaries. A contingent historical event in a specific socio-political context - say, for example, the irruption of colonialism in the Middle East (Mura, 2012) - might engender the temporary dislocation of discourses in that setting, promoting the emergence of new articulations. Here, Ernesto Laclau interestingly deploys the Husserlian notion of *desedimentation* to account for precisely

such contingent ‘events’ of displacement.While Edmund Husserl had deployed the notion of ‘sedimentation’ to mean the fixation and accretion of meaning, Laclau defines the social as the space of ‘sedimented’ discursive practices whose ‘contingent’ institutionalisation is forgotten as a result of their very routinisation (Husserl, 1937/1970). Such a closure is, however, always exposed to crisis, dislocation or *desedimentation* through which the *naturalisation* of discursive practices is contested, social relations unsettled, the unity of a certain field of discursivity disarticulated and meanings de-fixed. It is here that a new hegemonic competition between discursive practices is again possible. This competition implies the *reactivation* (another Husserlian term) of contingency and decision; in other words, the reactivation of the ‘political’ against the sedimented space of the ‘social’ (Laclau, 1990). According to Laclau, this impulse marks the sign of a strict analogy between social and linguistic structures, for they are both given as impossible. There will always be a *constitutive outside* enacting while simultaneously disrupting a claim to totality of a certain discursive and social realm. As Laclau puts it, by highlighting the psychoanalytical dimension of his discursive theory: ‘The centrality of hegemonic relations in discourse theory comes from the fact that the desire for fullness is always present, but fullness, as such, is unachievable and can only exist circulating among particularities which assume temporarily the role of incarnating it’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 6). The inescapable presence of a *discursive exterior* will always entail a ‘surplus of meaning’ in any signifying space (discursive and social), one which no discourse can finally exhaust. In the end, no articulation will be able to avoid the ultimate contingency of signification.

In the light of such a framework, it can be argued that *modernisation* figured in Western settings as the desedimenting event of a process of increasing technological and economic development (industrialisation and mechanisation) and growing social articulation that disrupted the symbolic coordinates of *tradition*. This desedimenting process was, however, accompanied by the emergence of a new and *alternative* symbolic horizon through which reality was made readable: *modernity*. This symbolic reservoir condensed a range of new discourses that challenged the role of traditional Western narratives (e.g., pre-modern and medieval universalism, geocentrism, theism, etc.). Similarly, the increasing colonial interference of Western powers in non-Western settings and the structural transformations produced by the integration of colonial modes of production, engendered new desedimenting effects in colonial areas – those places where distinct typologies of tradition were in place (Islamic, Indian, Japanese, etc.). By assuming the same perspective, this article proposes to read globalisation as a new desedimentation process, one that challenged the symbolic structure of modernity, decentring its ability to provide standard ideological and discursive coordinates in the representation of the world. This process is, in turn, accompanied by the emergence of transmodern discourses, which once again provide an alternative reading of world reality. Before examining how this process occurred, it will be useful to clarify briefly the manner in which I will consider the semiotic structure of modernity and elucidate its discursive morphology.Three main sources have contributed to developing the symbolic horizon within which a plurality of ‘modern’ discourses has been articulated. First, a ‘structural’ connotation of modernity has been advocated by so-called modernist theorists and has supplied a number of socio-economic categories which have been central to its discursive development (e.g., discourses on industrialisation conducive to social and institutional differentiation; scientific rationality; the belief in progress; secularisation; and the thesis of deprivatisation of religiosity). Second, an ‘ideological’ connotation in which modernity has been understood by critics as an ideological construct grounded in

the elaboration of specific political paradigms (i.e., the deployment of a binary logic in the theorisation of modern subjectivity, modern sovereignty, nationalism, colonialism, liberalism, and so forth). Third, since the nineteenth century a number of philosophers have described a plurality of moral dilemmas as eminently 'modern', thus enriching the symbolic structure of modernity with a 'moral' connotation (e.g. discourses of individualism, atomism, alienation, relativism, materialism, etc.). Modernity, then, emerges as a language in which most of these discursive elements have played a central role (from the nation-state to the idea of progress, from the rigid deployment of dualisms in the definition of political and social reality to individualism, etc.).

In the following pages, I examine the way in which three major effects of globalisation - *spatial displacement*, *virtuality* and *fragmentation* - have contributed to a desedimentation of the symbolic representation of the world of modern discourses, enabling transmodernity to challenge their hegemonic position. While the tension between modernity and transmodernity will be highlighted with special attention, I will give only a cursory mention to tradition. My reason for this choice is that the link between modernity and transmodernity is to be considered at a general level, rather than focusing on concrete cultural or geographical settings where specific modes of articulating traditional symbolic reservoirs are set in motion.

The Global Context: Spatial displacement, virtuality and fragmentation

According to David Harvey, a basic feature of globalisation and one that is constitutive of a new human predicament – the so-called 'postmodern condition' – can be found in what he calls 'time-space compression'. This expression refers to the general tendency of 'capitalist modernization to be very much about speed-up and acceleration in the pace of economic processes and, hence, social life' (Harvey, 1990, p. 230). A continuous acceleration of the time of production and circulation of exchange enabled capital – in a process of increasing mobility and internationalisation – to erode spatial barriers, melting differentiated places into a global indistinct space, and transforming local economies into a *global market*. Technology has played a central role in this context, bringing about dramatic transformations in the way in which space, time and communication are perceived. The term I use to refer to this process here is *spatial displacement,* by which I mean a sort of double movement produced by globalisation and informatisation, which enacts both the *dislocation* and *re-shaping* of notions of *space* and related cognitions of *time*. In the early days of informatisation, the expression 'electronic highway' was used to highlight the sense of optimism that informatisation gave rise to by promising to bridge the gaps between remote geographical areas of the world (Gore, 1995). What soon became clear, however, was that the information highway was not only the simple *medium* of our travelling, but was itself also a *place* (Jones, 1995, p. 11). Notions such as *cyberspace* - first used by William Gibson in his 1984 novel *Neuromancer* - and *virtual reality,* indicated not only the new technological structure of multimedia communication but also the emergence of a new way of *experiencing* space and reality. They expressed the double dimension involved in the process of spatial displacement as the dislocation of the way space and time were hitherto perceived, and the promotion, at the same time, of new formulations of reality. Cyberspace and virtual reality are important examples of the intimate link existing between the very process of spatial displacement and the recent phenomenon of *virtuality.* Virtuality is to be thought of as a new way of perceiving reality based on the deployment and *inter*-action of technological and computerised

artefacts. Its novelty lies in its ability to problematise *spatiality*, *temporality* and *institutionalised space* (public and private spheres).

When considering *spatiality*, for example, virtuality blurs not only the phenomenological understanding of space, but also all that constitutes its inner referentials (e.g. presence and absence, closeness and remoteness, origin and destination). Media theorist Mark Nunes notes that social networking websites, chat rooms or simple emails encourage users to interact by using metaphors of proximity rather than distance (Nunes, 1995, p. 322). This phenomenon also modifies a further phenomenological referent: *temporality*. The immediacy of chat rooms, emails and file-sharing software permit an *enduring* and *simultaneous* interconnection across users. Moreover, new developments in informatisation, such as Ubiquitous Computing or Augmented Reality, contribute to modifying our very cognition of material things. Objects become *sensible*, moving in relation to our movements; listening, speaking, satisfying and anticipating everyday needs in a continuous and imperceptible way. In this scenario, virtuality – in the form of cyberspace – questions the otherwise modern institutionalisation of social space and its organisation around a public/private divide. As I shall discuss in more detail, a dominant paradigm or logic at the core of the symbolic structure of modernity has been the deployment of binaries in the construction of space and subjectivity. As anthropologist Talal Asad points out, central to the enactment of a dualistic paradigm in modern discourses was the elaboration of the notion of the 'secular':

> what needs to be emphasized […] is that the complex medieval Christian universe, with its interlinked times (eternity and its moving image […]) and hierarchy of spaces (the heavens, the earth, purgatory, hell) is broken down by the modern doctrine of secularism into a duality: a world of self-authenticating things in which we *really* live as social beings and a religious world that exist only in our imagination' (Asad, 2003, p. 194).

Asad contends that the secular, with its endorsement of a dualistic logic, is a relatively recent construction. It was the modern creation of the 'social' as an 'all-inclusive secular space' that enabled people to think in terms of the secular, allowing them to distinguish the social from other domains such as that of the religious. Over the last decades, spatial displacement and virtuality have contributed to the desedimentation of modern binary constructions.

Emblematic of these transformations is the use of the term *forum.* Once referring to the wide and 'open court' of a Roman city in which the market was situated and administrative, religious, and juridical general affairs were undertaken, it embodied the realm of the outside where 'public' life was organised. Unlike its classical connotation, the term is now associated with a new gathering space in which the formation of public opinion has been relocated within its 'private' counterpart: the house. In the virtuality of the forum, subjects celebrate the contemporary figure of the indistinction between the public and the private, the spatial tension of speech that exceeds the dual field of the

public and the private. Today, the Internet provides us with a new measure of *publicness*, whereby personal popularity is less and less dependent on public recognition outside in the street, and is increasingly reliant on the number of Google search-results pages in which one's name is listed, which takes place in the intimacy of one's home. This discussion highlights the way in which global and technological changes have been re-shaping important levels of experience. Another major sign of globalisation, however, which I define as *fragmentation*, has also undermined established representations of space and subjectivity.

Fragmentation

The modern trend towards an increased blurring of binaries, and the capacity of virtuality to overcome the modern organisation of institutionalised space should be considered alongside the process of *subjective decentring* that globalisation and informatisation have fostered in the last decades. This is a process that I call *fragmentation*. While spatial displacement and virtuality suggest some form of dislocation occurring on established representations of *space* and *time*, a focus on fragmentation requires an examination of the particular disarticulation that modern constructions of *subjectivity* have undergone with the fading of modern binaries.

I pointed earlier to the intimate relation between globalisation and informatisation. I would now stress that this relation entails a *critical* transition: a movement from a period of mechanisation and industrialisation to that of a *quantitative* and *qualitative* domination of services and information in the domain of production. While the process of industrialisation remains, it has been transformed through the emergence of methods of production centring upon the utilisation and manipulation of information. This passage of transition has produced a dramatic change in the way in which social and political life is experienced. Despite problems related to spatial displacement, the structural transition from industrialisation to the informatisation of production has led to the *sophistication* and *intensification* of the modern construction of social space. This point can be better illustrated by referring briefly to the debate about individualism. As pointed out earlier, the reliance on a dichotomous organisation of social space along an inside/outside divide - for instance celebrating the enlightened triumph of secularity and rationality against religion - was central to the discursive development of modernity. Max Weber's well-known description of the modern world as a 'disenchanted world' accounted for the secular erosion of the holistic and transcendental horizons that had followed the humanist revolution. The crucial point here had been the gradual enfranchisement from a higher, holy order to a re-centring on mankind (Weber, 1918/1946). In this context, liberals celebrated the emergence, expression and centrality of *individuality* vis-à-vis society.

Most modern constructions of subjectivity in fact defined the individual in a dual relation with his/her social and cultural outside. In an etymological sense, the *individual* came to figure as the ultimate and *indivisible* constituent of society, whose ontological essence (rationality, egoism, altruism, etc.) was to be singled out and preserved against the context of an *outside* social. In Benjamin Constant's famous discourse of 1819, for instance, 'the liberty of the Moderns' coincides with individual liberty. According to Constant, it differed from the 'liberty of the Ancients' precisely because the latter extolled the political autonomy of the community assimilating the 'peaceful enjoyment of individual independence' to its needs (1819/1988, p. 102). The problem for modern discourses was precisely how to articulate such a relation. Whether to preserve, for

instance, a radical focus on individual rights and private enjoyment vis-à-vis the cultural constraints of society and the administrative regimentation of the state, or to redefine the *social* in terms of the free and organic expression of individuals. There is, nonetheless, a further meaning to be conveyed by the expression 'disenchantment of the world', one that points to the *modern* sense of meaninglessness in the absence of those horizons that had *traditionally* given sense to every aspect of individual and social existence. A common moral concern for liberal philosophers was, in fact, the degeneration of *individuality* to forms of *individualism* or *social atomism*. This fading, firstly of the transcendent and then of the social horizon, brought about a condition of *atomisation* which I characterise as a critical loss of sociability. The impression here was that the modern focus upon individuals entailed a narrowing of perspective, with the threat of losing the wider view for the social in the face of an almost exclusive focus on individual life. The effects of this condition upon a democratic industrial society were widely discussed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a modern context, where material interest and conformity seemed to dominate, 'not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart' (De Tocqueville, 1835-1840/1863/2007, p. 370).

Individualism meant that individuals, as the ultimate constituents of society, no longer perceived their original relation to the whole (hence the notion of the *atom* as an isolated unit which literally 'can not be cut' or, again, *in-dividual* as an ultimate 'in-divisible' being). By over-emphasising their own *raison d'être* in regard to society itself, individuals ended by experiencing the crisis of a lost sociability where society was now to be maintained merely in the shadows. The modern sense of a loss of sociability therefore implied the shadowing of the social-outside as a consequence of the over-emphasis upon the individual-inside. The great impact of modern discourses about man and society lay in their potential to *dull* social atomism by promising a new sense of belonging (to a nation, a religious community or a social class). Since individuality and sociality constituted the two poles of modern subjective relations, discourses such as nationalism and socialism attempted to resolve the problems of individualism by re-establishing the link between the individual and society. They proposed to reconstruct identities by promising to fill the void left by the lack of sociability, therein providing a new sense of *belonging*. In regard to this scenario, I contended that the recent overlap of communication and informatisation has contributed to the erosion of the modern binary organisation of space and subjectivity, with its separation between inside and outside and, in political terms, between the private and public. As Hardt and Negri observe: 'the liberal notion of the public, the place outside where we act in the presence of others, has been both universalized (because we are always now under the gaze of others, monitored by safety cameras) and sublimated or de-actualized in the virtual spaces of the spectacle. The end of the outside is the end of liberal politics' (2000, pp. 188-189). Baudrillard has similarly analysed the dissolution of modern paradigms in terms of 'obscenity':

> Neither is public yet a spectacle, nor is private still a secret […] The consumer society was lived under the sign of alienation; it was a society of the spectacle, and the spectacle, even if alienated, is never obscene. Obscenity begins when

> there is no more spectacle, no more stage, no more theatre, no more illusion, when every-thing becomes immediately transparent, visible, exposed in the raw and inexorable light of information and communication. *We no longer partake of the drama of alienation, but are in the ecstasy of communication* (Baudrillard, 1988, pp. 21-22).

It is within this transformation that I locate the shift from the *alienated* subject of the modern world to the *fragmented* subject of transmodernity, one which points to a process of de-centring of subjectivity. Unlike atomism, *fragmentation* does not occur as a result of lost sociability or from the incapacity to refer any longer to a society (no longer perceptible even as a trace). Instead, it stands as the outcome of a *hyper-intensification* of the modern binaries which had opposed individuals to society. Baudrillard uses the notion of 'hyperthelia' to indicate a *critical* process of over-development on the part of a system; the movement of a system beyond its own ends, of a model that supersedes the object it has striven to apprehend (1993). Such a notion is particularly useful when considering the kind of critical movement that I am proposing in relation to modern constructions. I argued that a constant process of intensification has led modern subjective constructions to over-emphasise the centre of the individual-inside against the social-outside. Following this same process of intensification and over-development, largely strengthened by the constant acceleration of capitalist processes and the effects of globalisation and informatisation, I contend that the increasing *focus* on the individual centre has paved the way for its critical fragmentation or implosion.

While the modern emphasis on the opposition 'individual-society' *initially* produced atomism, its inner over-development has brought about the disappearance of this opposition and the corresponding emergence of fragmentation. When modern subjectivity becomes fractured as a result of the fading of the binaries that lie behind its construction, then fragmentation emerges as a *residual* entity. It could be said that where the modern *individual*-self experiences a loss of sociability, the fragmented-*subject* produced by globalisation and informatisation experiences the loss not only of the public but also of the private. Being also *deprived of the private,* the fragmented subject experiences the loss of the modern Self. Hence a discursive universe that would aspire to appeal to a fragmented subject should start by inventing a new form of selfhood. Modern discourses such as nationalism and communism reconstructed identities by promising to fill the void left by the lack of sociability, thereby providing a new sense of *belongingness*. Hence, the modern symbolic appeal of signifiers such as 'corporatism', 'comradeship', 'fellowship' and lay or religious 'brotherhood' after the French Revolution, and their radicalisation under the experience of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. In a time in which both public and private vanish, a *transmodern* discourse points to the reinvention of notions of selfhood and community beyond any binary opposition to a specific outside.

The transmodern symbolic reservoir

Before mapping out the range of discourses and signifiers that have most contributed to the emergence of transmodernity as a *symbolic reservoir*, there is an important point that

needs to be stressed. Although spatial displacement, virtuality and fragmentation are constitutive features of globalisation, it would be inappropriate to assert that they affect the entire world in the same manner and with the same intensity, producing similar problems of desedimentation everywhere. In some contexts, in coping with the challenge posed by modern discourses over their traditional equivalents, people might experience problems of excessive individualism, loss of sociability and social atomism. Other environments might be more sensitive to the desedimenting effects of globalisation, promoting new formulations of subjectivity beyond modern binaries (private vs. public, domestic vs. foreign, etc.). I am considering here a 'complex' linguistic matrix within which different symbolic reservoirs operate simultaneously, overlapping and even opposing each other with varying degrees of intensity. This is a crucial point, as the very term transmodernity has been used to avoid the common reading of *post*-modernity as an historical epoch or sociological condition replacing modernity.

In this article, although transmodernity and post-modernity are closely linked, they remain distinct notions insofar as the latter provides the former with an 'internal' discursive component, which, among other things, contributes to the consolidation of its morphological structure. As we will soon see, transmodernity figures as a broader discursive scenario incorporating both sociological and historical discourses about *post-modernity* as well as so-called *postmodernist* political and philosophical theories. The prefix *trans*- aims to highlight precisely the discursive complexity of transmodernity and its *traversing* of these specific domains (the historical, sociological or philosophical dimension of both *post*-modernity and *post*-modernism) as well as other discursive connotations. In addition, this prefix emphasises a specific modality of engagement with modernity. I consider *trans*-modernity, in fact, as a symbolic scenario finding its discursive condition of possibility in the very hyper-intensification of modernity described above. An example of the discursive complexity described here is the recent debate in psychoanalysis about the radical change that is allegedly occurring in our contemporary era concerning the 'end of the paternal dogma'; that is, the erosion of the transcendental function of the father (Tort, 2007). Here, the idea is that *hyper*- or *post*-modernity would be responsible for what has been called the 'decline of the Oedipus, where the paradigmatic mode of subjectivity is no longer the subject integrated into the paternal Law through symbolic castration' (Zizek, 2000, p. 248). Naturally, a major consequence of this view is the crisis of desire and the potential entry into a realm of perversion where enjoyment is no longer marked by the experience of the limit. Once castration is suspended, 'desire' ceases to be a key manifestation of the subject of the unconscious, and faces something akin to a 'nihilistic obliteration' which testifies to the birth of a new type of subject: the 'man without unconscious' (Recalcati, 2010, p. x). The point to be emphasised here is that whether the decline of the Oedipus is acknowledged or not depends upon which reservoir we use to 'read' social reality and the type of discourse that we are considering. Should we refer, for instance, to a discourse celebrating the limiting function of the Law, thereby promoting austerity, sacrifice, and prohibition, or to a discourse extolling the ideal of unlimited and dissipating enjoyment? Interestingly, Zizek points to the current coexistence of the modern discourse of democracy which manifests, on the one hand, a hysterical structure, valorising the central function of desire and, on the other hand, the multicultural discourse of late capitalism, with its perverse injunction to enjoy (Zizek, 2000, p. 248). In this respect, Zizek emphasises the contemporary overlapping of modernity and transmodernity, desire and perversion, politics and post-politics, conflict and illusion of perpetual peace within the general structure of the symbolic.

Having established that transmodernity stands as a symbolic scenario alongside tradition and modernity, and that this scenario finds its 'paradigmatic' point of consistency in the over-development of modernity, it is possible to define transmodernity as *the discursive condition under which modernity experiences a sense of crisis as the result of a higher degree of sophistication*. Spatial displacement, virtuality and fragmentation intensify an over-development of modern binaries to a critical point of disruption, where modern conceptions of space and subjectivity fade. It is at this critical point that new transmodern formulations of selfhood and space are enacted and articulated, displaying their counter-hegemonic action in the desedimented space of the social. But how can one account for transmodernity from a semiotic perspective? I argued that three main sources contribute to determining the modern scenario, each one condensing a more or less defined range of discourses (i.e., structural, moral and ideological). Naturally, the borders of such a categorisation are not clear-cut. They rather play a purely indicative function, distinguishing between different levels of the debate about modernity. It can be said, for instance, that discourses contributing to the ideological connotation of modernity, such as liberalism or socialism, partake also in the determination of a moral connotation of modernity focusing on individualism and alienation. Using this categorisation as a point of departure, I will now account for a range of discourses that have emerged as an effect of the process of desedimentation enacted by spatial displacement, fragmentation and virtuality. Again, the allocation of discourses to specific semiotic connotations of transmodernity is purely indicative insofar as each transmodern discourse might contribute to the definition of more than one connotation resonating on different levels.

Transmodernity: An Ideological Connotation

A point of departure for understanding the diverse range of problems that transmodern discourses have tackled is the well-known notion of 'postmodernity'. Over the last forty years, this term has evoked a plurality of approaches animating a dynamic ongoing debate. At first glance, the set of discourses that constitute the concept of 'postmodernism' define what could be understood as an *ideological connotation* of transmodernity. Postmodernist perspectives reflect the general attempt to question modernity and its related forms of power and knowledge. Whether through the analytical critique of rationality that emerged with the Enlightenment or through an evaluation of colonialism as a power practice intrinsically related to modernity, all these perspectives stand together in the contestation of essentialist and dichotomous modern paradigms and the common celebration of notions of difference and multiplicity. In the face of modern binaries hierarchically dividing the world between centre and periphery, civilised and uncivilised, colonial powers and colonised populations, post-modernist discourses focus on 'transnational citizenship' (Balibar, 2004), 'diaspora communities' (Bhabha, 1994), 'hybridity' (Brah & Coombes, 2000), 'liminality' (D'haen & Bertens, 1994), 'mestiza' (Anzaldúa, 1999), cyber identity (Haraway, 1991; Turkle, 1995), transgender (Stone, 1996) or 'nomadism' (Braidotti, 1994). They aim to deconstruct modern binaries, promoting the invention of anti-foundationalist and anti-dichotomous forms of self-identification (the mestizo/a, the transgender, the cyborg, the nomad, etc., all categories used to go beyond the opposition between the white and the black, the masculine and the feminine, the organic and the inorganic, the domestic and the foreign, etc.). Social theorist Krishan Kumar, for one, points out that despite old essentialist approaches that continue to reside even amongst multiculturalist theorists, 'the future appears as one of "hyphenation", "hybridity", "syncretization", "creolization", and the creative invention of "diaspora cultures"' (Kumar, 2002, p. 60). These are all emblematic examples of the

range of signifiers that postmodernist theories articulate, contributing to the symbolic definition of a *transmodern* discursive scenario.

Despite aspiring to promote political resistance, some 'critics' have described postmodernist tendencies as the 'ideological' superstructure of late capitalism (Jameson, 1991), which, for some, have followed the erosion of the left at the end of the Cold War (Anderson, 1998). The constitutive features of postmodernism have been located in the aesthetics of citationism, or in a mode of textual practice underlying the widespread adoption of a 'soft relativism' (Taylor, 1991). In a provocative and seminal essay, Habermas accused postmodernism of constituting a mere recurrence of a Counter-Enlightenment project (Habermas, 1981). Notions such as 'liminal' or 'hybrid' identity, 'internationalism of people in the diaspora', as well as the attention given to local and sub-cultures or to the relativistic nature of culture itself, have constituted, for some critics, the very core of postmodernist ideological approaches. A postmodernist anti-foundationalist perspective tends to use the play of difference and contingency against logocentric 'subjective' representations (gender, social, cultural, etc.) in the ultimate celebration of the pleasures of the 'local, the popular, and, above all, the body', thereby becoming a 'ludic postmodernism' (Ebert, 1996). Although able to deconstruct and disarticulate well-established holistic modern discourses and open up a new space for discursive articulations, for some critics postmodernism represents the ultimate product of late-capitalism and late-patriarchy. Far from providing an effective remedy against forms of domination, postmodern discourses have been seen as the 'symptoms of the passage' towards new forms of global governance (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Hardt and Negri note that new economic and political powers have achieved a post-modernist mindset in recent years, thriving upon the very fluid subjectivities and micro-differences that postmodernism extols. New practices of marketing and consumption suggest the increasing valorisation of a postmodernist polity based on difference. 'Trade brings differences together and the more the merrier! Differences (of commodities, populations, cultures and so forth) seem to multiply infinitely in the world market, which attacks nothing more violently than fixed boundaries: it overwhelms any binary divisions with its infinite multiplicities' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 150). This position is supported by new developments in management and organisational theories which, in the last two decades, have increasingly drawn upon postmodern approaches, celebrating the mobility and flexibility of organisations and their ability to deal with difference.[3] A multicultural and multiracial milieu is often celebrated by top managers of transnational corporations as the best strategy to maximise creativity, profit and consumption.

[3] Business courses about how to learn postmodernist management theory and achieve a postmodernist organizational attitude are mushrooming: "'Postmodernists reject unifying, totalising and universal schemes in favor of a new emphasis on difference, plurality, fragmentation, and complexity [...]' (Best and Kellner, 1997). Join us in learning how to apply this new thinking to organizations!"; http://web.nmsu.edu/~dboje/TDworkshop_Boston.html. See also http://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/postmoderntheory.html where it is stated: 'The value in looking at a postmodernist approach to chaos and complexity lies in getting beyond the reductionist thinking of "modernist" managers'.

Transmodernity: A Structural Connotation

Apart from the ideological connotation of transmodernity in the form of particular variants of postmodernism, other scholars have tackled 'post-modernity' as both a socio-economic condition and a historical time. Unlike postmodernist theorists, their aim is not to devise political projects based on difference and multiplicity. They point rather to an analytical critique of post-modernity. The result is that a new array of discourses and signifiers has been produced, which enrich transmodernity with an *historical* and *structural connotation*. By expressing a diversified range of qualitative investigations, and semantic and terminological innovations, new conceptualisations have taken the analysis of post-modernity beyond Lyotard's seminal definition of it as the condition of 'incredulity towards metanarratives' (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. xxiii). Hence, we find notions such as 'second modernity' or 'risk society' (Beck, 1992), 'network society' (Castells, 1996), 'late' or 'high' modernity (Giddens, 1991), 'liquid' modernity (Bauman, 2000), 'hypermodernity' (Lipovetsky & Charles, 2005), 'transmodernity' (Rodríguez Magda, 2005; Dussel, 1995), 'supermodernity' (Augé, 1995), etc. In different terms and to different degrees, all these perspectives reflect the emergence of new discourses assuming postmodernity to be a definite historical phase or sociological reality with features of its own which would somehow progress beyond the social, political and linguistic constituents of 'modern time'. As amply debated, my categorisation of transmodernity encompasses the range of discourses that have emerged with globalisation and which define the ideological, historical and structural dimension of *post-modernity*. In this sense, I take these dimensions to express respective 'connotations' of the *transmodern* symbolic reservoir: not only *post-modernist* anti-foundationalist discourses celebrating difference and hybridity, but also historical, economic and sociological analyses of *post-modernity* assessing the constitutive features of this new 'reality'.

Transmodernity: A Spatial Connotation

In addition, I take transmodernity to include a number of discourses celebrating a new *global* or *deterritorialised* cognition of space and defining a *spatial connotation* of transmodernity. As I discussed earlier, a major effect of globalisation has been a process of *spatial displacement*, which has modified the way in which space is experienced, imagined and constructed. In addressing this predicament, new discourses have emerged which have reformulated the link between identity and space by overcoming the modern binary relation between the individual and his/her outside social and cultural context. A new relation has been constructed between *a fragmented subject* on the one hand and an *indistinct externality* on the other. That is, the globe, the depthless surface of the screen, cyberspace, various forms of potential communities or virtualities (communities to come, not yet realised, such as the perfect Islamic society, global citizenship) and various forms of already established multiplicities (the multitude, the global ummah etc).

Central to this movement is the increasing inability of people to firmly grasp external place. Notions such as 'universal placelessness' (Relph, 1976), 'release from gravity', 'megalopolis' (Olalquiaga, 1992), or 'geography of nowhere' (Kunstler, 1993) all illustrate a context in which spatial referentials have lost meaning, bringing about the discursive desedimentation of a whole signifying space and the formulation of new quests for personal and collective identities. Celeste Olalquiaga's notion of 'psychasthenia', for instance, refers to the condition of disorientation and the identity loss that occurs when external boundaries fade and the subject ends up losing itself in the vagueness of the

outside space, assuming 'a ubiquitous feeling of being in all places while not really being anywhere' (1992, p. 2). If we consider the role of virtuality in moulding new discursive representations of reality, the fading of external boundaries and the corresponding impact of new subjectivity formations assume particular relevance. Baudrillard points to the hypertelic role of technology in producing what he sees as the 'liquidation of all referentials' (1994, p. 254). A complex global network of microchips and computer devices, the infinite reproduction of images and information, and the 'virtualisation' of everyday practices has led to a questioning of the very possibility of distance, engendering, in the words of Virilio, the 'perpetually repeated hijacking of the subject from any spatial-temporal context' (1991, p. 101). In this scenario, Baudrillard elaborates and articulates an emblematic transmodern signifier: *hyperreality*. By radicalising Borges's allegory of simulation, which envisages a map of the Empire so detailed as to cover the exact surface of its territory – thus not merely symbolising but literally substituting and merging with its object – Baudrillard perceives the age of media communication and informatisation through the emergence of a new order of reality in which a 'precession of simulacra' supplants physical referentials (1994). Although the Internet exemplifies this global trend, manifesting itself as a closed, self-contained networked totality that precludes the empirical interrelation with a beyond, this predicament encompasses 'an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models', a technological appropriation of the entire world by way of microchips, electric devices, satellites, etc. (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 254).

In this ultimate stage of simulacra, a phenomenological representation of space is lost in favour of a ubiquitous narcissistic void in which *fractal* identities fluctuate restlessly. Once we are everywhere – it suffices to be on-line – there is no longer a place defining our location and no longer an original 'fragment' of ourselves to be maintained. Fractality and ubiquity – our infinite division into self-same parts and the unceasing reproduction of them in the seriality of the matrix – are the corollary of simulation. Hence the narcissistic stupor of virtual travelling, which absorbs users into the microworld of their dreams. Baudrillard describes this process in terms of a transition from *seductio*, the seduction by the other for the other, to *subductio*, the hypnotic obscene fascination of the self, eternally reproduced in the narcissistic abyss of the screen (1988, p. 43). In a world characterised by the mobility of boundaries, the reformulation of identity mirrors de-centralisation, testifying to the fragmentation of subjectivity and the attempt to recover forms of spatial externality and collective identity beyond modern binaries. Some discourses celebrate cyberspace and the new era of virtual communities, while others assume a 'globalist' perspective; that is, they acknowledge 'interconnectedness' as a way to recover a sense of externality in which to locate the action of the fragmented subject. Space and subjects are re-composed in what Manuel Castells defines in terms of a 'network society', where a 'space of flows' (flows of people, goods, information) replaces the modern 'space of place' and creates a new 'interdependent' world reality (1996).

Globalist perspectives are often paralleled by rejuvenated *universalistic* discourses that point to the emergence of new collective subjects. A universalistic ethos is here recovered in the celebration of an inclusive dynamic which allows differences to be absorbed while preserving, at the same time, forms of political litigation. In the recently popularised notion of 'multitude', for instance, the celebration of this new collective subject entails the re-articulation of 'individuals' as 'singularities', and the preservation and integration of difference (Hardt & Negri, 2004). Universalistic discourses can also draw upon eschatological representations, resonating with traditional religious discourses, as is the

case with the revived ideal of a global *ummah* (Muslim community) among certain jihadist trajectories. These discourses show that certain parallels can be established between transmodernity and tradition. The result is that the desedimenting process enacted by globalisation might allow traditional discourses to be revitalised in opposition to modernity and in conjunction with transmodernity.

Some remarks

In the light of my discussion of the *spatial connotation* of transmodernity, a few caveats are required. First, it might be said that transmodern discourses celebrating the emergence of global actors or global space are the heirs of modern internationalism, although they reflect the overdevelopment of modernity. Internationalism refers to a context where modern binary notions of space and subjectivity play a hegemonic role. The very words *inter*nationalism and *inter*national suggest cooperation or coexistence *amongst* nations, rather than their replacement with a supra-national reality. It is true that internationalism might also be taken to express a world order deprived of national constructions; for instance, via the establishment of a federation of either communes or anarchist communities. However, we should also bear in mind that classic internationalist representations involved both the deployment of modern binaries to construct space and subjectivity, and a modern logocentric approach towards either the notion of 'humanity' or that of 'structure'.[4]

The distinction between internationalist and universalistic discourses aligns with the differentiation between the modern notion of 'proletariat' and the transmodern concept of 'multitude'. Unlike the socio-economic conception of the proletariat, with its industrialist understanding of society and social class, the multitude marks the transition to an anti-foundationalist notion of selfhood. It figures as a 'multiplicity of singularities, already creolised, embodying immaterial and intellectual labour' (Negri & Zolo, 2005, n. pag). From a different angle, Virno observes that 'the notion of multitude seems to share something with liberal thought because it values individuality but, at the same time, it distances itself from it radically because this individuality is the final product of a process of individuation which stems from the universal, the generic, the pre-individual' (2004, p. 76). Hence, there remains a crucial difference in comparison with modern discourses, for unlike individuals, singularities do not stand as pre-constitutive 'solipsistic atoms' but figure as the complex and final outcome of the very process of differentiation of the multitude.

A second caveat concerns the complexity of forces that globalisation embodies and transmodernity aims to represent. All the discursive tendencies that I have described might entail either the celebration or rejection of difference. While some perspectives might share with postmodernist discourses the tendency to conceptualise global space in terms of hybridity and difference (in the guise, for instance, of a global multicultural society or the multitude where each of the *singularities* expresses a *differentia specifica*), other approaches advocate a standardisation of behavioural practices and values. Here homogeneity rather than heterogeneity is to be celebrated as the best way to confront global change. A case in point is the emphasis on homogenisation expressed by the

[4] It is worth noting that in the attempt to reformulate the structural foundations of orthodox Marxism and anarchism, contemporary theoretical reflections such as post-Marxism and post-anarchism have also assumed an anti-foundationalist approach to subjectivity and space (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Newman, 2009).

increasing visibility of fundamentalist approaches to religion. Here we observe trends towards revivalism that conceive of tradition as a fixed set of values, and advocate a rigid and scriptural reading of the holy texts. These currents can produce a rejection of local cultures, where holy texts are reduced to a set of well-defined literal injunctions deprived of any cultural reference. The norms that are drawn from holy texts express a deculturised vision of religion, for they are taken to reflect the tenets of creed alone. They can consequently be used in any location, despite the cultural and social context of reference, so maintaining a universal validity that can be very useful in a globalised context (Roy, 2004).[5]

The above example illustrates the complexity of effects produced by globalisation. Heterogeneity and homogeneity coexist in the globalised context, paving the way for alternative discursive trajectories. This point has been well elucidated by geographer Edward Soja, who considered the production and re-production of urban space under globalisation to be the result of a tension between homogenisation and differentiation (1989). David Harvey maintains a similar complexity by acknowledging, together with the homogenisation of the world, the notion of an increasing heterogeneity of cultural, economic and political demands: 'spaces of very different worlds seem to collapse upon each other, much as the world's commodities are assembled in the supermarket and all manner of sub-cultures get juxtaposed in the contemporary city' (1990, p. 302). Such complexity is present in the conceptualisation of culture as well. In the face of spatial displacement we have seen that fundamentalist tendencies recover some form of authenticity by adopting a de-culturised version of religion based on a homogenised and rigid set of injunctions and norms drawn from the holy text and to be used in every context. Other trajectories, however, might react to globalisation by revitalising or reinventing their contact with the cultural setting. The erosion of modern conceptions of space might alternatively induce the revitalisation of *traditional* ideals of 'subnational' ties through a reinvigorated emphasis on sub-cultures and 'the local' vis-à-vis 'the global'. Hence the neologism 'g-localization' that some scholars have used to highlight this double dimension in the process of globalisation.

To conclude, a final remark is needed to address the link between transmodernity and tradition. I contended that the desedimenting effects of globalisation have, in many respects, jeopardised the hegemonic position that modern discourses have covered over the last century. A clear example is the enfeebling of the political role of the nation-state or the increasing inadequacy of modern binaries to cope with the changes produced by technology and informatisation. This predicament has spawned a twofold movement. On the one hand, transmodernity has emerged as a new discursive scenario alongside tradition and modernity. On the other hand, a *reactivation* of the symbolic appeal of tradition has allowed traditional discourses to be revitalised and re-articulated in a creative way, working alongside transmodernity to challenge the language of modernity. Here, tradition provides alternative symbolic sources to redefine space and subjectivity in a globalised world. I mentioned the emergence of discourses stressing the tribal and subnational character of identities. One example is the rejuvenated Arab notion of *al-aṣabiyyah* (tribal solidarity) used by scholars to show how traditional forms of identification challenge the role of national narratives in Islamic settings (Sadiki, 2004).

[5] I should stress that fundamentalism, in its Islamic dimension, should not be confused with Islamism, the latter expressing a wide range of revivalist perspectives which are not necessarily conservative, literalist, or homogenising.

When compared with those transmodern reformulations of subjectivity that stress the supranational dimension of identity, it is clear that both these strategies reflect viable answers to the complex effects of globalisation, particularly with regard to its *g-local* character. The counter-hegemonic challenge to modern discourses that tradition and transmodernity promote is further characterised by some degree of resonance between the two reservoirs. The very *rebirth* of the concept of 'empire' or 'multitude' testifies to the transmodern attempt to rearticulate traditional signifiers in a manner adequate to the challenges posed within the new global context. In their essay on contemporary world order, Hardt and Negri point out that some traditional concepts such as Empire, *bellum justum* (just war) and *jus ad bellum* (right to make war) 'have reappeared in our postmodern world'. Though 'far from merely repeating medieval notions', these concepts 'present some truly fundamental innovations' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 12).

A further example is provided in this respect by Zielonka's analysis of the European Union, where a traditional conceptualisation of sovereignty is used to define the emergence of a 'neo-medieval' supranational entity: 'The [European] Union is on its way to becoming a kind of neo-medieval empire with a polycentric system of government, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, striking cultural and economic heterogeneity, fuzzy borders, and divided sovereignty' (2006, p. vii). It is in consideration of all the discursive trajectories here elucidated that we can grasp then the symbolic function of transmodernity and its ability to mould new representations of the world.

Conclusion

By assuming a discourse-centred perspective, I have described a linguistic system marked by the coexistence of distinct discursive horizons through which our imaginaries are formed and regulated. I pointed here to the overlapping of three *symbolic reservoirs* – *modernity*, *tradition* and *transmodernity* – which embody a number of discourses and the range of signifiers that such discourses articulate. My aim was to examine the symbolic function of transmodernity in particular, using this conceptualisation to account for those symbolic images which, over the last decades, have been articulated and deployed to construct new discursive representations of the world. In doing this, I assumed globalisation as a key desedimenting process of the social which dislocated the symbolic dominance of the modern vocabulary, enabling transmodernity and a reactivated tradition to disclose their counter-hegemonic potential and their symbolic function in making the world *readable*.

Acknowledgements

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement n° 249379.

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