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Temporality 1: Heidegger's analysis of time and its relation to psychoanalytic theory

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Abstract

In this article I attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the philosophy of time to psychiatric, psychological and psychoanalytic theories of development and therapeutic action. I choose to explore and analyse the writings of Martin Heidegger, arguably the twentieth century's pre-eminent philosopher of time. I then develop links between his philosophy and Freudian theories of time, and in particular Freud's notion of *Nachträglichkeit*, as advanced in the writings of André Green and Jacques Derrida. I conclude by advancing a range of temporal concepts that may be employed in the analysis of developmental theories and clinical approaches. In an accompanying article I undertake such an analysis, relating in particular to borderline conditions.

Introduction

In a broad sense, time, or temporality, permeates all aspects of our work as clinicians working in the fields of psychotherapy, psychiatry and psychology. When we think about our patients this occurs both in the retrospective sense when we consider case histories, developmental formulations and aetiology as well as in the prospective sense when we consider therapeutic goals and processes, the course of treatment and the nature of termination of treatment. With temporality being such an integral or essential element of our work, is there a way in which we can think about time philosophically, and bring this into a discussion of temporality in the clinic?

In this article, I intend to undertake such an analysis through an exploration of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, arguably the twentieth century's pre-eminent philosopher of time, going on to explore the affinities his philosophy has with Freudian psychoanalytic theories of time, traces of which are found in Freud's original corpus of work, but were then analysed or advanced more fully by psychoanalyst André Green and philosopher Jacques Derrida. Then in an accompanying article, I intend to explore how this theoretical analysis of temporality is relevant to our consideration of development and clinical work, focussing in particular on borderline conditions.

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Heideggers' Philosophy

Martin Heidegger's philosophy has been increasingly noted to have many affinities and relations with psychodynamic theory, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Later in his career, Heidegger (1959-1969) himself held the Zollikon Seminar regularly for over ten years with a group of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts in Switzerland. In these seminars Heidegger approached the task of elaborating the implications of his thought (the ontological, phenomenological and hermeneutic standpoints) for clinicians. Alongside this, his ideas were separately developed and adapted by Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss into schools of existential psychoanalysis (Binswanger, 1963; Boss, 1963, 1979). Heidegger (1959-1969) himself critically responded to this and elaborated what are some of the philosophical difficulties in building a systematic clinical approach (in a clinical-scientific domain) from his own philosophical approach, which is concerned with different questions to do with broader philosophical domains such as ontology, phenomenology and hermeneutics.

The question then becomes how philosophical ideas can be brought into dialogue with, or influence, thinking in a different though related clinical domain. There is already a precedent of this having occurred more broadly with Heideggerian philosophy and the clinical domain of psychoanalysis: Herman Lang (1997), for example, trained under Hans-Georg Gadamer (one of Heidegger's principle followers) and wrote about Heideggerian and Lacanian conceptualizations of language and the unconscious; and Hans Loewald (1978, 1980), a student of Heidegger in the 1930s, and subsequently a preeminent North American psychoanalyst, wrote in an apparently orthodox Freudian style which nevertheless shows obvious influences from his hermeneutic and phenomenological training. In the writings of both of these thinkers, one can see the influences that Heidegger's form of hermeneutic stance can have in its application to a clinical field. There are also representatives of the intersubjective, interpersonal and relational schools, such as Orange, Stolorow and Atwood (for example see Stolorow 2002 and 2007; Stolorow, Atwood and Orange, 2002; and Stolorow, Orange and Atwood, 2001) as well as other analytic thinkers with philosophical training or interests, such as William Richardson, Louis Sass, Alan Bass and André Green, who have drawn reference to Heidegger's work and other thinkers of the hermeneutic tradition. And, finally, there are those philosophers who have either advanced a hermeneutic orientation and then engaged with the fields of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and psychiatry (for example Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur), or have developed their own orientation that has then been related to these fields at the same time as being related to but distinguished from Heidegger's work (for example Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas).

With the benefit of all of these vantage points, the discussion below will attempt to elucidate a hermeneutic frame or perspective from which to approach the theoretical and clinical domain of borderline experience. This will first involve an elaboration of aspects of Heidegger's (1928) early writing, and in particular, his ideas around time and temporality.

Heidegger's own methodology was developed from two disciplines: the first being *hermeneutics* (loosely, the study of methods of interpretation, originally of scripture and other texts, but broadened to any form of human actions, utterances or practices amenable to understanding); and the second being *phenomenology* (loosely the study of one's immediate perceptions and experiences). His early principle work *Being and Time* (1928) was the beginning part of an enormous project aimed at a general theory of Being

(*ontology*) which began with an exploration of the specific nature of the existence of human beings. What is significant for us, here, is that Heidegger, along with other eminent contemporaries such as Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, elaborated a type of framework that undermines any decontextualized, individualistic notion of the self seen as a discrete autonomous agent, who divorced from the world processes the data of experience (perception, interaction with others) in a representational, algorithmic way. Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* (literally "being-there") and being-in-the-world indicates our irreducible and unsurpassable "embeddedness" in a concrete and contingent "life world"—we are always already in the world, practically immersed in the necessities and activities of life as an existential project into which we are thrown as finite beings. It is an inescapable context in which our being is already shared with others, housed in language, immersed in time within the horizon of death. In this context, our being, our self, is always an issue for us. But it is only from within this context that as selves we may begin to attempt to understand or explain who or what we are. This context is a background we can never fully master as we are always already a part of it. Heidegger holds that we exist within this context or horizon of being with an implicit understanding or what he might call a *pre-understanding* of how to go about things, with at the same time the possibility of explaining or explicitly understanding the nature of our being something which is furthest away from us.

Heidegger's exploration, with Nietzsche before him, of this notion of an existential limit, and the idea of self-estrangement and an opaque background to our being, I believe, is significant for our understanding of selfhood as clinicians. It has a bearing upon how we think about dimensions of the self that are implied in notions like the Unconscious. It also has a bearing upon how we can think about all of these concrete and very real elements of existence involved in the rich spectrum of our affective, interpersonal and embodied experiences. Now Heidegger affirms that all of these elements of existence are intrinsically *temporal* and to understand this we need to explore his project of *Being and Time* (1928) in some more depth.

Heidegger's Hermeneutic Ontology

Heidegger opens his foundational work *Being and Time* (1928) by referring to the entire history of philosophy as a "forgetting" of the "question of Being". In talking about this "forgetting", Heidegger (1928) is referring to philosophical thought from Plato and Aristotle onwards but is also including the modern scientific disciplines that emerged out of metaphysics in the seventeenth century and subsequent humanistic disciplines such as psychology and anthropology. Heidegger's project begins with an attempt to recover this "question of Being"—find an opening or a clearing in which to think about Being again. This will require a methodology of interpretation, a hermeneutic method, which will involve partly reading what has become omitted or hidden in philosophical discourse (but somehow remained implicit to it) in order to reveal it and allow it to be openly apprehended. The other element of his method of approaching the "question of Being" for Heidegger will be *phenomenological* insofar as it concentrates on what is experientially immediate and apparently self-evident to all of us. It is governed by phenomenology's principle of principles - the principle of presence and of the presence in self-presence, such as it is manifested in the Being that we ourselves are (our experience of what seems self-evident including our self awareness or self-consciousness). It is this proximity of Being to itself, and our questioning of Being to our own Being, that intervenes in Heidegger's choice or deduction of the exemplary form of Being for his

analysis—what he calls *Dasein* (literally "being there"). Heidegger's point is that we who are close to ourselves, we interrogate ourselves about the meaning of Being. This interrogation, as a process of interpretation, occurs within this "hermeneutic circle of Being".

To explain what is important about this notion of a "hermeneutic circle" I could refer to moments when Heidegger (1929) links this starting point for interpreting Being with the Kantian origins of an attempt to instigate a "Copernican Revolution" in metaphysics. This revolution relates to a reversal of the common-sense view of the subject-object distinction, specifically regarding the knowing subject and the object known. Just because it locates the ground of any knowledge of any object within the knowing subject, Kant's revolution represents, as Heidegger recognized, the first serious attack on the traditional Platonic-Aristotelian approach to insight into the nature of things by focussing on that which needs to be known (the objects themselves or "things in themselves"). For Kant, in contrast to the Aristotelian tradition, thought does not know the thing itself without any intermediary: thought merely interprets what sense-intuition "reports". The concept is not "necessarily in conformity with its object"; in fact, the Copernican Revolution proclaims the reverse: it is the object that, to be known, must conform to the knowing requirements of the knower – for Kant, the transcendental categories. These transcendental conditions govern the synthesizing operation of our immediate apprehensions and our pure concepts - they, in a way, permit existent things to be recognized. The "beyond" of this knowing, the *noumenal*, is unknowable. Kant thus brought us to the point where the ground of the presence or absence of an object in knowledge is to be seen within the nature of the knower. He has thus created the possibility of a new form of enquiry - namely, "the metaphysics of the subject". Heidegger's approach would be, then, that the invocation of transcendental laws regarding the how-and-what we can know concerns precisely the condition and nature of being - and moreover, the meaning of "Being" and the copula "is" in themselves. This, of course, is precisely the original motivation and orientation for Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" (the hermeneutic and phenomenological enquiry into the Question of Being). It is not the place to explore the relationship between Kant's transcendental philosophy and Heidegger's fundamental ontology any further so much as to point out that for Heidegger the hermeneutic circle simultaneously refers to self-understanding (the phenomenology of self-interpretation) and philosophical understanding (interpreting Being evolving through the history of philosophy). Both relate to thinking about Being through interpretation and approaching this through what is present phenomenologically and not objectively. For Heidegger, phenomenological interpretation is descriptive and opens a space to make thinking possible: it is about *potentiality*.

Heidegger's own revolution, then, is to re-situate and broaden out our notions of understanding and interpretation beyond them being, simply, methods of reading or procedures of critical reflection. Understanding and interpretation *become* modes of being: the universal, pre-reflective mode in which we conduct ourselves in the world is itself of a *hermeneutic* nature. The world is familiar to us through basic, intuitive ways of going about things, where tacit and intuitive approaches, pragmatic forms of know-how, predominate. Most originally, Heidegger argues, we do not begin by understanding the world simply through the acquisition of objective facts, algorithms or representational knowledge from which we can establish or derive universal propositions, laws, or judgments that, to a greater or lesser extent, correspond to the world. The world is already implicitly intelligible to us, familiar to us, something with which we are at home. Explicit

understanding and interpretation follow this, or co-exist with this. The hermeneutic circle of interpretation, then, refers to the interplay between our self-understanding and our understanding the world. Hermeneutics now deals with the meaning, or limits and lack of meaning in our own lives. This begins with individuals and their own situation, or situatedness.

Heidegger on Temporality

Arguably the most significant element of his existential analysis relates to the embeddedness of any form of behaviour or action within the situatedness of worldhood involving time and temporality. Importantly, *Dasein* is formally characterized by Heidegger as having that fundamental self-relation—that "comporting itself to its own Being"—which, above being directed towards and absorbed in any specific worldly activity or goal in the way I have discussed, is ruled by an inherent and intrinsic "directedness" of its own. This manifests itself in any the specific activities we engage in. Put loosely this unifying "directedness" in *Dasein* is referred to by Heidegger as the "Care Structure": the fact that *Dasein* intrinsically has "concern" in its existence, no matter what this concern may be for, in its dealings and comportments. At the heart of this is the notion of "Temporality" Heidegger later introduces in *Being and Time*, as well as that of "Ontological Difference" which Heidegger introduces in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1982) around that concept of Temporality.

Through these notions, Heidegger wants to assert that *Dasein* is not "in time" like other things in its world are. For we are not simply in a "present" which is as a function of its "past", on the way to a "future" which will come to be as a function of that "past and present". Rather, our existence is uniquely led by its "future" - a "future" which is, in effect, guiding, pulling or directing the present in a particular direction out of its past. Specifically, when we are absorbedly coping with a particular task this "future-driven" quality, or "future-directedness", manifests itself in an ability of *Entwurf* (Projection) which allows a form of *Umsicht* (practical circumspection) to lead it through specific tasks and more broadly how it goes about anything. This overall directedness is seen by Heidegger to be the unifying aspect of all of our concerns in the world. In this way, *Dasein*'s Being has a unifying "Care Structure" which makes it a "perpetual coming to be" at any possible level. Such capacities as *Entwurf* and *Umsicht* are ineliminable and intuitive and not able to be nomologically understood. They cannot be built up from component abilities in some incremental way. They are not programmatic - understood in terms of explicit rules, algorithms, prototypes, formulae. The capacities are general, global, presiding, primordial. They are a base intuition. To understand that this is not just a simple assertion on Heidegger's behalf we must also carry through the formal structure that this concept exists within and in terms of. Heidegger has disclosed it through his hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of *Dasein's* way of Being within a greater ontological framework driven by a fundamental "Question of Being". This means that Heidegger is in no way making assertions about a type of traditional subjectivity conceived of as a "conscious subject" or "transcendental ego" or "human being or soul". *Entwurf* and *Umsicht*, here, only have an import insofar as they are ontological, within Heidegger's own analytic of the ontology of *Dasein*. This analytic, ultimately, was alluded to as extending to the notion of "Care" which offers a unifying structure to the being that is *Dasein*, understood within that horizon of Temporality that separates *Dasein* off, purportedly, from other beings by virtue of an "Ontological Difference" that resides in Being as a whole.

It only really needs to be noted here, that Heidegger attributes to *Dasein*'s understanding of the roles and identities to which it comports itself, a deep notion of evolution and historicity. Not only are they embedded within the ongoing complexity of *Dasein*'s own existence, but also the evolving history of the culture of *Dasein*. That is, their fluidity - their being adapted, changed, improved - is not only continuing throughout *Dasein*'s own ongoing existence, but has been evolving hitherto over the entire history of the culture of which *Dasein* is a part.

This ability is at the heart of what Heidegger calls *Dasein*'s "absorbed coping" with the world. Heidegger, invariably, gives it the formal name *Verstandnis*, or "Understanding", in the sense of the German verb *verstehen* - "to be competently able to", "to understand how to" (and not in the sense of an explicit "awareness" or "comprehension"). In this way, Heidegger is referring to this ability as an ability of insight - rather than an expert knowledge or a trained expertise. Furthermore, it must not be confused with any specific aptitude, competence or skill - a kind of "know-how" ability, such as being talented at shearing or motorcycle repair. Though *Verstandnis* certainly intervenes in any such activity, it is not, in any way, the specific skill, competence or capability itself. This is why, in some ways, Heidegger's constant discussions of artisan activities, such as "hammering", may have been a poorly chosen metaphor to link to *Verstandnis*. For it is only something that allows any possible activity to be performed in a flexible, adaptive and, most importantly, intelligent way.

Across sections 31-32, Heidegger (1928) links this general, abstract ability of *Verstandnis* with the abilities of *Sicht* ("sight") and *Entwurf* ("projection"). At my level of discussion, sight is identifiable with *Umsicht* ("practical circumspection"), the ability which presides over any activity and allows creative adjustments to be made - a flexible and open-ended approach to the activity that allows *Dasein* to adapt to any changes and novel circumstances that may arise - so that the activity may always be brought to completion - to fruition and the fulfilment of its goal. In terms of *Umsicht* being characteristic of *Verstandnis*, it involves no will towards a concrete conceptualisation of the end-product or end-point of the activity – vis-à-vis a formal "blueprint", image or discursive plan of the completed activity; but, rather, it involves an intuitive "working understanding" of the way the activity is "progressing" towards a completeness - and the way this progression can be further aided, or left unhampered and uninhibited, as opportunities knock or obstacles present themselves.

And it is the process that operates when this intuitive *Umsicht* works its way through activities that Heidegger entitles *Entwurf*. This *Entwurf*, ultimately, is what *Dasein* is conscious of as its overall goal - it is what allows *Dasein* to see in its current situation and circumstances a manifestation of what is progressing toward that goal. In this way, the goal is only ever explicitly known as a "rough sketch" or "intuitive notion" of what is otherwise just appropriately "seen" as something which must be projected towards - something that must be achieved through acting upon what is currently given. When *Dasein* judges that nothing else needs to be done, then the activity has been completed - the goal, previously nothing more than a "towards which", has been attained. Any consciousness or declaration of an explicit goal is only derivative to the underlying "projection" of the "towards which" upon the current circumstances, situation and "predicament" manifesting themselves to *Dasein* in the environment of the activity. They, in a sense, are only ever ontically derived from the preontological "absorbed coping" that is already active.

This ontological approach to *Dasein*'s mode of being - *Existenz* - then, offers us a new way of looking at traditional concepts such as "subject" and "object", "consciousness", "ego", "soul" as well as, ultimately, "being". Importantly, *Dasein* is formally characterized by Heidegger as having that fundamental self-relation - that "comporting itself to its own Being" - which, above being directed towards and absorbed in any specific worldly activity or goal in the way I have discussed, is ruled by an inherent and intrinsic "directedness" of its own. This manifests itself in any more specific directedness *Dasein* comports itself towards, whether in the world, to other *Dasein*s in the world, or to itself. Although I cannot really elaborate upon this any more, this unifying "directedness" in *Dasein* is known simply by Heidegger as the "Care Structure": the fact that *Dasein* intrinsically has "concern" in its existence, no matter what this concern may be for, in its dealings and comportments.

In the second division of *Being and Time* (1928) Heidegger does establish the broadest context for the Care structure around *Dasein* reaching its potentiality for being in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity not only in relation to finite origins of thrownness (one's immediate concerns within a contingent, factical, limited background and context) but also in relation to the unsurpassable horizon of death. Heidegger characterizes death as non-relational, and being-towards-death as, thus, seeming to represent an individual, non-relational existential horizon. *Dasein* can authentically exist within this horizon or can inauthentically flee from this horizon by an immersion in public anonymity, what he refers to as *das Man* or "the They". At the same time, Heidegger does also characterize an authentic form of Care of others, or being-with-others when he describes solicitude: Dasein's capacity to leap ahead (*vorspringen*) of the Other and assist in a return to authentic being in the world, a return to a realisation of potentiality for being. In outlining the concepts of being-towards-death and solicitude Heidegger opens his analysis of temporality into the existential fields of mortality and communal life.

Tentative Affinities between the Thought of Heidegger and Freud on Time

Heidegger and Freud share a philosophical heritage in which Kant's "metaphysics of the subject" and the subsequent developments of neo-Kantian and Hegelian thought were met by Nietzsche's nihilistic ideas about the various challenges posed to self-interpretation by unconscious motivations and forms of illusion and self-deception. Both Heidegger and Freud developed approaches to interpretation that paid close attention to reading or interpreting symptomatically what is omitted, hidden, implicit, forgotten or repressed. After Nietzsche, this sensitivity to what is absent, what needs to be revealed, disclosed or brought to light, is also an "historical" sensitivity: for Heidegger, there is an historical narrative of the forgetting of the question of Being and this narrative within the history of philosophy correlates with his hermeneutic exploration of *Dasein's* own tendencies to immerse or become purposefully absorbed in its environment (*Umwelt*) working towards various goals and projects (*Entwurfen*), often not mindful of the existential context into which we have been thrown (our "thrownness" or *Geworfenheit*) and its horizons (death, our own facticity or what Heidegger would term our *historicity*). Heidegger would hold that this mode of being in the world conceals or omits a sense of the Being that is immanent and implicit to our going about things but not understood in any explicit way. Furthermore Heidegger would refer to the initial tendency for ourselves (*qua Dasein*) to understand ourselves and the world as falling into the terms of objective presence (what he calls "ontical" understanding), seeing ourselves as the objective entities that we are in

the objective world in which we exist. This form of "ontical" understanding entails all of the possible technical and scientific elaborations of understanding self and the world as objective entities and is aligned with the philosophical tradition of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics which understands the world in terms of objective presence. Part of Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* was to elucidate that this forgetting of Being philosophically also entails a distortion in the understanding of time. Put simply time may be officially and scientifically understood as an unfolding of successive objectively present moments in a linear sequence of past, present and future, something that is different, Heidegger will hold, to his phenomenological description of time he will attempt to arrive at in *Being and Time*. This is representative of the forgetting of the temporal nature of Being. A primary role of interpretation in Heidegger's ontology will be to open up a space in which this Being can be thought, revealing the hidden and undisclosed nature of the temporality of Being. As I have shown, fundamental to this understanding is a conception of the phenomenological or existential structure of temporality, Care (*Sorge*) which is based in *Dasein*'s *thrownness* (historicity, factical context), *projection* (being towards) and how this is involved in its present concern for its world within a broader horizon of solicitude and being-towards-death.

We can think of an analogous type of understanding of what is hidden and what becomes disclosed or revealed when we think of Freud's approach to the interpretation of neurotic symptoms. Neurotic symptoms have an historical nature understood in terms of a theory of infantile sexuality and modes of fixation, repression and regression occurring within the delayed action of unconscious memory. This historical nature is akin to thrownness insofar as it acts on the present and projects itself (and I mean this both in a temporal sense and a Freudian sense) into current activity including the transferential enactments and the remembering, repeating and working through in the analytic session. This hidden form of temporality (unconscious memory, conflict, transference) is counterposed with the more regulated, official, objective time of the analytic session in the analytic work and an objective sense of what is the past and what is the present. The analytic work, interpretive work, makes historical links and the nature of this interpretive work, *working in time*, and working with the *historical unconscious*, is what is of interest here.

Freud and the Temporality of the Unconscious

This idea of an historical Unconscious is problematic because, for Freud, the unconscious is also often referred to as timeless. We may be familiar with many moments in which Freud refers to the unconscious as "timeless". For example, in his (1915) article "The Unconscious" which appears in his papers on metapsychology, he states:

> The processes of the system *Ucs.* are *timeless*; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are
>
> not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to
>
> time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system *Cs* (p. 186).

Elsewhere in the paper he does refers to the relational and temporal aspects of the unconscious:

It is a very remarkable thing that the UCs. of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the Cs….descriptively speaking the fact is incontestable (p. 193).

And:

the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very

considerable periods of time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically

unconscious. When all our latent memories are taken into consideration it becomes

totally incomprehensible how the existence of the unconscious can be denied (p. 171).

Here, we are looking at a particular site in Freud's topographical writings where an issue appears that re-emerges in many situations in Freud's work: how atemporal unconscious elements (drives, motivations, conflicts) are influenced by memory; how the Unconscious acts as a system of memory; and how the Unconscious operates relationally as opposed to intrapsychically. One further implication of this relates to how, after Freud renounces his own Seduction Theory, within his conceptualizations of the intrapsychic and unconscious basis of neurotic conflict, any conflict or impact introduced by *actual* or *real* past traumatic events operates psychopathologically.

At this level, we need to elucidate the ways in which memory *acts upon* the present, and how, simultaneously, the present (interpretation, working through) acts upon the past via memory. Memory, here, can become a bidirectional constructive or representative process.

If we place these issues in the context of an attempt to understand the manner in which the Freudian analyst understands the historicity of the analysand and the unconscious work they undertake, we can begin to see how tensions arise when we attempt to understand the temporal or historical nature of the interpretations made: do the interpretations make causative links which relate different forms of objective presence (worldly or intrapsychic events), or do they uncomfortably cross a boundary between the objective presence of worldly objective events and an atemporal intrapsychic realm which is either understood in itself as an objectively present "psychic apparatus" (of drives, instincts) or simply a realm of interpretation (of symbolic primary processes).

The hermeneutic exercise of interpreting the exploration and use of temporal concepts in Freud's works, ultimately, is a difficult and complex one: there is no single work which elaborates upon a theoretical formulation of time, and Freud adopts varying and sometimes contradictory elaborations of notions of history, memory and temporality as

his project developed over thirty to forty years, and arguably as an open, transforming and sometimes unresolved set of theoretical, clinical ideas within psychoanalysis and beyond in realms such as anthropology, theology and aesthetics. Fortunately, a psychoanalytic theorist, with some philosophical literacy, André Green, conducted this form of hermeneutic project to enable us to make further links between Freud's thinking of time, and Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology. I will now explore this as a means of establishing some of these links that will become useful when I come to contemplate developmental and clinical time in the accompanying article.

Green, Nachträglichkeit *and Fragmented Time*

In the work *Time in Psychoanalysis* (2002) and related papers, Green attempts to extract Freud's thinking about time, memory and working through across the course of Freud's works (pre-psychoanalytic, Structural, Topographic) to extract and map out a psychoanalytic theory of time steeped in Freudian origins. A central concept of Freud's that he focuses upon is *Nachträglichkeit* which is often translated into English as deferred action and into French as *après-coup*. Green emphasizes that these translations do not emphasize the bidirectional nature of time that is captured in this concept: memory or past experience can remain suspended in conflict, fixation, repression or disavowal, so that any action on psychic life can be re-appear at a later time with a form of deferred action; but, conversely, a current experience can trigger a movement backwards in time, a regression which returns retroactively to the past state, reintroducing the necessity of its action and the possibility of working through by another means. And so, the bidirectional nature always refers to both a delayed effect and the related reconstruction, or working through of it…to this, Green (2002, p. 41) adopts a pun around the word *re-presentation*, capturing the idea of a deferred return, and a new reconstruction. I will emphasize this notion of *re-presentation* to capture Green's rediscovery of the bidirectional action of *Nachträglichkeit* as an active and constructive form of memory.

Green (2002, pp. 9-21) shows how this bidirectional action of time, appeared from the beginning and throughout Freud's writings but that this manifests in different renderings of temporality which seem to co-exist, whereby he concludes that time for Freud is *heterochronic* or *fragmented*. Freud's psychosexual theories, for example in *The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), uphold a theory of sexual development that is sequential, linear and progressive, but that elements of time in this theory are bidirectional: it involves sexual diphasism where unresolved elements of infantile sexuality are repressed and *re-present* in puberty and adulthood to be worked through, entailing bidirectional elements of fixation and deferred action as well as regression. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1910) refers to the pure present of the unconscious psychic dream space and the manner in which primary processes work upon unconscious memory traces, *re-present* them, where the dream is a form of phantastic memory construction, analogous to screen memory: the bidirectional nature of psychic life is the move. In the landmark paper *Remembering, Repeating and Working Through* (1914) Freud introduces a focus upon repetition and enactment: what cannot be represented (or remembered in the sense of a conscious, constructive act), continues to repeat itself (re-present, in the sense of enactment as a more primitive form of action memory), and this process manifests in the psychoanalytic setting with transferential enactment. This is extended when Freud, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) develops the concept of repetition compulsion as a manifestation of the death instinct, and Green argues, of all drives or instincts. In fact, with the Id supplanting the unconscious in this latter phase of Freud's writings (not

replacing it, for the structural and topographic models by no means intertranslate or substitute for one another), both unconscious atemporal drives, and traces of experience, somehow exist within non-psychic space through which ego function has as its role to bind and represent these aspects of the Id. Green (2002) also highlights the significance of *Mourning and Melancholia*, where Freud differentiates between mourning and melancholia through a more articulated theory of intrapsychic object relations, which can be the site of forms of pathological memory. This links object relations to another form of *re-presentation*. He also refers to socio-cultural memory, primal fantasy (the Freud of *Totem and Taboo* and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego)* having bidirectional quality.

I would add that Freud (in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle)* uses the term *Bindung* (translated as binding) to explain these ego processes and the phenomenon of repetition compulsion. *Bindung* also refers to a process in which psychic trauma, seen as an extensive breach of the ego's boundaries, is compulsively repeated in symbolic activity (one recalls his discussion of the *Fort-Da* game). And finally, there is a later notion of Binding (such as it appears in *An Outline of Psychoanalysis)* as one of the major characteristics of Eros and the life instincts—the move to self-preservation, ego integrity and self-unity, as opposed to the destructive, degenerative, fragmentation of the death instinct (*Entbindung*). I introduce these versions of Freudian *Bindung* because they refer to movements toward consciousness formation, ego integrity, self unity, and later the self-preserving instinct to compulsively work through trauma via unconsciously driven symbolic relational enactments to re-establish integrity and unity. These forms of *Bindung* are forms of *re-presentation*, action and integration that are temporal, in Green's sense of bidirectional time, and link to self-function or ego function. Interestingly, when using these later conceptualizations of *Bindung* Freud does not return to explore the question of unconscious time. For example, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* he states:

> At this point I shall venture to touch for a moment upon a subject which would merit
>
> the most exhaustive treatment. As a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we
>
> are to-day in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and
>
> space are 'necessary forms of thought'. We have learnt that unconscious mental
>
> processes are in themselves 'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not
>
> ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of
>
> time cannot be applied to them. These are negative characteristics which can only be
>
> clearly understood if a comparison is made with *conscious* mental processes (p. 28).

We see here that in this re-assertion of a timeless unconscious Freud simultaneously turns to the requirement of directing more attention toward an understanding of conscious mental processes, the integrity and functioning of the ego. Here we have something of a critical juncture in Freud's elaboration of his metapsychology which I will not develop

too much here: there is one movement in Freud's later work which focuses on the centrality of ego function and would no doubt be later adopted by the Ego Psychology schools; the other movement focussing on the death instinct (*entbindung*) in its necessary relationship with the life instincts. What is paradoxical about death is that as we have seen with the early Heidegger it may represent an ultimate horizon of non-relational, non-temporal individualization but within the existential context, it is something that is projected towards, it forms a *temporal* horizon. With regard to this latter movement, I would comment though that we see death figuring as a temporal concept in Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* as being-towards-death, projecting towards death, finding its individual authenticity in this relation to death. Extending this, there is room to analyse the creative potential of the Freudian death instinct and this may fit within the problematic of the absence of temporality in the Freudian Unconscious.

In all of this, Green (2002) uses *Nachträglichkeit* as a bridging concept for what he sees as a heterochronous, fragmented temporality, with an analogous history in the analysand:

Freud's heritage leaves us with an uncompleted task and we know only too well that

he was constantly re-working history in all its forms. For history, he believed, could

not be reduced to what is left behind in the form of visible traces (accessible to

consciousness) nor to that of which traumas conserve the memory. There is not one

history (great or small), but *several* histories within the spheres of the individual,

culture and the species, which are interrelated, interwoven, overlapping and sometimes

opposed – each living according to its own rhythm and its own time….And rather than

giving up and opting for the simplest solution – a strictly ontogenetic point of view –

we should have the courage to do justice to this complexity, attempting to gather in the

scattered threads of this web in order to bring together the multiple figures of time

(p. 27).

This analysis has been pursued to extend notions of temporality from the foundations of Heideggerian hermeneutic ontology to a point that we can begin to think about developmental and clinical time beyond the beginnings of conceptualizations of thrownness, Care, *Sicht, Entwurfen* and being-towards-death. Green's (2002) analysis shows us that in the complex and open system of Freud's works, memory processes, as *re-presentations*, are complex and heterogonous (enactment, narrative memory, screen memory, dream work, intrapsychic object relations, primal fantasy and myth) due to the heterochronicity of time. What underpins this is a complex, heterogonous, and to Freud, timeless, field of unconscious traces, drives, instincts, processes or, relatedly, *Id*. This could be considered, in Heideggerian terms, to be an ontological field never separable

from a *hermeneutic* horizon. Freud goes so far as to elaborate ego and binding processes that relate to memory work and *re-presentation* and Green states that although experience, finally, is heterochronous and heterogonous, ego or self function pursues cohesion, binding and meaning to constitute itself. This is work *in time*, although there is a double forgetting of time: "The unconscious is unaware of time *but consciousness does not know that the unconscious is unaware of time*" (p. 37). Ironically, his thinking of time, as Green (2002) has established it from Freud's work, itself has a bidirectional nature to it: Green is retroactively establishing a meaning and cohesion in Freud's work around time, where there wasn't one.

For Heidegger, the Freudian *Id* and unconscious would be incoherent or aporetic concepts with metaphysical underpinnings, if not thought of in terms of forgetting, a pre-Ontological background, a limit or a horizon. It is not inconsistent with a hermeneutic ontological orientation to think of personal time (and then developmental and clinical time) in terms of traces and *re-presentations*, within a broader perspective of Care, projection, futurity and *being-towards-death*. In this way, both the past and the future collapse within bidirectionality, where Being is a process of *becoming*, and the past is seen in terms of elements of potentiation and *Nachträglichkeit* as *re-presentation*.

Derrida, Nachträglichkeit and Différance

Freudian *Nachträglichkeit* (and along with it *Verspätung* or delay/deferral) played a significant role in the development of Derrida's ideas, appearing in a lecture entitled 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' at a time where Derrida is introducing a key deconstructive analysis of the suppression of writing in the metaphysical tradition which favours a metaphysics of presence, immediacy and speech, such as he had taken it up in the essays published in *De la Grammatologie* in 1967.

Derrida is interested in the fact that with the Freudian concepts of *Nachträglichkeit* and *Verspätung* there is an apprehension of time that is characterized by belatedness and that there is consequently no pure and simple present. Derrida questions the notion of presence and self-presence and looks subsequently into the opposition between the conscious and the unconscious in Freud, showing how Freud subverts it. According to Derrida, there does not exist in Freud an Unconscious that would be situated in a precise place and would belong to a definite time, an Unconscious that would have to be retranscribed in another place and another time (the conscious). The past is contained in the present. And Derrida (1978) makes reference to this Freudian basis in *Writing and Difference*:

> That the present in general is not primal but, rather, reconstituted, that it is not the absolute, wholly living form which constitutes experience, that there is no purity of the living present – such is the theme, formidable for metaphysics, which Freud, in a conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself, would have us pursue (p. 266).

All these considerations will open the way to Derrida's concept of *différance*, which are, Derrida writes, "the Freudian concept of trace must be radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retains it."

In the context of his deconstructive analysis, Derrida is interested in the fact that Freud relies upon the metaphor of a writing machine to represent the functioning of the psyche. In the 1925 text "Note on the Mystic Writing-Pad" Freud seizes upon the metaphor of a children's toy writing machine, the *Wunderblock* (the Mystic Writing-Pad) to describe the functioning of the psychic apparatus in terms of the production of a permanent trace in memory whilst maintaining ongoing, indefinite capacity to receive new stimulation or percepts. In practical terms, the Mystic Writing-Pad is a device constituted of a slab of wax covered with a transparent sheet made of two layers: a transparent celluloid sheet (used as a protection) and a sheet of thin translucent waxed paper. To write, one uses a pointed stylus with which one scratches the surface and which forms grooves, which with the sheet in contact, form visible traces. To wipe off or erase these traces, one lifts the transparent sheet and the contact is interrupted. The traces remain in the slab, but the paper and celluloid sheet are again clear to be re-inscribed. Freud saw this as an ideal metaphor for the limitless reception of conscious perception, and the capacity of indefinite preservation in the unconscious that can be inscribed behind perception with indelible memory traces.

In the essay "Freud and the Scene of Writing", Derrida (1972a) notes Freud's reliance upon technological writing metaphors when he attempts to describe the action of unconscious memory. Derrida (1972a) analyses Freud's use of the "mystic writing pad" as a means of explaining unconscious memory as trace/inscription. Derrida (1972a) points to Freud's failure to recognize the existence of more sophisticated archiving technologies to use metaphorically, as well as Freud's lack of awareness of and reliance upon such technological metaphors of description. Derrida (1972a) argues that this device is used metaphorically as a supplementary machine. In loose Derridean terms, a supplement is something that, allegedly secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to something 'original' or 'natural'. Supplement has a double meaning here: it is not only secondary as a stand-in, a signifier or a representative; it also adds to and modifies.

In Derrida's deconstructive terms, the originary form that is favoured (presence, speech, essence, the natural) may indeed always be dependent upon, or altered by the supplement. In the various pieces where Derrida (1978, 1987, 1998) analyses Freud's work, a core theme is the supplementary representation of the unconscious, and unconscious memory in particular, where all manner of technological metaphors are adopted. As described earlier, a central theme in Derrida's analysis will always relate to a key Derridean concept: that of *différance*. *Différance* is a neologism which simultaneously refers to "differing" and "deferral". It can describe the production of meaning through such metaphors: firstly (relating to deferral) there is the notion that metaphors will never fully summon forth what they mean, but can only be defined through appeal to additional signs, words or metaphors, from which they differ. Thus, meaning is forever "deferred" or postponed through an endless chain of signification.

In a lecture subsequent to "Freud and the Scene of Writing", "La différance*"*, Derrida (1972b) makes links between *Nachträglichkeit* and his own concept of *différance*, which has two meanings; the first refers to the determining functions of *Nachträglichkeit,* namely, time and deferral, the second, to difference as differentiality. Now, Derrida here

recognizes that the notion of *Nachträglichkeit* has enabled him to unfold a philosophy of the future and not of the past, dialectics or synthesis. He writes:

> This structure of deferral (*Nachträglichkeit*) forbids us . . . to consider temporalisation
>
> (temporisation) as a simple dialectical complication of the living present, an original
>
> and unceasing synthesis (constantly returned to itself, assembled on itself, assembling)
>
> of retentional traces and protentional openings (p. 21).

Deferral is adding, supplementing meaning, constituting the present as a form of delay beyond or different to apparently immediate temporal present that is illusory. Derrida argues that this demonstrates that writing unfolds in a discontinuous time where unconscious traces remain and can have a deferred action or presence at any time, but the originary nature of those traces, and of temporal presence, is only ever understood supplementarily, in the play of *différance*.

Conclusion

In all of this, we have arrived at a thinking of time, via Freud's oeuvre, in which *Nachträglichkeit*, *re-presentation*, heterochronicity and, finally, *différance*, can be seen to relate to a hermeneutic ontological orientation, extending Heideggerian concepts of Care, *Umsicht*, *Entwurfen* and being-towards-death, to permit a fuller understanding of historicity and potentiality that will be extended in the accompanying article when we consider developmental and clinical time.

Ultimately, Heidegger has described the temporality of existence in terms of its futurity, its embeddedness in tasks, goals and projects in which there is an intuitive understanding of process and outcomes that often defies explicit definition or representation in an objective or algorithmic sense. This temporal trajectory of existence fits within the broader horizon of mortality, worldhood and sociality from which we can only, in a derivative and secondary sense, extract ourselves to theorise or conceptualise ourselves as timeless, separate, knowable individuals. In this context, Green has ably developed Freudian psychoanalytic theory to uphold the complexity of development and background, the double action of the repetition of past in the present and the present reconstruction of the past in therapeutic work. Here, the historical or temporal unconscious background is an active field of both of the psychopathology and of potentiation in the patient's therapeutic future. And Derrida has upheld the idea that the unconscious field or background is ineliminable, always to an extent beyond our understanding and always reduced or inextricably altered through our use of technical metaphors of interpretation.

With these ideas about temporality in mind, we can now proceed to a further consideration of developmental time and the temporal field of psychotherapy. In the accompanying article, I will advance a discussion on this topic, focussing, in particular, on so-called "borderline" conditions.

Biographical Note

Paul Cammell is a psychiatrist, academic and psychoanalytic psychotherapist who originally trained in philosophy, and is affiliated with Flinders Medical Centre and Flinders University, South Australia as a senior psychiatrist and senior lecturer. He has recently been a Visiting Fellow at the Personality Studies Institute, Cornell University, New York. He is currently the Chair of the psychotherapy training committee of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatry.

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Temporality 2: The relevance of the Heideggerian concept of time to the treatment of borderline conditions

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Abstract

In this article I attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the philosophy of time to psychiatric, psychological and psychoanalytic theories of development and therapeutic action. In an accompanying article I established a range of relevant temporal concepts, emerging from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, with links made to Freudian concepts of time, in particular *Nachträglichkeit*, developed in the writings of psychoanalyst André Green and philosopher Jacques Derrida. In this article I proceed to explore this philosophy of time through a consideration of the developmental theories and clinical approaches of Donald Winnicott, Jean Laplanche, André Green and Hans Loewald. I conclude by establishing that the *temporalizing* function of therapeutic action can be seen to be a core or essential element of work with patients presenting with so-called borderline conditions. I demonstrate how a range of problems or ambiguities that coalesce around this condition (including dissociation, traumatization, self harm and brief reactive psychosis) can be understood in *temporal* terms.

Introduction

During therapeutic dialogue and interaction, both patient and clinicians are drawn to look back at questions of origin, cause and developmental formulation, at the same time as look forward to a future in terms of progress, outcome, resolution and so forth. In this article, I will seek to explore how a Heideggerian conceptualization of temporality can inform us about these notions of understanding *time* in terms of developmental origins and working with time in the clinic. I will draw particular reference to the understanding and treatment of borderline conditions. I have chosen this field of clinical work because, I will argue, the "borderline" concept as it is adopted in notions of "borderline phenomena", "borderline personality organization" and "borderline personality disorder", is ambiguous and problematic for the clinician because the prevailing theories of psychopathology that adopt it are excessively individualistic, categorical, intrapsychic and *atemporal*. I will begin by contextualising the "borderline" concept in terms of very specific cultural and historical determinants, and then attempt to describe developmental

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origins and clinical approaches that are fundamentally temporal, and relate to the Heideggerian philosophical orientation I have elucidated.

In the previous article I arrived at a thinking of time that began with Heidegger's hermeneutic ontological orientation, where I elucidated concepts of Care, *Geworfenheit* (thrownness), *Entwurfen* (project) *Umsicht* (sight or practical circumspection) and being-towards-death before extending this thinking via Green's and Derrida's reading of Freud's oeuvre, in which *Nachträglichkeit, re-presentation*, bidirectional time, heterochronicity and, finally, *différance*, could be seen to permit a fuller understanding of historicity, facticity and potentiality that arguably remained consistent with the Heideggerian orientation.

We saw that Heidegger described the temporality of existence in terms of its futurity, its embeddedness in projects in which there is an intuitive understanding of motivation and purpose, the goals of which often defy explicit definition or representation in an objective or algorithmic sense. This temporal trajectory of existence fits within the broader horizon of mortality, worldhood and sociality from which we can only, in a derivative and secondary sense, extract ourselves to theorise or conceptualise our-selves as timeless, separate, knowable individuals. We saw that Green developed ideas about time in Freudian psychoanalytic theory to uphold the complexity of development and background, the double action of the repetition of past in the present and the present reconstruction of the past in therapeutic work. Here, the historical or temporal unconscious background is an active field of both of the psychopathology and of potentiation in the patient's therapeutic future. And then we saw that Derrida's deconstructive analysis of Freudian time showed that the unconscious field or background that is worked with therapeutically is ineliminable, always to an extent beyond us and always reduced or inextricably altered through our use of technical metaphors of interpretation.

In this article I will firstly attempt to explore *developmental* notions of temporality further, where the conceptualizations of Jean Laplanche (otherness and the enigmatic signifier) and Donald Winnicott (unintegration and disintegration) introduce fundamentally *temporal* notions of developmental origins and temporality. These notions will be seen to be in a sense originary or foundational limits that pervade infantile, child and adult experience, and will thus be relevant to the clinical approach to time and temporality in the final part of this article, where a developmental orientation will be maintained and extended. This clinical approach will explore issues that seem to coalesce around so-called borderline conditions, including issues of "trauma", "abuse", "dissociation", "self harm", "suicidality", "impulsivity" and "somatization".

The borderline concept has arisen with unstable, shifting meanings in the past 50 years. I have argued elsewhere (Cammell, 2014) that the borderline concept has necessarily arisen in our modern context as a simultaneously marginal and pervasive limit concept that exposes or challenges the limits of many of the contemporary schools of psychoanalytic, psychological and psychiatric theory and clinical practice. Clinically, there is the possibility that there is an open and heterogeneous range of experiences that become transformed behaviourally into a uniform and identifiable "borderline syndrome" (even if this varies subtly in type from practitioner to practitioner or model to model) when the "borderline individual" comes to interact with the modern clinical setting. Thus, at an individual and a contemporary cultural level many extreme and enduring problems

at the margins of experience, some related to aspects of gender difference, sexuality, aggression, and social disruption, may present under the guise of the "borderline" diagnosis.

Wirth-Cauchon (2001), for example, argues that the borderline construct situates itself within conflicts around gender and sexual difference, taking over from hysteria which was a related limit concept in the Victorian era. In the age of hysteria, the hysteric may have appeared out of the dynamics of the inability to express the unthinkable, the will to implicit silencing, the action of taboo, privacy and secret. In the "borderline" era, the borderline may be a fragmented, chaotic expression of the limits of our permissivism, the after-effects of our openness to explicitness (sexual, violent, graphic) and the collision of our high ambitions for individualism (individual rights and responsibilities) with frank problems of neglect, omission and maltreatment seen in the formative course of individuals' lives. The borderline individual's experience is constructed from within a symbiotic relationship with the clinical and cultural elements of the organization of self experience. These individual and cultural elements reflect the terrain of the failed reach of our civility in terms of the purported control of the law and human services. This is the terrain of the brutal, the savage, the rough, the bad and inhumane ways we treat each other, our children, a terrain which is then related to by means of clinical sterilization, *clinicalization*, *medicalization or technologization*. Here, therapies could be seen as forms of (substitutive) care and in pursuing such forms of care, there is a risk of dehumanization, stigmatization and disenfranchisement of the individual. In contrast to this, I would want to articulate a therapeutic stance in which the therapist is aware of their complicity in the creation of the borderline diagnosis or identity, and maintains something of a knowing and critical stance toward it in their interactions and relationships with individuals designated as "borderline". The position of the therapist is to respect the uniqueness, complexity, autonomy, and "otherness" of the person presenting for therapeutic work. And in what follows, I will seek to establish that this stance can be best established through an awareness of and sensitivity to the types of temporal issues I will elucidate. To begin, then, I will first explore *developmental* notions of temporality further, where the conceptualizations of Jean Laplanche and Donald Winnicott introduce fundamentally *temporal* notions of developmental origins for any individual.

Laplanche: Nachträglichkeit, Translation, the Enigmatic Signifier and the Theory of General Seduction in Development

One of the central themes in Laplanche's (1987, 1990, 1992) writings is his attempt to retrieve elements of Freud's early writings about traumatic seduction and expand these into a general theory of seduction where seduction is seen as foundational and universal in the development of the unconscious. As such, Laplanche is attempting to overcome the rupture in Freud's work following his abandonment of the seduction theory by universalizing the processes of seduction and sexualisation (as a form of traumatic process). This is something that will become relevant to the clinical discussion below, when concepts of abuse and trauma are analysed critically. In his theory, Laplanche suggests that repression is a "failure of translation", occurring because of the asymmetry between the child and caring adult. In the transactions between adult and child, there is a surplus (of meaning or understanding) which is nevertheless retained by the child, where repression is a form of implantation and deferral. This surplus originating from the adult can be conscious or unconscious, but for the infant or child the remnants or traces are

very much residually unconscious but reappear, in need of translation. Laplanche (1987, 1990, 1992) refers to these remnants as enigmatic signifiers or messages, the unconscious representing a surplus of untranslated communication.

For Laplanche, the small child is dependent upon the care of the adult, and has limited capacity to communicate, reliant upon the attentive, receptive and projective capacities of the carer. For the child, the primitive communication received by the carer is related to survival, adjustment and adaptation; whereas from the carer, usually the maternal figure, there is a surplus of communication, verbally and non-verbally, consciously and unconsciously, where other key elements are present such as the sexual and love components of the carer's communication (the erotics of breastfeeding and physical nurturance, the love component of maternal investment and care) that the small child passively receives. Laplanche argues that at the broadest level this is a form of primal seduction.

Thus, Laplanche's project is to formulate a generalized theory of primal seduction which is cast in terms of foreign, enigmatic elements that the child is universally exposed to, beyond the more narrow focus of the abused child or the perverse patient, that were Freud's more specific psychopathological foci and beyond a normative sequence of psychosexual development where there is an interrelationship between sexual drive/excitement and self-preservative biological needs cast in a normative, intrapsychic development sequence. Laplanche would argue that Freud's radical discovery of infantile sexuality omits the relational components of otherness and differentiality at a primal or foundational level (presuming these emerge more significantly later in Freud's Oedipal complex). Seduction, as such, is no longer an aberrant or "abusive" event, but a universal, primal one:

I am, then, using the term primal seduction to describe a fundamental situation in which an adult proffers to a child verbal, nonverbal and even behavioural signifiers which are pregnant with unconscious sexual significations (1987, p. 126).

Seduction and enigmatic signification lay the foundations for future sexuality and other unconsciously driven activity in terms of untranslated signifiers that have as their origins the otherness and differentiality of the adult world of the carer—otherness and differentiality encapsulating the horizon, what is "bigger and beyond" the infant in terms of the conscious and unconscious, verbal and nonverbal, affective and behavioural world and repetoir of the adult, featuresof which are enigmatically implanted within the future-driven, drive-based developmental trajectory of the small child. Now, in this, *Nachträglichkeit* becomes the key concept in Laplanche's theory of primal seduction Laplanche posits that Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit*:

contains both great richness and great ambiguity between a retrogressive and

progressive directions. I want to account for this problem of the directional to and fro

by arguing that, right at the start, there is something that goes in the direction from the

past to the future, and in the direction from the adult to the baby, which I call the

implantation of the enigmatic message. This message is then retranslated following a

temporal direction which is sometimes progressive and sometimes retrogressive

(according to my general model of translation) (p. 222).

Here, translation refers to a passive form of repression where undifferentiated, unassimilated "enigmatic messages" are retained and constitute the drive from without, sexual or otherwise. This radical reconceptualization of the drive is not in some essentialist, biological account being related to an originary somatic source so much as necessarily formed by implantations by the other. Every act of translation involves an incorporation or binding integration of the enigmatic signifier into the ego and its internal objects, where any untranslated remainder remains unconscious. In fact, Laplanche holds that there is always an unconscious surplus or excess, which he terms the *source-object*, an object that collapses the Freudian distinction between an external *object* of the drive (an external object that enables the drive to achieve cathexis and satisfaction) and its *source* (a stimulus or excitement in an erotogenic zone). Laplanche's *source-object* is a repressed, internalized fragment that becomes the source of the exciting, traumatizing drives pressing toward discharge, impinging the homeostatic body-ego from within. These drives are a combination of exogenous by-products of implantations that are residual secondary to the infants failed attempts at translation and binding leading to repression. The translation process partially alleviates repression as a process of sublimation.

As such Laplanche's revision of Freudian metapsychology involves the seductive-traumatic action of the other as the foundational origin of the drive in infant development, as well as the defensive, metabolizing process of translation and binding of the other's implantations by the subject through processes of repression and sublimation, which are ego processes that bind and integrate. By linking translation and *Nachträglichkeit*, Laplanche conceptualizes a matrix of origins that are relational but also temporal, destined to be repressed and worked through, remaining residual as unconscious enigmatic signifiers and source-objects. This process of translation, and the temporal function of *nachträglichkeit* in Laplanche's model of primary seduction, fits the descriptions of temporality derived in the preceding accompanying article, referring to bidirectional time, *re-presentation* and *différance* (deferral, excess).

Also of significance, are Laplanche's descriptions of pathological forms of implantation, which will come to be of relevance in the clinical discussion of borderline experience below. In contrast with everyday, normal implantation, Laplanche (1990) postulates a violent, pathological form he calls *intromission*:

Implantation is a process which is common, everyday, normal or neurotic. Beside it, as its violent variant, a place must be given to *intromission*. While implantation allows the individual to take things up actively, at once translating and repressing, one must try to conceive of a process which blocks this, short circuits the differentiation of the agencies in the process of their formation, and puts into the interior an element resistant to all metabolisation (1990, p. 136)

Intromission results in elements that cannot be subject to normal processes of repression-translation—Laplanche (1990) refers to these elements as *psychotic enclaves* of untranslatable parental elements (conscious and unconscious, actions, relations, wishes, fantasies) that persist as untranslatable, foreign, unmetabolisable. Interestingly, at points Laplanche does allude to the possiblity of the superego, universally, as such a psychotic enclave which acts on the ego, while at other times he is referring to psychotic enclaves as a specifically pathological form of disturbance. In the following clinical discussion, Lapanche's ideas on psychopathology will be explored further insofar as such untranslatable elements can be seen to play a role in borderline experience, and how a notion of intromission can be expanded beyond early development and be seen to become an element of borderline and dissociative phenomena.

Ultimately, Laplanche's conceptualizations of the enigmatic signifier, repression-translation and *Nachträglichkeit* form part of a renewed, more encompassing theory of generalized seduction which includes the action of the other, unconsciously driven, on the origins of self or ego, in a form that develops the origins of the drive, in a relational and temporal situation that Laplanche refers to as the *fundamental anthropological situation*. And most importantly, Laplanche develops an understanding of the originary action of temporality in functions of *Nachträglichkeit* as bidirectional, involving *différance* and *re-presentation* through the action of repression-translation, an action which can be extended to thinking about trauma and psychopathology at a relational and temporal level, something that will be advanced in the clinical section. What will be taken up now is some related thinking Winnicott (1971, 1974) developed in his thought around impingement, breakdown, unintegration, integration and disintegration, all of which has a fundamentally temporal character.

Winnicott: The temporal action of integration and impingement in development

Winnicott's (1971) model of transitional phenomena highlights an understanding of early development as being primarily relational prior to any sense of a differentiated ego with boundaries between inner and outer, self and other, and so forth. Importantly, Winnicott also developed fundamentally temporal notions in his model of transitional experience. In Winnicott's (1971) *facilitating environment*, the infant fluctuates between states of primitive anxiety and feelings of omnipotence where there is no sense of inner or outer. Impingements or failures of the environment that the infant may experience as milder primitive anxiety (if gentle enough), lead to an engagement with the world in which transitional states emerge with the development of a sense of projective intentionality and subjective objecthood (the classical example being self soothing with the transitional object). Progressively, play in the transitional space culminates in mature object relating (a mature sense of unitary self and world, self and others) but where there is still, for Winnicott, a privileging of play and transitional phenomena as being at the heart of mature health, creativity and vitality (aesthetic sensibility, intellectual endeavours, religious faith, other mature forms of pleasure and transcendence). As such, two notions of developmental time operate can be seen to operate here: linear, progressive developmental time and regressive, unconscious time insofar as the self has a capacity to progress through different self states—mature objecthood, play/creativity in the transitional space, primary narcissistic states (e.g., narcosis) and profound impingement and environmental failure creating primitive anxieties. At the broadest level, the transitional object and transitional phenomena may be conceived of in three ways: firstly,

as typifying a phase in the child's normal emotional development in which processes of individuation are acted out in the process of play; secondly, where this play is used as a defense against separation anxiety (analogous with but considerably developing Freud's discussions of the *Fort-Da* game, for example); and, lastly, as an articulation of a more universal sphere of agency and creativity that is intrinsic to our sense of engagement, dwelling and agency in the world.

These Winnicottian conceptualizations illustrate a developmental component to the bidirectional temporality I have described. Here, temporality is constitutive of infant-caregiver interactional patterns where there is an unfolding of processes of identity and differentiation, continuity and change, mutuality and intersubjectivity leading to an integrated sense of self in the world of others and objects. Thus, even though Winnicott did not conceptually advance a broader notion of *Nachträglichkeit* or temporality, he certainly emphasized the importance of continuity in time, of the self and other, in ego integration and a sense of self and reality. Another key contribution, here, is his distinction between unintegration, integration and disintegration.

For Winnicott, unintegration represents a timeless, primal originary state that is immediately influenced by the facilitating environment in terms of environmental failures and impingements, leading to processes of transitional experience, potential space and ego integration. As such, unintegration could be seen to be an abstract or illusory origin for which there is a sense of nostalgia. In Winnicott's theory temporal processes become active and understood in relation to absence and frustration: in *Playing and Reality* (1971) Winnicott lists at least three aspects of the ego sense of time: the experience of a time limit to frustration; a growing sense of process and remembering; and the capacity to integrate past, present and future. An important instance of the failure of ego to integrate experience in time is seen in the clinical "fear of breakdown" (1974). Clinically, the fear of breakdown is experienced as the fear of a "breakdown that has already been experienced" although developmentally it relates to an "unthinkable anxiety" that could never be integrated in time as a transitory event in the present and then, contained within temporal ego function, so continues to be experienced as the trace of a futural prospect of annihilation. This relates to other self-states Winnicott describes under the rubric of *disintegration* where there is a loss of continuity in space and time, and the self is experienced as fragmented, annihilated, depersonalized or subjected to the most primitive anxieties such as a fear of falling forever. Experiences of disintegration and fear of breakdown relate to severe or cumulative environmental failures and Winnicott (1962) described the development of a *false self* structure to overcome disintegration, breakdown and other instabilities of self. These forms of psychopathology, as well as the notions of integration and disintegration, will be relevant to my subsequent clinical discussion of borderline experience. What is of significance here, is the elucidation of the temporal qualities of Winnicottian concepts of *integration*, which relate to a differentiated, bound sense of time as an ego function; *unintegration*, as some form of illusory, atemporal origin for which there is idealization and nostalgia;, and *disintegration*, as a form of unbinding and loss of self in which past experience seems immediately present or futural in fragmentary states of primitive anxiety.

Concluding Comments about Temporality, Development and Developmental Psychopathology

In the previous accompanying article, I advanced notions of *Nachträglichkeit*, *re-presentation*, bidirectional time, heterochronicity and, finally, *différance*, that could be seen to permit a fuller understanding of historicity, facticity and potentiality that arguably remained consistent with the Heideggerian orientation to temporality. Here, I have sought to expand upon this in the developmental context more fully: origins of seduction (Laplanche) and primary narcissism/dependence (Winnicott) permit the action of the other to occur over time with ineffable temporal rhythms (presence/absence, frustration/relief, unconscious implantation) where ego or self integration processes are developed that are temporal in nature in keeping with our understanding of *Nachträglichkeit* and bidirectional time—processes of translation-repression and movements between integration and disintegration. We saw that drives, as a form of project, are inextricably linked to this developmental context even if our understanding of them is enigmatic or supplementary.

We now also have the temporal foundations of an understanding of trauma, seen within a universal phenomenon of seduction as the imposition of the other upon the small child within the context of differential relating, which can in some way become excessive in the process of intromission of unassimilable, unmetabolisable experiences which will reside as unintegrated, psychosis-inducing fragments; as well as the notion of an excessive or cumulative experience of impingements (both as environmental failures and excessively active input from the care giver) that lead to self pathologies in terms of disintegration and defensive false self structures.

What I will turn to, now, is an application of these philosophical and developmental principles concerning temporality, to the clinical treatment of borderline conditions.

Winnicott, Green and Laplanche on the Temporality of Clinical Work

In Winnicott's (1971) thinking around the transitional, potential space of psychoanalysis, he describes elements of the *temporality of play*:

> I make my idea of play concrete by claiming that playing has a place and time. It is not inside by any use of the word (and it is unfortunately true that the word inside has very many and various uses in psychoanalytic discussion). Nor is it outside, that is to say, it is not part of the repudiated world, the not-me, that which the individual has decided to recognize (with whatever difficulty and even pain) as truly external, which is outside magical control. To control what is outside one has to do things, not simply think or wish, and doing things takes time. Playing is doing (p. 41).

Within the Winnicottian metaphorics of the clinical encounter, play occurs both within a relational and a *temporal* field. We are reminded of Winnicott's (1971) developmental ideas about the timing of presences and absences, senses of integration and disintegration, effects of failure and impingement, leading to traumatic effects (impingements, loss of a sense of self and the real, false self structures and so on). Green (2002, pp. 110-130) extends the notions of the symbolization of play, reflecting on Freud's ideas about the *Fort/Da* game, traumatic enactment and symbolization, expanding these ideas to a much broader field of "traumatic play" that occurs within the therapeutic space, in all manner of performative and narrative based expression and symbolization.

Winnicott and Green: Traumatic Play in the Therapeutic Encounter

Green (2002) develops a sophisticated theory of drive and object relations (the *drive-object*, "objectalizing") based upon many of the ideas Freud (1920-1922) develops in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, simultaneously linking and relating the Freudian conceptualizations of the pleasure and reality principle, *Eros* and *Thanatos*, *Binding* and *Unbinding* with more Winnicottian conceptualizations of play and trauma. Underlying this is a commitment to reinstate a drive theory, a commitment I do not necessarily share in the form it takes in Green's (2002) theoretical elaboration, where I would see that there remains a risk of maintaining some form of deterministic, essentialistic or reductionistic system of energetics. Ricoeur's (1965) work *Freud and Philosophy* conducts a careful analysis of the Freudian hermeneutic realm where the causal energetics of the drive become inextricably linked to the domain of symbolic interpretation for the analyst, a hermeneutic link between energetics and meaning. In this work Ricoeur (1965) does repeatedly note the significance of Freud's assertions of the timelessness of the unconscious and the Id, but Ricoeur does not undertake a broader analysis of Freudian time or temporality within this project.

What is relevant for us, here, is the temporal element to traumatic play that Green develops from Winnicott's work. This can be melded with the broader field of relational, somatic, affective and technical elements I have elaborated upon within my hermeneutic ontological framework. If we adhere to ideas of traumatic elements re-emerging repetitively, seemingly in an unthinking, compulsive sense, we can use notions of temporal rhythmicity (binding/unbinding, discontinuities/fragmentation) and the idea of these elements being somehow dissociated, unintegrated or outside time, in order to understand the requirement of a *temporal* quality to therapeutic action. Here, therapeutic work may relate to the "temporalizing" of traumatic elements as they are constructed, contextualized and worked through in the therapeutic relationship. Green (2002), aptly describes the challenges of work with borderline cases, or even defines borderline cases, in temporal terms:

> With borderline cases, the compulsion to repeat has revealed a psychic vocation whose
>
> purpose is *anti-time*. Everything has to return to the point where it began; it is not
>
> possible to consider any conflict with the minimum degree of suspension required for

it to be elaborated, and then, perhaps, overcome. Everything has to be actualized and

exhausted on the spot; not only to prevent any progression, but also to prevent

anything new from emerging (p. 121).

I would add, here, further Winnicottian elements to the atemporal traumatic elements: features such as severe unthinkable acute psychic pain (as a form of archaic disintegration experience), suicidal thinking, other overwhelming states described as affective (pain, anxiety, horror, despair) or dissociative (depersonalized, derealized, disavowed, absent and so forth), experiences of psychic death that are also performatively expressed and thus highly dangerous insofar as they entail self harming or suicidal impulses. These elements, which seem so immediate and overwhelming, are difficult to work with, *play* with (saying this, in itself, seems glib or antithetical), re-temporalize or contextualize. All of the contextual, constructive work therapeutically (the relationship developed, the concern, the boundaries and limits, the empathic gestures) might have at their heart an attempt at establishing an enduring and intact temporal continuity in the therapeutic relationship. In Winnicott's terms, the good-enough mother survives. In broader terms, the therapist maintains the context of the work, the good will and attempt to meet and engage in a working, constructive dialogue and interaction where it is necessary for the patient to see how he or she is held in mind, thought about, related to, responded to over time. All of this work has a temporal quality (the rhythm/regularity of the work, the reliable presence and absence of the therapist), all of the temporal elements to distinguish boundaries and borders around me and not-me, related to in terms of actions, utterances and discourse. The broader theoretical, conceptual or technical aspects to this therapeutic endeavour could be considered supplementary in Derridean terms.

We can add to this a consideration of our earlier discussion of Laplanche's (1990, 1992) formulation of a general theory of seduction, where his theorization of the formative impact of enigmatic signifiers, the impact of the other in the differential relationship as universally seductive and traumatic, and the ongoing temporal modes of translation-repression, all fit within a theory of bidirectional developmental time. In the clinical setting, this enigmatic otherness constitutes an invitation to seduce or be seduced (with all of the "sexual", "aggressive", abusive", "traumatic" or other overtones this may engender) both directed toward the patient and the therapist alike. It constitutes the general field of traumatic enactment and play that is relationally based and constituted by the therapist and patient alike. To maintain a differential orientation, the therapist must maintain a thoughtful stance giving him or herself the opportunity ("giving him or herself *time*") to think temporally from within the field, with and for the patient so that the patient can come to do this more so with and for themselves. And this process is not merely a past-focussed, reconstructive, insight-forming process. It is a process of potentiation and becoming that hopefully facilitates broader growth and change for the patient.

Loewald and the Therapist's Sicht

Loewald (1980), in papers such as "The Experience of Time" and "On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis" was keenly interested in the futural focus of the psychoanalyst in what he termed the "teleological" aspects of psychoanalysis. In his view, the process is always guided by the analyst's awareness of the patient's true form or "emerging core". The analyst must hold this in trust to steer the process: "It is this core, rudimentary and vague as it may be, to which the analyst has reference when he interprets transferences and defences, and not some abstract concept of reality or normality" (p. 229).

In a broader field than the traditional analytic field of one-person interpretation what does this mean? The therapist somehow maintains a temporal focus, working with the patient within a space of potentiation to construct, contextualize, constitute and understand the therapeutic process in a temporal sense: a broad field of discussing, reflecting upon, differing about "what you're doing", "what I'm doing", "what we're doing" where "doing", in the broadest sense of *play*, refers to a whole experiential-relational field of narrative and performative expression. It fits into and melds with the context, what the therapist does and says, what can and can't be offered and so forth. The therapist thinks about those alteritous, enigmatic elements that impact upon the space. In a traumatic sense, these are important to think about and this requires some restraint and maintenance of a space for the patient to articulate, work on and play with these elements, and for the therapist to think about and respond to them from within a differential relationship. The therapist must be mindful of this, and this requires an awareness of and cultivation of a differential setting within which this can occur (a setting of thought, observation, consideration and deliberate responsiveness). As such, this is not just a therapeutic process of therapist and patient meeting in the here and now, where the therapist attempts to attune to and connect with their patient without a sensibility to temporal elements. Although this kind of present-focused process is important, and it is articulated well by Daniel Stern (2004) describing moments of meeting, attunement, and implicit relational processes that assist in the development of a sense of relational self, even Stern (2004, pp. 197-218) does not hold to ignoring the action of the past on the present in the therapeutic processes he describes in his own work and the work described by the Boston Process Change Study Group.

The therapist does and must take up the opportunity to engage with, play with and change with their patient in the present moment, but also, at the same time, in an enigmatic way influence their patient where a significant part of this influence involves a number of temporal actions with and for the patient: *reflection upon*, *coming to terms with*, *working through*, *anticipating*, *projecting* and so forth. In the sense of trauma, this temporalizing action may take the form of restoring elements to their place in the past, or it may be an attempt at restoring a futural focus. If this refers to understandable, discrete, traumatic events it can be a sense of the balance between "getting over" something and "getting on with life" in a process of restoring some sense of temporal balance alongside balance in the other aspects of being described in my hermeneutic ontological framework. However many elements are more enigmatic, less understandable in that literally traumatic sense, and the therapist cannot claim to arbitrate and interpret all of these with an objective or omniscient stance. Chronologically, the earlier the "events", the more implicitly, enigmatically retained or understood they may be. There is no sense that one can reliably attempt to reconstruct a reality or an insight in this. In spite of the many vacillations and

complex statements Freud made about actual trauma, intrapsychic trauma, seduction, phantasy and wish, which have become a core element of the controversial heritage and contestability of his body of work, Freud (1917) did hold to the ambiguity between truth and falsehood in "traumatic experience":

If infantile experiences brought to light by analysis were invariably real, we should feel that we were standing on firm ground; if they were regularly falsified and revealed as inventions, as phantasies of the patient, we should be obliged to abandon this shaky ground and look for salvation elsewhere. But neither of these things is the case: the position can be shown that the childhood experiences constructed or remembered in analysis are sometimes indisputably false and sometimes equally certainly correct, and in most cases compounded of truth and falsehood (p. 367).

Elsewhere, Freud (1900), also, described hysterical symptoms as being more than just traumatic remnants in a mnemic sense: "Hysterical symptoms are not attached to actual memories, but to phantasies erected on the basis of memories" (p. 491).

Further aspects of the Temporalizing function of Therapy with So-called Borderline Conditions

If, in my analysis, I extend this notion of "hysterical" symptoms being mediated unconsciously to all manner of processes of expression or articulation that are relationally, temporally, somatically, affectively and technically derived, it becomes evermore complex. What the therapist can hope to do is establish a sense of relatedness, dwelling and sharing in this context of limits, alterity and complexity. What the therapist can be mindful of, here, is the manner in which the temporalizing function creates room or space for this relating, for dreaming and thinking, interpreting and understanding where previously there wasn't.

Thinkers of the Intersubjective School have articulated some related ideas in their writings on trauma work. Stolorow (2011a, b; 2009), for example, elaborates his own conceptualization of relational trauma and relational work that establishes kinship-in-finitude: he uses the philosophical conceptualisations of Critchley and Derrida on death and mourning, and adapts the Heideggerian concept of *Mitsein* (and in particular, being-towards-death, solicitude and authenticity), to articulate how relational work can re-establish a sense of temporal and relational functioning after trauma. Orange (2011) describes how dialogue, in all of its metaphorical complexity, can help to understand and overcome the most complex or inarticulable elements of traumatic "experience", where creative dialogue and metaphoric play can form a part of therapeutic work. In thinking at this level, we are aware of the limits of explicit, conscious work on identifiable traumatic elements (imaginal re-exposure, integration work, and so forth): some of the work may simply be levelled at attempts at re-establishing temporal, relational, affective and somatic links. In doing this, we have an orientation for approaching unconscious work with the traumatized unconscious that is much broader, temporally and relationally attuned and able to approach the complexity of the action of trauma which may become manifest in all manner of atemporal, non-relational, unresolved, unformulated, dissociated, psychotic, unsymbolized, somatic, and affective fragments of expression or gesture.

I believe that many of the problems around understanding the temporality or historicity of what I loosely call the traumatized unconscious may be addressed using this type of relational, temporalizing therapeutic stance grounded in my hermeneutic ontological approach. This can be considered, for example, in cases of brief reactive psychosis, dissociative psychosis, or what since the mid to late nineteenth century have been known as hysterical psychoses (see van der Hart et al., 1993). In some ways, hysterical psychosis could be described as involving forms of splitting and fragmentation that lead to personal modes of expression (acting, speaking, self-interpreting) which rely on fragmentary experiences, descriptions or expressions which seem narrow and limited, often with a literal and concrete quality, which can be overcome through the kind of therapeutic work I am describing. Often these presentations seem to relate to an event of re-traumatization, sometimes with a "determined" feel to it (linked to repetition compulsion) in which the subsequent decompensation may have psychotic elements (persecutory and grandiose) as well as more dissociative elements related to a disjointed sense of self, time, others and so forth. There may be concrete and fragmentary symptoms (conversion symptoms, symptoms akin to somatoform dissociation) that seem to have a mnemic or symbolic quality that the patient cannot consciously acknowledge. The present interpersonal situation (therapeutically or extratherapeutically) can be responded to as a form of "re-traumatization" leading to a sense of fragmentation or dissociation, somatic and affective experiences that feel real and in the present, and interpretations of occurrences that meld the past and the present in a narrowed down, collapsed form of temporality as if it were all appearing in a fragmentary form in the present-day.

Interpretively, repetitive efforts made at linking the re-traumatizing event to the concrete psychotic state (referring to splitting and projective mechanisms) would not lead to an "ahah" moment where an insightful awareness crystallizes and the psychotic state resolves, losing its "literal realness". Rather than asserting an explanation or a causal understanding the therapist opts for exploring the experiences and events in a more open approach, dialogically, facilitating a dwelling in and reflecting upon the experiences together, describing them together and exploring them for their possibilities. The therapist actively attempts to disentangle what is past and what is present, what is attributable to the patient or to the other (which could be the therapist him or herself), defining borders and boundaries in the work, relationalizing and temporalizing the work in the manner I have already described above. In doing this, there may be a gradual restoration of a sense of self and place and time, and with this is a gradual working through of what begin to crystallize as "memories" as if from the current day viewpoint what couldn't be comprehended is now "seen".

As this process develops, the patient experiences the return of a sense of self awareness and reflectiveness, a capacity to self interpret and a gradual recovery of themselves as not overcome by two separate forms of objective presence: the event of re-traumatization and the psychotic state. They feel they can descriptively explore the complex moods and feelings—they may be senses of violation, self-loathing, shame, disgust, anger—and link these to the described past and present events and occasions which are acknowledged to be only partially apprehended or understood as memories. Here, we may be dealing with complex interpersonal experiences and events, with no objectifiable truth or understanding, and with the possibility of limits of understanding, memory or comprehensibility. There is no sense that this is fully resolved or worked through so much as a sense that the patient has somehow recovered themselves to go on with the work of the therapy in all its complexity, openness and potentiality.

This kind of case can be explored in such a way in order to elaborate upon how a therapeutic process in which the patient and therapist dwell together more openly and attempt to experience, relate to, describe and explore the hidden and concealed in what the patient experiences without the inference of causal mechanisms, definitive explanation or reference to forms of objective presence leads to the sense of a more complex self structure which is analogous in some ways to Heidegger's Care structure in its relationality and temporality. This is the case because it involves an overcoming of self-splitting which features modes of self-interpretation which have recourse to objective presence. Other modes of self-functioning, what Heidegger might call more authentic modes, are recovered and these relate to aspects of the Care structure in its temporal historicity (how thrownness and projection are implicated in a present moment that seemed seized by the past re-traumatizing event and the continuously "present" dissociative or psychotic states). This recovery is facilitated by the reciprocal process of dwelling together which facilitated mutual awareness (what Heidegger called doubling or empathy) something recovered after relational events in which doubling or empathy do not feature.

Conclusion

I have deliberately spoken about this in general and abstract terms in order to encapsulate this type of work in a way that encompasses many different iterations and forms of complexity. One can think of cases of hysterical psychosis one has seen, or even generalize this type of relational and temporalizing stance to many other forms of clinical situations or clinical work where the expression of apparently enigmatic unconscious, dissociative or psychotic elements are worked through, understood and contextualized in a relational and temporalizing therapeutic process. It can incorporate all manner of complex and fragmentary affective, somatic disturbances, relational problems and dissociative disturbances featuring discontinuity and disintegration. For example, I could refer to Bromberg's (1995, 1998) conceptualization of multiple selves, traumatisation, and the understanding of dissociative identity disorder or multiple personality disorder being seen as an extreme variant of selfhood which is universally conceptualized as multiplicitous, the norm of which involves "standing in the spaces". One can apply the temporalizing form of relational work I describe here to this domain, where stable, self-attributed identities can be seen as a developmentally appropriate but restrictive form of trauma response that require validation and empathy but also addressed with understanding and contextualisation with a view to working through and overcoming.

An important emphasis has been placed upon a broad notion of play that encapsulates more discursive and performative elements than Winnicott (1971) originally described. These elements, unconscious, enigmatic and traumatic, become temporalized in such a way as the patient is more open to the complexity of their being, less affected by the intrusive, fragmentary, disintegrating and unbound elements that had existed without a temporalizing, restorative function found in play with others. This is what is therapeutically discovered as a form of true self found in dialogue and relationship with the therapist. The temporal movement in this work helps to re-situate the individual in a space of care with the therapist, which becomes an expressive and performative *microcosm* of a broader horizon of care in life outside the consulting room. What the patient may gain is more of a sense of themselves, their own being, and authenticity in their relationship with themselves and others. The intrusive, enigmatic and fragmentary unconscious intrusions or impingements are less narrowing, alienating or destabilizing, as

these have been shared and contextualized so as to create a clearing, a space from which to consider the future as an horizon. The patient is no longer confronted by death (psychic death, suicide) as an immediate prospect or already experienced annihilation, so much as an horizon of finality and alterity that can be comported towards, related to with others within the project of life, but thankfully deferred.

Biographical Note

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Mathematical Representations of Matte Blanco's Bi-Logic, based on Metric Space and Ultrametric or Hierarchical Topology: Towards Practical Application

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Abstract

The Chilean psychoanalyst Ignacio Matte Blanco developed theories of subconscious processes and their relationship with conscious reasoning. This work, in the book *The Unconscious and Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-Logic* published in 1975, uses mathematical perspectives. In this article I will show how such perspectives are closely aligned with the mathematics underpinning data analytics. This is based on text analysis. Such text can be the surface expression, through expression in language, of thinking and reasoning. On the one hand, an aim of this work is to use the greatly insightful perspectives of Matte Blanco for such data analytics. Secondly a more extensive aim is to further develop the work of Matte Blanco with reference to psychoanalysis and various other disciplines.

Introduction

Approaching Data and the Object of Study, Mental Processes

In approaching the data-based study of the human mind, it is useful to note how important and how feasible it is to integrate mental processes (analytic, synthetic mental processes) with the objects of these, our human, mental processes. This is surely all the more essential when the objects of mental processes happen to be those very same mental processes.

Jean-Paul Benzécri's approach to data analysis, sometimes referred to as the French school of data analysis, displays both cohesiveness of theoretical underpinning and breadth of applications. Benzécri's early data analysis motivation, in Rennes to begin with and subsequently in Paris, came from linguistics. Benzécri's correspondence factor analysis methodology is closely associated (mathematically and in practical application) with agglomerative hierarchical clustering, and other multivariate data analysis, and more broadly, statistical analysis methods. Correspondence Analysis was initially proposed as an inductive method for analyzing linguistic data. From a philosophy standpoint, Correspondence Analysis simultaneously processes large sets of facts, and contrasts them in order to discover global order; and therefore it has more to do with synthesis (etymologically, to synthesize means to put together) and induction. On the other hand, analysis and deduction (viz., to distinguish the elements of a whole; and to consider the properties of the possible combinations of these elements) have become the watchwords

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of data interpretation. It has become traditional now to speak of data analysis and correspondence analysis, and not "data synthesis" or "correspondence synthesis". In such analytics, emphasis can also be given to interactive data analysis, that includes visualization, or in one phrase, the analyst or data scientist seeks the visualization and verbalization of data (Blasius and Greenacre, 2014).

This article is structured as follows. Section 1 takes salient and important points from Matte Blanco's work. These points are of direct interest to us in what follows. Section 2 introduces metric and ultrametric mathematical concepts, how they are related to Matte Blanco's thinking, and how they permit data analytics. Section 3 considers the textual mapping, embedding in a metric space, of a short extract from a therapy session. Section 4 looks at Matte Blanco's symmetrization of our thought processes, in the unconscious, and we can relate this to conscious reasoning (invoking Matte Blanco's asymmetry in thought processes) and also to how we can find remnants or vestiges, tracks and trails, of unconscious thought processes. Section 5 turns attention to the topic of tracking of emotion. All case studies that are discussed share the underpinning mathematical data analysis platform. An Appendix discusses some further considerations in regard to textual data that can be used, in analyzing narratives (such as narratives of activities that are integrally linked to emotions).

Matte Blanco's Psychoanalysis: A Selective Review

Matte Blanco's work is concerned with conscious reasoning and subconscious thought processes. His great achievement is to develop a cognitive model that embraces both. I begin with a selective review of Matte Blanco's work in order to set out the key terms and the key thrusts of his work, such that there will be a strong resonance with the mathematical concepts and mathematical or computational processing that is discussed in this paper. Matte Blanco's *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets* (originally published in 1975; see Matte Blanco, 1998) was, according to the author, "written for psycho-analysts as well as for mathematical philosophers" (p. xxv) and is described in Eric Rayner's Foreword as "undoubtedly [his] most fundamental work" (p. xviii). What follows is the summarizing of particularly salient aspects of Matte Blanco's work. That will help in showing how the various points can be seen in mathematical terms. Quotations in the following are from Matte Blanco (1998).

Matte Blanco asymmetry and symmetry relative to Freud's conscious and unconscious

Relative to Freud's work, Matte Blanco had it largely reformulated in terms of symmetry and asymmetry. For him, these were "two kinds or modes of being rather than of existence" (p. 94). The interplay of symmetry and asymmetry is the focus of Matte Blanco's work. The upshot of this was that Matte Blanco arrived at what he termed a bi-logical system or bi-logic. There are "two fundamental types of being which exist within the unity of every man: that of the 'structural' id (or unrepressed unconscious or system unconscious or symmetrical being) which becomes understandable with the help of the principle of symmetry; and that visible in conscious thinking, which can roughly be comprehended in Aristotelian logic" (p. 13). Freudian consciousness and unconsciousness are reformulated in terms of symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being. It is to be noted that this is not a Freudian "rational-irrational" polarity but rather,

on the side of the symmetric mode of being, the "unrepressed unconscious", or what is "the unconscious by its own nature or structural unconscious" (p. 95). As seen in the development of the theory of Matte Blanco, "It is an attempt at putting in logico-mathematical terms the findings of Freud" (p. 49).

Symmetrization gives rise to a cluster or class of things

Within a class of things as conceptualized by the thinking person, there is perfect equivalence of class members, implying the following: no contradiction; absence of negation; displacement; space and time vanish; no relations of contiguity; arising from the last-mentioned: no order. How a class is defined in practice, or is known to the thinking person, is described in these terms. Firstly, because, as elaborated on in Matte Blanco, one class member is – in terms of class membership – indistinguishable from another class member, there is the following: "the unconscious does not know individuals but only classes or propositional functions which define the class" (p. 139). Further, "The only unity for the (symmetrical) unconscious is the class or set, in which all individuals belonging to it are included. The unconsciousness cannot, therefore, deal with parts, except by treating them as classes or sets" (p. 141). "Consciousness ... when confronted by a whole class can only consider it in two ways: either it focuses on the limits (or definition) of the class, that is, on those precise features which characterize it and distinguish it from all other classes, or it concentrates on the individuals which form the class" (p. 97).

A class comes about through condensation: "... two impulses which appear incompatible in Aristotelian logic and their union in one expression, ... is accomplished in condensation" (p. 44). The principle of generalization relates different classes. We assume various classes. Then "the principle of generalization and the principle of symmetry" (p. 11) are both taken for their explanatory capability in regard to classes. In this way, the "generalizing part [in the human] leads to symbols" (p. 106), since symbols arise out of knowledge of, or awareness of, classes. Classes are structured as, what might be called, "bags of symmetry" (in quotation marks in the original, p. 125), and also "levels". Counterposed to the symmetrical principle in Matte Blanco is the asymmetrical principle. The asymmetrical principle is visible in conscious thinking. It can roughly be comprehended in, or expressed through, Aristotelian logic: "Asymmetrical being ... perceives reality as divisible or formed by parts and, as such, related to spatio-temporality" (p. 20). Symmetrical being can by known only through the glass or prism of asymmetrical being: "Thinking requires asymmetrical relations. So does consciousness" (p. 97).

Towards empiricism and analytics

First we consider the measurement of the symmetrical. For Matte Blanco (p. 104), "Symmetrical being alone is not observable in man." Even delineating it is "already an asymmetrical ... activity". In regard to emotion, the "magnitude of emotion" is understood in terms of "the proportion between symmetrical and asymmetrical thinking" (p. 17). "[U]nconscious psychological events are not intrinsically immeasurable" (p. 18) although compared to a physical event being susceptible to just one measurement, instead with unconscious events it is a matter of being susceptible to infinite measurement – understood on the basis of the Cantor argument whereby a whole set, being in a bijection

with a part of this same set, implies the same countable infinite cardinal for both whole and part sets. "By making the individual identical to the class, the principle of symmetry, *as seen from an asymmetrical point of view*, leads to the infinite set ..." (p. 106) "We must ... keep in mind the possibility that if things are viewed in terms of multidimensional space, symmetrical being can actually unfold into an infinite number of asymmetrical relations" (p. 110, footnote).

Next we consider how data may be obtained in this context. In free recall, and in other areas besides such as in literature, words are tracers for expressing what lies behind. "Consciousness cannot exist without asymmetrical relations, because the essence of consciousness is to distinguish and to differentiate and that cannot be done with symmetrical relations alone" (p. 96). "Symmetrical being is translated into asymmetrical terms by means of words. *Words (i.e. their meanings) are the asymmetrical tools of the translating-unfolding function*" (Italics in the original, p. 115). We have that "words, abstract things, fulfill the function of differentiating between concepts and also between other things. They are bound to be, therefore, highly asymmetrical in their structure" (p. 115). To further support Matte Blanco's view here, consider the following. Text is the "sensory surface" (McKee, 1999, p. 252, formulated in statistical and computational terms in Murtagh et al., 2009) of the underlying semantics. In later sections and in the Appendix, I will return to further motivation as to why words are a good starting point for further analysis and how this can even go towards accessing aspects of underlying symmetrical being. Thus far, I have selected various central themes from Matte Blanco. This leads us to a conclusion drawn by Lauro-Grotto (2008, pp. 538-539) that directly follows from Matte Blanco: "... here comes my observation: the structural unconscious, in the way it is reformulated by Matte Blanco, the symmetric mode – all this is homologous to an ultrametric structure. The generalization principle reflects the hierarchical arrangement in which all the stimuli (or concepts) are perceived as belonging to classes, and the classes are clustered into super-classes of increasing generality. Finally, a single omni-comprehensive class is generated". Lauro-Grotto (2008) points to how equi-similar (or equi-distant) stimuli or concepts indicate an ultrametric (or hierarchy, or tree) topology.

The Metric Space and Ultrametric, or Hierarchical, Space Structures that Underly Matte Blanco's Asymmetry and Symmetry

The real world, metric space: The context for asymmetric mental processes

Our real ambient space, and an ordered timeline, are fundamental to our human, conscious mental processes. A metric perspective is very appropriate for our usual three-dimensional world around us, to which we can add time as a fourth dimension. The real number line is then appropriate for any dimension of this 3D+T (three-dimensional space, and time) world. For geometric modelling, Cartesian coordinates can be availed of where this appellation comes from mathematician and philosopher, René Descartes (1596–1650).

For our purposes, the terms metric and distance are used synonymously. The visually intuitive distance, informally expressed as the "as the crow flies" distance, is the Euclidean distance. In examples in sections below I will be using the Correspondence Analysis methodology. This data analysis technique is, in fact, a highly developed platform or environment for data analysis. It begins with appropriately coding the data that expresses what we are interested in. The data starts as symbolic and/or numeric, and is taken into a categorical (also termed qualitative) data matrix for analysis. Metric geometric is appropriate for semantic analysis. For example, in textual analysis, text segments are defined as the average of their constituent words, and words are defined as the average of their constituent text segments. We embed the text and words in a metric – Euclidean – latent semantic space. A high point of such semantic analysis, using metric embedding, can be seen in Bourdieu's use of Correspondence Analysis. Renowned social scientist, Pierre Bourdieu, 1930-2002, used Multiple Correspondence Analysis for mapping survey data into a metric, latent semantic space. This was done in various works including his book, *Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, published in French in 1979, and in English in 1984. Bourdieu's work relates to social and aesthetic preferences, cultural and educational capital.

In practical and operational settings we can take text, or text transcribed from voice, or survey or questionnaire results, or other measured data on our observables, together with the characteristics of our subjects, or observables, and map such data into a semantic space that is metric (because, by design, the factor space, or latent semantic space, is a high dimensional metric space). Then we can proceed from there to induce a hierarchy, or tree structure. Distance on a tree structure, or hierarchy, is more restrictive than, for example, Euclidean distance. Distance on a tree structure or hierarchy is termed an ultrametric, and we will look further at it in the subsection to follow. For a metric context, the natural geometric ordering is on the real line, whereas in the ultrametric case the natural ordering is a hierarchical tree. Khrennikov (2014) notes how the real number system is used for measurement in real world, physical spaces. But ultrametric distances are appropriate, Khrennikov holds, for mental spaces. See Khrennikov (1997, 2004, 2007, 2010) for a very great amount of work studying dynamical processes in ultrametric spaces. Thus, Khrennikov lays the basis for unconscious information processing. Khrennikov (2014) notes the following: "The idea that physical and mental spaces have essentially different geometries was discussed already by Aristotle. He emphasized continuity, infinite divisibility, and connectivity of the physical space. At the same time he presented motivations that the mental space is discrete, hierarchic, and totally disconnected. The latter matches perfectly with the modern notion of a totally disconnected topological space."

Ultrametric topology, relevance for expressing symmetric mental processes

Having surveyed Matte Blanco's view of unconscious thought processes expressed as (Matte Blanco's term) symmetry, and conscious reasoning expressed as (again Matte Blanco's term) asymmetry, in this section I will lay out a basis for mathematically modelling these – symmetry, asymmetry – as respectively ultrametric (i.e., metric on a tree or hierarchy) and metric.

As observed by Lauro-Grotto (2008, p. 539), the aspect of anomaly modelling via an ultrametric is nicely consistent with Matte Blanco's symmetrical logic: "... we know that something similar can actually be experienced in finite space when we look at a very distant three-dimensional structure and we perceive it as though it were a single point. Symmetrization of relationships can therefore be described as a transition from a metric to an ultrametric conceptual organization". Take the example of Figure 1. We consider objects y and z to be agglomerated, i.e. clustered, at level 1.0, and then a third object, x, to be with them in a cluster containing all at level 3.5. This is a standard dendrogram representation. The root node is at the top and the branches are at the bottom. From the hierarchy or tree, the distances between x and both y and z are equal to 3.5. This is their ultrametric distance. One among an infinite number of depictions of this set of relationships is in the right panel of the figure.

In an ultrametric space all triangles are either isosceles with small base, or equilateral. We have here very clear symmetries of shape in an ultrametric topology. In Figure 1 from x's point of view, y and z are indistinguishable. In mathematical terms, an ultrametric topology (which we can quite acceptably term a hierarchical topology, or a tree topology) has further properties that are recognizably along the lines of Matte Blanco's symmetric mental processes. Insofar as a cluster, corresponding to any node of the hierarchical tree, contains a set of objects, these objects are all identically members of this cluster. There are unusual properties. Any member of the cluster can be taken as its centre. As a mathematical ball or hypersphere, the radius equals its diameter. The cluster or ball is topologically open and closed as the same time and this is termed a *clopen* set. This last mentioned property is explained thus: the set is closed because objects on its boundary can be members; and it is open because the cluster extremity is defined by what is not a member relative to the external, complement set. These are deep mathematical concepts, from topology and then other areas such as number theory. Our essential point here is that the mathematical viewpoint is so greatly helpful towards taking into practice – the practice of data analytics to start with – the exceedingly insightful work of Matte Blanco.

Figure 1

Left: Hierarchical clustering of *x,y,z*. The strong triangular inequality defines an ultrametric: every triplet of points satisfies the relationship: $d(x,z) \leq \max\{d(x,y),d(y,z)\}$ for distance *d*. Cf. by reading off the hierarchy, how this is verified for all *x,y,z*. In addition the symmetry and positive definiteness conditions hold for any pair of points. Right: A depiction of these three points. They form an isosceles triangle with small base. The base is formed by points y, z.

In the practical and operational context of analyzing data, inducing an ultrametric means building a hierarchical clustering from given data. A mapping of metric to ultrametric is achieved by an agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm, a well-established approach that depends on a cluster (compactness, or connectedness, or other) criterion.

Finally, in this short discussion of hierarchical clustering, to draw yet another link to the work of Matte Blanco, it is noted in Rayner's (1995, p. 2) review of Matte Blanco that the latter's investigation of "*process of thinking ...* emphasizes the essential centrality of *classificatory* activity at all levels of thought, even in the unconscious".

Mapping A Short Discourse from a Therapy Session

Matte Blanco considers the infinity of human thought processes. Now from some form of expression of human thought, I first address how our data analytics allow us to establish a spatial mapping of that. A metric space is our initial aim in regard to this mapping. The dimensionality of the metric space can be arbitrarily high. By metric, it is meant that all entities in this space are endowed with a distance, a typical one being the Euclidean metric. The Euclidean distance, the "as the crow flies" distance, is visually intuitive for us.

Notationally, we have the following. For objects that we are dealing with, x_i and $x_{i'}$, consider them as positioned in a space of dimensionality *J*, that is endowed with the Euclidean distance. Their (Euclidean) distance squared is: $d(i,i')^2 = \sum_{j=1}^{J} (x_{ij} - x_{i'j})^2$.

In our discussion here I will explain the overall aims and implementations of our

analytics. In analyzing textual narratives, Murtagh et al. (2009) explain a great deal more about the underpinning mathematics of our methodology. Murtagh (2005), in particular chapter 5, covers many themes ranging from classical Greek philosophical texts, Russian literature, contemporary political discourse and many other areas including an extensive study of dream reports that will also be discussed in the section to follow below. The expression of human thought processes that will be used here is textual. That can easily enough be the outcome of a recorded expression of vocal, gesture or other human activity. Then taking the words used in their context, the aspect of context that we particularly use is the presence/absence and frequency of occurrence of words in their surroundings. In this way, the semantics or meaning of a word is the totality of the contexts in which it is used.

Language aspects of discourse in therapy

Schneider (2013) presents an extensive review of structural frameworks for a therapist-patient discourse. He starts with consideration of the analyst's narrative vis-à-vis the patient's narrative. In therapist-patient discourse, "linguistic strategies", comprising substitutions of words and phrases, or other forms of reformulation, are used by the therapist in the discourse in order to influence and modify the patient's narrative. This works on different linguistic levels. Now, every such therapy session is embedded in a social context. Therefore the socio-cultural practices imply that meaning and understanding are influenced, and indeed created, by sources that are external to the therapist-patient session. Thus we ask the following, with a view towards later, comparative assessment of therapy sessions. Can we map out a therapist-patient discourse, in a way that is revealing and illustrative of the discourse flow? Such a mapping should be illustrative, in a visualization or display sense. Further afield, then, with lots of therapy sessions undergoing the same sort of analysis, aims are as follows. Firstly, an aim is to extend beyond the illustrative, in order to be suggestive of, and hence reinforcing, good practice. Secondly an aim is to determine heuristics for successfully addressing problems.

An exchange in a therapy session is recounted by Schneider. The patient is considering termination. Schneider describes in detail the many connotations and denotations of what is said in the short discourse, consisting of 34 exchanges (17 each, in turn) of patient and therapist. In this very detailed commenting on the therapist-patient discourse, Schneider notes the importance of "verbal quirks in tone and grammatical form, departures from normal discourse rules, truncated utterances, etc.". The mutual conditioning of connotations of words is noted, and external socio-cultural "rules". Elements of silence are important. Tone is important, and Schneider discusses the different meanings that apply to the term "OK". Speed of vocal exchange in discourse means that the interaction is ad lib, but against a given background. The foregoing points to our interest in being able to map out the discourse, in a way that lends itself to visualization of such discourse. Such mappings should be reflective of the data, and not impose any structural model. Schneider refers, a few times in his detailed discussion, to how his own verbal expressions were counter-transferential. He also notes how the discourse is to be viewed here in terms of measures of awareness in the exchanges; the significance for one another; how each values the other; and the importance of one for the other (how important the therapist is to the patient, and how central and hence important the patient is to the therapist). So there is the possibility to consider value, hence measurement and

even, if really pushed, quantification. We will consider this as part and parcel of our mapping of the discourse. Preserving "face" and self-esteem are just among the examples of how value enters into the discourse. So too are the "force(s) of utterances" and the kind of speech act that the utterance is. For Schneider, "linguistic aspects of the exchange" move into emotion. And: "In the whole emotional context of the relationship the words function not merely as bearers of quasi-propositional meaning but as emotional gestures, as actions." (Schneider notes that what is "extra-intentional" is not to be taken as coterminous with the 'unconscious'." This is very clear from the earlier discussion of socio-cultural context, just as one example of the conscious, albeit very complex, domain of what we are considering.)

From the discourse text to the mapping

Schneider (2013) provides 17 patient and therapist exchanges. The first two are as follows:

1. "1P", "Sigh Well dots I know I have to leave (falling tone) dots (Long pause in which the patient looks away and then at me.)"
2. "1T", "Ah, hmm dots How do you know that? "
3. "2P", "(Looks slightly taken aback) I mean dots I guess it's time for me to move on."
4. "2T", "What makes you guess? Is that something you can guess? "

In the previous subsection, we have noted many levels of meaning of words and other discourse elements (like pauses, here noted as such, or alternatively noted with a succession of dots). Since we will not consider punctuation (taking it to be of far less interest than the words – but note one exception that we allow, for question marks), and with some word pairs being useful to keep as a pair (e.g. a verb accompanied by "not"), and to cater for non-standard word usage (included here were "Whyzat? ", "Yeahh", "yeah", "Weeeeeell") we elected to do the following. We just retained a selection of words, and in a few cases converted the given word to a substitute word. We did such substitution in analogy with the fairly standard practice in text analysis to carry out stemming and lemmatization (e.g., "go" is used in place of "going", "goes", etc.). So we retained, or converted, words as follows. Because of the value-related discussion in the previous subsection, we kept verb stems, although we ignored most uses of the verb "to be". Verbs of motion, for example, lend themselves to labelling with some sort of value (e.g., "fall" or "leave" being negative). Because of positive or negative meaning, we kept "yes" (and substituted this for "yeah", "yeh", etc.), "no", "OK", "right", "sure", "certainly", "nod" (substituting "nods"), "tired", "afraid", "fixed", "smile" (substituting "smiles"), "laugh" (substituting "laughs", "half-laugh"). We kept because we also wanted to see if there would be any difficulty in regard to our analysis with them, "goodbye", "oh", "ah", personal names – here, "Z", "Ed", – "silence", "mother", "pause" including dots. Finally, given the great importance of the subjective and related factors here, we retained: "I", "me", "myself", "you", "your". Finally, due to the importance of interrogative mode here, we kept the question mark, as a "Q".

The first four utterances thus become the following (cf. above):
1. "1P", "sigh pause I know I haveto leave falling pause looks me"

2. "1T", "ah pause you know Q"
3. "2P", "looks I mean pause I guess me move"
4. "2T", "makes you guess Q you can guess Q"

Our input data consists of the selected set of words (just defined as a contiguous sequence of one or more characters) in each of the 34 utterances. The utterances are also labelled with the "P" or "T" for, respectively, patient or therapist. Mathematically we consider two dual (meaning integrally related) spaces, the set of 34 utterances in, as we find, a 91-dimensional space where each coordinate is a word; and the set of 91 words, in the utterance space, such that each word has a coordinate value on the 34 utterances/coordinates. We speak of the cloud of 34 utterance points in a 91-dimensional space, and the cloud of 91 word points in a 34-dimensional space. In the standard mathematical way of defining how one of these spaces is related to the other, we have a matrix that crosses the utterance set (providing the rows of the matrix) by the word set (providing the columns of the matrix). That is what a matrix is, a transformation between vectors in one space and the set of transformed vectors in another space. The intersection values of the matrix are the number of times that a given word appears in a given utterance. Not surprisingly most of the intersection values are zero, the given word is not in the given utterance: occupancy is 6.9%.

We endow the space of utterances, and the space of words, with the chi squared distance. Then we transform the two clouds in the dual spaces endowed with this chi squared distance into a factor space, where the two clouds of points are projected into the same factor space, that is endowed with the Euclidean metric. That certainly facilitates visualization of the semantic relationships, arising out of relative positioning in the factor space. The coordinate axes of this space, i.e. the factors, are ordered in decreasing order of importance. "Importance" is the contribution to inertia. The contribution by inertia of a cloud of points about the axis to the inertia of the whole cloud betokens the classical mechanics, developed by Christiaan Huyghens (1629–1696). One aspect needs to be noted: we have coordinate, hence positional, information for our points, utterances and words. We have their masses also, provided by relative frequencies of marginals of the utterances times words matrix. Mathematically then the relative importance, the contributions to inertia, of the factors are given by the decreasing eigenvalues of a matrix product based on our input data, the utterances by words matrix.

To show the latent semantics expressed by the factors, it is generally the case that the plane of factors 1,2, followed by 3,4, etc. are perused. We find that factor 1 is strongly related to the 9th utterance, and factor 2 to the 8th utterance. The information content of these factors is respectively 7% and 6.7% of the total cloud inertia (the same, from the mathematical principles involved, for the cloud of utterances and the cloud of words). We prefer the layout, and expressiveness, of the plane of factors 3,4. As can be seen, in Figure 2, the information content of these factors, 6.15% and 6.07%, is not much lower than that of factors 1 and 2. We have prepared Figure 2 to avoid overcrowding, with labels of 91 words, and numbers associated with the 34 utterances. So in Figure 2 we took just the 14 highest valued utterances, and the 14 highest valued words, relative to their coordinates (i.e. projections) on the two factors here. All words have their locations at the small red triangles. The unlabelled words, as seen, are bunched at the origin (i.e. the coordinates 0,0 in the plane of factors 3,4). The 14 labelled words are to seen in red.

The utterances all have a blue dot. The bunched utterances at the origin have the words superimposed (so the blue dots there are superimposed by the red triangles). We have cut down on the utterances and words shown in order to direct our attention on the most useful and revealing subset.

We see how factor 3, the horizontal axis in Figure 2 is characterized essentially between the extremes of utterance 15, and utterance 23. Utterance 15, indicating that there is no sense in continuing her therapy, is a low point in the dialogue. (See pp. 13–14 of Schneider, 2013, where he discusses this utterance by his patient.) Utterance 23 is the patient categorically backing up that position. Now let us move to the vertical axis (called the ordinate, while the horizontal axis is called the abscissa). To the positive side we have the distancing of the patient from the therapist, exemplified by her utterances 15 and 23; and then the somewhat cooling of that distancing towards the end of the dialogue. (The ending of this dialogue was to see each other once again in a therapy session one week later. Schneider, 2013, reports however that the patient ceased the therapy two months later.) The two utterances, 15 and 23, are initially as follows:

- Utterance 15: "8P", "Well yeah sort of. It trivializes the whole thing."
- Utterance 23: "12P", "I'm thinking of how I'm tired of going over the same stuff."

One important issue relates to the origin. This is the average, more correctly the centre of gravity, of the utterances cloud of points, and of the words cloud of points. As always here, we are dealing with a projection onto a low-dimensional space, a plane. As the average, what is projected to, or very close to, the origin is not particularly interesting to us.

Figure 2

A display, showing the factor plane of factors 3 and 4, of Schneider's (2013) therapy session fragment. The red triangles here are the 91 words that were retained. The blue dots here are the 34 alternating utterances of patient and therapist. Labels are the 14 highest coordinate, on either axis, utterances, and the 14 highest coordinate words. Shown as supplementary element projections are the patient and therapist, P and T respectively; and the three segments determined as being statistically significant for the narrative flow here. These are close to the origin, labelled respectively 1, 2, 3 (coloured brown, as are the labels P, T).

In summary the mapping here is one of, firstly, assertion of the patient's consideration of ending the therapy, contrasted with her conciliatory justification of this; and secondly, the patient proposing to leave the therapy versus a relatively accepting state at the end, to return to the next therapy session. To aid interpretation, we plot so-called supplementary elements, meaning elements projected into the factor space post-analysis. These supplementary elements are projected at locations shown by the brown triangles. In Figure 2, just a little away from the origin, we see the patient (P) located to the positive side of factor 4, thereby understandably with this half axis being characterized by her considering to end the therapy. We have the therapist a little to the negative side of this factor, factor 4, being more concerned (for lots of reasons, discussed in Schneider, 2013) with continuing therapy.

One aim of applying clustering to the narrative flow in a context such as this therapy session is to segment the flow. As exemplified in Bécue-Bertaut et al. (2014), this can be done on a statistical basis by permutation testing of what is allowed to be clustered, subject too to the clusters respecting the chronological order of the utterances. The clustering, in order to be consistent with the inertia-based factor space construction principles should use an inertia or variance (i.e. the inertia when all masses are identical, as they become when projected into the factor space) principle. We must relax this requirement to the well-known complete link agglomerative criterion, in order to ensure that we can construct a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (for full discussion, see Murtagh et al., 2009, or Bécue-Bertaut et al., 2014; what is at issue is that the agglomerations creating clusters are representable by a hierarchy, with no inversions, also termed reversals, in levels of the hierarchical tree). The complete link agglomerative criterion for cluster creation is also a cluster compactness criterion, that is often in practice close to the inertia or variance (i.e., inertia with unit masses) agglomerative criterion. Here, as stated, we build the hierarchy just as far as we are allowed by our statistical testing for the hypothesis, at each agglomeration, as to whether there is significant "sameness" in the cluster. With reference to the planar projection of our high dimensional space (the one factor space resulting from the utterance space and the word space), it is to be noted that our clustering is on the basis of the full factor space dimensionality.

We find the following outcomes in regard to segmenting the flow of, in total, 34 utterances: from utterance 1 to 22, from 23 to 30 and from 31 to 34. Utterances 22 and 23, and then 30 followed by 31 to 34, are as follows. We see the change in flow between utterances 30 and 31; and the somewhat more relaxed ending in utterances 31–34. See now in Figure 2 how segments 1 and 2, while as for all segments are fairly close to the origin, nonetheless point to, respectively, the patient's making of her case (upper left, i.e. positive F4, negative F3), justifying it (upper right, i.e. positive F3, positive F4), and then the third segment associated with the somewhat conciliatory ending (negative F4).

- 22: "11T", "What's up? "
- 23: "12P", "I'm thinking of how I'm tired of going over the same stuff."
- 30: "15T", "(after another long pause) Well, look here, if you're asking me whether you're fixed, whether you graduate now with your BMH, I'll tell you what I've told you before. You've made a lot of progress, it's naive to think that there'll come some definitive point at which you're fixed, no more problems. I'm sure you could continue this work on your own; I think you'll be OK without therapy, but it's up to you. It's what you want to do dots (pause) But, now, if you're asking me will I miss you? The answer is yes. But I'm certainly not going to tell you what you should do, (tone of mock desperation), cause there ain't no should."
- 31: "16P", "OK. (long pause)"
- 32: "16T", "OK (long pause)"
- 33: "17P", "I'll see you next week."
- 34: "17T", "(nods) See you then."

Another interesting thing we can do is look at the statistically most significant words associated with categories, like P (patient) and T (therapist), or the segments in the

narrative flow. Significant over- and under-representation of words in the category are determined. Interestingly, for the patient, two words in particular are very significant, over-represented being "I", and under-represented being "you". For the therapist, it is just the other way around: "you" is over-represented in the therapist's utterances, and "I" is under-represented. Coming now to the three segments of the therapy session narrative flow, for the first segment (utterances 1–22) we find just the word "you" being under-represented. For the second segment (utterance 22–30) we do not find any word being statistically significant. For the third segment, we find the words "see" and "ok" being significantly over-represented.

This, therefore, completes, for now, our analysis of the short therapy session dialogue. While there is great depth and valuable outcomes from Schneider's discussion, nonetheless for large-scale assessment there is a need to focus our attention, to have visualizations, to find statistically significant relationships, and, all in all, to prioritize our analysis steps and analysis outcomes.

An Approach to Detecting Matte Blanco's Symmetry in Bi-Logic

The factor space is a latent semantic space. It provides an appropriate platform for further analysis work on the data. While our focus is on textual data, it is clear that activities and actions can be considered also. In the therapy session, we used indications of pauses, for example, and of laughing. At least in terms of no restraints, and mathematically, our factor space can be of arbitrarily high dimension. Our data mining analysis methodology is (statistically) robust, and (computationally) scalable. One of the studies carried out in Murtagh (2005, see section 5.10.5) relates to 910 texts comprising 931,537 words. For all data analysis processing work in this area, we very much recommend that the first stage of the processing is the creation of the factor, latent semantic, space.

Dream reports: Seeking vestiges of the subconscious in data

From the Dreambank repository (DreamBank, 2004, and see also Domhoff, 2002, 2003, 2006) I selected various collections. See Murtagh (2012a,b) for further description and analyses. One set of 139 dream reports, from one individual, Barbara Sanders, was particularly reliable (according to Domhoff, 2006). In order to have a text that ought to contain vestiges of ultrametricity because of subconscious thinking, admittedly subconscious thinking that was afterwards reported on in a fully conscious way, I took these Barbara Sanders dream reports. In discussion of this data provided in Domhoff (2002) he notes that there is "astonishing consistency" shown in dreams such as these over long periods of time. Taking the set of 139 of the Barbara Sanders dream reports, I used the 2000 most frequently occurring words used in these dream reports including function words. Then I took 30 words to carry out some experimentation with their ultrametric properties. These are listed as follows. Note that the processing converts all upper case to lower case. The thirty words selected were as follows: "tyler", "jared", "car", "road", "derek", "john", "jamie", "peter", "arrow", "dragon", "football", "lance", "room", "bedroom", "family", "game", "mabel", "crew", "director", "assistant", "balloon", "ship", "balloons", "pudgy", "valerie", "dolly", "cat", "gun", "howard", "horse". These words were selected in order to have some personal names, some words that could be metaphors for the commonplace or the fearful, and some words that could be commonplace and hence banal. Names of people are: Tyler, Jared, Derek, John, Jamie,

Peter, Lance, Mabel, Valerie, and Howard. I carried out, firstly, a Correspondence Analysis of all 139 dream reports crossed by the 2000-word set. Then I use for the subsequent analysis the Euclidean, factor space, with full dimensionality, for the 30 selected terms. Figure 3 shows a hierarchical clustering of these terms, using their full-dimensionality factor space coordinates. That is to say, the 30 selected terms are used in their semantic embedding, or in accordance with their latent semantic expression.

Figure 3

Hierarchical clustering using the Ward minimum variance agglomerative criterion. Note how "car" and "road" are clustered early on in the sequence of agglomerations. Note similarly "room", "bedroom". In the first four terms that are clustered here, we note the interestingly mixed, but nevertheless mutually close, semantics of "ship", "baloons", and "crew", "baloon".

Forming a hierarchical clustering in this way, in the traditional manner, can be helpful in understanding all important similarities in one's data. The clusters themselves can be explored (i) with respect to cluster membership, and (ii) with respect to the role as a cluster centre of gravity location in the factor space. It has also been traditional practice with Correspondence Analysis to explain the meaning, and interpretational relevance, of the factors in terms of the clusters, and vice versa, to explain the clusters in terms of the

factors. (See Murtagh, 2005.) However we can, and should, note the following issue. A hierarchical clustering, such as is shown in Figure 3, is induced on the data. From any data set, of coordinates or of a dissimilarity or similarity measure, we can construct a hierarchical classification. In order to find strong associations that could lead to illustrating the subconscious of Barbara Sanders, we can draw on Matte Blanco in the following way. We will seek inherent ultrametric relationships in the data, starting from, and only that, induced hierarchies. Our procedure is as follows (Murtagh, 2014b). We use two or more hierarchical clusterings, and form their consensus, in order to bring us closer to what is inherent to the data and not just imposed. Our procedure for constructing a consensus hierarchical clustering is innovative. We examine relations in triplets of points (here, the 30 selected words), which, because they come from a constructed hierarchical clustering, respect the ultrametric inequality.

We further restricted our word set to 16 words, to especially focus on named individuals. These were as follows: "Peter", "Mabel", "horse", "arrow", "John", "pudgy", "Darryl", "football", "Derek", "game", "Howard", "gun", "family", "Dwight", "car", "road". Explanation for some of these follows. The dreamer, Barbara Sanders, had an affair in the past with Derek; Howard was her divorced, now deceased, ex-husband; Darryl was an ex-boyfriend; Dwight was her favourite brother; John, a young man, she fantasizes about; Peter was a student, and Mabel was a co-worker; horse, arrow, and especially gun were used metaphorically quite often. For all of these 16 words, there was quite sufficient reported presence in the dream reports used.

We determined the consensus hierarchical clustering (using the full dimensionality factor space, and in order to have quite different agglomerative clustering criteria, using the single and complete link criteria). Murtagh (2014a) presents a summary of this work, and Murtagh (2014b) provides full details. Based on the consensus hierarchy, we sought corroboration, in the factor space coordinate data, hence in the Euclidean latent semantic space, for ultrametric-respecting triplets of words. From the ultrametric-respecting triplets that we used for analysis, we derived the following interpretation:

1.   Derek and John are in a similar relationship relative to Howard.

2.   There is a close semantic proximity between family and gun (the latter word, as we have noted above, being used considerably to denote threat, and self-defence), and then counterposed are Peter, arrow (which appears to be used quite metaphorically by her), football, and the adjective, pudgy. It does appear from this that tensions within the family are associated in her mind with a general, background and ongoing metaphor of a gun.

3.   Peter, Mabel and the word horse are all conceived as having distance from Howard and family.

In Murtagh (2014b) further analysis was carried out, along the same lines, on Stephen Fry's Twitter feed in 2009 (when he had about one million followers, whereas he now has 7.4 million). The words we put the spotlight on for such analysis included "party", "young", a few terms related to darts contests, and the locations, Cambridge (England) and LA (Los Angeles).

In summary, we have proceeded as follows. Firstly, from the given or observed data, we constructed a lantent semantic space, given by our Euclidean-endowed metric factor space produced by Correspondence Analysis. From this factor space, we investigated one aspect of Matte Blanco symmetrization, namely, that the data considered is mapped into an ultrametric, or tree or hierarchy, topology. One of the most straightfoward applications of Matte Blanco symmetrization was not pursued here: namely, words or events that are symmetrized. We leave it for future work on appropriate, and preferably vast quantities of data (because of being potentially very interesting), to determine close associations at, or close to, the same chronological time points. Therefore here instead, we addressed the challenging task of finding ultrametric relationships, as being symmetrized in the Matte Blanco sense. As seen, we have established the path to be following in such an endeavour.

Tracking Emotion in Narrative

In the PhD thesis of Tonti (2012), Matte Blanco's work is taken into the domain of human emotion, which is closely associated with the human subconscious. Emotion is "the component of thought that can be attributed to [...] unconscious rules" (Tonti, 2012, p. 78). "... emotions are a fundamental and building force for cognition, and not just an attribution of affective aspects or a physical response" (p. 164). Emotions are a fundamental constituent of thought and intelligence. They are not juxtaposed to thought and intelligence. Intelligence is not possible without emotion. Emotions are also regulatory functions in our (human) process of segmenting reality (p. 9).

Here we will discuss the tracking of emotion. A full account of this work is in Murtagh and Ganz (2014). We first selected the dialogue interchange between the main protagonists, Rick and Ilsa, in the movie script of Casablanca. There were 150 dialogue expressions, with few exceptions alternating between Rick and Ilsa. Out of the 77 scenes in the movie script, we grouped these dialogue utterances into their scenes, 11 scenes in all. We carried out a Correspondence Analysis on these 11 scenes, crossed by the words they contained. We kept function words, singulars and plurals, due to their potential emotional relevance. We set all upper case to lower case, and removed all punctuation. In the latent semantic space, i.e. the factor space, we looked at the semantic locations – in their full dimensionality in the factor space – for the 11 scenes, and for two selected words betokening emotion, "darling" and "love". Largely we note in Figure 4 the same movement, low values betokening the scene as emotional. Scene 30 is a flashback to Paris and the German occupation, and Scene 70 concerns Ilsa leaving Casablanca with her husband, Laszlo. By appropriate indicator terms, "darling" and "love" being our choice here, our semantic embedding allows us to relate the semantics, both between words used, and the activities in the chronology of the narrative, here the scenes.

**Semantic distances between two terms and eleven scenes**

Figure 4

Casablanca movie: In the full dimensionality factor space, based on all interrelationships of scenes and words, the distance was determined between the word "darling" in this space, with each of the 11 scenes in this space. The same was done for the word "love". The semantic locations of these two words, relative to the semantic locations of scenes 30 and 70 are highlighted with boxes. In these two scenes, there is a pronounced ebbing of emotion.

We next turn attention to the three-way (Emma, her husband Charles, and her lover Rodolphe) relationships in Flaubert's 19th century novel, Madame Bovary. In order to be applied in a very general manner to textual description such as this, we used successive text segments of 20 lines each. Similar data preparation was used as for the Casablanca case study. Sentiment analysis using the words "kiss", "happiness" and "tenderness" was carried out, allowing us to track emotional expression in the chronology of the narrative.

Figure 5 presents an interesting perspective that can be considered relative to the original text. Rodolphe is emotionally scoring over Charles in text segment 1, then again in 3, 4, 5, 6. In text segment 7, Emma is accosted by Captain Binet, giving her qualms of conscience. Charles regains emotional ground with Emma through Emma's father's letter in text segment 10, and Emma's attachment to her daughter, Berthe. Initially the surgery on Hippolyte in text segment 11 draws Emma close to Charles. By text segment 14 Emma is walking out on Charles following the botched surgery. Emma has total disdain for Charles in text segment 15. In text segment 16 Emma is buying gifts for Rodolphe in spite of potentially making Charles indebted. In text segments 17 and 18, Charles' mother is there, with a difficult mother-in-law relationship for Emma. Plans for running away

ensue, with pangs of conscience for Emma, and in the final text segment there is Rodolphe refusing to himself to leave with Emma.

Emma's evolving state vis-à-vis Rodolphe (lines/circles) and Charles (full lines)

Figure 5

Madame Bovary novel: The relationship of Emma to Rodolphe (lines/circles, black) and to Charles (full line, red) are mapped out. The text segments encapsulate narrative chronology, that maps approximately into a time axis. Low or small values can be viewed as emotional attachment.

In summary, this data-driven approach allows us to map out the semantic content of our data. It has been shown, too, how we can track out emotional content, and observe its evolution over time. We can also visualize narrative sub-plots, for example using the strength of Emma Bovary's relationship with Charles and with Rodolphe.

Conclusion

Mathematically modelling Ignacio Matte Blanco's principles of *symmetric* and *asymmetric being* in this paper has objectives such as the following: visualization of concepts developed by Matte Blanco, and hence use as an aid for understanding Matte Blanco's work and imparting it to others; and to provide pointers to where and how such mathematical modelling can be instrumentalized, The ambition is even greater, namely

through Matte Blanco's work to set out, and make extensive use of, the geometry and the topology of mental processes.

It has been shown how the topology of a rooted tree, i.e. an ultrametric topology, can be used as a mathematical model for the structure of the logic that reflects or expresses Matte Blanco's symmetric being, and hence of the reasoning and thought processes involved in unconscious reasoning or in reasoning that is lacking, perhaps entirely, in consciousness or awareness of itself. Such an ultrametric model corresponds to hierarchical clustering that can be induced on empirical data, e.g. text. For Matte Blanco's asymmetric, real-life, and conscious reasoning, a map of empirical data that captures such perceived and defined objects of observation can be formed such that the semantics can be modelled through Euclidean geometry. This furnishes geometrical representation of the latent semantics. Finally we have discussed the passage from metric geometry to ultrametric topology (and vice versa, as is clear from Figure 1). Thus Matte Blanco's bi-logic in its passage from symmetric to asymmetric (in creativity, when emotion comes to lead behaviour, or when trauma dominates behaviour) or vice versa from asymmetric to symmetric (in dream, in repression or in traumatization), in passages both ways between symmetric and asymmetric being, our geometric and topological modelling is enlightening and elucidating.

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Appendix

Text Analysis as a Proxy for Both Facets of Bi-Logic

Both conscious or asymmetric reason, and unconscious or symmetric reason, are facets of bi-logic according to Matte Blanco. What he means is that both play a role at different times, that these roles are often complementary, and that the interplay of the two separate domains can be very revealing and instructive. In this Appendix I address the plausibility of appreciable analysis of content of thought processes based on interrelationships that in turn are frequencies of co-occurrence data. Text will be used as a proxy of underlying thinking, reasoning, conscious phenomena and also, every bit as much, representative of the underlying emotional, dreaming, or other unconscious mental processes. What I am seeking is an approach that is deployable and hence usable in practice.

Words are a means or a medium for getting at the substance and energy of a story, notes McKee (1999, p. 179). Ultimately sets of phrases express such underlying issues (the "subtext", as expressed by McKee) as conflict or emotional connotation. Change and evolution are inherent to a plot. Human emotion is based on particular transitions in thought. So this establishes well the possibility that words and phrases are not only taken literally but can appropriately capture and represent such transition. Text, says McKee, is the "sensory surface" of a work of art (counterposing it to the subtext, or underlying emotion or perception). Simple words can express complex underlying reality. Aristotle, for example, used words in common usage to express technically loaded concepts (Murtagh, 2005, p. 169), and Freud did also. Rayner (1995, p. 50) notes the following: "The unconscious largely deals not with particular logically asymmetrically locatable subjects and objects, but with abstract attributes, qualities or notions. Put in another way, these propositional functions are adjectival and adverbial; they lie behind verbal nouns: lovingness, frighteningness and so on." Such words, he notes, are "abstract class attributes, notions or conceptions" and "are the equivalent of the propositional functions of the class".

This has an immediate bearing on the words used in unconscious processes. Rayner (1995, p. 50) notes the "propositional functions or abstract attributes" or "predicate thinking", that underly the unconscious as fundamental constituents. He also briefly exemplifies this through clinical work in schizophrenia and child abuse by adults. One could of course deal with other units of thinking, or reasoning, or unconscious processes, other than through words. Chafe (1979), in relating and establishing mappings between memory and story, or narrative, considered the following units.

1.   *Memory* expressed by a *story* (memory takes the form of an "island"; it is "highly selective"; it is a "disjointed chunk"; but it is not a book, nor a chapter, nor a continuous record, nor a stream).

2.   *Episode*, expressed by a *paragraph*.

3.   *Thought*, expressed by a *sentence*.

4.   A *focus*, expressed by a *phrase* (often these phrases are linguistic "clauses"). Foci are, "in a sense, the basic units of memory in that they represent the amount of information to which a person can devote his central attention at any one time".

The "flow of thought and the flow of language" are treated at once, the latter proxying the former, and analyzed in their linear and hierarchical structure as described in other essays in the same volume as Chafe (1979) and in Chafe (1994). In Murtagh (2012a, b) I address the following: Can we attempt to separate out good proxies for symmetrical logic and for asymmetrical logic? To do this, a great number of texts are taken, relating to literature, technical writing, and after-the-fact reporting on unconscious thought processes.

Book Review

Reviewed by Maren Scheurer[1]
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Hilda Reilly's historical novel *Guises of Desire* offers her readers an absorbing fictional biography of Bertha Pappenheim, who is perhaps still better known as Anna O., the first and most famous patient of Josef Breuer's and Sigmund Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* (1895). In an effort to contextualize the novel for modern readers, it is subtitled "The story of Freud's Anna O". In terms of the significance and notoriety her case gained in psychoanalysis, she may still be seen, to a certain extent, as "Freud's Anna O", but it was in fact Josef Breuer, Freud's elder colleague and co-author, who had treated her and had written the famous case study of 1895. This document, along with an unpublished case report from 1882, guided Reilly's research and subsequent fictionalization of Pappenheim's clinical history.

Guises of Desire is not the story of Josef Breuer, however. In an author's note, Reilly (2012) deplores that "much has been written about Bertha by academics and psychoanalysts but nowhere do we hear the voice of Bertha herself. This is what I have tried to provide" (p. 250). Sceptics of the genre of fictional biography will not be swayed by this, and anyone who expects a postmodern treatment of Bertha's case, reflecting the difficulty or even impossibility of assuming her voice, will be equally in for a disappointment. Reilly accepts Roy Porter's (1985) challenge to reconstruct "patterns of consciousness and action" to mend the dearth of patients' perspectives in medical history (p. 185). In the absence of accounts of her illness by Pappenheim herself, an attempt to reconstruct Bertha's perspective as much as possible can only be made through a fictional approach bolstered by historical and medical research and a realist perspective. The one-sidedness of the historical biography and the disruption or destabilization of Bertha's point of view through experimental writing, though perhaps more attuned to the epistemological doubts that may be brought to bear on Reilly's project, would inevitably reproduce the gap she sets out to mend.

Despite this, we seldom encounter Bertha's actual voice. Though centred on her experience, the novel is mostly told from a third-person perspective; Bertha's own words can only be encountered in letters written to her cousin Anna Ettlinger. In this manner, *Guises of Desire* follows Bertha through the onset of her symptoms in 1880, her subsequent treatment by Breuer, as well as its tumultuous termination two years later. Bertha suffers from a varying set of symptoms, including hallucinations, visual and speech impairments, paralysis, absences and mood disorders, all of which are diagnosed

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and treated as hysteria by Breuer. Although Reilly (2012) offers "temporal lobe epilepsy" (p. 249) as a more likely diagnosis in her note, the novel remains ambiguous when it comes to the aetiology of Bertha's malady: A Freudian reading of her symptoms as a reflection of repressed Oedipal and sexual desires is equally as possible as a feminist interpretation, locating Bertha's main problem in her frustration with a misogynist, patriarchal society that bars women from serious intellectual and meaningful professional pursuits – a reading very much in line with the fact that Pappenheim went on to become an influential social worker and feminist activist after her recovery. Readers are also encouraged to consider organic and iatrogenic factors in the development of Bertha's condition: Bertha's ophthalmologist disagrees with Breuer's diagnosis, and her morphine addiction, a consequence of Breuer's pain treatment, clearly exacerbates her symptoms. Despite Breuer's (1895/2001) confident statement of Pappenheim's complete recovery at the end of his 1895 case report (p. 41), subsequent commentary has brought to light the fact that Pappenheim was far from cured by the end of Breuer's treatment and went through a long period of hospitalization afterwards.

Breuer also sought to cover up the more disconcerting aspects of the therapeutic relationship with Pappenheim. He was not equipped to deal with her erotic transference and terminated the treatment for good after having been called to her bed one night: Exhibiting all symptoms of a hysterical pregnancy, she believed she was giving birth to Breuer's child (Gay, 2006, p. 67). From the first signs of interest in Breuer through the pleasure of being the focus of his ministrations up to powerful and regressive erotic fantasies and hallucinations, the novel traces Bertha's involvement in the therapeutic relationship in great detail. Breuer's role in this is, however, explored less consistently. Her mother's diary entries and a few passages told from Breuer's point of view provide a limited external perspective on Bertha and her caretakers' perception of her illness. Thus, readers learn of her mother's impatience with Bertha, Breuer's doubts about his diagnosis, his discomfort with an increasingly dependent patient, and even an unwelcome moment of desire for his patient. In making these passages a comparatively rare occurrence in her novel, Reilly sticks to her agenda to foreground Bertha's perspective, but given the interactive dynamics of any therapeutic relationship, readers are left to wonder: How much did his desire influence hers and vice versa? Why did he not perceive the early signs of erotic transference and drug addiction? How did Bertha's intellectual curiosity stimulate him and his treatment methods? In *Studies on Hysteria*, Breuer (1895/2001) credits his patient with inventing the "talking cure" (p. 30). In contrast to this case report, in which Breuer depicts himself as stumbling by accident upon Pappenheim's narratives and their cathartic effect under hypnosis, in *Guises of Desire*, Breuer already has a theory based on Aristotle's *Poetics* that determines the course of the treatment. Bertha's perspective precludes any insight into what perspires during the hypnotic sessions, and even in Bertha's and Breuer's more mundane dialogues, readers are not given first-hand access to her stories. In consequence, it is impossible to witness an important part of the actual narrative therapy Pappenheim was involved in creating.

Consistently, Reilly's focus is on Bertha's experience of her illness rather than on its treatment. Her linguistic difficulties, possibly among her most baffling symptoms, feature prominently in this exploration of her condition. Breuer (1895/2001) describes Pappenheim's speech disturbance as "a deep-going functional disorganization of her speech":

It first became noticeable that she was at a loss to find words, and this difficulty

gradually increased. Later she lost her command of grammar and syntax; she no longer

conjugated verbs, and eventually she used only infinitives, for the most part

incorrectly formed from weak past participles; and she omitted both the definite and

indefinite article. In the process of time she became almost completely deprived of

words. She put them together laboriously out of four or five languages and became

almost unintelligible (p. 25).

After a period of complete mutism, she began to speak in English, and sometimes in French or Italian. Reilly also depicts Bertha's linguistic symptoms in detail, although, as the novel is written in English, italics are the only means to indicate when Bertha converses in English rather than in her native German. Untranslated snippets of Italian and French and the reproduction of her regression to simplified grammar and truncated speech, however, convey an idea of the disconcerting and alienating effect her inability to speak German must have had on Bertha, her family and her therapist. The loss of her linguistic faculties also points to a reason why Reilly may have resisted using Bertha's first-person perspective to narrate her novel: The further her symptoms progress, the less effective her efforts to communicate become. As Reilly (2013) discusses in a blog post, feminist critics such as Elaine Showalter and Dianne Hunter have suggested that Pappenheim's refusal to speak German can be read as a rejection of dominant patriarchal discourse. Reilly is inclined to believe that the cause for these symptoms is more likely to be found in "neural disturbances in the speech centres of her brain than in any kind of gender confusion" (Reilly, 2013). The novel, in fact, hints at further motives for Bertha's speech disturbance. Her defective grammar and her recourse to foreign languages frustrate her mother and shut out Bertha's less educated nurse but they increase Breuer's fascination with the case. Whatever the cause of her altered linguistic faculties, a variety of contradictory inter- and intrapersonal, therapeutic, social, and political meanings must be considered in any discussion of Pappenheim's refusal to speak the language expected of her.

Reilly closes her novel with Bertha's retrospective reflections on Breuer and Freud in 1925, when the publication of Freud's *An Autobiographical Study* stirs up a history she has chosen to put behind her in favour of concentrating on social work. Surprisingly, despite her exasperation with the breach of therapist confidentiality in *Studies on Hysteria* and in Freud's recent publication, Bertha mostly agrees with his interpretation of her case, including his discussion of infantile sexuality and transference love, suggesting that she has not simply been a victim in the two doctors' misguided quest for knowledge. The real conclusion to the novel, however, is Reilly's "Author's note", which points to a number of lacunae in the discussion of Pappenheim's case and contradictions between the existing case reports and interpretations of her condition. For any reader interested in the history of psychoanalysis, it would have been useful if this note could have been longer, detailing Reilly's research, her contemporary interpretation of the case, and the inconsistencies in Breuer's case reports. As a novel, however, *Guises of Desire* opens

new avenues of imaginary investigation that may provide useful pointers for readers to reconsider Pappenheim's case.

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Book review

Metaphor and Fields: Common Ground, Common Language, and the Future of Psychoanalysis. S. Montana Katz (Ed.) (2013). New York and London: Routledge, 224 pages, £28.99 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-415-63172-3

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This edited volume is aimed at psychoanalysts belonging to different schools of thought. What all these analysts must have in common however is an interest in thinking through the importance of theories of metaphor and theories of fields as applicable in the context of psychoanalysis. It would not be a stretch to say that the basic concepts of 'metaphor and fields' are periodically reinvented by psychoanalysts of various persuasions who are not acquainted with each other's work since they do not read or review the literature that is produce outside the school to which they belong. Montana Katz's editorial intention in putting together this volume of seventeen papers is to make it possible for analysts of various persuasions to read, comprehend, and translate each other's work without the need for endless reinvention and reduplication that comes from insular or parochial approaches to psychoanalytic theory and practice. The main theoretical source for these papers by practicing analysts is the academic literature produced by linguists, literary theorists, cognitive theorists, and field theorists in order to help analysts with a clinical orientation to make sense of their own assumptions, intuitions, and presuppositions about the nature of the human mind. While certain schools of psychoanalysis are better known for their preoccupation with the structure of language, field dynamics, and relational approaches to transferential phenomena, Katz argues that these structuring concepts are useful for all schools of analysis. So while it may not be possible for all schools to work with the same conceptual structure, they should at least be able to translate their concepts without too much difficulty across a range of theories. This is like different painters painting the same scene, albeit with different stylistic approaches. There are a number of papers by Katz herself in this volume. Katz's work serves not only to produce a sense of editorial cohesion, but to also throw light on the main concepts and processes involved in thinking about psychoanalysis in terms of metaphors and fields.

Most of the papers included in this volume are preoccupied with the differences between theories of metaphor and metonymy; they attempt to map these differences within not only the space of the analytic situation, but also within the forms of communication and cognition that constitute the existential difference between healthy and neurotic modes of being. This book should be of interest to linguists and cognitivists as well who will be delighted to discover how seriously their theories of language are being applied in the psychoanalytic realm. These analysts are basically claiming that the language of psychoanalysis cannot be deployed in clinical practice without a rigorous understanding of their linguistic foundations. So, in that sense, this volume is not a grudging acceptance

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of the importance of linguistics; it is a dynamic incorporation of linguistic concepts within the space of psychoanalytic concepts. Linguistic concepts serve to both de-familiarize and formalize psychoanalytic concepts in these papers. Among the areas that are being rethought here include categories like: psychoanalytic clinical data, psychodynamic research, the meaning of the mind, the relationship between theories of mind and theories of language, the concept of the talking cure, language and the affects, space and time in the psyche, and so on. It is almost as though the contributors to this volume came up with a list of theories in linguistics and a list of concepts in psychoanalysis and then decided to match the two lists to the extent possible so that no combinatorial possibility remains unexplored from a theoretical or a practical point of view. Many of these papers have been previously published in psychoanalytic journals; this helps to demonstrate the extent to which linguistic theories have percolated into theories, journals, and institutions of psychoanalysis in not only the Anglo-American world - as was the case in the past - but increasingly in Latin America as well. This is one of the books that takes the contributions of Latin American analysts seriously and includes a number of references to what is happening in Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay. It is commonly overlooked that the future of psychoanalysis will be increasingly determined by the colossal clinical markets in Latin America irrespective of which school of thought an analyst may belong to. It is therefore important that the theories, techniques, and tools of psychotherapy being innovated in this part of the world should move into the analytic mainstream. Latin America is also interesting because of the passionate forms of the transference that we witness in these clinics given that patients in these parts of the world are not in any way disillusioned with psychoanalysis as is sometimes the case in North America. Why this should be the case is an interesting topic for research in itself. It is common knowledge by now that most soap operas in Brazil include characters that are in analysis, are analysts, or would like to be in analysis sooner or later to make sense of their lives. It is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to envisage the future of psychoanalysis without including Latin America; this volume, I must point out, takes a crucial step in that process of clinical and theoretical inclusion.

The contributors to this volume are also interested in incorporating field theory within psychoanalysis; this should not come as a surprise since, like Lacanian theory, the concepts of 'metaphors and fields' has percolated into all schools of psychoanalysis. Lacan's work is often described as the 'Freudian field' or the 'Lacanian field' – understanding and articulating the differences between these fields is common amongst Lacanians. An interesting question in this context is whether the concept of a field is itself a metaphor; and, if yes, what are the implications of invoking the 'field' as a figure of speech? What is it that field theory can help analysts to understand with greater clarity? Does the concept of the field relate to what is 'inside' the space of the clinical situation? Or, does it subsume what used to be known as the 'discourse' of psychoanalysis. What, for instance, is the difference between a field and a discourse? I get the impression that the incorporation of theories of metaphor has made more headway within different schools of analysis than theories of the field. There is still some uncertainty as to whether the concept of the field is just a metaphor or whether it is rigorous enough to displace the concept of a discourse, and what the advantages of doing so might be. Some of the contributors to this volume, for instance, have attempted to synthesize the theories of the field with those of metaphor and process. It will not be possible to find anything lacking in this volume in terms of rigor or thoroughness in thinking through how the main concepts in the title relate to each other. The typical generic form of a paper in this volume is to start with the definition of a linguistic

concept, delineate its history, apply it in the context of psychoanalysis, and then argue for its relevance to a general theory through the invocation of some clinical data that it helps to make sense of. An additional theoretical move might also be to go beyond the metaphors and fields model of analysis, and introduce another concept, category, or typology altogether to individuate an analysts's contribution.

This book will appeal mainly to readers with an academic temperament – especially those who appreciate the need to understand the relationship between theories of language and the main concepts of psychoanalysis; and who, furthermore, are haunted by the prospect that that these forms of linguistic research might be lost to clinicians who prefer to proceed on the basis of intuition and improvisation rather than on the basis of the research that is readily available for incorporation. It will therefore serve as useful study material in advanced courses on theoretical and clinical psychoanalysis. I would also recommend this book highly to sociologists and historians of psychoanalysis since it will give them valuable insights into how psychoanalysis is both thought about and practiced in the Latin American markets. Readers might also want to think about why each of these contributors has specialized in a particular area of psychoanalysis, and how that relates to the demands of his or her clinical practice in these markets. That kind of approach to reading this volume of papers will provide them with both the clinical and theoretical rudiments for any further research that they may want to do on the sociology of the psychoanalytic symptom. This is all the more important given the disappearance of formative forms of the psychoneuroses like hysteria in the Anglo-American world; and their transmutation into a host of psychic disorders in the classificatory schema of contemporary psychiatry. I want to conclude by stating that taking the Latin American clinical markets and their preoccupation with psychoanalysis seriously will help historians and sociologists to reconstruct the genealogy of psychoanalysis in the Anglo-American world. It will also help us to re-think, as Katz and her contributors promise us, what we mean by the concepts of metaphors and fields within theories of psychoanalysis.