Language and Psychoanalysis

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The journal of *Language and Psychoanalysis* is a fully peer reviewed online journal that publishes twice a year. It is the only interdisciplinary journal with a strong focus on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of language and psychoanalysis. The journal is also inclusive and not narrowly confined to the Freudian psychoanalytic theory.

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Contents

The Iconic Order of the Autistic Communication-Speech Disorders

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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the study of autistic speech from the perspective of iconicity. Language is a major means of human I-not-I interaction and communication. When there is affinity between content and the form designating it, this form (linguistic units and their organization) is said to be iconic to that content. Looking at the various modes of linguistic iconicity (from the phonetic level to the entire discourse, and from identity and continuity to modes of resemblance and analogy), milestone autistic denominators are detailed and analyzed as they occur in an authentic diary written over three years by a woman with autism. This article offers a look at echolalia; pronoun management; perception of affinity as exemplified in the use of kinship terms; content words vs. grammar markers, neologisms and other phenomena. These findings are then integrated to show that mutism is the most authentic – and iconic – mode enacting the traumatic autistic rupture of the delusory symbiotic state. In this premature frail encapsulation the counter-iconic use of language is in itself a pseudo use. By treating both language (phones, words, idioms, discourse, etc.) and people as things, the verbal oddities of autistic speakers authentically iconize the inauthentic inanimate stance.

In memory of Hadar,
my autistic triplet twin
– with love.

Introduction

Iconicity is a quality of affinity between content and the form designating it. Semiotics, following Charles Peirce (1965) classifies signs into three cardinal categories: *firstness*: identity (pure icon); *secondness*: resemblance (index) and *thirdness*: analogy mediated by convention (symbol). Linguistic iconicity may manifest itself along the different linguistic levels: from the single phone to the entire discursive interaction.

Mankind has long used signs to communicate. Visual signs have existed from prehistoric periods of human development. The color red depicting the very content of danger: blood and fire, is a visual sign currently used all over the world to warn or prohibit. Philosophers and linguists disagree about the iconic quality of words. In his dialogue

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"Cratylus" Plato presented two opposing approaches: one claiming that the relations between the signifiers (phonetic strings) and the content they denote are arbitrary and conventionally determined (in every language and in each era); the other arguing for a necessary, and hence natural, intrinsic affinity between the content and the particular signifier denoting it. Onomatopoeia – mimicking the sound produced by an object in the real world by using the sound system (phonemes) of a language (signifiers) to denote that referent (such as "cock" or "bottle") – employs phonetic acoustic iconicity (image). A different kind of iconicity (diagram) operates with resemblance of characteristic features or qualities, such as the parallel between the syntactic ordering of words and of constituents in a sentence and the temporal or thematic sequence of the events in reality described by those words or sentences.

Following Frances Tustin (1992, p. 9), the term 'autism' covers "a specific spectrum of disorders in which there is an absence of human relationships and gross impoverishment of mental and emotional life". These impairments, she argues, result from "the blocking of awareness by an early aberrant development of autistic procedures". Lacking clear neurobiological markers autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) are necessarily described in behavioral terms (Lord & Spence, 2006, p. 2; DSM-V, 2013, pp. 50-59). Language – present or absent – plays a central role in the behavior, diagnosis and assessment, as well as in the treatment of individuals with ASD.[2]

Considering the various modes of linguistic iconicity (from the phonetic level to the entire discourse, and from identity to different modes of resemblance and analogy: secondness and thirdness) the emergence of autistic etiology in autistic speech is outlined. This article offers a detailed look at different types of echolalia; pronoun management (especially regarding I-not-I); perception of affinity as exemplified in the use of kinship terms, and content words vs. grammar markers reflecting soft vs. hard.

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[2] Kasher and Meilijson's deliberate decision to restrict their paper "Autism and Pragmatics of Language" (1996) to the reduction of the autistic core impairments to terms of the knowledge required for the various pragmatic categories as they surface in the utterances produced by autistic speakers, irrespective of the autistic etiology, results in a seemingly correspondence between their description and the autistic denominators listed in the DSM-V. Nevertheless, the objective of the DSM being a diagnostic tool is to establish the set of externally perceived symptoms, and so it is not expected to engage in issues such as etiology and causes; Kasher and Meilijson's decision seems unjust. Due to space limit, we are unable to refer to their specific arguments. We suffice here expressing our hope that the current discussion, integrating psychoanalytic conceptualization with linguistic tools will make apparent the necessity to tie linguistic observations concerning autistic linguistic behaviour with clinical conceptualization. Doing so shows that what surfaces as pragmatic oddities, are not, as Kasher and Meilijson argue mental representations shortcomings and matters to do with knowledge and skills, but the iconic manifestations of the autistic separation-individuation state and trauma. Pragmatics viewed, following Kasher and Meilijson, "as the linguistic conditions of appropriate use of sentences in context", these oddities seen from the autistic ruptured context turn out to be not only the most appropriate but iconically imaging that state.

Methodology

Data

The empirical data for the study comes from an authentic handwritten diary and a few letters written between 1991 and 1998 by Hadar Ephratt, supported by my intimate and firm familiarity with her oral style. Hadar (1956-1998), after on- going withdrawal since the age of two, was finally diagnosed with autism at the age of six.[3] She lived her entire adult life in a hostel (Beit-Ganim residence for independent adults with autism in Jerusalem) and worked at Meital (sheltered occupational center for persons with autism). Hadar turned to the diary – notebooks as well as occasional loose sheets of paper – at work and at home, particularly in the last three years of her life when she was coping with breast cancer. The diary consists of hundreds of pages covered in a childishly large handwriting (see below Illustration 1), the graphemes do not accord with the conventional spelling of the words: rather both spelling and spacing follow the sound of speech. The material is authentic: not only isn't it edited (by Hadar or others)[4] but also, her diary style, lacking register competence[5] – in flow, grammar and wording – is identical to her oral (spoken) style (see note 16 below concerning the letters). There are no punctuation marks throughout, except for a full stop at the conclusion of each entry – narrative chunk – stating "*zehu*". (that's it.).[6]

Qualitative Analysis

Mapping excerpts of autistic speech onto iconic qualities of the autistic etiology, involves three facets: language, iconicity and autism. The next section (pp. 7-24) presents and locally analyses the findings from the data, classified according to the degree of iconicity between the specific documented autistic speech (text) and the micro autistic signifiers and states (outlined, e.g., in DSM-V, 2013, pp. 50-59). After that (see pp. 24-27) we synthesize the above groupings and analysis into an integrated picture of the autistic etiology as studied and described in the literature.

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[3] Hadassa Lascar Institute in Jerusalem. Though autism was described (by Kanner back in 1943 and by Asperger in 1944, it entered the DSM only in 1980 (DSM-III). In 1962 the assessment of autism was quite new among Israeli professionals (see e.g., Davidovitch et al., 2013), hindering diagnosis especially in cases such as Hadar's, whose autism was veiled by substantial vocabulary and high cognitive capabilities (see Kanner, 1943 and Asperger, 1944).

[4] Editing is a serious obstacle when attempting to utilize published diaries for the study of the language of autistic persons (see e.g., Sellin Birger, 1993 [1994]).

[5] Register competence is the ability to select between various styles (lexicon and grammar) according to the purpose of communication (diary, letter, the intimacy between the interlocutors (formal, informal) and the medium (such as written, oral, face-to-face or mediated). This lack of register competence might be a case secondary to the autistic state, e.g., resulting from matters to do with tuition, knowledge and learned skills. Not directly originating from the autistic state this too fails to count as support for Kasher and Meilijson's (1996) arguments – see note 2 above.

[6] For notation and translation, see note 9 below.

Analysis of the Linguistic Iconicity of Autistic Speech

One of the milestone denominators of autistic objects is their odd use, a use unlike their common or original function (Kanner, 1973, p. 246; Asperger, 1944, p. 81; Tustin, 1992, p. 5; Amir, 2014, p. 70, see excerpt [14] below, and the quote from Bosch (1970, p. 93) following excerpt [21]). It is, then, not surprising that autistic speech too shows similar peculiarities. Language as a mode of interaction necessitates three elements: two interactants and a need. This is how Amir opens her book *Cleft Tongue: The Language of Psychic Structures*:

> Language is first and foremost a depressive achievement involving both the concession of what cannot be articulated – and the giving up of the symbiosis with the other by acknowledging him or her as a distinct subject. Indeed, acknowledging separation is simultaneously the driving motivation to speak as well as an essential condition for establishing language (2014, p. 1, see also Tustin, 1992, pp. 78-80).

The infant, then acquires and integrates language while it becomes differentiated as a separate self. This separation, which takes place at the formative age between 2 and 3 (referred to as "the Oedipus complex" or by "the introduction to the parental order"), makes absences apparent, thus motivating the call to the other (see Amir, 2014, pp. 1-30; Bosch, 1970, pp. 85-87).

Autistic Muteness as Pure Icon

Autism – when the route of I-not-I differentiation is prematurely cut – surpluses language altogether. Individuals with autism, who do not speak, iconically, reflect *as such* the autistic state of being. This iconic mode of reflection lacks the necessary two-fold quality of a sign: separate and independent content (referent, the 'what') and form (signifier, 'how'). In the absence of separation between form (psychic mutism)[7] and content (confused immature separation, and with no integrated self, which is thus cut-off from the experience of absence and needs) autistic mutism does not *signify* the autistic state but *is* the autistic state per se. Peirce's pure iconicity (firstness), being undifferentiated (such as the a feeling), does not constitute a sign (1965, 2.92; 2.276; 3.1). Autistic mutism is not a form the person with autism uses to communicate her state (by way of the content) – it is one and the same with that state.

Autistic Speech as Iconic Imaging of the Autistic State

Since it is a systematic convention of signification, language falls outside Peirce's pure icon (firstness). When iconic, language signs can only result in iconic signs of secondness

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[7] As DSM-V (2013, p. 51 E) and scholars point out organic or cognitive impairments must first be ruled out.

and thirdness.[8] The *muteness* of the person with autism is not only a symptom, which belongs according to Peirce in the category of indices, i.e., "a sign which signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with it" (1965, Book 3, p. 211, Book 2, p. 179) but a pure icon of the autistic state of being, while autistic *speech* – the object of our investigation – is counter-iconic. Kanner (1943, p. 243) argues that as far as the communicative functions of speech are concerned, there is no fundamental difference between a speaking person with autism and a mute person. We now investigate the semiotic relations holding between the autistic states and the selected typical linguistic behaviors emerging in autistic speech: our first sub-section focuses on echolalia (pp. 8-10); we then focus on similarity (pp. 10-20) and conclude looking at analogy (pp. 20-24).

The iconic qualities of echolalia

Among "[r]estricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities" the DSM-V (2013, p. 50) specifies as DSM denominators "[s]tereotyped or repetitive […] use of objects, or speech (e.g., simple motor stereotypies, lining up toys or flipping objects, echolalia, idiosyncratic phrases)" as well as "[i]nsistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns of verbal or nonverbal behavior".

In essence, echolalia – immediate or delayed echoing of speech (others' or one's own words or phrases) – conceptually covers all the verbal behaviors outlined in the above quote from the DSM. The surface outcome is thus one and the same.

Manifest in speech (verbal-linguistic signs) echolalia does not seem to fit with Peirce's pure icon. Despite the speaking-autistic person's diffuse separateness and disintegrated self (depriving her of the two conditions motivating communication and speech) she does speak, mostly using conventional words and phrases. Further examination of the verbal phenomena listed in the DSM under echolalia, shows that it should be considered as being situated in between symptomatic – index, i.e., associated by contiguity, and –on the other hand - verbal sign which iconically images the autistic states (secondness) or is analogous to them (thirdness).

Reading through hundreds of pages of Hadar's diary, echolalia is prominent: it forms the macro raison d'être of writing the diary and from there on reaches down to the lexical micro level. As she disclosed in the diary it served as a medium for the reproduction of particular texts/narratives over and over again. These pages were not written with a reader (herself or others) in mind. Their writing served the same local and immediate function as any other repetition, such as rocking back and forth on the chair (see the DSM list cited above): soothing and reassuring through repetition. Clearly to this end the semiotic quality of language, namely the communicative use of the signs to convey (to the not-I) content via form is irrelevant.

Excerpt [1] illuminates the characteristic echolalia:

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[8] Physiologically derived sounds, and thus not meant to communicate (they are not a cry for help), genuine exclamation words, are according to Peirce's categorization indexes integrated into the lexicon as linguistic elements. "Ouch", an authentic pain cry, is a canonical example: rather than a sign (onomatopoeic or otherwise) denoting trouble, it is distress as such. Being a sound produced by opening the mouth wide to instantly inhale oxygen for the distressed body, it is a symptom (associated by contiguity, and not by resemblance with its object).

[1] *kaasher hayiti Gan Olami* […] *asu li et ha-shkiat dam ha-dkira ba b-tor haftaa az oto zman Miryam ha-ozeret natna cvitat xiba b-taut baxiti shfoferet mayonez bayit im gag adom*[9]

> Gloss:[10] When [I] was (ps. 1p sg.) {in} Olami Kindergarten […] did (subjectless 3p pl. imprs., =gave me) the blood sedimentation test{.} the puncture came as [a] surprise{.} then same time Miryam the cleaning lady gave (omission of syntactic object: herself as recipient) [an] affectionate pinch by mistake{.} [I] cried (ps. 1p sg.){.} {"}mayonnaise tube{.} [a] house/home with [a] red roof{".}[11]

As apparent, not only were the fixed, stuck-together, idiosyncratic compounds "mayonnaise tube" and "[a] house/home with a red roof" unrelated to each other, they were also unrelated to the specific context. In stressful situations or when Hadar deliberately tensed herself, she produced them for the sake of repetition. As a ritualized verbal pattern (detached of any lexical meaning) this example of echolalia constitutes not only a symptom (form connected with object by cause and effect relations) but also a pure icon (associated by identity – lack of separation) of the autistic state.

As indicated in DSM-V, echolalic ritualized verbal patterns are a subclass of other (non-verbal) ritualized patterns. As is the case here, such verbal patterns may initially have been created by the autistic speaker, but by ritualizing them the option of a new production is blocked (see also Amir, 2014, pp. 76-90). Moreover, the autistic state of detachment from the experience of self makes the issue of source – whether it is the speaker's own text; idiomatic literary language, or someone else's regular (non-pathological) speech – immaterial. Accordingly, the person with autism experiences the repetition of her own speech in the same way as she experiences observing her own photos (see [7] below). As it is an external retrieval of ready-made speech, echolalia contrasts with spontaneously generated speech. Such stereotyped speech is external to the unique situation and context.

This brings us to echolalia not as a pure icon but as a diagram (secondness) in which the repetitive quality of the linguistic signifiers iconically resembles their referents (contents).

A phenomenon typically associated with autistic echolalia involves self designation. As detailed below (see pp. 10-16) not all forms and incidents of shifted pronominal deixis

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[9] For each excerpt, a broad transliteration of the Hebrew text is followed by an English glossary equivalent of the idiosyncratic content and form. Inevitably, the gloss appears as ungrammatical, incomplete or otherwise deficient odd sentences (see note 4 above). For convenience, proper names are capitalized in the transliteration.

[10] Gloss notations: round brackets are reserved for additional grammatical information; square brackets are used to list linguistic elements implicit in the Hebrew grammar but explicit in English. For clarity essential punctuation marks, prepositions and conjunctions were added in curled brackets.
Abbreviations of grammatical information (mainly regarding inflection): first person = 1p; second person = 2p; third person = 3p; past = ps.; participle = prtc.; future = ft.; impersonal (neuter) = imprs.; singular – sg.; plural = pl.; masculine = ms. and feminine = fm.

[11] On the significance of these events, see pp. 20-22 below.

should be attributed to echolalia. Still, some incidents of the use of second person pronoun to designate oneself clearly originate in echolalia. Such is Hadar's invariable use of an enclitic second person suffix when she tells of harmful or negative incidents resulting from (deliberate or uncontrolled) deeds in which she has been the agent. She then uses formulaic Hebrew collocations such as "*ole lak al ha-acabim*" (E: gets on your nerves, see [9] below); "*biglalek*" (E: owing to you) and "*lo letaamek*" (E: not to your taste) – all in the second person, as if replicating the negative comments she received (in response to her reprehensible deeds) but without adjusting perspectives to herself as the thematic object, which would require grammatical first person.

Secondness

Peirce's secondness consists of signs in which form resembles content but is not identical with it. Such resemblance could be similarity between the signifier and the referent, or similarity between significant features of the form and qualities of the referent. Secondness is exemplified here by the autistic iconic use of person pronouns and markers (I not-I, pp. 10-16 below) and content words vs. procedural (structural) grammar markers (soft vs. hard relations, pp. 16-18 below).

Modes of designating oneself which iconically image the autistic state

As mentioned a key verbal behavior associated with autism is the "use of 'you' when referring to self" (see DSM-V, 2013, p. 54).

Communication and the use of language in general, and the symbolic (non-echolalic, see above) use of the pronoun "I" – referring to self, the first person speaker in particular - necessitates an internal notion of self, yielding differentiation between I and not-I. In view of the process of intrapsychic development, it is no coincidence that in normal language acquisition infants master this faculty around the formative age of 30 months (see e.g., Bosch, 1970, p. 109; Cruttenden, 1977; Clark, 1978; Berman, 1985, pp. 273, 303-308). First person pronoun markers are unique in that in any possible normal-natural context (excluding artificial situations such as an actor on stage, or when one quotes direct speech) it is only the individual speaker who can use first person pronouns and markers, and when doing so she necessarily refers to herself. In contrast with second, third and impersonal pronouns (such as "you" "she", "we" or zero [Ø]) no two speakers can use "I" (or "me", "mine") to designate one and the same person. This is why the appropriate use of "I" cannot be grasped and learned by rote mimic. The infant does not hear "I" referring to itself. Apart from integrated self, separation and grammatical competence, the successful acquisition of first person markers requires flexibility supported by play and inference.

Bosch (1970) points out that (what he terms) the confusion of personal pronouns in autistic language is consistent and regular (by no means random), springing, according to him, from the autistic etiology and state. Contrary to typically developing infants' initially mixed use of pronouns, autistic speakers do not only persist in this behavior but also, as Bosch pointed out, stick to a replacement of "you" for "I" but not the reverse (see e.g., Tustin, 1992, p. 54).

The establishment of a mature notion of self – I not-I – becomes manifest in the distinctive choices a person makes between the possibilities offered by the grammatical

and pragmatic system (see Kasher and Meilijson, 1996, but see note 2 above). Hebrew, being a synthetic (heavily morphologically marked) language, offers rich options. Grammatical markers indicating pronominal forms for deixis indicating the speaker's perspective emerge in the morpho-syntactic inflection of verbs (tenses); in an explicit pronominal form and in its subject syntactic agreement with the verb and in the object's (dative possession, patient) case roles (Berman, 1985). Moreover, verbs and adjectives are usually marked for gender. Usually, we say, because when we face or hear the subject speaking of herself (first person) this grammatical information is pragmatically redundant, and so no grammatical marker designating the first person is marked for gender.

This morpho-syntactic richness constantly compels the young Hebrew speaker to take a stand: to identify in each event and utterance the grammatical relations and qualities (including gender) which hold between her as a speaker and the participants and objects occupying the various syntactic roles. This entails intricate manifestations of self-imaging in the speech of Hebrew speaking persons with autism. The choice of signs – personal pronouns and markers - is iconic to the pragmatic locus (I-not-I) of the speaker. Being part of an acquired language signification system it is beyond the quality of pure icons.

First person markers when referring to others – be it the addressee or a third person – were categorically non-existent in Hadar's oral speech and diaries (see note 16 below), and so this reversal was no option in her pragmatic-grammatical inventory. The fact that when referring to herself she used first person markers such as "*ani*" (E: I); "*-i*" enclitic suffix for verb past tense inflection and object pronouns (E: "me"; 'mine') as one option, by no means reduced her use of second person, third person (including her own proper name, at times followed by her family name) forms, as well as the impersonal form and inanimate pronouns to refer to herself. In fact, in light of the standard obligatory use of first person markers in the appropriate pragmatic circumstances her use of first person as one option among a rich inventory is iconic, and so telling.

[2] *bikashti lhitkaleax levad b-kohot acmex*
   Gloss: [I] asked ("-*ti*": ps. 1p sg.) to shower alone on her own ("-*ek*": 2p fm. sg., literally: with her own power){.}

Excerpt [2] exemplifies some of the options Hadar used to refer to herself. Even though an explicit realization of the subject role: "*ani bikashti*" (E: I asked) is quite common in Hebrew, the obligatory realization of first person singular verb inflection ("-*ti*" "*bikashti*") unequivocally determines the subject (as the speaker) making the subject's explicit mention redundant, so that it is often left out. This phrasing coincides with standard conversational and written Hebrew. The grammatical and lexical choices made so far iconically match the message: an independent (separate) self wishing to shower – an activity conducted in privacy –unaccompanied by others, relying on her own abilities. But the use of the second person "*acmex*" (in place of the expected first person "*acmi*") challenges the entire picture. This phenomenon attested throughout the corpus rules out parapraxes or a grammatical agreement error or a pragmatic shortcoming (see note 2 above). In the specific context of [2] it seems to result from the autistic state perpetuated by echolalic segments (see above).

[3] *b-ikar ein li al ma lihyot lehuta zehu ha-goral shel Hadar v-nosaf l-ze at isha mevugeret bat41 kimaat zkena* […] *zehu ha-mazal ha-ra shel Hadar lo ba mi-ha-leida v-gam regishut yeter* […]

> Gloss: Mainly there is nothing for me to be enthusiastic (prtc. fm. sg.) about₍.₎ that's Hadar's fate₍;₎ and in addition you [are a] grown[-up]/adult woman aged41 almost [an] old [woman] […] that's Hadar's bad luck₍.₎ ₍it did₎ not come (ps. 3p ms. sg.) from the birth and also hypersensitivity […]

Excerpt [3] illustrates three modes standing here for self reference: the standard dative first person article "*li*" (E: me); her proper (given) name "Hadar" (twice) and the object second person feminine pronoun "*at*" (E: you, fem. sing.). Customarily, speakers would state their proper name (given name, possibly followed by their family name) only in the mode of introduction. The speaker may mention her addressee's name (but not her own) as the second person referent of the vocative case, i.e., for addressing that addressee or drawing her attention. A third person's name is commonly used by the speaker to refer to that person.

Unlike with the use of second person above (see pp. 8-10), the content and grammar of [3] clearly rule out echolalia as an explanation. This is a narrative Hadar kept telling herself. The use here of second person and given name (third person) iconically images the content of her utterance as well as her alienated state: lacking a sense of self, and thus feeling no control over her own fate.[12]

A moving expression of detachment and relatedness to self is articulated, iconically using "recited" first person, proper name ("our Hadar") in the following excerpt in which she relates to her coming death:

[4] *ani roca lamut kaasher yihye b-mea v-esrim b-kever shaxor axarei ha-bdika b-yom rishon ha-rofim lexlitu ken ishpuz b-Shaare Zedek o Hadaasah Ein Karem od nituax lhoci et gush yesh li xaze nituax plasti mi-ze yakol lamet yekola lamut ze az nigmar Hadar shelanu* […] *vilava shelax shaa 9 ba-boker bi-mkom ze tavo xanixa xavera xadasha shma gam Hadar b-gil yoter cair bat shmone esare* […]

> Gloss: I want (prtc. sg. fm.) to die when be (ft. 3p ms.) in hundred twenty in [a] black tomb₍.₎ after the check up on Sunday the doctors decided (3p pl. typos.) yes to hospitalization in Shaare Zedek or Hadassah Ein Kerem (medical centers) another operation to remove the lump I've got chest plastic surgery from this (one) can die (ms.) (one / I) can die (fm.)[13] from this₍.₎ so finished (over) with our Hadar […] your

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[12] Hadar's statement in [3] that she was not, so to say, born into this state, is one of many texts in which Hadar grants us an innocent first-hand report of the autistic state, which matches – and so supports – academic studies and theses concerning autism and persons with autistic spectrum disorder (see e.g., Kanner, 1943, p. 250, see also note 23 below).

[13] The psycholinguistic (as well as metalinguistic) notion of "repair" entails I not-I awareness, as if to say: I produced an erroneous utterance and in order to get my message successfully across to my addressee I must repair this shortcoming (see e.g., Keen, 2003). Throughout hundreds of pages of Hadar's writing, she never crossed out a single word. "Can die (fm.)" immediately following "(one) can die (ms.) (one / I)" (in [4]) could be a single case of verbal repair. Alternatively, it could be

funeral (typos.) 9 in the morning{.} in place of this{.} [a] new resident{.} member (or friend) also named Hadar in [a] younger age eighteen [years] old […]

Hadar uses various modes to refer to her (dying) self: explicit first person subject position "I"; first person possession (I've got = my lump); subjectless: "Ø can die" (I can die); impersonal (neuter) and proper name "finished with our Hadar" (see [4a] below); second person (your funeral) as well as inanimate pronoun ("instead of this": me) referring to herself.

Excerpt [4a], drawn from a different notebook of the diary, presents the same narrative but offers other verbal means and context:

[4a] *maxar horidu et ʧfarim tamuti lo yihye yoter Hadar nexapes Hadar xanixa axeret xadasha*

Gloss: Tomorrow removed (subjectless ft. 3p pl. imprs.) stitches{.} die (subjectless ft. 2p sg.) {.} not be (ft.) Hadar anymore{.} search (ft. 1p pl.) Hadar another new resident{.}

The self-reference in [4] and [4a] which is iconic to the autistic state, is immensely amplified in light of the content of these excerpts. Facing (early) death and lacking the sense of self and of holding, a form of continuance – such as in the memory of others – is not perceived as an option. Her use of "our" (our Hadar) in [4] and "another" ("another Hadar") in [4a] as if to narrow the semiotic/pragmatic extension of "Hadar" seems to render her perception of names as common nouns or adjectival tags and not as onomastic, persons' proper names. This is not an impairment to do with knowledge (see Kasher and Meilijson 1996, and note 2 above) but a linguistic behavior iconically imaging the autistic objectification of persons and words (see pp. 24-27 below). In the next excerpts, Hadar's use of the second person pronoun (in place of the grammatically expected first person) iconically depicts her mental as well as physical reality:

[5] *ani kol ha-zman meyallelet mekateret boxa coeket coraxat ad ha-shamayim doreshet dvarim ani lo yexola lkabel noshexet et acmaex ha-yadayim male siman shel xabalot*

Gloss: All time long I whine{.} grumble{.} cry{.} shriek{.} scream to high heaven{.} order things I can't get{.} bite (all verbs in the prtc. fm. sg. form) herself{.} the hands full [of] wound's mark{.}

The grammatical formation iconically images the phenomenon of objectification: her body, the hands she bites, as well as the wound marks she notices (made by her own teeth) are experienced as objects external to herself: not "my hands" but "the hands" (see also Bosch, 1970, p. 94). This accords with the apparent absence of an authentic expression of internal pain formed using first person: she reports on observing the wounds but not on sensing them.

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explained as an unmarked form (ms.) expressing an aphorism, followed by reference to herself (fm.), or it could also be a double statement broken into masculine and feminine. The matter of verbal repair is of importance concerning autistic speakers, as it concerns speech act management (see Keen, 2003) not as raw pragmatic and socio-pragmatic competence (see Kasher and Meilijson, 1996 on repair, and see note 2 above) but as linguistic behaviour originating from I not-I distinction, absence and need. Unfortunately, these issues cannot be pursued here.

The apparent gap between hypersensitivity (see [3] above) and the detachment in [4] is well attested concerning autism in general, and in Hadar's case seems to be settled by the distinction between external tangible sensual stimuli (such as heat or noise) to which she was hyper-sensitive and internal self-inflicted physical pain to which she appeared indifferent (see p. 18 below, but see also pp. 20-24 below).

Excerpt [6] illustrates another situation, iconically expressed by means of the second person possession suffix:
[6] […] *kimaat lo sholetet al acmex*
 Gloss: […] almost (literally hardly) not control (prtc. fm. sg.) on (sic., see following [7] below) yourself{.}

This could well be a case of echolalia (see [2] above), but the qualification of the verb 'control' by what seems an unexpected and inappropriate quantifying adverb "*kimaat*", as well as the content, reinforces its reading as iconically imaging the lack of control over the self.

A broader sense of detachment emerges in reports such as the one about looking through her own photo album [7] and when reporting dreams [8]:

[7] […] *ha-albom lo shel ha-yaldut Hadar smexa kmo ciyeru oti axrei keev beten* […] *cilum al Hadar lifnei ha-shad* […]
 Gloss: […] the album {.} not of childhood {.} Hadar [is] happy like drew (subjectless ps. 3p pl.) me after [a] tummy ache […] [a] photo on (sic) Hadar before the breast […]

The situation of looking through a photo album in general and one own's in particular, seems to amplify the autistic state: the categorical demarcation between looking at oneself and looking at others is blurred, as well as, that between echoing (photo) and imaging (drawing), as the excerpt bears out.[14] Hadar's grammatical "error" replacing "of" with "on/about" (see also [6] and [15]) further distances her self from the situation, resulting in a story-like reporting about something (not-I).

[8] […] *halaxti lanuax ba-xeder taxat smixa im az xalamti eize xalom* […] *Hadar yocet l-biluy la-ir beit tixo beit kafe oxelet salat* […] *Hadar b-gil axer lifnei ha-mashber shel Sima lo rak im shad axat shtei shadayim bli gushim ba-shad*
 Gloss: […] [I] went (ps. 1p sg.) to rest in the room under the blanket with then [I] dreamt (ps. 1p sg.) a dream […] Hadar goes (prtc. fm. sn.) out [on an] outing to town{.} Ticho House (a restaurant in Jerusalem) {.} coffee shop { } eating (prtc. fm. sg.) salad […] Hadar in a different age before the Sima crisis{.}[15] not only with one breast two breasts without lumps in the breast{.}

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[14] This resembles Peirce's example of pure iconicity "So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream – not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon". (1965, Book 3, p. 211).

[15] Hadar refers here to an incident which she associates with a teacher named Sima. Ever since her childhood, Hadar considers this event as a major crisis.

The following modes show up when Hadar refers to herself in her dream report: the grammatical first person verb suffix (see [2] above); her own given name (as if designating a third person) and a zero alternant in place of the missing subject expected (obligatory) first person pronoun ("ani" E: I) of the verb "to eat". The latter results in an impersonal (neuter) form (a "fourth person" as it were), i.e., no specific person.

In her oral speech Hadar's mode of designating her addressee was systematically fixed with no modifications.[16] As mentioned, she reserved first and second person verbal affixes and pronouns to refer to herself and not to refer to the second person (see above Bosch 1970). Proper name: given name, often followed by family name or by adjectival tags of very specific semantic fields (e.g., "Tamar Ephratt your [referring to her] mother") or the zero alternate resulting in the impersonal, were the two forms Hadar used for referring to second and third person (as said these, along with other standard and nonstandard forms, also served to refer to herself (see e.g., [8] above). Interestingly she scarcely used third person pronouns such as "*hi*" (E: she); "*hu*" (E: he); "*hem*" (E: they) and "*hen*" (E: they fem.).

The autistic state is iconically reflected not only by the shift of pronouns and pronominal markers but also by the blurring of case roles such as agent and patient. This is illustrated in excerpt [9]:

[9] *hitnahagti ha-yom al ha-boker kmo yalda mufraat ktana craxot bexi ceaakot ad ha-shamayim az ha-cevet ala lax al ha-acabim*

    Gloss: [I] behaved (ps. 1p sg.) today since the morning like a troubled (fm. sg.) small (fm. sg.) girl (fm. sg.) {.} shriek{.} cry{.} scream to high heaven{.} then the staff got on your nerves{.}

The content as well as pragmatic roles reveal role switching: her behavior got on her own nerves (in place of the staff's nerves). This excerpt, concluding the matter of first person designation, adds a fifth mode, hitherto not encountered: leaving out herself as an initiator, a human agent. As opposed to zero alternate for unspecified impersonal verbal form, ellipsis, by omitting any trace of the doer, iconically materializes here in the absence of a verb. This entire utterance ([9]) consists of a flat amalgamate of nouns, in which even the cries and screams a living agent necessarily produces are objectized as detached entities.

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[16] Hadar use to send out letters on special occasions such as new-year, and thank-you letters. Letters are the typical written appeal to a second person, but it is not by accident that the style of Hadar's letters, which in many respects resembles her oral speech and her diary style, differs tremendously when it comes to stylistic letter writing peculiarities. These peculiarities are further reinforced due to the ceremonial nature of greeting letters: they are not spontaneous, may even be dictated, or phrased, by a member of staff (in the hostel or in the work place). Never in oral encounters did Hadar express any interest in her interlocutor. A letter consisting of formulaic questions such as "How are you doing?" stands out as inauthentic, both in its form (second person pronoun for the addressee) and in its contents. This oddity, firstly for Hadar (as the writer), showed up in one particular letter in which all modes of reference (including one incident of first person pronoun) to the addressee appeared in a mess.

This morpho-syntactic iconic structuring serves to point out one more deficiency characteristically associated with the construction of interaction that constitutes the topic-comment (theme-rheme) relations in an utterance. Being aware of the separation of I-not-I, the speaker (I) bases the new information she wishes to communicate to the not-I on what she believes to be shared, known information (see Chafe, 1976). The topic of the sentence presents the latter, whereas a distinct predicate provides the new information (rheme). Mastering this division of communicative labor between theme and rheme is part of intersubjective, and thus discursive-pragmatic, competence.[17] The absence of a theme in [9] deprives the addressee (not-I) of the shared information and prevents the differentiated designation of the doer and her deeds.

Pronoun references are linguistic signs. The odd linguistic – morpho-pragmatic – choice of articles, i.e., mismatch between the two (independent) phases of these signs: the pronominal form and its content (the reference) in autistic speech iconically parallels the autistic state of being.

As explained, unlike mutism (see p. 7 above) any use of language, in so far as it involves signs (resulting from the diagrammatic merging of an independent form with content) is not pure iconicity. Yet, the bringing together of certain independent yet non-arbitrary elements (modes designating self and image of self) is indeed iconic, and thus telling.

Content words vs. grammar markers: soft vs. hard relations

Being a system of signs language includes two complementary elements: content words and structural-procedural words. Content words are lexemes such as nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, denoting referents in the world. These could be objects or events, real or imagined, internal or external, objective or subjective. Structure words, such as affixes and articles, prepositions, conjunctions and discourse markers, are responsible for structuring the relations in the particular linguistic unit (construct form, sentence or discourse) and so produce hierarchy and cohesion within and among units.

Focusing now on the management of content words and procedural words in Hadar's texts, we notice that the line dividing between content words and procedural words should not be considered categorical. Instead it should be drawn between particles (grammar and discourse markers) governed by formal rules (particular to the specific language) irrespective of meaning, on the one hand, and pragmatically governed markers on the other.

The former constitute the objective and rigid container or skeleton holding the subjective, flexible and changing (speaker and context dependent) content. Hadar's overall linguistic behavior complied with the grammatical rules directly associated with the skeleton: number, tense and gender inflections and other grammatical articles show up where Hebrew grammar (morphology and syntax, see also Kanner, 1943, p. 144) prescribes them. But their content does not match the referents and the relations obtaining in the world. As we have seen, once the grammatical forms are determined (such as second

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[17] This too is of importance concerning the autistic speaker. Due to space constraints the issue of given vs. new in light of the perception of the not-I (as e.g. question-answer; definite article and proper names vs. descriptions, etc.) cannot be pursued here.

person designating oneself) the grammatical agreement rules follow intact. The same also was true regarding prepositions, e.g., [6], [7] and [15], in which case a preposition was syntactically present ("*al*" E: on / about) but its odd semantic selection was the outcome of her odd perception of herself as a figure in a story or in a photo album.

Conjunctions (such as "and", "but", "if" and "because") are responsible for the coherence of the text, prepositions – half way in between grammar and pragmatics – designate relations. As such, they comprise the textual skeleton. Amir (2014, 75-90) cleverly portrays the autistic syntax as the inverse use of an organ point. A musical organ point is a sustained tone that interacts with the changing music to create polyphony (harmony, disharmony, continuation and shift).[18] The autistic inverse use of a psychic organ point, says Amir (2014, p. 77)

is […] a similar phenomenon, in which what was meant to be the framing structure

refuses to be erased, to fade and take the status of a background […] Instead of

affording a base for flexibility and renewal – the sustained organ point becomes a

dominant, exclusive content.

Conjunctions, linguistically categorized as structure words, constituting the (hard) vertebra – the linguistic skeleton – are therefore expected to be intact in the autistic syntax (on hard/soft see below). But this anticipation is tricky, because conjunctions are not determined by formal grammar but by the flexible semantic and pragmatic relationships which obtain in the world. Moreover, it is the very essence of conjectures to connect and relate (see Amir 2014, 87). Hadar's habit to leave out conjunctions iconically reflects the nature of the (inner) skeleton: the rigid links are there but they are disjoint, failing to carry a firmly integrated narrative:

[10] *tiyul shabat mata shel ha-shzifim nixnas li anaf b-tox ha-ayin halxu l-tipul*
    Gloss: {on / during} Sabbath outing { } orchard of the plums {then/suddenly} [a] branch went into my eye { } went (subjectless ps. 3p pl.) for treatment{.}

The cause and effect link missing in [4a] between "tomorrow removed stitches" and "[I'll] die" or the absence of a temporal conjunction in excerpt [12] below (and see [17]-[20] below), are classified as structure words, thus belonging to the linguistic skeleton, but reflect the pragmatic (content) relations and states existing in the referent (outer world). In line with the omission of conjunctures is the apparent absence of punctuation marks. Punctuation marks are orthographic notations for paralanguistic oral expressions such as prosody and intonation. They belong in the pragmatic discursive phase, which is

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[18] Amir's distinction between hard (syntax) and soft (semantics) tying up with Tustin's (1992, pp. 92-134, and see below) explanation of the autistic dialectical experience of soft v. hard, seems a clear case illuminating the loss resulting from Kasher and Meilijson (1996) isolating syntax being intact in autistic speech and pragmatic impaired from the autistic etiology and context of being, and so overlooking its iconic psychic context (see note 2 above).

not governed by grammar rules. The absence of punctuation marks (except for an automatic − ritualized − full stop at the conclusion of each narrative chunk − stating "*zehu*". (=E: that's it.)) reflects the autistic person's stilted monotonous intonation (along with non-varied facial expressions), all iconic to the autistic state (see DSM-V, 2013, p. 54). As discussed in pp. 24-27, there seems to be iconic similarity between the intricate hard and soft relations in the experience of the person with autism of self and world (content) and the above mentioned linguistic relations between grammatical form and lexical content. Strict compliance with rigid grammar rules is part of the soothing encompassing function of repetition: grammar rules are the ritual of language but when they serve as inverse organ point they expel (inner) content altogether.

Autistic perception of affinity: affection and kinship

The failed achievement of mature differentiation between I and not-I manifests itself on the psychic intersubjective level in severe deficits in social communication and social interaction and on the external sensory level in "hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input or unusual interest in sensory aspects of the environment" (DSM-V, 2013, p. 50).

The autistic mode of being is often described as a glass dome or a cocoon to which the child or person with autism clings as a concrete wrap or shield.

In typically developed language usage, the speaker wishing to contact and communicate with the other, uses the uniform rigid grammar − language skeleton − to support and transmit her unique, individual, flexible creative content: stories, emotions, experiences, thoughts and the constant flow of feeling in the self. It is fascinating to see how in Hadar's autistic expressions the ostensibly plain use of content words, such as words denoting emotions or kinship terms, turns out, when referring to their immediate (linguistic) context, to be a superfluous application. This empties them from their internal-emotional depth, and so all that is left is reference to an external concrete referent. Such was the case regarding will and independence in [2]. We now look at longing:

[11] *kaasher mishehu nosea l-xuc la-aarec xodesh wa-xeci shana wa-xeci mi-rov gaaguim xazaqim mkablim harbe matanot*

Gloss: When someone goes abroad a month and-a-half a year and-a-half₍,₎ ₍abundant with₎ strong longings ₍ ₎ (subject omission) receive (prtcp. pl. imprs.) many presents₍.₎

"Strong longings" is a common expression denoting the emotion aroused by the absence of someone close and meaningful, often in the context of travel abroad. But in the specific context such emotionally expressive use of the word is ruled out disclosing instead a rigid concrete give-and-take transaction: physical absence reimbursed with gifts. The phrasing of this excerpt iconically presents this objectization: rigid grammatical articles, such as inflectional number agreement, are intact. Yet not only are prepositions (such as "[for] a month"); cause and effect prepositions or conjunctions (such as "a month and-a-half [and] a year and-a-half") missing, like in the absence of immediate contact with the distant person, here too there are no people: longing is detached from its intersubjective personal experience and so described in terms of objects (see Asperger, 1944, pp. 70-78 and note 57 there).

Another typical case is one in which the broader context of an emotion word affords a perception of inner content (emotions) in terms of external – visual appearance. Here is Hadar's report on her mother's visit, when her mother took her to a close-by supermarket for a treat and Hadar misbehaved:

[12] *osa carot l-ima mdaberet shtuyot gasuyot zoreket avanim ba-avir* […] *az ima baxta mi-rov kaas*

   Gloss: (subjectless) makes (prtcp. fm. sg.) trouble for Mummy{.} talks (prtcp. fm. sg.) nonsense{.} rude (words) {.} (subjectless) throws (prtcp. fm. sg.) stones in the air […] so Mummy cried (ps. 3p fm. sg) out of much anger{.}[19]

Sobbing – shedding tears – is a distinct visual manifestation of (internal) grief. Hadar misinterpreted this appearance as an expression of anger instead of expression of sorrow, because the former is a feeling directed outwards whereas sorrow is internal.

Similar instances of emotional voiding of content words also show up in the resemblance between the autistic state and language preferences of other content words. Here we confine the discussion to a unique group – that of the semantic field of kinship – as it emerges from Hadar's writings. What seems at first to be standard innocent use of kinship content words turns out to render a blurred distant affinity.

[13] […] *doda Bettie xavera shel ima mi-anglia anti Bettie ihayta haxi elegantit*

   Gloss: […] Auntie Bettie [a] friend (fm.) of Mummy from England{.} Auntie (in English, see note 26) Bettie was (ft. 3p fm. sg.) the most elegant{.}

[14] […] *ha-xaverot krovei mishpaxa shel ha-axayot sheli Michal ve-Shira b[a]-kita ha-cofim beit-sefer avdu* […]

   Gloss: […] The friends (fm.) family relatives of my sisters Michal and Shira in the class{.} scouts{.} school worked (ps. 3p pl.) […]

Hadar's frequent use of "friend" along with the mention of kinship terms reveals ignorance of the variations of intimacy holding between I and not-I: the expected distinction between siblings and friends (both belong to peer group) is missing: her mother's sister is a friend, her own sisters' friends are their relatives but not (transitively) her relatives. In light of this estrangement, Hadar's use of the third person possessive pronoun ("your") when referring to her own sister, as in

[15] *yesh li zikronot tovim mi-ha-avar al tiyul b-shxunat Talbiya yaxad im Michal axotex*

   Gloss: I have good memories from the past on (sic.)[20] a walk in [the] Talbiya neighborhood together with Michal your sister{.}

seems to be entailed by plain reciting (see pp. 8-10 above) but more so by the blurring of soft – internal – affinity in general and sisterhood in particular. DSM-V (2013, p. 50) lists among the signifiers of autistic spectrum disorder "Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple contexts"; "3. Deficitsin

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[19] The entire excerpt telling of herself is phrased in a style reminiscent of a story mode: subjectless, verbs are inflected as participle feminine singular.
[20] See discussion of "al" (E; on) following excerpt [7] above.

developing, maintaining and understanding relationships". The kinship setting as encountered here is iconic to the autistic state because it does not result from lack of understanding and pragmatic skills (see note 2 above) but originates from psychic developmental breakdown in which separation and thus hierarchies of intimacy– from the most intimate (I) to gradually more distant circles within the not-I – were not established and so could not be internally experienced.

Excerpt [16] illustrates the objectization of family relations, rendering the above ([13], [14], [15]) lexical use unequivocal:

[16] *harasti et* […] *shover galim shel aba davar nadir axat b-mino davar yakar kmo ha-dubi shel Hedva yakar kmo axot ba-mishpaxa*

> Gloss: [I] ruined (ps. 1p sg.) […] Daddy's breakwater [a] rare thing$_{\{:\}}$ one in a kind$_{\{,\}}$
> [a] precious thing like Hedva's teddy-bear$_{\{,\}}$ precious like [a] sister in the family$_{\{.\}}$

To express what the shiny chrome model of a (dock's) breakwater means to her, Hadar compares it to a sister in the family and to her classmate's teddy-bear. This excerpt is most impressive in the way it captures the nature of autistic objects as opposed to transitional objects. It will shortly feature again regarding iconic analogy and in the synthesis (p. 26 below; see the quote from Bosch, 1970, p. 93).

Thirdness: Language is analogical to the autistic state

The iconic quality of analogy (Peirce's thirdness) clusters phenomena in which likeness does not inhere in the sign itself, i.e., through direct resemblance between form and contents (as in pp. 10-20 above), but is obtained by intermediate parallelism between two signs: sign A resembles sign B by way of quality X. Metaphor is a classic instance of such relations.

To illuminate the analogical relations that obtain between form (Hadar's language) and content (the autistic state) we look further into the autistic tendency for concreteness and the route of objectization as they operate in Hadar's world and as they manifest by analogy in her language.

Ever since Hadar was small – as she repeatedly said (in complaint and with frustration) and as she described in her diary – she had been oversensitive to heat (sun, stoves, cigarettes, car exhausts). Also she would not tolerate nicknames such as hypocoristic pet derivations of her proper name (such as "*Hadari*"; "*Hadarile*") or words of endearment such as "*motek*" (E: sweetie), labels such as "*gveret*" (E: lady), not to mention debasing words such as "*tipsha*" (E: stupid).[21] She hated and dreaded them and was constantly on guard doing all she could to avoid sensing heat or hearing such words (at times, she would deliberately provoke such situations as an excuse to burst out, ruin an event or

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[21] See Freud (1913, p. 54-55) words on taboo upon names, where he says that "As was only to be expected, obsessional neurotics behave exactly like savages in relation to names. Like other neurotics, they show a high degree of 'complexive sensitiveness' in regard to uttering or hearing particular words and names; and their attitude towards their own names imposes numerous, and often serious, inhibitions upon them".

draw attention). As Hadar portrays in the following four excerpts, words sting and penetrate, thus, in the same way as heat, forming a threat to the shield".

[17] […] *ha-shemesh ba-xuc yom shel kayic xamsin meod xam 35 maalot kmo erec micrayim ha-sipur shel pesax yeciat micrayim ba-hagada shel pesax ose li dkira ba-yad soref li ba-haref kmo maxat sika xada mashke im gazim bira soda tempo ambatia xama rotaxat akica shel dvora dabur*

> Gloss: The sun outside: [a] summery day{,} heat-wave{,} very warm 35 centigrade like Egypt countryside the story of Passover{,} exodus from Egypt{,} Passover legend{.} makes (=causes, no subject, possibly referring back to the sun) a prick in the hand{,} burns my back/neckline like{:} [a] needle{;} [a] sharp pin{;} carbonated beverage{;} bear{;} soda{;} Tempo (generic use of the trade name of an Israeli soda brand) {;} hot boiling bath {and} [a] sting of [a] bee {or} [a] hornet{.}[22]

[18] *lakaxti ugiot shokolad asa li ba-lashon kmo motek kaasher hayiti ktana baxiti cavtu oti amru li motek*

> Gloss: [I] took (ps. 1p sg.) chocolate biscuits {this/they} made (=caused, ps. 3p sg.) me (object of main verb missing) in the tongue{. / this is} like {verb or action missing}{the word "} sweetie["]{,} when [I] was (ps. 1p sg) small{. / and} [I] cried (ps. 1p sg.) {because} pinched me (subjectless – ps. 3p pl. imprs.) me {and/or} said (ibid.) to me{:} {"}sweetie{ .}

[19] *ani yashavti ba-salon raiti toxnit l-yeladim hayta mila ba-ot tet ani haxi sonet kmo eizo dkira shel maxat caakti mi-ze ad lev ha-shamayim*

> Gloss: I (explicit subject) sat (ps. 1p sg.) in the lounge [I] saw (watched, ps. 1p sg.) [a] program for children{,} there was [a] word with the letter *tet* (to avoid uttering "forbidden" words Hadar used to refer to them by their initial letter, she here alludes to the word "*tipsha*" E: stupid) {which} I hate (prtc. fm. sg.) most{,} {this felt} like some prick of [a] needle{,} [I] screamed (ps. 1p sg.) from this (as a result) to high heaven{,}

[20] […] *ha-xom shel ha-mitbax kmo cvita ba-yad o cbitat xiba*

> Gloss: The heat of the kitchen {is} like [a] pinch in the hand or [an] affection pinch{,}

The four excerpts lay out the analogical shift between physical sensations (such as heat or a prick) and words. The analogy goes through physical penetration and the existential threat to the fictive frail shield. This parallelism is the outcome of the objectization of words, the iconic sensory perception of sounds – words – as concrete physical objects. But the above words reveal that an additional layer of objectization takes place, and this is the materialization of emotions as concrete external objects: sharp, hard and physically penetrating, and not as psychic-internal soft experiences, such as pain or humiliation.[23]

Excerpts [1], [18] and [20] provide a connection to the succession of events that led to the associations emerging in the iconic-metonymic shifts. In these excerpts Hadar alludes to

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[22] On the apparent absence of conjunctions and punctuation marks and the lack of coherence see pp. 16-18 above.

[23] The similarities between this iconic objectization and the phenomenon of nominal realism, the nature of the particular words (see Segal, 1957) and the matter of taboo words, are beyond the scope of this article (see note 21 above).

physical pinching (a child's cheek) as a way of showing affection, probably occasionally accompanied by verbal expressions such as pet names. Hadar often expressed her belief that an early experience (aged two, see note 3 above) of shock evoked by a brutal injection had caused her autism.[24] The affectionate pinch like the unexpected vaccination (see [1]) were both intrusive acts performed by adults, who instead of protecting her, let her down by brutally penetrating her young fragile shield. Through objectization these traumatic experiences were analogically extended to any sudden sense of intrusion (as listed in excerpt [17]).

The high register language, most apparent in the intensive use of idioms, strongly associated with the speech of Asperger individuals has puzzled researchers. The central characteristics of idioms, propagating their use in mundane (non-pathological) registers, are the fact that they are memorized, frozen collocations (not generated by the speaker) and carried over from past cultural heritage (which also explains their figurative vocabulary). Despite the object-based attraction of some persons with autism to sounds (see below) the salience of idioms in the speech of Asperger and other individuals with autism spectrum disorder has nothing to do with esthetic sensitivity or preference (such as hyperlexia). It is the outcome of their iconic use of ready-made segments. This explains why these speakers equally recite slang or even texts in foreign languages (see e.g., Kanner, 1943, p. 238). It is most striking that the non-pathologic sociolinguistic use of idioms and formulaic speech, namely, the speaker's choice in a particular setting of cited segments rather than her own speech, communicates her being part of that heritage and setting (see e.g., Chetrit, 1995). The noteworthy citing of idioms, of other's utterances and the rigid use of formulaic speech in verbal individuals with autism spectrum disorder communicates a break, starting from her most intimate circle, namely herself, up to society as a whole.

But, specifically, regarding idioms, it is not only citing that propagates their use by verbal persons with autism, but it is their phraseological quality, namely the gap between their idiomatic figurative meaning and the joint meaning of their constituents (literal meaning).

Hadar incorporates many idioms into her speech and writing. Idioms such as "a smile on the face from ear to ear" (in fact two separate idioms joined) (likewise see "grumble cry shriek scream to high heaven" [6], [17] below) are perceived and introduced in their literal meaning. The autistic speaker performs a reverse analogy, from the idiom back to the constituents. The reverse analogy iconically conveys, through objectization and concreteness, the autistic intake of the external.

Moreover, literal – concrete – handling of idioms expressing emotions and internal states, e.g., "a smile from ear to ear", is in line with Temple Grandin's recollection regarding her social skills training, when her aunt labeled each facial expression appearing on photos of Temple with the appropriate emotion-word. Temple's aunt used these to direct Temple,

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[24] It could well be that the vaccination incident to which Hadar alludes ([1]) was traumatic not so much because of the nurse but due to the traumatic tearing of the mother-child symbiosis facing her own mother letting her down as she merely stood by leaving her helpless. This is another case (see note 12 above) in which Hadar refers to her autistic state. It seems particularly interesting, as it might shed new light on the ongoing debate concerning association between MMR vaccination and autism (see e.g., Richler et al., 2006 and see also Kanner, 1943, pp. 244-245).

e.g., when the mouth spreads upwards this means that the person is happy, and if downwards she is sad, etc (see [12] above).

We conclude this discussion of analogical iconicity following the objectization of words by pointing out that very early on (between age 5 and 9) Hadar made up about a dozen neologisms that served her from then on to refer to states for which one would conventionally use emotion words. Hadar generated these neologisms[25] using two strategies: one was by distorting English words[26] as in "*idevel*" to denote terrifying incidences, originating no doubt from the word "devil"; "*pik*" to denote the sense of sharp and stunning penetration, coming from "prick", and "*rodingdan*g" after "rod" (smooth and shiny) denoting something (not necessarily tangible) to be enthusiastic about.[27] The second group of neologisms bore no etymological relation to either existing English or Hebrew words; they were made up from scratch on the basis of secondary phonetic iconicity: back – grave – vowels ("o" and "u") for the expression of negative horrific feelings (e.g., "*iguzi*"[28] for a dancing shade reflected at night from a distant lampshade) and front high vowels (mainly "*i*") for positive ones (e.g., "*chipichipi*" her sister's sore toe which amused her). Such expressive sound symbolism accords with linguistic literature (for overview see Jakobson and Waugh, 1987, pp. 181-198) but seems counter-intuitive to typical autistic clinging – as Amir's (2014; and see above) inverse organ-point - to the hard i.e., consonants (and not soft - i.e., vowels). "*Rodingdang*" explained above could serve to settle this seeming discrepancy. To derive this neologism Hadar added repetitive stop (plosive) consonants to the (given) base "rod" alternating vowels: "*i*" and "*a*". The resulting sound pattern accords with Hebrew (Semitic root and pattern formation) function of the vowels (rather than consonants) as the organ-point carrying the semantic variation of meaning. From a psychological perspective, the word "*rodingdang*" starting with the iconic "*o*" vowel (expressing graveness), moving on to "*i*" (signaling cheerfulness) may reflect the uncanny autistic state by analogical iconicity: as mentioned Hadar was hypersensitive to heat, and her idiosyncratic autistic objects (hard and shiny) were themselves sources of heat: car exhausts, toast racks, candlesticks, or taps which being made from metal attracted – and so released – heat. The sound symbolism and the intricate relations between the hard stops (consonants) and the soft vowels in "*rodingdang*" iconically reflect the uncanny attraction and dread (Freud's "*Scheu*") such objects entailed. [29]

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[25] It is interesting to note that the term "neologism" originated in the context of abnormalcy. Webster's dictionary states: "a usually compound word coined by a psychotic and meaningless to the hearer" (Gove, 1986, p. 1516) and see Freud, 1900 p. 296 fn. 2.

[26] Hadar was raised bi-lingually in Hebrew and in English. Living in Israel Hebrew was her dominant language out of home. Yet, she often mixed these languages both orally and in writing.

[27] See excerpt [16] and the discussion on pp. 24-27 below concerning autistic objects.

[28] The recurrent final "*i*" acts as the Hebrew adjectival suffix.

[29] Occelli et al. (2013) found that people with autistic spectrum disorder performed just above chance in the classic Maluma-Tacket test (a test matching two-dimensional visual images with nonsense words). Bearing in mind autistic prevalence of visual perception, this seems surprising. It could well result from clinging to a single sound as inverse organ-point (see Amir, 2014), and ignoring its

The seeming antinomy between the creative faculties manifested in neologisms and the manifest renewal in general and imaginary play in particular, said to be blocked for persons with autism, is settled if we bring to mind that typically developing young children make up words out of ignorance (being unfamiliar with the conventional lexicon). As the children get familiar with the conventional – adult – words they give up these private words. Older autistic persons seem to be stack freezing the first stage: they go on using these childish neologisms, not replacing them – as anticipated – by the common words on the one hand and not generating more neologisms on the other. Their continued use of their infant neologisms is rudimental of what Tustin (1992, p. 188) describes, regarding autistic objects, as "the result of primary creativity having gone wrong".

A discussion of sound symbolism concludes our overview of analogic iconicity along with an overview, findings and analysis of the different types and examples of linguistic iconicity in the data.

A synthesis of autistic iconic speech and the autistic etiology

We devoted the previous section (pp. 7-24) to the analysis of typical autistic language behaviors, from muteness as pure icon, through echolalia, to grammatical and semantic characteristics demonstrating similarity (secondness) and analogy (thirdness) to autistic states.

Unsurprisingly the DSM outlines diagnosis and assessment criteria for mental disorders, but looks into etiology issues (such as genetic or circumstantial information) only to the extent this is required to either support or rule out diagnosis. This is true for the DSM in general and in the case of ASD in particular (see note 2 above). The DSM-V's denominators helped us detect manifestations of linguistic signifiers in Hadar's writings and analyze them locally; it helped us identify the nature of their iconicity and explain them as such.

Having identified these iconic pathologies from a linguistic-iconic perspective, a step forward is now taken by integrating the findings into a comprehensive picture in light of the autistic etiology.

In regard to speaking individuals with ASD DSM-V (2013, p. 53) states that "[e]ven when formal language skills (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) are intact, the use of language for reciprocal social communication is impaired". Scholars raise serious doubts concerning the likelihood that autistic speech can truly be intact. Pragmatic and conceptual intactness should be considered an additional phase between the two types of intactness outlined in the quoted reservation from the DSM: language skills and the communicative-social use of language. Mismatches, such as the cases outlined above (pp. 7-24) (co-reference between the personal pronoun and the denoted referent) or the conceptualization following (internal) discrimination between "friend" and "relative"

effect in interaction with complementary sounds (such as stop vs. liquids; hard vs. soft), or to methodological shortcomings when administrating artificially structured experiments to people with ASD (this critic also concerns Kasher and Meilijson's (1996) paper and their reliance on empirical studies in particular).

come neither under language skills nor under communicative-social use of language. They stem from the autistic state of being interfering with the pragmatic and conceptual phase of language. The issue at hand is not the lack of linguistic competence or cognitive deficits blocking understanding. Labeling such behavior as odd is justified when compared not with regular speech but with typically developed differentiation between I-not-I and more so with non-pathologic psychic development. As stated at the start, attempting to understand (prior to intervention and healing) autistic linguistic behavior from a semiotic-iconic perspective, mutism appears the pure iconic mode of the autistic experience (see also Kanner, 1943, p. 244; Amir, 2014, p. 79). For the person with autism, blocked from early normal psychological development by an abnormal fusion with the mother and lacking a background presence of primary identification (see Tustin 1992, p. 33), language and interaction are not authentic to her inner psychic state. As the person with autism fails to proceed[30] to mature, healthy separation and intimacy (I not-I) any engagement in language is altogether odd.

This is why the authentic language of speakers with autism (those who do speak) is – following Amir's words (2014, referring to various psychic languages) – "an attack on language", embodying an ever-suspended state of being cut-off from pathological symbiosis without maturely arriving at individuation. Such language is thus omnipotent. Lacking dyadic object relations, it cannot connect. This results in a language detached from self (I's inner world); the language of a speaker who is not motivated by the experience of absence (I not-I separation, see the quote from Amir, 2014, p. 1, on p. 7 above), and so a language that does not communicate (the I to the not-I).

To delve into the autistic authenticity of the non-authentic – odd – use of language (and language behavior) we look at excerpt [21] (Illustration 1):

[21] [...] *baxiti lama yacaati adam lama noladti adam raciti lihyot buba o kelev caacua o sil o misxak yeladim o davar asu oto b-beit-xaroshet mi-xomer* [...]

> Gloss: [I] cried (ps. 1p sg.){:} {"}why did [I] come out (=emerge, ps. 1p sg.) a human-being{?} why was [I] born (ps. 1p sg.) [a] human-being{?}{".} [I] wanted (ps. 1p sg.) to be [a] doll or [a] toy dog or [a] seal (in English, = seal toy) or children's game or a thing {that} it was made (subjectless ps. 3p pl. impers.) in a factory out of material [...]

Things – artifacts – are static: they lack the capacity to feel, interact (with an inner self as well as with the not-I) and accordingly, they do not adjust and grow. As shown, the language –form and content – of persons with autism authentically iconizes their state as objects rather than living persons. Examining the list detailed in excerpt [21] further reveals this iconicity: dolls and toys are artificially manufactured things,


Illustration 1

[30] That is only individuals clinically diagnosed with ASD and not individuals diagnosed for other impairments (e.g. physical, organic, mental).

but like the autistic experience (and language) they mimic, and thus they belong in the realm of the animate-inanimate. This brings us back to the autistic objects discussed following excerpt [16]. Scholars and caretakers have noticed the early preference of toddlers and children with autism for hard inanimate objects over Winnicott's "transitional objects". Tustin (1992, pp. 111-126) describes "autistic objects" as sensation-dominated objects particular to each individual child, who uses them obsessively in idiosyncratic ways, which also differ from the function for which they were manufactured and intended. Due to the rigid sensory and static quality of autistic objects play and fantasy are blocked and so they impair mental development. Tustin continues, "the main purpose of autistic objects is to shut out menaces which threaten bodily attack" (p. 115, see also Kanner, 1943, pp. 246-250; Amir, 2014, pp. 67-90). Hardness, when detached and emptied from softness, (a denominator of autistic objects) constitutes an illusive pseudo-protection. This yields omnipotence that stops the child from seeking contact with people. This description of autistic objects highlights how they are the reverse of transitional objects: the latter serve as a bridge to reality whereas the pathological use of the former acts like a barrier to it. Moreover, being inanimate inflexible objects they tend to break irreparably, an experience that blocks the child's prospect of growth and recovery. This dead-end, according to Tustin, is the source of the psychotic child's despair (p. 121, see also the quote from Tustin, p. 24 above, and see also Amir, 2014, pp. 70-72).

Bosch (1970, p. 93) points out that "autistic children are disturbed in their relationship with other people but not with things, and that this relationship with things has been transferred to people" (but see p. 105). In light of excerpts [16] and [21] it seems that this relationship with things is not merely transferred to people in general, but first and foremost to the autistic (impaired) self. As claimed above regarding autistic language, which is never completely free of oddities, this psychic-constitutional endowment affects and so disturbs all perceptions and relations. Being cut off from the animate-inanimate distinction not only objectizes and concretizes everything (self, other people as well as language) but as Bosch (1970, p. 106) claims, this in turn distorts her relation with things, as the hard complementing the soft. Tustin (1992, pp. 92-134) points out the formative developmental role of tolerating the fact that both soft and hard are "me" experiences, which enables coming to terms with the conflicting pleasure principle and reality principle, thus getting primary differentiation and integration going.

Hadar used language to express her resentment of being born human rather than inanimate: a substance artificially manufactured [21]. This is not a matter of preference but an authentic reflection of the autistic etiology manifested in objectization. On several pages, where Hadar spells out the differences between the course of her life and that of her two twin sisters, she mentions that she did not – and will not – get married. She then narrates her vision of a normal life: she would have a husband, children and a house/home with taps, a toast rack and shiny candlesticks. This as [16] illuminates is an identification of soft inner relations, which in the case of Hadar is typically experienced by and among people with hard concrete objects. Moreover, Hadar's inventory of home life poignantly demonstrates the distorted identification of possessing things (hard artifacts) with intimacy (soft compassionate coupling, family bond and home partnership).

Dana Amir (2014) identifies concrete language and pseudo language as two fundamental non-languages that negate language, as an attack on linkage (communication). For lack of

space, we must abridge Amir's elaborate and most relevant account. Amir characterizes concrete language as a functional, yet emotionally meaningless language, resulting from a hollow mother-infant unit, lacking "a substratum upon which a child can establish a private language or an experience of an 'I'". Pseudo language, says Amir, emerges from "a mother-tongue [that] was unable to give any object a stable and unambiguous status", and so its function is to "[empty] language of its ability to illuminate distinctness. Blurring the limit between self and other is in the service of both the refusal to see the other as well as the refusal to see oneself" (2014, pp. 6-9). Regarding both pseudo language and concrete language, Amir (2014, p. 3) maintains, "the lack of emotional authentic language is the enactment of an unbearable primary bond" (see also Asperger 1944, p. 70). The autistic linguistic behavior outlined here on the basis of Hadar's writings emerges as a non-language characteristically merging pseudo language and concrete language, thus mirroring how hypersensitivity and detachment dwell together in the autistic state. Mutism is the most authentic – and iconic – mode enacting the traumatic autistic rupture of the delusory symbiotic state and what Tustin (1992, p. 12) describes as *a state not fully born*. In this premature frail encapsulation the counter-iconic use of language is in itself a pseudo use: "a language one can use to speak – but not to converse with" (Amir, 2014, p. 10). Detached from soft inner meaning and dealt with by means of objectization, the content materializes as concrete language.

It must be noted that it is not the wording that counts, but the idiosyncratic context and circumstances in which the specific utterance appears. The very same word or phrase may either reflect concreteness or manifest pseudolangauge; at times it is an appearance of reluctant communication while at other times it may underwrite rigid compulsive behavior that comes to struggle against the feelings of void associated with traumatic separation, or serves to act as an assuring holding envelope. In yet other cases, like the idiom and formulaic speech, pseudo-language assumes the language of the other where inner speech is expected, simultaneously reflecting rigidity and objectization. Hadar did not use first person pronouns or articles when referring to others; except for formulaic, hence ritualized, letter writing patterns, she reserved second person pronouns and articles to herself, and as detailed, she used third person and proper name for all (self and others). Through restricting first and second person to herself, the concrete, emotionally hollow languages produces the I while the pseudo-speaker utters the second person.

Conclusion

The oddities of autistic speech (grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, stylistic odd forms or mismatches) genuinely reflect the unnatural foundations of the interaction of the person with autism in general and her verbal communication in particular. Tustin (1992, p. 118), explaining the effect of the use of the pathological autistic object, in place of soft transitional objects, says that "such a child expects to do everything at the first attempt without any practice away from the actual situation". Language, as a mature substitute for bridging separation (I-not-I), finds the person with autism unprepared and displaced: she lacks the required conditions like for instance having passed through the developmental psychic stages and experiences that lead to separation and integration. The unsuccessful separation impairs the ability to confront loss, which in turn impairs motivation in general and interaction with the other in particular. This sequence of failures results in detached non-communicative verbalization, in mimicking (a pseudo, not-I language), and in clinging to a hard, fixed, inanimate, concrete language devoid of soft inner contents. The

particular speech of the autistic speaker authentically iconizes her inauthentic inanimate stance.

We are fortunate to have Hadar's diary and letters, and refer to Asperger's (1944, p. 67) observation that the autistic personality, despite many individual differences, is highly distinctive, in the hope that Hadar's unique legacy and the semiotic notion of iconicity have joined here to yield a productive fresh view of the order, or the authenticity, of the autistic verbal disorders.

Biographical Note

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Impressions and Transformations: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Effects of Early Linguistic Disruptions, Emotional Trauma, and of Testimony through the Study of Oscar Hijuelos' Thoughts without Cigarettes

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Abstract
This article takes a psychoanalytic approach to the analysis of Oscar Hijuelos' *Thoughts without Cigarettes*. Hijuelos' memoir is studied for the manner in which offers illustrations of the developmental significance of language and of the psycho-emotional and social effects that stem from its abrupt cessation. My work examines the significance of memory, as well as the transformative effects of writing: It is a look into the way in which this late writer's narrative conceals the paradox that embraced the affective relation he held with his first and later objects of affection, as well as with his first and second tongue. This paper studies how life-long narratives are of much significance to academics and professionals interested in the area of language and psychoanalysis. Through the analysis of Oscar Hijuelos' memoir I highlight the manner in which written testimonials often unveil writers' known and unknown histories of object-relations, introjections, projections, transferences, repetitions and need for reparation. Equally important, this article considers the manner in which Hijuelos' testimonials became the medium through which he articulated the perceptions of his experiences, and how such articulation created a space for him to eventually understand, transform and even attempt to heal from the dislocations and internal void that shaped and reshaped his hidden drives, life long needs and translingual subjectivity.

Introduction

In *Thought without Cigarettes* Oscar Hijuelos narrates his life-experiences between his Spanish and English languages. In a memoir published only two years prior to his sudden death, Hijuelos provides an interesting testimony of linguistic imbalance, emotional trauma, loss, linguistic replacements, identity shifts and search for love. Through stories of early experiences between Cuba and the United States, this American-born writer, of first generation Cuban migrants, lays the methodical grounds for what perceptually stood at the root of his libidinal attachments, his sense of self, and his personal and professional life within internalized tongues and cultures.

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Hijuelos begins his memoir by sharing aspects of his parents' pre-and post-marital lives, their socio-educational differences[2], and the reason for their geographic re-location from Holguín, Cuba in the 1940s.[3] He also introduces how, Spanish, the language he inherited from his parents, and spoke with his older brother and extended family, was the symbolic code of meanings that engulfed his earliest memories as an emerging subject: "…that language, Spanish, must have permeated me like honey, or wrapped around my soul like a blanked or, if you like, like a matilla, or, as my mother, of a poetic bend would say, like the sunlight of a Cuban spring" (p. 7).

Following the landscape of his childhood construction, this translingual writer turns his readers' attention to an incident that, borrowing from Freud (1893), amounted to the meaning of his obsessive act (p. 139).[4] Hijuelos explains that at the age of four, while visiting his family in Cuba with his mother and older brother, he contracted nephritis, a virus that in those days inflicted a serious, life-threatening risk in children (p. 45). Upon their eventual return to New York, and following doctors' advice, Hijuelos was separated from his loved ones and isolated in English-speaking hospitals for a one-year period of time (p. 46). In his attempt to reconstruct his experience, Hijuelos writes:

> The few things I do remember about my initial hospitalization –tubes shoved up me and medical smells, and dreary wards, and a terrible loneliness, blood being constantly taken and bitter-tasting pills – seem to have unfolded in the kind of darkness that children experience in bad dreams. Bloated and seeping blood, I must have felt that something had gone wrong, but did I even know? Was I even awake at first?…and even if I had been aware of it, what on earth could I have been feeling? (p. 45)

After explaining the conscious limitations of his memory, and how such poorly recalled experience formed part of a "dark hole" (p. 47), Hijuelos highlights the emotional and linguistic rupture that resulted from his trauma. As recalled by this author, in a brief six-month-span, he replaced his mother tongue with that of the English language. The most

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[2] Hijuelos explains that his father came from a long lineage of Cuban farmers and his mother was the daughter of Spaniard migrants who belonged to Cuba's upper-middle class (p. 14).

[3] His parents' migration to New York was unrelated to politics. Both parents left Cuba, their country of birth, in search for financial stability.

[4] In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" Freud (2006) explains that victims of distressing events demonstrate a fixation to the moment of the traumatic occurrence. Many become unable to release themselves from the moment of trauma and thus feel stuck in a state of alienation -with a non-integrated past and inability to envision a future-. Often these subjects relive their traumatic situation in their dreams and have the need to repeatedly describe their traumatic obsession in hopes of understanding and/or releasing themselves from their trauma (139).

striking aspect of his linguistic occurrence is that the sudden acquisition of English was concurrent with the immediate attrition of his primary language:

> The partition between my mother and me became the story of our lives, I had absorbed
>
> English from the nurses, doctors, and children of my acquaintance with some kind of
>
> desperate ease. English in, Spanish out, or at least deeply submerged inside me - from
>
> my childhood onward, I have long complicated dreams in which only Spanish is
>
> spoken (p. 8).

Knowing that generally "everything that takes place in the life of the psyche survives" (Freud, 2002, pp. 7-8), we may suppose that Spanish, the language that enabled his ego development and became intimately linked with his affective prototype, was the one lived symbolic code that remained etched within his unconscious, regardless of his conscious memory. At the conscious level, nonetheless, Hijuelos reasons that the act of becoming emotionally and linguistically distanced from this primary tongue stemmed from becoming ill in Cuba:

> For a long time all I would know was that I had gotten sick in Cuba, from Cuban
>
> *microbios*, that the illness had blossomed in the land of my forebears, the country
>
> where I had once been loved and whose language fell as music to my ears…what I
>
> would hear for years afterward from my mother was that something Cuban had nearly
>
> killed me and, in the process of my healing, would turn my own "Cubanness" into air
>
> (p. 45).

When exposed to a traumatic experience, trying to find a reason and a projected blame for a presumably unfair experience is a natural occurrence. As an adult, Hijuelos described having attributed his sickness, physical weakness and life-long restrictions to his early trip and by extension, to its hosting country, language and culture. However, knowing that "all forms of mentation occur in concurrence to one another" (Akhtar, 2009, p. 220), we cannot overlook the unconscious underpinnings of his linguistic attrition and cultural distancing. In fact, what becomes most meaningful to this article's discussion is that Hijuelos' incident offers a glimpse into what occurs when a basic human need and essence are interrupted at a young age. As recounted by this writer, the response to his linguistic and emotional rupture was not only manifested through the celerity in which he replaced Spanish with the English language, but also in the manner in which the loss in socio-emotive function of his primary tongue coincided with the act of emotionally drifting apart from his mother:

Of course, she was my mother, I knew that – she kept telling me so – "*¡Soy tu mamá!*"

But she also seemed a stranger, and all the more so whenever she started to speak

Spanish, a language which, as time went by, sounded familiar and oddly strange to

me...I remember nodding at her words; I remember understanding my mother when

she said... *¿Sabes que eres mi hijo?* ("Do you know you are my son?") (p. 6)

There is much we can extract from this quote. Some may suggest that little Oscar responded to his loneliness and desire to belong by embracing his host environment, and disowning his parents and the chief mark of their foreignness: their Spanish language.[5] Yet, as a Kleinian, I would like to acknowledge that the feelings we have towards our first object(s) of affection become unknowingly and most inevitably transferred onto the language she or he speaks, onto the system of meanings that links us verbally and emotionally to our primary caregivers. Thus, it makes sense to assume that as a four-year-old child immersed within a foreign language and an unfamiliar environment, little Oscar could not have understood the reason for his mother's absence. Having been perceptually abandoned made him feel lost, afraid and confused. It is also natural to suggest that he most likely felt angry towards his mother for leaving him behind while he needed her the most. Grounded in these circumstances, I propose that the confounding emotions Hijuelos experienced towards his mother were transferred onto the feelings and sense of worth he experienced towards her Spanish language. Thus following his trauma, Spanish -the symbolic system of meanings integrated within his affective prototype- became part of a lacerated and demoted essence that could no longer connect him to the social and support his subjective development.

Our Primary Language and Winnicott's Transitional Phenomenon

To grasp Hijuelos' response to his early trauma, let us also consider the idea of language as part of Winnicott's (2005) transitional phenomenon. In *Playing and Reality,* Winnicott offers the definition of a transitional object as one that helps infants transition from dependence to independence and thus, individualize as subjects. He stresses that such object can only become developmentally relevant to the child when the internal object - the magically introjected breast- is alive, real and not persecutory (pp. 13 & 19), after the 'good enough mother' provided her child with enough opportunity for illusion and, later, gradual disillusionment (pp. 15-17). This child psychoanalyst explains that if the external object's, primary caregiver's, efforts do not meet the needs of the infant, then the internal object fails to have meaning, a situation that results in the meaninglessness of the transitional object as well (p. 13).

Winnicott's theory discloses the difficulty perceived by subjects who experienced a sense of emotional discontinuity during their foundational stages of development. It speaks of the challenges undergone by those who have been raised by primary caregivers who, for a

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[5] This valuable comment was offered by a blind reviewer for this article.

number of possible reasons, were incapable of providing a good enough environment that nourished their child's or children's healthy developmental growth. Winnicott exposes the possible consequences of such deviance by providing two key examples: one of a male, and another of a female patient. Winnicott explains that as a child, the male patient was difficult to wean. He was fully dependent of his mother's presence and affection, and was incapable of becoming attached to any tangible article. Winnicott describes that as an adult this subject had no significant emotional relation with anyone other than his mother, and consequent to this isolating attachment, this man moved apart from his mother, finding employment away from his hometown (pp. 9-10).

Winnicott supports his theory by also offering, in more detail, the case of a woman who as a child was separated from her mother for extensive periods of time. With the use of vignettes we learn that what affected this patient throughout her young and adult life was the feeling of internal disconnection that developed from her mother's absence. Winnicott explains that she was haunted in her dreams and felt a sense of emotional dislocation in her day-to-day perceptions. Eventually, this patient felt that the only thing real was the consistency of her nostalgia, the ongoing sense of absence, or amnesia (pp. 30-32).

Both of Winnicott's case studies support a theory grounded in the long-term implications of either not being efficiently weaned, and/or not having the occasions for illusionment. For children, not having the opportunity for illusionment and disillusionment renders their first possession developmentally meaningless, and thus unfit for their transition towards becoming healthy subjects. Under these circumstances subjects eventually feel that their personality is not well integrated: they sense that "something is wrong" and tend to be unhappy with themselves. Such developmental deviation, continues Winnicott, inevitably trickles onto the subjects' self-other relations (pp. 89-90) and correspondingly, into their interactions within their third space.[6]

Even though Winnicott's developmental theory is grounded on infantile events, and although his transitional 'object' is understood as a tangible article[7], his theory is nevertheless applicable to Hijuelos' childhood occurrence within language. Beginning with this writer's age, one can argue that since he was hospitalized as a monolingual Spanish-speaking subject, becoming plunged into a foreign language and reality situated

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[6] Britzman (2006) offers a definition of the third space as an area in which self-other interactions become governed by an unconsciously shared "give and take". It is a terrain through which we unknowingly respond to others' psychic histories and resulting affect as much as others respond to our own history of affect (pp. 42-44 & 49). Britzman's definition is of significant value to our understanding of language: Since our symbolic code of meanings becomes an interactive, propelling and encoding register, we cannot disregard our tongue's inevitable implication within this space, especially after accounting for the way in which language holds together our known and unknown histories, perceptions and experiences that mark our responses towards and interpretations of others, and of ourselves in relation to others.

[7] A transitional object is described by Winnicott (2005) as an objectively perceived article chosen by the child, such as a blanket or a teddy bear, that is meant to offer the child the comfort and safety that is needed for her transition into becoming an individual (p. 130).

him at an infantile stage of language.[8] Taking into account the unconscious law of relationality, moreover, we can conceptualize how such an occurrence made this four-year-old relive a primary developmental stage, and therefore feel the unconscious need to recreate his infantile cultural experience.

While remaining with Winnicott's descriptions, even though language is indeed an objectiveless phenomenon, by definition it nevertheless intersects with Winnicott's conceptualization of a transitional object. If we look into psychoanalytic theories that define the affective meaning a primary tongue, we see that our first symbolic system of meanings is described as one that is intimately linked to our earliest and later developments, and "to our affective prototype" (Britzman, 2010). Our mother tongue is, quoting from Akhtar (1995), "the link to the earliest maternal imago" (p. 1069) and paradoxically, the essence that enables a child's transition as a subject. Adding to such descriptions, our primary tongue is a subjectively perceived developmental trait that, in agreement with Phillips (1998), enables the child to move away from her first love(s) and eventually become a subject within the larger community of competent speakers (pp. 43-45).

After drawing attention to such claims, I propose that if our language is a phenomenon that forms part of subjects' cultural area of experiencing, then for Hijuelos, as it was for Winnicott's patients, having had his external object absent and non-nurturing during his time of need, made his internal object lose its developmental relevance. As a result, the transitional object, his Spanish language, became socially and intrinsically unfitting or, borrowing from Winnicott, developmentally -and socially- meaningless.

Identifying Dislocations in the Developmental (Dis)Continuum of an Early Migrants' Language Learning and Subjectivity

Hijuelos' memoir allows us to further conceptualize the manner in which early historical traumas infringe upon subjects' lifelong realities, and upon their self-other relations. In *Thoughts without Cigarettes* we note how the ramifications of this writer's childhood experience created a sensed dislocation within his personality, which in turn affected the manner in which Hijuelos believed to be perceived by his parents, and by those who formed part of his third space:

> …when it came to something as important as restoring that which was taken from me, a sense of just who I was, I doubt that, as with my mother, it occurred to him [his father] that something inside of me was missing, an element of personality in need of repair (p. 67).

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[8] This assumption is founded on one of Erwin Stengel's (1939) arguments. In "On Learning a New Language" this former adult migrant and psychoanalyst, argues that when subjects, regardless of age, are immersed within a foreign language and reality they become re-submitted to an "infantile stage of language learning" (Stengel, 1939, pp. 471-473).

This quote offers a description of how, similar to Winnicott's patient, Hijuelos was dissatisfied with himself and with his socio-emotional reality. In retrospect, he sensed that the gap or dislocation created by his emotional and language-related trauma rendered his persona "in need of restoration". His recollections highlight the manner in which language not only shapes subjects' socio-emotional and cognitive developments, it also influences the ego's libidinal attachments. Beginning with the relationship he held with his mother, we could assume that Hijuelos' resistance to her may also be tied to her eloquence when relating in Spanish, a language that became second to the writer. In the first chapter of his memoir, Hijuelos describes his mother as "a high strung individual" (p. 3), who had enjoyed, as a child, an aristocratic upbringing as part of Cuba's upper-middle class (p. 13). He presents Magdalena as a well-spoken person who was known for "winning prizes for writing essays, and poetry" at school (p. 14). Years following his father's death, Hijuelos explains how his "artistically inclined" mother turned her attention back to Spanish poetry, a talent Hijuelos describes as "sophisticated" (p. 330).

As a researcher in migration and language, I must add that this mother-child detachment was also created by their linguistic condition as first and 1.5 generation migrants. The gap Hijuelos described experiencing with his mother was not only linked to his childhood experience, but also to his inability to relate with his mother at her linguistic level -when speaking Spanish-, and to his mother's inability to fluently interact with her son in English, his dominant tongue. Adding to their linguistic challenge(s), their void was evidently and inevitably intensified with his schooling, through young Hijuelos' internalization of the host language and culture. As a subject who has experienced migration and the sense of being in-between languages from an early age, I understand that the way we sound, and not just what we say, influences the manner in which we are perceived by those who surround us, and thus on how such perception influences the way in which we understand our own projected selves in relation to others. This is an aspect of our speech that is clearly stated in Hijuelos' text when he recounts his feelings, once again, towards his mother and her 'broken' English (p. 74).

Another interesting aspect of this writer's language-related memoir, one that brings me back to my own experiences as a translingual subject, is that the author's early perception of his parents' speech affected, by way of relation, his own self-perception:

I lived in dread of being called on, and lacking self-confidence, I always felt that I had to play catch-up when it came to reading and writing, over which I agonized, all the while thinking that I was not very smart. And not just because I was often too distracted by my own anxieties to concentrate well, but out of some sense that my mother and father's limitations, when it came to English, had become my own: Just attempting to read - anything really - I'd feel as if I had to swim a long distance through murky water to fathom the meaning, and, at the same time, though I eventually improved, shell-shocked though I was, I always had the sense that the

language was verboten to me…No matter how hard I tried, or how well I did on the

tests, I secretly believed that my mind was essentially second-rate- all the other kids

just seemed brighter than me (p. 75).

What makes this passage thought provoking is that it serves as an example of how for Hijuelos, his parents' peripheral or marginal linguistic membership assumed a social weight on him as a child, on his feelings, his self and self-other perceptions and his imagined aptness within the host language. Since our primary identification as children tends to be intimately connected to our parents or primary caregivers, at least until we develop our own set of conscious histories and experiences as separate subjects, we may reflect their image onto ourselves. For Hijuelos, perceiving his parents' apparent ineptness with the dominant tongue and within the host community, made him internalize, as a child, such view onto himself.

Understanding that language aids in encoding, processing, retrieving and expressing information, we can deduce that during his childhood, Hijuelos' sense of difference also rested in his limited exposure to the English language. Following his hospitalization, Hijuelos describes being homeschooled for a year by his non-English speaking mother (p. 73). Concurrent with his homeschooling, his poor health restricted his outdoor playtime with English speaking children. This is observable when he explains: "I felt, from the start with my mother by my side, tremendously self-conscious and uncomfortable, not just because I've been apart from other children for so long, but because of the way I'd come to believe that something is wrong with me" (p. 74). Hijuelos tells his readers that when he was finally registered in grade one, he felt othered. Not having the linguistic tools that enabled critical learning, moreover, made him feel academically challenged during his primary years.

In addition, by considering the concept of language, culture and identification, we should also turn our attention to the unavoidable authority that stems from a dominant culture. In Hijuelos' case, we see how such authority infringed upon his subjectivity: "…in New York…there were always people to stare resentfully if they overheard someone speaking Spanish on the street…" (p. 26). Once at school, he began to see the world and his existence through the lens of the host culture. This introjection is evident in the ways in which he disapproved of his mother's linguistic struggles, and even in the manner in which he attempted to break away from his heritage culture:

My idols…were those icons of the British Invasion, from the Beatles to the Rolling

Stones…Since I really had little identity of my own - except as this "son of *cubanos*' -

who had once been sick and didn't identify with Latin culture in general, for when I

heard Spanish songs, they always sounded passé and locked in some perpetual,

unchanging past, and I didn't even consider my Spanish anything I should try to

improve upon - I spent those (teenage) years trying to become anything else but what I

should have been, Oscar Hijuelos (p. 155).

As a 1.5-generation migrant he viewed the host culture as a desired goal, even if it was not always felt as an all-embracing culture. The narrator's desire to reject his heritage is provided when he expressed his longing to have a different name:

I recall feeling envious over a cowboy's name Rawhide…Years later, when I first

thought I might publish somewhere, I seriously considered adopting the nom du plum

Oliver Wells, and to jump even farther ahead, during the kind of journey I could never

have imagined as a child, I signed my name on the guest registry of the archeological

museum Ankara, Turkey, as Alexander Nevsky, the kind of thing I'd do from time to

time (pp. 76-77).

Hijuelos' ethnic name "grounded his social existence" (Bohórquez, 2008, p. 49). It rooted an existence that he, as a young subject, openly rejected. While providing us with instances of life reality[9], we note how this writer internalized dominant attitudes, and projected them in the form of embarrassment towards his parents, his roots and the Spanish tongue. Equally important, this writer's dissociation within Spanish is not only evident in his playful choice of names and/or in his outspoken attitude toward his parents' speech and migrant status. By looking at this self-narrative's text reality[10], we note that his linguistic relation to Spanish becomes clear through his grammatical mistakes. Whether Hijuelos' grammar reflect his life-long personal troubles, or depict a combination of linguistic attrition and cessation in language learning, it is common sense to note that his poor use of Spanish grammar hints to the subjective relation he holds with his mother tongue. Considering that as an adult Spanish was a language he understood, but barely spoke, and knowing that Hijuelos was in a position to find Spanish-speaking editors for his memoir, and yet refused to do so, leads to the assumption that his 'personal' use of language expresses a developmental detachment with his primary tongue, and a conforming attachment to English, the language he claimed as his own.

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[9] In "Autobiographical Narratives as Data in Applied Linguistics", Aneta Pavlenko marks the distinction between three interconnected types of information gathered from autobiographical narratives: text, subject and life reality. "Text reality" refers to the way in which writers narrate their stories -how they use language; "subject reality", refers to how events were perceived by the writer; and "life reality" is a study of how things are or were; it is a look into the overall attitudes and behaviours that influence –or influenced- the subject (Pavlenko, 2007, p. 166).

Interpreting the Unconscious through the Act of Writing

As once mentioned by my former thesis supervisor Deborah Britzman (2010), an interesting aspect of language is that it "describes while embodying a process" (pp. 40-63, one that accounts for the juxtaposition of the inner self with the social. Through the study and application of theory, we learn that language is embedded in desire, and such desire accounts for our actions, attitudes and behaviours that together shape and reshape us within our complexity as split subjects. The significance of Hijuelos' self-narrative also rests in how it exposes the influence language has had on this late transligual writer. Hijuelos' memoir provides descriptions of language as a process, as one that embeds itself in the subject's affective history, while exposing unconscious mechanisms that slip through the use of his words.

Beginning with transference, with a careful reading of Hijuelos' words and while focusing on this writer's relationship with his parents, we can deduce that he has transferred the affection he felt towards his first love-object his loving, yet perceptually absent mother to his father, who, regardless of narrated idealizations, is repeatedly described as an absent figure:

> I can only recall his kindness…I got so attached to him that I came to re-write my history in the hospital…Fabricating his presence in memor…I just found something comforting about him, even if I would never get to know what he was really about (p. 66-67).

Instances of his father's absence are written throughout the beginning and middle of his text. Following the most recent quotes, this writer continues to draw attention to Pascual's absence by stating that he "never taught me anything at all" (p. 67). Later, knowing that the author's illness inflicted a lifetime of physical examinations, he mentions that unlike his mother, his father "never once accompanied me to the doctor's…" (p. 77). Pascual's distance was inevitably heightened, by way of response, when the writer was a teenager. This becomes evident when Hijuelos recounts their last exchange:

> A month or so short of my eighteenth birthday, I was so self-involved that on the day I left for Miami, and my father, sitting on our stoop, wanted to embrace me just before I got a lift down to Penn Station in a neighbor's car, I sort of flinched and waved him off…feeling slightly put-upon seeing him smiling –perhaps sadly- at me as he settled on that stoop again and reached for a cigarette. I can recall wondering if I'd been a

little cold…Of course now I wish I'd been more receptive to him in those moments,

but the truth is, I didn't know it would be the last time I'd see him alive…(p. 167)

As described by this writer, his father's identity was linked to being Spanish and Latin: "he possessed an abundance of down-home Cuban warmth" (p. 66). Prior to his father's death, Spanish reflected an inner subjective element and a language with which the author could not connect or process: "…I simply tuned out… when it came to Spanish, some busy emotions in my head preventing, as it were, my momentary concentration" (p. 151). As explained by Hijuelos, Spanish was part of a language and culture that while he was a child, a teenager and later, a young adult, was not perceived as his own:

One of those what-on-earth-are-you-doing-with-your-life evenings. I was in the kind

of mood where just to hear *español* spoken on the street irritated me…(So maybe I

was a white motherfucker after all)…(p. 293)

In his memoir Hijuelos makes repeated reference to his light skin and thus, to his distinction from –what he describes as- the stereotypical Hispanic looks. Time and again he describes feeling disconnected with the language and culture that made him feel as an outsider. Yet there is perhaps more to this quote than what readers may perceive in passing. With Hijuelos, understanding the Oedipus relation, and the anger and disconnect he felt as a child towards his mother, brings me to highlight the extent of which his words, specifically with his use of the term 'motherfucker', depict the mixed feelings he experienced towards his mother and, by extension, toward her language and culture. Here we see that this bracketed sentence offers yet another instance of how our feelings towards and comfort within a language and its corresponding culture relate to the disclosed and hidden emotions we feel towards those who speak and therefore represent it.

Hijuelos' self-narrative presents behaviours that seem shaped and defined by his life's vicissitudes. An event of much interest to my study relates to the writer's attitudinal change towards the Spanish language and culture following his father's death. As Hijuelos layers his present emotions and assumptions into the memory of his past, we notice that Pascual's irreversible absence becomes a pivoting point in Hijuelos' career, awakening his desire to learn about his migrant culture. Such change can be linked to both Felman's and Winnicott's theories. Beginning with Felman (1987), the relationship between the father, language and the law takes us to Lacan's discussion of the symbolic within the Oedipus Structure. Felman states that for Lacan, the individual is initiated through the father's first 'no', and that such articulation aids in the development of the infant's ego boundaries. Based on this Lacanian assumption, Hijuelos' Spanish language was not only linked to his mother, and an early childhood image of her absence, but also to his father's ongoing absence and disconnect.

To better understand Hijuelos' unconscious relation to his father, let us once again draw a parallel between this writer's reality and that of Winnicott's female patient. Returning to

Winnicott's theory (2005), we note that as experienced by his nameless female patient, Hijuelos' recalled events outline a paradox. Half way through the memoir we read that Hijuelos only began to feel his father's presence following his passing: "I felt my father's presence all around me…I felt his absence…anything I wrote eventually, however veiled, in some mystical way led back to my pop…I was haunted by his memory…" (p. 264).

At this pivoting point in his life, Hijuelos also reconnects with his Latin roots. He begins to appreciate his Cuban identity, starts to listen to Spanish music and becomes eager to read Latin American literature. Quoting from Hijuelos: "I read everything I could get my hands on, without any overriding design, a kind of madness - or book lust - coming over me…I dove more deeply into the sea of Latin American letters and found those waters increasingly warm" (p. 219).

Concurrently, under the guidance of his professor Bathelme, Hijuelos experienced transference through his writing: "I began wanting to write more and more about Cuba. It simply possessed me. Reawakened memories…" (p. 219). Relevant to our discussion, during this time Hijuelos writes his first immigrant novel, *The Mambo Kings*, which outlined his father's lifelong experiences:

> …my novel, *The Mambo Kings*, was my way of…holding a conversation with him,
>
> though he had long since been dead. His spirit, for better or for worse, in its kindness
>
> and gentleness, in its melancholy and, alternately, exuberance, his love for life, fear of
>
> death, his passions and vices –down to the thousand drinks he had consumed and
>
> cigarettes he smoked were all transformed, in that book. Or to put it differently, he was
>
> alive again, if only as a momentary illusion…(p. 367)

In addition to his novel, his father's passing eventually awakened his desire to understand his experiences through the act of memoir writing.[11] Aside from the dynamics that influenced his attachment with his deceased father, when Hijuelos describes both of his parents there is evidence of idealizations and possibly of splitting. However, before pointing at such mechanisms and looking into the manner in which these shaped this writer's discourse, I would like to draw our attention to Melanie Klein's theory, once again, for an even deeper understanding of Hijuelos' text.

In "The Origins of Transference" Melanie Klein (1975) explains that an infant's existence is governed by anxieties, phantasies and defenses that initiate and influence primary and later object-relations (pp. 48-54). From the onset of postnatal life, anxieties and a split between hate and love, hunger and gratitude governs infants' feelings (p. 49).

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[11] In his self-narrative he highlights his father's smoking throughout the text. Although the writer also describes himself as a smoker, through such references we can deduce that in his memoir's title: *Thoughts without Cigarettes,* 'cigarettes' are a metonym representing his father.

During the first three to four months of life the child experiences persecutory anxieties. He or she develops a relation with aspects of his or her mother's breast. The breast is perceived as good when it satiates the infants' hunger and is perceived to be bad when the child feels hungry.

Klein (1964) also explains that while hungry and the child's anger and hate erupt, he or she projects onto the bad breast feelings that, in phantasy, are destructive. Such negative feelings dissipate when the infant's primary needs are satiated through feeding. While being fed he or she takes in, or introjects, the good loving breast (pp. 58-59). However, after being nourished and feeling loved the infant is overcome by guilt and fears retaliation from the bad breast. Klein suggests that as a defense against that 'retaliative' bad breast, the infant turns the good object -breast- into an ideal one as a protection against what is perceived to be a dangerous and persecuting object. As Klein proposes, these processes of splitting and idealization, which stem from the very early stage of persecutory anxiety, influence ongoing object relations (p. 49).

With Hijuelos, this splitting between good and bad, desirable and undesirable is seen throughout his text. It is legible, specifically, in how he perceives his parents on the basis of their language. Through retrospective manoeuvres of memory, the author often recalls his father's charm, while highlighting his ability to speak English and learn other languages: "…well liked and affable, working around not only other Cubans like himself but immigrants from Italy, Greece, and Poland (whose languages he began to absorb)" (p. 26).

At times, however, this author expresses the opposing sentiment when describing his mother, who's English he openly criticized:

I can only recall his kindness [the author's father's], and with the bias I eventually developed toward my mother because of language, I got so attached to him that I came to re-write my history in the hospital…Fabricating his presence in memory…(p. 66)…He'd speak to me in English, not always, but when he did, it was with a quiet authority and without my mother's befuddlement and confusion…(p. 67)

Aside from transferences, idealizations and splitting, the writer's unconscious is brought to the surface through the description of a hallucination and of one of his most prominent dreams. Following the death of his father and after obsessing with his ghostly presence. Hijuelos narrates:

At night, I'd worry about falling asleep and seeing his ghost. I'd…awaken, my heart beating wildly, from an impression that my pop was just outside in the hall waiting for me, as if he wanted to take me with him. One night I walked into the darkness of the

living room, where I saw my father, or the shadow of him: he spoke to me, in Spanish, of course, saying: *Soy ciego* - "I'm blind". And then he said: *"Por favor, abra la luz"* – Please turn on the light. When I did, he told me "Thank you" and simultaneously vanished. I swear this happened, dream or not, that's what I heard…(p. 265)

Since hallucinations, according to Winnicott (2005), are dream material (p. 31), I will treat this scene as a dream by applying Freudian theory to a possible interpretation: The author's acknowledgement that his father never took much time to connect with, and pay much attention to him, brings me to link the father's blindness to the son's conscious and unconscious interpretation of his father's unawareness of, or blindness. In addition, in Hijuelos' narrative we can discern condensations stemming from traces of the ongoing guilt and obsessions that haunt him in his waking hours. The stress that erupted from him writing about his father and becoming emotionally consumed over his memory had expressed itself in his somatic reactions:

In my self-mortifying Catholicism, I eventually came down with the worst case of eczema…My arms, chest, back, and neck were raw and dry; high-strung and feeling guilty, I lived with a *picazó*n - an itching - that drove me crazy and intensified every time I'd sit down to write (p. 266).

As described by Hijuelos, his bodily reaction to such stress, however, subsided after having a pleasant dream that involved his father and the act of forgiveness:

Walking in a meadow, maybe in a place like Cuba, in the distance I beheld a river, and in the river there stood a man. As I approached, I could see it was my pop, Pascual, awaiting me. There he told me, shaking his head: - "Por que te moritifiques?" — "Why are you torturing yourself so?" And with the kindest of expressions on his face, he, reaching into that water…washed over my arms, my face, my back…I do remember feeling a sense of relief, and, though a dream it may have been, in the morning when I awakened, my skin had cleared of its soreness (p. 266).

It is common sense to state that this dream depicts the writer's desire for reparation. As mentioned, his distance from his father, specifically during the last awkward moments

they spent together -when Hijuelos was leaving for Miami, and his father attempted to embrace him- combined with their ongoing emotional distance, retrospectively triggered pain and guilt. Thus in his dream we see the true meaning of wish-fulfillment[12], especially since the author, by way of his dream, felt absolved and cleansed by both the water and his father's loving arms.

Another significant aspect that takes us into the unconscious relates to Hijuelos' repetition of the event of his trauma. When relating to others, the writer's emotional disconnection becomes palpable when he downplays the experiences and memory that led to his failed marriage: "…I finally did get married to my girlfriend of some three years, Carol, think it was 1975…" (p. 225). The details of their marriage are barely narrated. Pages after focusing on his unsuccessful attempts to find himself as a writer he resurrects his former wife, Carol, by disclosing the eventual end of their relationship.

Not having been tuned to her concerns, Hijuelos describes feeling shocked one evening when, after returning home from work, he found that his wife had emptied their apartment of her possessions. He then explains that her reason for leaving him, her logic, was written in a note she posted on the fridge. Aside from her apology, nevertheless, the content and emotional relevance of her letter are never shared, even minimally, with his readers (pp. 247-248). Another interesting aspect of the description of his failed marriage rests is that its significance does not seem to rest in its emotional worth. Instead, the event of his break-up appears to relate to the manner in which such occurrence incited Hijuelos to continue with his writing and eventually flourish as a novelist:

> Oddly enough, suddenly freed up, after an increasingly fallow period of writing, and without much of anything better to do with myself, and after hearing for so long the opinion that the last thing in the world I could ever be was a writer, I started finding my feet in that regard again (p. 248).

Another indicator of his ongoing emotional disconnection is clear towards the end of his memoir when Hijuelos mentions, in passing, that he was emotionally involved with a female friend. It is essential to note that while reminiscing about his emotional affairs all acknowledged attachments are mentioned by name. This, however, is not the case when he acknowledges receiving an exciting call for the award of the Pulitzer Prize for his novel *The Mambo Kings*. At this point of his narrative, on the last four pages of his memoir, out of the clear blue he makes reference to, perhaps, his most recent girlfriend, who, in his entire text, remains nameless (p. 363). The significance of such oversight brings us once again back to Winnicott's theory and the case of his female patient. Grounded in Winnicott's thoughts, it is natural to suggest that this girlfriend's presence in Hijuelos' life would only become tangibly restored through the passing construction of a

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[12] In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" Freud (2006) explains that the nature of –non-accident-induced-dreams- are to "conjure up pictures [imagined and unimagined events/memories] from the time when the patient was healthy, or else pictures of the return of health that is hoped for in the future" (p. 139).

layered memory, by means of the possible absence incurred by a conceivable breakup. In other words, her presence, just as that of his father, would only feel as real and thus, noteworthy of genuine recognition, following her absence.

Now my interest in the study of language and psychoanalysis makes me feel inclined to draw a parallel between Hijuelos' response to his mother tongue with his response to his father [13]. As described by this author, growing apart from his primary language increased his attrition-rate and, over time, his ability to sound and feel Spanish. Yet regardless of such disconnection, during his adult years his Spanish became noteworthy of regard, becoming 'his' only after he experienced its sensed loss. Such occurrence supports one of my initial arguments founded on the manner in which subjects' relation to their first tongue interrelates with their foundational history of affect, which in Hijuelos' case is tied to a loss of love. This writer's response to the Spanish language supports my discussion of language as a transitional object, as one that, in his particular case, could only be sensed as real following its apparent absence.

For this late writer, his history became a list of repetitions initiated by the absence of his mother, and followed by that of his primary language, his father and later loves. As seen in this published memoir, except for his living mother, his loved ones were not openly acknowledged unless there was an interruption or cessation of their physical presence. In addition, this writer's unknown affective attachment to Spanish is exposed to readers when he describes being in Rome and falling in love with the Italian language:

…the bel canto of the Italian language itself, which for some reason I felt far more at

ease navigating than even my ancestral espanol. In fact, I'd use the Spanish I more or

less improved upon during my recent travels to help me get along with Italians (down

in Naples, the Italian almost sounds like Castilian sometimes). They understood me

completely, and, because I had no emotional turf to defend, I eventually flourished (p.

300).

Similar to Elias Canetti's feelings when taken back by the sounds of the Slavic tongue (cited by Heller-Roazen, 2005, pp. 174-175), for Hijuelos, Italian represented the 'echo' of his primary language. It became the language that awoke his affect by unknowingly bringing back the warmth and love he experienced as an infant. Since Italian was not directly linked to his childhood trauma, the author, without "having an emotional turf to defend" was allowed to become engulfed by its words and sounds, which together brought back emotions that could only stem from a romance language that resembled his very own.

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[13] I would like to highlight that my postulations are founded on this late writer's autobiographical narrative, and not on post-memoir experiences.

Conclusion

For those of us who have experienced a linguistic disruption at an early age, in an attempt to conceptualize its inner meaning and its tie to our subjectivity, we often try to understand the depths of our perceptions, attitudes and behaviours within language(s) through the use of our, and often most prominently, lived symbolic code. Some of us turn to theories in search for meaning, while others write autobiographical testimonies in hopes of "giving their lives meaning across time" (Pavlenko, 2007, p. 164), symbolizing their experiences and integrating the internal and external "I" that will always exist within language (Derrida, 1996, pp. 28-29). Conceptualizing our inner need to grasp our occurrences is key to the understanding of Hijuelos' symbolic motive. It is also important, I suppose, to the meaning of my own choice of study, a choice that inevitably leads to the sharing of a not so recent memorable event, and a corresponding afterthought. This takes me back to my second year as a doctoral student, when my former professor and supervisor, Deborah Britzman, asked me why we obsess with our beginnings? Such question left me thinking and later reminded me of a statement taken from Friedrich Nietzsche (c1980)… that "the tree is always in love with its roots" (p. 20).

Of course there is much we can extract from this decontextualized metaphor. I will nevertheless take the liberty of linking it to this article and of focusing my discussion on the following consideration: Since love often leads to a range of obsessions, perhaps out of our need for love, we obsess with our beginnings, with the way our parents were and may still be, with the manner in which we relate and related to them, and with the conscious and unconscious feelings that resulted from the early and even later tensions that stemmed from their authority. This well-known obsession, which forms the base of psychoanalytic discourse, rests in our human need and innermost desire to understand our inner and social selves.

Hence, we often try to learn and to recognize the buried drives that form and impact our attitudes, inhibitions and our overall actions: the hidden forces that shape the enigmatic subjects we are today. We strive to understand our feelings and decisions, along with our behaviours and socio-emotional relationships, simply because these aspects of our lives define our existence and our place within our shared world, within a world that changes, while often remaining the same, within a shared and personal world that is mostly mediated, understood, misunderstood and always felt through and within the use of our inescapable language.

As I demonstrated with the analysis of Hijuelos' memoir, this endless search offers within its description a process that takes us directly and indirectly to our affective histories, to histories that, once again, develop from within, and are understood through, this paradoxical phenomenon we call language. In this paper I have established how the feelings one experiences towards our first object(s) become incorporated as part of the ego's affective prototype, and how such emotions become transferred onto subjects' preceding relationships. I discussed the importance of a mother tongue and of how, along with, or aside from our first object, this language becomes part of our affect, by posing as "a representation of a representation" (Winnicott, 2005, p. 54; Derrida, 1982, p. 312).

Hijuelos' response to his two languages is presented directly and indirectly in his text. By reading his memoir we learned that throughout his life this late writer was torn between the tug of his primary language, which represented the language of his parents and of his childhood trauma, and that of the English language, the tongue that became linked to

introjections from the host culture. Yet, regardless of the conscious and social significance of his claimed English tongue, Spanish, the language he attributed to migrants, the tongue that became almost forgotten and socially downgraded during his many years in the United States, was still the language that engulfed his affective history. For this writer Spanish became the symbolic code of meanings that represented his infancy, and thus his early moments of nurturance, love and dependence. Equally important, Spanish was the language that preceded, while paradoxically becoming, a vibrant aspect of his writing, it became part of the 'meaning of his obsessive act', and his conforming need to put into words and therefore understand the dynamics that embraced the personal and shared reality that formed and informed his third space.

Biographical Note

Fernanda Carra-Salsberg has been a postsecondary foreign language educator for the past fifteen years. Born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, her interest in language, culture, migration and identity formations stems from her repeated migrations as a child and an adolescent, and from experiences as a language pedagogue. She has taught English as a Second language and Spanish. Carra-Salsberg is currently teaching advanced Spanish Grammar and Spanish for Native Speakers at York University, Canada.

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Reconstructing agency by shifting perspective in trauma narrative

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Abstract
In the treatment of sexual abuse victims reconstructing the abuse narrative from fragmented memories and gaining back a healthy sense of agency are major objectives of therapeutic interventions. Our analysis of the psychotherapy process in case of a sexual abuse victim analyzes in-session interaction in terms of joint construction of narrative by client and therapist in psychodynamic psychotherapy, focusing on the immediate effects of the therapist's single interventions on the reconstruction of the client's self-narratives. We discourse analyze the interaction of one audio recorded therapy session. We examine narrative perspective (NP) in the text using our discourse-based model of perspective. Our analysis reveals how — in the course of reconstructing the abuse narrative with the help of her therapist — a reconstruction of agency and patiency takes place through shifting the client's NP. The client's perspective of her own role as agent goes through gradual shifts as the interaction progresses. The therapist has a crucial role in the reconstruction process by influencing the client's perspective shifting behavior through shifting NP in her own interventions. Implications for psychotherapy research and clinical practice are discussed

Introduction

Dissociated or confused memories, loss of control and lacking a sense of agency has been considered important characteristics of trauma narratives of sexual abuse victims (O'Kearney & Perrott, 2006). Reconstructing an abuse narrative from memories of flash-bulbs or dissociated fragments (Allen, 2001), and regaining a healthy sense of agency are major objectives in therapeutic interventions aiming at recovering patients from psychopathological complications arising as a result of sexual violence (e.g., PTSD, depression, dissociation, etc.). The purpose of our study is to analyze client-therapist interaction by studying the joint construction of trauma narratives taking place at a psychodynamic therapy session. The main question we want to answer in our particular analysis is how the client's agency and patiency (i.e., a sense of powerlessness and

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passivity) is reconstructed in the course of narrative interaction at the therapy session, and how the therapist's interventions influence this process.

By reconstruction process we refer to the gradual transforming of the original narrative (a dream) in terms of its emotional relevance, reorganizing the memory episode it contains, and creating a new narrative, which can be reintegrated into the autobiographical knowledge system (Habermas, 2012; Lane, Ryan, Nadel, & Greenberg, 2014). In the narrative reconstruction process we focus on the shifting of *narrative perspective* (NP) of the talkers. The concept of NP (Genette & Sheridan, 1982; Uspenskij, 1973) refers to the narrator's point of view while telling a narrative, from which viewpoint events and characters are presented to the listener. In our analysis of in-session interaction with a female client who has suffered a trauma of repeated sexual and emotional abuse we concentrate on the shifting perspective of agency and patiency in the narrative. We show how a reconstruction of the client's sense of agency takes place through a series of shifts in her NP. However other aspects of NP such as shifting between different strategies of remembering (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) are also shown to have an important role in reconstructing the client's self-narrative. Importantly, our analysis also reveals how, and through which interventions the therapist helps the client to recover and reconstruct her abuse experience. We suggest that this is accomplished by the therapist's influencing the client's perspective shifts through shifting NP in her own interventions. Thus, by a detailed analysis of the interactive perspective shifting behavior of the talkers, we are able to study the role of individual therapeutic interventions in helping the client to accommodate a new point of view.

The Problem of Agency and Patiency in the Psychotherapy of Abuse Victims

Clinical consequences of sexual abuse and trauma include the loss of a healthy sense of agency. Loosing agency can be traced in post-traumatic symptoms such as the inability to integrate conscious experiences in dissociation, and to control retrieval inhibition. This leads to intrusive and repetitive recall of the trauma memories (Conway, Harries, Noyes, Racsma'ny, & Frankish, 2000), transient amnesia regarding the traumatic event, as well as intensive, uncontrollable emotions, psycho-somatic symptoms, and nightmares (American Psychiatric Association & American Psychiatric Association.Task Force on DSM-IV, 1994). According to Bromberg (2003) as a result of the traumatic event biochemical, physical, perceptual, cognitive and emotional processes may become dysfunctional. Memory of the traumatic event may be dissociated (Van der Kolk, 1996; Bromberg, 1994), and as a result, conscious retrieval may not be possible. Hence, a hiatus may be created in the abused person's self-narratives reducing coherence of the self.

A common goal of debriefing, cognitive behavioral and psychodynamic therapies with sexual abuse trauma cases is the reconstruction of a healthy sense of agency while reconstructing the narrative of traumatic experience (Kaminer, 2006). The reconstruction process taking place in therapy helps the client in the emotional re-experiencing of events in a safe and supporting environment while creating a linguistic representation of experiences with the aim to integrate sensory-perceptual episodic memory of the traumatic event with the autobiographic knowledge-system of the self (Allen, 2001; Beaudoin, 2005; Conway, 2001; Kaminer, 2006). Judith Herman (1987) from a psychoanalytic point of view considers it important for the client to recognize the trauma narrative as her/his own and recreate the continuity with earlier events of the life story.

Keskien (2004) makes another important point shading a different light on the problem of agency in the case of sexual abuse victims. She argues that one must be careful in assuming such clients to be responsible actors in their abuse narrative, for example, when responsibility on the part of the victim is assumed for the continuation of intimate violence, or, for the occurrence of sexual assault. This is still the case in various social or cultural contexts, where stigmatization of the victim often implies responsibility on her part. While therapists think it critical for clients to gain a sense of self-agency: to learn to take action, maintain their rights, gain autonomy and independence in the abusive situation, it is also important to help them to a relief from guilt, in case trauma victims feel as solely responsible for the consequence of their experiences. Therefore, reframing, re-narrating and reconstructing trauma narratives may revolve around the problem of accepting powerlessness and patiency as much as around gaining a sense of agency. Reconstructing both the client's agency and patiency and that of other actors in the narrative is part of the reconstruction process that takes place in psychotherapy.

Agency and Patiency in Narrative

In narratives, the problem of agency and patiency is tied to the question of intentional action (Karlsson, 2002). Agency concerns whether an event in the story comes about as a result of a character's intentional behavior, or as a consequence of chance, natural law, or some other process. Traditionally, narrative agents are considered to be human, or humanized beings, who perform actions and initiate processes (Prince, 2003; Bremond, 1973). Patiency, in contrast, concerns the passive suffering of consequences of others' actions or events of the narrative. Patients are affected by processes initiated by agents, and their situation is modified by consequences of events that happen to them, but are not initiated by them.

Empirical study of agency and patiency in self-narrative from a psychological point of view has been based on differing conceptualizations by authors such as McAdams (Adler, Skalina, & McAdams, 2008), Schafer (1976), and Habermas (2006). McAdams argued that a sense of agency is expressed as stories of self-protection, self-assertion, and self-expansion, with the primary motivation to master or gain control over the self or the outside world (McAdams, 2001). He studied themes of agency in self-narratives, however did not consider expression of patiency in narratives at all. Schafer (1976) distinguished between the narrator/character's role in the story as an active agent or passive sufferer of events and consequences. According to Schafer when the narrator portrays herself as a passive sufferer or "patient" hiding her motivations even from herself, she is at the same time, avoiding her own responsibility in outcomes and events. Habermas (2006) building on Schafer's idea argues that taking (moral) responsibility for ones action is expressed through various aspects of NP. Thus, in order to express moral responsibility of actors it is not sufficient for the narrator to be represented as an actor in the story; rather, it is necessary to use mental verbs of wanting and deciding.

In contrast to narrative accounts relating agency and intentionality, a more general view is offered by Jackendoff's (1992) view of agency based on his cognitive-semantics theory, which may be applied to any type of text including narratives. According to this view, agency is interpreted in a broad sense, and hence not only intentional actors (i.e., persons) may be regarded as agents, but also those inanimate objects or processes, which can fill the place of an argument in the *cause* function (Jackendoff, 1992). For examples, in statements like "the stream of water developed a floodplain" agency is attributed to

water (inanimate object), causing through a physical process, whereas in a statement like "my stomach digests the food" agency is attributed to a body part (part of the self) as causing the physiological process of digestion. Expanding Jackendoff's view to patiency, we interpret it as any living or inanimate object filling the place of an argument in the *cause* function as well; however, referring to who or what is *being subjected to a cause-event, or undergoing state-alteration*. The implication of these distinctions to psychological explanations of intentionality in narratives is that it accounts for important aspects of the narrator's representation of different types of agents and patients in the story: whether the agent or patient mentioned is identical with the narrator, or not, a living person, or inanimate object/process — which have been shown to be relevant concerning sense of agency and moral responsibility of actors in narrative accounts (Habermas, 2006; Schafer, 1976).

In order to systematically assess agency and patiency in therapeutic discourse we use Jackendoff's concept of agency as a basis of our definition. We differentiate agency types in narrative based on potential agents: a) self of the narrator, b) part of the narrator's self (e.g., body part of the narrator), c) another living person, or d) an inanimate object, or process — which, importantly, may express various "degrees" of responsibility on the part of the narrator although we do not consider these categories to constitute an ordinal scale. We analyze patiency in an identical way to agency, distinguishing the same types of patients as the sufferers of outcomes and events in the narrative.

Constructing Self-Narratives in Psychotherapy while Shifting Perspective

In the therapeutic setting the client's self-narratives are jointly constructed by reconstructing and negotiating stories, identities, and agencies with the therapist (Beran & Unoka, 2005; Habermas, 2006; Ochberg, 1994; Schafer, 1976; Labov & Fanshel, 1997). In this joint construction process the patient and therapist negotiate the meaning of narratives: they reinterpret and modify them. Old stories are reconstructed and transformed by new meanings resulting in transformation of the narrative (Beran & Unoka, 2005). During this process, shifts in the talkers' perspective also occur.

The concept of NP, as mentioned above, is used to define the narrator's position with respect to the story plane, the time and place of its actions, actors, and characters (Genette & Sheridan, 1982; Uspenskij, 1973). In self-narratives, told in first person singular, the events are seen from the point of view of the main protagonist. When the client recollects a childhood memory or narrates a recent event to the therapist, she presents, and represents the events by showing them from a specific angle, or point of view. She recounts events through the lenses of his/her current self, influenced by unconscious or conscious factors such as current emotional states, and those at the time of events, his/her attitudes, desires, intentions, etc. Such influential factors determine the narrator's/client's use of linguistic structures, and the organization of the narration itself (Beran, 2005; Berán, 2011; Zubin, 1995). As it has been argued previously (Beran & Unoka, 2005) there is an interconnection between the speaker's NP, and the specific memories that she/he has access to, come up in his/her mind, and become verbalized. As a consequence, shifting of NP plays an elemental, formative role in the continuous changing, reshaping and reconstructing of self-narratives that takes place in therapeutic treatment. During therapeutic interaction NP of the speakers is continuously shifted, and by tracking these continuous shifts we can characterize the construction process of the narrative self.

Our study illustrates that patient's and therapist's perspective shifts are not independent from each other. Rather, speakers influence each-others perspective shifts as interaction progresses. We argue that coordination or alignment of NPP between the speakers occurs similarly to coordination or alignment of other discourse communication phenomena, such as bodily posture, use of certain grammatical structures, or vocabulary (Garrod & Pickering, 2009).

Since perspective used by one speaker draws attention of the other speaker to a specific aspects of the narrative (Nelson & Fivush, 2004), NP used by one speaker influences the NP of the other speaker in his/her consecutive utterances. We refer to this process as coordination of perspectives or mutual regulation of the speakers' NP shifting behavior. Mutual regulation of NP allows the therapist to influence the client's shifting behavior. Thus, consequences of individual therapeutic interventions as affecting the client's shifts can be traced throughout the narrative construction process. Studying interrelated shifting behavior of the talkers is useful for an "online" description and detailed understanding of the transformation of the client's narrative.

A Discourse-Based Model of Perspective

We defined NP using four component aspects of perspective which could be assessed by discourse based variables applied on our unit of analysis that we used for segmentation of the speech flow: intonation unit (Chafe, 1994; Clark, 1996). (For a more detailed description of the linguistic variables see the "Methods" section below.)

1) Physical aspect: refers to the spatial and temporal axis of the narrator/character's point of view, providing spatial and temporal "coordinates" of the narrator's position (Genette & Sheridan, 1982; Van Dijk, Kintsch, & Van Dijk, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). We operationalized this aspect in our discourse analysis by the variables of a) verb tense, and b) deixis.

2) Subjectivity aspect: identifies the person of the narrator, as well as his/her positioning with respect to the story world in which narrated events take place. We operationalized this aspect by the variables a) grammatical subject person, and b) number in the given intonation unit, and c) the narrator's being/not being a participant of the story world (Beran & Unoka, 2005; Genette & Sheridan, 1982).

3) Intentionality aspect: Defines the narrator's attitude towards his/her own person, and towards other characters *as mental agents*. We operationalized this aspect with three variables: a) focalization, b) agency and c) patiency.

4) Discourse level aspect: Positions the narrator in terms of his/her identifying with the narrator, or character of the story, or talking in the here and now of the therapeutic situation. Represents different types of remembering and self-knowledge: semantic, or general vs. episodic level.

Methods

Participants

Participants were volunteers, and received no compensation for participating in the study. The therapist participating in the study is an experienced clinical psychologist and psychoanalyst in Budapest, Hungary. She is a member of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Association and IPA. The treatment method applied was psychoanalysis. The therapist filled out the Clinical Data Form (CDF), which is a clinician-report form that assesses a range of variables about the client relevant to demographics, diagnosis, and etiology (Westen, Shedler, Durrett, Glass, & Martens, 2003).

The client — whom we are going to call Clara in the analysis — is an undergraduate university student in her 20's, living in Budapest, Hungary. Based on the therapist's assessment in CDF she suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, sexual dysfunction and dependent personality disorder. Her love partnerships were unstable. She was able to develop stable friendships and was able to work and study at the same time, being rather effective in both. Her family history contributed to her emotional problems: she grew up in an instable family, and her parents were divorced when she was 13. Her mother suffered from anxiety disorder and eating disorder. Her father suffered from alcohol dependence.

Procedure

Data collection and sampling

The data for the current study has been collected as part of the Budapest Psychotherapy Database, a systematically collected and transcribed set of psychotherapy sessions in Hungarian language. The database consists of the audio-recording of therapeutic treatment in psychodynamic psychotherapies with two patient-therapist dyads for a period of 1.5 years into treatment from the onset of therapy. Between 2004 and 2006 five consecutive sessions at the beginning, middle, and last third of the observation period were audio-recorded. The current study consists of a qualitative analysis of the transcribed text of one therapy session with a female therapist — female client dyad. The session examined here is from the beginning phase of the observation period, a few months after beginning therapy.

Selecting excerpts from the full transcript for data analysis

Using theoretical sampling method we analyze 5 excerpts from the session containing almost all of the dialogue from the trauma-narrative construction process. The choice of these particular sequences from the complete transcript of the sessions was based on our aim to follow through one thread of themes of discussion taking place at the session, namely: the actual psychoanalytic process of revealing the sexual abuse experience of the patient. The process begins with the client's recollection of her dream, and ends at roughly in the middle of the session, with the patient finally revealing her traumatic relationship with an abusive partner. This is the point until we follow the events of the session in this paper, due to space limitations, and also, because after revealing the trauma narrative, another type of therapeutic activity proceeds — the discussing and working through this experience — which is outside of the scope of this paper. In our

analysis of excerpts, we first present the patient's dream narrative in its complete form (Excerpt 1). Following this sequence, part of the transcript was not analyzed here due to space limitations; however, we were careful not to leave out any segment of the dialogue that would contain crucial information for readers to understand the narrative construction process. Excerpt 1 is followed by 4 additional consecutive dialogue sequences (Excerpt 2 - Excerpt 5), allowing for a continuous monitoring of the progressing narrative construction. We present all excerpts in English translation, which has been overseen by a native speaker. See Appendix C for the original Hungarian text.

Recording of session

Audio recording of sessions was carried out by participant analysts using a Sony min-disk device. Audio-recording as opposed to video-recording was chosen in order to avoid interference with the therapeutic work as much as possible. Asking participant analysts to do the recording themselves, served the same purpose of avoiding intrusion. The treatment method implied the classical arrangement of the client laying on the couch with the therapist sitting near her head. The consequence of this arrangement regarding the interaction was that the interactors' facial expressions were not visible for each-other, body and hand gestures were minimized, thus mainly reducing the relevant communicative aspects in the interaction to verbal content, tone of voice, and pauses.

Ethical considerations

The study for creating the Budapest Psychotherapy database, and its scientific analysis was approved by the board of Semmelweis University Regional and Institutional Committee of Science and Research Ethics. After the procedure(s) had been fully explained to them, participants signed the informed consent form in which they agreed to the use of their material for scientific and educational purposes. Also, participants were informed that they had the chance to resign at any point of the observation period if they felt uncomfortable. Recordings of sessions were carried out by the participant therapist; thus researchers did not meet clients personally. In order to preserve anonymity of the participant clients and therapists we deleted all personal information from the text-files, such as names of persons, places, institutions, dates of events, etc.

Data transcription

Audio-recorded therapy sessions were transcribed by the first author using the CHILDESS system (MacWhinney, 2000). The list of transcription codes used in this particular data-set is presented in the Appendix. The talkers' speech was transcribed verbatim, segmenting the speech flow into intonation units, as defined by Chafe (1994) in English, and by Németh (1996) in Hungarian. According to this, an intonation unit was defined as a group of words bounded by silence, a short pause or final intonation to signal question, period, or exclamation. Single words, sentence fragments could also be considered separate utterances, or fragmented utterances. The method of segmentation was tested for inter-rater reliability, and showed high level of agreement (Berán, Unoka, & Czobor, 2011), agreement between two people who segmented 300 common intonation lines was 88,08% volt (chi-squared = 13, 79, p < .01). Inter-class correlation inter-rater reliability (Shrout-Fleiss reliability point) = .99, p < .01. Translation of the transcript into English was overseen by a native speaker of English.

Coding of NP

Coding of NP was based on the original transcript in Hungarian, using the coding system we created for analyzing therapeutic discourse (for coding manual write to first author). We used the following variables in coding NP for individual intonation unit lines:

1. Verb tense: the grammatical verb tense in Hungarian includes three categories we used: a) past, b) present, and c) future.
2. Deixis: Adverbs of time and location, and demonstrative pronouns. We distinguished a) proximal, b) distal, and c) mixed categories, as well as d) "no deixis" present in a given intonation unit.
3. The narrator's relation to the story world (i.e., 'diegesis'): The narrator may be a) part of the story world ('inside-narrator'), or may be b) looking at it from the outside ('outside-narrator'). The narrator may c) identify with a character and tell the story from their point of view ('pseudo-narrator').
4. Grammatical subject: number and person. This is the same in Hungarian as in English. The subject could be a) singular or b) plural, and a) first, b) second, c) third person. We also distinguished two further categories of grammatical subject: d) impersonal (general) subject, or e) no subject present.
5. Mode of focalization: We differentiated a) internal mode of focalization: intonation units expressing mental contents (emotions, desires, intentions, etc.), from b) external mode of focalization: describing only overt behavior and events, but not the mental world of the participants.
6. Agency and patiency: Who is the actor in the story, who is influencing events in an active way, and who is the one who passively suffers the consequences: a) Self-agency/, patiency, b) Self-part agency/patiency, c) Other person-agency, patiency, d) Object-agency, patiency, e) No agent, or patient included in the given unit of analysis.
7. Discourse level: Positions the narrator in terms of whether he/she is telling the story from the narrator's point of view (i.e., narrator's level), or a character's point of view (i.e., character's level), or talking in the act of narration, in the here and now position of the therapeutic session ("here and now" of the therapeutic session"). These levels are also related to the process of recall, based on differing types of memory structures. The narrator is recalling general autobiographical information or a specific episode, or talking about the thoughts and feeling related to what is happening in the present (therapeutic session).
8. Coding for the segments included in the paper was independently carried out by the two authors, and disagreements were discussed and resolved afterwards. However, inter-rater reliability was computed based on 300 intonation units of the total transcript coded by independent ratings of the authors. Cohen's kappa for all the variables was between .55 and .76 (verb tense: .76; subject number: .69; subject person: .72; mode of focalization: .70; discourse level: .56; agency: 0. 67; patiency: .55).

Micro-Analysis of Excerpts from the Psychotherapy Session

Dream narrative

At about 10 minutes after the beginning of the session, the client, Clara, starts recollecting a dream. As she claims at a later point of the session the dream has popped into her mind just after leaving from the previous meeting. Her ambivalence about issues

of agency and control emerge even in relation to recollecting her dream, as she reports to the therapist: "and I was very happy that, that I finally … like I was able to realize, that that I really forget things". Following the recollection of her dream after the previous session however, she had what she described as a "horribly bad day", experiencing psychosomatic symptoms such as a strong headache.

In Excerpt 1 we quote the client's dream narrative that serves as a basis for later discussion at the session. See the Appendix for original transcript in Hungarian for all excerpts, and for transcription codes.

Excerpt 1
220 C: So this was my dream Monday morning, right.
221 C: and er ooo+…
comment: pause 26 sec
222 C: er I can't.
comment: pause 4 sec
223 C: well, so…
224 C: so, I had a dream about *Laci,*
225 C: and er+…
comment: pause 4 sec
226 C: so, like,
227 C: I don't know like+…
228 C: we met,
229 C: and then,
23o C: erer+…
231 C: we started like kissing,
232 C: then a sort of foreplay started, right,
233 C: which er er at the end was only+…
234 C: that erer +…
235 C: +, so like er+…
236 C: we have already got each other undressed and all,
237 C: and so I was like +…
238 C: kissing his belly,
239 C: and pulling down his his pants,
24o C: and there was nothing there. ##
241 C: and so like er+…
242 C: it was childish patterned underwear he wore.
243 C: like children's+/
244 C: that kind of a children's +…
245 C: underwear.

It is apparent that in the dream sequence, that the therapist does not interrupt the client's narrative; thus, she does not influence the client's way of reconstructing her story. Examining the use of NP in the dream, we find that the client uses past tense throughout the narrative. Remembering in this perspective — despite using a first person subject — creates an emotional distance between the dream-self and the present self of the narrator. Using exclusively past tense in self-narratives — in contrast to, for instance, alternating past tense with present tense — results in reduced emotional involvement as perceived by the listener (Berán et al., 2011; Pillemer, Desrochers, & Ebanks, 1998; Polya, Laszlo, & Forgas, 2005; Schiffrin, 1981). The effect of reduced affect is further supported by the

fact that the emotional interpretation of self and other is missing in the story. The narrator, Clara, focuses on merely the behavior of the two main characters (Clara and Laci, her formal romantic partner); however, their thoughts, feelings, emotional reactions are not mentioned. Inner experiences are not described. From line 240 to 245 only the external appearance of the lover's missing sexual organ is reported, but the narrator's and/or her partner's emotional reaction is not. The narrator's strategy of focusing on events and visual effects (i.e., using external mode of focalization) instead of recounting thoughts and emotions has been reported often to be used in trauma narratives.

The expression of agency in the narrative is characterized by the frequent use of *self-agency* by the narrator. This means, that Clara portrays herself as active, willing participant of events, who is capable of influencing outcomes, and is responsible for them -- as opposed to being a passive sufferer of the consequences of another's actions. Examples for this are expressions like "I had a dream", "I don't know", "we started kissing", "we started to undress each-other".

However, a non-living object takes the place of the agent, at various points in the narrative, such as in lines 240-245, where the agent becomes "nothing", and "children's underwear". This latter use of non-living object agency is related to the negation of the penis on the part of the dreamer. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the narrator/dreamer here makes the penis disappear, denies its existence, or destroys it, which is an aggressive way of relating the self to the object. This object in fact is part of the lover's body, or in general, part of the male body. Thus, the relationship between the self and the other person is an aggressive one here — the actor, or aggressive agent being the narrator/dreamer. One might speculate, that the fact that agency is being delegated to the object ("nothing", or "children's underwear") suggests that the narrator is ambivalent about relating aggressively to the other. Nevertheless, the client/narrator appears in the dream narrative as an active, capable, assertive, or even aggressive agent.

Sexuality, disgust and aggression

Clara's complex relation to male sexuality or other is further elaborated in the discussion following the dream narrative. In her free associations she begins to describe emotional and physical difficulties related to her sexual life (i.e., oral sex). In Excerpt 2 the discussion continues on this topic.

Excerpt 2
276 C: but that+…
277 C: that this is+…
278 C: +, that this is something horrible for me+…
279 C: +, disgusting,
280 C: appalling!
281 C: like it makes me wanna vomit,
282 C: but really concretely,
283 C: and like er er+…
284 C: I am scarred,
285 C: and at the same time,
286 C: I mean very severe,
287 C: I think it is a severe impairment that,
288 C: that I am not able to do this.

The first important shift in this sequence is the use of discourse level 3, what we called the *here-and-now of the therapeutic session.* In contrast to the character or narrator levels, level 3 is characterized by the narrator's stepping outside of the story world, and talking about his/her actual thoughts and emotions directly to the therapist. In contrast to the dream narrative, in this "space" outside of the story world Clara is able to re-experience and express her negative, aggressive, and avoidant emotions related to the penis.

The specific NP shifts that occur in this section provide further support for this claim. In contrast to the NP of external focalization used in the dream-narration, Clara uses internal focalization, with intense emotion expression while talking about oral sex, expressing her disgust and fear related to it. She also uses present tense throughout this section in first person singular, which perspective expresses an increased involvement of the self (Schiffrin, 1981), as compared to the past tense used in the dream narration.

Looking at agency in Excerpt 2 we find a dominance of non-living object agency in the client's use of perspectives, the agent being oral-sex, or "impairment". At the same time, self-patiency is used in line 281-284. This use of agency in the discussion of strong emotions and feelings suggests that Clara portrays herself as a helpless and a passive sufferer, who must suffer the effects that certain objects produce in her (i.e., penis), or the consequences in her circumstances. In line 286-88 self-agency returns in the use of "I mean", "I think", "I am not able to". This again suggests that Clara is the responsible actor for outcomes and events, however, in this case, agency also represents self-blame.

The therapist's intervention

The following excerpt is a continuation of excerpt 2. Its most important event is the therapist's intervention and the client's reaction to it.

Excerpt 3
289 T: yes, well the boys-
290 T: did they say that,
291 T: this is an impairment?
292 C: no!
293 C: no.
294 C: but like+…
295 C: expecting it,
296 C: like that+…
297 C: there were a few of them,
298 C: who would have expected it,
299 C: but I am not capable of it.
300 C: I can't do it.
301 T: and what was their response.
302 T: when you were not able to do it?
303 C: well+…
304 C: nothing.
305 C: well, obviously nothing.
306 C: that it's ok, of course.

The therapist's intervention is a radical shift in comparison to the patient's perspective in 289-291 in several aspects of NP. First, she introduces "the boys" as actors, positioning

them as agents. This use of agency calls into question the client's previous interpretation of events, her taking responsibility for outcomes, and her self-blame. In contrast to Clara's internal focalization, the therapist uses external focalization: talking of the boys' behavior, not about their thoughts, or emotions. The therapist also uses outside-narrator, looking on the events from outside of the story-plane, hence differentiating „the boy's" as well as the client's previous perspective from her own. She also shifts into narrator's position, where causal connections may be examined with more emotional distance, at a higher level of knowledge. The therapist's shifts of perspective represent a lower level of emotional involvement in comparison to Clara's former perspective used in 284-288. Thus, the therapist's shifting of NP in 289-290 down-regulates the intensity of emotional involvement. Table 1 summarizes the differences in perspective between the talkers.

Answering the therapist's question with "no" for short — meaning: "No, the boys did not say that this was impairment" — Clara also takes on the perspective offered in 284-288 by the therapist. However, she shifts back again to her previous point of view by using internal focalization in 294 C for "the boys", guessing their mental content (expectations). Then, again she uses self-agency in 299-300, taking responsibility and blame for what she sees as her incapacity. Thus, the talkers take conflicting point of views regarding the agent's identity, as expressed in their perspectives: the therapist using "the boys" and the client herself (Clara) as agent. This suggests that despite self-agency implying, in this case, self-blame, giving it up is not an easy step for the client.

Reacting to the client's statement, the therapist's next move — in line 301 — is shifting perspective again, by using "response" as an object-agent. Clara accepts this perspective and also uses object-agency in her answer in 303-306. Thus, the "agent" that is acceptable for both, is being negotiated by the talkers: first the therapist shifting into object-agency, then the client. Hence, at this point they come to an agreement on the question.

Who is the agent?
Excerpt 4 is a continuation of the discussion which centers on the question of emotional terror – an important part of the client's experience of sexuality. Problems with agency dominate the discussion in this section as well.

Excerpt 4
307 C: yes,
308 C: but that+...
309 C: but that led to emotional terror always.
310 T: on your part.
311 T: according to this.
312 C: yes.
313 T: so it weren't the boys+…
314 C: no!
315 T: +, er er who complained about this-
316 C: no!
317 C: it was me, myself.
318 T: you felt that way+/
319 T: you yourself felt that way,
320 T: that you should be able to do this.

321 T: or that this is not right.
322 C: well, yes.

The section is characterized by the talkers clarifying Clara's feelings of emotional terror using the narrator's level. As we mentioned earlier, the shift of NP to the narrator's level was initiated by the therapist in 289-290, and repeated again in her question in 301-302. As a response, the client also shifted to the narrator's level in 303, holding on to this perspective throughout Excerpt 4. Since this position signals a reduced level of self-involvement, shifting to the emotionally less intense position allows the client to differentiate her formal self — as a character of the story — and her present position.

This differentiation of the client's former and current positions allows her to focus on her feelings of terror — using internal focalization mode — without being overwhelmed by it. In 307-309 Clara uses general subject (impersonal), and object agency to describe events related to the "terror". Her perspective prevents the listener from identifying who used emotional terror against whom. In reaction to this obscuring of the agent's identity, the therapist uses various NP shifts to test hypotheses about the client's view of the agent's identity. In 310 the therapist directly asks the client who was responsible for her feelings of terror. The therapist uses second person, putting Clara in the passive position of the patient, in internal focalization. The therapist's NP in 313, 315 regarding subjectivity and intentionality aspects is in contrast with her perspective in 318-321, as it is shown in Table 2. Thus, the therapist offers two contrasting perspectives, one of which is verified by the client in turn, in 322.

Despite the client's explicit agreement with the therapist's perspective of agency in 318-321, there are two contrasting views, or alternative possibilities of agency presented in the therapist's question, "mirroring" the client's previous perspective. This strategy on the therapist's part — whether conscious or not — opens up a new possibility for the client to discuss the issue further, perhaps elaborate on it more. Thus, the therapist's offering of alternative views of agency is followed by Clara's shifting of NP, and her recollection of her trauma of a sexual abuse experience in Excerpt 5.

Trauma narrative

Excerpt 5
323 C: 'cas actually in my first-
324 C: m like sexual relationship,
325 C: this has been like a very serious problem.
326 T: hm.
327 C: so that like +…
328 C: that that boy could make the worst humiliations m out of that.
327 T: you haven't told me about this yet.
328 C: no.
comment: pause 7 sec
329 C: mm erer+…
330 C: he was a German guy,
331 C: and that +…
332 C: well he m+…
333 C: +, this was his request in fact.
334 C: and I told him that I couldn't do it,

335 C: and I am not able to do this,
336 C: he just simply like+…
337 C: +, pushed down my head.
338 C: and so+…
339 C: he demanded it.
340 C: or made me kneel like on the floor.

Claras's recollection of her sexual experience with an abusive person involves a radical shift of perspective, in comparison with her previous point of view either in her dream narrative, or in the discussion following it. Looking at these shifts of perspective we find the following:

From line 322 to 328 the client continues using the narrator's position. This emotionally less involving position allows for a wider scope on narrated events, and generalizations across experiences in various episodes, as well as the integration of contradictory perspectives. There are two contradictory narratives to be integrated here: one involves Clara's taking the agent's position, and taking responsibility for events, using self-blame. The other involves Clara's powerlessness, suffering and humiliation, and potentially the experience of anger. The former position is represented by the dream narrative, whereas the latter is represented by the trauma narrative. The dream narrative is a fantasy, expressing the desire of overcoming powerlessness that is represented by the trauma narrative. This latter may be assumed to reflect the outside real events, and the narrator's experiences of that reality.

In terms of NP used in the trauma narrative, we find a shift of agency in line 330. The new agent becomes a concrete person, referred to as "that boy" or "a German guy" — as opposed to former general reference to other agents, such as "boys". As "a German guy" becomes the agent, Clara becomes the patient at the end of the trauma narrative, being subjected to abuse and aggression. In 336-340 first a body part, or part of the self (head) is being put into the patient's position, then the whole self appears as the passive sufferer.

Along with abandoning the position of the agent, in 334 Clara shifts her point of view from narrator to character position, recounting the episode of abuse in detail. This perspective expresses a more intense emotional involvement of the self. However, emotions or mental contents of the participant self and other are not narrated: external focalization is used — similarly to the dream narrative. NPs used in the dream narrative and in the trauma narrative are summarized in Table 3.

Discussion

In the above five excerpts we have analyzed the first 25 minutes of a psychodynamic therapy session. Starting out with a dream a story, as the interaction between patient and therapist progressed, the narrative of a repeated sexual abuse has been revealed. With respect to the talkers' use of NP, more specifically, perspectives of agency and patiency, the dream and trauma narrative may be contrasted in several aspects (as shown in Table 3) showing a shift in the client's perspective:

In the dream narrative as well as in the client's initial associations to the dream the self appears as the agent, whereas the patient of the narrative is the other person, a male lover, or an inanimate object, which is part of the "other" male body (penis). In the course of the

interaction this narrator-agent at times appears to be a) initiating actions, for instance, when undressing the lover, b) aggressive, for instance, by making the penis disappear, or c) responsible for outcomes, such as unsuccessful love relationships. In the trauma narrative the narrator's self and part-of-self is put in the position of the patient. The agent is the other (male), who is being aggressive, and b) controlling and abusing the narrator, and c) is responsible for outcomes such as abusive behavior and unsuccessful love relationship.

Thus, in the two narratives the position of agent and patient is switched between the self and other. In the dream, the self is in the position of the agent — the other is in the position of the patient, whereas in the client's reconstructed memory of the abuse narrative it is vice versa. The first, dream situation may be considered as the client's fantasy wish, whereas the second one is a reconstruction of a real life experience, probably a close enough description of what actually took place from the client's point of view at the time of events.

In our analysis we have shown that the therapist's role in the joint construction of the abuse narrative has been a facilitating one. She initiated shifts by shifting to a new perspective in her interventions, offering new potential point of views to the client. This way she helped the client to shift her own perspective: from agency to patiency, shifting back and forth between character to narrator levels, from external to internal focalization mode, etc. Thus, the therapist's shifting behavior gave new direction to the unfolding of the narrative at various points of co-construction with her initiating a sequence of shifts directed towards a specific aim to change the client's point of view regarding positions of agency and patiency. Such important shift was for instance, when the therapist mentioned "the boys" as potential agents in the story providing an opportunity for the client to consider other actor's active role in outcomes and responsibility besides herself.

We argue that the psychological significance of the client's going through a gradual shifting of perspective is that she is able to re-construct the traumatic event, and re-narrate it from a different point of view. In her trauma narrative Clara abandoned the position of the agent she took initially in the dream narrative as well as in other fragments of her self-narrative discussing her love-life. Her initial position had the psychological advantage of protecting the client from experiencing negative emotions of powerlessness; however, it also involved the client's experiencing other negative emotions such as guilt, and self-blame in a maladaptive way. These on the long run lead to relationship difficulties and contributed to her low self-esteem in relationships.

Shifting into a new perspective in terms of agency — patiency and re-constructing her trauma narrative has two important consequences for the therapeutic process: First, it allows the client to gradually re-experience difficult emotions from the past, while reorganizing her memory of the traumatic events (Allen, 2001; Conway, 2001). As it is shown in Table 3 at this point of the therapy session, the trauma narrative has not yet included internal focalizing perspectives: references to mental states of self and other, which could verbally reveal the re-experiencing of such emotions (Unoka, Berán, & Pléh, 2012). However, some negative emotions of disgust and fear the client mentioned at an earlier point in the session could be reorganized in a more realistic narrative of her emotionally confusing abuse experiences in the future. In her reconstructed narrative she will be able to include experience of fear, shame, disgust, and humiliation, as well as experience of powerlessness and passivity. Moreover, from this point on in therapy, the

possibility of dealing with negative emotions and also of working through them opens up. Second, while recalling her abuse experience that has occurred in her first intimate relationship, as she puts it, the client shifts into a NP that expresses and acknowledges her passive role in the abuse situation. This is in contrast to the client's initial positioning of herself as agent in her sexual interactions excluding the possibility of others' responsibility. As a result of her position as agent, the client was suffering excessive self-blame and feelings of guilt taking responsibility for her own negative experiences in the abuse situation itself, as well as for long term outcomes in the form of relationship problems she mentions earlier in the session. The reconstructed abuse narrative positions Clara as the patient, hence allowing the lessening of guilt and self-blame.

Recovering the abuse narrative and accepting experiences of passivity and powerlessness on the part of the client creates a linguistic representation of experiences which integrates episodic memories of the traumatic event with the autobiographic knowledge-system (Allen, 2001; Beaudoin, 2005; Conway, 2001; Kaminer, 2006) including new, reconstructed self and other representations. Thus, as a result of transformed narrative the client's self-representations may include her genuine feelings of powerlessness, pain and sadness, as well as the therapist's emphatic reactions to these experiences, which reduce, for instance, feelings of shame associated with them. The newly experienced self and other representations help the healing processes by fostering reconstruction and reconsolidation (Gorman & Roose, 2011) of the trauma episode in memory. This seems to be a necessary step towards recovering the client's sense of agency that allows a healthier way of relationship-functioning.

The process of joint reconstruction of the client's abuse narrative demonstrates how therapeutic process in psychodynamic psychotherapy can be studied using a micro-level discourse analysis. In a step by step description of shifts in NP in the client's talk, we followed the gradual transformation of her self-narrative. The therapist's active role in the process of reconstructing the client's narrative was also revealed by the analysis. By examining perspective shifts in the therapist's talk, we could trace effects of single interventions on the client's perspective shifts. We showed *how* in the course of the interaction, the therapist was able to influence the unfolding of the client's narrative, and hence, the construction of the narrative self by acting upon a crucial aspect of its structure-formation, namely the point of view from which the client tells her story.

Limitations of Data-Interpretation

We would like to mention two methodological concerns regarding our data interpretation, one is related to using verbal interaction as data source, the other to psychoanalytic theory used by the participant therapist. It has been pointed out in previous studies (Levitt & Rennie, 2004; Levitt & Piazza-Bonin, 2011) that there are important aspects of in-session interaction which are not verbally expressed, cannot even be overtly verbalized, hence cannot be assessed using textual analysis. Therefore, important aspects of the interaction may be overlooked in the type of analysis we undertook in this research. This is a limitation all discourse analysis of in-session interaction must deal with to some degree.

Modes of nonverbal communication typically studied as important sources of information not included in the above analysis are facial emotional expressions, hand and body gestures and tone of voice. As we mentioned in our Method section however, the arrangement of the psychoanalytic setting radically reduces the relevance of facial

expressions, hand and body gestures in the communicative process. Due to the limitation of the scope of our analysis we did not include analysis of tone of voice, ad pauses, although these could be revealing of emotion states of the talkers. Since we included this information in our transcript, this aspect of therapeutic discourse may be the topic of future studies.

Since our framework for data analysis is a discourse based narrative analysis, the question may arise how this framework is related to psychoanalytic theory used by therapist in her interpretation of in-session events and the client's narrative. First, we must note that using the narrative/discursive framework does not exclude, nor contradict any psychoanalytically grounded interpretations or explanations of the therapeutic process, in fact, this method could be used to further investigate psychoanalytically based explanations, or elaborate on certain aspects of them. In addition we think that while our analysis is based on data from psychodynamic psychotherapy, this method may also be used for examining therapeutic process in therapies using different theoretical backgrounds and techniques such as client centered, expressive, etc. as long as there is narrative construction taking place at the session. Secondly, although there is example in the literature how additional information from the therapist may be used for interpreting in-session discourse events, for instance, in the classic study by Labov and Fanshel (1997), there are a great number of studies of therapeutic discourse not using this secondary source of information while providing valid analysis of in-session interaction grounded in discourse theory such as conversation analysis (Voutilainen, Perakyla, & Ruusuvuori, 2011).

There is another, theoretical limitation we must consider regarding our analysis. We must emphasize that reconstruction of the trauma narrative is just one element of the therapeutic process, perhaps not always the first step. The problem of recovering agency in traumatized patients might be complicated and influenced by various factors different for each individual case. Such influential factor may be, for example, the severity of the trauma. If the client repeatedly experiences flashbacks and other sudden intrusions of the traumatic memories, regaining the capacity of self-agency in the traumatized part of his/her personality is a long and complex process (Berán & Unoka, 2005). Thus, various interventions, such as helping to develop emotion regulation skills of the client may be necessary before reconstructing agency in the trauma narrative.

Implications for Psychotherapy Process Research and Clinical Treatment

Based on our analysis of in-session interaction there are two considerations to keep in mind regarding future research of psychotherapy process:

1) Analyzing the psychotherapy process by studying narrative co-construction taking place between client and therapist with a *focus on the interactive process of perspective shifting* of the talkers.
2) Presenting a new way of conceptualizing and analyzing the *effect of single interventions* by studying interactive shifting behavior.

Regarding clinical practice our theory of NP regulation in this and other studies was shown to be useful for describing relevant discourse events in the therapeutic interaction in terms of transformation of the client's narrative. The fact that we showed how, and in

what way the psychoanalyst is able to influence the reconstruction of the narrative may have interesting consequences for clinical practice. According to our results, the construction of the narrative self is influenced by the therapist by acting upon a crucial aspect of its structure-formation, namely on the NP or point of view, from which the patient tells his/her story. Further examination of the details of this process in case studies dealing with various psychological problems could provide useful information for therapeutic training and practice. Future studies are needed to find out whether shifting perspective is a "technique" that could be applied at will and practiced by therapists online, or conscious control of most aspects of language use concerning perspective is not probable in spontaneous speech production at the session; also, whether learning particular type of shifting behavior may generalize to other similar situations as a cognitive skill.

We found that shifting into a given perspective or elaboration of certain perspectives might be uncomfortable for the client at a given moment in therapy, or it may even prove impossible. Hence, learning particular NP shifts is not accomplished as a one-time event. Rather, shifting from one particular perspective to another — as initiated by the therapist — is often accomplished in multiple steps (i.e., sequences of shifts) by the client. Thus, it is a prolonged process that takes place over an extended period of time spent in psychoanalysis, practicing certain shifts by "repetition".

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Appendix A

Transcription Codes

The interaction was transcribed using the CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000) coding system. Each line represents a full or broken intonation unit, realizing a given narrative perspective. At the beginning of each line there is a number signaling the place of the line within the transcript of the therapeutic session. The *T* or *P* following the number signals the speaker being the therapist or patient, respectively.

Final intonation contour at the end of full units:
. falling
? rising -- question
! exclamation
, level, continuing
Broken intonation units:
+… broken unit, fragment
+//   interrupted by another speaker
+/.   self-interruption
+,   beginning of an intonation unit continuing a broken unit
Final intonation contour at the end of fragmented units:
-.   falling
-,   level
-?   rising
/   emphasized word or syllable
(1 s) pause btw words or within words

Appendix B

Table 1

Differences of perspective between talkers

NP variable	NP in Client 284-288	NP in Therapist 289-290
Agency	self-agency: Client	other-agency: the boys
Focalization	internal focalization	external focalization
Story world	inside-narrator	outside-narrator
Subject person	1st person	3rd person
Verb tense	present tense	past tense
Discourse-level	here-and –now of the session	narrator's level

Table 2

The therapist offers two contrasting perspectives

NP variable	NP in Therapist 313, 315	NP in Therapist 318-321
Agency	other-agency: the boys	other-agency: the client
Focalization	external focalization	internal focalization
Story world	outside-narrator	outside-narrator
Subject person	3rd person	2nd person
Discourse-level	narrator's level	narrator's level

Table 3

The client's perspective in dream narrative vs. trauma narrative

NP variable	NP in Dream narrative	NP in Trauma narrative
Agency	self	other person
Patiency	other person, non-human object	self
Focalization	external focalization	external focalization
Subject person	first person	first person
Story world	inside-narrator	inside-narrator
Discourse-level	character level	narrator / character level

Appendix C

Original transcript of excerpts from the therapeutic session in Hungarian

Excerpt 1
220 C: ezt álmodtam ugye hétfőre reggel.
221 C: és öö ooo+…
comment: pause 26 s
222 C: öö nem megy.
comment: pause 4 s
223 C: jó végül is így,
224 C: tehát hogy a Lacival álmodtam,
225 C: és ö+…
comment: pause 4 s
226 C: tehát így,
227 C: nm tudom így+…
228 C: találkoztunk,
229 C: aztán így,
230 C: öö+…
231 C: úgy elkezdtünk csókolózni,
232 C: aztán ugye így elkezdődött egy ilyen előjáték,
233 C: ami öö ben végül is annyi volt+…
234 C: hogy öö +…
235 C: +, hogy így ö+…
236 C: már levetkőztettük egymást meg minden,
237 C: és hogy én így+…
238 C: puszilgattam a hasát,
239 C: és lehúztam a a nadrágját,
240 C: és nem volt ott semmi. ##
241 C: és ugye így ö+…
242 C: egy gyerekmintás alsónadrág volt rajta.
243 C: ilyen kisgyerek+/
244 C: amilyen a kisgyerekeknek a +…
245 C: alsónadrágja.
… *Interaction segment not included in the analysis*

Excerpt 2
276 C: de hogy+…
277 C: hogy ez+…
278 C: +, hogy ez nekem valami iszonyú+…
279 C: +, gusztustalan,
280 C: undorító!
281 C: így konkrétan hánynom kell tőle,
282 C: de hogy egészen konkrétan,
283 C: és így öö+…
284 C: rettegek tőle,
285 C: és közbe meg így,
286 C: szal ilyen nagyon,
287 C: nagyon súlyos fogyatékosságomnak élem azt meg,

288 C: hogy én erre nem vagyok képes.

Excerpt 3
289 T: igen hát a fiúk,
290 T: azt mondták,
291 T: hogy ez egy fogyatékosság?
292 C: nem!
293 C: nem.
294 C: dehát így+…
295 C: elvárni,
296 C: azt így+…
297 C: voltak így többen,
298 C: akik elvárták volna,
299 C: de hát én meg nem vagyok rá képes.
300 C: nem tudom megtenni
301 T: és mi volt a válasz.
302 T: amikor nem volt képes rá?
303 C: hát+…
304 C: semmi.
305 C: hát nyilván semmi.
306 C: hogy így jó, persze.

Excerpt 4
307 C: igen,
308 C: de hogy+...
309 C: de hogy ebből ilyen lelki terror lett mindig.
310 T: a saját maga számára.
311 T: ezek szerint.
312 C: igen.
313 T: tehát nem a fiúk+…
314 C: nem!
315 T: +, öö hányták a szemére,
316 C: nem!
317 C: én magam.
318 T: hanem maga érezte úgy+/
319 T: saját maga érezte úgy,
320 T: hogy ennek mennie kellene.
321 T: vagy ez így nincsen jól.
322 C: hát igen.

Excerpt 5
323 C: mer végül is nekem az első,
324 C: m ilyen szexuális kapcsolatomban,
325 C: ez egy ilyen nagyon komoly probléma volt.
326 T: ühm.
327 C: tehát hogy ilyen +…
328 C: hogy a legdurvább megaláztatásokat bírta m belőle csinálni az a fiú.
327 T: erről még nem mesélt.
328 C: nem.
comment: pause 7 sec

329 C: mm öö+…
330 C: ő egy német srác volt,
331 C: és hogy +…
332 C: hát neki így m+…
333 C: +, ez volt a kérése, tulajdon képen.
334 C: és én mondtam hogy én ezt nem tudom megtenni,
335 C: meg én erre nem vagyok képes,
336 C: ő meg egyszerűen csak így+…
337 C: lenyomta a fejemet.
338 C: és így izé+…
339 C: követelte.
340C: vagy így letérdeltetett a földön.

Ambiguity, Equivocation, Unconscious

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Abstract

In his text *L'étourdit*, Lacan develops a tripartite definition of the equivocal, distinguishing between the homophonic, grammatical, and logical. Psychoanalysis, being the praxis of alleviating unconscious symptoms via the semblance that is language, depends upon the equivocity of language. This paper elucidates these three forms of ambiguity in their relevance to the clinic and the end of analysis.

Introduction

How does one define the equivocal in its relation to psychoanalysis? From a Freudian point of view, parapraxes, dreams, symptoms, and bungled actions first come to mind in that they all suppose compromise formations. Yet even speech without lapses remains equivocal. On the basis of the presumption that the equivocal is to be studied at the frontier of linguistics and psychoanalysis, a dictionary can be used and definitions support the research. According to the *Oxford Dictionary* (2010, p. 593), one finds the following definition: "An expression capable of having more than one meaning; a pun. The fact of having more than one meaning; ambiguity".

Insofar as the term concerns the field of psychoanalysis, we propose to use the three final definitions found in the *Littré* (2007): "equivocal rhyme", "interpretations of *double entente*" and "wordplay or *calembour*". In other words, the equivocal refers to when the nature of language reveals itself in the ambiguous, arbitrary relation between signifier and signified; when the signifying chain diverges simultaneously towards two or more meanings.

The importance of the equivocal as a foundational concept appears discretely throughout Freud's written works. Indeed it is pivotal in the development of his hypothesis of the unconscious. "Freud's interest in the assumption [of the unconscious] was never a philosophical one - though, no doubt, philosophical problems inevitably lay just round the corner. His interest was a *practical* one. He found that without making that assumption he was unable to explain or even to describe a large variety of phenomena which he came across" (Freud, 2001b, p. 162). Furthermore, he learns from his patients that mutual contradiction is absent from the unconscious, perhaps most clearly in the case of dreams. "Dreams are disconnected, they accept the most violent contradictions without the least objection, they admit impossibilities, they disregard knowledge which carries great weight with us in the daytime, they reveal us as ethical and moral imbeciles"

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(Freud, 2001c, p. 87). One could thus say that equivocity is characteristic of the unconscious.

The equivocal is a topic that Lacan emphasized considerably in his last period, especially from 1972 on with his indispensable text, *L'étourdit*. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to imagine that the equivocal doesn't appear in Lacanian theory prior to the seminar *Encore*. Already in 1953, at the time of his first "Rome Discourse", a monumental structuralist manifesto[2], Lacan spoke about the equivocal in the symbolic register and its essential place in the analytic cure. In this discourse we find the following reference where he accentuates the importance of the letter in the analytic praxis. For Miller (2011a), the future importance of *savoir lire*, which will be central from *Radiophonie* on, is already announced:

> Here the letter of the message is what's important. To seize it, one must stop an instant at the fundamentally equivocal character of speech, insofar as the function is as much one of concealing as of discovering. But even adhering to what the letter makes known, the nature of language does not permit the isolation of resonances which always indicate its reading along several significances. It is this inherent partition in the ambiguity of language that alone explains the multiplicity of possible entrances to the secret of speech. It remains there is only one text for which what is said and what is left unsaid can be read at once, and it is to this text that the symptoms are bound as intimately as a rebus to the phrase in which it figures (Lacan, 2001e, 140).

From the beginning of Lacan's seminars in the 1950's there is an emphasis on the pre-eminence of the letter[3] as being the only way to grasp the essence of the analytic

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[2] The Rome Discourse and corresponding article, *Function and field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, constitute a response both to continual pressure for his exclusion from the SPP on the part of the IPA which came to a head earlier that year, as well as the authoritarian approach of his analyst, Rudolph Lowenstein and his lover, Marie Bonaparte.

[3] It is essential not to forget that Lacan's definition of the letter changes over the course of his teaching. If in 1957, with the publication of *L'instance de la lettre*, the summit of an era of the pre-eminence of the symbolic, one finds,
 "By 'letter' I designate the material medium (*support*) that concrete discourse borrows from language" (Lacan, 1966b, p. 495). The definition of the letter in the final Lacan, *e.g., Lituraterre*, is hardly the same. There, the letter constitutes the shore between the real and semblance: "Between centre and absence, between knowledge and jouissance, there lies the littoral that only fetches to the literal provided you are able to take this very same bend at all times" (2001b, p. 16).

experience, of correctly reading the instance of the letter in subject's unconscious on his vocalizations. As Lacan proposes, the flexible relation between signifier and signified in speech and the abundant existence of homophones contribute to the fundamentally equivocal character of speech. If we take the *Two Ronnies* Hardware Shop sketch as an example, one quickly sees that the ambiguity of whether one said *Four candles* or *fork handles*, or even *fork and hells* needs the written letter be avoided. Lacan continues, however, asserting that such an "isolation of references", a reduction of possible significations for a given signifier or chain of signifiers, is not always possible simply through the written letter. Such is the case with Kuno Susumi's famous experiment, in which he requests a computer program to give him the signification for the English sentence, *time flies like an arrow* (Kuno, 1970). In this case, written language offers little help in reducing the plethora of potential meanings beyond the exclusion of homophones; for Lacan, the nature of language doesn't permit an absolute reduction of ambiguity. Here he references language because even when written, language remains equivocal, though admittedly less so than speech. A minimal sentence, *time flies*, could be understood in at least four different ways. The unspoken axiom of Lacan's assertion is that the unconscious is structured like a language, and furthermore is a combinatory of metonymic fragments and letters, an extreme hypothesis that Serge Leclaire (1998) helped to corroborate with the formalization of his Dream with the Unicorn.

This attention to the letter continues throughout Lacan's teaching and his varied attempts to raise psychoanalysis to the dignity of science.[4] Indeed, the letter proves to be primordial to the Lacanian approach. Even if, in *Seminar XXI*, when Lacan announces a new ethic, *The unfooled err*[5], he founds this axiom in the confidence of the spoken, the *savoir lire* lauded by Miller (2011a) situates itself at the level of the letter and not the acoustic image conceptualized by Saussure. In his 2006-2007 *Lacanian Orientation*, Miller professes "Last year, thrice I found myself remarking on, and not in the manner of a feint, the distance I took, or rather that this *I* which speaks to you, itself took from Lacanian disance: distance and distance.[6] I said disance... That which saves, will save us from disance, I will say it: reading and reading to the *letter*" (Miller, 2012, p. 17).

But more specifically, this quotation indicates the direction to be taken when interpreting the "fundamentally equivocal character" of speech. Lacanian analysis aims not at meaning of the analysand's speech or the generation of new meaning: e.g., "I know what you really mean to say". Such an endeavour would be condemned to perpetual misunderstanding. Rather it directs itself towards the underlying interplay of letters of the unconscious. If "there is only one text where one can read at once what is said and unsaid", would this text would be the unconscious? Or *lalangue*? It would be best not to confuse the polysemous series of possible meanings of a given phrase and the fundamentally univocal nature of the *presence* of a certain signifier or letter. Let us imagine a patient telling us the following, "I dreamt of a woman, I can not be sure who it was, but I know it was not my mother". It is at the level of the materiality of the signifier "mother" that there is no equivoque, not at the level of signification. And so, the analytic ethic espoused in this paragraph of Lacan's first Rome Discourse (1956) does not consist in grappling with the production of meaning; it is not a case of explaining symptoms,

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[4] Initially *via* the structural linguistics of Saussure and Jakobson, then the formal logic of Russell and Gödel, and finally topology with Klein, Soury, Thom, and Thomé.

[5] *Les non-dupes errent.*

[6] *Disance* being a synonym for lexicon, similar to jargon.

which would approach a delusion of interpretation. Rather it is a case of fidelity to the letter in its materiality. From here one can see that "Interpretation is not open to any and all meanings". The quote continues, "The fact that I have said that the effect of interpretation is to isolate in the subject a kernel, a *kern*, to use Freud's own term, of *non-sense*, does not mean that interpretation is in itself nonsense... It has the effect of bringing out an irreducible signifier. One must interpret at the level of the *s*, which is not open to all meanings, which cannot be just anything, which is a signification, though no doubt only an approximate one", says Lacan in his *Seminar XI* (1990, p. 250). Lacanian interpretation is at the level of the repetitive presence of a signifier or letter, and so the interpretation is just or proper insofar as it does not lead to a proliferation of meaning, to the establishment of a delusion of signification. An interpretation oriented by meaning will never reduce the excess of meaning.[7] This is the "bedrock of castration" Freud (Freud, 2001d) grappled with. As such, the only right interpretation would be that which dilutes meaning, which rests true to the letter.[8]

Later Lacan elaborated further on this "fundamentally equivocal character", the polysemy of intentionality of the phrase in his notion of lying, misleading truth.[9] The lying truth constitutes the wall of the nature of enunciation itself, up against which all discourse stumbles. One can never tell the whole truth, regardless the judicial imperative "Swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing by the truth"; in its geometric consistency, a facet of the truth escapes any utterance. As such, the lying truth is clearly more radical than what could be called the veracious lie[10] — a concept Lacan passes by ephemerally in

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[7] As such psychoanalytic interpretation is perhaps a misnomer. It has little in common with legal interpretation in which judges wrestle with the appropriate signification of a text. Psychoanalytic interpretation more resembles oracular speech, oracular speech that aims for the discovery of the text of the unconscious.

[8] An analysand says he told a coworker how much money he spends on fashion, and yet how difficult it is to spend money on analysis. The analyst interprets from a position of surprise: "You told her all that?" Next session, "I thought about what you said, I think you're jealous". End of the session, the analyst's punctuates based on the analysand's fantasy. The analysand returns and speaks of how much money he spends on substances during parties and how he shares because he "doesn't want to be taken as someone who *counts*". The analyst echoes "You don't want to be taken as someone who *counts*?" This declaration possesses a clear equivoque between a miserly subject and one of importance. Next session, the patient tells of a traumatic childhood separation from another placed at the level of imaginary and symbolic identification. He describes the separation, "It was exactly like coming down from ecstasy... Have you taken ecstasy?" Here the analyst does not respond with yes or no, nor drugs are bad for you or any other of the myriad of possible platitudes. Instead he says, "This is something which *counts* for you". The vignette shows how psychoanalytic interpretation bases itself neither on morality, nor on the knowledge of the psychoanalyst, it is based on the materiality of language. The equivocal term found in the analysand's speech is, in this case, the fulcrum for the installation of transference, of the subject supposed to know.

[9] *La vérité menteuse*

[10] "But, certainly, it is in the space of the Other that he sees himself and the point from which he looks at himself is also in that space. Now, this is also the point from which he speaks, since in so far as he speaks, it is in the locus of the Other that he

his *Seminar XI*, when he pays homage to the poet Aragon who "in the 60s had formulated something he called the *mentir-vrai*... The true lie is an untruth which attains, which reveals truth" (Miller, 2011c, p. 140). Simply put, its another name for *Einfall*, the phenomena that no matter what one speaks of, one will, or rather one's subject will pronounce, quite possibly unbeknownst to the ego, a *Kern* of truth on the nature of his trauma by language. The lying truth is something entirely different, *qua* "the truth itself is a lie" (*ibid.*).

Les Tours Dit: Lacan's definition of the equivocal

Homophony

In this great oracular text the early 1972s, Lacan divides the equivocal into a tripartite classification: homophonic, grammatical, and logical. Regarding homophonic equivocity, Lacan writes, "I begin with homophony, - whence depends orthography. The fact that in the language which is mine, which I played on above, "*deux*" [two] be equivocal with "*d'eux*" [of them/their], guards a trace of this soul game by which *make two-together of them* finds its limit in "*make two*" of them. One finds others in this text, from *parêtre* to *s'emblant*" (Lacan, 2001c, p. 491). To demonstrate the equivocity of spoken languages, he refers to the myriad of signifiers of the French language who share the phoneme *dø*. The French language is particularly resonant at the level of homophony; "Thank God the French language, often ambiguous when spoken" (Lacan, 1981, p. 307) provides countless examples in stride: *e.g.*, *vers/vert/verre/ver, ou/où/août/hou/houx*, and *sans/s'en/c'en/sens/sent/sang/cent*. Yet, the French language is hardly unique in this regard, in that it possesses so very many homonyms. Upon a quick glance at English one finds: air/are/e'er/ere/err/heir or boar/Boer/boor/bore. Such equivoques are assuredly present in all human languages; *A fortiori* by approaching the question of language from Gödel's discoveries on the incompatibility in all formal systems of completeness and consistence, arise the striking realization that it is fundamentally impossible to have a univocal language. In order for a language to be without ambiguity, there must be a unique sign for each and every thing in the universe, and a system with one sign for every object wouldn't truly be a human language but rather a code of signs. There would be no signifiers in the psychoanalytic sense since though "the sign is something that represents something for somebody, but the signifier is something that represents a subject for another signifier" (Lacan, 1970, p. 194). The signifier is not the bearer of the sense of the object, "but rather something of the order of a mark applied in some manner on the object, which superimposes it" (Lacan, 1960-1961).[11] The only human artefact remotely

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begins to constitute that truthful lie by which is initiated that which participates in desire at the level of the unconscious" (Lacan, 1990, p. 144).

[11] Lacan derived such definitions from Saussure's work on the phonic chain and Jakobson's research into aphasia, deducing a fundamental separation between sound and idea. For Saussure, the sign is the combination of sound image and idea. Jakobson's major advance was the discovery that the signifier or phoneme can be without signified. In the New World, Charles Sanders Peirce instead termed the signifier a *representamen*, the referent as *object*, and named the meaning that one obtains from a sign the *interpretant*. More importantly, the relation between 'sign-user' or receiver and sign is one of negotiation with the receiver deciding one meaning from nigh infinite possibilities. Such a perspective, that the signified is not

capable such of formalization would be mathematics, which, though a human language, is not a language of acoustic images but rather a highly formalized one with fixed meanings. Furthermore, Gödel proved that any even formal systems based in mathematics would always be incomplete, always *pas tout*. The "fundamentally equivocal character" of language need not arise from a human limitation, being the result of logical impossibility.

A posteriori, the decrease in phoneme perceptiveness in infants (Pons, F. *et al.,* 2009) renders inevitable the equivocity of language. Around the end of the first year of life, the total range of sounds produced by the child begins to diminish from a Babel of phonemes limited only by physiology to the more restricted set of sounds heard in the language of its entourage. Gödel's impossibility aside, such a poor selection of sounds, limited first by human anatomy, and then by the newborn's exposure to language will not be able avoid homophony and synonymy. And we have not yet considered the ambiguities of a given message in relation to where one places the cuts between sounds to form words, *e.g., novio* vs. *no vio*. The serious researcher will undoubtedly find formal incoherencies in all human languages; all spoken languages possess equivocity.

Another Lacanian example of a homophonic equivoque is to be found in the binary "tu es celui qui me suivra partout" vs. "tu est celui qui me suivra(*s)* partout". Naturally, the ambiguity between the simple future and the imperative future tenses only clarifies itself through writing, through the supplemental letter. This ambiguity at the level of speech reflects the unconscious desire of the subject of enunciation.

There is an underlying *I* to the " You are the one who will follow me ["*Tu es celui qui me suivras partout"*] on which I insisted to such an extent.[12] It inscribes itself, with the whole problem of a certain future, at the interior of the vocatives properly speaking, the vocatives of vocation. For those who were not there, I recall the difference there is in French - it is a finesse whose demonstration not all tongues permit - between "You are the one who shall follow me " and " you are the one who will follow me", [*Tu es celui qui me suivras partout* and *Tu es celui qui me suivra partout*], without *s*. In this occasion, the difference of the performative power of the *You* is effectively an actual difference of the *I* inasmuch as it operates in this act of speaking. One clearly sees at this level that the subject always receives his own message in an inverted form, namely it is the *I* to avow itself here by the intermediary of the form it gives to the *You...* Nevertheless, fundamentally what one finds at the second floor[13] [*d* arrow $\$\diamond a$], is a call of the being

the same as the message, is confirmed in the field of psychopathology. In delusions of interpretation as found in paranoia and erotomania, the chain signifier may lead unproblematically to significations, but the true meaning is the exclusive property of the subject, (s)he deduces a message, often menacingly, directed to his person. We take as a given that a signifier or signifying chain can signify one of many 'signifieds'. Beyond this, it need have no relation whatsoever to the meaning ascribed to it by the receiver. Umberto Eco (1990) names this hermetic semiosis, explaining "*from a certain point of view everything bears relationships of analogy, contiguity, and similarity to everything else*", but the phenomena of certainty and universal unicity of meaning in delusions of interpretations seem beyond even hermetic semiosis.

[12] First found in *Seminar III.*

[13] Of the graph of desire.

emitted more or less forcefully. It always contains, more or less, a *Let it be*[14], and there, once again, one of the marvellous homophonic equivoques that French contains. (Lacan, 2013, p. 46).

This homophonic equivoque explicitly demonstrated by Lacan plays on the finesse of the French language, on the distinction between certainty of the future and the causality of the invocatory future; this ambiguity returns to the subjective position of (s)he who accounts for subject of enunciation, to the "underlying *I*" (Jakobson, 1971, p 132).[15] The signification swings back and forth between stringency, plausibly from a universal observation - little matter which other - and the election of a singular other. One might say the meaning of the phrase oscillates between the sacrament of marriage and persecution.

"The appeal of the being", which would be located at the second level of the graph of desire, involves the desire of the subject of the unconscious. The being - there, in *Seminar XI*, Lacan still uses this term (*l'être*) as though it referred to a being with consistence[16] - emits "full speech" (Lacan, 1988, p. 107)[17] *via* through its enunciations. This "appeal to the other" resides between the *suivra* of recognition or perhaps exasperation and the *suivras* of exigency; one hears the desire articulated in its relation to the fantasy, the delusion, formalized as follows: d→$<>a. Hence the affirmation, the desire of the subject makes itself heard in the space between the pronounced words, in the equivoques present. Here the psychoanalyst interprets; (s)he interprets based on the fantasy, the fantasy of the analysand, of course! It is precisely here that the famous ego-psychologists like Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein lose their bearings, believing they should interpret using their own fantasies, as though they could offer themselves as anchoring points for the madman. In that case, it is suggestion instead of psychoanalysis, the imposition of the analyst's fantasy, of his subjectivity upon the analyst.

Addressing the homophonic equivoque, Lacan goes even further, saying that if the listener, the receiver in question has not acquired "something that represents a knot, a clamping point in a bundle of significations... he will hear *you are the one who shall follow me everywhere*" (1981, p. 316), meaning a persecutory delusion. If there is not a certain suture between signifier and signified, something fulfilling the function of the

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[14] *Soit*: The subjunctive tense of *être*; the conjunction "soit... soit" / "either... or"; an affirmation of accordance "So be it" or "That being so"; an equivalent of "that is to say" or "namely", in mathematics "Soit l'équation y=x+a"/ "Let y=x+a".

[15] According to Jakobson, a *shifter* is a term whose meaning can only be deduced by referring to the message communicated between the sender and receiver.

[16] Throughout Lacan's teaching, in accordance with his renouncement of ontology which gives way to henology, the term gradually changes from *being* to *subject*, and finally to *parlêtre*.

[17] "Full speech is speech which aims at, which forms, the truth such as it becomes established in the recognition of one person by another. Full speech is speech which performs [*qui fait acte*]. One of the subjects finds himself, afterwards, other than he was before. That is why this dimension cannot be evaded in the analytic experience" (Lacan, 1966b). "Full speech, in effect, is defined by its identity with that which it speaks about".

maintaining the metaphoric structure of language, then the accentuation of equivocal enunciations will not be without risk.

Grammar

The second modality of the equivocal addressed by Lacan in *L'étourdit* is the grammatical equivoque.

> For interpretation is seconded here by grammar. To which, in this case as in others, Freud does not deprive himself of recourse. I do not return here to what I underscore in this practice confirmed in many examples. I stress only that it is there what analysts impute modestly to Freud as a slippage in the indoctrination. This has dates (cf. that of the rat man) when he had no more backdrop for proposing them than the system ψ prey to "internal incitations". Thus the analysts who cling to the madhouse of "general psychology", are not capable of reading, in these startling cases, that Freud made subjects "repeat their lesson," in their own grammar. To the extent that he repeats for us that, from each of their statements, we must be ready to revise the "parts of discourse" that we have believed to be able to retain from precedents. Of course this is what linguists propose to themselves as an ideal, but if it appear-to-be (*parest*) propitious to Chomsky, I have marked that my first sentence is inscribed as a contradiction by equivoque countering his transformational tree. "I am not making you say it". Is this not the minimum of interpretive intervention? But it is not its sense that matters in the formula that the language I use here permits to give to it, it is that the amorphology of a language opens the equivoque between "You said it" and "I take it all the less to my charge as, such a thing, I in no way made you say it" (Lacan, 2001c, p. 491-2).

Freudian interpretation is not limited uniquely to homophonic ambiguities; he "makes subjects 'repeat their lesson', in its grammar", in the grammar of their drives. Freud makes his patients learn from their repetitions indeed, and long before his text of 1914 *Erinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten*. Lacan continues his elaboration, indicating

that the kernel of psychoanalytic interpretation can be reduced to a minimalist indication of the analysand's own position as a *sui generis* cause, a "I didn't make you say it". You yourself pronounced that without any exhortation on my part. The famous example from the case of Ida Bauer comes to mind. When she complains emphatically of the hypocrisy of her entourage and her objectification as an item to be bartered, Freud interprets, "Look to you're own role in the disorder which you bemoan" (Lacan, 1966a). This interpretation relies on grammatical equivocity, insofar as it opens access to truth of the grammar of the drive. And thus one can distinguish between interpretations on the equivocity of the grammar of the drive, and on the equivocity of the grammar of the *dire* that "remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard" (Lacan, 2001c). First we will consider the grammar of speech before turning to the grammar of the drive. As the reduced core of interpretation, Lacan proposes a fundamental, *je ne te le fais pas dire*. The function of this minimal interpretation is one of decontextualising what was said, in order to allow new meaning to emerge (Miller, 1996; Leclaire, 1998). Even in Lacan's formulation, it does not only involve a simple indication with regard to the analysand's speech. There is ambiguity, a certain oracular nature to the analyst's interpretation; it is not clear if it is a more or less neutral indication, or rather an accentuation: *I* didn't make you say that, I didn't *make* you say that, I didn't make you *say* that, I didn't make you say *that*, etc. Lacan observes that the very absence of emphasis leaves the ambiguity open, leaves the act of joining signifier and signification undone. In this example one finds a slippage of meaning between the identity of the cause, coercion, the frontier of utterance, and an evaluation of the preceding speech. The equivoque "is seconded by grammar" because all of these connotations do not found their ambiguity in the indeterminacy between a singular acoustic image[18] and a plurality of words to which it may refer, but insofar as the accentuation of one of several signifiers in the sentence modifies the meaning, without any need of exchanging one homonym for another. Thus Lacan names the "amorphology of a language" (Blum, 2005), the monotone and homogenous nature of an enunciation which leaves the connotations at the level of the phrase undetermined, grammatical equivocity. As such, the grammatical equivoque remains distinct from the homophonic or logical. But, as mentioned above, the amorphology of a language is in no way the only manifestation of grammatical equivocity in the analytic experience.

During the 2014 AE soiree on the equivocal, Eric Laurent asked the auditorium - seeing how the definitions of homophonic and logical equivoques were evident enough - "what would be an example of grammatical equivocity?" Of an equivoque that does not rely uniquely on the sonorous poverty of all human languages, nor on the logical negation inherent to the end of psychoanalysis. Perhaps the simplest answer would be the pronoun. The pronoun and the ambiguity it can engender offer at least one clear example of grammatical equivocity. In the case of the pronoun, it does not strictly speaking involve

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[18] "The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and an acoustic image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychic imprint of this sound, the representation which gives us the evidence of our senses; it is sensorial, and if we happen to call it 'material', it is only in this sense and in opposition to the other term of the association, the concept, usually more abstract [...] I call the combination of a concept and a sound image a *sign*, but in current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word, for example (*arbor*, etc.). One tends to forget that *arbor* is called a sign only because it carries the concept 'tree', with the result that the idea of the sensory part implies the idea of the whole" (Saussure, 1916, p. 418).

homophonic equivocity; there is no abundance of possible words indicated by a single acoustic image, but rather a fundamental variability, a vacuity of signified, variability essential to the very function of the pronoun. Jean-Claude Milner (1982) writes extensively on the topic of grammatical equivoques in his works on the anaphor[19], ἀναφορά being a figure of style, which consists in beginning verses, phrases, or larger syntactical groupings by the same word or syntagma. We are principally interested in the manifestations of anaphors that involve pronouns. Before advancing further, let us clarify the difference between co-reference and anaphor - especially since, in French, the term anaphor is defined in two divergent meanings.[20]

Presently, it appears that many discussions concerning linguistic identity can be taken up anew. Traditionally, one distinguishes the relation of two referential units into categories of identity of reference and lexical identity. The first is nothing other than actual co-reference: it implies the material identity of the designated segments (when these have substance), but not those of the designating linguistic units [*e.g., Un train peut en cacher un autre*]. The second [anaphora] is more complex: for these linguistic units, the lexical identity is the lexical material itself: nothing more, nothing less. But, due to the inexistence of absolute lexical synonymy, when it is a case of nouns, virtual co-reference is tantamount to lexical identity. They are not the same concept, however: so, in strict terminology, it would be false to maintain that pronominal anaphora

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[19] For the purposes of our discussion on the relation between anaphor and grammatical equivocity, perhaps a clarification of the definition of "anaphor" imposes itself. In this way we hope to limit, at least to reduce the ambiguities of terminology, comically recursive in relation to the topic of this chapter. According to Jean-Claude Milner, *co-reference* and *anaphorisation* are two distinct concepts: "There is a relation of co-reference between to referential unities, A and B, when it so happens that they have they refer to the same thing - which can arise, without the interpretation of one being affected by the interpretation of the other. [...] The relation is manifestly symmetrical and transitive; To consider it reflexive is not devoid of sense: one referential unity could be said to be co-referential to itself. [...] The relation of the anaphor, however, is an asymmetrical relation, existing between a first anaphorised term and a second anaphorising term". (Milner, 1982, p. 32).

[20] "In English, the name of the pertinent class is *anaphor*, the name *anaphora* being reserved for the relation and not one of its terms. The French language does not permit such a distinction [though adopting these words to the lexica would suffice]; the name *anaphor* is thus 'ambiguous and it depends upon the context to manifest whether it refers to the relation or to the term of the relation" (Milner, 1982, p. 32).

suppose lexical identity, since, by principle, a noun and a pronoun are materially (and

lexically) distinct. But one could say that, in general, the pronoun must have the same

virtual reference as its antecedent; sometimes, this is even the only, the unique relation

that establishes it. By abuses of language, to the extent that the virtual reference is

attached - in the case of nouns - to there lexical specificity, one would say the pronoun

adopts the lexical unity: for example, such is the point of view of Gross (1973),

according to whom *en*, points to the unit *lions* [I saw ten lions and you saw fifteen of

them]. One can see how the formula is justifiable, but also how imprecise it is (Milner,

1982, p. 32).[21]

In simple co-reference, it is a case of two signifiers that designate the same signified.
Simply put, they are synonyms. Milner provides the example, one train may hide another
[*un train peut en cacher un autre*], The first train can hide a second train, signified here in
French by the word, *en*; there is an identity of references. So we have two different words
indicating one same actual reference - two distinct references which are equal. The two
co-referents will never have exactly the same connotations, since so long as they are not
the same signifier, they do not have the same signifying materiality, (Lacan, 1998*b*, p.
33)[22] but they aim more or less for the same signified.

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[21] *«Il apparaît enfin que bien des discussions touchant l'identité linguistique peuvent à présent être reprises sur nouveaux frais. Il est de tradition de distinguer, pour deux unités référentielles, entre l'identité des références et l'identité lexicale. La première n'est rien d'autre que la coréférence actuelle : elle implique l'identité matérielle des segments désignés (lorsque ceux-ci ont une substance), mais non pas celle des unités linguistiques désignantes [e.g., Un train peut en cacher un autre]. La seconde [l'anaphore] est plus complexe : elle-même, l'identité lexicale est l'identité matérielle des unités linguistiques : rien de plus, rien de moins. Mais, à cause de l'inexistence de la synonymie lexicale absolue, l'identité lexicale et la coréférence virtuelle s'équivalent, quand il s'agit des noms. Elles ne sont cependant pas le même concept : ainsi, en stricte terminologie, il serait faux de soutenir que l'anaphore pronominale suppose l'identité lexicale, puisque, par principe, un nom et un pronom sont matériellement (et lexicalement) distincts. Mais on peut dire que, dans la généralité des cas, le pronom doit avoir la même référence virtuelle que son antécédent ; parfois, c'est même là la seule et unique relation qui s'établisse. Par abus de langage, dans la mesure où la référence virtuelle est attachée, pour les noms, à leur spécificité lexicale, on dira que le pronom alors reprend l'unité lexicale : tel est par exemple le point de vue de Gross (1973), selon qui en, 'désigne' (points to) l'unité lions [j'ai vu dix lions et toi tu en as vu quinze]. On voit en quel sens la formule est justifiable, mais aussi combien elle est imprécise »* (Milner, 1982, p. 32).

[22] Lacan showed in his comparison between *abbatu* and *atterré*.

In the case of the anaphor, it is the lexical value which is identical across the various cases, and yet the signified differ. Here the pronoun offers a quintessential example of the anaphor.

> The traditional notion is that of a relation between two terms. From this point of view
>
> one distinguishes between a free anaphor, which is indifferent to the constraints to the
>
> specified subject and finite sentences, and a bound anaphor, which is dependent upon
>
> these constraints. The first relation results from discourse, insofar as it exceeds the
>
> limits of the sentence. The second relation results exclusively from the sentence: *thus,*
>
> *a usual pronoun such as 'he' can have an antecedent situated in a distinct sentence, or*
>
> *even a different replica in a dialogue.* The reflexive, on the other hand, can only have
>
> a term situated in the same sentence as an antecedent (Milner, 1982, p. 363).[23]

Regarding the functioning of anaphoric pronouns, Jean-Claude Milner distinguishes between those of virtual reference and actual reference: "the segment of reality associated with a sequence is its actual reference; the ensemble of conditions characterizing a lexical entity is its virtual reference" (Milner, 1982, p. 32). In the case of the pronominal anaphor, one possibility is that the pronoun replaces a noun from a prior phrase; in such cases it would be called a bound anaphor. It can also be the case that the pronoun repeats itself throughout several phrases; in this case anaphor in question is free from any constraints of signification. Thus the pronominal anaphor gives an effect not without resemblance to that of *paroemion*, but at the level of the word instead of the letter.

Concerning the clinic, the anaphorisation of a pronoun can incarnate the equivocal point between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enounced. A married patient complains of a couple that are always arguing, "They shouldn't have had a child" [*ils n'auraient pas dû avoir un enfant*], he says. If the analyst punctuates here, (s)he causes the ambiguity of the pronoun *they* to resonate. In French, there is a homophonic equivocity between *Il* and *Ils*, but let us consider the grammatical aspect of this free anaphor, the semantic flexibility of the word *They* instead. The cut, the analytic punctuation, causes the signified of the pronoun to vacillate. Does *They* refer to the other

[23] «La notion traditionnelle est celle d'une relation entre deux termes. On distingue de ce point de vue entre une anaphore libre, qui est insensible aux contraintes du sujet spécifié et des phrases finies, et une anaphore liée, qui est sensible à ces contraintes. La première relation ressortit au discours, en tant qu'il excède les limites de la phrase. La seconde relation ressortit exclusivement à la phrase : *ainsi, un pronom usuel tel que 'il' peut avoir un antécédent situé dans une phrase distincte, ou même une réplique différente dans un dialogue.* En revanche, le réfléchi ne peut avoir pour antécédent qu'un terme situé dans la même phrase » (Milner, 1982, p. 363).

couple, to the couple to which the subject of enunciation belongs, or even to the parental couple of the patient? As a result, the sentence in its ambiguity can be heard as an auto-condemnation of the analysand himself. In this aspect, the equivoque of the pronominal anaphor approaches the example *You are the one who will/shall follow me* where if "a clamping point in a bundle of significations" lacks; the analyst's interpretation could lead to attributing the equivoque to the unconscious, enigmatic desire of the analyst, e.g., "The analyst is going to confuse my remarks... The analyst is putting words in my mouth". It's an opening of the unconscious in which the unbearable desire of the subject is located, projected onto the body of the analyst. For this reason Miller reminds us of how the analyst works with fire; one should not forget the distinct possibility of engendering the spectre of the malevolent analyst.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Lacan asserted that Freud made his patients "repeat their lesson", meaning, learn the grammar of their drives. This is one reading of what Freud resumed in the phrase, *Wo Es war, soll Ich warden* (1923). This maxim highlights the analytic ethics of Freud, to bring into focus the grammar of the drive, of the *jouissance* of the analysand.

I'm much more myself. Before, I was a para-me who thought of myself as the true one, and who was absolutely false. I think that no sentence is more appropriately expressed. It *was absolutely false*, this para-me. An *I* in the first part of the sentence, it has become an *it* in the second.... *the Other is, therefore, the locus in which is constituted the I who is speaking with him who hears* (Lacan, 1981, p. 307).[24]

The vignette quoted by Lacan, the phrase that expresses itself justly, recounts the passage from a para*moi*[25] to a divided subject. It is difficult to imagine the subjective division between the identifications of the *ego* and the unconscious subject, of the alienation which the person undergoes as a result of his unconscious desire, and even of ego identifications being based in the locus which is the Other, as being more clearly spoken.

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[24] «Je suis beaucoup plus moi. Avant j'étais un *paramoi* qui croyais être le vrai et qui était absolument faux'. Je pense qu'il n'y a pas de phrase qui s'exprime plus juste ; ça ne sonne nullement à côté, mais vous sentez bien ce que 'l'absolument faux' n'est pas, 'l'absolument faux' ne colle pas. Il 'était absolument faux' ce *paramoi*. Il est un *il* dans la deuxième partie, et il est un *je* dans la première... L'Autre est donc le lieu où se constitue le *je* qui parle avec celui qui entend ; ce que l'un dit étant déjà la réponse, et l'Atre décidant à l'entendre si l'un a ou non parlé» (Lacan, 1981, p. 307).

[25] *paramoi* is either a neologism, or an obscure allusion to *Hellinsia paramoi.*

Logic

Number 3 now: it is logic, without which interpretation would be stupid, the first to

serve themselves of it being of course those who, to transcendentalise existence with

the unconscious, arm themselves with Freud's thesis that it is insensible to

contradiction [Popper] (Lacan, 2001c, p. 492).

Here Lacan alludes to the famous Popperian critique of psychoanalysis. Popper denounced psychoanalysis for as always being right; that the principle of treating denials as confirmation of the existence of the unconscious *Vorstellung* opens the door to irresolvable logical paradoxes. If the psychoanalyst is always right, then psychoanalysis can never attain the rigor of a science. This perspective is based in a certainty of the impossibility of induction. Popper writes, "I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified" (1963, p. 55). For Popper, no positive induction is certain; the only possible certainty follows the refutation of a theory *via* a negative result. Falsification thus functions for Popper as the indispensable criteria as to when a theory may be considered scientific. This absolute mistrust in the Other resonates with that of Descartes, of an Other, an untrustworthy God. One can see that "the absolute is always an affair of the impossible" (Miller, 2011b). For Popper, the absolute is the certainty of not knowing. All knowledge is never anything more than a fragile hypothesis awaiting the caprice of falsification. Hence Popper's critique with respect to the concept of the unconscious, if it is never falsifiable, it cannot be scientific. If such a paradox were possible, it would threaten his certainty.

It has no doubt not yet occurred to them that more than one logic has taken advantage

of interdicting this fundament, and of no less remaining "formalized," which means

proper to the matheme (Lacan, 2001c, p. 492).

Lacan does not directly respond to Popper's critique at the level of the clinic, but he does address that critique via the history of mathematics, commenting on the apparent lack of perceptiveness of Popper and Hume, who have both failed to notice advances in mathematics, which demonstrate the fatality of contradiction (Fierens, 2002, p. 285).[26] Some examples among many include Lambert's discoveries in non-Euclidian geometry and Gödel's ever-famous proof. Gödel demonstrated that any formal system, any theory to use Popper's lexicon, can never escape the fate of contradiction. Either the system is incomplete or it is inconsistent. We would add that inasmuch as the unconscious is

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[26] "Les logiques qui admettent plus de deux valeurs de vérité ou les logiques qui ne sont pas vérifonctionnelles (comme la logiqe modale ou la logique déontique) n'en reste pas moins *formalisées*" (Fierens, 2002, p. 285).

structured as a language, with a formal structure, it is unavoidable that it be incoherent. "To sum it up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of cathexes), timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical reality - these are the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the unconscious" (Freud, 2001b, p. 187).[27] The symbolic unconscious is complete not in relation to the meaning of words, but due to the *Vorstellung Representanz* themselves, in their *lexicality*[28]; at the level of the real of their combinatory. For Lacan (1978, p. 122), the real is without lack?[29]

> Who would reproach Freud for such an effect of obscurantism and the dark clouds that
>
> it immediately, from Jung to Abraham, accumulated in response to him? Certainly not
>
> I who have also, to this place (of my inversion), some responsibilities (Lacan, 2001c,
>
> p. 492).

Freud stayed the path of granting his creation, psychoanalysis, the dignity of science. At the end of the XIXth century, one finds his essays on aphasia and his famous unfinished letter to Fliess, titled: *Entwurf*. Indeed, he sustained his earliest scientific formation throughout his career; in the *Studies on Hysteria*, once again one finds the claim that psychoanalysis belongs to the sciences: "And no doubt yet other forms of this process exist, which are still concealed from our young psychological science; for it is certain that we have only taken the first steps in this region of knowledge, and our present views will be substantially altered by further observations" (1895, p. 262). This is still the case in the end, or at least until 1937 (1937a; 1937b). Moreover, Freud maintained this epistemological position despite the periodic departures of colleagues in disagreement with his theories.[30]

So then, how can we understand Lacan's attribution of obscurantism, to a response of obscurantism "from Jung to Abraham", to Freud's discovery? Dr. Carl Jung famously distanced himself from Freudian theory in 1914. Jung's view on the nature and contents of the unconscious was becoming incompatible with Freud's, and his conception of sexuality and libido differed from Freud's.

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[27] In his *Traumdeutung* (Interpretation of dreams, 2001c), one finds the following: "Dreams are disconnected, they accept the most violent contradictions without the least objection, they admit impossibilities, they disregard knowledge which carries great weight with us in the daytime, they reveal us as ethical and moral imbeciles".

[28] *motérialité*

[29] "Le réel est sans fissure".

[30] Freud begins his first major work *Instincts and their vicissitudes* (1915a*)*, as follows: "We have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built upon clear and sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group classify, and correlate them".

I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, "My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark". He said that to me with great emotion, in the tone of a father saying, "And promise me this one thing, my dear son: that you will go to church every Sunday". In some astonishment I asked him, "A bulwark -- against what?" To which he replied, "Against the black tide of mud" -- and here he hesitated for a moment, then added – "of *occultism*". First of all, it was the words "bulwark" and "dogma" that alarmed me; for a dogma, that is to say, an indisputable confession of faith, is set up only when the aim is to suppress doubts once and for all. But that no longer has anything to do with scientific judgment; only with a personal power drive. This was the thing that struck at the heart of our friendship (Jung, 1961, p. 150).

It seems difficult to disregard that this quotation be the allusion to which Lacan refers in *L'étourdit*. For Freud, the abandonment of the theory of libido constituted the fall into obscurantism. From this point, it is clear that Lacan has his own responsibilities for such obscurantism; during his *retour à Freud*, the application of structural linguistics to obtain *L'inconscient est structuré comme un langage* and the pre-eminence of reading symptoms to the letter, minimize the importance of libido and *jouissance*.

After the schism, Jung's theory (1978) developed into its own discipline with concepts such as the *imagos*, the collective unconscious, and the *unus mundus*[31]. In this way, Jung's path passes from Freud's focus on sexuality to a more encompassing, monistic definition of libido; for Jung, libido is psychic energy, "It is the energy that manifests itself in the life process and is perceived subjectively as striving and desire" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 697).

As for Karl Abraham, it is curious that Lacan pairs him with Jung; how does the innovative author of the *Liber Novus* resemble the loyal disciple aside from their given name? Abraham never left Freud's school of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1917). Rather he remained in the role of the ideal disciple. Moreover, he wrote extensively on sexual

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[31] "The unexpected parallelisms of ideas in psychology and physics suggest, as Jung pointed out, a possible ultimate *one-ness* of both fields of reality that physics and psychology study - i.e., a psychophysical one-ness of all life phenomena. Jung was even convinced that what he calls the unconscious somehow links up with the structure of inorganic matter - a link to which the problem of so-called "psychosomatic" illness seems to point. The concept of a unitarian idea of reality was called by Jung the *unus mundus*" (Jung, 1978, p. 309).

libido! In fact, when Abraham died tragically young on Christmas 1925, Freud wrote the following eulogy, "Among all those who followed me along the dark paths of psychoanalytic research, he won so preeminent a place that only one other name could be set beside his. It is likely that the boundless trust of his colleagues and pupils would have called him to the leadership; and he would without doubt have been a model leader in the pursuit of truth, led astray neither by the praise or blame of the many nor by the seductive illusion of his own fantasies" (1994, p. 101). Why then does Lacan locate Abraham on the side of obscurantism?

Lacan's attribution of obscurantism to Abraham found in *L'étourdit* only takes on meaning when read together with his previous condemnation of Erikson's culturalism. Erik Erikson elaborated a theory for the chronologically progressive hierarchy of psychosexual stages (1956). In the 1950s, Lacan discredited Erikson's theory of a hierarchical development of stages of ego development, proposing instead a theory of the ego as the contingent sum of all identifications as well as a shift in emphasis from the ego to the subject of the unconscious.

In his seminar on March 9 1955, while speaking on the difficulties of regression theory, Lacan said the following of the cultural focus of Erikson's theory.

This so-called culturalism consists in emphasising in analysis those things, which in each case, depend on the cultural context in which the subject is immersed... You will be surprised to see that this culturalism converges quite singularly with a psychologism that consists in understanding the entire analytic text as a function of the various stages in the development of the *ego*... Unfortunately his culturalism isn't a very useful tool for him. This culturalism obliges him to raise the so-called problem of the study of the manifest content of the dream. Erikson then sets up an entire theory of the different stages of the *ego*, with which I will acquaint you. These psychological diversions are certainly extremely instructive, but to me they seem in truth to go against the very spirit of Freudian theory. For, in the end, if the *ego* is this succession of emergences, of shapes, if this double face of good and evil, of realisations and modes of derealisations constitute its type, one fails to see what can be made of the fact that Freud states in a thousand, two thousand different places in his writings, namely that the ego is the sum of the identifications of the subject, with all that that implies as to its radical contingency (Lacan, 1978, p. 187).

The dwarfing of the radical decentring of the Freudian discovery, the closing of the traumatic discovery of subjective division behind the banality of the progressive development of the self, as seen in Piaget and Erikson's theories, will eventually lead to an accentuation of the ego as exemplified in Ego psychology. Let us return to Abraham's theoretical work. From 1907 to 1912, Abraham endeavoured to distinguish between hysteria and schizophrenia by their subjective constitution. Since both structures can involve body events - depersonalization, paralysis, psychosomatic symptoms, etc. - the theoretical differentiation between these two structures becomes difficult without the Freudian distinction *Verdrängung* vs. *Verwerfung* nor the Lacanian concepts the Name of the Father and phallic signification. After all, acquisition of language effects the nature of libido for all humans. "This body, when it incorporates the symbolic, this has an effect on its *jouissance* in Lacan's sense" (Miller, 1983). The traces of language on the body is perhaps most clear in hysterical conversions that attests to the potential effects of the symbolisation of *jouissance* in the body. The hysteric bears witness with an imaginarily organised body, etched by words in a manner that has nothing to do with anatomy and physiology. For the schizophrenic, there are also body events, but not symptoms of metaphoric conversion as found in hysteria. Typically, these body events rest enigmatic, inaccessible to language. The schizophrenic's body is not one organised as a constellation around a master signifier. Lacan (2001c) will explain that the "so-called schizophrenic" doesn't enter into discourse since the phallus as an imaginary signifier is necessary to operate a separation between symbolic and real; this phallic signification is absent in schizophrenia[32]. And early as 1894, Freud had already significantly advanced the distinction between repression in hysteria or obsession, and "a much more energetic and successful kind of defence. Here, the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all. But from the moment at which this has been successfully done the subject is in a psychosis, which can only be classified as *hallucinatory confusion*" (Freud, 1989, p. 15). Thus the notion of *Verwerfung* is already present in the *Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* as this "more energetic defence", though he does not explicitly name this defence mechanism *Verwerfung*. Yet, Abraham, faced with the problematic of distinguishing between the cause of hysteria and schizophrenia, chooses to differentiate at the level of psychosexual constitution based in "a premature appearance of libido and also in pathological fantasies, which are prematurely engaged with sexual matters to the exclusion of all other conscious thoughts... Therefore these individuals never really surpassed infantile autoerotism. Objectal love never completely developed... The psychosexual constitution of dementia praecox thus rests on an inhibition of development" (1965, p. 32). For Abraham, the schizophrenic subject remains in an infantile autism at the level of the oral erogenous zone due to a developmental impasse. The correspondence between Freud and Abraham clarifies Freud's reception of these ideas. For Freud, it is simply impossible to attribute an aetiology such as Abraham's conception to psychosis since "this abnormal constitution is the general infantile constitution" (Abraham & Freud, 1969). Moreover, any analogy between psychotic autoeroticism and the so-called regression to infantile autoeroticism would be suspect seeing as "the detachment of libido [in the case of the psychotic] is almost always of a partial nature" (*ibid.*). Thus Freud rejected Abraham's reduction of differential diagnosis to subjective evolution, to the condition of successful traversal of progressive stages.

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[32] "Ce dont le dit schizophrène se spécifie d'être pris sans le secours d'aucun discours établi" (Lacan, 2001c).

At the beginning of the twenties, Abraham theorised on the development of the *ego*, successful or abortive, in a progression through three stages - oral, anal, and genital - each with two sub-stages. Furthermore, he outlines this nosography of character as dependent upon the reception of the child by the maternal Other in each of these sub-stages. From this hypothesis, Abraham writes the following, "It is now easy for us to circumscribe the task of an ideal therapy of melancholy. It would consist in lifting the libido's regressive movements, and in labouring for its progression in the direction of a completed love for the object and genital organization" (Abraham, 1965, p. 208).

Lacan's criticism of Abraham will be multifaceted. With regard to melancholia, he disapproves of Abraham's reductionism and the normative aims of treatment, as well as his conception of a hierarchic progression of stages. In opposition to the predominance of the undifferentiated object in Abraham's theories, Lacan underlines the importance of Freud's theory of castration. In Lacanian theory, it is more a question of the want-to-be than the object found wanting. In this way, Lacan follows Freud's example, who, already in 1915, had written to Abraham, "Your observations on melancholia are precious... And yet you still pass by the veritable explanation" (Abraham & Freud, 1969). It is not simply that the arrival of psychoanalysis occurs at very specific historical coordinates, but its progress, and Lacan's contribution is no exception, does also continually destabilise the semblance that spares us from the real. This other side of psychoanalysis reveals itself in the modification of other discourses *via* the destabilisation of semblance. An comparable event can be found in the text *L'étourdit*, where the complete lack of imaginary scaffolding, the pursuit of reducing semblance renders the text nearly indecipherable; the Lacanian definition of a writing, of an *écrit*, being "Not-For-Reading... Something like 'Beware of dog', or 'No trespassing'. Verily: *Lasciate ogni speranza*" (Lacan, 2001c). It consists in an effort to orient oneself towards the real, towards the pure logic of the signifier, as found in the unconscious. This short digression aside, Lacan returns to the theme of logical paradox. Theories of absolute falsifiability do not only encounter problems at the level of inherent contradiction in formal logic, the realm of logic has never escaped the paradoxical.

I will recall only that no elaboration of logic, this beginning before Socrates and from elsewhere than our tradition, has ever proceeded except from a core of paradoxes, -for having served itself with a term, receivable everywhere, by which we designate the equivoques which situate themselves by this point which, for having come here as third, is also first and second. On what have I run aground this year in making felt the bath of Jouvence of which the matheme said logical has found for us its place and its vigour, are these the paradoxes not only refreshed from being promoted in new terms by Russell, but still original in coming from the dire of Cantor? (Lacan, 2001c, p. 492).

This fundamentally contradictory nature of logic exists from long before Aristotle, indeed before Socrates. Lacan continues by referencing other traditions than ours, meaning those cultures who do not stem from the *Judeo-Greco* roots of occidental society. For Lao Tzu, the logic of his great work, the *Tao Te Ching, founds itself in paradox, on a profound separation that would impede any and all access to the real by means of the symbolic. With regard to the philosophy of Socrates, one finds a similar foundation upon paradox.*[33] *Further paradoxes found the henology of* Parmenides and Zeno[34] (Planck, 1901). *Moreover, one can hardly claim that the formalisation of modern physics* has somehow reduced the scope of such paradoxes at the foundation of knowledge (Bekenstein, 1973)[35]. On the contrary, the advances of physics in the last century led to an eruption of the real, one directly in contradiction with Popper's excessive simplification. Quantum mechanics heralds the existence of new paradoxes, such as the quantum Zeno effect (Hodges, 2004, p. 54).[36] The perseverance of these pre-Socratic paradoxes, their reappearance, ever unattainable at the frontier of scientific knowledge, as the real which always returns to its place, undermines the validity of the Popperian perspective, namely the validity of his doctrine of zero tolerance towards contradiction.

Will I go on to speak of the "genital drive" as the cata-logue of the pre-genital drives insofar as they do not contain themselves, but have their cause elsewhere, that is, in that Other to which "genitality" only has access inasmuch it takes on a "bar" from the division effected by its passage to the major signifier, the phallus? (Lacan, 2001c, p. 493).

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[33] γν θι σεαυτόν (Know thyself) in contradiction with *ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat.*

[34] Their paradoxes aim to assert a philosophy of the one, of the singularity of all. These paradoxes, formulated as critiques of pluralist philosophies, were of with surprising rigour. The paradox of complete divisibility, for example, was not satisfactorily resolved until Cantor's discovery of transfinite and the minimal distance discovered by Planck.

[35] "Considerations of simplicity and consistency, and dimensional arguments indicate that the black-hole entropy is equal to the ratio of the black-hole area to the square of the Planck length times a dimensionless constant of order unity"... *Planck length* = 1.616 199(97) x 10^{-35} m (Bekenstein, 1973).

[36] "It is easy to show using standard theory that if a system starts in an Eigenstate of some observable, and measurements are made of that observable N times a second, then, even if the state is not a stationary one, the probability that the system will be in the same state after, say, one second, tends to one as N tends to infinity; that is, that continual observations will prevent motion" (Hodges, 2004, p. 54).

In reading *Three Essays on Sexuality,* we see Freud arrive at the lucid conclusion that there is no universality in sexual behaviour, no sexual instinct in humans that is not reshaped in a singular manner by language. On the one hand, the myriad of possible detours in object choice testifies to the non-existence of another where libido naturally condenses. On the other, perversions with distortions not at the level of the object, but of the aim, indicate that the drives in question do not involve a complete "genital drive"; the normative sexual drive reveals itself to be a mirage. After all, not even the so-called "normal" sexual relation sustains itself without recourse to the fantasy, by a "psychical participation in the transformation of the sexual drive" (Freud, 1962, p. 49). The partial object is always there as cause of desire; the fantasy transforms agony and ecstasy to pleasure. Moreover, the beloved other is represented mentally with the characteristics of idealisation and overestimation (*Ibid*).

For Freud, "The sexual drive in and of itself is not a simple given fact; it is formed of diverse components, which dissociate in cases of perversion" (*Ibid*). The five Freudian cases of psychoanalysis show the pre-eminence of other drives: oral, anal, scopic, and invocatory. These pre-genital drives find their cause in the Other, located on the liminal spaces of the body of the infant, there where the maternal Other cares for the newborn. The pre-genital drives find their cause in the reception this Other offers. It seems access to the dialectic of desire and the social bond depend upon the "good enough" reception by this Other, as seen in the famous Kleinian case (Klein, 1930). This reception will always be uncertain since its "good enough" nature necessitates a minimal distance, a separation; this reception would also be in relation with the maternal fantasy.

Therefore, if one wishes to speak of the set of "sexual drives", it seems one would be obliged to admit that this constitutes an empty set. *Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel...* in other words, there is no normal sexual *trieb*; any instinct that may have been was fractured by the inscription of language in the body, by the genesis of the subject. Just as any other formal set, that of the drives obtains no coherent completeness in its totality, and above all attains no universality. As such, the so-called genital drive would be located where the impossibility of Gödel's discovery manifests itself. If Freud considered the verb 'love, *lieben*, as "the expression of the sum total of sexuality" (Freud, 1915a)[37], here one runs up against a logical equivoque of the human experience. The tabulation of partial drives, the set of the genital drive that would assemble all the pre-genital partial drives, itself excepted, is contradictory. This apparent paradox stems from the logical equivoque of the drives in the sexual life of man.

And for the transfinite of demand, that is, re-petition, will I return to its only having another horizon from giving body to the two, being no less than it inaccessible in only beginning with the one which would not be that of the empty set? (Lacan, 2001c, p. 493).

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[37] *"Ausdruck der ganzen Sexualstrebung"* (Freud, 1915a).

The repeated petition, that is to say, "the transfinite of demand", originates from the gap between demand, *die Forderung*, and desire, *das Begehren*. Satisfaction of demand never attains the level of desire. The metonymic object of desire is always elsewhere. "*It wasn't really that which I wanted*". The Freudian example of the butcher's wife's dream elucidates this asymmetry between demand, desire, and want in exemplary form. "This patient very much smitten with her husband, what does she demand? It is love, and hysterics, like everybody else, demand love, except that for them, it is more of an encumbrance. What does she desire? She desires caviar. One need only read. And what does she want? She wants not to be given caviar" (Lacan, 1998, p. 364). This vignette shows us the disconnect between demand and desire; she wants for her demand not to be satisfied in order to be able to continue desiring. In this way, no fulfilment of the demand of love ever attains desire, as the tortoise chased by Achilles.

The primordial demand is the infant's cry of suffering a physiological need. Insofar as the Other interprets this primordial cry, the Other transmutes it from biological need into demand. By this transformation from need to demand, the child enters into the circuit of demand, which consists in a separation that gives the Other its status. From this moment on, the child's life will unfold along the coordinates of a demand aimed at the Other. What Lacan names the transfinite of demand involves this horizon, the horizon that demand approaches asymptotically, never becoming parallel with desire. This demand addressed to the Other lends a dyadic structure. Hence the transferential unconscious of psychoanalysis, the unconscious is fundamentally intersubjective. Yet Lacan envisions the end, the exit out of analysis by the passage from two to one; from the intersubjective nature of the transferential unconscious to the real unconscious in order to arrive at the function of the analyst, singular and unique.

The end of analysis

The obstacle, which the transfinite of demand presents at the end of analysis, appears in cases of hysteria, just as obsession, in the transference love of the Other. For the obsession neurotic, attempts to go beyond the barrier of demand to his desire are haunted by anxiety. Lacan observes that manifestations of obsessive's desire carry with them a certain paradoxically in that they depend upon the Other - as all desire does - but simultaneously involve a fading of the Other, a kind of destruction of the Other. "The desire of man in so far as it is the desire of the Other, namely that it is beyond the passage of the articulation of man's need in this necessity to make it known to the other, this desire in the form of absolute condition, of something which is beyond every satisfaction of need, and which is produced in the margin which exists between the demand for the satisfaction of need and the demand for love, which is situated there. As such a demand contains within it the demand for love, it is a simply fulfilled biological necessity, but a demand "which presents the character of an absolute condition, that it is this one and same one which I designate to be proper to desire", and when this fixated demand which contains the truth of desire is in play, this "desire as such, namely that in its constitution, comprises the destruction of the Other". Such desire minimizes the Other. Yet, desire is always desire of the Other; it is always located in the Other, a logical paradox. "The obsessive, insofar as his fundamental movement is directed towards his desire as such, and above all in its constitution as desire, implies in every movement towards the attainment of this desire what we call the destruction of the Other". This very destruction of the Other renders his desire ephemeral, hesitant.

The desire of the obsessive thus "dissimulates beneath the demand of the Other". The obsessive fantasy is that of sustaining the completeness of the Other, which is simply another way of saying "the obsessive applies himself to destroying the desire of the Other". The obsessive finds manifestations of the desire of the Other, the desire of the analyst, unbearable in all there capriciousness. This paradox "can lead to the eternalisation of the cure". Each time his desire as desire of the Other, or the desire of the analyst manifest, the obsessive risks backpedalling before the Other's lack. The unconscious as real in the very last period of Lacan's though, of *Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI*, announces a radical turning point. There Lacan writes, "The space of a lapse, has no significance of meaning (or interpretation), only then is one sure of being in the unconscious. One knows it, oneself. But paying it attention suffices for one to exit. No amity there, which this unconscious sustains" (Lacan, 2001d). This conceptualization of the unconscious is radically devoid of meaning. It is only in the nonsensical lapses that the unconscious can be claimed to be present. Moreover, it is no longer envisioned as being sustained by the transference relation between the analysand and the analyst as a subject supposed to know. Lacan no longer conceives of the unconscious as intersubjective, it concerns the solitary analysand, the singular one.

In a final period of his analysis, Bernard Porcheret - recently named AE - experienced an "*éclaté d'équivoques*" during which meaning and the story tale, his fiction, fragmented and revealed the hole of non-meaning bordered by the letter. During this time of understanding, he dreamt the following dream, which he named 'the dream of the *biffure'*: "I have before me a vague relief map of northern Spain. My analyst passes by me and crosses out a sort of [unintelligible] with a yellow marker. He underlines the letters of a name of a town *Llógar,* written with an accent above the 'O'. The analyst snatches my iphone, I find myself without means of accessing knowledge, I am anxious since soon I must intervene about my own case in the improbable scenery of study days. I rejoin him further on, the analyst, in order to recover my iphone. Without looking, without speaking, he negligently gives me a broken telephone, a child's plaything".[38]

Mr. Porcheret begins the analysis of his dream by telling us that llógar condenses two Spanish words *lugar*, and *llegar*. On the one hand, "the accent points as an index", a vector towards the destination. On the other hand, it is a crossing-out, *LlØgar*. The 'o' could also be read as a hole, a zero, '0'. In this case, a hole doubly negated, by its very nature and then by the added accent of annulment, the crossing-out. This neologism, *Llógar* anticipates itself somewhat in the French language since the word '*zéro'* is written with this same trace. One can clearly see the *Wunsch* of the dream in the fact; "soon I must intervene about my own case in the improbable scenery of study days". This very testimony of his dream took place at the AE study days on the equivoque. But the veritable kernel of the dream is the destitution of the subject supposed to know. The enacting of the fall from grace of the transference to the Other. "Without looking, without

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[38] «J'ai devant moi une carte vague des reliefs du nord de l'Espagne. Mon analyste passe à côté de moi et fait une biffure avec une marquer jaune sur une sorte de [inaudible]. Il souligne les lettres d'un nom d'une ville *Llógar*, écrit avec un accent sur le 'O'. L'analyste embarque mon Iphone, je me retrouve sans moyens d'accéder au savoir, je suis angoissé car je dois bientôt intervenir, à propos de ce cas. Dans le décor improbable d'une journée d'études. Je le rejoins plus loin, l'analyste, pour récupérer mon Iphone. Sans regard, sans parole, négligemment il me donne une téléphone cassé, un jouet d'enfant.»

speaking, he negligently gives me a broken telephone, a child's plaything". It is a dream of the passage from the two of the transferential unconscious to the one of the real unconscious; where with the mirage Other being the subject supposed to know and the "love addressed to knowledge" (Lacan, 2001a) yield to the *one* without recourse to the knowledge of a second.

The end of analysis and the narrow path of the *passe* involve a logical equivoque. For M. Porcheret, "an equivoque on being".[39] It consists in the isolation and consent to a creative trace, genitor of the subject unseizable at the level of the signified. A logical equivoque between the unconscious meaning of symptoms and the fundamental nonsense of the traumatism of the inscription of language in the organism. Furthermore, there is logical equivocity in the destitution of the transferential unconscious, of the subject supposed to know without which no analytic act exists, and its contradiction, the real of the unconscious, *'Ere's one*[40], as the exit point from the analytic experience towards the singular.

Bernard Porcheret's dream constitutes a traversal of the transfinite of the transferential unconscious, that of the intersubjectivity of two - the demand ever-directed towards another - to the autism of the one of the real unconscious. He awaited the Other's knowledge, but the dream shows the Other is equally deprived of meaning, of an anchoring point that would orient the subject. He lends his knowledge to the Other, and the other returns the letter.

> I want to mark here that there is only a collection there--ceaselessly fed by the
>
> testimony that those of course whose ears I open give to it--a collection of what
>
> anyone as well as I and they get from the mouths themselves of analysands however
>
> little they are authorized to take the place of the analyst (Lacan, 2001c, p. 493).

The passage from analysand to analyst plays out in the singularity of the one. The generation of the one does not occur from the basis of addition, of counting one's possessions. It is not through sameness, by the inclusion in the universal, - for example, counting sheep, 1, 2, 3, ... *ad infinitum*. Rather "It is very exactly that, contrary to appearance, *the One* by essence could not be founded on sameness, but it is very precisely, on the contrary, by set theory, marked as needing to be founded in pure and simple difference" (Lacan, 2011, pp. 110-111). Set theory teaches us the one is founded by its absence, a lack. The "pure and simple difference" is, insofar as it concerns the analyst, his singularity, the unicity of his linguistic trauma. The one appears from the starting point of the lack; regarding the analyst to be, it is from the letter, which causes the want-to-be. At the end of the analytic experience, reading desire at the letter passes by negation. It requires a refusal to read the letter at the level of meaning, at the level of the signified. In a way, it is no longer a case of the signifier either, but of tracing, by the combinatory of signifiers, the letter as unit of jouissance.

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[39] *"une équivoque sur l'être"*.
[40] *"Y'a de l'Un".*

That it be simply a question of a herd of domesticated animals does not provide for the genesis of the one, it is more the one which lacking in the real, in relation to the expected number in the symbolic. To assert this modern mathematical logic took quite the detour to find again what was there in the beginning of writing. Not enumeration of worldly objects, but starting from the moment when the trace refers to nothing to be found in the world. The structure of the number is made to designate what doesn't exist in the world. The same could be said of the letter. It concerns the gap between being and existing.

Conclusion

Late in his teaching, Lacan will remark, "When all is said and done, equivocation is the only weapon we have against the *sinthome*... In effect, interpretation operates uniquely by equivocation. There must be something in the signifier which resonates" (Lacan, 2005, p. 17). I read Lacan's quote as an observation that equivocation is the only path for grasping the singularity of the subject. It is the true *Via regia* to the unconscious. Whether it be via the analyst's systematic misunderstanding of the analysand's discourse, or his punctuations which accent the ambiguity of the analysand's speech, or by repetition or other interpretations based around the analysand's master signifiers, or even the analyst's simple stupidity (Allouch, 2009, p. 81).[41] we know the psychoanalytic experience advances through incomprehension and surprise; effects of truth occur at the fault lines of the lying truth. And of course, if this exclusive function (equivocation → unconscious) is true, which I hold it to be, we soon find ourselves confronting serious questions on the nature of this relation. Does the equivocal nature of language itself engender the unconscious, $f(\varepsilon)=\$$. Alternatively we could formulate it Ł◇$, does the incoherence of language as a formal system leads unavoidably to the phenomena of the unconscious, to the subjective division? Lacan visits this hypothesis in passing, first saying in "the unconscious is structured by language" (1998, p. 65)[42] before modifying his thesis, "the unconscious is structured *like a* language" (Lacan, 1990, p. 20). All of these complicated questions are fundamentally relevant to psychoanalysis, as they are difficulties encountered in reduction of the oppressive over-determined meaning which initially causes the subject's suffering, as well as in deduction of the singular one at the end of the psychoanalysis. Attaining the one, the unary trait, constitutes the prime goal, the foundation of the psychoanalytic ethic. This is the root of the opposition between ego psychology and other cognitive or behavioural approaches on the one hand, which

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[41] "*He had to decide. For months and months he had told Lacan of his love for X, talked about her, of his relationship with her, of her life. In short, he had completely analysed his choice of her....*
He arrives in the session to declare, finally:
- 'I'm getting married next week.'
Lacan:
- 'To whom?'"
(Allouch, 2009, p. 81)

[42] "Disons que tout ce qui est de l'ordre de l'inconscient en tant qu'il est structuré par le langage, nous met devant le phénomène suivant - ce n'est ni le genre, ni la classe, mais seulement l'exemple particulier qui nous permet de saisir les propriétés les plus significatives" (Lacan, 1998, p. 65).

attempt the suppression of the symptom and the normalization of the subject, and psychoanalysis on the other, oriented towards the denomination of the one.

Biographical Note

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examines the effects of narrating painful life circumstances. It proposes that
sharing life stories with others can transform the way individuals make
meaning of their lives, and of themselves. The author argues that this process
encourages subjects' sense of hope (pp. 174-175).

Section one, titled "Telling and Retelling the Stories of our Lives", is
subdivided into five chapters. In them Denborough talks about the use of
narrative therapy to better understand: (a) individuals' values and dreams; (b)
the effects of externalizing problematic circumstances and of reclaiming one's
life from their grip; (c) the benefits of acknowledging special individuals in
one's life, and of the effects of their teachings on the subject; (d) the ways in
which past experiences influence people's actions in the present and future;
and (e) how to deal, and learn from one's memories.

In the first chapter the author asks readers to think about, name, and give value
to those abilities and/or special qualities that they hold dear. Denborough
proposes that in naming what he calls "precious values" (p. 4) and in providing
them with meaning, individuals are able to draw strength from them. According
to Denborough, in order to recognize these cherished qualities and skills, one
may need to reflect on the stories of his/her life. It is through this process of
self reflection that individuals discover who they really are, and who they wish
to become. In this respect, the author points to the works of Michael White,
whose exercise "Tree of Life" (p. 11) assists individuals in thinking about their
skills and values in a metaphorical manner. In this exercise the different parts
of a tree symbolize distinct aspects of people's lives. For example, the roots
symbolize one's family history. They point to where the subject comes from, to
family members, and to all those whom the individual appreciates and holds
dear. A further example can be seen in the part of the tree symbolizing the
ground. This section of the tree represents one's present actions and daily
activities. The different aspects of the tree, thus, help the subject recognize his
or her resources and abilities.

Similarly, in chapter two the author presents a series of questions that guide
readers towards the externalization of problems. Denborough explains that in
the externalization of distressful events through narrative, individuals separate
themselves from problems affecting their lives. In so doing, these individuals
are able to reconsider the effects that these problems have on their lives and,
more importantly, they are able to take action towards them (pp. 40-43). In this
process of looking from the "outside in", the author explains, individuals gain a
different perspective, distize the so-called problem, and see it as something that
is influencing them, rather than as a characteristic of who they are (pp. 47-49).

conceptualizes the implications of trauma and loss, and addresses the negative effects of cultural expectations. This section also draws attention to the importance of valuing diversity in character. It stresses the significance of constructive memories and points to the benefits of understanding subjects' own personal and shared existence as part of a continuum of legacies.

Both sections address the benefit of documenting and sharing personal hardships, goals and achievements. They emphasize the empowering effects of having a voice, and finding comfort with past and present, as well as real and imagined audiences. Denborough describes the non-linear process of –positive- change. He invites his readers to reflect on their lives and take a thoughtful, hands-on approach to recording stress-evoking experiences. This therapist explains how to understand and manage challenges with the use vignettes, visual illustrations and letters, and provides examples of ways in which to document and share experiences by offering templates of charts, graphs, diagrams, questionnaires, certificates, spiritual testaments and non-material wills.

In his first chapter, "A Life of Stories", Denborough offers a model for reclaiming one's storylines through selective descriptions of lived occurrences. By highlighting specific events of his own childhood as examples, he explains how deciding on what and how events are shared alters the conceptualization of individuals' own realities and sense of self (p. 4). He defines the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of identities and highlights the implications of recognizing how sexist, racist, homophobic, and abusive lenses mark the manner in which subjects perceive their occurrences. Equally important, this therapist underlines the importance of externalizing such views, and –once again- embracing socio-emotional aspects worth remembering and sharing.

Chapter two, "We Are Not Our Problems" maintains the significance of identifying and externalizing psychological, emotional and social stressors. Denborough explains how personifying problems and understanding their triggers lessen their negative influence(s). With an emphasis on narrative theatre and interviews, this chapter continues to support the worth of re-writing life stories, and the significance of drawing strength from a supportive audience (pp. 41-43, 53, 69). Chapter three, "Finding the Right Audiences for Our Stories" points to the value of compassion, understanding and empathy. Denborough stresses the fruitfulness of taking proactive steps to understand and overcome difficult problems. He highlights the significance of contributing to friends' and loved ones' experiences as acknowledging witnesses. As seen earlier, this chapter supports the worth of sharing and receiving supportive feedback. After having worked with prisoners and individuals living in social isolation, Denborough also recommends writing letters to imagined audiences, explaining that such an act can also be conducive to writers' positive change.

In connection with the aforementioned chapter, chapter four, "Teamwork and Remembering Who is important to Us", focuses on the significance of membership and thus, of the therapeutic aspects of being part of a supportive team of individuals (p. 87). In this chapter Denborough presents the idea of creating a 'team sheet' for one's 'club of life'. He explains that such list may include imaginary and/or real friends, as well as

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to actual or imagined audiences influences subjects' claim and (re)interpretation of their past and present realities.

religious figures, and even pets. This list, continues Denborough, may contain the names of individuals who are alive, and/or diseased (p. 93). As always, this therapist highlights the importance of documenting goals and keeping a list of scored accomplishments. He also invites his readers to create a diagram representing their individual and collective achievements (p. 103), and reinstates the significance of celebrating accomplishments. Denborough outlines the worth of being attached to subjects' 'better judgements', and points to the importance of staying connected with those who have introduced us to positive thoughts (p. 107).

"Life as a Journey: Migrations of Identity" analyses the benefits of understanding the way in which individuals respond to sudden transitions (p.121). Denborough looks into the manner in which personal changes lead to migrations of identity (p. 123), and speaks of the unsettling feelings that may follow such vicissitudes. The importance of writing and sharing letters is stressed once again, as is the documentation of goals and responses (pp. 130-132). He explains that during times of drastic change experiencing "backlashes" in the forms of fears and/or negative feeling is natural. He suggests that predicting and externalizing such setbacks makes the process of change and that of reclaiming one's life more manageable (pp. 141-142).

The sixth chapter, "Questioning Normality and Escaping Failure", invites individuals to challenge cultural expectations, re-consider the definition of normal and honour diverse forms of living (pp. 147,149). Denborough asks his readers to resist cultural pressures, suggesting that socio-cultural influences often lead to self-criticism and a sense of personal failure. He stresses the benefit of documenting and appreciating one's distinctiveness (pp. 152-153, 155, 160-162, 168). In this chapter, as read in all other chapters, Denborough continues to stress the importance of active listening (p. 150). In "Reclaiming our Lives from Trauma and Honouring What's Important to Us", this therapist offers coping strategies for individuals affected by trauma. He highlights the importance of cherishing individuality and honouring the qualities that make survival possible. He explains that even if a response becomes blocked and consciously forgotten, "no adult or child is a passive recipient of trauma" (p. 177). All subjects, argues Denborough, "take action to minimize their exposure to trauma and decrease their vulnerability to it" (p. 177). This therapist reiterates that connecting with compassionate individuals while reclaiming our lives influence the manner in which we understand our reality, perceive occurrences, and therefore act (p. 184). This chapter reinforces the significance of honouring acts of resistance, and of forging a stronger bond with others and oneself to overcome trauma (p. 198).

"Saying Hello Again when we have Lost Someone we Love" addresses the value of transforming the experience of grief and carrying legacies of loved ones who have passed away. Here Denborough rejects the cultural expectation of "saying good bye". He suggests that the Western notion of "finding closure" and hence anticipating an end to the relationship one holds with loved ones can be difficult to tolerate and/or conceptualize (pp. 211, 213). Denborough emphasizes the Western paradox of mourning and acknowledges Freud's theory through a reference to Barbara Myerhoff's (1982) work. In this section he highlights how in Western societies, regardless of the profound loneliness, need and isolation mourners experience following their loss, individuals are often expected to "move on" and adjust to the idea of leaving behind the relationship held with those who pass away (p.213). Following Freud, Denborough challenges such expectation by inviting mourners to reincorporate the memory of those who perished into their

present: to remember stories, honour their lives through prayers, and write letters highlighting memories and overall feelings (p. 213).

In this chapter, while addressing the guilt that often rises following the death of abusive individuals, Denborough stresses the importance of self-forgiveness and understanding (p. 239). He briefly returns to a theme presented in the introductory chapter by once again making reference to how socio-cultural signifiers and expectations influence subjects' self-other perceptions and identities. He thus mentions how issues of gender, ethnicity, etc., affect the way individuals cope with grief. Denborough also emphasizes that feelings of loss can be further complicated with experiences of physical, emotional and/or sexual abuse (pp. 238-239). Once again Denborough draws attention to the benefits of writing, suggesting that when subjects under the experiences of grief, guilt, and isolation, they should find comfort in writing and sharing their work with an imagined or real audience.

Chapter nine, "Legacy and memory: When we are facing our Final Chapter", discusses ways for readers to think of their mortality. Here Denborough stresses the benefits of focusing on the positive memories individuals leave behind (p. 246). While remaining with the theme of memory and loss, this chapter also draws attention to the fears that rise from being diagnosed with the early onset of dementia. This therapist discusses the challenges of preparing for one's physical passing, while he addresses the separate, yet perceptually interconnected experience of anticipating the eventual absence of one's short-term memory. The emphasis is once again placed on the significance of writing letters and asking family and friends to preserve and cherish the love and memories we leave behind. Denborough re-introduces the benefit of creating a spiritual will of legacies, proposing we should see our lives as a part of an important process that lives on despite our physical passing.

In the tenth and final chapter, "Where does our Story Fit in the Bigger Picture", Denborough points to the importance of linking our lives with those who came before, and those who came –or will come- after us. He suggests that challenging and/or embracing our ancestors' actions, as well as their priorities, hopes and dreams aid(s) in the beneficial reconstruction of our own identities (pp. 271-272). In this chapter Denborough asks his readers to consider to the changes that can be taken up for the sake of future generations (p. 287). As read in chapter nine, this therapist highlights the spiritual and emotional importance of conceptualizing our existence as part of a spiritual continuum. Once again, Denborough provides his own, as well as others' experiences. He describes the significance of forging a connection through letters written to past and/or present, lived and/or imagined individuals, and guides his readers with important points to consider when writing their own letters (pp. 286-287). As always, in this final chapter Denborough continues to stress the emotional importance of sharing one's writing with others.

As mentioned throughout this review, *Retelling the Stories of our Lives* highlights the significance of investing in actions that concretely grant us the power to change the views of our past, present and future. Denborough emphasizes that as social beings, we are enriched by the existing and/or imagined presence of those who offer us spiritual and emotional comfort. He points at the manner in which our worlds become deepened by those who -knowingly and unknowingly- perceive our existence as part of a continuum of memories and legacies. This writer does a wonderful job at inspiring and granting his readers a sense of purpose. His book is empowering; it offers tools to help conceptualize

and verbalize realities, ongoing actions and self-other perceptions. Equally important, Denborough addresses the importance of empathy and forgiveness, and the consequence of embracing one's existence with a renewed interpretation of the journey we know as life.

While this therapist makes no reference to the dynamics that take place within our third space, and thus to the defenses triggered within the constant interplay of our private and shared, conscious and unconscious realities[4], Denborough's words indirectly reflect psychoanalytic practice through his rejection of passivity. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud explains that being unwillingly passive when exposed to sudden and/or ongoing danger, intensifies subjects' unpleasure. This is a condition that results in the unconscious deployment of defenses meant to counteract the ego's sensed hopelessness (pp. 138, 141-142). As explained thus far, actively overcoming one's crises, as well as one's sense of doom and/or despair in the face of physical and/or emotional trauma(s), loss and melancholia, is central to Denborough's approach.

That being said, academics and psychoanalysts may still feel that certain sections in *Retelling the Stories of our Lives* could have benefited from direct references to psychoanalytic theory. There could have been a more in-depth discussion of trauma, mourning, melancholia, and of dream interpretations as wish fulfilments, or as repetitions of the moment(s) of trauma. The same could be said of the absence in addressing subjects' histories of affect, and, as argued by Freud in "Observations on Love and Transference", of the advantages of transference within and outside of the analytic setting (p. 347). Yet, scholars and therapists must bear in mind that Denborough's aim was to offer to a general audience the unmistakable benefits of narrative therapy. His book presents simple descriptions of consciously perceived events, offering step-by-step illustrations of how, through the act of writing, subjects may consciously transform perceptions of experiences and cope with life's short and long-term problems. Once again, *Retelling the Stories of our Lives* draws attention to the importance of sharing and externalizing experiences. Denborough highlights the emotional significance of human connections, albeit at the conscious level. He stresses the value of experiencing a sense of socio-affective belonging and continuity through time. In his book this therapist informs his audience –patients, relatives, friends and professionals- that focusing on positive aspects of our actions, and documenting concerns, wishes, and achievements, alters the way in which we see ourselves, define our existence and therefore behave within the interconnected fluidity of our personal and shared realities.

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[4] Our social interactions, knowledge, perceptions and behaviours are not limited to isolated layers of conscious, preconscious and unconscious dynamics, but on the interaction of the subject's split worlds within the area known as the third space. As argued by Britzman (2006), this third space is an area in which self-other interactions become governed by an unconsciously shared "give and take"; it is a terrain through which we unknowingly respond to others' psychic histories and resulting affect as much as others respond to our own history of affect (pp. 42-44 and 49).

Biographical Note

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Book review

The Myths of Mars and Venus: Do men and women really speak different languages?
Deborah Cameron. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008, vii + 196 pages
(paperback), ISBN 978-0-19-955099-9

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In this book, the renowned scholar and author of many texts on the topic of gender
differences in language use, Deborah Cameron, presents and challenges some of the most
known and spread gendered 'myths' such as that women are by nature more cooperative,
talkative and polite than the opposite sex (p. 11). Her particular interest is language
interaction so she skilfully examines data gathered from public and private settings
including home, work, and urban schools. The clear, simple writing style makes this
volume accessible to both general audiences and professional readership of linguists and
sociologists. Since a number of chapters refer to psychological elements and evolutionary
psychology, with language and words as primary data sources, one can imagine this book
also being of interest to those involved in psychoanalysis and counselling.

Cameron's volume is comprised of nine chapters. The reader is first introduced to the
widespread myth of Mars and Venus discussing some possibly harmful effects it can have
on forming public perceptions of genders. The author posits that the touted differences in
gender talk are only part of the problem; other social and psychological issues are to
blame, too. Among the listed culprits for the perpetuation of the myth of Mars and Venus
are, among others, the self-help books, 'popular science', the media, and widespread
false believes about how men and women interact. Also seen as responsible are authors
such as John Gray and his 'whimsical' book, *Men are From Mars and Women are from
Venus*, that exploits 'people's tendency to rely on stereotypes when processing
information', and takes 'shortcuts when dealing with new situations and difficulties, thus
reducing human behaviour to manageable proportions' (Cameron, p. 14). Also challenged
is the so-called 'soundbite science' on male/female brains (p. 18) that reports such items
as the average number of words men and women produce (7,000 and 20,000
respectively). The first chapter ends with three basic questions that drive Cameron's
volume: (1) What is the evidence for the claims about men, women and language? (2)
What consequences does it have in the real world if large numbers of people believe these
claims? and (3) Why are the claims being made? While Cameron focuses on questions
one and three, question number two is somewhat under-explored.

From there, the chapters seem to follow a thematic arrangement, from history to
anthropology and evolutionary psychology, brain research, human rearing, identity
forming and workplace. In Chapter Two, "A Time and Place: Putting Myths in Context"
Cameron charts the gender myth historically, quoting for example Lord Chesterfield's
'assessment' of female language abilities made in 1777 as a precursor for the notion that
women talk too much (in Cameron, quoted in Bailey, 1992): "Language is indisputably

the more immediate province of the fair sex…The torrents of their eloquence, especially in the vituperative way, stun all opposition" (p. 25). Moving on to the 20th century, Cameron turns to Jespersen's entry on 'The Woman': " [women] shrink from coarse and gross expressions and [have] preference for refined… veiled and indirect expressions" (p. 27). Implicit in these comments is the view of 'innate' female chattiness and natural tendency to use language more politely. The historical references that are used in this chapter are less known or shared in public discourse thus readers may find them interesting. The same, though, might not be said about hinting to the innateness of the behaviour discussed.

In Chapter Three, "Partial Truths: Why Difference is not the Whole Story" the centrepiece is the data collected by a psychologist Janet Hyde. In the article "Gender Similarities Hypothesis" Hyde uses 'meta-analysis', a statistical technique allowing the analyst to collate many different research findings (in this case words) and draw overall conclusions from them. Hyde reviewed a large number of studies concerned with all kinds of 'putative male and female differences' (p. 42) based on language behaviour and found that the actual overall difference, expressed by the value *'d'* was close to zero *(*where *'d'* value can be very large, large, moderate, small or close to zero). It is noteworthy that Cameron quotes studies from journals of psychology, but she stops short of engaging their relevance beyond the purely socio-cultural one. Here, if linguistics and psychoanalysis could interact and collaborate, one can see potential for information and data sharing that clearly can benefit both professional groups and their goals.

Chapter Four, "Worlds Apart? Mars and Venus in Childhood and Adolescence" is particularly notable for its relevance to linguistic and counselling work because it engages the questions of growing up differently in boy/girl camps, so to speak. The starting premise is Tannen's book *You Just Don't Understand* (1990), which showcases dialogues from boy and girl distinct worlds that are being blamed for different communicative competences. Tannen, well-know for her gender research, discusses upbringing styles but also notes 'natural' interactional tendencies towards 'competition and cooperation' (in males and females respectively) (p. 61). Skilfully juxtaposed is Judith Baxter's study that shows no such natural tendencies towards cooperation or competition: she concludes that men and women can be both cooperative and competitive depending on the situation and personal style (p. 64). Cameron uses more recent gender work by Baxter to help explain the gender dynamic. According to Baxter, " popular girls tend to attract resentment from their peers when they assume leadership", and because boys don't like it girls go about things in "a covert way…so not to transgress the norms of femininity and …be punished for it" [by not being liked or by being rejected]. In other words, girls are not 'more polite' naturally, or more cooperative either, but they are forced by social norms to appear to be so. This work can cross-pollinate with advancements in psychodynamic therapy where behaviour is an important variable. In Baxter's data, girls could be seen through Freudian prism, meaning the urges and needs of individuals versus what is socially acceptable behaviour (of girls in this case) and how it is mitigated. In other words, it is reflected through 'ego' versus 'super-ego' struggles (Wright, 1984), so one would see this chapter be of interest to those working with, or helping, adolescents and the maintenance of girl/boy relationships.

Chapter Five "Cross-purposes: the Myth of Male-Female Misunderstandings" moves the discussion to the 'alleged lack of assertiveness and confidence' (p. 85) women are thought to exhibit, and self-help books that seem to have 'hijacked' those myths and

profited from them. Here the reader is taken back to Gray's book on genders being natives from different planets, particularly when couples need to decide who takes the garbage out – another 'myth' of how men cannot naturally process indirect requests from women. One can imagine that a lot of language reported in this chapter is also heard in couple's sessions as 'telling is indeed the key activity in all psychotherapies" (Peräkylä, 2013). Perhaps a lot more such data collected by analysts working in critical or feminist discourse might find a useful application in consultation work. In the same chapter, the sub-heading "Just Say No" has eerie relevance to rape victims and those working on their psychological rehabilitation. Without a doubt, this chapter could be a valuable resource for anyone interested in the psychological aspects of language, and what psychological states a linguistic method, such as for example conversation analysis (CA), can help reveal hidden in language interaction.

Chapter Six, "Back to Nature: Brains, Genes and Evolution" re-evaluates the evolutionary psychologists' explanations that "many behaviour-patterns which we might assume to be products of culture are actually the results of biological evolution: they reflect the ways in which our earliest ancestors adapted to the conditions of life" (p. 101). This view allows the genes passed on to us to be accountable for differences not just physical but also in the working of our minds (p. 101). Also cited is *The Essential Differences* by Simon Baron-Cohen who offers explanations about male and female brains, the former built to systemize, the latter to empathize. To Cameron 'things that interest evolutionary psychologists (human emotions, their sexual behaviour) cannot be deduced from fossils and artefacts (p. 101). Language is central to such understanding as it is to linguistics and, one may add, psychoanalysts, but when looking at emotions their effects on language use are often short-changed (Peräkylä, 2013), though they should be considered more holistically. The chapter concludes pointing to the need to consider cross-cultural and historical differences when discussing male/female speaking styles, such as status, setting, subject and purpose of conversation (p. 119).

In Chapter Seven, "Public Speaking: Mars and Venus in Politics, and the Workplace" Cameron takes up gender politics and is very effective in her selection of pertinent examples. She quotes from a large New Zealand study, the Wellington Language in the Workplace project, to examine the claim that women are expected to be 'nice and cooperative' and when they are not being so, male co-workers refer to them in unusual ways, not common for male interaction. For instance, Holmes cites the case of "Queen Clara" a female boss who is teased by the male co-worker by being addressed as 'mum' when giving directions to her co-workers (thus being referred to as the British Queen Mother or Mum). Clara operates effectively by combining her authority with self-deprecating humour, but this may suggest that men have trouble taking orders from women so women have to be less direct (Grujicic-Alatriste, 2008). Or as this chapter concludes, "A woman who displays authority as unabashedly as Clara still makes a lot of people (here possibly implying men) feel uncomfortable or threatened" (p. 135). All examples from this data pool are very strong and effective, albeit interpretative. Such data is a goldmine for other disciplines that work with gender-based issues and treatment, and might be very relevant and useful to work place counselling.

The role of gender in identity forming and its effects on speech styles is taken up in Chapter 8, "Doing What Comes Culturally: Gender, Identity and Style". It supports the premise that all identity is culturally and socially constructed and exploited for personal or power gains. The work of Mary Bucholtz, a linguist, is used to illustrate what it means

to be 'cool' and how adolescents copy the 'coolest style of speech' wanting to be perceived as 'cool'. Also cited is Penelope Eckert, a sociolinguist studying male and female students in a suburban high school in Detroit, who concluded that both gender groups consist of 'jocks and burnouts' (p. 146). However, male jocks are socially allowed to demonstrate individual accomplishments to gain status, whereas female jocks are not, thus they are "driven to assert their status and commitment to the group through other means such as personality and appearance or language" (p. 147). A lot of gender identity is expressed through language and style, but it is related to group membership, upbringing and socio-economic class. Some linguistic domains such as Conversation Analysis have made strides towards examining place-based interaction such as schools or street groups, or the homeless, and have built successful collaboration and intervention with other disciplines, particularly social and medical fields (e.g., Sidnell & Stivers, 2011). Already highlighted in psychodynamic psychiatry is the view that all factors from biologic, social, to cultural shape mental health and illness and should be considered and evaluated (Frosch, 1990), making this chapter a must read for audiences interested in the relationship between personality and the circumstances that surround and shape them.

In the final Chapter Nine, Cameron concludes that there is too much in-group and intra-group overlap and variation for any general conclusions to be made about all men or all women: "To deal with the problems and the opportunities facing men and women now, we must look beyond the myth of Mars and Venus" (p. 181). Nothing seems truer! Perhaps the looking should be done by multiple disciplines, considering human biological and psychological aspects and needs. It should be a concerted effort aimed to allow for cross-pollinations of different fields that have language as a base for their analysis.

Biograpical Note

Lubie Grujicic-Alatriste is doctor of applied linguistics with training in discourse analysis including conversation and text analysis. Her work explores language and its place in cross-disciplinary collaborations, valuing multi-methods, reflexivity and praxis. Her latest publication, *Linking Discourse Studies to Professional Practice* (Multilingual Matters, August 2015), advocates for interdisciplinary approaches to real life settings and language use.

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