

An Introduction to the Transference Unconscious

David Hafner¹
Universidad de Monterrey

Abstract

This paper explores the evolving definition of the term ‘unconscious’ in late twentieth century French psychoanalysis: structuralist, real, and enunciative. Each hypothetical definition of the unconscious employs a rather different reading of Freud’s discovery of the divided nature of subjective reality, adopting different approaches to the question of trace permanence and strangeness. The paper argues that an assessment of the sequence of Lacanian theories of the unconscious should be understood against the backdrop of discontinuous progress as conceptualised by French historical epistemology.

Let’s be categorical: in psychoanalytic anamnesis, what is at stake is not reality, but truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by the scant freedom through which the subject makes them present.
(Lacan, 1953)

The first thing to say about the unconscious is what Freud says about it: it consists of thoughts. (Lacan, 1968)

When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. *One knows*.
(Lacan, 1976)

If you don’t take the unconscious as the subject of the unconscious, then you’re taking it as a memory, where everything is already written, and it’s a matter of getting to read what’s already written. On the contrary, if one takes the unconscious as a subject, *the ‘it’s written’ lies in speech itself*.
(Miller, 2011)

Introduction

My specific concern in this paper is the transmission of Freud’s hypothesis of the unconscious through the work of Lacan. Though Lacan’s starting point in his unceasing discussion of the unconscious is in an ethology of the image (Lacan 1953, 2006a, & 2006b), followed by the reformulation of the unconscious through structural linguistics, arguably his most famous contribution, his endpoint at a non-structured real unconscious has often been overlooked.

¹ Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. David Hafner, Department of Psychology, Universidad de Monterrey, San Pedro Garza García, Nuevo León, 66238, México. Email dzhafner@gmail.com
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

In 1931, we find Lacan's first published references to the notion of the unconscious. Just one year prior to his thesis defence in which he would unfold the disorderly contradictions of diverse psychiatric accounts of paranoia, he writes disparagingly of 'the technicians of the unconscious', avowing their impotence in curing paranoia. Two years later, when publishing his *amicus curiae* of the Papin sisters' violent crime, Lacan employs the term 'unconscious' as an adjectival trait of an aggressive drive. "We could call it unconscious, signifying that the intentional content which translates it into consciousness cannot manifest itself without a compromise with the social demands integrated by the subject, that is to say without a camouflage of motives, which is quite precisely the whole delusion" (Lacan, 1933). The aggressive drive deserves the qualifier unconscious insofar as it can only attain consciousness through distortion. This proposition is in agreement with Freud's dynamic theory of unconscious formations and their modification by displacement, condensation, and transposition. Further on Lacan alludes to those "psychoanalysts themselves, who when they derive paranoia from homosexuality, style this homosexuality as unconscious, as 'larval' (Lacan, 1933). These first adjectival uses of the term 'unconscious' do not imply a theory of the unconscious as an entity, but seemingly resemble more the pre-psychoanalytic theories of Hering and Butler (Butler, 1920) and the earliest Freudian writings (Freud, 2001c), employing a theoretical style which Freud progressively leaves behind in 1900 favouring the dynamic, ontological formulations of 1915 instead of the descriptive use of the term found at the beginning of his career.

The transition from 'unconscious' as adjective to the conception of the unconscious as an entity, real or hypothetical, in the Freudian archaeological model or in the Lacanian linguistic structure, constitutes the founding axiom of psychoanalysis and the point of separation from Cartesian psychologies of consciousness (Braunstein, 2013)². Once one gifts the unconscious a genuinely real ontology, as a mental entity, and does not simply consider it a description for what remains outside consciousness at any given

² Foucault isolates four fundamental assumptions in the psychoanalytic discourse, each of which relates to a particular reading of the unconscious:

"1) A clinical codification of the procedure for making someone talk: anamneses, a system of questions, a system of interpretation akin to that practiced on bodily signs and symptoms.

2) A general and diffuse notion of causality, acting as a guarantee that, no matter how far off it might seem at first sight, the concentrated causal power of sexuality is there to be discovered. (How can we not recognize here that distinctive combination of 'pansexualism' linked to the rigorously dogmatic doctrine of psychic determinism, so characteristic of psychoanalysis?)

3) The premise that the truth of sexuality is essentially clandestine, elusive and latent. Note that this argument, when found in psychoanalysis, appears both at the level of the biological phases - the 'latency' phase, which at time Freud seemed to regard as the crucial causal factor in human beings' vulnerability to neurosis - as well as in the notion that sexuality is 'the secret' *par excellence*, so that there is an opposition between sexuality and language.

4) The logic of the censor, by which the not-permitted, the not-said, and the non-existent support and confuse one another" (Forrester, 1990).

moment, it is no longer synonymous with non-consciousness. Then the unconscious is no longer reducible to the state of sleep:

In neither [normal subjects nor neurotics], however, does the efficacy of the unconscious cease upon awakening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field. The presence of the unconscious in the psychological order—in other words, in the individual's relational functions—nevertheless deserves to be more precisely defined. It is not coextensive with that order, for we know that, while unconscious motivation manifests itself just as much in conscious psychical effects as in unconscious ones, conversely it is elementary to note that a large number of psychical effects that are legitimately designated as unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristic of consciousness, nevertheless bear no relation whatsoever, by their nature, to the unconscious in the Freudian sense. It is thus only due to an incorrect use of the term that “psychical” and “unconscious” in this sense are confused, and that people thus term psychical what is actually an effect of the unconscious on the soma, for example (Lacan, 2006h).

The Freudian unconscious is a limited subset in the vast ensemble of mental activity that remain outside consciousness. In this way Freud moves from a descriptive to a scientific formalisation of the unconscious; it is not simply what has been repressed. It is synonymous neither with the absence of consciousness, nor with the autonomous organic functions of the body, of the nervous and endocrine systems, which remain stable beyond any need of the subject's will. (This is of course a simplification of Freud's continual reformulating of his discovery; 1915, 1920, 1923, 1926 each constitute major turning points in Freud's topology of the psychic apparatus, but are beyond the scope of this paper).

Here Lacan is arguing against various other post-Freudians who attempted to make the Freudian unconscious synonymous with biological instincts. When he claims, “The unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier”, Lacan's structuralist manifesto could not be clearer.

The justification for Lacan's critique of the neurophysiological reading of Freud's discovery jumps out at the reader once one compares Freud's *Gesammelte Werke* with Ernst Jones' *Standard Edition*, where the German term *Trieb* was rendered in English as *instinct*. This is no minor occurrence of *traduttore, traditore*; the axiomatic distortion involves a core assumption. Freud's (2001d, 2001f) *Trieb* possesses grammatical structure, as does language. By rendering *Trieb* as *instinct*, this connotation of structure disappears; it is replaced by connotations of innateness, permanence, and organicity. Whereas Freud clearly located the drives on the frontier between the soma and the psyche, the instincts in Jones' system belong to the soma. The transformation of *Trieb* to *Instinkt* equates psychology with physiology. Such an equivalence is in line with the current dominant paradigm of neuropsychology, in which physiology and psychology are treated as synonyms in the correlative study of behaviour and neurological models. The axiomatic chasm between Jones' and Freud's lexicon reveals their models to be, in Kuhn's words, incommensurate.

Perhaps one could ascribe Jones' translation and its wholesale acceptance by the Anglo-Saxon community to a positivist refusal of any psychological division which does not reside in a visible corporal division. Freud's hypothesis of the drives obliges one to assent, even provisionally, to the notion of a psychological/linguistic space which is not clearly determined by biochemistry. In his first published work, *On Aphasia*, Freud (1953) criticises *localisationist* presumptions, preferring a dynamic approach (Solms, 2000): "As much as possible, we wish to separate the psychological point of view from the anatomical". This breaking point crystallised in his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, when the choice of not publishing, or even completing the *Entwurf*, marks Freud's distancing from anatomical neurology in favour of psychoanalysis.³

Was the Freudian notion of the unconscious as possessing structure and being distinct from instincts, from emotions—after all, Freud (2001g) directly claims that affects and emotions are never unconscious—too close to metaphysics for protestant American taste?⁴ The Lacanian approach that endorses a return to Freud's psychoanalytic

³ "I can no longer understand the state of mind in which I hatched the psychology and cannot fathom how I could have burdened you with it. I believe you have been too courteous, I now see it as a kind of absurdity" (Freud, 1985, letter 82, November 1895).

⁴ "American psychoanalysts, I have argued, many of whom were trained in Europe and found themselves adapting for better or for worse to the American situation owing to the Diaspora, came to emphasize the adaptation of the human subject to the prevailing social, economic, and political environment; seeking recognition by the American medical establishment, they diligently excluded all those who might potentially jeopardize their good reputation in the public's mind - above all, those persons of 'dubious' sexual orientation and practice. Having striven to adapt to their new environment, these American psychoanalysts came to see it as part of analytic therapy to teach their analysands how to adapt to their own environments. They came to conceive of illness as the inability of the analysand's ego to adapt the analysand's id impulses to the analysand's reality. The analysand's ego was too weak for the task of adaptation, and had to be encouraged to identify with the analyst's supposedly Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65
36
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

unconscious is vastly more popular in predominantly catholic countries like France and many nations of Latin America. There is also of Freud's claims that the ego is subjected to the drives, ideals, and external reality, claims that go directly against the limitless optimism of the American Dream, of Calvinist ethics and the evergreen advice, *just pull yourself up by your bootstraps*. The treatment plans of ego-psychology, producing a stronger ego, would seem then to represent a direct refusal of Freud's intuition on power relations between the demands of the body, the family, and more general reality upon the self.

In any case, the Anglo-Saxon insistence of correlating the Freudian topologies with the evolutionary division of the hindbrain, the midbrain, and the forebrain appears time and again in the literature. Let us consider Dr. W.H.R. Rivers' theory of the unconscious.

I propose, therefore, to adopt as the distinguishing marks of one class of instincts: firstly, the absence of exactness of discrimination, of appreciation and of gradation of response; secondly, the character of reacting to conditions with all the energy available; and thirdly, the immediate and uncontrolled character of the response. It is interesting to note that Head and Gordon Holmes have found these characters to hold in large measure of the activity of the optic thalamus, the essential nucleus of which they have shown to be the central representative of the protopathic aspect of the peripheral sensibility and the central basis of emotive reactions. As I have already pointed out, it is clear that in this case we have to do with a structure which has come down from an early stage of the development of the nervous system. The optic thalamus is now hidden away within the interior of the brain, overlaid and buried by the vast development of the cerebral cortex. Just as I have supposed that emotive and instinctive reactions are buried within the unconscious, hidden from consciousness by the vast development of those reactions which are associated with intelligence, so do we find that the organ of the emotions and instinctive reactions

strong ego" (Fink, 2014). We mention in passing the curious proximity between psychoanalyst and shaman, a theme thoroughly addressed by Chertok, Devereux, and Ellenberger.

has been buried under the overwhelming mass of the nervous structure we know to be pre-eminently associated with consciousness (Rivers, 1920).

As John Forrester observed, Rivers' position with regard to Freud's unconscious diverges, simultaneously substantiating Freud's method of dream interpretation while discrediting his theories.⁵ A major historical figure in the introduction of Freud's method of dream analysis to England, Rivers (1920) also published outspoken criticisms of Freud's propositions of the unconscious and the drives. And a quick perusal of the above quotation reveals multiple points of separation from Freud's theory. Rivers collapses the Freudian unconscious and the emotions into the same space, a view Freud argues against in his 1915 text on the unconscious.⁶ Moreover, Rivers founds his psychobiology on the supposition that the unconscious belongs to the deep of the human psyche, in order to construct the metaphor—one we consider of dubious scientific rigour—that the unconscious is located in the optic thalamus, since both would be hidden, one beneath the 'overwhelming mass' of the cerebral cortex, the other beneath consciousness. This metaphoric forcing, that macroscopic brain anatomy has anything to do with mental functioning, is akin to claiming a computer's motherboard must be located closer to the surface of the earth than RAM or the hard disk since it is the foundation of the computing system.

⁵ "Working on W. H. R. Rivers (1864-1922) has become something of a cottage industry in recent years. But the question that still hangs over historians is: which Rivers? Nobody has yet taken the measure of Rivers' diverse and fundamental contributions (for some indication, see Slobodin 1978 and Langham 1981). Given the constraints of this paper, let me make clear that for these purposes my Rivers is the medical psychologist, persuaded of the importance of Freudian therapeutic techniques and of dream interpretation by his personal experience as dreamer and as medical psychologist at Maghull and Craiglockhart Hospitals... Many historians, including Young (1995, 1999), have been exercised to distinguish Rivers' views and methods from those of the psychoanalysts, principally Freud. In this they have taken Rivers at his word, noting how he criticized the doctrines of the unconscious, of repression, of the importance of infantile sexuality – all the shibboleths of psychoanalysis. Yet what is most striking in Rivers' work is how under the spell of Freud he is – not at the level of theoretical concepts, where he went out of his way to criticize and disagree, but at the level of method. Indeed, the book *Conflict and Dream* would be best titled, *A Dialogue with Freud in and on Dreams*. It is a book which is "normal science" in the Kuhnian sense at its clearest: taking the exemplars of a great scientific achievement as its model and worrying away at the puzzles the achievement of that model presents and opens up" (Forrester, 2006).

⁶ "It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it that it should be known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings, and affects are concerned... We know that three vicissitudes are possible: either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all anxiety; or it is suppressed" (Freud, 2001g).

In opposition to this searching for an anatomical notion of depth that would correlate to the conjecture of the unconscious, the Lacanian perspective argues that the unconscious appears in a liminal space, insofar as it manifests itself at the surface level of speech and language, in a clockwork-like system of words and syllables uttered by a person, sometimes against his or her will, sometimes without awareness.⁷ It is this surface phenomenon that causes one to always say more than intended. To paraphrase Foucault, the ‘unconscious’⁸ has nothing to do with an “underlying reality on which we might try, with difficulty, to get a hold, but rather a great surface network” (Foucault, 1990, p. 105). Treating the unconscious as a great surface network implies that instead of memory storage, the unconscious is to be found in the variable separation between the ‘ribbon of sound’ and retroactive word choice. But let’s return to Rivers.

Rivers continues to separate himself from Freud, declaring the cerebral cortex to be “pre-eminently associated with consciousness” and thus distinct from the awaited location of the unconscious. Freud did not share such hypotheses of anatomic compartmentalisation. What’s more, the current state of anaesthesiology is one of ignorance as to the locations of actions and mechanisms involved in the production of reversible loss of consciousness. To quote Hameroff (2012, p. 1), “Despite 170 years of research, we as a specialty are clueless as to how anaesthetics cause reversible loss of consciousness, behaviour and memory. We know how to safely deliver anaesthesia, but quite literally, we don’t know what we are doing”. Let us presume that anaesthesia is the inverse of the state of consciousness. Current research into locating the anaesthetic action finds no evidence that anaesthetic molecules exert their effects on particular protein receptors in cell membranes (Eger, 2008). Nor does anaesthesia appear to involve an inhibiting or stimulating effect on a macroscopic region of the brain. Instead anaesthetic potency is directly correlated with cell membrane permeability, which would imply that the anaesthetic effect takes place inside cells (Seifriz, 1950). If we accept anaesthesia as the inverse of consciousness, then the field of anaesthesia research, from Claude Bernard until now, contradicts Rivers attempt to locate a modular theory of the psyche in the anatomic divisions of the brain. Freud himself warned against the epistemological error of confusing psychology with physiology so prevalent in academic psychology.

Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the Brain as with that of no other organ. The discovery of the unequal importance of the different parts of the brain and their individual relations to particular parts of the body and to intellectual activities takes us a step further—we do not know how big a step. But every attempt to discover a localisation of mental

⁷ “The dream’s manifest content, he tells us, deserves to be placed once again in the foreground. On this point, there follows a very confused discussion, based on this opposition between the superficial and the profound, which I beg you to rid yourselves of. As Gide says in *The Counterfeiters*, there is nothing more profound than the superficial, because there isn’t anything profound” (Lacan, 1978, p.153).

⁸ ‘Sexuality’ in Foucault’s version

processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve cell and of excitations as migrating along nerve fibres, has miscarried completely. The same fate would await any theory which attempted to recognise, let us say, the anatomical position of the system Cs.—conscious mental activity—as being in the cortex, and to localise the unconscious processes in the sub cortical parts of the brain. There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled, nor is it one of the tasks of psychology to fill it (Freud, 2001g).

Now, having considered the far-reaching transformations of Freud's discovery by his English-speaking colleagues, we can delineate Lacan's place in the history of psychoanalysis with more clarity. His 'Return to Freud' was a necessary counterbalance to the biological reductionism of other post-Freudians, who in their quest to grant scientific dignity to psychoanalysis, assimilated the geography of the brain with psychoanalytic ideology. Lacan (1968) declined this detour through neurophysiology, bolstering himself instead in the Freudian discovery of the essentially cognitive or linguistic structure of the unconscious. "The unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier" (Lacan, 2006h). Lacan's structuralist manifesto was a classic example of an anti-discipline, in which the introduction of a previously ignored field of study prevents a given scientific field from descending into scientism. In this way, Lacan's structuralist theory of the unconscious, from 1953 to around 1972, treats psychoanalysis as applied linguistics instead of a subset of physiology. For the structuralist Lacan, free-associations and unconscious formations follow Saussure and Jakobson's rules of synchronic versus diachronic relations and metaphor versus metonymy (Lacan, 1990).

1953, Structure & Otherness

Finally, as Lacan (2006f) frequently affirms in the structuralist period of his teaching, "the unconscious, it is the discourse of the Other." This phrase is a translation of Freud's assertion that the unconscious is always *eine andere Schauplatz* to Lacan's lexicon (Freud, 2001c). But, not so fast, we just mentioned how Jones' transformation of *Trieb* to *Instinkt* drastically modified the connotations of this fundamental psychoanalytic concept. One should note the same is true for 'discourse'. *Schauplatz*, the meaning of which we might translate loosely as the historical moment in which a story inscribes itself, doesn't necessarily have self-sufficient discursive coherence. Lacan's addition of the term 'discourse' imports structuralist notions of organisation and rule-based form. Hence, the unconscious' linguistic structure. But the attribution of discursive order to the unconscious is not a permanent feature of Lacan's hypotheses. Otherness, on the other hand, is. No matter whether we speak of the imaginary unconscious of the *Mirror Stage*, or the symbolic unconscious of the structuralist epoch, or the real unconscious, the autistic unconscious of the last Lacan,

that is to say from his seminar *Sinthome* on, the psychoanalytic unconscious is always the field of the Other. What can that mean?

In order to read this formula, *the unconscious is the discourse of the other*, let us use Lacan's structuralist definition of the Other from the fifties: the Other is the *treasure of the signifiers*, the set of phonemes and words of a language. As such, even before his/her birth, the language that a new-born's family speaks, a language that will mark the new-born's body, exists. The sexual relation between parents that the young child will interpret in his/her manner exists prior to birth. In light of this, one observes that as the unconscious reality constitutes a sexual reality, the patient's unconscious or at least his/her fundamental fantasy can be attributed to an interpretation of the parent's sexual relationship. If these prior assertions are correct, then the fundamental relation of a speaking being to language is one of *jouissance* and cognition, and not simply one of communication.⁹ What one can think and can communicate depends entirely on the words and language available. Lacan will eventually go beyond this hypothesis, throwing the optimistic notion of communication to the wayside and focusing on the regulatory function of language on the body experience¹⁰, on what he calls *jouissance*¹¹. Furthermore, this language along with the unconscious which consists of

⁹ "The newborn produces no speech sounds, however. During the first year of life, speech-like sounds gradually emerge, beginning with vowel-like coos at six to eight weeks of age, followed by some consonant sounds, then followed by true babbling. By the end of the first year, children are typically babbling sequences of syllables that have the intonation contour of their target languages. Finally, meaningful words are produced; that is, the onset of speech occurs" Nadel (2003), Yang (2004), & Yang (2013).

¹⁰ Psychoanalysis demonstrates time and again how one binds his subjective experience to the organism is anything but simple; the way in which one's body, one's body image, and language hold together shows itself to be exceptional in each case. See for example, Freud's experience in "Das Unheimliche", Winnicott's patients in "Primitive Emotional Development". The body experience always exceeds symbolization, sometimes even leading to experiences which are not located in the physical organism; "Another patient discovered in analysis that most of the time she lived in her head, behind her eyes. She could only see out of her eyes as out of windows and so was not aware of what her feet were doing, and in consequence she tended to fall into pits and to trip over things. She had no 'eyes in her feet'. Her personality was not felt to be localized in her body, which was like a complex engine that she had to drive with conscious care and skill. Another patient, at times, lived in a box 20 yards up, only connected with her body by a slender thread" (Winnicott, 1945).

¹¹ "My original idea was that the traumatic nature of *jouissance* is not due to its intensity or strength or power, but rather to the fact that it is enigmatic... The *jouissance* is traumatic for Little Hans because he has no way of understanding its source and origin, or in less psychological terms, because it is not inscribed in a signifying chain. Thus it is traumatic, not because of its intensity but because it is enigmatic. So my thesis initially was that *jouissance* is traumatic precisely in so far as it is meaningless, in so far as it escapes or exceeds the symbolic network within which it is inscribed... The broadest possible definition of *jouissance*, as Lacan understands it, is that it is synonymous with the drive's satisfaction; it is

Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65 41
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

the impact of early pre-syntactic language experiences belong to an Other—of family, culture and society—that exists prior to the subject. For this reason Lacan (1990, p. 137) claims, “the unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject¹², it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently the unconscious is structured like a language”.

Lacan proposes that the manifestations of the unconscious always possess an uncanny, foreign essence. The subject experiences his slips of the tongue, bungled actions, and dreams, even eventually his fundamental fantasy as otherly, opaque to his experience of continuity of being. “The fact that the symbolic is located outside of man is the very notion of the unconscious. And Freud constantly proved that he stuck to it as if it were the very crux of his experience” (Lacan, 2006g). It is for this reason that Lacan selected the donut to represent the shape of the unconscious subject; in Lacan’s reading of psychical reality, mental life is structured around an axiomatic fantasy which organises psychical life, but this founding axiom remains out of grasp; it is a constitutional blind spot. The genesis of the subject that implies the installation of subjective division¹³ forever excludes a part of being, rendering it inaccessible. Whether it is primary repression, negation, or foreclosure, the unconscious will always be experienced as alien, whether as hallucination or forgetting. In later Lacan, this foreignness of the Other scene moves to the body as an extimic experience.

not necessarily sexual, nor is it necessarily unpleasurable, though it can be both. At different stages of his work, Lacan states that this satisfaction can arise from imaginary, real or symbolic sources—for instance, the narcissistic *jouissance* obtained from the imaginary dyad of ego and alter-ego; the symbolic *jouissance* obtained from the *Witz* [wit], as analyzed by Lacan in *Le Seminaire. Livre V. Les formations de l’inconscient*, 1957-58 (The Formations of the Unconscious; 1998b); or the *jouissance* that arises from a symptom and whose origin is ultimately 'the real' of one's drive. In this most general definition of the term, despite its having been elaborated by Lacan at different times, these cases combine to show the different possible ways—imaginary, symbolic and real—in which human beings enjoy” (Grigg, 2012).

¹² To generate his symbolic definition of the subject, Lacan borrowed from Peirce’s definition of the sign; he thus gave many variations on the following definition, the subject is represented by one signifier for another. We might say this definition truly takes flight from 1953 on with his Roman manifesto. It follows that the subject is a symbolic function, as opposed to the imaginary identity of the ego. Moreover, Lacan’s subject is not the philosopher’s subject; it is not synonymous with conscious agency. We could further say that the Lacanian subject is the subject of the unconscious; meaning that it only appears in brief moments of truth, which close again quick as lightning.

¹³ Subjective division, or the contradiction between conscious and unconscious desires was first found by Freud and constitutes the fundamental discovery of psychoanalysis. This *Spaltung*, the want-to-be is seemingly present for all, and the stabilizing function of fantasy and/or delusion is to cover over this hole in meaning and unity.

Ubiquity

In Lacan's hypothesis of the field of the unconscious, beyond being the discourse of the other, and the treasure of signifiers, and demonstrating a fundamental subjective division, the unconscious is ubiquitous. "The efficacy of the unconscious does not cease upon awakening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field" (Lacan, 2006h). Imagine an adolescent patient who describes his father as disgraceful and unworthy, saying that every time he trespasses the laws of society, his father becomes 'hysterical'. He claims to be much closer to his mother. Since he has been hospitalised, he claims she is the only one he misses. One he trusts his therapist, he relates his story of sexual abuse at age six. A cousin called him into the garden, far from the other members of his family, where they exchanged fellatio, 'mamadas' he calls it. The cousin was fifteen years old. He never told anyone of this, neither his parents, nor his siblings. Then as his fifteenth birthday approaches, he enters a drug rehabilitation centre as an inpatient. During his stay he has his fifteenth birthday, and at that time loses his virginity to a younger boy.

On entering adolescence, he began to hang out with gangs, often escaping from the house and school without his parents' knowledge. His father regularly beat him for this. After intentionally flunking out of an intermediate school his father respected, but which he judged too posh, he encountered drugs. Initially he robbed his parents to for drug money, but after his first internment, he stopped robbing and begins selling drugs for money. At this time stopped attending high school. This path coming closer and closer to narcotraffic continued until the death of his best friend produced a traumatic cut. Whereas his elder brother shares his father's name and style of dress, the patient has always eschewed this style in favour of streetwear.

During his second internment, he dreams regularly of his mother, and of his best-friend who was recently killed. The fifteen, the *mamadas*, the maternal proximity and unworthy father, his flirtation with organised crime, all these historical narratives show the pervasive influence of the unconscious clockwork on the history of the subject. The laws of the unconscious are traceable in the repetitions of his desire. He remembers, from his childhood, that his mother would always ask him, repeating the old song, "when you grow up, you won't be bad will you?" The case remains unfinished, yet one can clearly observe how this apparently innocuous speech takes on the value of the Other's desire and becomes destiny. This fragment of speech does not account for the specific jouissance of his way of badness, any more than it justifies the underlying hysteric logic of the case. Instead the mode of jouissance and structure combine with the Other's speech in spinning fate.

From this point, one might propose a stronger hypothesis for the superficial, linguistic unconscious; the motifs of the unconscious are present in every speech act of a given subject. As such, searching the depths for the underlying profound being of a patient is unnecessary. The unconscious reveals itself in the most superficial of speech insofar as a person's speech always circles around the unconscious fantasy (Lacan, 1978, p. 184). In this sense, Lacan initially considered that the unconscious is the expression of a patient's history. "The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be found again;

most often it has already been written elsewhere... What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history” (Lacan, 2006d).

Ineradicable Permanence

Finally, a complete disappearance of unconscious impositions on the life of a speaking being would appear impossible. One cannot escape confirming that even at the end of analysis, having traversed the fantasy, or separated from the object, or completed the social rite of the pass, the unconscious, understood here as synonymous with the fundamental fantasy¹⁴, still and always imposes itself upon the analyst. Its fate is bound up with the transference, never completely vanishing.

In this case, the unconscious might appear as history, as the subjective registration of life’s coincidences and traumas. Immediately, this perspective runs up against the clinical evidence of singular subjects. Why did such an event mark the patient, this trauma instead of another? Why did this shared experience traumatise one and not others? The enigma of the emergence of a fundamental subjective nature poses insurmountable difficulties to a purely developmental, environmental hypothesis, *tabula rasa* style. As Leclaire observes, common opinion of trauma as caused by an event trips over the unanswerable quandary, why that day?¹⁵ If we guide ourselves by

¹⁴ Miller’s reading of Lacan provides concise definitions of fantasy and fundamental fantasy; “At first, one can simply talk about “fantasies” or “fantasmization” with a rich wealth of characters. But the distillation of those fantasies is precisely a construction effect proper to psychoanalysis, in which case we are getting close to formulas of a simplicity similar to that offered by Freud in “A Child Is Beaten”. At first, then, and like in *The 120 Days of Sodom*, we come across an entire world of characters and situations that justify the term used by Lacan to refer to this dimension: “the fantasy jungle”. But through analysis, all this is gradually cleared towards a formalization, a simplification, a sort of singularization, if I may say so, of the fantasy”. (Miller, 1984) “The construction of the fundamental fantasy is the same thing as its reduction to the drive”. (Miller 1998).

¹⁵ “Common opinion on this point is as follows: things are stabilised by an accident or happenstance, something occurred, and it will be a question of rediscovery, much in the same way as when one sees somebody twisted, as when one sees someone with his spinal column askew, one thinks, it’s because one day he fell from the ladder, so, either he remembers the day he fell from the ladder or he doesn’t, we try to rediscover it and eureka, the loose ends are tied up, we found the accidental event that provoked this fixation or that particular character, just like a scar on the face, etc... But if we look that things in a slightly more analytic fashion, slightly more distant, we first see there are many distinct identifiable events to which we could impute the distortion or the fixation in question. When we detect several events in this way, we say: it’s just because they are repetitions of the original traumatic event that we don’t find it, but we find the entire series of secondary traumas which, of course, fixated it. We always leave the first event unrecovered beyond reach.

But, if truth be told, if we look even closer, contrary to what certain child analysts who see things unfold before their eyes might think, to be honest, when push
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65 44
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

the examples of the formalised sciences of our time, this singular enigma can only be considered a stochastic phenomenon (Kupiec, 2009; Haroche, 2006; Hacking, 2001).

Why is another drive, or another region of the body, or a different series of symptomatic metaphors not emphasised instead? These questions oblige a logical reversal in our understanding of the causal bond between unicity, trauma, and fantasy. It seems as though something intrinsically inscribed in the speaking being, at the level of his unique relation to language, his fantasy, determines his traumas. It is not the subjective experience—or at least not memorable experience—of a historical series of events which constitutes the inaugural trauma, forging the subjective singularity and determining one's unconscious. Rather, it is the unicity of the subject, his unconscious fantasy, the incidence of language on one's body, what we might call the real unconscious, which determines the coordinates of reality that resonate. From such suppositions it follows that the coordinates of reality periodically correspond with one's unconscious fantasy, that there occurs a sort of subjective resonance that marks the subject with this accentuation, adding more meaning to his historical narrative. Thus the unconscious would be a sort of formulaic knowledge that occasionally confirms itself through one's singular vision of reality, a kind of positive feedback loop.

Such a viewpoint argues that the unconscious was already constituted, readymade, at the moment of subjective genesis. This of course begs the questions of when and what is subjective genesis. We see the tendency to find earlier and earlier moments of traumatic genesis in the works of Rank (1924) and Winnicott (1945, 1954). When the hypothesis of historical trauma is obstinately taken to the extreme, it produces pseudoscientific ideologies such as those found in constellations therapy or past life regression. One might say the coherence and rationality of a psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious, as well as its clinical safety and benevolence, relies on our not inquiring too often and too insistently into the enigmatic birth of the subject; one cannot know prehistory (Garcia-Castellano, 1997).

comes to shove any event might be considered as having produced any distortion, fixation, or deformation. So, there's something that's starting to be bothersome. Why is it on this day when he saw past that shrub, or through that open door, rather than on another day when he saw from atop the granary haystack, anyway why would such an event rather than any other have fixated the dominance of the scopic function? Of course we can construct an entire succession, but you must see that this poses the fundamental problem of what makes for an event; what makes the event, what produces it, what of this perspective is supposed to cause the fixation? The accidental, the traumatic, the series of events no doubt, provided we clarify what we mean by that, and what truly makes for the specificity or the singularity of an event and above all gives it its traumatic character... In other words, I think that to really understand what happens and what a certain type of erogenic body concerns, meaning a singularity, this famous genetic perspective must be radically dismantled" (Leclaire, 1999, pp. 74-78).

1964, *Organ or Engraving*

Lacan did not restrict his study of structural attributes of language—synchrony and diachrony—to elaborations on the concept of a combinatory, he also attempted to use these notions which order the discourse of structuralism, to bring together the psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious and the drives. In 1964, the year of his divergence from Freud, Lacan remarked that the unconscious possesses a rhythmic character in that it appears in the slip of the tongue only to disappear instantly; he ascribes this repetitive manifestation to a Sisyphean impossibility of attaining some object or truth that is always missed.

If the unconscious is what closes up again as soon as it has opened, in accordance with a temporal pulsation, if furthermore repetition is not simply a stereotype of behaviour, but repetition in relation to something always missed, you see here and now that the transference—as it is represented to us, as a mode of access to what is hidden in the unconscious—could only be of itself a precarious way. If the transference is supposed, through this repetition, to restore the continuity of a history, it will do so only by reviving a relation that is, of its nature, syncopated. We see then, that the transference, as operating mode, cannot be satisfied with being confused with the efficacy of repetition, with the restoration of what is concealed in the unconscious, even with the catharsis of the unconscious elements (Lacan, 1990).

Lacan formulated this pulsating version of the unconscious, no longer as historic truth waiting to be remembered, but as a continually missing distance between what must be said and what is said, in an attempt to bring together the fundamental Freudian concepts of the unconscious and the drives. One can see the pulsating unconscious, opening and closing, brings to mind the liminal orifices of the human body. As such, the unconscious of 1964 is a frontier space between linguistics and biology; this is where Lacan links together the transference, the drives, and the unconscious as different faces of repetition.

There is of course the question of whether Lacan's pulsating unconscious errs as Rivers' neuroanatomical unconscious did; after all, such metaphors are suspect. Though I would argue that Lacan was most likely not attempting to locate the psychoanalytic hypothesis of the unconscious in the human organism, but trying to reconcile the paradoxical dichotomy between the permanence of certain aspects of symptoms after interpretation, and levity of their witty double entendre. On the one

hand there are certain unconscious formations at the level of the bodily experience, of what he would name *jouissance* as a translation of Freud's 'death drive' and the libido bound up in it. On the other, one finds the levity, the simplicity of deciphering unconscious meanings as an effect of language structure (Miller, 2000). Freud as well was concerned with reconciling these two divergent aspects of symptomatology in psychoanalysis, as evident in the progression of his *Introductory Lectures* from "The Sense of Symptoms" to "The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms" (Miller, 2003). Perhaps the wisdom of Freud and Lacan in not jumping to neuro-metaphors involves differentiating between the biological organism and our experience of body.

Alternatively, instead of hypothesizing the unconscious as an abstract and immaterial organ¹⁶, one could envision it as the remains of the language learning process, as the engraving of certain cognitive and affective experiences on the body. The predominance of bodily elements as signifying phenomena in the analytic setting, and their potency as bridges from one repetitive discourse towards forgotten truths, would seem to argue in favour of this consideration, as does the common psychoanalytic experience of the reduction of symptoms and fantasies of an analysand towards a fundamental fantasy. The fundamental fantasy acts as a limit point of knowledge, further research into the unconscious runs up against enclosing walls, and the exit from analysis involves either the identification with this minimal enunciation of fantasy, or the relativist claim that even this fundamental fantasy is no more than fiction, just as any subjective history. Nonetheless the fact that no fundamental psychoanalytic symptom appears without intimate ties to the body argues in favour of the supposition that there is an axiomatic relation between human psychical life and the engraving of language in the subject's body. The examples are endless, the fact that a woman whose mother nearly bled to death during childbirth—and who presents an aversion to menstruation, frequent nosebleeds, frequent nightmares of maternity and pregnancy, and grammatically ambiguous speech as to her gender and sexual identity - frequently squishes her nose during sessions points to the signifying function of this body location, all the more so since minimal remarks bringing attention to her body such as "your nose" lead to free association involving new traumatic material. There is of course the scientific question of whether this is an iatrogenic phenomena, one related to counter-transference - such as differences of classical hypnotic presentations between the Nancy and Salpêtrière schools of Bernheim and Charcot (James, 1891; see also Ellenberger, 1970)—but to a certain extent, the entirety of the psychoanalytic experience is two-body experience, in which the iatrogenic effects of the analyst's unconscious are not absolutely suppressible.

Moreover, the analytic experience produces a certain ordering effect, a structuring of the unconscious of the patient. It transmutes, purifies - if you will permit the expression - from a wild state towards the clarity of the fantasy. Simply put, the patient's verbalisation of unconscious tendencies in speech and thought cause the unconscious to be structured as a function of the symbolic. This is most likely the therapeutic motor of psychoanalysis; to paraphrase Paré, *je l'écoutai, Dieu le guérit*.

Lacan recognises that the fact of elaborating symptoms and fantasies via speech produces a certain effect of organisation. "We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, by that part of it which is articulated by passing into words. It is for

¹⁶ On the flimsiness of such immaterial/material dualities see Rorty (2009).

this reason that we have the right—all the more so as the development of Freud’s discovery will demonstrate—to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end no other structure than the structure of language” (Lacan, 1991, p. 42). In a certain way, the analytic act involves a passing from the unconscious as inexplicable symptoms to the verbalisation of what must have been an unconscious fantasy; this act accounts for the reduction of what Lacan names *jouis-sens*, or excitation (ecstasy and agony) derived from speech and language. In this way, the analytic experience leads to significant consequences in the analysand’s relation to language.

From the seminar *Encore* onward, one of Lacan’s greatest theoretical dilemmas consists in finding a way to bring the linguistic unconscious together with the organism, the body of human experience. He concludes this yearlong seminar with the axiomatic formulation. “The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1975, pp. 118). He attributes the otherness of the unconscious to the mysterious body and its inertia in treatment. This mystery of the body harkens back to Christine Papin’s puzzlingly innocent explanation for her Bacchian desecration of the other’s body, the body holds the “mystery of life”.

The period from *Encore* to *Sinthome* thus involves an attempt to reconcile, to treat as synonyms the mystery of the body and the unknown of the unconscious. The discourse of the Other now refers to the body’s impinging on mental life. His clinical work in this period focuses on the necessity and impossibility of interpreting the enigmatic speaking body, of how to make linguistic interpretations without speech. One sees this in the famous testimony of Suzanne Hommel (2015) for example (Miller, 2012). Yet, just three years later, Lacan no longer equates the real of the body with the unconscious. Rather he speaks of an abyss that divides the unconscious as knowledge from the real body.

Llanguage and the Mystery

The mere fact that he [Descartes] speak, since by speaking *llanguage* he has an unconscious, this lost soul like everyone else with self-respect; it’s what I call a knowledge unreachable by the subject, while the subject, he has only one signifier to represent himself in comparison with this knowledge; If I may say so, it is a representative of commerce with this constituted knowledge, for Descartes as was the custom in his time, his insertion into the discourse of his birthplace, what I call the master’s discourse, the discourse of noblaugh. That’s why he doesn’t get by with his “I think therefore I enjoy”. (Lacan, 1974)

Thus Lacan’s departure point is: the unconscious is imaginary and the construction of an operational concept of the image. Lacan’s teaching begins once he renounces this conception in favour of the one that dominates his teaching up until the end of the *Sinthome*, namely: the unconscious is symbolic. All of final accounts we have of Lacan concern a third definition that was truly given only once in these terms, in “L’esp d’un laps”: the unconscious is real. (Miller, 2012, p. 43)

What could the term ‘real unconscious’ possibly mean? First off, the final Lacan slowly reduces his tripartite Borromean chain towards the duality semblance/real. Which is to say, to make sense of the untreatable, he divides between wispy make-pretend on the one hand, and the unmoveable on the other. A new way of speaking of the distinction between appearance and reality. Thus the real unconscious is intransigent, it has to do with what cannot be modified.

The term real unconscious does not imply a complete abandoning of the hypothesis that the unconscious be composed of language material.¹⁷ Rather, the unconscious is no longer conceived of as an organised linguistic structure, which would possess predictive rules of grammar and syntax. As such it no longer justifies cyclic repetition through the artificial language model of binary code (Fink, 1995). The real unconscious is related to what Lacan names *llanguage*¹⁸, a linguistic trauma, unique to each person, which leaves no possibility for unconscious intersubjectivity. In his last period of theorizing, from the *Sinthome* on, the intersubjective unconscious is nothing other than the supposition of another who might know, another name for transference. Sometimes this intersubjective gambit permits a transmutation of the subject of the unconscious, and yet the unconscious itself remains an autistic instance. Otherwise said, Lacan’s hypothesis of the real unconscious consists entirely of a unique set of S₁, but without any link to an S₂ that would generate meaning and syntax. One could say that the S₂ terms which generate meaning only come into being through the presence of an interlocutor. In the analytic setting this role is played by the analyst along with the transference, in other words, that the patient believes speaking to the analyst has worth. But the unconscious as a collection of S₁ involves no second person. The necessary result of his move from linguistics to *linguisterie*, though arriving late, arrives unequivocally; the real unconscious, bound up with the spoken/speaking body, leaves no room for organised structure or another who would know.

Lacan still argues that the way in which the new-born received language from his surroundings determines him subjectively. More specifically, what one says of and to the new-born, and the way in which (s)he hears it marks the body in such a way that this language acquisition process then determines dreams, symptoms, and bungled actions. But it is no longer simply a question of the discourse of the other; the emphasis has shifted to the other’s manner of speaking. Beyond the structural and legal emphasis of discourse, the notion of the other’s manner of speaking accentuates intonation, pitch, volume, articulation, phoneme selection, but also subtler aspects such as breathing and cadence.¹⁹ The notion of the unconscious thus returns as a

¹⁷ “What Freud called the unconscious: a knowledge expressed in words. But this knowledge is not only expressed in words of which the subject has no any idea: it is Freud who rediscovers these words in his analyses” (Lacan, 1975b).

¹⁸ “What I put forward, by writing *lalangue* [llanguage] as one word, is that by which I distinguish myself from structuralism, insofar as the latter would like to integrate language into semiology - and that seems to me one of the numerous lights Jean-Claude Milner shed on things. As is indicated by the little book that I had you read entitled *The Title of the Letter*, what is at stake in everything I have put forward is the sign’s subordination with respect to the signifier” (Lacan, 1975a, pp. 101).

¹⁹ “Why write it (*Lalangue*) as one word? The references are numerous, and Lacan explained it in this way: it is because of its homophony with ‘lallation’. Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65
49
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

developmental trace, but now instead of involving the historical truth of a personal fiction with its traumas and secrets, it involves the process of language acquisition prior to the earliest memories. This inscription of the mother's and others', ways of speaking, constitutes the root of the real unconscious. One could even speak of the trauma of language learning. In fact, one might say this is the only true trauma, since it cannot be transmuted into semblance by the re-elaboration of new fictions. But *llanguage* is also the psychoanalytic path to a cure, one shared by the arts. Perhaps, instead of trauma, it is more appropriate to speak of an indelible mark. We have come full circle back to Peirce (1935, pp. 271) "a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea", except now the (s)he is nothing but a letter.

In a way, we have returned to Lacan's first elaboration of the historical unconscious, especially insofar as it links up with trauma. Once again the unconscious is the exclusive property of the subject, it is no longer an intersubjective space. Yet, if the unconscious is an effect of the history of the language learning, then it becomes a message in a bottle whose code no one else can ever know. It is not a knowledge that can be shared, for it is not possessed by the patient. It would be more proper to say (s)he is possessed by this writing. It follows that one must not confuse this hypothesis of the first prehistoric mark with the unconscious as a forgotten memory, a coherent thought outside of conscious experience. And that clinical work with subconscious material will gradually move from what may be sensibly understood in terms of history, to what more appropriately could be called the primordial engraving of language onto the human body.

The impact of the environment in the creation of this unconscious-*llanguage* is Lacan deriving an unconscious from the sound material of language. In this way it can be read as a final attempt by Lacan bring psychoanalysis into the fold of science, with its object of study, the materiality of language. As such it is a repetition of the structuralist manifesto, marked by his return to Rome for a third time to pronounce his speech *La troisième*. As the 1953 Rome discourse left behind biology and physiology in favour of linguistics; his 1976 passage to the real unconscious leaves behind linguistics to forge a science of the letter.

This accentuation of the *llanguage* aspect of the real unconscious instead of the unconscious as formal language or syntactic structure, puts the equivocal in the foreground.

Llanguage. The Greeks, from the time of Aesop on, were well aware that it was of absolutely capital importance. There is a well-known fable on this topic, but

'Lallation' comes from the Latin *lallare*, which the dictionaries say designates the act of singing 'la, la' to send infants to sleep. The term also designates the babbling of the infant who doesn't yet speak but who already makes sounds. Lallation is sound separated from meaning, but nonetheless as we know not separated from the infant's state of satisfaction. *Lalanguie* evokes the speech that is transmitted before syntactically structured language. Lacan says that *lalanguie*, as one word, means the mother tongue: in other words, the first things heard, to parallel the first forms of bodily care" (Soler, 2014, 25).

nobody notices it. It is no coincidence at all that, whatever language it is that one receives the first imprint of, words are equivocal. It is certainly no coincidence that in French the words 'ne', 'not', is pronounced the same as the word '*nœud*', 'knot'. It is no coincidence at all that the word 'pas', 'not', which in French, contrary to any other languages, doubles the negation, also designates *un pas*, a step. If I am, so interested in 'pas', 'not'/step', it is not by chance. This doesn't mean that language in any way constitutes a heritage. It is absolutely certain that it is in the way in which language has been spoken and also heard as such, in its particularity, that something will subsequently emerge in dreams, in all sorts of mistakes, in all manners of speaking. It is in this *materialism*, if you will allow me to use this word for the first time, which the unconscious stakes hold. What I mean is that here there resides what it is that prevents anyone from finding another way of nourishing what just before I called the symptom (Lacan, 1975b).

For Lacan, *Llanguage*— if we may borrow Grigg's translation of *lalangue* - does not constitute a patrimony. It is not a heritage of members sharing a parish dialect. *Lalangue* is quite simply the speaking being's unique remains of the maternal language learning process, not a knowledge shared between generations, nor a brotherhood. It would be a stochastic process, unique to each person. Lacan continues his efforts to bind the unconscious to language all the while avoiding any merging with Jung's theory of the collective unconscious.

Secondly, the real unconscious involves an attempt to link up the psychological notion of a linguistic unconscious with bodily excitation that resists words; that which words do not tame. In Freud's theory of the psychical apparatus, the organic body influences the unconscious by the drives.²⁰ The body is also there as the material substrate of the psyche.

²⁰ "Freud placed a lot of emphasis on this. And he thought, notably, that the term 'autoeroticism' needed to be accentuated, in the sense that the child initially discovers this sexual reality on his own body. I permit myself - this doesn't happen every day - to disagree - and in the name of Freud's work itself.

If you study the case of little Hans closely, you will see that what appears there is that what he calls his *Wiwimacher*, because he doesn't know how to call it anything else, is introduced into his circuit. In other words, to call things quietly by their name, he has his first erections. This first enjoyment manifests itself, it
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65 51
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

Then...The real Unconscious at Geneva?

How could people fail to appreciate before Freud that these people called men, or women on occasion, inhabit talking? It is very odd for people who believe they think not to realise that they think with words. There are things there that have to come to an end, don't you agree? The thesis of the Würzburg School, on the so-called apperception of I know not what synthetic thought that isn't articulated, is really the most delusional that a school of supposed psychologists has ever produced. It is always with the help of words that a man thinks. And it is in the encounter between these words and his body that something takes shape. Moreover, I would even use the term 'innate' in this respect— if there were no words, what could man bear witness to? This is where he places meaning (Lacan, 1989).

As he arrives at the final period of his teaching, Lacan still maintains the fundamental importance of the word, claiming that the subject takes shape in the encounter between words and body. He goes further, claiming that the word is essentially what defines the human; thought doesn't exist in a wordless vacuum, one can only think with language, though Daniel Tammet's (2007) account of numerical hypnagogic hallucinations do raise questions on whether numbers or images could act as letters.

Here Lacan coincides with the Stoics and some contemporary linguists in considering

could be said, in everyone. Is this, if not true of everyone, then verified in everyone? But this is precisely the *point* of Freud's contribution - its being verified in certain people is enough for us to be in a position to construct something upon it that has the closest of connections with the unconscious. For it's a fact, after all, that the unconscious is Freud's invention. The unconscious is an invention in the sense of a discovery, which is linked to the encounter that certain beings have with their own erection.

Being, this is what we call it, because we don't know how to say it any differently. It would be better to do without the words 'being'. Some people have in the past been sensitive to this. A certain Saint Thomas Aquinas - he is a holy man [*saint homme*] and even a symptom [*symptôme*] - wrote something called *De ente et essentia* [*On Being and Essence*]. I can't say I recommend that you read it, because you won't, but it's very astute. If there is something called the unconscious, it means that one doesn't have to know what one is doing in order to do it, and in order to do it while knowing it full well. Perhaps there is someone here who will read *De ente et essentia* and who will see what this holy man, this symptom, works out very well - being is not grasped so easily, nor is essence" Lacan (1989).

languages primary function not to be one of communication, but rather of a sort of cognitive scaffolding, a system which permits thought. Lacan goes further still when he considers language as fundamental in the regularisation of *jouissance*. One observes a broad spectrum of anecdotal evidence for this claim, from the success of the talking cure, to the use of writing and speech to diminish manic excitement, to the simultaneous disordering of language and affective suffering as described by Artaud (1984).

Indeed the psychoanalytic experience demonstrates repeatedly that language and the Lacanian notion of *jouissance*, which might be translated in Freudian terms as libido, are intimately bound together. Nowhere is this clearer than in the example of the mystic's agony and ecstasy. The oceanic mystic experience involving limitless *jouissance* for the silent person, loses its brilliance as soon as one attempts to put it in words. Indeed, the words never measure up to the affective experience. Not only can they not adequately depict the mystic's unique *qualia*, but the very attempt to narrate this singular sensation diminishes its subjective impact.²¹ We can now see why Lacan spoke of the unconscious mystery of the speaking body. Though the symbolic and the real appear to be two distinct, irreconcilable registers—the symbolic unconscious and the excitation of the organism—they are intimately intertwined. Thus the concept of *jouis-sens*, or the enjoyment of babbling, of blah blah. From here one can distinguish two versions of excitation, one regulated and limited by the discrete nature of language, and the silent excitation of the mystic, which Lacan used as a provisional path to studying feminine *jouissance*, one unbounded by language.

The above block quotation from Lacan's 1975 Geneva lecture on the symptom is to be understood together with excerpts below from his seminar *The Sinthome*, where he speaks of unconscious effects as omnipresent, proliferated into the entirety of the speaking beings subjective life. As Lacan argued for the impossibility of thought without speech, or at least language, and he argued for the impossibility of a language act without the unconscious as a surface effect, this leads to the hypothesis that no act of thinking escapes interference from the unconscious—so long as the unconscious is defined as the set of constituent fragments of *llanguage* in addition to including the *metonymic treasure of signifiers*.

The Sinthome: Real vs. Unconscious

The primary distinction between the theory of a structural unconscious and later ones does not reside in a wholesale devaluing of language, but rather an abandoning of a

²¹ “One last important thing to say before we take up the text, I would like to emphasize Angelina di Foligno's ethics: an ethics of speaking well. What she tells him [Arnoldo di Foligno], what he writes, is not equal to what she experiences. What she experiences is at the limit of the vocable: inexpressible, ineffable, indescribable, it's beyond words. And to speak of this mystical experience, to tell of her relation to God, to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, is to speak ill, speak falsely, to blaspheme! In such a way that she will often say she doesn't recognize herself in what he wrote. And even when she accepts what is written, she says that her experience, so joyous, so ardent, has in the transcription become, truly insipid” (Encalado, 2015).

grammatical approach towards a disorganised notion of language fragments. If the first period of Lacan's teaching focused on the forgotten, and the symbolic structure that necessitates repetition epitomised in the *Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"*, the unconscious as a phenomenon of the real involves moving towards a chaotic grouping of eruptions, towards what cannot be said. The lapsus is still the compass that orients Lacan's final formulation of the unconscious, but he no longer characterises it as being meaningful, or in other words predictive.

As such, the primary changes to the hypothesis of the unconscious involve the loss of any status of intersubjectivity, "No friendship here that this unconscious might support" (Lacan, 2001). Using mutual intelligibility as a common criterion for determining language and dialect boundaries, one could say Lacan assigns absolute unintelligibility to the real unconscious that it is an idiolect.

The principal change from his earliest formulations to his final formulations of the unconscious does not involve a change to the fundamental justification. "It is difficult not to see that the lapsus is that upon which, in part, the notion of the unconscious is founded" (Lacan, 2005, p. 97). This definition of the unconscious is derived from *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* more than any other Freudian text. The principal change occurs in the reading given to these lapses. If in a first moment, they were understood as historic monuments whose deciphering would enable the recapture of forgotten subjectivity, now they are senseless. The theory of the real unconscious leaves behind the notion of a grammatically structured unconscious, as well as an intersubjective unconscious, or an unconscious modelled on the notion of repressed coherent thoughts. The parapraxes orient the final formalisation of the Lacanian unconscious, one which paradoxically distances itself from Freud's thesis of the *Trieb*, which after all were determined by a certain minimal grammar. Lacan (1976) continues to found the hypothesis of the unconscious on the eruption of nonsense in the middle of an association of ideas by a foreign element or distortion. The lapsus, the return of the repressed is considered as the image itself of the link between the conscious and the unconscious.

I try to be rigorous by pointing out that what Freud supports as the Unconscious always supposes a knowledge, and a spoken knowledge, as such. That this is the minimum that is supposed by the fact that the Unconscious can be interpreted. It is entirely reducible to a knowledge. After which, it is clear that this knowledge requires at the minimum two supports, is that not so, that are called terms, by symbolizing them as letters. Hence my writing of knowledge as being supported by S, not to the power of 2, of S with this index, this index of a small 2, of a small 2 at the bottom. It is not S squared, it is S supposed to be 2, S₂. The definition that I give of this signifier, as such, that I support from S index 1, S₁, is to represent a subject,

as such, and to *truly* represent it. On this occasion truly means *in conformity with reality*.

The True is saying in conformity with reality. Reality which is on this occasion what functions; what truly functions. But what truly functions has nothing to do with what I am designating as the Real. It is an altogether precarious supposition that *my* Real—I must indeed accept my part in it—that my Real conditions reality; the reality of your hearing, for example.

There is here an abyss which is far from, which one is far from being able to guarantee will be crossed over. In other terms, the agency of knowledge that Freud renews, I mean renovates in the form of the Unconscious, is a thing which does not at all obligatorily suppose the Real that I use...

I mean that - if indeed it is something that one can call a Freudian lucubration—that it is my own way of raising to its degree of symbolism, to the second degree, it is in the measure that Freud articulated the Unconscious that I react to it. But already we see there that it is a way of raising the *sinthome* itself to the second degree. It is in the measure that Freud truly made a discovery— and supposing that this discovery is true— that one can say that the Real is my symptomatic response. But to reduce it to being symptomatic is obviously no small thing. To reduce it to being symptomatic, is also to reduce all invention to the *sinthome* (Lacan, 2005, p. 131).

We are still in the realm of the Freudian unconscious, one which always supposes knowledge. Typically, understood in a historic variant of memory and mementos. Otherwise, the unconscious could be approached in its symbolic dimension, at the level of linguistic knowledge. Puns and wordplay that permit interpretation in a given dialect come within the competency of a symbolic unconscious. It also supposes a knowledge, but instead of the historic knowledge, it has more to do with the

machinery of a symbolic combinatory, with its related language rules.²² And here we should be attentive, if the unconscious is a knowledge built up upon a foundation of a ‘manner of speaking’ related to *llanguage* as defined above, then we have *llanguage* as a chance set of noises and silences characterised by continuity, and the symbolic unconscious as an artefact of semblance. The symbolic, intersubjective unconscious thus becomes an ethical hypothesis with little more real consistency than the supposition that the analyst possesses the intimate knowledge necessary to decipher one’s malaise. Then transference unconscious must fall away at the end of analysis along with the analyst’s fall from grace, leaving behind only the solitary unconscious.

If one argues for an unconscious structured by/as language, unless one claims unique dialects for every speaking being—which is part of Lacan’s *llanguage* argument—the apparent shared nature of language among nearly the entirety of humanity and the relatively limited number of languages, ~6909 for the 7.4 billion world population according Lewis (2009), extrapolates towards the supposition of a collective unconscious. Jung (1991, p. 43) is often credited with a mystic, religious concept of the collective unconscious, but in the 1911 edition of the *Traumdeutung*, Freud concurs with Ferenczi that “every tongue has its own dream-language”. Artemidorous’ famous account of Aristander ‘most happy interpretation’ is available in both ancient Greek and modern French, though not in English.²³ It comes down to a question of where one demarcates languages and dialects. So long as one works within the intersubjective transference unconscious, at the level of the meaning of symptoms and unconscious formations, then the language code is shared between analyst and analysand, here we are at the level of Ferenczi’s dream tongues. However, once one claims that this language is an elaborate artefact built upon *llanguage*, a hypothetic marking or regulating instrument of bodily excitation, then the probability of intersubjectivity becomes astronomically infinitesimal. It is at this level that Lacan objects to Jung’s theory of a collective unconscious.

If the unconscious is the product of a unique inscription of language from chance encounters with ways of speaking found in one’s early environment, then it would never recur in the same way for two people. But Lacan goes even further than this

²² “The unconscious supposes a knowledge, but beyond this, the unconscious is entirely reducible to knowledge. Nevertheless, what Lacan calls here the unconscious, unconscious-knowledge, is the symbolic unconscious, meaning cut off from the imaginary, from the body. And thus what he calls the unconscious properly speaking, this interpretable unconscious, one must say it is an unconscious disjointed from the body and therefore disjointed from what we call since Freud the drives, which obey another logic than that of $S_1 S_2$ ” (Miller, 2012, 44).

²³ “I think too that Aristander gave a most happy interpretation to Alexander of Macedon when he had surrounded Tyre and was besieging it but was feeling uneasy and disturbed by the length of time the siege was taking. Alexander dreamt he saw a satyr dancing on his shield. Aristander happened to be in the neighbourhood of Tyre, in attendance on the king during his Syrian campaign. By dividing the word satyr [σάτυρος] into σά and τυρος he encouraged the king to press home the siege so that he become master of the city. (σά τυρος = Tyre is thine.)” (Freud, 2001c) In French one finds: satyre, sa Tyre, satire, ça tire, etc.

absolute difference from inscription, arguing that living languages are in continual evolution, not only for language communities but for individuals. It would follow that if languages are in continual evolution then the notion of archetypes enveloping the totality of humanity—unless they derive from some structure besides language—could be justly described as a psychoanalytic version of the normative, reminiscent of Genet’s epiphany that everyman is equal and worth any other.²⁴ In Lacan’s terminology, this passion of interchangeability belongs to the dimension of images, and not to the discontinuous nature of language.

One creates this tongue, one creates this tongue in as much, in as much as at every instant one gives it a meaning. It is not reserved to the sentences in which the tongue is created. At every instant one gives a little prod, otherwise the tongue would not be living. It is living in as much as at every instant it is created. And that is why there is no collective unconscious, that there are only particular unconsciousness’, in so far as everyone, at every instant, gives a little prod to the tongue he speaks (Lacan, 2005, p. 133).

²⁴ “Something that seemed to me like a rottenness was in the process of corrupting my entire former vision of the world. When, one day, in a train compartment, while looking at the passenger sitting opposite me, I had the revelation that every man *is worth as much* as every other... This man had just raised his eyes from a newspaper, and quite simply had placed them, no doubt inadvertently, on my own which, in the same accidental way, were looking at him. Did he immediately experience the same emotion - and same disarray - as I did? His gaze was not that of another person: it was my own I meet in a mirror, by accident and in solitude and forgetting myself. What I experienced I could convey only in this form: I flowed out of my body, through my eyes, into the traveler’s at the same time that the traveler flowed into my own. Or rather: I had flowed, for the look was so brief that I can recall it only with the help of this tense of the verb. The passenger returned to his reading. Stupefied by what I had just discovered, only then did I think of examining the unknown man, and I came away with the impression of disgust described earlier: beneath his crumpled, rough, dingy clothes, his body must have been dirty and wrinkled. His mouth was soft and protected by a badly trimmed moustache, I told myself that this man was probably spineless, maybe cowardly. He was over fifty. The train continued its indifferent course through French villages... This disagreeable experience did not happen again, either in its fresh suddenness or in its intensity, but its consequences within me have never stopped being felt. What I experienced in the train seemed to me like a revelation: after the accidents - in this case repugnant - of his appearance, this man contained, and let me detect, what made him identical to me. (I wrote that sentence first, but I corrected it with this, more precise and more distressing: I knew I was identical to this man)” (Genet, 2013).
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

And so we find, in the seminars and writings from 1975-1981, the real unconscious, Lacan's sinthomatic production, progressively abandons hope in the intersubjective unconscious, moving towards a more isolated unconscious. One could say that Lacan's teaching does not end on an upbeat note. The unconscious continues to belong to the field of the Other; not as imposed rules of language and society, nor as the repository of a languages vocabulary, but insofar as it compiles the singular marks of hearing speech and learning language. Lacan's theory of the unconscious moves from a kind of knowledge without subject, to a fictional construction established on the senseless traces of *llanguage*.

This Other is located in the interior, or at least on the body of the speaking being; though we speak loosely of social institutions of culture, rites, and language, Durkheim (2014) makes a convincing case that social facts are internal to individuals, where else could they possibly be inscribed? The schizophrenic subject demonstrates that the Other is, an act of faith, faith that the throng of others is more than just an endless series of peers. It is for this reason that Lacan and Miller employ the term 'extimacy'²⁵, to speak of what remains foreign even as it is the most intimate part of a speaking being; that the closest a human gets to an ontological justification remains in the field of otherness.²⁶ The unconscious inhabits this paradoxical space. The unconscious is not found in peers, nor does it reside entirely in a shared symbolic space. Instead, its uncanny nature recalls Winnicott's invention of transitional space, yet Lacan brings the unconscious closer to the traces of the other on the one, than the collaborative intersubjective space of Winnicott (Conway, 2011).

The Last Lacan: The Senseless Unconscious of the Preface to the English Edition

In 1976 during his seminar on *l'une-bévue*, faced with the proposition that the analysand arrives at the end of analysis through identifying with his analyst, Lacan places himself in direct opposition. The identification of the patient to doctor as a means of ending the analytic experience, is exactly what we see in the famous *as-if* case described in detail by Helene Deutsch (1991). She wrote of those patients who advance very rapidly in their treatment until demanding to be recognised as worthy

²⁵ "Even in Heidegger's writings one comes upon the idea that man - being connected to the environment and to the future - is always projecting himself outside himself. What Heidegger called *Dasein* is not an interiority. He defines the existence of man not as an interiority, an inner something like ideas or feelings, but rather as a constant projecting outside. Heidegger himself invented the notion of ex-sistence - *stare* outside - that Lacan took up; Heidegger himself invented the distinction between ex-sistence and insistence. Having no interiority, one projects outside, and this repeats itself; Lacan's wordplay on "*L'instance de la lettre*" (The *Instance* [meaning 'agency' or 'insistence'] of the Letter) stems in reality from Heidegger." (Fink *et al.*, 1996, 10)

²⁶ "The term 'extimacy' (*extimité*), coined by Lacan from the term 'intimacy' (*intimité*), occurs two or three times in the Seminar, and it will be for us to transform this term into an articulation, a structure, to produce it as an S1 which would allow us to go beyond and over the confusion that we first experience when faced with such a signifier" (Miller, 2010).

analysts just as their doctor, as though manoeuvring oneself to being equal to the other justified the completion of analysis and brought along with the title of psychoanalyst, just as the other.

It is a question of much interest since it would result in certain remarks that have been advanced, that the end of analysis should be to identify oneself to the analyst. For my part, I do not think so, but this is what Balint maintains at any rate, and it is very surprising. To what then does one identify at the end of analysis? With one's unconscious? This is what I do not believe. I don't believe it, because the unconscious remains, I say 'remains', I am not saying 'remains eternally', because there is no eternity, remains the Other. It is the Other with a capital O that is at stake in the unconscious. I don't see how one could give meaning to the unconscious, except by situating it in this Other, the bearer of signifiers, which pulls the strings of what is imprudently called, imprudently because it is here that there arises the question of what the subject is from the moment that it so entirely depends upon the Other. So then, this mapping named analysis consist in what? Might it be or might it not be, to identify oneself, to identify oneself while taking some insurance, a kind of distance, from identifying oneself to one's symptom? (Lacan, November 16th 1976)

Lacan unhesitatingly criticises the patient's identification with the analyst as the right exist from the analytic experience. Moreover he criticises any notion of harmonious identification with one's unconscious: love one's unconscious yes, yet to identify with it is out of the question.²⁷ The unconscious remains on the foreign side of the Other,

²⁷ "But if the *x* of the relation that might be written as sexual, is the signifier in so far as it is connected to phallic enjoyment, we have all the same to draw out its consequence. The consequence is that if the unconscious is indeed the support of what I told you about today, namely, a knowledge, the fact is that everything I wanted to tell you this year about the non-dupes who err means that anyone who is not in love with his unconscious errs. That says nothing whatsoever against centuries past. They were just as much in love with their unconscious as the others and they did not err. Simply, they did not know where they were going, but as regards being in love with their unconscious, they certainly were! They imagined that it was knowing because there is no need to know that one is

Language and Psychoanalysis, 2017, 6 (1), 33-65 59
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v6i1.1566>

essentially incomprehensible and undecipherable. Lacan is very clear in his experience of the unconscious. The unconscious forever persists as unfamiliar, whether that be as the other's language code, or the mysterious body, or the unquenchable drives.

When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one sure that one is in the unconscious. *One knows*. But one has only to be aware of the fact to find oneself outside it. There is no friendship there, in that space that supports this unconscious. All I can do is tell the truth. No, that isn't so—I have missed it. There is no truth that, in passing through awareness, does not lie...

It should be noted that psychoanalysis has, since it has ex-sisted, changed. Invented by a solitary, an incontestable theoretician of the unconscious (which is not what one imagines it to be—the unconscious, I would say, is real), it is now practised in couples. To be fair, the solitary was the first to set the example...

Why, then, should we not put this profession to the test of that truth of which the so-called unconscious function dreams, with which it dabbles? The mirage of truth, from which only lies can be expected (this is what, in polite language, we call 'resistance'), has no other term than the satisfaction that marks the end of the analysis. (Lacan, 2001)

Lacan's theory of the unconscious of the 1970's is animated by an unresolved tension. The tension between the purely singular phenomenon of the unique speaking body and the apparent universal of language. In this final period he portrays the person's essential subjectivity as being shared neither with others, nor with its host. It is in this

in love with one's unconscious in order not to err. One only has to offer no resistance, to be its dupe. For the first time in history, it is possible for you to err, namely, to refuse to love your unconscious, since in short you know what it is: a knowledge, a knowledge that pisses you off. But perhaps in this impetus, you know, this thing that pulls, when the ship is riding at anchor - it is perhaps here that we can wager on rediscovering the Real a little more in what follows, to perceive that the unconscious is perhaps no doubt discordant, but that perhaps it leads us to a little more of this Real than this very little of reality which is ours, that of the phantasy, that it leads us beyond: to the pure Real" (Lacan, 11 Juin 1974).

sense that Lacan depicts the nature of language, and the unconscious, as parasitic instances. With the fall of the Other of the Other, announced by Nietzsche, the unconscious of the last Lacan is not intersubjective. For Lacan, every individual continually gives life to language in a continual recreation of living language. This language marks the body and regulates *jouissance*, but is not a collective experience. Instead, the radical otherness of the unconscious locates itself in the absolute distance between psychological experience and the biological organism. This would appear to be synonymous with the universal/particular distinction. During the period from *Encore* to *L'insu que sait*, Lacan fought to reduce the gap between the unconscious as an enigmatic real experience of the body and the unconscious as a language combinatory. As seen above, during his seminar on the *sinthome*, he separates the two, on the one hand the unconscious as knowledge in conformity with reality, on the other the real as the inexplicable which is dictated by no knowledge. The very final period of his teaching, however, from his *Preface* onward locates the unconscious as real in the field of meaningless eruptions of nonsense, and ordered language, discourse, and thought on the side of semblance. As Freud was obliged to modify his theory of dreams as wish fulfilment, due to anxiety dreams and the war neuroses, so Lacan found himself in need of modifying his structuralist formulation of the unconscious due to phenomena of the speaking body and the discovery of the *sinthome*.

For the very last Lacan, the unconscious is nothing more than nonsense which suddenly erupts, disrupting the semblance of the imaginary and symbolic. As soon as the unconscious manifestation reorganises and is included in the field of meaning and logic, it is now semblance. Simply a new manifestation of the fantasy of the unconscious. For Lacan, the unconscious's calling card becomes its traumatic aspect, its irreconcilability with meaning. The end of analysis marks a satisfaction commensurate with the fall of the subject supposed to know and the hope that the unconscious, essentially, organises itself through a syntax which would give meaning. The end of analysis implies a giving up on the search for the one true narrative; taking into account this dimension of lack while grasping the singular *jouissance* of the drive which orients us.

References

- Artaud, A. (1984). *Œuvres complètes. Vol 1*. Paris, France: Gallimard.
- Braunstein, N. (2013). ¿Qué entienden los psicólogos por psicología? In *Psicología: ideología y ciencia* (pp. 21-46). México: Siglo XXI.
- Butler, S. (1920). *Unconscious memory*. London, UK: Jonathan Cape.
- Conway, J. (2011). Lacan with D. Winnicott. In *Open seminar: Lacan with the post-Freudians*. Dublin: ICLO-NLS . Retrieved from [http://www.iclo-nls.org/wp-content/uploads/Pdf/Lacan with Winnicott.pdf](http://www.iclo-nls.org/wp-content/uploads/Pdf/Lacan%20with%20Winnicott.pdf)
- Deutsch, H. (1992). On a type of pseudo-affectivity (the “as if” type). In *The therapeutic process, the self, and female psychology*. (Transactio, pp. 193-207). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Durkheim, E. (2014). *The rules of sociological method*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Eger, E. I., Raines, D. E., Shafer, S. L., Hemmings, H. C., & Sonner, J. M. (2008). Is a new paradigm needed to explain how inhaled anesthetics produce immobility? *Anesthesia & Analgesia*, 107, 832-848.
<https://doi.org/10.1213/ane.0b013e318182aedb>

- Ellenberger, H. (1981). *The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Encalado, J.-C. (2015). Angèle de Foligno. In *Séminaire sur la jouissance féminine, la jouissance des mystiques*. Bruxelles.
- Fink, B. (1995). *The Lacanian subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fink, B. (2014). *Against understanding volume 1: Commentary and critique in a Lacanian key*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Forrester, J. (1990). *The seductions of psychoanalysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Forrester, J. (2006). Remembering and forgetting Freud in early twentieth-century dreams. *Science in Context*, 19(1), 65-85. Retrieved from <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17147216>
- Foucault, M. (1990). *History of sexuality, Vol. 1: An introduction*. New York, NY: Vintage.
- Freud, S. (1953). *On aphasia: A critical study*. Madison, CT: International Universities Press (Original work published 1891).
- Freud, S. (1985). *The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fließ*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Freud, S. (2001a). *Instincts and their vicissitudes. The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud: 14*. London, UK: Vintage (Original work published 1915).
- Freud, S. (2001b). *Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud: 12*. London, UK: Vintage (Original work published 1911).
- Freud, S. (2001c). *Studies on Hysteria. The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud: 2*. London, UK: Vintage (Original work published 1895).
- Freud, S. (2001d). *The interpretation of dreams. The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud: 5*. London, UK: Vintage (Original work published 1899).
- Freud, S. (2001e). *The unconscious. The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud: 14*. London, UK: Vintage (Original work published 1915).
- Garcia-Castellano, J.-L. (1997). Surprise et certitude. In *La conversation d'Arcachon : Cas rares, les inclassables de la cliniques*. Paris, France: Le Paon.
- Genet, J. (2013). *Ce qui est resté d'un Rembrandt déchiré en petits carrés bien réguliers, et foutu aux chiottes*. Nolay: Les Éd. du Chemin de fer. Retrieved from <http://www.chemindefer.org/catalogue/styled-26/ce-qui-est-reste-d-un-rembrandt-dechire-en-petits-carres-bien-reguliers-et-foutu-aux-chiottes-jean-genet.html>
- Grigg, R. (2012). The enigma of jouissance. In *The literary Lacan: from literature to lituraterre and beyond* (pp. 291-304). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hacking, I. (2001). *An introduction to probability and inductive logic*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hameroff, S. (n.d.). Why anesthetic mechanism research has failed, and what to do about it. Retrieved March 19, 2017, from [http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/sites/default/files/Why anesthetic mechanism research has failed\(7\).pdf](http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/sites/default/files/Why%20anesthetic%20mechanism%20research%20has%20failed(7).pdf)

- Haroche, S., & Raimond, J.-M. (2006). *Exploring the quantum : atoms, cavities and photons*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hommel, S. (2015). La division du sujet d'un pays à l'autre, d'une langue à l'autre, d'un faim à l'autre. In *7th PIPOL Congress of the Euro-Federation of Psychoanalysis*. Brussels, Belgium.
- James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (review). *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 21, 270-272. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1983.0040>
- Jung, C. (1991). The concept of the collective unconscious. In *The archetypes and the collective unconscious*. London, UK: Routledge (Original work published 1936).
- Kupiek, J.-J. (2009). *The origin of individuals*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Retrieved from http://zmmu.msu.ru/files/Библиотека_Павлинова/kupiec-2009_origin_of_Individuals.pdf
- Lacan, J. (n.d.-a). *Le séminaire. Livre XXI: Les non-dupes errent (1973-1974)*.
- Lacan, J. (n.d.-b). *Le séminaire. Livre XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue qui s'aile à mourre (1976-1977)*.
- Lacan, J. (1933). Motives of paranoiac crime: The crime of the Papin sisters. *Le Minotaure*, 3-4.
- Lacan, J. (1970). Of structure as the inmixing of an otherness prerequisite to any subject whatever. In R. Macksey & E. Donato (Eds.), *The languages of criticism and the sciences of man: The structuralist controversy* (pp. 186-200). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Lacan, J. (1975a). La Troisième: 7th Congress of the Ecole Freudienne of Paris at Rome. *Lettres de l'École Freudienne*, 16, 177-203.
- Lacan, J. (1975b). *Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre XX: Encore (1972-1973)*. Paris: Seuil.
- Lacan, J. (1976). Conferences and Conversations at North American Universities. *Scilicet*, 6-7, 1-60.
- Lacan, J. (1978). *Le Séminaire. Livre II: Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse (1954-55)*. Paris, France: Seuil.
- Lacan, J. (1986). *Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre VII: L'éthique de la psychanalyse (1959-1960)*. Paris, France: Seuil.
- Lacan, J. (1989). Geneva lecture on the symptom: 4th October 1975. *Analysis*, 1, 7-26.
- Lacan, J. (1998a). *Le séminaire. Livre V: Les formations de l'inconscient (1957-58)*. Paris, France: Seuil.
- Lacan, J. (1998b). *The seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (1964)*. New York, NY: Norton & Company.
- Lacan, J. (2001a). La méprise du sujet supposé savoir. In *Autres Écrits* (pp. 329-339). Paris, France: Seuil (Travail original publié 1967).
- Lacan, J. (2001b). Préface à l'édition anglaise du Séminaire XI. In *Autres Écrits* (pp. 571-573). Paris, France: Seuil (Travail original publié 1976).
- Lacan, J. (2005). *Le séminaire. Livre XXIII: Le Sinthome (1975-1976)*. Paris, France: Seuil.
- Lacan, J. (2006a). Presentation on psychical causality. In *Écrits* (pp. 123-158). New York, NY: Norton & Company (Original work published 1946).
- Lacan, J. (2006b). Seminar on the Purloined letter. In *Écrits* (pp. 176-185). New York, NY: Norton & Company (Original work published 1956).
- Lacan, J. (2006c). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In *Écrits* (pp. 197-268). New York, NY: Norton & Company (Original work published 1953).

- Lacan, J. (2006d). The instance of the letter in the unconscious. In *Écrits* (pp. 412-441). New York, NY: Norton & Company (Original work published 1957).
- Lacan, J. (2006e). The mirror stage as formative of the I function as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In *Écrits* (pp. 75-81). New York, NY: Norton & Company (Original work published 1949).
- Lacan, J. (2006f). The situation of psychoanalysis and the training of psychoanalysts in 1956. In *Écrits* (pp. 459-491). New York, NY: Norton & Company (Original work published 1956).
- Lacan, J. (2011). *Le séminaire. Livre XIX: Ou pire (1971-1972)*. Paris, France: Seuil.
- Leclaire, S. (1999). *Oedipe à Vincennes. Séminaire 69*. Paris: Fayard.
- Lewis, P. (2009). *Ethnologue: Languages of the world* (16th ed.). Dallas, TX: SIL International. Retrieved from <https://www.sil.org/resources/publications/entry/6133>
- Masataka, N. (2003). *The onset of language*. Cambridge, UK: The press syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Retrieved from <http://www.cambridge.org>
- Miller, G. (2012). *Rendez-vous chez Lacan*. France: Editions Montparnasse.
- Miller, J.-A. (1984). *Dos dimensiones clínicas: sintoma y fantasma*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Manantial.
- Miller, J.-A. (1996). An introduction to seminars I and II: Lacan's orientation prior to 1953. In B. Fink, R. Feldstein, & J. Marie (Eds.), *Reading seminars I and II*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Miller, J.-A. (1998). Le sinthome, un mixte de symptôme et fantasme. *La Cause Freudienne*, 39, 5-13.
- Miller, J.-A. (2000). Paradigms of jouissance. *Lacanian Ink*, 17, 10-47.
- Miller, J.-A. (2003). The binary sense-jouissance. In *THE SEMINAR OF BARCELONA on Die Wege der Symptombildung*.
- Miller, J.-A. (2010). *Seminario de la orientación lacaniana: Extimidad*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (2011). Marginalia to "Constructions in analysis". *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, 22.
- Miller, J.-A. (2012). *Seminario de la orientación lacaniana: El ultimísimo Lacan*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Paidós.
- Miller, J.-A. (2015). The unconscious and the speaking body. In Y. Vanderveken (Ed.), *The speaking body* (pp. 27-42). Paris, France: Ecole de la Cause Freudienne.
- Peirce, C. S. (1935). *Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes V and VI: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism and Scientific Metaphysics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rank, O. (2010). *The trauma of birth*. Eastford, CT: Martino Publishing.
- Rivers, W. (1920). *Instinct and the Unconscious*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Seifriz, W. (1950, January). The effects of various anesthetic agents on protoplasm. *Anesthesiology*. Retrieved from <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15402032>
- Soler, C. (2014). *The Unconscious Reinvented*. London, UK: Karnac.
- Solms, M. (2000). Freud, Luria and the clinical method. *Psychoanalysis and History*, 2, 76-109. Retrieved from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e9a9/821f95c6e23a4a5512e350d7e9bca03b6ae4.pdf>
- Tammet, D. (2007). *Born on a blue day : inside the extraordinary mind of an autistic savant : a memoir*. New York, NY: Free Press.

- Winnicott, D. (1945). Primitive emotional development. *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 26, 137-143. Retrieved from <http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1946-03133-001>
- Winnicott, D. (2016). Birth memories, birth trauma, and anxiety. In Leslie Caldwell & Taylor Robinson (Ed.), *The collected works of D. W. Winnicott: Volume 3, 1946-1951*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/med:psych/9780190271350.001.0001>