Trust Through Intelligence?
Exploring the Nexus between Community and Counter-Terrorism Policing

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Abstract
It would be understandable to view community policing and counter-terrorism policing as two distinct concepts which are intrinsically situated at opposites poles in the world of policing. While one invokes cultures such as transparency, public engagement and visibility, the other is traditionally considered as a series of clandestine operations more akin to the intelligence-led policing model. This paper will argue that the two policing strategies are in fact compatible. With a shift in the nature of terrorism itself apparent, the contemporary lone wolf attacker is not only a deadly threat, but one which is incredibly difficult to detect using methods such as background checks and covert investigation. This is due to a lack of communication and/or physical ties between attackers, a high level of isolation stemming from affinity to extremist ideologies, combined with self-struggle and anger. In order to combat prospective attacks, effective preventative measures must be implemented in both geographical and social spaces. Such measures warrant the implementation of community policing philosophies which can help establish trust and promote co-operation, leading to accurate, reliable community intelligence, as well as reassurance and security for the members of the community itself.

Keywords: Community Policing, Terrorism, Intelligence, Security
1. Introduction

In the field of modern policing, there are many strategies inherently diverse in philosophy and operational detail. Two such strategies, which have conceptually existed for a long period of time and have been thrust into the spotlight in a global, interconnected world, will be analysed in this paper. The first is community policing — a highly visible form of policing guided by public relations and familiarity (Tilley 2008). The second, counter-terrorism policing, is often associated with secrecy and covert operations (Innes & Thiel 2008). Community policing has been widely researched (Alderson 1979; Banton 1964; Mackenzie & Henry 2009; Skogan & Hartnett 1999), and is very much considered a highly visible, domestic, public facing and ‘on the ground’ policing strategy. Counter-terrorism policing on the other hand has traditionally been seen as a form of high policing (a policing style based on gathering of information or intelligence) exclusive to security-related, investigative or even military organisations.

The problem of international terrorism in particular brings a global perspective to the strategy, and emphasises the importance of transnational co-operation between states as well as the utilisation of agencies such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Masse 2003; O’Reilly 2015). This considered, since the turn of the century counter-terrorism operations have branched out to include a lower form of policing with multi agency co-operation, such as community intelligence and local contact units. Perhaps this is due in part to the recognition of a shift in the tides of terrorism, namely a proliferation of lone-wolf style planning and attacking. It is this extension of counter-terrorism operations that can draw from the community policing philosophy and adopt strategies that will promote cohesion, trust and positive relations between the police and the public (Ramirez 2008), with the goal of preventing potential attacks at the root as opposed to relying on often disproportionate reactive measures. In turn, this relationship can greatly aid the police with vital intelligence, whilst simultaneously supporting communities which may be burdened with individuals who are predisposed to adopting radical views, or even violent behaviour (Thomas 2016). These two policing strategies can work in unison and are not wholly incompatible. However, it is important to consider that there is no one formula which can be applied to all communities, agencies or groups, as well as certain caveats and potential difficulties that arise concurrently with the amalgamation of the two concepts.

In this paper, I will profile the two concepts of community policing and counter-terrorism policing, briefly outlining the constitution and contemporary context of both, and allude to converging themes such as empathy, visibility and legitimacy. The changing terrorist threat
will be explored and how the added difficulty of identifying and investigating radical individuals is relevant to the argument for unison. I will then go on to discuss the common elements that are key to the compatibility of the two concepts. These include public engagement, partnership working, trust, and transparency. In addition, the importance of procedural justice, models of co-operation, and empathy towards Muslim communities in particular will be discussed in light of growing concerns of international terrorism perpetuated by Islamic extremism. However, the rise of far-right extremism will also be acknowledged. The concept of community intelligence and its importance to counter terrorism as well as local policing will be emphasised.

It should be noted that the majority of academic literature reviewed in this area is Anglo-American, with a small contribution from European authors. I cannot account for how this argument travels in the Global South, therefore it is crucial that further research on the matter is done by authors from here, particularly Middle-Eastern countries where terrorist attacks are more frequent (Ward 2018). Regarding local communities themselves, much of the analysis and discussion places an emphasis on Muslim communities. The majority of studies produced in the 21st century are relevant to the current ‘wave’ of terrorism (Rapoport 2003), which places a strong emphasis on religion at its core— specifically Islamic extremism.

2. Community Policing

Defining community policing has been a notoriously contested debate amongst scholars, due to the highly specific nature of the strategy as well as the ethnic and socio-economic diversity of the modern day ‘community’. There is no universal ‘one size fits all’ definition that can be applied (van der Giessen, Brein & Jacobs 2017). However, there are widely established philosophies which constitute the community policing concept, and characterise the approaches’ overarching theme of effective police-public relations (Bennett 1994). A review of community policing literature by Mackenzie and Henry (2009) put forward key components of effective practice, which have appeared (in some degree) consistently in a number of other academic sources (Bennett 1994; Hamilton-Smith et al. 2013; Skogan & Hartnett 1999; Skogan & Williamson 2008).

The first key principle is public engagement, emphasising the importance of allowing communities a voice to raise issues or concerns which are specific to local needs, therefore giving police an idea of what to prioritise. It is best achieved through decentralisation and a sense of familiarity between officers and the public (Murray 2005). This component also relates to community empowerment, allowing greater autonomy, recognition of the public as a police partner, and is epitomised by the phrase ‘policing by consent’.
Another tool - that is not exclusive to community policing - is effective agency partnerships. While community policing is, often critically, associated with a ‘widening’ of the police role (Bittner 2001; Millie 2013), collaboration with local organisations such as schools, places of worship, housing associations, trusts/groups and local councils can create a productive division of labour. This complements the work of the police and allows action to be taken even if demands cannot be met with direct police action (Mackenzie & Henry 2009).

Proactive problem solving combines the two previously mentioned components for police to explore specific and creative solutions to concerns raised by members of the community. The community officer can act as a direct agent of change, or as a conduit for another agency (Thomas 2016).

It is imperative for a community policing team to be sincere, trustworthy empathetic and accountable in their work. The perceived right to exercise power should be gained from these attributes, as opposed to an obligation due to fear of repercussions (Tankebe 2013). This concept is referred to as police legitimacy and is vital for the maintenance of a positive relationship between the police and the community.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that successful community policing is a shift away from reactive, ‘fire-brigade’ policing to a more preventative approach, aiming to stop crime at the root through community initiatives, police visibility and diversionary tactics (van der Giessen, Brein & Jacobs 2017). This preventative component is particularly relevant in relation to the application of counter-terrorism policing in the community.

In order to implement the philosophies described, there are several operational strategies which tend to be associated with community policing. Police-public consultation forums are an excellent way of maintaining a consistent level of public engagement, communication and police accountability. Harkin (2014) recognises that such forums contribute to ‘civilising policing’, and aid police legitimacy. In addition to this strategy, community police officers increase their community contact time by spending more time on the beat, hosting ‘drop-in’ sessions, being present at community events and giving talks at local schools. This increases their visibility to the public, with the aim of instilling feelings of confidence and security (Bennett 1994). However, it is important to note that in practice this is often difficult due to an inherent association between the police and oppression, as well as practical challenges of encouraging community members to attend sessions or events. The installation of a community policing is certainly not a quick-fix and must be handled care and tact in order to build the trust and rapport that is integral to its success.

The highlighted philosophies and operational strategies relevant to counter-terrorism efforts will be explored later in this paper. Some scholars have made a case for intelligence-led
policing to offer a more effective partnership with counter-terrorism operations (Carter & Carter 2009; Carter & Carter 2012). This is mainly due to the similarities which stem from the systematic, ‘invisible’ elements of both policing styles, as well as the desire for the removal of serious or prolific offenders from society (Tilley 2008). While these elements may be favourable in a retrospective, investigative context, they are limiting to the prevention of a terrorist incident. An intelligence-led policing approach hinders some of the crucial strategies mentioned previously, and while there is certainly a place for it in relation to counter-terrorism, it would be unfavourable to use this model exclusively, in a community setting.

3. Modern Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Policing

Similar to community policing, there is a debate over the definition of terrorism. What constitutes a ‘terrorist act’ is subjective, though there are common elements as stated by Innes and Thiel (2008). Terrorist acts are committed by individuals or groups who are politically, religiously or ideologically motivated. They utilise violence, target civilians and to a larger extent their civil liberties, in an attempt to bring about socio-political change. This is largely in accordance with both the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) Governments which use very similar terms in their definition of terrorism (HM Government 2000; 18 USC Ch. 113B). The events in the US on 11th September 2001 represented the beginning of an association between terrorist acts and Islam, through the creation of a near-global scale moral panic stemming from generalisations carried by media sensationalism (Powell 2011). However, despite limited academic research up until the 21st century, terrorism is categorically not a new concept. Islamic extremism was thrust into the spotlight due to a number of unprecedented attacks and proliferation of factions, particularly in the Levant. Historically, terrorism by Irish Republican groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its variants was seen as the most prominent terrorist threat to the UK. In more modern times, there has been a proliferation of far-right movements likely perpetuated by populist politics and the use of social media outlets as a means of promotion of hate speech and extremist ideas (Alvares & Dahlgren 2016)

Innes (2006) frames terrorism as communicative action and an attempt at social control. Attackers attempt to alter the social norms of a more powerful group i.e. a state and bring about a societal or political shift. Although resilience is considered a mainstay of the British and American people, it is apparent that terrorists can succeed in this goal. These shifts could be a nation-wide change to legislation, such as changes to airport security or national gun control, or more ‘minute’ societal changes which can still have a symbolic impact on a population. For example, the Crusaders® – New Zealand’s most successful rugby team – were rebranded due

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to negative connotations with the oppressive crusades, which were cited by the Christchurch mosque attacker (The Guardian 2019).

While the community policing philosophy has remained relatively consistent since its inception, the concept of terrorism has shown an element of fluidity, exhibiting temporal and geographical shifts. Depending on time and place, terrorism is associated with different radical organisations or societal groups. This relates to Rapoport’s (2003) ‘Four waves of modern terrorism’ states that over the past century terrorism can be grouped into four distinct periods or ‘waves’. The current, ‘distinctly international’ religious wave is expected to diminish in 6-7 years (ibid.). In western societies, Islamic extremism is specifically identified as the prominent actor in this wave, but therein exists further branches or ‘sub-waves’. Gallagher (2016) suggests that this fourth wave may end before Rapoport’s estimation, citing the decreasing religiosity of attacks. He cites that now it may well be the time of actors motivated not only by religion but by an extreme social agenda. This accounts for the increase in attacks by far-right attackers and white supremacists in recent years. Gallagher (2016) interestingly remarks that the dissipation of religiosity could mark the resurgence of Rapoport’s first wave, rooted in anarchical ideology. Examples of these acts include the murder of Member of Parliament (MP) Jo Cox prior to the EU referendum by an individual with a far-right ideology, described by then prime minister David Cameron as an ‘attack on democracy’ (BBC 2016). Another poignant example is the aforementioned mass shooting at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand by a white supremacist motivated by neofascist goals (Martin & Smee 2019).

Crucially, counter-terrorism policing has also undergone change. As the war on terror continues, there has been a shift – arguably an extension – of counter-terrorism operations from largely global to include a more local orientation, intertwining the ‘invisible’ and ‘visible’. Counter-terrorism has seen a division of labour across the high and low policing spectrum. I maintain that the high policing element – such as covert surveillance and investigation from the security services and counter-terrorism branch – are largely incompatible and inherently dissimilar to community policing philosophies. More recently however there has been a widening of the police role in terms of policing terrorism ‘on the ground’. This extension of policing responsibility necessitates the inclusion of community policing philosophies and operational strategy, in order to effectively achieve the critical goal of preventing future attacks.

In addition to framing terrorism in a 21st century context, Innes (2006, p. 227) creates a classification of police counter-terrorism work in order to ‘map the division of labour in terms of how key agencies perform their specific roles as part of the overall counter-terrorism effort’. The second strand – the ‘community protection function’ – is associated with the work that
domestic or local police forces do (ibid.). Prospectively it includes creating a hostile environment for attackers, both socially and physically, through information sharing, procedural justice and ‘target hardening’ techniques. Retrospectively, it places emphasis on mitigating the effects of an attack, providing reassurance, monitoring inter/intra-community relations or even tensions (ibid.).

Community policing is an advantageous strategy for the implementation of a large portion of the classification’s components, especially on a prospective level. While target hardening and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is favourable for securing densely populated areas with a heavy flow of people on a physical level, a community policing approach can help promote and develop ideas to change cultures and mindsets which are not restricted to only bustling city centres. Concepts such as co-operation, police-public relations, reassurance through trust and confidence, de-radicalisation, identification and intelligence can all be actuated – in some capacity – by the community policing strategy.

4. The Changing Terrorist Threat

As briefly discussed earlier, Gallagher (2016) notes there has been a shift in the motivations of terrorists from a heavily religious rationale toward a radical social agenda outlook. He suggests that this could bring about the end of Rapoport’s ‘religious wave’ and formulate a new ‘fifth’, more akin to the first ‘anarchist’ wave (ibid., p. 74). The momentum gathered by the Islamic State (IS) represents a sub-wave, somewhere between the fading fourth and the emerging fifth. While Al-Qaeda are a strict hierarchical, tiered organisation whose strategy is perhaps more specific, IS represents a state - or a state of mind - with a lot less restriction. Rather than reaching out and appealing to ‘members’ of the organisation, they target conflicted, marginalised individuals who may not have immediate ties - rather ‘leanings’ - to the state’s ideology (Cronin 2015). These global shifts in the very nature of terrorism itself have created a new phenomenon known as the ‘lone wolf’.

The emergence of this new sub-wave of terrorism over the past decade has questioned counter-terrorism units and security agencies policing strategies. There has been an apparent shift from ‘quality to quantity’ (ibid.; Innes & Thiel 2008). A decline in hierarchical organisations with a skilled, structured inner core driving operations, means there is less of a focus on them from counter-terrorism agencies, yet this does not translate to a decline in dangerousness. Previously these agencies were concerned with targeting high profile individuals who were high ranking or skilled members of whichever organisation they belonged to. Recently, however, there has been a recognition from both academics and practitioners that radicalisation is occurring locally, and these individuals are not being driven exclusively with the support of
‘global’ terrorist organisations. Due to the individualised nature of lone wolf terrorism, the characteristics and motivations that these attackers exhibit are difficult to pinpoint but have been documented. Spaaj (2010, p. 866) comments on the significance of self-struggle and anger: ‘lone wolf terrorists tend to create their own ideologies that combine personal frustrations and aversion with broader political, social, or religious aims’. Their radical thoughts are often exacerbated by an enabler, followed by a triggering event, which can occur sharply or over time (Hamm & Spaaj 2015).

Lone wolves are a problem for high policing agencies. They are difficult to identify and investigate due to the lack of ties to terrorist groups, and can easily fall under the radar, often not having criminal history (Bakker & de Graaf 2010). Therefore, the ‘traditional’ counter-terrorism strategy is largely ineffective in preventing attacks; instead, building rapport with communities on the ground could help to provide intelligence that otherwise would not be acquired through ‘higher’ means. There is now an awareness of the potential for unison of the two concepts. This shift in what constitutes a radicalised individual and their pre-disposition for violence in today’s society – as well as an extension of counter-terrorism policing to the local setting – warrants the prioritisation of resources on community policing strategies, particularly in communities which are likely to feel marginalised or oppressed.

5. Relationship Between The Two Policing Models

5.1. A Community Policing Approach

This section will explore how the community policing philosophies and practices highlighted earlier can be applied with the goal of combatting terrorism at the ‘glocal’ level. While considered incompatible in the past, there has been a spate of literature as well as recognition from practitioners with regard to the two disciplines working in unison: ‘good community policing, as well as good counter-terrorism policing, demands that real efforts are made to work within and with local communities’ (Hill 2018, p. 47). Scholars have suggested that the role of community policing in the fight against modern terrorism should prioritise the prevention of attacks rather than the pursuit or investigation of individuals following one (Clarke & Newman 2007; Lyons 2002; Murray 2005). This is best achieved through the practice of Innes’ community protection function (Innes 2006, p. 227). Through this class of counter-terrorism police work via community policing principles, constabularies have the potential to achieve the goals of an effective local policing strategy (while also opening the gate for vital intelligence) stemming from the following components.

Spalek (2010) highlights the importance of trust between the police and members of the Muslim community. It is common for Muslim communities to be labelled as ‘suspect’ and
be placed under surveillance and control, which then raises the danger of over-policing and the subsequent erosion of trust (Bowling & Phillips 2007; Spalek & McDonald 2010). In the heavily politicised context of modern Islamic terrorism, many have criticised the Blair government for publicly announcing that ‘Islam isn’t the problem’ before denouncing it and allowing negative connotations to breed within the populace (Klausen 2009, p. 417). Scholars such as Klausen have degraded aspects of community policing such as partnership working, arguing that they are not effective on a day-to-day basis, therefore cannot find success when applied in a counter-terrorism context (ibid.). Spalek (2010, p. 794) instead suggests that trust ‘goes beyond responding to people’s everyday concerns about crime’. A breakdown of trust severely inhibits the community policing function, and in a counter-terrorism context can halt information sharing as well as restrict intelligence (Hillyard 2005; Innes et al. 2007). In addition to this, the breakdown of legitimate trust will pave the way for ‘harder’ policing strategies such as raids, stop and search and covert surveillance (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009), which will only break down relations further. Despite potential underlying feelings of islamophobia, trusting relationships can still be established not only between individual officers and communities but also crucially at an institutional level. This must be on a broader level than simply information sharing, with genuine empathy and care expressed toward the community and issues that are present within. The key here is the utilisation and appreciation of community members as partners, instead of resources or informants. In addition, Spalek (2010) suggests that a crucial prerequisite to the maintenance of trusting relationship is openness, honesty and transparency. She found that officers in the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) – a specialist community focused policing unit – and the Muslim community had a more trusting relationship when officers openly explained their role and what they would be doing (ibid., pp. 801-803). Activities such as supporting community interests or initiatives and offering advice through consultation forums, thereby empowering community members, were found to be effective in building contingent or ‘short-term’ trust (ibid., pp. 803-804). However, establishing implicit trust involves a long-standing relationship. Therefore, the key here is police legitimacy stemming from the contingent trust building activities and officer familiarity, which good community policing necessitates.

Lyons (2002) notes implicit trust can also be created by improving co-operation and two-way channels of communication. Partnership working between the police and the community in general can help with this as well as partnerships with local organisations or agencies. However, these partnerships must be reciprocal and help must be offered by police, even in matters that do not appear to have any relevance in terms of counter-terrorism (ibid., pp. 532-533). Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq (2010) distinguish co-operation as either *instrumental* (co-
operating due to fear of repercussions or the benefit outweigh the risk), or normative (co-operating due to perceived legitimacy). Procedural justice – the fairness by which the police apply the law – has been cited as crucial to effective police-public co-operation and perceived legitimacy. In their study of a Muslim-American community, they found that procedural justice and police practice heavily shapes co-operation (ibid.). This provides evidence in favour of the effectiveness of normative cooperation as opposed to instrumental. Community policing at its core aims to combat crime through precisely these means — policing by consent as opposed to coercive policing by fear. Clarke and Newman (2007) put forward the caveat of finding a balance between coercive policing and over-leniency, which can skew perceptions of right-leaning members of the community. As seen in previous examples, the scales can tip in the other direction, and perceived ‘terrorist sympathising’ could well be the enabler or trigger event for far right radicalisation or violent behaviour. A balance must be reached by police, and consistently reviewed or consolidated (ibid., pp. 14-15).

In 2009, Alejandro J. Beutel (p. 5) produced ‘Building Bridges to Strengthen America’, written on behalf of the Muslim Public Affairs Council which proposes ‘fresh and constructive’ ideas from a Muslim standpoint. It offers an alternative model for terrorism by framing terrorism as a business firm, which creates ‘grievance themed advertisements to tap into and/or create a market for people experiencing identity crises’ (ibid., p. 12). These individuals fit the lone wolf taxonomy and form the ‘market for martyrs’ which terrorist groups such as IS attempt to reach out to. Even without recruitment, ideas and propaganda can be disseminated. In return, community policing style counter-terrorism measures must offer a ‘product extension merger’ between the Muslim community and law enforcement (ibid.). The two ‘partners’ each have particular strengths that can help each other when brought together, thus competing against the terrorists in the ‘market for martyrs’ (ibid., p. 15). Crucial to this model is division of labour. Beutel (ibid.) suggests that community policing teams must focus their efforts on initiatives to maintain inclusivity with the Muslim community whilst acting on intelligence gained from them and following leads. They would clamp down on the terrorists’ ability to ‘operate within the market’, while the Muslim community reciprocates these efforts by ‘drying up the market itself’ - attempting to inoculate vulnerable individuals from radicalisation through religious education, creating strong social networks through programs and initiatives, and investing in long-term groups or societies (ibid., p. 16). On the policing side, principles involve respecting communities’ civil rights and liberties, aiding in a number of social services, and basing decisions on credible information. However familiar with the community, officers should try to avoid engaging in theological discourse as they are largely ill-equipped compared to commu-
nity or religious leaders, who have linguistic and cultural tact (ibid., pp. 17-19). This considered, perhaps the gap between counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation activities can be bridged with the role of Muslim police officers. Spalek (2010) comments that Muslim officers with experience in community policing who also live in and identify with the community being served is a hugely favourable addition to a community policing team. This could be a boost in terms of religious credibility, cultural understanding, empathy, enhanced familiarity and respect (ibid.).

5.2. Community Intelligence

A recurring theme which is continually put forward by advocates of a community-based counter-terrorism strategy is community intelligence. Firstly, it is worth noting that this concept is not new or unique to counter-terrorism. Community intelligence cannot not fall under the intelligence-led policing philosophy, as it relies on the effectiveness of visible, local, consensual policing in order for it to be of value, as opposed to ‘high’ intelligence of a clandestine, covert nature (Innes & Sheptycki 2004). It is generated when information supplied by members of a community supports police decision making with regard to operational strategy (Thomas 2016). Information can relate to a several issues such as risk, vulnerability, tension and harm within a community, or indeed between communities (National Policing Improvement Agency 2010, p. 56). This allows police to ‘build up a picture of the contextual risks that a particular community group feels concerned about. Community intelligence applied to counter-terrorism is precisely the type of data that might help police circumvent intelligence gaps and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established methods’ (Innes 2006, p. 230). Even if in the main objective in some cases is to allow a better understanding of how different communities function, as well as tensions, gathered information serves an important purpose. Strategic contacts are of an overt nature and are heavily reliant on a good rapport built on trust, which was highlighted earlier as a crucial component to the community-based counter-terrorism principle. The caveat that exists with this strategy includes the authenticity of sources, and if the ‘contact’ truly represents a community’s views (ibid., p. 234). A resolution to this problem could lie with the inclusion of Muslim officers that can themselves contribute and offer better judgement with regard to community issues (Spalek 2010). In addition, there is a danger of the police presenting themselves as insincere, which can be perceived as a ruse for gathering intelligence, thus resulting in ‘identity groups’ or even entire communities shutting themselves off and become reluctant to co-operate (Hanniman 2008). Therefore, sincerity and a genuine will to serve the community must be shown through community-based initiatives and trust building activities discussed earlier.
It is important to consider that within a ‘community’, there are a number of diverse social groups — each with their own identity. Consequently, there is an increase in potential victims or perpetrators (Innes 2006, p. 231). This presents the need for police to expand their network of contacts, or ties. The strategic contact methodology tends to rely on certain key contacts, such as community leaders or those in the position of acquiring information. This is perhaps an advantageous approach for hierarchical terrorist organisations of the past, where there existed individuals that community or religious leaders were aware of. However, in today’s lone wolf sub-wave, I suggest Granovetter’s (1982) ‘strength of weak ties’ theory is favourable. Information on these individuals is harder to acquire and certainly more diffuse, therefore having a larger number of contacts increases the likelihood of something being seen or heard in the community. This method can effectively compliment key strategic contacts whilst incorporating a lower, ‘on the ground’ approach. One methodology developed by Innes and Roberts (2007) was ‘conversation with a purpose’ or CWAP. If police happen to interact with a member of the public who is not a witness, victim or suspect, they are encouraged to check up on any general concerns that individual has, collecting overt intelligence through transparency and empathy. It serves as useful tool and requires little training. The methodology was then developed into the ‘intelligence-based Neighbourhood Security Interview’ (i-NSI) (ibid., p. 6). This is a more systematic, sophisticated approach which involves software that identifies a ‘gap’ or a need for intelligence, based on information from CWAP. Contacts are then selected for a structured interview (ibid.). This strategy has been shown to be effective in a study by Lowe and Innes (2012). However, it is noticeable that there were very few interviews/ conversations conducted with black and minority ethnic (BAME) individuals in the results. Perhaps this was a representative sample of the community in the study. It, however, raises the following question: are the interviews being conducted proportionately and with relevance to each specific community? A recurring theme from this section is the danger of the police-public interaction appearing superficial, or ‘in bad taste’. Being ‘formally’ interviewed by a police officer heightens anxiety, therefore the officer conducting these information gathering operations must be empathetic, fair, and demonstrate procedural justice.

6. Policy Implications

Many of the principles and strategies explored in this section are already being put into practice in some regard. The UK Government’s CONTEST strategy was re-evaluated and updated in 2018, and shows positive signs relating to the issues and concepts discussed in this paper, particularly with regards to the Prevent strand (HM Government 2018). It acknowledges
the individualism of the modern terrorist and considers religiosity, background factors, personal factors, and radicalisation vulnerability (ibid., p. 33). The importance of partnership working with communities as well as local agencies and civil society organisations is highlighted, some of which can help to combat radicalisation, as recommended by Beutel (2009). In addition to this, the role of education in schools and community centres is imperative, as young people are increasingly vulnerable to identity crises, and have access to numerous internet sources (HM Government 2018; Beutel 2009). This is certainly a step in the right direction, but it remains to be seen if the outlined strategies acknowledged are implemented with efficiency, empathy and tact.

7. Conclusion

This paper has outlined the two distinct policing concepts of community and counter-terrorism policing in a modern context, as well as identifying key philosophies and strategies that intersect and can be utilised in the amalgamation of the two. The exploration of Rapoport’s wave theory (2003) and recognition of the shift in the current terrorist wave has brought to light the individualistic nature of the modern-day terrorist threat, and therefore the importance of an ‘on the ground’ approach to countering said threat. From there, the application of community policing components in a counter-terrorism context were explored and, and it has been shown – with supporting academic literature as evidence – that many elements of community policing can and are being used in order to combat radicalisation and violent tendencies in communities across the UK and the US. While acknowledging the spotlight on the Muslim community, the importance of principles such as trust, co-operation and procedural justice have been examined. Finally, the importance of community intelligence as well as the caveats that present alongside it have been discussed, as well as the UK Governments’ recognition of the importance of a local, integrative approach. This paper has displayed the application of community policing to combat modern day terrorism is not only favourable, but is being recognised and implemented in the Anglo-American setting.

References

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